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1‘Digitalization’ is often described as a huge upheaval 
facing our societies to which we must adapt. The WBGU 
opposes this interpretation, saying that digitalization 
must be shaped in such a way that it can serve as a lever 
and support for the Great Transformation towards Sus-
tainability, and can be synchronized with it. The WBGU 
understands digitalization broadly as the development 
and application of digital and digitalized technologies 
that augment and dovetail with all other technologies 
and methods. It has a profound effect on all economic, 
social and societal systems and is developing an ever 
greater transformative force. This in turn is increasingly 
having a fundamental impact on people, societies and 
the planet itself and must therefore be managed accord-
ingly. Just as in 1987 the Brundtland Report entitled 
‘Our Common Future’ outlined the concept of Sustain-
able Development, the WBGU’s report entitled ‘Towards 
Our Common Digital Future’ sketches the concept of a 
digitalized sustainability society.
This report represents the greatest challenge the 
WBGU has taken on since it was founded in the Rio 
year 1992 – intellectually, politically and ethically. The 
WBGU is expanding the scope of its analysis beyond its 
core area of expertise, because the future fate of the 
planetary environment will depend massively on the 
progress of the digital revolution. The WBGU is getting 
involved in a societal discourse that is becoming 
increasingly hectic because it is about global innovation 
leadership in the 21st century. The WBGU is also trying 
to find answers to core questions – questions about the 
medium-term future, indeed even about the sheer sur-
vival of the Anthropos on Earth. Sustainability trans-
formation can only succeed if the digital upheavals can 
be successfully geared towards sustainability. Other-
wise, digitalization threatens to act as a ‘fire accelerant’, 
exacerbating growth patterns that breach the planetary 
guard rails. Sustainability pioneers must seize the 
opportunities offered by digitalization and, at the same 
time, contain its risks. If those who are attempting to 
advance sustainability transformations ignore or 
neglect the dynamics of digitalization, the Great Trans-
formation towards Sustainability will fall by the way-
side. The WBGU therefore advocates the continuation 
and acceleration of the Great Transformation by digital 
means. In addition, it is becoming clear that digitaliza-
tion is going to change our societies so profoundly that 
our understanding of sustainability will also have to 
evolve in radical, new directions. The WBGU reveals 
possible directions for the next generation of sustain-
ability paradigms and goes far beyond the perspectives 
of the 2030 Agenda.
Putting such an epochal watershed in the history of 
humankind into perspective, while at the same time 
providing practical advice for policy-makers, is ambi-
tious and fraught with tension. Yet even if some assess-
ments of these fundamental changes should be mis-
taken, this can still be useful in throwing some light on 
the paths that should now be quickly pursued by more 
knowledgeable people.
In a sense this is a warning: this WBGU report 
attempts to take a holistic approach to digitalization in 
the context of the sustainable development of our civili-
zation, which is under threat from many sides – an 
approach that has been missing up to now. Such a huge 
aspiration can only be realized – if at all – with weak-
nesses, generalizations and omissions. This report 
should be read accordingly. 
However, in order to facilitate a favourable and pro-
ductive reception, the structure of this WBGU report 
also deviates from the norm: this time, the actual sum-
mary is preceded by a narrative essay, which attempts 
not only to sketch out the report’s train of thought, but 
also to indicate the immense thematic landscape, which, 
in addition to balmy lowlands and emerging new realms 
of possibility for sustainability reforms, also includes 
some deep abysses. On this terrain, the narrative deals 
with the digital possibilities for, and risks to, preserving 
what evolution had yielded until the Earth’s entry into 
the Anthropocene period, and with the conceivable 
creation of new digital entities or even the possible 
substitution of human intelligence by machine intelli-
gence. This is followed by a summary of the report’s key 
messages, the individual chapters and recommenda-
tions for action and research.
Summary
2 Summary
Conservation and creation in the Digital Age
Albert Einstein revolutionized physics in the early 20th 
century – this is a well-known fact. He also possessed 
the rare gift of being able to express complex facts both 
within and beyond science in a single sentence. Not 
least, he is credited with the following famous state-
ment:
Problems cannot be solved with the same way of 
thinking that created them!
Of course, this is an aphoristic simplification of crit-
ical aspects of societal reality. Nonetheless, it is an ideal 
starting point for a combined approach to what are per-
haps the two most important developments of the 
recent modern age: on the one hand the growing threat 
to humanity’s natural life-support systems, and on the 
other the explosive advances in the field of information 
and communication technologies.
In a sense, the first development is the source of the 
WBGU’s raison d‘être since its foundation by the Ger-
man Federal Government in 1992. The analysis of the 
damage caused by civilization to the natural life-sup-
port systems and the resulting self-threat to human-
kind centres on the climate crisis, which is constantly 
intensifying and whose all-encompassing dimension 
has been revealed by research in recent years. The rapid 
pollution and acidification of the oceans, the progres-
sive loss of biological diversity, and the degradation of 
fertile soils are also being documented in ever greater 
detail and increasingly understood in context. 
The Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) on the feasibility of limiting 
anthropogenic global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018) 
convincingly argues that this limitation could avert 
serious damage to nature and culture in many parts of 
the world. At the same time, however, it also confirms 
that this success – if at all – can only be achieved with 
a rapid and far-reaching transformation of an economy 
still dominated by fossil fuels. A recently published 
meta-study by an international research group (Steffen 
et al., 2018) points out that it might not even be possi-
ble to stably ‘park’ the climate system near the 2°C 
guard rail. Self-reinforcing processes (such as the 
release of greenhouse gases from thawing permafrost 
soils in Siberia and Alaska) could cause the system to 
slide uncontrollably towards an irreversible ‘Hothouse 
Earth’ state. The implications would be the same as 
shifting the global environment 15 million years back 
in geological time – involving a 5–6 °C increase in the 
Earth’s temperature and a rise in sea levels of up to 60 
metres. Similar tipping processes could probably also be 
triggered by anthropogenic disturbances in the bio-
sphere and pedosphere.
These and other recent publications make it clear 
that the implementation of the Paris Agreement on 
climate change, the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and soil 
regeneration are minimum measures for preserving the 
natural human life-support systems. 
Yet the acute environmental crisis is only one of the 
many sustainability challenges that have been created 
by the modern industrial age. Strategies for dealing 
with them are inextricably linked with questions of 
social justice and societal cohesion. The United Nations‘ 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a rea-
sonably suitable set of objectives for this complex of 
challenges. In addition to critical environmental and 
resource-related aspects, they also take into account 
numerous socio-economic dimensions, the sustainable 
restructuring of our industries and cities, the fight 
against poverty, the reduction of inequality and con-
flicts, and, not least, equal opportunities for all people 
to lead a fulfilled, good life – regardless of gender, age, 
physical health or origin (UN, 2018). 
In this context, the WBGU has developed a much 
simpler orientation system (‘normative compass’: 
WBGU, 2016a, b), which so far includes the concepts of 
‘Inclusion’, ‘Eigenart’ (a German word meaning ‘charac-
ter’) and ‘Sustaining the natural life-support systems’. 
It is explicitly supplemented in this report by the indis-
pensable category of ‘Dignity’ (Fig 1). Unfortunately, 
despite progress on some sub-targets, global society as 
a whole is currently failing to take the right course, 
regardless of which navigation system is consulted.
The rather nebulous term ‘digitalization’ is used to 
denote the second development mentioned above, 
even though it represents nothing less than a civiliza-
tional revolution. It is now common knowledge that a 
new era began with the introduction of electronic data 
processing in the 1950s, but what is going to happen, 
when and how in this age is the subject of sometimes 
naive fantasies of progress, bitter controversies and 
increasingly fear-laden scenarios. Controversies are 
ignited particularly by the mass collection of private 
data, the manipulation of communicative spaces, and 
discrimination by algorithmically controlled systems. 
The imagined free, equal, worldwide network has in 
reality become a software-based cybersphere driven by 
economic and geopolitical interests. Popular dystopias 
are particularly concerned with the technical creation 
of different forms of ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI), 
 al though there is already considerable controversy over 
this term. Even so, it is a fact that in strategic games 
such as chess or Go, self-learning machine systems 
based on neural networks now effortlessly beat the 
world’s best human opponents. And that is only the tip 
of the digital iceberg, as this report will explain.
First, however, we consider it important to put this 
3breathtaking dynamic into the larger planetary con-
text. The history of human civilization is marked by 
two steep steps, one of which was climbed in the mil-
lennia following the last Ice Age (i.e. from 11,000 years 
ago), the other 150 years before the First World War 
(i.e. from the year 1760 CE). In the first case, known as 
the Neolithic Revolution, Homo sapiens’ metabol-
ic-physiological potential soared as a result of plant 
management and animal husbandry. In the second case, 
the Industrial Revolution, humankind’s manual skills 
were increased a hundredfold through mechanization 
and fossil fuels. With the digital revolution that is now 
taking place, certain cognitive achievements of our spe-
cies – the only one of many millions of species on Earth 
with technical intelligence – will eventually be replaced 
or far surpassed. 
Is the stage thus set for an act of creation with no 
geological or religious template? Could this act bring 
together ‘supernatural’ physiological, manual and cog-
nitive abilities in a novel way and thus transcend the 
essence of what is human? This could set in motion a 
whole new epoch of evolution on our planet. However 
bizarre the idea may sound to many, it is already being 
discussed seriously in certain circles. The WBGU looks 
into it in Chapters 6 and 7 of this report – for the first 
time explicitly discussing the significance of this uto-
pia/dystopia for the great issues of sustainability.
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to carefully 
explore the prospects opened up by the digital revolu-
tion for the timely resolution of the acute global envi-
ronmental crisis, which could soon put an end to our 
civilization and thus also to all speculation on ‘human 
enhancement’. After all, in the sense of Einstein’s 
above-mentioned quote, one can say that cybernetics 
and information and communication technology mark 
the birth of a new way of thinking that is systemic and 
networked. It could help solve the problems created by 
the ‘old’ industrial way of thinking – alongside all the 
great achievements of the modern age. This old way of 
thinking has now practically congealed into a dogma, 
insisting on specialization, separation and linearization. 
However, what is needed is a holistic approach in order 
to avoid ‘not seeing the wood for the trees’, to recog-
nize side effects, and to close loops. The very paradigm 
on which progressive digital concepts and applications 
are based can create the necessary conditions for this, 
especially since it emerged in close interaction with the 
complexity sciences. 
However, if we now add a logical step to Einstein’s 
statement, then the ‘new’ way of thinking should not 
only provide a better explanation of the world, but also 
help solve the real problems that have been piled up by 
the conventional model, which has reached its limits. In 
today’s prevailing digitalization euphoria, which is seiz-
ing even the most peripheral corners of the planet, AI’s 
arsenal of methods is believed to be capable of every 
conceivable – and inconceivable – miraculous achieve-
ment. And indeed, they really are perhaps the most 
powerful tools ever created by our civilization. 
So what could be more obvious than to apply these 
tools on a grand scale as quickly as possible to the most 
pressing challenges this civilization has ever faced: par-
ticularly to anthropogenic global warming, which sets 
the framework for all other current environmental cri-
ses? Shouldn‘t machine intelligence help us where 
human intelligence obviously fails?
In its report, the WBGU has examined these questi-
ons and reaches a double conclusion. On the one hand, 
it must be plainly stated that the digitalization of busi-
ness and everyday life has so far been only marginally 
Figure 1
Normative compass for the Great Transformation towards 
 Sustainability in a digitalized society. The transformation can 
be achieved by interaction and a balance between the follow-
ing three dimensions:
• 'Sustaining the natural life-support systems' (N): Comply 
with planetary guard rails and avoid or solve local environ-
mental problems.
• 'Inclusion' (I): Ensure universal minimum standards for 
 substantive, political and economic inclusion.
• 'Eigenart' (E): Recognize the value of diversity as a resource 
for successful transformation and as a condition for well- 
being and quality of life (Eigenart is a German word meaning 
‘character’).
Up to now, human dignity has been the WBGU’s implicit nor-
mative starting point. It cannot be realized without the three 
compass dimensions, but it is becoming an increasingly sensi-
tive issue in the Digital Age due to numerous challenges. For 
this reason, the WBGU explicitly names the inviolability, re-
spect for and protection of Dignity as guidance in the sense of 
the Transformation towards Sustainability.







 oriented towards sustainability aspects. There is no lack 
of rhetorical references, especially by applying the term 
‘smart’ to every subsystem of industrial society that 
needs to be transformed in a climate-friendly way: 
smart grids, smart cities, climate-smart agriculture, etc. 
However, up to now, digital resources and projects have 
been mainly used for conventional growth in establis-
hed markets characterized by international competi-
tion. Sustainability is not the primary purpose of digital 
progress in these contexts; the dominant aspects are 
entertainment, convenience, security and, not least, 
short-term financial gain. Overall, digitalization proces-
ses today tend to act as ‘fire accelerants’, exacerbating 
existing non-sustainable trends such as the overuse of 
natural resources and growing social inequality in many 
countries.
On the other hand, what is not yet possible can – 
and must – become possible. After all, digitalization 
offers an enormous range of possibilities for supporting 
the Great Transformation towards Sustainability 
(WBGU, 2011) – from sensor systems to self-organized 
system optimization. The WBGU has defined three 
Dynamics (Figure 2) to illustrate the huge spectrum of 
potential benefits and risks in the context of digitaliza-
tion and sustainability. In the First Dynamic, ‘Digitali-
zation for sustainability’, attention is focused on the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. This 
can only be a provisional overall assessment, as the 
scientific literature on the subject is astonishingly 
sparse and unspecific. There are many general assump-
tions and expectations, albeit few specific and quanti-
tative analyses. It is evident that ‘digitalization’ can 
have numerous effects that are harmful to sustaina-
bility as well as effects benefiting sustainability. The 
first category includes, of course, information and com-
munication technologies’ enormous thirst for energy, 
unless this thirst is quenched from renewable sources. 
The second category includes the rapid emergence of 
immersive virtual reality that could probably make the 
majority of business trips by plane unnecessary.
It is also evident, however, that there is no syste-
matic analysis of the relevant opportunities and risks, 
either for Germany or worldwide. In this respect, the 
WBGU identifies not only major shortcomings, but also 
a glaring gap in research. The WBGU demands that the 
two cardinal challenges – i.e. ‘sustaining the natural 
life-support systems’ and the ‘digital revolution’ – are 
finally studied holistically. This will require the creation 
of effective political incentives and processes. 
If we now go one step further from the opening quo-
tation, the question immediately arises as to what new 
problems are created by the way of thinking that per-
haps solves the old problems. This analytical twist is 
more than justified, as shown by the chronicle of inno-
vations and their consequences. No one will deny that 
the invention of movable-type printing at the begin-
ning of the modern age (i.e. around 1450 CE) created 
the basis for the later Enlightenment and the democra-
tization of knowledge. However, in addition to printing 
Bibles, leaflets were produced predominantly to sow 
hatred, paving the way for the terrible religious wars in 
Germany. What is taking place today in the internet-ba-
sed ‘social media’ seems like a repetition of history, 
albeit at an incomparably higher technical level. The 
mechanized use of fossil fuels has produced industrial 
mass production and thus created a great deal of pro-
sperity; but it has also made mechanized killing possi-
ble in countless regional conflicts and two world wars.
Thus, it might be inferred from the history of inno-
vation that there is such a thing as a ‘retarding moment’, 
i.e. that disruptive technological innovations are 
 initially more of a curse than a blessing for society as a 
whole. It would be naive to think that everything will 
be different this time, especially since the digital revo-
lution will probably eclipse all earlier phases of techni-
cal progress in terms of reach, range and speed. Instead 
of hoping for voluntary self-restraint on the part of 
technology developers and political-economic inter-
ests, common-good-oriented democratic states must 
not only build up a strong anticipatory capacity, but 
also create a strategic bundle of institutions, laws and 
measures. Only in this way can digital forces be harnes-
sed and simultaneously contained. The WBGU’s Second 
Dynamic, ‘Sustainable digitalized societies’, looks at 
this challenge of shaping the Digital Age itself in the 
sense of a humanistic, sustainable world society. 
Relevant topics range from dealing with the now 
widely discussed changes in the global labour markets 
to necessary reforms in the education system, the pro-
tection of individual privacy and the digital public 
sphere, to the mammoth task of gearing the shifts of 
power in the AI age towards a pluralistic, mature 
society. Another important task is the need to restrict 
the rapidly rising consumption of energy and resources 
by hardware and software. The lack of transnational 
political architecture (‘global governance’) remains the 
elephant in the digital room for solving both old and 
newly emerging problems. The key challenge for the 
international community is to develop a common vision 
of a sustainable, digitally supported future – despite 
faltering multilateralism – and, with this in mind, to 
affirm and establish collective principles, regulatory 
framework conditions and ethically justified boundar-
ies. The WBGU develops far-reaching recommenda-
tions for action in these thematic areas based on the 
normative principles of guaranteeing the natural 
life-support system, societal inclusion, Eigenart and 
inviolability of human dignity. 
5As an interim summary, it can be stated that a pro-
active state has at least two major challenges in the 
Digital Age: on the one hand, to tap the enormous 
potential of novel information and communication 
technologies for the purpose of sustainability transfor-
mation (‘old problems’) and, on the other hand, to pre-
vent possible, indeed probable, negative spin-offs from 
the surge of innovations (‘new problems’). These two 
tasks involve quite different philosophies of public 
action or inaction. The contemporary ‘American model’ 
largely refrains from regulatory intervention and relies 
on market forces to ultimately guarantee the maximiza-
tion of the common good. By contrast, the contempo-
rary ‘Chinese model’ relies on hierarchical planning and 
a command economy, at least in areas of strategic natio-
nal importance. The WBGU is firmly convinced that 
neither political philosophy can do justice to the dual 
responsibility described above. It is a third, civil- society 
Figure 2
Three Dynamics of the Digital Age.
The chart shows the positive case of the Dynamics being successfully contained through goals and governance. All three 
 Dynamics are already emerging in parallel today, albeit with different levels of intensity, so there is no strict chronological 
 sequence involved. Each Dynamic consists of different subpaths following different trajectories. The name given to each 
 Dynamic reflects the priorities for action required in each case.
The texts beneath the figure give keywords on the potential (: upper row) and risks (: lower row) of the three Dynamics.























The future of Homo sapiens
 Digitally support 
  sustainability
 - Comply with planetary guard rails 
(climate, nature, soils, oceans)
 - Secure social cohesion (against 
hunger, poverty, inequality; for 
access to water, health, education, 
energy)
 New humanism
 - Networked world society as a further 
advancement of Enlightenment and 
humanism
 - Development of global 
(environmental) awareness
 - Culture of cooperation, empathy, 
global solidarity
  Strengthen Homo sapiens‘ self-
confidence
 - Preservation of the biological human 
in its natural environment 
 - Ethically reflected advancement of 
humanity 
 - Design human-machine collaboration
 Ecological and societal 
 disruption
 - More emissions and resource use
 - More inequality
 - Greater concentration of power
 - Erosion of civil rights and privacy
 - Erosion of the state’s governance
  Digitally empowered 
totalitarianism
 - Hollowed-out democracies and 
digitally empowered autocracies
 - Massive inequality, domination by 
elites, total surveillance and loss of 
freedom
 - Environmental destruction and loss 
of social cohesion
  Blurring of borderlines between 
humans and machines
 - Abuse of human-machine 
relationship
 - Superintelligence
 - Artificial human evolution
Summary
6 Summary
path in the tradition of the Enlightenment and huma-
nism that seems appropriate. A Europe acting jointly 
could introduce this into the global negotiations and set 
an example together with like-minded states. 
This brings us to the last step outlined in the Einstein 
quote. Whenever there is a sweeping reference to 
‘problems’, then it must be made clear that these are 
defined by passive-active relationships: not only is it 
necessary to ask which problem arises for which subject 
via which agent, but also how this problem is perceived 
and assessed. It follows, among other things, that a 
problem can be changed or eliminated by changing the 
physical or psychological state of the subject, even if 
the agent remains the same. This sounds like superflu-
ous hair-splitting; it is, however, anything but: 
After all, human beings themselves will be changed 
by the digital revolution, and the WBGU considers this 
development in the Third Dynamic, ‘The future of 
Homo sapiens’. In evolutionary terms, Homo sapiens is 
a creature of the Ice Age, an epoch in geological history 
when environmental conditions were characterized by 
rapid and massive change. Accordingly, the people of 
that time had to organize themselves as opportunistic 
hunters and gatherers in small, highly mobile groups. 
The comparative advantage of this particular species 
lay not in the shaping of its living conditions, but in its 
perfect adaptation to the given circumstances. This 
advantage was partially eliminated by the transition to 
settled agriculture, and this change in lifestyle was even 
accompanied by retrograde physiological and cognitive 
steps. Individually, Neolithic humans were probably 
weaker and more susceptible to disease than their early 
ancestors. However, these disadvantages were offset at 
the level of the overall population by new opportunities 
(such as stockpiling), so that the population was able to 
grow markedly. A similar process took place in the 
course of the Industrial Revolution, which ultimately 
brought about the ‘Great Acceleration’ (Steffen et al., 
2015) of societal metabolism and population dynamics 
in the 20th century. 
There is much to suggest that the digital innovations 
that are just beginning to unfold will most likely trans-
form people’s qualities and the structures of people’s 
coexistence even more radically – depending, of course, 
on how these innovations are accompanied, guided, 
restricted or even prevented. Here lies the most pro-
found question of the Digital Age. As indicated above, 
all attempts at an answer must take their orientation 
from the key category of ‘Dignity’, which complements 
the WBGU’s previous compass of values. 
The current debates on topics such as ‘artificial intel-
ligence’ and ‘human-machine interactions’ are taking 
place amid increasing tensions between hope, horror 
and hype and largely ignore the embedding of the 
emerging conglomerates in the natural environment. 
However, science cannot simply withdraw from this 
field, but must – in terms of an extended concept of 
sustainability that includes the human being – deal 
with the dominant utopian and/or dystopian discourses 
and their drivers. For the WBGU, this debate explicitly 
belongs to the science-based deliberation culture of an 
open democratic society that remains a fundamental 
guideline for the European Union. 
Fully aware of the speculative nature of the follow-
ing thoughts, the WBGU would like to introduce three 
hope-oriented mind games into the corresponding dis-
course: 
1. Humankind finds itself
It is uncertain whether and when the development of 
universal AI will succeed. Nevertheless, it is already 
clear that in some areas AI far surpasses the cognitive 
performance of our species. However, the corres-
ponding abilities by no means make up the entire 
human being. If nothing else, the achievements of 
information and communication technology could draw 
our attention and appreciation to capacities that are not 
directly cognitive; these are often referred to collec-
tively as emotional and social intelligence. Most likely 
these were at least as important in civilization building 
as the achievements of measuring, calculating and doc-
umenting. AI would possibly grant us a certain amount 
of emancipation from the latter and allow us to focus 
more on skills such as empathy, care and solidarity. In 
contrast to the ‘hard’ clichés of the superhuman with 
the computer brain in a world of steel, this would delin-
eate a ‘soft’ vision of societal progress.
2. Humans create companions for themselves
The more advances AI makes in ever broader applica-
tion areas, the more diverse and intimate will be the 
points of contact, interfaces and hinges between tech-
nology and people. This can lead to symbiotic connec-
tions, which, however, may turn out differently than 
imagined in the popular ‘cyborg’ dreams. It is also pos-
sible that AI-enabled entities emerge that will become 
well-integrated, loyal companions of humans in socie-
ties that are more liveable than those of today. For 
example, in the medium term, digital assistants could 
liberate us more and more from monotonous activities 
(e.g. by taking on logistical tasks), support us in learn-
ing and understanding (e.g. by synthesizing and inter-
preting the overwhelming wealth of information), and 
ultimately help us to value ourselves and our environ-
ment more highly (e.g. through diagnostics and mir-
roring). Such a prospect encounters far less scepticism 
7in the East Asian cultural sphere than in Western 
 societies, for example, and promotes a world view that 
does not categorically isolate humans from nature and 
 technology. 
3. Humans invent their masters
Speculation about the future progress of AI-relevant 
technologies diverges widely: Ideas on what ontological 
quality these could produce remain highly controver-
sial. Especially in the debate on ‘Artificial General 
 Intelligence’ or even ‘Super Intelligence’, (human) opin-
ions differ greatly. However, the emergence of  conscious 
AI systems has been discussed for some time. Assuming 
this possibility, it would be only logical to ask whether 
animate artificial entities with independent deci-
sion-making and reproductive capabilities could be 
formed in a later phase of the digital revolution.
The WBGU has also examined this mind game – 
which, from today’s perspective, appears absurd to 
many experts outside of Silicon Valley – and looked for 
possible societal options for action. The intuitively ‘rea-
sonable’ option would be a general moratorium that 
would fundamentally prohibit R&D efforts to create 
conscious and therefore sentient systems. The current 
controversies about certain procedures in reproductive 
medicine and synthetic biology can provide valuable 
pointers here.
But is such a complete and, above all, global morato-
rium even feasible? While this text is being written, an 
attempt is perhaps being made in a well-guarded 
research laboratory somewhere in the world to equip an 
AI system with ‘feelings’. In this respect, the WBGU has 
decided to recommend at least a discourse on an alter-
native option:
If the development of civilization since the Neolithic 
Age has evidently been self-organized and directed 
toward substituting and transcending human (physio-
logical, manual and cognitive) capabilities, can the cre-
ation of a new entity by humans not be seen as the 
next, perhaps inevitable leap in planetary evolution? 
Such reflections generate horror or enthusiasm, 
depending on the circles in which they are presented.
Yet although the protection of human dignity 
remains a quintessential challenge, it is equally impor t-
ant to understand the genus Homo as a product of the 
fundamentally open ‘life’ process. Seen from an opti-
mistic point of view, could the combination of human-
kind’s social and emotional intelligence with the super-
ior cognitive abilities of machines make a form of 
co-evolution possible whose creatures possess even 
more humanity than we ourselves do?
So much for mind games. In this flagship report, the 
WBGU explicitly recommends that the current challen-
ges of digitalization be contained by regulation and pla-
ced at the service of the Great Transformation towards 
Sustainability. At the same time, however, we must 
start thinking today about the future of humankind in 
the post-industrial age in a democratic way that is ori-
ented towards the common good. Particular care should 
be taken, especially in the areas of research and 
development and in multilateral policy, to ensure that 
no irreversible decisions are taken and that as much 
scope as possible remains for society to shape the 
future. 
In Einstein’s sense, we are faced with the Herculean 
task of mastering the present-day ecological and social 
challenges – both generally and with the help of digital 
means – while anticipating and largely avoiding the 
problems associated with these new tools. The protec-
tion of human dignity is the ultimate challenge in this 
context.
The tasks ahead: the Great Transformation 
 towards Sustainability in the shadow of digital 
upheaval
The WBGU’s aim with its work on the Great Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability is to put forward for 
discussion development paths to sustainable societies 
that keep within the planetary guard rails and can offer 
all people, including future generations, a good life in 
dignity and a long-term future (WBGU, 2011). This 
transformation includes profound changes to infras-
tructures, production processes, investments, regula-
tory systems and lifestyles, and a new form of interac-
tion between politics, society, science, business and 
individuals. International agreements that call for 
transformations towards sustainability now exist due to 
the adoption of the 2030 Agenda with its 17 SDGs 
(2015), the Paris Climate Agreement (2015) and the 
Aichi targets for biodiversity (2010). Nevertheless, the 
change in direction towards sustainability is proceeding 
much too slowly. Our economies and societies are still 
on a collision course with the Earth system. Moreover, 
social centrifugal forces are undermining cohesion and 
stability in many societies. So far, there has been too 
little research on how digital change can make sustaina-
bility transformations easier – or more difficult – or 
how it might lead to completely new demands on sus-
tainable societies or to changes in people’s understan-
ding of sustainability. In this respect, the WBGU’s 
report identifies not only massive deficits in action, but 




Combine digitalization and 
 sustainability research (p. 23)
Using digitalization to implement the 2030 Agenda 
The WBGU’s analyses show that digitalization dynam-
ics have a massive impact on all 17 SDGs of the 2030 
Agenda. The debate on the implementation of the SDGs 
can no longer be conducted without an adequate 
understanding of the potential benefits and risks of 
digitalization for the entire 2030 Agenda. 
A double course correction is needed
The first course correction requires a profound change 
in the discussion on the Great Transformation towards 
Sustainability, since, up to now, it has hardly taken into 
account the fundamental dynamics of digitalization, 
e.g. the opportunities and risks of algorithm-based 
decision-making processes, or the interlinkage between 
our physical world and virtual spaces. These topics can-
not be found in either the 2030 Agenda adopted by the 
UN in 2015, Germany’s 2017 sustainability strategy, or 
the WBGU report on the Great Transformation  published 
in 2011.
Sustain natural life-support 
 systems (p. 17)
The second course correction must be made by the 
economic, societal and political digital pioneers and by 
digitalization research, because up to now digitalization 
has hardly been linked with the great sustainability 
challenges of the Anthropocene. Digitalization should 
be made sustainable and used as a powerful tool to 
achieve the sustainability goals! The actors of sustain-
ability and digitalization need to make a powerful joint 
effort to initiate a trend reversal towards a digitalized 
sustainable society. 
Action needs to be taken quickly – combine digitali-
zation, planetary guard rails and social cohesion
The report shows that digitalization can help us comply 
with the planetary guard rails. Decarbonization, a cir-
cular economy, more environmentally friendly agricul-
ture, resource efficiency and emissions reductions, and 
the monitoring and protection of ecosystems could be 
achieved more easily and quickly with digital innov-
ations than without them. It is therefore imperative 
that these possibilities of a digitally driven sustainabil-
ity transformation are rapidly and comprehensively 
mobilized. Furthermore, digitalization can tap potential 
for societal modernization. Globe-spanning knowledge, 
globe-spanning communication, and global societal 
networking in virtual and hybrid spaces can accelerate 
sustainability transformations, improve human inclu-
sion, strengthen global environmental awareness, and 
create a transnationally networked society in which 
global cooperation cultures develop. 
However, the WBGU also shows that there is no 
technological determination per se for the major chal-
lenges facing humankind. The digitalization of the past 
decades – the internet, the many different terminal 
devices, the increase in production automation and 
product networking – has been accompanied by ever 
increasing energy and resource consumption, as well as 
global production and consumption patterns that place 
an even greater burden on ecosystems. Technical inno-
vation surges do not automatically translate into sus-
tainability transformations, but must be closely cou-
pled with sustainability guidelines and policies.
Promote poverty reduction and 
inclusive development (p. 18)
Nor is the societal innovation potential of the digital 
transformation automatic. At present, our societies 
seem to be overwhelmed by the speed and extent of 
technological upheavals and their use by powerful 
actors – mainly from the private sector, although there 
are state actors, too. Fake news, social credit scores, the 
erosion of civilization standards on the internet, the 
loss of confidence in data-driven services, govern-
ments’ problems in properly taxing companies operat-
ing in the digital sphere, politicians who seem over-
taxed by the demands of accelerated digitalization – all 
these are just some of the pathological effects of 
 unchecked developments.
Digitalization to support sustainability 
 transformations – an enormous (inter)national task
Up to now, digital expertise has been severely underde-
veloped in ministries, parliaments, municipal adminis-
trations, non-governmental organizations, sustainability 
research institutes, the media and international organi-
zations. Creating the sheer ability to shape and plan 
requires a push for modernization in all the areas men-
tioned, in order to create digital expertise and bring it 
9into line with the requirements of the sustainability 
transformation. If this does not succeed, technology-ori-
ented and short-term self-dynamics will prevail; then it 
will no longer be possible to link the digital transforma-
tion with the sustainability transformation. Public insti-
tutions need to make comprehensive modernization 
efforts, like those carried out in the early 1970s, 
 supported and accompanied by extensive scientific 
research programmes (Scharpf, 1972; Mayntz et al., 
1978). Back then, the aim was to prepare public insti-
tutions to dovetail economic, technological, social and 
environmental developments and to expand societal 
inclusion; today, the aim is to create comprehensive dig-
italization expertise and to combine this with sustain-
ability transformations.
The Digital Age is emerging as a new societal forma-
tion – imagining the Great Transformation towards 
Sustainability beyond 2030
The WBGU identifies five core characteristics of the 
Digital Age that make it possible to understand devel-
opment trends and the direction of change. It becomes 
clear that using digital instruments to implement the 
sustainability goals is not enough. The digital upheavals 
are fundamentally changing the playing field of societal 
development. The Great Transformation towards Sus-
tainability can only take place under these changing 
conditions of the Digital Age, which were hardly taken 
into consideration by the architects of the 2030 Agenda.
 > Interconnectedness: Technical systems, as well as peo-
ple, things, processes and organizations, are becoming 
more and more omnipresently interconnected at dif-
ferent levels of action. This development can multiply 
exchange relationships, cooperation and learning 
opportunities, and creates qualitatively novel, often 
transboundary economic, social, cultural, institutional 
and political networking structures. Networking can 
increase the vulnerability of interdependent infra-
structures and processes. 
 > Cognition: Universal intelligence is humankind’s 
 unique selling point in the world as we know it. The 
Internet of Things and methods from big data and AI 
are increasingly creating technical systems that can 
use computers to perceive, learn, analyse, evaluate 
and in this way, for example, create art and texts or 
recognize and imitate language and faces. Silicon Val-
ley expects original achievements by AI systems to 
be good enough to win Nobel prizes in 5–15 years’ 
time. Such systems could fundamentally change many 
things: our view of what it means to be human, the 
economy, labour markets, learning processes, our 
knowledge, our dealings with  technology, society and 
nature. 
 > Autonomy: Autonomous technical systems that 
make independent decisions based on data are 
already being used in industry to control production 
processes, in public environments to improve public 
safety, and (already in many contexts) to predict and 
monitor human behaviour. In the future, such auton-
omous technical systems will be used in many differ-
ent ways: in transport (autonomous driving), the 
banking system, the social sector, the judicial sys-
tem, and political negotiation processes. They can 
recognize patterns that are hidden from human 
beings because of their complexity or the large 
amount of data involved. They can help to make bet-
ter-informed economic, political and social deci-
sions, but they can also lead to a loss of societal con-
trol, the abuse of power or an undermining of pri-
vacy and freedom. 
 > Virtuality: The virtual world is creating new spaces 
for human societies. People can meet in virtual 
spaces regardless of their physical location, and 
access and change distant objects. Avatars and social 
bots can become people’s companions. In this way, 
the Earth system, ecosystems and distant cultures 
can be experienced directly. At the same time, 
designing these virtual and hybrid spaces is a great 
challenge. This is already illustrated by the dysto-
pian example of people sinking into virtual (game) 
worlds which only suggest a connection to nature, 
while real nature is increasingly degenerating. 
 > Knowledge explosion: Digital methods are moderniz-
ing all kinds of quantitative and qualitative research. 
Almost every traditional scientific discipline already 
has a digital manifestation called eSciences, digital 
humanities, etc. Data acquisition and processing, as 
well as modelling, simulation and visualization, offer 
new approaches to understanding and shaping our 
natural and societal realities. In addition, digital 
 methods offer novel approaches to knowledge, 
 education and global exchange. 
These five characteristics will change not only our 
economies and technical infrastructures, but also Homo 
sapiens itself. The Anthropocene – the human age – 
hitherto a term that emphasizes that humans have 
become the greatest force for change in the Earth sys-
tem, is gaining an extended meaning: in the digital 
Anthropocene, humans create tools with which they 
can now fundamentally transform themselves through 
ever closer human-machine cooperation using digital-
ized technology and an ever closer interaction with AI, 
right up to the technological dystopias of ‘human 
enhancement’, a technologically supported optimiza-
tion of the human being. 
At the same time, developments that are of great 




from the point of view of sustainability transforma-
tions: globally networked civil societies, the emergence 
of a global (environmental) awareness, a circular econ-
omy supported by digitalization, universal access to 
exploding knowledge, or new opportunities for 
develop ing countries and emerging economies to 
 quickly embrace new digitalized infrastructures. In the 
21st century, therefore, digitalization will change the 
deep structures of our societies just as fundamentally 
as the drivers of the Industrial Revolution led to the 
fundamental transformation of the world in the 19th 
century. Adam Smith, who was not only an economist 
but also a moral philosopher – a fact that is often for-
gotten – argued in his ‘Wealth of Nations’ (1776) that 
markets and radical change could only function without 
destabilizing societies if the autonomy of market 
dynamics were constrained by the norms and values of 
societies. This is all the more true for digital upheavals. 
Unless digital change is embedded in strong systems of 
standards and values, the dystopian potential of the 
digital society will prevail. 
Set framework conditions and 
 limits to the sustainability of 
 digitalization (p. 17)
Karl Polanyi, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber also 
teach us that standards and values can ultimately only 
be anchored in societies and protected from the inter-
ests of the most powerful actors if institutions are cre-
ated that can deal with the changes and steer individual 
and collective actions into channels agreed on by soci-
ety. Against this background, the WBGU discusses dig-
italization not only as a process of technological change, 
but in particular from a normative perspective and as a 
societal task for managing the processes involved. 
Avoiding systemic risks in the Digital Age 
In order to be able to exploit the potential of digitaliza-
tion, we must be aware of the possible systemic risks in 
the Digital Age. Digital systemic risks are conceivable, 
large-scale changes in our societies, each of which could 
in itself trigger destabilization in those societies. Dom-
ino and cumulative amplifying effects would multiply 
accordingly and have a broad-based impact. 
Shape the work in the future and 
promote the reduction of 
 inequality (p. 19)
Some of these threats are undisputed (e.g. 
labour-market disruptions), but the magnitude of the 
changes is uncertain. The probability of other systemic 
risks occurring is significant (e.g. breaching of plane-
tary guard rails, digital authoritarianism, further power 
gains by large digital corporations), while the probabil-
ity of other risks occurring is relatively low from today’s 
perspective (e.g. acceptance of human enhancement to 
create an optimized Homo sapiens). However, even the 
latter systemic risks should not be neglected because, in 
a worst-case scenario, they would have a major impact 
on the future of civilization. The WBGU identifies sys-
temic risks in the Digital Age, which include the follow-
ing:
 > exceeding planetary guard rails as a result of digi-
tally driven, resource- and emissions-intensive 
growth patterns,
 > disempowerment of the individual, threats to pri-
vacy and an undermining of the digitalized public 
sphere through digitally empowered authoritarian-
ism or totalitarianism,
 > an undermining of democracy and deliberation by 
normatively and institutionally non-embedded, 
automated decision-making or decision-making 
support,
 > dominance by companies that can elude government 
control, driven by further data-based power concen-
tration,
 > disruption of labour markets by the comprehensive 
automation of data-driven activities and the danger 
that human labour will become ‘increasingly irrele-
vant’ to the economy,
 > a deeper division of the global society because access 
to, and use of, digital potential is mainly limited to 
the wealthy minorities in world society,
 > abuse of the technologization of human beings 
based on human-enhancement philosophies and 
methods.
It is also important to bear in mind that the digital 
upheavals are being experienced by societies that are 
already unsettled by globalization, the rise of new 
powers, by forms of authoritarian populism and the 
flow of refugees. The bow waves of digitalization are 
colliding with the current crisis in Europe and the West 
and with frontal attacks on a multilateral world order 
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based on cooperation and rules. The systemic risks of 
the Digital Age could overlap with and reinforce the 
centrifugal forces that already exist in many societies.
Setting the course for a European road to a 
 digitalized sustainable society
The European Union (EU) should lead the way in 
 integrating sustainability and digitalization.
Establish the EU as a pioneer of a 
digitalized sustainability society 
(p. 21)
It is precisely by strengthening technological inno-
vations and systematically linking them to sustainabil-
ity-oriented social, cultural and institutional innova-
tions that the EU could add something special to the 
global technology race and make a real impact on the 
search for roads to the digitalized sustainability society. 
The EU is already a pioneer in some areas of digitaliza-
tion regulation. In the field of data protection and the 
protection of privacy, the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (EU, 2016) is so far unique in the world.
Protect privacy (p. 20)
It embodies a Europe that defends fundamental rights 
against commercial and state data-collection frenzy. Fur-
thermore, the EU is working on a European data space 
aimed at providing citizens and businesses with a highly 
developed, well-functioning, transparent system of 
 public data, information, services and standards. This 
system would also help combine competitiveness with 
data protection in order, hopefully, to create competitive 
advantages for EU companies, e.g. in competition with 
China and the USA. The EU is also at the forefront of 
sustainability policy (e.g. environmental protection is 
enshrined as an EU objective in the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, and the EU is currently working on a new 
Environmental Action Programme as well as a decarbon-
ization strategy as a contribution to the Paris Agree-
ment). However, the EU is not (yet) a pioneer when it 
comes to the urgently needed, implementation-oriented 
dovetailing of sustainability and digitalization. Ideas on 
how ethical principles for AI could be developed, or how 
digital change should be used to implement the SDGs, 
are still in their early stages. 
The WBGU proposes fundamental decisions to be 
taken on five different stages for a European road to 
digitalized sustainability societies, in order to master the 
profound and radical changes towards sustainability in 
the Digital Age. Taking this road can only succeed if the 
fundamental decisions made on the five stages are 
intermeshed.
1 . New humanism for the Digital Age – renew the nor-
mative foundations of our societies: The WBGU is 
developing some basic features of a new huma-
nism for the Digital Age with the aim of defending 
the fundamental, albeit endangered achievements 
of humanism and enlightenment over the past two 
centuries and, at the same time, creating attrac-
tive future prospects for a digitalized sustainability 
society. Our hope is that Europe will be able to make 
such an effort for civilization.
Begin societal discourse on new 
normative issues (p. 21)
2 . Charter for the transition to a digitalized sustain-
ability society: Societal discourses for a new huma-
nism need a starting point. On the basis of its ana-
lyses and discussions, the WBGU has condensed 
some key principles and guidelines for the digi-
talized sustainability society into a Charter. They 
include the protection of the planet and the pre-
servation of human integrity and dignity. The Char-
ter also encompasses support for local and glo-
bal fairness, justice and solidarity under the con-
ditions of a digital revolution. Finally, the Char-
ter includes strengthening global (environmental) 
awareness and the cultures and systems of global 
cooperation by using digital opportunities, and also 
strengthening an advancement of AI that furthers 
human development opportunities, societal lear-
ning and social cohesion. The Charter can become 
the starting point for the renewal of sustainability 
paradigms and place our common digital future at 
the centre of efforts at the national, European and 
global level. The Charter follows on from the 2030 
Agenda and, at the same time, goes beyond it to 
denote the normative foundations of our societies 
in the Digital Age.
3 . Building blocks of a responsible society capable of 
taking action: Science and education are fundamen-
tal for freedom, inclusion and the Eigenart of the 
individual in the sense of future-oriented and 
 creative, inclusive societies. The demands placed on 
our societies cannot be ‘solved’ solely by individual 




 pricing or a new global competition regime). Rather, 
responsible societies capable of taking action must 
be developed and strengthened, so that the uphea-
vals outlined can be mastered and managed. 
Promote future-proof  education 
and digital literacy (p. 19)
 
The WBGU sees the following central building 
blocks in this context, which – in their entirety and 
if they are cleverly combined – result in the archi-
tecture of feasible, responsible societies. The WBGU 
proposes concrete reform packages for all these 
basic elements of a responsible society capable of 
taking action:
 > People must be enabled to understand and help 
shape the upcoming upheavals. Comprehensive 
education for sustainable development in the 
Digital Age is the key to this.
 > Science should generate knowledge about the 
future to shape digitalized sustainability and sus-
tainable digitalization. Just as, four decades ago, 
the Herculean task was accomplished of bringing 
together climate and Earth-system research with 
social science and economic disciplines to form 
the sustainability sciences that are established 
today, it is now necessary to quickly and closely 
interlink these with digitalization research. 
 > States must be capable of shaping processes 
themselves: states and public institutions need to 
invest in their own capabilities in order to estab-
lish and consolidate digital literacy for the transi-
tion to a sustainability society.
 > The creation of arenas for experimentation and 
discourse in Germany and Europe would make it 
possible to prepare and accelerate innovations, to 
think ahead and to develop examples for shaping 
the future.
Regulate shifts of economic and 
political power (p. 20)
 > The new power constellations must be contained 
in order to secure democratic inclusion. Import-
ant examples in view of the high global mobility 
of the digital economy are the international har-
monization of competition law and corporate 
taxation, as well as non-discriminatory, clearly 
regulated cross-border exchange processes in 
virtual spaces that are standardized in the sense 
of interoperability.
 > Digital changes always have a global impact, so 
that global, rule- and fairness-based regulatory 
models are needed that enable a combination of 
digital and sustainability transformations as pro-
posed in the WBGU Charter. Only if the EU devel-
ops a common policy in this direction will 
 European societies be able to influence the global 
restructuring of the future. 
 > Digitalization will fundamentally change the 
opportunities available to societies in developing 
countries and emerging economies – for better or 
for worse. International cooperation for sustain-
able development, and Germany’s and the EU’s 
cooperation with the United Nations and other 
multilateral actors, must therefore be urgently 
expanded in this direction.
4 . Technological game changers can accelerate sus-
tainability transformations: Digitalization offers an 
enormous toolbox of instruments and methods that 
must be used effectively and efficiently to achieve 
the sustainability goals. Here are some examples of 
technology-led game changers that the EU should 
rapidly promote in order to trigger change processes 
in European societies and in the world economy in 
cooperation and competition with other states and 
the United Nations:
 > The extended possibilities of digitalized remote 
and near-Earth observation, and the sensors, 
equipment and infrastructure required for this 
purpose, should be expanded worldwide and 
upgraded for the comprehensive and real-time 
monitoring of the natural Earth systems, their 
condition and development. The resulting inter-
national digital commons should be used as a 
starting point for the establishment and realiza-
tion of services and applications for global (envi-
ronmental) awareness. 
 > Building on this, the nation states should, in the 
context of the UN, develop a globally coordina-
ted and interoperable system of digital SDG indi-
cators to improve the topicality, transparency, 
comparability and verifiability of digitalized nati-
onal and international SDG reports.
Establish and secure digital 
 commons (p. 21)
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 > In parallel, the sustainability and environmental 
data collected for SDG indicators and Earth obser-
vation should be made available as digital 
 commons.
Provide public-service  
ICT (p. 21)
 > Also, ICT infrastructures should be made availa-
ble on a non-discriminatory basis as part of basic 
public services, thus fostering inclusion and the 
emergence of ‘quality media’ also in the digital 
sphere.
 > The use of digital technologies, processes and 
infrastructures that make it possible to map the 
emission and resource footprints of both traditio-
nal industries and the digital economy across the 
entire value chain should be globally established.
 > The diverse potential of AI should be used in sus-
tainability issues, for example, to improve 
understanding of material cycles, production 
processes, supply chains, usage contexts and 
consumption patterns, to determine key triggers 
and patterns, and to identify and implement 
optimization potential. 
 > The use of digitalization to determine ecological 
parameters and correlations (e.g. reaching SDGs, 
footprints, material cycles) creates the informa-
tion base for an efficient regulation of environ-
mental resource consumption. Especially for the 
central goal of decarbonization, digitalization can 
make the difference, as it not only plays a key 
role in the realization of renewable energy sup-
plies, but also makes specific production- and 
consumption-oriented regulations possible. In 
combination with economic policies on decarbo-
nization, these can have a real impact.
Consider the fragility and  
autonomy of technical systems  
(p. 20)
 > However, none of these digitalization-related 
levers will become effective without comprehen-
sive guarantees of the resilience, cyber-security 
and trustworthiness of digitalized infrastructu-
res, their longevity and robustness, and human 
decision-making sovereignty in the case of socie-
tally relevant automatic systems involving AI. 
5 . Strengthen the sustainability and resilience of the 
economy: Digitalization processes not only open up 
opportunities to advance a green economy, but also 
to strengthen the diversity and resilience of eco-
nomic structures by supplementing the private sec-
tor with other economic forms. Digitalization is also 
used by cooperative, public and common-good-ori-
ented enterprises to create new business models. 
This emerging diversity again ties in with the old 
strengths of post-war European economies: a 
strong private sector, a diversity of business forms, 
and markets embedded in institutions and norma-
tive systems. In order to exploit the potential bene-
fits of digitalization, it is important to find a new 
balance between entrepreneurial competition, nati-
onal legal frameworks, societal responsibility and 
orientation towards the common good. The guard 
rails and values set out by the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, the 2030 Agenda and the WBGU’s 
Charter for a Digitalized Sustainability Society could 
thus become guidelines for the renewal of Europe.
Gear digitalization towards the 
common good (p. 17)
Immanuel Kant analysed the essence of the Enlighten-
ment as a ‘change in the way people think’. Having 
arrived at a new level of civilization in the Digital Age, 
we face a similar challenge in the struggle for sustain-
able, globally and virtually networked digitalized soci-
eties and in the search for a new humanism: the further 
development of our civilization on a finite planet in the 
digital Anthropocene.
An overview of the report 
This Section provides an overview of the report’s indi-
vidual chapters and the main issues covered.
Sustainability in the age of digitalization 
After Chapter 1, the ‘Introduction’, Chapter 2, ‘Sustain-
ability in the age of digitalization’, embeds the report’s 
theme into the WBGU’s sustainability perspective and 
presents the WBGU’s normative basis in the form of a 
‘normative compass’. This compass is explicitly based 
on the bedrock of the Enlightenment and on respect for 
human dignity, with the aim of meeting the related 
challenges posed by digitalization. As a first step, the 





Arenas of digital change
The 'arenas of digital change' are intended as examples to give 
a multifaceted impression of how digitalization can be placed 
at the service of the Transformation towards Sustainability. 
The report briefly presents and analyses concrete topics and 
extrapolates recommendations for action and research.
Industrial metabolism
Digitalization changes the energy- and material-exchange re-
lationships (metabolism) within companies and value chains. 
In the case of digital devices, the main issue is currently envi-
ronmental risks (e.g. electronic waste). In production, digital-
ized manufacturing processes that are coordinated in the 
sense of Industry 4.0 offer potential for higher resource effi-
ciency. Digital platforms could enable a close linkage of mate-
rial flows between companies. The global sustainability impli-
cations and the contribution to the circular economy are 
ambivalent and require in-depth analyses.
New forms of digital economy
Digital technologies enable new, collectively organized eco-
nomic systems that are oriented towards the common good. 
These include new business models (sustainable digital entre-
preneurship, green digital start-ups) and corporate forms 
(platform cooperatives), alternative forms of production (pro-
sumer, commons-based peer production), and participatory 
value creation (sharing economy). Unlocking the related po-
tential requires a suitable legal framework, a corresponding 
promotion of economic development, and the development 
of infrastructure.
Sustainable consumer behaviour
Digital technologies can be used to help people to consume in 
a sustainable manner (e.g. by buying only what they need, 
and through resource-sparing use, reuse, repairing and shar-
ing). The focus is on consumer decisions about the type, 
quantity and use of products. It presents sustainability-rele-
vant forms of ‘digitalized consumption’ and identifies the 
challenges and potential of digitalized consumption for sus-
taining natural life-support systems. 
Online commerce
Online commerce is growing rapidly. This involves both nega-
tive environmental effects – from delivery services, packaging 
waste and returned goods – and positive effects from fewer 
private journeys and optimized logistics. Most of the turnover 
in online commerce is currently concentrated on a small number 
of companies that are displacing bricks-and-mortar retailing 
outlets. Opportunities for monitoring compliance with envi-
ronmental and social standards at the place of origin are dimin-
ishing. Municipalities and cities should develop strategies to 
react to the displacement of the local retail trade. 
Electronic waste and the circular economy 
Digitalization is a driver of resource extraction and rapidly 
growing amounts of electronic and toxic waste. In order to 
reverse this trend, aims of the circular economy – e.g. re-
source conservation, durability, ease of repair, recycling – 
must already be integrated into business models and product 
designs. Clear regulations and incentives, societal embedding 
and a research offensive are levers for unlocking the potential 
of digital technology along the entire product life cycle.
Digitalization for climate-change mitigation and the 
energy transformation
Digital solutions support the integration of fluctuating renew-
able energies into energy systems and can promote access to 
modern energy in off-grid regions. Increases in energy de-
mand triggered directly and indirectly by digitalization can be 
problematic. Long-term targets must be clear and reliable to 
ensure that investment and innovation are used for cli-
mate-change mitigation. The reliability and security of the 
increasingly complex energy systems and data protection 
should be taken into account from the outset. 
‘Smart City’ and sustainable urban development 
Sustainable urban development using digital technologies 
presupposes that municipalities and urban societies retain 
their governance sovereignty vis-à-vis the digital economy 
and develop their own technological sovereignty. A growing 
number of cities are actively investing in decentralized digital 
urban platforms, open architecture and an orientation to-
wards the common good. If this trend prevails, there is justi-
fied hope that the digital transformation can be used for in-
clusive, sustainable urban development. 
Sustainable urban mobility 
Digitally supported innovations in the transport sector are 
currently being tested in many cities and give us an idea of 
future disruptive changes. In many cases, it is not clear how 
data and liability issues will be handled. However, solutions to 
key problems of urban transport systems (e.g. high CO2 and 
air-pollutant emissions, land consumption, noise pollution, 
increasing travel and transport times and accident risks) are 
not a purely technological matter; rather, they will be decided 
by how digital solutions are embedded into comprehensive 
concepts of sustainable urban mobility. 
Precision farming
Land use is a key sustainability issue for food security and 
nature conservation. Digitalization must not reinforce the 
trends towards industrial agriculture. It should be used to re-
duce environmental damage caused by the use of fertilizers 
and pesticides and to promote the diversity of cultivation 
methods and landscapes. Trustworthy data systems, a focus 
on data sovereignty, Open Data and Open Source can all help 
prevent farmers from increasingly losing control and becom-
ing dependent on agricultural corporations.
Agriculture in developing countries 
Most of the world’s agricultural land is farmed by smallhold-
ers. Precision agriculture is highly capital-intensive and 
therefore less suitable for smallholder agriculture in develop-
ing countries. Even so, digitalization can increase the efficien-
cy, productivity and sustainability of small farms by improv-
ing access to information, advice and education. Mobile 
connectivity and organizing small farms in cooperatives play 
a key role here. 
Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity 
Digitalization is changing nature conservation in fundamental 
and transformative ways. Digitally enhanced ecosystem mon-
itoring cannot directly influence the drivers of the biodiversi-
ty crisis, but it is a source of valuable knowledge and opens 
up new opportunities for monitoring compliance with man-
agement rules and bans that are aimed at preventing the 
overexploitation of biological resources. The vision of a global 
system for monitoring biodiversity with semi-automated in-
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ventories of species and ecosystem services is becoming more 
realistic. 
Collective global awareness 
Individuals can be motivated to act in a way that preserves 
the Earth system by creating a corresponding awareness of 
the problem and specific knowledge of how best to act. New 
digital possibilities, such as interactivity, gaming, virtual ex-
periences of nature and citizen-science projects offer new 
opportunities for promoting environmental awareness. In the 
longer term, this will lead to a new willingness for global co-
operation and a strong sense of global citizenship.
Public discourse 
Digital technologies are changing how we communicate, how 
we perceive societal debates, and how we can take part in 
them. New forms of participation, algorithmic pre-structuring 
of media content, the use of social media, and new forms of 
content editing are restructuring public discourse. New skills 
and suitable legal and institutional framework conditions are 
required to ensure that the foundations of democratic opin-
ion-forming and journalistic quality are preserved in the long 
term.
Scoring society
Scoring procedures map human behaviour using numbers. 
They are being used in more and more core areas of society 
(e.g. health care, law enforcement) as a basis for deci-
sion-making, often without the knowledge of those affected. 
The potential for more objective decision-making is being 
undermined by a lack of transparency concerning areas of 
application, methods and data, as well as a lack of supervi-
sion. Individuals should be given a right to have decisions 
justified by rational reasons. The way in which scoring influ-
ences societal norms and moral standards should be a central 
research topic.
Future-proof education 
Up to now, digitalization has not been systematically incorpo-
rated into educational programmes. The planned promotion 
of digital skills and infrastructure (e.g. in the German ‘Digital-
Pact for Schools’) seems necessary, but it is not enough. The 
conceptual combination of digitalization and sustainability 
requires a variety of initiatives in the education context. The 
WBGU shows how education could be ‘future-proofed’, 
which risks (e.g. ‘fake news’) should be countered, and where 
there is potential for more solidarity-based quality of life.
Public-service ICT 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) have be-
come a lot more important in society and are increasingly 
influencing citizens’ lives. The public sector has a responsibil-
ity for the operation and content of public-service ICT. This is 
an important prerequisite for equal inclusion in societal life, 
for the provision of, and access to, digital commons, and as a 
locational factor for innovation, competition, employment 
and sustainable economic growth. 
Digital technology as a gender bender? 
Despite growing political attention, gender equality has not 
been achieved in any country in the world. Existing gender 
inequalities and stereotypes are reproduced in socio-techni-
cal systems such as the internet, and this can lead to new 
discrimination. Equal-opportunity measures are still neces-
sary, and not only in the context of a two-gender understand-
ing of the issue. Digital technology offers emancipatory po-
tential by providing access to information and networking, 
exposing discrimination, and raising awareness in digital are-
nas for experimentation.
Digital self-tracking
Digital self-tracking apps supply people with information 
about their own bodies and offer comparisons with others. 
The WBGU uses this example to reveal the implications of 
healthcare-system digitalization and universal data collection 
and availability. The potentially better information base for 
users is partly offset by major quality deficits in data protec-
tion, data quality, collection and processing. In addition, us-
ers’ privacy, personal freedom and self-determination could 
be restricted.
International division of labour
The ongoing digital structural transformation in the interna-
tional division of labour will lead to a readjustment of the role 
of developing countries and emerging economies. Unequivo-
cal conclusions on the impact of digitalization on the interna-
tional organization of value chains are currently limited. On 
the one hand, there are large potential job losses due to digi-
tally supported automation and production relocation pro-
cesses; on the other, new markets are accessible, primarily via 
digital platforms.
Working environments of the future
Digitalization and sustainability transformation are radically 
transforming labour markets. People will continue to work in 
the future, but it remains to be seen how this can be embed-
ded into society and organized in such a way that the func-
tions of gainful employment as we know them today – secur-
ing livelihoods, social participation, the basis of self-esteem 
– can be guaranteed in the future. However, digital change 
and sustainability transformation offer opportunities to de-
velop and establish new models for more sustainable working 
environments.
Digital commons 
Based on common goods in general, digital commons are data, 
pieces of information, educational and knowledge artefacts in 
the public interest that are available to the public barrier-free. 
They must be protected from exclusionary use for profit max-
imization and from abuse. To this purpose, fundamental or-
ganizational, regulatory and financial decisions, e.g. obliga-
tions to provide information, are necessary to develop a 




Great Transformation towards Sustainability. This is fol-
lowed by an explanation of the three dimensions of the 
WBGU’s normative compass – Sustaining natural 
life-support systems, Inclusion and Eigenart. Human 
 Dignity is both the explicit starting point and the target 
vision of the normative compass, since it is particularly 
significant in the Digital Age, and protecting it is a key 
priority in shaping digitalization. 
Understanding the Digital Age 
Chapter 3, ‘Understanding the Digital Age’, provides 
basic knowledge and develops a conceptual angle on 
the facets of the Digital Age. In order for digital change 
to be placed at the service of the Great Transformation 
towards Sustainability, the potential benefits and risks 
of digital technologies and solutions must be under-
stood and globally oriented towards the SDGs. The 
Chapter analyses the historical development towards 
the Digital Age, its basic functions, key technologies 
and essential characteristics, as well as foreseeable 
changes to key areas of human civilization, i.e. to the 
environment, to human beings, society, the economy 
and technology. It becomes clear that the dynamics of 
digitalization are profoundly changing the conditions 
under which the Transformation towards Sustainability 
must take place. An evaluation of recent reports by 
international organizations shows that shaping the Dig-
ital Age to make it sustainable involves a lot of uncer-
tainty, so that flexible governance is required. Charters 
for the Digital Age that have been proposed to date 
indicate the beginnings of a corresponding framework 
for action; however, they neglect the specific connec-
tion between digitalization and sustainability.
Actor constellations in the digital transformation 
Chapter 4, ‘Actor constellations in the digital transfor-
mation’, raises the question of who will shape the Dig-
ital Age. An introduction to the theoretical principles of 
how a Transformation towards Sustainability can be 
shaped is followed by an analysis: assuming that digital 
change and the Transformation towards Sustainability 
would cause changes in humanity’s leeway for creative 
action, would these shifts be to the benefit or detriment 
of individual actor groups? In addition to individuals, 
business (especially digital companies) and civil society, 
the WBGU focuses on tech communities, which it 
believes play a prominent role in the Digital Age. The 
WBGU identifies considerable shifts of power within the 
multi-level system of cities and municipalities, nation-
states and international organizations, as well as among 
transnational actor groups operating across these levels. 
In some cases, they lead to blockades and unsustainable 
path dependencies, especially due to the lack of control 
and governance by nation-states and the international 
community. At the same time, new players, e.g. digital 
companies and tech communities, are opening up poten-
tial avenues of sustainability transformation that have 
hitherto not been seen among traditional companies. 
Arenas of digital change 
In view of the broad scope of the two topics of digital-
ization and sustainability, the WBGU uses a selected 
range of examples in its approach to Chapter 5, ’Arenas 
of digital change’ (Box 1). The Chapter gives concrete 
examples to illustrate the status, prospects and chal-
lenges of digitalization in the face of the necessary global 
Transformation towards Sustainability. The arenas reflect 
the scientific state of the art; they are directly related 
to the issue of sustainability and are particularly impor-
tant for the Transformation towards Sustainability. They 
thus provide a multifaceted impression of how digitali-
zation can be shaped in the service of sustainability 
transformation. Some of the arenas are at the direct 
interface between the environment and digitalization, 
dealing, for example, with energy and resource con-
sumption and land use. Others throw light on the inter-
action between digitalization and key social and eco-
nomic dimensions of sustainability (e.g. the work in the 
future, international division of labour, digitally sup-
ported mobility). Finally, topics are addressed which, 
al though already the subject of debate today, will only 
impact on society in the longer term (e.g. the develop-
ment of collective global awareness). These thematic 
‘deep drillings‘ not only generate concrete material lead-
ing to recommendations for action and research; they 
are also one of the main sources  informing the WBGU’s 
perspective and messages. 
Drafts for the future and visions on digitalization 
and sustainability 
Chapter 6, ‘Drafts for the future and visions on digital-
ization and sustainability’, visualizes various different 
realms of discourse and possibility in a concise, narra-
tive form. The Chapter merges selected elements from 
scientific and popular-science sources to form utopian 
and dystopian narratives. These narratives extrapolate 
trends into the future that are already incipient today, 
illustrating them and making them tangible. The dis-
tinction between utopian and dystopian aspects is not 
always clear-cut, and any classification is dependent on 
subjective assessments and cultural preferences. 
 However, the dystopian visions reveal possible  breaches 
of guard rails, such as the authoritarian total surveil-
lance of people by digitally upgraded state institutions. 
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Preparations must already be made today to anticipate 
these breaches, in order to be able to recognize and 
contain at an early stage the threat they pose to sustain-
ability goals. 
Synthesis 
Chapter 7, ‘Synthesis’, develops the connection 
between digital change and the Transformation towards 
Sustainability with its fundamental questions for the 
future. The following three ‘Dynamics of the Digital 
Age‘ are presented to illustrate different, but acute 
areas where action is needed.
 > First Dynamic: ‘Digitalization for sustainability’ – 
using digitalization to protect the Earth system and 
ensure social cohesion: Here, the focus is on the 2030 
Agenda and its SDGs. On the one hand, the aim is for 
digitalization to make valuable contributions towards 
improving and accelerating solutions to global envi-
ronmental and development problems. On the other 
hand, digitalization can also massively exacerbate 
existing sustainability problems and lead to severe 
societal distortions if no countermeasures are taken. 
 > Second Dynamic: ‘Sustainable digitalized societies’ – 
realizing a new humanism and preventing digital 
totalitarianism: This idea focuses on dealing with the 
fundamental societal upheavals triggered by digital 
change. Positive and negative development oppor-
tunities with corresponding challenges on how to 
deal with them are also apparent here. In the posi-
tive scenario, there is hope that digitalization will 
bring us closer to a humanist vision of a sustainable 
world society in the Digital Age. In the negative sce-
nario, however, digitalization entails the risk that 
hollowed-out democracies and digitally empowered 
autocracies will destroy any previous sustainability 
achievements.
 > Third Dynamic: ‘The future of Homo sapiens – 
 discourses on drawing boundaries: This Dynamic 
deals with the most fundamental of all sustainability 
issues: the future viability and identity of the human 
being itself, embedded in society and in the environ-
ment it has transformed. Here, the WBGU asks ques-
tions that sound futuristic, but are already highly 
topical today. 
The key challenge for the world community is to 
 develop a common vision for a sustainable, digitally 
 supported future. 
Global governance
Chapter 8, ‘Global governance for the global Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability in the Digital Age’, con-
tains initial proposals on how the international commu-
nity might agree on common guidelines, principles, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks, and ethically 
justified limits. The EU has a special role to play here: 
on the one hand in developing its own sustainable, dig-
itally supported model for the future that differs from 
the existing models in China and the USA; on the other 
as a player on the international stage working towards 
a shared understanding in a multilateral network. The 
WBGU makes an initial, tentative assessment of the 
potential benefits and impacts digital technologies can 
have on sustainability and the SDGs, suggests a further 
development of the current understanding of sustain-
ability, and presents a charter for ‘Our Common Digital 
Future’ as a stimulus for global processes. 
The report closes with Chapter 9, ‘Recommendations 
for action’, and Chapter 10, ‘Recommendations for 
research’, which are summarized in the following.
Recommendations for action
The Digital Age brings with it new challenges when it 
comes to the protection of fundamental and human 
rights. In the digital domain, the areas of protection and 
the options for exercising these rights are changing, so 
that new assurances are required here. Human dignity 
is the focal, unchangeable point of reference in this 
context. In this report, the inviolability of human dig-
nity explicitly serves as a reference point for making 
digitalization sustainable. Closely linked to this is the 
need to ensure that the digital revolution is oriented 
towards the common good and embedded in a strategy 
of sustainable development. This requires creating 
appropriate frameworks and demarcations. Unless it is 
actively shaped, global digital change furthermore risks 
further increasing the threat to humankind’s natural 
life-support systems. In its stirring paper entitled ‘Dig-
italization: What we need to talk about’, the WBGU 
(2018) formulated subject areas that are taken up in 
the following recommendations for action.
Sustaining the natural life-support systems
At present, digitalization is 
perpetuating existing trends 
towards rising emissions, 
increasing resource consump-
tion, soil degradation and the 




leading to the production of more and more electronic 
waste. There are no signs of the necessary trend rever-
sal in which digitalization is completely decoupled from 
emissions and the pressure on ecosystems, although 
numerous international agreements are already formu-
lating targets for sustaining natural life-support sys-
tems. These must be consistently underpinned by con-
crete policies and instruments at the national level and 
beyond. The WBGU recommends: 
 > Use digitalization for the comprehensive pricing of 
environmental goods: The manifold potential of dig-
italization for monitoring should be used to make all 
consumption of resources and all damage to natural 
life-support systems liable to taxes and charges, to 
decouple economic development and environmental 
damage, and to simultaneously avoid undesirable 
rebound effects from environmental policies.
 > Use digitalization for decarbonization and cli-
mate-change mitigation in the energy sector: The 
potential of digital technologies should be used to 
switch to renewable energy systems. Energy and 
resource efficiency should be made explicit innova-
tion targets for digital technologies and applications.
 > Circular economy, use of resources, toxic substances: 
In the spirit of the circular economy, forward-look-
ing product design in the field of electronic appli-
ances should include longevity and ease of repair, 
and avoid using resources in ways that are harmful 
to the environment or to health. Electronic waste 
should be effectively recycled and illegal exports 
prevented. 
 > Ensure sustainable land use and ecosystem protec-
tion: In agriculture, digitalization should be utilized, 
among other things, to reduce the use of fertilizers 
and pesticides and to diversify cultivation methods 
and landscape design. Digitally supported monitor-
ing helps protect ecosystems. 
 > Support global (environmental) awareness and sus-
tainable consumption through digitalization: An obli-
gation to provide digital information on the external 
effects of products should be introduced; this infor-
mation should be made easily accessible to consum-
ers (e.g. using footprints). Common-good-oriented 
platforms with a focus on sustainability should be 
funded, and the opportunities offered by virtual 
spaces and global communication networks used to 
promote transnational networking. Universities and 
municipalities could create arenas for experimenta-
tion to enable people to experience global environ-
mental awareness in virtual spaces.
 > Actively involve companies in designing a digitalized, 
sustainable future economy: Incentives should be 
created to encourage transparent value chains (e.g. 
certificates and product labels). Public procurement 
should be correspondingly geared towards sustain-
ability targets.
Poverty reduction and inclusive development
The use of digital technologies 
to combat poverty and pro-
mote inclusive development 
can only succeed if the neces-
sary analogue foundation is in 
place and the use of technol-
ogy is integrated into a strategy 
for a digitalized sustainability 
society. Digitalization influences the implementation of 
all 17 SDGs. It should therefore become a cross-cutting 
task of development policy, and this means developing 
corresponding skills. In particular, comprehensive use 
should be made of digital possibilities for resource pro-
tection and the mitigation of climate change. Coopera-
tion with emerging economies should focus more on 
dialogue, scientific cooperation and global governance. 
Against this background, the WBGU concentrates on 
examples in the areas of infra structure and education, 
urban development and mobility, and improved data 
applications in development cooperation. The WBGU 
recommends:
 > Consolidate the analogue foundation, e.g. infrastruc-
tures and education: The use of digital technologies 
to combat poverty first of all requires bridging the 
digital divide by developing infrastructures, creating 
affordable access and promoting digital literacy.
 > Use digitalization to improve development coopera-
tion: The integration of data-based applications into 
development cooperation could potentially lead to 
the development of new solutions. Examples include 
coordinating humanitarian aid after an epidemic 
outbreak, supervising compliance with fishing quo-
tas, and monitoring systems for measuring advances 
in development. 
 > Gear the digitalization of cities towards sustainability 
criteria and inclusiveness: If the use of digital tech-
nologies in urban development in the interests of the 
common good is to succeed, municipalities and urban 
societies must retain creative sovereignty and 
develop into inclusive platform providers.
 > Embed the use of digital technologies into sustainable 
and inclusive mobility strategies: Cities should 
develop models of digitally supported, sustainable 
urban mobility that focus on health and quality of 
life. Digital solutions should be used to avoid indi-
vidual motorized traffic, to improve access to emis-
sion-free public mobility, and to make cycling and 
walking safer.
19
Work in the future and reducing inequality
Labour markets, gainful 
em ployment and the interna-
tional division of labour in its 
present form are currently 
undergoing profound changes. 
However, people will continue 
to work in the future. Joint 
research into digital change 
and the Transformation towards Sustainability offers 
opportunities to establish models for sustainable work 
in the future. The WBGU recommends:
 > Reform tax and contribution systems: Tax and contri-
bution systems should be used as a central lever for 
shaping the two processes of societal change. Con-
sistently pricing environmental goods as part of a 
comprehensive social-ecological tax reform would 
make it possible to reduce tax burdens on earned 
income without restricting the state’s financial leeway.
 > Secure and promote social standards for occupational 
health and safety: Following on from the Interna-
tional Labour Organization’s global dialogue process 
entitled ‘The Future of Work We Want’, an interna-
tional initiative should be promoted to seek agree-
ment on (minimum) standards in occupational health 
and safety and social security, and to negotiate a 
suitable representation of interests also for people in 
digital employment relationships.
 > Develop new distribution mechanisms: New distribu-
tion and alternative participation concepts such as 
an (unconditional) basic income or more direct par-
ticipation in company profits should be comprehen-
sively scrutinized to determine their individual and 
societal incentive value. Work carried out in this 
context should be interdisciplinary and take into 
account the systemic implications, such as necessary 
reform steps for financing such mechanisms.
 > Establish a broader concept of work and new guiding 
principles: There should be a conscious upgrading of 
activities and skills that contribute to sustaining the 
natural life-support systems (e.g. voluntary work) or 
make better coexistence possible by promoting 
Eigen art and societal inclusion (Figure 1). This can 
be done by creating free time or financial leeway and 
incentives, or by integrating these activities into for-
mal labour markets. 
 > International division of labour – press ahead with 
technology transfer: Ongoing structural change will 
lead to a readjustment of the role of developing 
countries and emerging economies. In order to pre-
serve jobs in developing countries and emerging 
economies, technology transfer should be pursued 
systematically.
Future-proofing education 
Education enables people to 
carry out productive activities 
and to think up and implement 
societal innovations and trans-
formations. To this end, educa-
tional content and formats 
must be in line with the key 
challenges facing society and 
promote digital literacy. Further pivotal factors here are 
equitable inclusion in high-quality formal education 
and providing educational opportunities in sectors and 
locations with intensive change processes. The use of 
digital possibilities can significantly improve access and 
provision; at the same time, direct experience remains 
indispensable. The WBGU recommends: 
 > Set up an education pact to provide for periods of pro-
found upheaval and digital dissemination in societies: 
A new education pact for the 21st century should 
merge the broad content and personal competence 
concepts of Education for Sustainable Development 
and Global Citizenship with online media education, 
digital intelligence and an understanding of technol-
ogy. This is equally in line with the kind of qualifica-
tions required for increasingly digital, agile and com-
plex work environments.
 > Take education seriously as an investment in the 
future: The German National Platform and the expert 
forums of the Global Action Programme on Educa-
tion for Sustainable Development have set up struc-
tures that make it possible to negotiate an expansion 
of both the canon of content and strategic measures 
and projects. Necessary qualification measures and 
investments should now be defined in close cooper-
ation with pioneers from real life and laid down in a 
roadmap over a period of, say, 10 years. To achieve 
this, significantly more funds than in the German 
‘DigitalPact for Schools’ must be mobilized, and 
corresponding evaluation formats must ensure an 
upward spiral of ambition.
 > Provide prominent support for a continuation of the 
Global Action Programme on Education for Sustain-
able Development: After the 2019 High Level Politi-
cal Forum review of SDG  4, ‘Ensure inclusive and 
equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all’, the focus in interna-
tional cooperation should shift from monitoring to 
implementation barriers and to institutional and 
financial support for achieving the goals. 
 > Strengthen an orientation towards the future in deci-
sion-making processes: Societal understanding of 
plausible, possible and desirable futures and their 




approach to trends and challenges. Anticipation and 
‘futures literacy’ should be specifically promoted as 
new research and education subjects and consoli-
dated in existing bodies; or else suitable future bod-
ies should be created for the purpose.
Big data and privacy
In the age of big data, both the 
potential for the common -
good-oriented use of data and 
the technical prerequisites for a 
totalitarian dictatorship are at a 
level which, historically, is 
 probably the highest ever. In 
order to defend and preserve 
the foundations of free, democratic, peaceful and per-
manently sovereign societies in the longer term, it is 
essential to promote data protection, freedom from 
manipulation and informational self-determination, 
both nationally and globally. The WBGU recommends:
 > Focus more on sustainability in the use of data: Sus-
tainability aspects should be consistently taken into 
account when formulating national or corporate 
strategies relating to the handling of data.
 > Negotiate a United Nations Privacy Convention: A 
United Nations Privacy Convention should be nego-
tiated covering the global human right to privacy 
(Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights). Effective privacy protec-
tion should be integrated as a cross-cutting issue in 
all areas.
 > Sustainably protect individual privacy and the digital 
public sphere – prevent digital totalitarianism: 
(Mass) surveillance that is not democratically con-
trolled should be rejected, as it threatens the foun-
dations of democracy. Data protection and data 
security should be guaranteed technically and 
organizationally, for example by the strict imple-
mentation of data security and data protection by 
design and by default.
 > Shape the digital structural transformation of the 
public sphere in a way that is innovative and oriented 
to the common good: Informational self-determina-
tion should be guaranteed for society as a whole. 
Furthermore, a broader European or even global 
public sphere must be strengthened in the service of 
the common good. 
Fragility and autonomy of technical systems
Digital technologies are taking 
on increasingly complex moni-
toring and control tasks, and 
societies and individuals are 
dependent on their reliability. 
It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to focus on pro-
tecting the systems from crim-
inal activities, manipulation and espionage, but also 
from organizational and technical deficiencies and fail-
ures. Any transfer of decisions to automated systems in 
core societal areas should only be carried out in a way 
that is methodically and democratically safeguarded, 
and understandable for all those affected. The WBGU 
recommends: 
 > Regard the security of digitalization as a prerequisite 
for the Transformation towards Sustainability: Secu-
rity requirements should always already be taken 
into consideration during the development of soft-
ware and hardware (security by design). A European 
register of technical systems, their outages and dam-
age should be built up.
 > Big data and algorithmic decision-making – create 
legally enforceable rights: Lack of transparency and 
methodological weaknesses can lead to distorted 
algorithmic decisions. Decision support and deci-
sion-making must therefore be verifiable even if a 
decision is only partially automated. In order to 
increase enforceability, such decisions should be 
subject to judicial review by the people affected. 
 > Regulate algorithmic decision-making: There is a 
need for more transparency about procedures, the 
participation of civil society, better information for 
the people affected, and state supervision of algo-
rithmic decision-making. Obligations relating to 
information and labelling for those responsible for 
decision-making, preventive monitoring of technical 
systems in critical areas of application under which 
the supervisory authority reserves the right to grant 
authorization, and liability rules should be discussed 
and established.
Economic and political power shifts
Digital technologies are shift-
ing power and influence 
between states, companies and 
citizens. As a result of strong 
network effects and economies 
of scale, digitalization today is 
largely being shaped by a few, 
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mostly private-sector stakeholders. Individual coun-
tries, too, are already making intensive use of digital 
technology to increase their state power. Digitalization 
will exacerbate existing social inequalities unless all 
people are equally given the opportunity to share in its 
potential. The WBGU recommends:
 > Create public-service ICT and digital commons: All 
people should have non-discriminatory and barri-
er-free access to ICT infrastructures, to reliable and 
high quality data, information, services, knowledge 
and digital commons as a public service. Net neutral-
ity and a reduction in discrimination should be 
ensured. 
 > Strengthen competition on digitalized markets: Com-
petition-law regulations and procedures for deter-
mining market power and its abuse should be further 
developed and coordinated internationally. The role 
of data in the concentration of economic power 
should be addressed.
 > Contain state concentration of power with regard to 
the analysis of large amounts of data: The example of 
China shows the dangers of a concentration of power 
that arise when state and economic power are inter-
linked with digital tools. Citizens of Western coun-
tries, too, are at risk from data-based surveillance 
and abuse of power by both private and state actors. 
Civil-society initiatives should be strengthened at all 
levels of governance to actively insist on the obser-
vance of human and civil rights.
Global governance for a sustainable Digital Age
The issue of ‘digitalization and 
sustainability’ is not robustly 
anchored in global governance 
architecture, nor is there agree-
ment among the international 
community of states on a com-
mon framework for action. 
Furthermore, no suitable global governance has yet 
developed for the globally operating and dynamically 
developing international digital economy. The EU 
should play a leading role by developing and imple-
menting a forward-looking vision and strategy for a 
digitally supported sustainable society. The WBGU rec-
ommends: 
 > Call a UN summit on sustainability in the Digital Age 
with the aim of adopting a charter: 30 years after the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
Germany and the EU should support a ‘UN 
 Conference for a Sustainable Digital Age’ in 2022. A 
key outcome of the UN summit could be the adop-
tion of a charter by the international community on 
‘Our Common Digital Future’. In preparation for the 
UN Summit, a ‘World Commission on Sustainability 
in the Digital Age’ should be appointed, modelled on 
the ‘Brundtland Commission’.
 > Ensure that the issue of digitalization is strongly 
anchored in the UN’s institutional system: In order to 
embed the issue of digitalization in work and strat-
egy-building processes, consideration could be given 
to a UN mechanism for system-wide coordination 
(‘UN Digitalization’). The most complex option from 
a negotiating standpoint, but potentially the most 
enforceable, would be a ‘UN Framework Convention 
on Digital Sustainability and Sustainable Digitaliza-
tion’. In addition, the state of scientific knowledge 
on all sustainability-relevant aspects of the digital 
transformation should be reviewed in regular assess-
ment reports. A body similar to the IPCC or the 
IPBES should be set up for this purpose.
 > Create competitive advantages through an ‘EU 
 strategy for sustainability in the Digital Age’: Having 
its own model of a digitalized sustainability society 
would give the EU an opportunity to make an inter-
national name for itself as a sustainable environ-
ment in which to live and work. Guaranteeing data 
protection and merging digitalization and sustain-
ability to form a model of the ‘digitalized sustain-
ability society’ can be perceived by businesses and 
citizens as a basis for future locational advantages. 
Effective European data-protection instruments 
should be designed in such a way that they can be 
used as international standards to facilitate neces-
sary adaptation beyond European borders. In view 
of the many unpredictable and rapid technological 
developments, ‘European real laboratories for a sus-
tainable and digital future’ should also be  established. 
New normative questions – the future of Homo 
sapiens
Man-made digital technologies 
irreversibly influence and 
change not only the planet, but 
also human beings and preva-
lent ideas on what it means to 
be human. The relationship 
between humans, machines 
and the environment is 
dynamic because all three components can be changed 
by humans via technology. This raises fundamental eth-
ical questions that must be discussed by society as a 
whole. The WBGU recommends: 
 > Anchor research ethics, data protection and a shut-




brain-controlled neuroprostheses: There is an urgent 
need for action here regardless of the stage of devel-
opment, as digitally controllable prostheses and 
implants are already being used for curative pur-
poses today. Contrary to today’s common practice, 
compulsory encryption or shutdown functions 
should be included. 
 > Approval standards and ‘early warning systems’ for 
products and services in the field of human-machine 
interaction: A labelling obligation should be estab-
lished for communication with a machine ‘counter-
part’. Moreover, due to the potentially far-reaching 
consequences for psychological integrity, corres-
ponding licensing standards should be established 
for all socio-technological innovations, i.e. products 
and services related to human-machine interaction. 
Furthermore, a new, more anticipatory technolo-
gy-impact assessment and early warning systems 
should be developed with regard to particularly 
 vulnerable target groups.
 > Continuously adapt our understanding of the ‘man – 
machine – environment’ relationship. Continuous 
monitoring of technical developments is necessary, 
especially with regard to human-machine interac-
tions and interfaces, as a prerequisite for the trans-
parency of the state of technical development, its 
potential and risks. Furthermore, a broader under-
standing of the future than a one-sidedly technolo-
gy-oriented understanding is required for the critical 
and responsible anticipation of the future potential 
and risks of technological developments. In addition 
to expanding education to promote digital literacy, 
the foundations should also be further developed in 
science itself in the sense of research into the future, 
prognosis and technological change. 
 > Create effective and inclusive discourse arenas: ‘Dis-
course arenas’ should be set up to discuss digital- 
ethical topics in the context of a broad understand-
ing of sustainability. These should include science, 
politics, business and potential users. 
Research recommendations 
Both the structure and the programmes of the German 
science system should be further developed in order to 
create and disseminate the knowledge required for dig-
italized sustainability societies, and to strengthen the 
role of science as a space for discourse and reflection. 
‘Transformation research‘ aimed at better understand-
ing the importance of digitalization for fundamental 
societal change processes plays an important role here, 
as does ‘transformative research’, which, with its 
research findings, initiates and catalyses transforma-
tion processes towards sustainable development 
(WBGU, 2011: 22 f.). The contribution of science lies 
not only in stimulating relevant discourses and provid-
ing technically sound foundations for them, but also in 
developing new technologies for digitalized sustain-
ability and preparing them for application. Table 1 pro-
vides an overview of the ideas that the WBGU proposes 
for the further development of fundamental and 
applied research, existing research programmes, and 
sustainable digitalization in industry. These are 
explained in more detail below.
Ideas for the further development of basic research 
Since both digitalization and sustainability are cross-
sec tional topics, both should be put on the agenda and 
disseminated by the key actors in the science system 
(ideas for fundamentally oriented transformation 
research for digitalized sustainability societies). The 
WBGU’s objective is thus to achieve a powerful inter- 
and transdisciplinary mainstreaming of these topics in 
all relevant areas of science itself, as well as in the 
exchange of ideas with business and society. The aim is 
to firmly establish, and then successively expand, both 
a broad understanding of sustainability in the spirit of 
the SDGs and a sustainable design of research linked to 
digitalization.
 > Found research institutes on the fundamental issues 
of digitalized sustainability: The WBGU supports the 
initiative for a new Max Planck Institute in the field 
of ‘Geo-Anthropology’ (Rosol et al., 2018). In addi-
tion, because of the complexity of the fundamental 
issues involved in digitalized sustainability, the 
WBGU proposes the establishment of further 
research institutes – for instance under the umbrella 
of the Max Planck Society, the Leibniz Association, 
the Helmholtz Association or the Fraunhofer-Ge-
sellschaft, or as federal or state government insti-
tutes – in order to be able to conduct research into 
the various facets of key questions of a digitalized 
sustainability society in a way that is free from eco-
nomic and political constraints. 
 > Set up a permanent DFG Senate Commission on Sus-
tainability in Digitalization Research: The WBGU rec-
ommends that the DFG establishes a permanent 
Senate Commission on Sustainability in Digitaliza-
tion Research. The Senate Commission should draw 
attention to digital developments that raise scien-
tific, ethical, legal or social questions and conflict 
with the conservation of natural life-support sys-
tems. It should also point out gaps in research-polit-
ical and public discourses.
 > Formulate and further develop guidelines on sustain-
ability and digitalization in universities and colleges: 
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Universities and colleges should create, or enhance 
and implement, guidelines for their own practice on 
the sustainable use of digital methods and tools in 
university and college activities. For this purpose, 
they should seek ways to share and exchange know-
how with faculties engaged in research on digitaliza-
tion. The topic of digitalization should form an addi-
tional part of the BMBF project ‘Sustainability at 
Universities’ (HOCHN).
Reciprocally intertwine research programmes on su-
stainability and digitalization and develop them fur-
ther in a transdisciplinary way
The WBGU is in favour of a reciprocal reorientation of 
the current research priorities: on the one hand, research 
on digitalization should consistently incorporate sustain-
ability aspects; on the other hand, sustain ability research 
should be further developed in relation to digitalization 
and given a transdisciplinary orientation by incorporat-
ing real-world laboratories and arenas for experimenta-
tion. This can fill existing gaps in knowledge and gener-
ate more insights into the potential benefits and risks of 
digitalization for the transformation towards a sustain-
able structure of the economy and society. 
 > Horizon Europe – embed digital sustainability in 
Europe: In view of its great societal relevance, the 
paradigm of ‘responsible research and innovation’ 
should be implemented as a standard for research on 
digitalization and sustainability. Furthermore, the 
WBGU recommends structurally incorporating 
research on fundamental global challenges (‘grand 
challenges’) into the future framework programme 
on research, and focusing it more strongly on issues 
of sustainable development, digitalization and digi-
talized sustainability. In addition, the WBGU propo-
ses the establishment of a ‘Digital Sustainability 
Know ledge and Innovation Community’ (KIC) at the 
planned European Institute of Innovation and Tech-
nology as a cooperative knowledge and innovation 
community together with industry. 
 > Future Earth – extend sustainability research in the 
direction of digitalization: Digitalization issues should 
be integrated into Future Earth as an important com-
ponent, a global project on ‘eSustainability’ should 
be launched and a knowledge action network called 
‘Digitalization’ created.
 > High-Tech Strategy 2025 – combine thinking on digi-
talization and sustainability more closely: Sustain-
ability should be embedded as a cross-cutting topic 
in the High-Tech Strategy and consistently conside-
red alongside digitalization. As a new global develop-
ment paradigm, the concept of welfare and the SDGs 
should be at the forefront of the High-Tech Strategy, 
and the focus should not be primarily on the concept 
of growth and international competitiveness. Social, 
ecological and cultural dimensions of innovations 
should be reinforced as strategic elements for achie-
ving welfare. Sustainable digitalization, in the sense 
of its safe, resource-saving and energy-efficient 
design, should be manifested for every digitally sup-
ported implementation project. Digitalization for 
sustainability, in the sense of developing digitally 
supported solutions oriented towards the SDGs, 
should become an additional concrete mission of the 
High-Tech Strategy. 
Table 1
Further development of the German research system showing the challenges of digital transformation in the Anthropocene.
Source: WBGU
Strengthening of transformation research
 
Fundamental research on transformation  
processes in the Digital Age
Strengthening of transformative research
 
Transdisciplinary and application-oriented  
research for digital change
Set up research institutes on the fundamental issues of 
digitalized sustainability
Ideas for the further development of fundamental 
research:
 > set up a German Research Foundation (DFG) Senate 
Commission on ‘Sustainability in Digitalization 
Research’
 > guidelines for universities and R&D
Reciprocally extend research programmes for 
 sustainability and/or digitalization and develop them 
 further in a transdisciplinary way:
 > Horizon Europe
 > Future Earth
 > High-Tech Strategy 2025
 > BMBF’s Research for Sustainable Development (FONA)
 > Energy research programme
Stimuli for sustainable digitalization in industrial 
research:
 > Sustainability lines for R&D




 > Link FONA4 with digitalization: The BMBF’s Fourth 
Framework Programme, ‘Research for Sustainable 
Development’ (FONA4), should be used to strengthen 
and further develop the topic of digitalization within 
the goals of sustainability research. To achieve this, 
(1) the connection between digitalization and the 
2030 Agenda should be made a topic for research, 
(2) digitalization should be taken into account to 
ensure the effective implementation of the SDGs, 
and discussions on values should be intensified, (3) 
the discussion should also include the issue that dig-
italization triggers fundamental societal changes. 
The Transformation towards Sustainability must 
there fore be re-considered.
 > The concept of the Federal Government’s energy 
research programme should be broadened: Not only 
market potential but also societal and environmental 
sustainability effects should be considered within 
the framework of R&D projects on energy technolo-
gies and systems. Societal and structural prerequi-
sites in developing countries and emerging econ-
omies for designing sustainable energy systems 
should be given greater consideration in research 
funding, both in the development of new energy 
technologies and in the investigation of the neces-
sary framework conditions. 
Stimuli for sustainable digitalization in industrial 
research
Two thirds of annual R&D expenditure in Germany 
comes from the private sector. It is primarily concen-
trated on high-value technology sectors (BMBF, 2018). 
Companies are therefore important players in working 
towards sustainable digitalization.
 > Integrate ethics and sustainability aspects into in-house 
corporate research: In order to encourage responsible 
innovation, the WBGU recommends that the dimen-
sions of ethics and sustainability should be system-
atically taken into account in private-sector high-tech 
development – in the sense of responsible research 
and innovation (RRI). For this purpose, companies 
should, on the one hand, develop guidelines that con-
sistently integrate ethics and sustainability aspects 
into their internal research. On the other hand, they 
should offer appropriate training and further-educa-
tion programmes to empower developers to critically 
engage with conscious (e.g. privacy by design) and 
unconscious (e.g. gender stereotypes) assignments of 
values in technologies. In parallel, research on linking 
design ethics with professional ethics (such as the 
IEEE initiative on ‘ Ethically Aligned Design‘) should 
also be supported. Research funding should offer 
companies corres ponding incentives.
 > Sustainability-oriented target indicators: The range of 
instruments offered by digitalization makes it possi-
ble for companies to conduct a wide range of obser-
vational and analytical tasks. In order to be able to 
integrate sustainability goals more efficiently into 
production processes, companies should develop a 
set of sustainability-oriented target indicators. Com-
panies could make targeted use of data on resource 
flows and energy consumption for this purpose. 
They should also forge ahead with the development 
of monitoring, warning and forecasting systems to 
ensure compliance with existing limit values.
Recommendations on the content of research on su-
stainable digital transformation 
Compared to the speed and breadth of digital develop-
ment, there is still not enough reliable knowledge about 
the impact of digital technologies on the Earth system, 
societies and people. As a result, socio-political dis-
courses on the effects of digitalization – for example 
with regard to work in the future or energy and resource 
consumption – are characterized by contradictory 
assessments and a lot of uncertainty. Equally, there are 
only initial research results on digitalization’s potential 
for achieving the SDGs and the question of how digi-
tally supported educational measures can promote 
knowledge and action for the Great Transformation 
towards Sustainability. The WBGU proposes the follow-
ing superordinate lines of research to create more 
knowledge for a digital sustainable transformation:
 > Research on digitalization for sustainability (First 
Dynamic): How can digital technologies, digitalized 
infrastructures, as well as digitalized systems and 
end devices be made sustainable, especially with 
regard to their energy and resource consumption 
and the establishment of a circular economy? How 
can digitalization be used as an instrument to imple-
ment the SDGs and for decarbonizing today’s eco-
nomic and societal system?
 > Research for sustainable digitalized societies (Second 
Dynamic): How can societies be preserved that are 
both capable of taking action and able to assess the 
system-changing impact and related uncertainties of 
digitalization, and can also proactively and sustain-
ably shape that impact and successfully counter any 
unintended consequences? Important tasks for 
research include studying systemic risks and 
 potential, developing new forms of inclusion in the 
context of work in the future, shaping human-ma-
chine interactions, and empowering the individual in 
digitalized sustainability societies. Research funding 
on the impact of AI on the digitalized sustainability 
society should be significantly increased. 
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 > Research on the future of Homo sapiens (Third 
Dynamic): As a result of the transformation, being 
human is itself becoming a topic of sustainable 
development. To what extent should old and new 
human images be questioned in the light of possible 
interlinkages between humans and technology and 
the increasing cooperation between humans and 
machines? How can the preservation of human 
 dignity be ensured?
Timely implementation of the recommendations for 
action and research will make it possible to exploit the 
potential of digital change for the Great Transformation 
towards Sustainability and to contain its risks. This 
WBGU report is therefore intended as a stimulus for 
long pending discussions and initiatives on all levels 




Digital change is epochal and opens the door to a new 
era of human development. Big data, artificial intelli-
gence, the Internet of Things, cybersecurity and other 
digital applications will profoundly change systems of 
societal standards and values. They will also open up 
new opportunities and entail risks – in similar ways to 
the previous development of complex human language 
(about 70,000 years ago), the Neolithic revolution (about 
11,000 years ago), the emergence of cities (about 5,000 
years ago), the invention of the printing press (550 years 
ago), and the technological and societal upheavals since 
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Through new 
globally active actors, digitalization fundamentally 
changes living and working conditions, production pat-
terns and the international division of labour, commu-
nication and information dissemination (and the possi-
bilities for manipulation that this involves), international 
cooperation and, last but not least, international power 
constellations. But it is also a significant accelerator when 
it comes to the consumption of energy and resources. It 
is an open question whether it will be possible to make 
use of the new technological possibilities for globally 
sustainable development; it is also the political challenge 
of the coming decades: how can digital technologies be 
placed at the service of global sustainability? 
This perspective, together with its long-term view 
well beyond the year 2030 (the target year of the Sus-
tainable Development Goals – SDGs), sets the WBGU’s 
report apart from most existing global studies on the 
topic of ‘Digitalization and Sustainability’, which see 
digital technologies only as an instrument, while their 
more far-reaching significance for the reorganization of 
societies and for shaping the future beyond 2030 is 
hardly discussed. The same applies to the question of 
which digital development trends should be avoided in 
order to sustain the natural life-support systems and 
social cohesion in our societies. Against this back-
ground, the present report reformulates the key issues 
of global sustainability policy in the context of digital 
change: How can a good life be provided within the 
limits of the Earth system for a global population that 
will soon reach 10 billion? Which economic, technolog-
ical, institutional, social, cultural and normative inno-
vations are necessary locally and globally to make pros-
perity, human well-being, democracy and security pos-
sible within the boundaries of the Earth system? How 
can local and global ecosystems be stabilized? How can 
welfare gains in industrialized countries, emerging 
economies and developing countries be systematically 
decoupled from resource consumption and the pressure 
on ecosystems, so as to avoid tipping points in the Earth 
system? How can a comprehensive decarbonization of 
the global economy be achieved by the middle of the 
century in order to stabilize global warming well below 
2°C? How can such comprehensive transformations 
towards sustainability succeed at all within such a nar-
row time frame? How might such a change be shaped 
locally, nationally, regionally and globally? 
In order to answer these questions and develop solu-
tions, a bridge needs to be built between the networks 
of digitalization and sustainability – in science, busi-
ness and politics. These networks have hardly been 
connected to each other up to now, but they will have 
to be interdependent in the future if a transition to sus-
tainability is to succeed under the conditions of digital 
change. Digitalization research, which is highly tech-
nology-oriented, is an important driver of fundamental 
societal and economic change. However, as the WBGU’s 
comprehensive literature analysis shows, it has so far 
dealt only marginally with the key issues of sustain-
ability research. Similarly, the manifold effects of digi-
tal technologies on the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability is a topic that has hitherto received little 
attention from sustainability research. What potential 
do digital technologies have for the Transformation 
towards Sustainability, especially for sustainable mobil-
ity, the demand for resources and raw materials, cli-
mate-change mitigation, sustainable land use or pov-
erty reduction? This gap is filled by the present report.
Since digital technologies make it possible to change 
human beings to a previously unknown extent, and 
since human beings are at the focus of all sustainability 
considerations, the WBGU has greatly broadened the 





‘Environment and Development’ in this report. It there-
fore also addresses fundamental normative questions 
such as human dignity. 
Furthermore, shaping the transformation towards a 
sustainable society in the rapidly changing Digital Age 
is not just a question of implementation, it also involves 
a high degree of uncertainty. For this reason, this report 
also addresses, and makes recommendations on, the 
challenges of taking action under uncertain conditions 
and the role of science and research in this global crea-
tive task. Strategic foresight and technology-impact 
assessment are important elements for policy making.
The use of digital technologies for globally sustain-
able development is, after all, a new and hitherto lit-
tle-examined challenge for global governance and poli-
cy-making at the national, regional and local levels. The 
report shows that, although many global initiatives 
have been launched, the international institutional 
structure is inadequately equipped to shape global dig-
ital change. At this point, the WBGU’s reflections go 
back to the emergence of the Brundtland Report in 
1987 and the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, and 
raise the question of how a similar new start and para-
digm shift could be initiated and developed for the topic 
of ‘Digitalization and Sustainability’.
Structure of the report
This introduction is followed by Chapter 2, ‘Sustainabil-
ity in the age of digitalization’, in which the report’s 
subject is embedded into the WBGU’s perspective on 
sustainability. A central role is played here by compli-
ance with planetary guard rails and social cohesion 
(Figure 1-1). The normative basis of the report is pre-
sented in the form of a ‘normative compass’, and refer-
ences are made to enlightenment and respect for human 
dignity. 
Chapter 3, ‘Understanding the Digital Age’, provides 
basic knowledge and develops a conceptual angle on 
the facets of the Digital Age. The chapter analyses the 
historical development towards the Digital Age, its 
basic functions, key technologies and essential charac-
teristics, as well as foreseeable changes to key areas of 
human civilization, i.e. to the Earth system, the econ-
omy, society, human beings and technology. The main 
questions include: How are these spheres of life chang-
ing in the Digital Age? Which technologies need to be 
given special attention from the point of view of sus-
tainability and ethics? How do international organiza-
tions in the field ‘Environment and Development’ 
address digital change? 
In Chapter 4, ‘Actor constellations in the digital 
transformation’, the WBGU examines how digitaliza-
tion changes the ability of different actors to act, shape 
and plan, how it affects their power to steer the process 
of shaping global sustainability, and how the actors 
themselves influence digitalization. 
Chapter 5, ‘Arenas of digital change’, deals with 21 
selected fields of action that are particularly important 
for the Transformation towards Sustainability. Some of 
the arenas are at the direct interface between the envi-
ronment and digitalization, dealing, for example, with 
energy and resource consumption or land use. Others 
throw light on the interaction between digitalization 
and key social and economic dimensions of sustainabil-
ity (e.g. working environments of the future, the inter-
national division of labour, digitally supported mobil-
Figure 1-1
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ity). Finally, topics are addressed which, although 
already the subject of debate today, will only impact on 
society in the longer term (e.g. the development of a 
collective global awareness for sustainable develop-
ment). 
Chapter 6, ‘Blueprints of the future and visions for 
digitalization and sustainability’, presents possible 
future scenarios of digital change. It describes conceiv-
able utopian and dystopian developments and juxta-
poses the opportunities and risks associated with them. 
Chapter 7, ‘Digitalization and sustainability – syn-
thesis’, describes the connection between digitalization 
and sustainability with its fundamental questions and 
dynamics moving into the future. Three ‘Dynamics of 
the Digital Age’ are presented. Action-guiding princi-
ples are presented for these three dynamics. 
Chapter 8, ‘Global governance for the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability in the Digital Age’, deals 
with the key challenges for international sustainability 
policy, and submits concrete proposals for political 
decision-makers and societies. Proposals are made on 
how the international community can agree on joint 
guiding concepts, principles, regulatory and institu-
tional frameworks, and ethically justified boundaries. 
The report concludes with recommendations for action 






















The WBGU views digitalization from a sustainability perspective that  explicitly 
draws on a foundation of critically reflected enlightenment and respect for 
human dignity. It proposes a ‘normative compass’, the dimensions of which 
include, first, sustaining natural life-support systems, second inclusion, and 
third Eigenart (a German word meaning ‘character’). Human dignity is both 
the explicit starting point and the target vision of the normative compass, 
since it is of particular importance in the Digital Age, and protecting it is a key 
priority in shaping digitalization. 
2 .1
A comprehensive understanding of transforma-
tion must take the megatrend of digitalization 
into account
In 2015, two major world conferences paved the way 
for the Great Transformation towards Sustainability. In 
New York, the 2030 Agenda with its 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs; Box 2.1-1) was agreed and 
in Paris a binding target was set to limit global warming 
to well below 2°C. Both agreements, the 2030 Agenda 
and the Paris Agreement, define a clear system of 
objectives and create the basis for a global transforma-
tion process. Based on the need to sustain the natural 
life-support systems, the WBGU regards the Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability as a global mod-
ernization process integrating both target systems and 
moving towards a low-carbon society (WBGU, 2011; 
WBGU, 2016b). 
In the WBGU’s view, the goals of any transformation 
are the basis for further in-depth societal debates. 
Change takes place as a learning and search process for 
society as a whole, shaped by actors from business, pol-
itics and civil society, as well as citizens and consumers. 
The WBGU regards societal participation and broad dis-
course among all actors as prerequisites for a democrat-
ically legitimized transformation. The Great Transfor-
mation cannot be shaped without an agreement on 
normative principles and without jointly developed or 
enhanced guiding concepts that describe the future in a 
new way (WBGU, 2011). 
To provide orientation in the complex transforma-
tion processes, the WBGU has suggested a normative 
compass as a guiding concept for the Great Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability (WBGU, 2016a). Along 
with inclusion and the need to sustain the natural 
life-support systems, this compass takes into account 
diversity and formative freedom as fundamental pre-
requisites for a transformation process, captured in the 
German term Eigenart (Section 2.2). 
This normative basis can be greatly influenced by 
fast technological and socio-cultural changes in the 
course of digitalization. Digital solutions are already 
fundamentally changing societal systems such as work 
or the dissemination of information and knowledge. Yet 
digitalization is hardly taken into account in the context 
of the Great Transformation and features only margin-
ally in the SDGs. In this report the WBGU examines not 
only the impact of digitalization on ‘sustaining the nat-
ural life-support systems’, but also the challenges for 
‘inclusion’ and ‘Eigenart’ (Section 2.2). Both as a start-
ing point and as a goal, the WBGU furthermore refers 
to the containment of technical and societal develop-
ments in order to protect human dignity. 
Sustainability in the Age of 
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2 Sustainability in the Age of Digitalization
Box 2 .1-1
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development
In September 2015, the ‘2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
 Development’ was adopted by all member states at a UN 
 summit in New York (UNGA, 2015). Together with the Paris 
Climate Agreement adopted in the same year, it is a multilat-
eral  milestone and key reference point for global efforts to 
achieve change towards an inclusive, responsible and low- 
carbon economy and lifestyle worldwide. The 2030 Agenda is 
an action plan of the international community for People, 
 Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership. These ‘5 Ps’ form 
the five guiding principles of the 2030 Agenda. 
 > People: End poverty and hunger in all their forms and 
dimensions; ensure that all human beings can fulfil their 
potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environ-
ment. 
 > Planet: Protection of the planet from degradation, inclu-
ding through sustainable consumption and production, 
sustainably managing its natural resources and taking 
urgent action on climate change, so that the Earth can sup-
port the needs of the present and future generations. 
 > Prosperity: Ensure that all human beings can enjoy pro-
sperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social and 
technological progress occurs in harmony with nature. 
 > Peace: Foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies which 
are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable 
development without peace and no peace without sustai-
nable development. 
 > Partnership: Mobilize a revitalized Global Partnership for 
Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthe-
ned global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of 
the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation 
of all countries, all stakeholders and all people. 
At the heart of this concrete vision, and the core elements for 
its implementation, are a catalogue of 17 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) with 169 associated targets which are 
integrated and indivisible. The SDGs combine all three classic 
dimensions of sustainability and integrate ecological, social 
and economic aspects of sustainable development. The SDGs 
are as follows (UNGA, 2015): 
SDG 1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
SDG 2 End hunger, achieve food security and improved 
nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
SDG 3 Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all 
at all ages.
SDG 4 Ensure inclusive and equitable, quality education 
and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
SDG 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women 
and girls.
SDG 6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of 
water and sanitation for all.
SDG 7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable 
and modern energy for all.
SDG 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable eco-
nomic growth, full and productive employment and 
decent work for all.
SDG 9 Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization and foster inno-
vation.
SDG 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries
SDG 11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable.
SDG 12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns.
SDG 13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts.
SDG 14 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources for sustainable development.
SDG 15 Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of 
terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
SDG 16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustai-
nable development, provide access to justice for all 
and build effective, accountable and inclusive insti-
tutions at all levels.
SDG 17 Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable 
 Development.
The 2030 Agenda has replaced the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) as a new sustainable development agenda. 
With its comprehensive system of goals and targets, it has 
succeeded in combining classic development goals such as 
overcoming poverty and hunger with classic environmental 
goals such as the conservation of ecosystems, and in further 
developing them in an integrated way. The 2030 Agenda is 
therefore also an important innovation in global governance: 
for the first time, states have committed themselves in this 
breadth and concrete detail to a universal political action plan, 
i.e. one that applies to all. In contrast to earlier development 
agendas, it is no longer only developing countries and emerg-
ing economies that are addressed and called upon to take 
 action; the title ‘Transformation of our world’ concerns every-
one, also industrialized countries. 
Although the universality of the 2030 Agenda is an im-
portant breakthrough, its target system is non-binding under 
international law. Its implementation is the responsibility of 
the nation states and depends on intensified cooperation in 
existing and new Global Partnerships – explicitly including 
the contributions of a broad spectrum of actors ranging from 
(sub-)national governments, local authorities, civil-society 
organizations and philanthropy, science and universities, to 
micro-enterprises, cooperatives and multinational enterpris-
es. Children, young women and men are also addressed 
 directly as “critical agents of change” who now find in the 17 
SDGs “a platform to channel their infinite capacities for 
 activism into the creation of a better world” (UNGA, 2015:  12). 
Like the Paris Climate Agreement, the 2030 Agenda is there-
fore a central attempt by the international community to 
 define a global perspective of the common good and to 
 establish it as a nexus of global cooperation (Messner and 
Scholz, 2018). 
Implementation has been disappointing to date, however. 
The central governance instrument is limited to short, volun-
tary national reporting on efforts and progress to the annual 
plenary sessions of the UN High-Level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development (HLPF). More than 150 voluntary 
national reviews had already been received by 2019 (UN, 
2019). However, the pressure to act and systematic account-
ability within this framework are still inadequate – which is 
why the review mechanism and the participation of non-state 
actors should be reformed and substantially improved 
(Beisheim, 2018; Sections 9.3.1, 4.2.8). 
Although the currently slow pace of implementation is a 
problem known in international politics, the importance of 
the 2030 Agenda should not be underestimated. With its uni-
versal catalogue of objectives, it is not only a guiding concept 
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2 .1 .1 
Digitalization poses fundamental challenges to 
the Great Transformation towards Sustainability 
In this digitalization report, the WBGU takes techno-
logical developments as the starting point for its analy-
sis. Digitalization impacts on the physical coupling pro-
cesses between infrastructures and the Earth system. In 
theory, they thus offer enormous potential for the sus-
tainable use of resources and for sustaining natural 
life-support systems. For example, decarbonization can 
be promoted by intelligent networking and feed-in reg-
ulations for renewable energies, and the environment 
can be spared through precision agriculture. However, 
digital technologies do not only provide the fundamen-
tal infrastructure for controlling the industrial metabo-
lism, they also consume resources themselves (Rosol et 
al., 2018). In addition, there are interactions between 
societal and economic processes and digital infrastruc-
ture systems. Depending on economic framework con-
ditions, societal fields such as employment conditions 
(e.g. work automation) and individuals’ social and 
financial resources can change. As an accelerator of 
existing and not-very-sustainable forms of production 
and consumption patterns, digitalization also poses 
dangers for the Great Transformation, threatening to 
increase the likelihood of planetary guardrails being 
breached.
Starting from the various interactions between sus-
tainability goals on the one hand and rapid technologi-
cal developments and changes for society, the economy, 
technological systems and individuals on the other, the 
WBGU examines three dynamics of the Digital Age: 
The First Dynamic (Section 7.2) concerns the con-
crete combined approach to digitalization and the Great 
Transformation. On the one hand, digitalization has the 
potential to solve global environmental and develop-
ment problems better and faster. On the other hand, if 
it is not shaped and, where necessary, countered, digi-
talization can exacerbate existing environmental prob-
lems and inequalities (Chapter 5; Table 5.1-1). 
With the Second Dynamic (Section 7.3) the WBGU 
looks at incipient changes in societal and economic 
areas (such as the future of work or digitalized educa-
tion). Fundamental questions on societal forms – such 
as data handling, privacy, security, health, inequality, 
the rule of law, well-being and the common good – are 
becoming more relevant as a result of digital  technology. 
The emerging Third Dynamic (Section 7.4) involves 
uncertainties and tense debates about fictitious futures 
for humanity that have been spawned by digitalization 
(e.g. Kehl and Coenen, 2016). Questions are raised 
about what it means to be human and the conditio 
humana – i.e. human beings themselves (Box 2.1.1-1, 
2.1.1-2) 
2 .1 .2 
Combining our thinking on digitalization and the 
Great Transformation directs attention towards 
human beings themselves 
The possible consequences of digitalization for individ-
uals and society require the WBGU to emphasize its 
normative compass even more explicitly than before as 
a starting point and orientation aid for the debate – and 
to call for digitalization to be shaped for the benefit of 
society. 
Digitalization raises the hope that new technological 
and societal breakthroughs could make it possible to 
fully develop civilizational and human potential. The 
WBGU proposes using the diverse challenges of the 
interaction between digitalization and the Great Trans-
formation as an opportunity to focus on human beings 
and their potential for development. In the second half 
of the last century, humanistic psychology, which was 
developing at that time, showed that people draw sat-
isfaction and well-being from being able to be – or 
become – themselves (Rogers, 1963). In contrast to the 
psychoanalytical approach, human beings were cred-
ited with a self-reflective understanding of their needs 
and the possibility of self-development (Maslow, 1974; 
Rogers, 2002). The tradition of psychological human-
ism summarized here ties in with modern humanistic 
trends (Box 7.3-2). 
The WBGU takes up this positive notion of self-real-
ization through self-reflection; it is seen in humanistic 
psychology as a prerequisite both for empathy and for 
creativity in the sense that people are in principle open 
for experience, express their ideas and impulses, and 
can actively shape themselves and their environment 
(Maslow, 1974). With digitalization, another new phase 
is beginning in which human curiosity, diversity and 
physicality can be freed from material limitations and 
for global sustainability policy and a central paradigm of glob-
al governance, it also emphatically calls for a polycentric 
 architecture of responsibility for the “transformation of our 
world” (Chapter 4). 
Digital change can also play an important role in achieving 
the SDGs; this involves new opportunities as well as new risks 
(Section 8.2). 
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constraints, and the conditions needed to largely over-
come deprivation and conflict and for self-realization 
can at last be created for all people. The WBGU’s vision 
here is that of a more profound humanization of people 
with the help of technical systems. Digital technologies 
are already enabling and universalizing transnational 
communication, networking, and information and 
knowledge growth in unprecedented ways. The convic-
tion inherent in humanism that rational people become 
capable of cooperation and civilization by reflecting 
and living out their needs (as also formulated in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948; UN, 1948) is seen by the WBGU as the starting 
point for the hope that digitalization can strengthen 
these human abilities and even help them develop fur-
ther.
The emancipatory hope of a new humanism with dig-
italization can only be legitimized and realized as a soci-
etal process of searching and shaping. The WBGU 
therefore sees an urgent need to create spaces for a 
discourse on democratic self-understanding about pos-
sible futures (Schöppner, 2016). The WBGU proposes 
regarding digitalization and the associated societal dis-
courses on education and transformation as an oppor-
tunity to examine the future viability of societies. The 
aim is not to prepare people for a changed digital envi-
ronment, but to create a framework in which human 
potential can develop in a digitalized and ecological 
environment.
In concrete terms, this means empowering people to 
shape the future, and reflecting on our current under-
standing of education. Historically, every great trans-
formation of societies has been accompanied by a 
transformation of rules and norms, of thinking, forms 
of communication, and culture. These immaterial 
changes often took place before the structural ones: 
human observation, reflection and imagination drive 
deviations, experiments and innovations. 
The 2013 report by the International Social Sciences 
Council (ISSC) and UNESCO introduced the concept of 
futures literacy (future viability): “people’s capacity to 
imagine futures that are not based on hidden, unexam-
ined and sometimes flawed assumptions about present 
and past systems” (ISSC and UNESCO, 2013:  69). The 
ability to imagine and evaluate futures is influenced by 
the individual world views of actors acting intention-
ally and also by a striving for power, interests and a 
sense of justice. The central idea for the implementation 
of sustainability is that of reflection: “systematically 
exposing blind spots, allowing us to experiment with 
novel frames for imagining the unknowable future, and 
on that basis, enabling us to critically reassess actions 
designed in the present” (ISSC and UNESCO 2013). 
Here, future is not understood as a condition to be pre-
dicted as accurately as possible – a future that is 
approaching and for which we must prepare. The future 
is regarded as a result of decisions made and actions 
taken today that is pre-structured, but open in the long 
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Box 2 .1 .1-1
Ethics of technology and responsible computer 
science 
New, often unforeseeable problems are frequently created 
when solving problems with the help of technology (Grun-
wald, 2012:  81). The societal and technological results of the 
Enlightenment are therefore contradictory and should be 
subjected to critical scrutiny. Only humans bear the responsi-
bility for the technologies created by them and their conse-
quences. Thus Hans Jonas’ principle of responsibility, accord-
ing to which the effects of human actions must be compatible 
with securing genuine human life on Earth and all (technical 
or political) actors have a responsibility to maintain the con-
ditions for a dignified existence (Jonas, 1979), also applies 
here. In the context of digitalization, Joseph Weizenbaum 
(1986) reminded “computer professionals” of their “power to 
alter the state of the world fundamentally and in a way con-
ducive to life” (Weizenbaum, 1987:  43). Since in extreme cas-
es information processing can both save lives (e.g. in medi-
cine) and kill (e.g. in drone warfare), in the sense of 
Enlightenment 2.0, this power must be used and promoted as 
much as possible (Ullrich, 2014:  698). Thus, there is a need for 
an “enlightenment about digital enlightenment”, which is 
 capable of “distancing itself intellectually from the digital 
zeitgeist, instead of merely trying to disseminate it” (Capurro, 
2017:  IX). Digitalization is a human endeavour and should use 
pro-active technology design to pursue objectives that serve 
the general public, human dignity and autonomy. Although 
many areas in the world are being modelled with increasing 
success using methods of computer science, this does not 
change the fact that these are models, and models always sim-
plify reality. Its numerical and thus computable representa-
tion in data sets becomes problematic if the model is inade-
quate and its simplification too crude, thus ignoring or even 
distorting essential elements (Ito, 2018). Where people are 
the object of the representation, the danger is not only that 
they are inadequately categorized on the basis of selected 
 behavioural data and thus reduced to individual aspects of 
their existence; rather, the individuals are not perceived in 
their entirety but as mere objects. The only parts seen are 
those that can be depicted in the model; the rest is ignored. 
This is not compatible with a concept of humankind that is 
oriented towards dignity and freedom. Examples include 
 deficient software for ‘predicting’ recidivism among prison-
ers, or the excessive use of scoring procedures (Ullrich, 
2018:  11). In short therefore, in terms of the Enlightenment, 
we must ask “whether we have the technology we need” and 
“whether we need the technology we have” (Kornwachs, 
2009:  39). In  other words, technology must be there for the 
sake of  humans, not humans for the sake of technology.
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term. This also means that future is not singular, but 
that many different futures are conceivable. Thus, the 
discussion about shaping the future comprises both 
plausible and possible as well as desirable futures. In 
order to make necessary or structurally forced transfor-
mation processes as democratic and conflict-free as 
possible, it is therefore important to be aware of this 
selective effect of paradigms and assumptions about 
the world. Looked at positively, it could be said that a 
society’s ability to reflect and its level of education 
directly influence its transformability and future 
 viability.
2 .2
The WBGU’s normative compass in the Digital 
Age 
In 2016, the WBGU presented a normative compass 
(WBGU, 2016a) as an extended normative foundation 
for the Great Transformation towards Sustainability 
(WBGU, 2011; Section 2.1) – and spelled it out with a 
view to the transformative power of cities. In the 
 present report, this compass is applied to the specific 
challenges of digitalization. The compass offers three 
basic orientations relating to the need to sustain the 
natural life-support systems, ensure inclusion and 
secure  Eigenart. 
2 .2 .1 
Sustaining the natural life-support systems
Sustaining the natural life-support systems is a core 
concept of the Great Transformation towards Sustaina-
bility and forms one of the three dimensions of the nor-
mative compass developed by the WBGU (2016a:  133). 
On the one hand, this dimension includes compliance 
with planetary guardrails, the breaching of which 
would have intolerable consequences either today or in 
the future. On the other hand, it involves avoiding local 
environmental problems whose impacts may result in 
complex interactions with global environmental 
changes (WBGU, 2016a).
Digitalization exerts a fundamental influence on our 
current ways of life and doing business; it is thus also 
changing our options for sustaining the natural life-sup-
port systems and securing a long-term, solidarity-based 
quality of life on our planet. The various effects of dig-
italization on resource and energy consumption must 
be critically examined in terms of their impact on the 
geophysical, biological and atmospheric processes of 
the planet and of local environments (e.g. Sections. 
5.2.1, 5.2.6). An extensive global assessment of these 
effects is currently not possible, not least because of 
the difficult data situation (Köhler et al., 2018). How-
ever, their increasing relevance is not disputed – 
 especially in view of the urgency of global and local 
ecological problems. This makes it necessary to actively 
shape digitalization in such a way that planetary guard-
rails and local environmental changes are taken into 
account. Two core questions result from this require-
ment. Firstly, to what extent can the opportunities 
offered by digitalization contribute towards sustaining 
the natural life-support systems? Secondly, how can 
the rapid processes of change associated with digitali-
zation be prevented from exacerbating existing ecolog-
ical crises? The sustainability dimension of the norma-
tive compass provides a fundamental orientation aid in 
answering these questions. 
2.2.1.1 
Planetary guardrails for global environmental 
change
The concept of planetary guardrails developed by the 
WBGU since 1994 (Box 2.2.1-1) defines “quantita-
tively definable damage thresholds, whose transgres-
sion either today or in [the] future would have such 
intolerable consequences that even large-scale benefits 
in other areas could not compensate these” (WBGU, 
2011:  32). The concept was taken up by Rockström et 
al. (2009) and Steffen et al. (2015b) as ‘planetary 
boundaries’ and, in part, even adopted as a political tar-
get (e.g. stopping global warming below the 2°C climate 
guardrail of the Paris Agreement). In its reports, the 
WBGU has developed planetary guardrails for specific 
areas, including climate (WBGU, 1995, 1997), poverty 
(WBGU, 2005) and the oceans (WBGU, 2006). The 
WBGU refers to the following six guardrails (Box 2.2.1-1; 
WBGU, 2014b): 
 > Limit climate change to a maximum of 2°C,
 > limit ocean acidification to 0.2 pH units, 
 > stop the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, 
 > stop land and soil degradation, 
 > limit hazards due to pollutants with a long life-span 
(e.g. mercury, plastics, fissionable material), 
 > stop the loss of phosphorus. 
The resource and energy effects of digitalization have a 
substantial impact on the possibility of complying with 
planetary guardrails. For example, there should be a 
critical examination of digitalization’s impact on the 
possibility of complying with the 2°C climate guardrail, 
on stopping land and soil degradation, and on estab-
lishing more sustainable consumption patterns. In addi-
tion to the hoped-for efficiency gains and possibilities 
for resource conservation through a circular economy 
or dematerialization, rebound effects should be taken 
into account, as should possible increases in the demand 
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Box 2 .1 .1-2
Transcending humankind? Concepts of 
humankind in trans- and posthumanism
Trans- and posthumanism are philosophical movements that 
rethink the traditional conception of what it means to be hu-
man (Table 2.1.2-1). Unlike the humanist ideal, which seeks 
to emancipate the responsible human being from the ‘animal 
and barbarian’ through culture and education, the aim of 
transhumanism is to use the possibilities of scientific and 
technological progress to expand human capabilities, thereby 
initiating a new stage of human evolution. In technological 
posthumanism, on the other hand, the focus is on transcend-
ing humans and their physicality by creating a techno logy-
based species. Critical posthumanism distances itself from 
these schools of thought. It concentrates on the critical fur-
ther development of the humanistic world view, negating the 
special position of humans assumed in humanism and looking 
at humans as part of a continuum of nature, culture and 
technology.
The term transhumanism was coined at the beginning of 
the 19th century; as a school of thought it has developed into 
a movement since the 1950s (Loh, 2018:  34ff.). However, this 
movement is just as heterogeneous as the many orientations 
and approaches that the term incorporates (Coeckelbergh, 
2018: 81). Among the supporters of this movement, econom-
ic liberals and libertarian representatives of Silicon Valley (e.g. 
Kurzweil, Thiel) in particular have attracted a lot of attention 
(Kehl and Coenen, 2016). 
Transhumanists argue that advances in areas such as AI, 
nanotechnology, biotechnology and neurotechnology will ex-
pand the human being’s natural abilities to reach a new stage 
of evolution. The transformation into a posthuman being will, 
it is claimed, be brought about using such emerging technolo-
gies as regenerative medicine for improving human character-
istics (such as health and intelligence). The logic of improve-
ment, body control and disembodiment has had a formative 
effect on the discourse on human enhancement, which aims 
to overcome existing boundaries of body and mind (Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016) Technological posthumanism, by contrast, is 
oriented towards more speculative technologies such as the 
transfer of consciousness to computer systems (mind upload-
ing) to overcome human corporeality and to achieve the eter-
nal existence of the individual mind (Ferrando, 2014). 
 Furthermore, representatives of both movements discuss 
opening up new habitats such as outer space with people 
adapted to the living environments there, or even using 
 artificial super intelligence. 
The ideas of both movements, which cannot always be 
clearly distinguished, are controversially discussed not only 
with regard to their concept of humankind, which focuses on 
its shortcomings, but also with regard to a “philosophical 
naïvety” and contradictory arguments (Loh, 2018:  15). The 
basic philosophical insight into the limits of human experi-
ence and knowledge is frequently missing, as is the epistemo-
logical virtue of corresponding modesty (Coeckelbergh, 
2018:  92). The often inadequate understanding of human 
happiness and the probable overestimation of technical pos-
sibilities are also criticized: “Transhumanism is usually based 
on a utilitarian ethic, whose central orientation towards use-
fulness – for the individual or for a community – is not sub-
ject to the proviso of human dignity, however defined” 
(Schöppner, 2016:  47). The experience of and behaviour to-
wards suffering is rather “an essential dimension of human 
self-conception shared by many” (Schöppner, 2016:  47). Fur-
thermore, it is claimed, the supposed transcending of human 
vulnerability during the process would inevitably lead to new 
vulnerabilities and thus create further physical or psycholog-
ical suffering (Coeckelbergh, 2013a:  19ff.)
Both transhumanism and technological posthumanism 
“largely ignore the fact that an (individual) human being [...] 
cannot be completely controlled, calculated and predicted as 
‘humankind’” (Loh, 2018:  79). Such simplification “on the 
one hand involves a kind of trivial anthropology, and, on the 
other, a fatalism that is frequently even expressed explicitly” 
Table 2 .1 .2-1
Typology of present-day humanisms.
Source: modified on the basis of Loh, 2018: 14, 31
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for energy or negative consequences of novel material 
flows which should be prevented (Köhler et al., 2018; 
Arvidsson and Sandén, 2017). 
Technical developments can help our understanding 
of the Earth system with its complex interactions, tip-
ping points and planetary guardrails. Examples include 
the real-time measurement of temperature, salinity and 
ocean currents, which have become indispensable for 
the climate and marine sciences (e.g. Roemmich et al., 
2009). Scientists have been trying to maximize these 
advances since the 1990s. Under the catchphrase 
‘ Digital Earth’ they hope to give every person digital 
access to a scientifically sound model of the Earth that 
makes historical and future changes to the planet tan-




In addition to global guardrails, specific environmental 
problems must also be kept in mind – even and espe-
cially if their effects only show themselves in the local 
context or are limited to individual states, regions or 
(e.g. marginalized) population groups. Local environ-
mental changes often interact with global phenomena, 
are amplified by them or can, in turn, amplify them 
(WBGU, 2016a:  134). Numerous increasingly globalized 
economic processes, such as textile production, mining 
or aluminium production, are already having concrete 
impacts on local environmental systems. In many cases, 
effects like these follow the pattern of the externaliza-
tion society (Lessenich, 2016), according to which the 
costs of the lifestyles of the wealthier countries and 
population groups are predominantly shifted to poorer 
countries and population groups.
Such local or regional pressures on ecosystems, 
which become invisible from a globally aggregated per-
spective, can also be caused or promoted by digitaliza-
tion. For example, the extraction of raw materials criti-
cal for information and communication technologies, 
such as rare-earth elements, precious metals and rare 
semiconductor materials, has highly differentiated 
effects on local ecosystems and population groups 
(Yang et al., 2013). The high innovation frequency of 
the digital economy and the planned obsolescence of 
digital end devices also leads to a continuous increase 
in global electrical and electronic waste (Section 5.2.5). 
In the future, local environmental problems are likely 
to be exacerbated by the further development and dif-
fusion of such technologies as wearable computing, 
pervasive computing and the Internet of Things (Köhler 
et al., 2018). Given the momentum and speed at which 
digital innovations are changing global and resource 
consumption, normative guidelines such as planetary 
guardrails and the avoidance of local environmental 
problems are important for shaping digitalization in the 
sense of the Great Transformation towards  Sustainability.
(Loh, 2018:  80). Methods of human enhancement (see Topic 
box 5.3-2) are essentially contrary to humanist education, 
since transhumanism – unlike humanism – “degrades humans 
to a passive object of design” (Loh, 2018:  84; see also Dam-
berger 2016). In addition, visions of the future ‘posthuman’ 
commit an epistemological category error, since the goal of 
human self-transformation lies outside the human horizon of 
experience. Technological posthumanism’s reduction of the 
mind to a collection of information in turn raises the question 
of whether the essence of a human being can actually be 
 expressed in terms of information (Damberger, 2016:  32ff.). It 
is also questionable whether, in the vision of mind uploading, 
the copy of a person is still ‘the original’.
By contrast, the perspective of critical posthumanism 
(Braidotti, 2014; Mol, 2002), which has been emerging since 
the 1990s and is based on the humanistic foundation of digi-
tal environmental science, sees a continuum of nature, cul-
ture and technology. For this reason, the ‘post’ does not refer 
to a futuristic world ‘after’ humankind, but stands for a new 
humanism beyond anthropocentrism that does more justice 
to the diversity of humans in their environment. The posthu-
man subject is understood as complex, embodied, embedded, 
relational and affective and unfolds agency and conscious-
ness from collaborative, more-than-human processes 
( Braidotti, 2014; Haraway, 1991; Bennett, 2010). In the age 
of digital and ecological transformations, differentiated an-
alyses of these links are necessary in order to “critically and 
creatively reflect on who or what we are in the process of 
becoming” (Braidotti, 2014:  17). 
This posthuman sensitivity thus makes it possible to deal 
with the complex ethical and political issues of digitalization 
and ecological crises without falling back on the mental barri-
ers of the historically formative dualisms of body and mind, 
nature and culture, nature and technology. In these ethical 
discussions the focus really is on humanistic values of justice, 
as well as on individual and collective freedom and responsi-
bility (Braidotti, 2014; Rose, 2017). It is not a question of 
reversing the achievements of the Enlightenment and human-
ism, but of extending them to do greater justice to the multi-
tude of human-techno-ecological realities. Posthumanism in 
the critical sense “thus does not mean being indifferent to 
human beings or dehumanized”; on the contrary, it “involves 
a new connection between ethical values and the well-being 
of the community in a more comprehensive sense that also 
includes our territorial and ecological interrelations” 
( Braidotti, 2014:  193). Critical posthumanism also deals with 
the question of whether not only Homo sapiens, but also oth-
er living beings or even entire ecosystems should have a right 
to exist in dignity (Holland and Linch, 2016; Whatmore, 
2002). 
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2 .2 .2 
Inclusion – the basis for a good life
Societal inclusion for all is an essential goal of the Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability because, with-
out it, “neither a good life nor sustainable development 
is possible” (WBGU, 2016a:  137). Inclusion aims to 
open up equal opportunities for all people to get 
involved in society and to realize their potential. The 
WBGU bases its concept on human rights and the 
 Capabilities Approach (Box 2.2.2-1).
2.2.2.1 
Substantive inclusion as a basic category
Substantive inclusion forms the foundation for  economic 
and political inclusion. It includes basic opportunities 
for personal realization and societal  participation and 
thus the minimum prerequisites for a decent life. Based 
on human rights and in line with the corresponding goals 
of the 2030 Agenda for  Sustainable Development, these 
include, from the WBGU’s  perspective (2016a:  138), 
qualitatively and quantitatively adequate access to:
 > food, 
 > clean drinking water, 
 > sanitary facilities, 
 > housing,
 > healthcare, 
 > education,
 > modern energy and telecommunications services, 
 > mobility, 
 > waste disposal, 
 > healthy environment, 
 > security. 
Furthermore, with regard to digitalization, it is pivotal 
to enable equality of inclusion in ICT infrastructures 
and the virtual world with the data, information and 
knowledge artefacts that are available there. If this is 
not sufficiently guaranteed, political and economic 
inclusion ultimately suffers. Access to public ICT, the 
continuous expansion of broadband networks and pub-
lic information services, as well as network neutrality in 
the sense of equal data packages – instead of an inter-
net with several classes – are therefore important pre-
requisites for substantive inclusion (Section 5.3.5). The 
same applies to reliable and secure infrastructures and 
information. Furthermore, the conditions for auto-
nomy, freedom of information and education in the 
sense of digital competence, self-determination and 
Box 2 .2 .1-1
Planetary guardrails
The concept of planetary guardrails developed by WBGU 
since 1994 pursues the approach of identifying those states 
of the Earth system that should be avoided at all costs in order 
not to endanger humanity’s natural life-support systems. 
Since then, the WBGU has proposed and substantiated guard-
rails for very different areas of global change, such as climate 
change, biodiversity, ocean acidification, sea-level rise and 
soil protection (WBGU, 1997, 2000, 2006, 2009b). The con-
cept was taken up and further developed by Rockström et al. 
(2009) and Steffen et al. (2015b) with the concept of ‘plane-
tary boundaries’. International policy also includes approach-
es that correspond to the idea of planetary guardrails – e.g. 
the goal agreed in the Paris Agreement to limit the global 
temperature increase to well below 2°C.
The WBGU has described planetary guardrails as quantita-
tively definable damage thresholds, whose transgression ei-
ther today or in the future would have such intolerable con-
sequences that even large-scale benefits in other areas could 
not offset this damage (WBGU, 2011:  32). Firstly, however, it 
should be noted that guardrails do not represent clear-cut 
system boundaries where all damage could be averted on this 
side of the guardrail, and severe, direct damage or disasters 
would have to be expected beyond the guardrail. Secondly, 
the quantification of guardrails is always a normative act, 
since the demarcation between tolerable and intolerable con-
sequences is necessarily based on values. Science can make 
well-founded proposals here, but the decision on setting 
guardrails should be subject to a democratic process. 
Building on this work, the WBGU proposed a set of six 
guardrails in a policy paper in 2014 and gave detailed reasons 
for them (WBGU, 2014b). This paper also contains a detailed 
discussion of the background to the guardrail concept. The 
proposed guardrails are:
1. Limit climate change to a maximum of 2°C: In order to 
comply with this guardrail, global CO2 emissions should 
be reduced to zero by about the middle of the century; 
emissions of other greenhouse-gas emissions should also 
be reduced. 
2. Limit ocean acidification to 0.2 pH units: Compliance with 
this guardrail also requires CO2 emissions to be reduced to 
zero. Other greenhouse gases, on the other hand, do not 
influence ocean acidification.
3. Halt the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: To 
achieve this, the anthropogenic drivers of biodiversity 
loss – e.g. the conversion of natural ecosystems – should 
be halted by 2050 at the latest 
4. Halt land and soil degradation. Net land degradation 
should be stopped worldwide by 2030 – globally and in 
all countries. 
5. Limit the risks post by long-lived and harmful anthropo-
genic substances (e.g. mercury, plastics, fissile material): 
The substitutable use of mercury and anthropogenic mer-
cury emissions should be stopped by 2050. The release of 
plastic waste into the environment should also be stop-
ped worldwide by then. The production of nuclear fuel 
for use both in nuclear weapons and in civilian nuclear 
reactors should be stopped by 2070.
6. Halt the loss of phosphorus: The release of non-recover-
able phosphorus into the environment should be stopped 
by 2050; phosphorus recycling should be achieved world-
wide.
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sovereignty must be guaranteed in order to counteract 
problems such as the fragmentation of the digital public 
sphere, the discourse power of large corporations or the 
manipulation of users, and to make economic and polit-
ical inclusion possible. Ultimately, substantive inclusion 
amounts to being able to recognize and shape the world 
even in the Digital Age, since otherwise there is a risk 
of “structural marginalization” of those affected if they 
are excluded from a digitally pervaded world (Apprich, 
2015:  76).
2.2.2.2 
Economic inclusion instead of exclusion
Closely interwoven with substantive inclusion, eco-
nomic inclusion means not only integration into an eco-
nomic system but, above all, access to formal and infor-
mal markets (WBGU, 2016a:  139). While the WBGU 
flagship report on urbanization especially highlighted 
the labour and real-estate markets, digitalization influ-
ences the dynamics of the economic system itself. 
Shaping this epochal change is also about reducing 
social inequality and preventing exclusion. In the global 
context (UNIDO, 2017:  19) as well as at national level, 
further economic divisions of society are already 
emerging in the course of digitalization (Couldry and 
Mejias, 2018). Questions should be raised here, for 
example about the value of data, their ownership and 
control, as well as about the future role of gainful 
employment and new systems of remuneration and 
social security. It is also becoming apparent that the 
financial and monetary system will continue to change 
as a result of new technologies. With these changes, 
security and transparency are relevant to decision- 
making processes shaped by algorithms (SVRV, 2018). 
Since the imbalance between the power of the most 
important ICT companies on the one hand, and 
 individual users and the ‘network community’ on the 
other, is likely to get worse rather than better in the 
future, further societal debates are necessary here, too 
( Chapter 9). 
2.2.2.3  
Political inclusion as a democratic basis
Political inclusion is not only a prerequisite for the 
Great Transformation towards Sustainability and the 
development of a new social contract (WBGU, 2011; 
Messner, 2015), it also plays a central role in co- shaping 
the digitalized society. The minimum requirements for 
political inclusion (WBGU, 2016a:  141) – electoral, 
information and participation rights as well as collective 
rights and legal protection – are already significantly 
affected by digitalization. Central to this is initially the 
new structural change in the public sphere (Imhof, 
2011; Fraser, 2010; Capurro, 2017) caused by phenom-
ena such as digital filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011), echo 
chambers and the dissemination of ‘fake news’ in social 
media, or the continuous challenge to classic journalis-
tic business models (Section 5.3.2). In addition to the 
freedom of information and speech necessary for the 
forming of political will and political inclusion, at the 
collective level a group-related right to privacy and data 
protection is just as relevant as a reliable legal basis, 
especially in an international and global context. Fur-
ther challenges concern more direct connections with 
decision-making processes within and beyond estab-
lished nation states (e.g. direct democracy, e-govern-
ment, governance of the internet – but also trans-
nationalization, glocalization and global stakeholder 
 processes). 
Box 2 .2 .2-1
Basic human capabilities
In addition to human rights, the WBGU’s inclusion concept is 
explicitly based on the capabilities approach (CA), which goes 
back to Amartya Sen (1985) and Martha Nussbaum (1999; 
WBGU, 2016a:  149, 156). The CA conceptualizes and  analyses 
individual well-being primarily through people’s activities or 
capabilities. It thus embodies universal access to basic oppor-
tunities for human realization (‘capabilities’), which simulta-
neously remains open enough to do justice to their diversity. 
The common basis is the protection of human dignity – re-
gardless of the context of life. In the societal context, individ-
ual well-being is oriented towards possible capabilities and 
activities; individual freedom in the sense of a self-deter-
mined life represents the central normative category (Graf, 
2017:  312). Due to its global perspective, the CA has also be-
come the basis of the UN Human Development Index.
Beyond Sen’s (1985) rather open-ended method, 
 Nussbaum (1999) emphasizes the key capabilities to live a life 
(1) in one’s own environment and in one’s own context, (2) 
worth living in its full length and with good health and nutri-
tion, (3) with adequate satisfaction of needs as well as use of 
the five senses (if fully available), and (4) avoiding unneces-
sary pain, but also (5) in connection with nature as a whole 
while treating it caringly. It is therefore necessary to also 
shape digitalization in order to maximize human quality of 
life. For example, with regard to transhumanism, neuro or 
body enhancement (as opposed to healing), it needs to be 
clarified where, within the framework of human dignity, the 
borderline with dystopian paths needs to be drawn and what, 
by contrast, is left to individual preference and Eigenart 
(Section 2.2.3).
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2 .2 .3 
Eigenart as a foundation for self-effective indivi-
duals and societies capable of transformation
The WBGU already made it clear in its last flagship 
report (WBGU, 2016a) that enabling and recognizing 
diversity is relevant to transformation. The compass 
dimension called Eigenart emphasizes this value of 
diversity both as a resource for transformation and as 
an important condition for well-being and quality of 
life. 
Three such conditions are the potential for self- 
efficacy, for social cohesion and for identity. People 
experience themselves as self-effective in (co-)shaping 
their own living environment, i.e. in the concrete expe-
rience of being effective in their own actions (Bandura, 
1977). Social cohesion, i.e. the cohesion of societal 
groups, is an important resource for successfully 
addressing demands and providing social support. 
Social cohesion emerges from interpersonal exchanges, 
from the experience of living together, exchanging 
ideas, and feeling connected (Diener and Seligman, 
2004; Kahnemann and Krüger, 2006). As regards iden-
tity, identifying with groups is just as relevant as the 
possibility of keeping one’s distance from them. An 
important prerequisite for this is being able to regulate 
privacy. Westin (1970) defined privacy as the demand 
of individuals, groups or institutions to decide when, 
how and to what extent information about them is 
passed on to others. Taking up this notion of privacy, 
the psychologist Altman (1976) assigned profound 
 significance for psychological integrity and well-being 
to the regulation of privacy, i.e. self-determination 
about which self-interests and self-expressions may be 
revealed to whom. The possibility of privacy regulation 
is thus an important prerequisite for the realization of 
Eigenart. 
2.2.3.1 
Eigenart as a guiding concept for the protection of 
individual freedom of development
Eigenart and the conditions for quality of life can be 
both called into question and strongly reinforced in the 
Digital Age. This involves at-times-considerable chal-
lenges for individuals. 
The disappearance of Eigenart is at the core of many 
dystopian visions of the future (Chapter 6) in which 
digitalization and technical progress frequently lead to 
uniform post-privacy societies, where omnipresent sur-
veillance and punishment for deviation not only 
increase direct pressure for uniformity, but also indi-
rectly strengthen self-censorship and thus threaten 
Eigenart. 
Risks – such as the loss of privacy and protected 
areas, lack of transparency about how private data are 
used and automated decisions made, or the logic of 
nothing being forgotten in the digital environment – 
can complicate identity development and create a pres-
sure towards uniformity. If playing with different iden-
tities and trying things out in enclosed, protected areas 
helps people form their own identity from childhood to 
old age, then digital transparency involves the threat of 
an increase in self-censorship. In this context, the 
notion that information is permanently stored on the 
net (instead of being eventually ‘forgotten’) probably 
also creates stronger control over self-representation, 
i.e. a restriction of diversity.
On the other hand, futures are also conceivable that 
perfectly enable Eigenart – i.e. creativity and compre-
hensive identity development. For example, this could 
be a notion of a society in which people have space for 
meaningful activities that generate identity. Since the 
internet offers the possibility of anonymity, it can 
 represent an additional playing field for trying oneself 
out and testing one’s identity. Precisely because digital 
technologies offer many people spaces for creativity, 
new forms of expression and self-efficacy, viable ways 
(in the sense of Eigenart) should be found to strengthen 
this potential and, at the same time, effectively contain 
the dangers.
Digitalization thus opens up paths for many differ-
ent possible worlds and it is this tension that makes the 
protection of privacy, autonomy and self-determina-
tion the core demands of Eigenart. Mental health and 
positively experienced relationships require permanent 
negotiations on making contact and withdrawing – and 
thus also the need to determine how much information 
about oneself may be passed on to others (Trepte and 
Reinecke, 2011; Trepte and Masur, 2017). Violations of 
privacy occur when people are unable to act in this 
regard, and information is made public against their will 
or without their authorization and used for other pur-
poses. 
People and societies should therefore have the abil-
ity to negotiate and discuss in situations where the 
application of technological developments by states, 
companies or other individuals affects their privacy, 
autonomy and self-determination. The special duty to 
protect Eigenart is thus concretely translated in many 
areas of a digitalizing world, for example as e protection 
of individual and group-related privacy, the right to be 
forgotten, effective data protection and effective data 
security. People should have a right to times, places, 
actions or spheres of life that are not monitored and 
where no data are collected. 
This protection of privacy is currently best covered 
by the legal concept of the protection of a person’s pri-
vate life. Private life  in the legal sense, pursuant to 
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 Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
includes “the identity and development of the person, 
as well as to the right to establish and maintain rela-
tionships with other persons and the outside world” 
(Sydow, 2018). Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court 
describes the general personality rights enshrined the 
German Basic Law (Articles 2(1) and 1(1) of the 
Grundgesetz – GG), from which the right to privacy is 
derived, as follows: it has the task of guaranteeing the 
more narrow, personal sphere of life and the preserva-
tion of its basic conditions, which cannot be conclu-
sively covered by the traditional guarantees of freedom 
(BVerfG, 1969; BVerfG, 1973). This includes the integ-
rity of the personality in the mental-emotional and 
spatial – also virtual-spatial – sense (Murswiek and 
Rixen, 2018). The protection of private life enshrined in 
human and fundamental rights is therefore a prerequis-
ite or condition of privacy. If the private life, under-
stood as a legal position, is violated, individual privacy 
may be threatened.
In the private and public spheres, many questions 
relating to the protection of privacy are currently still 
unsolved from the Eigenart perspective.
2.2.3.2 
Eigenart as a socio-political guiding principle
The Eigenart dimension is of enormous importance in 
relation to systemic change processes in the context of 
digitalization. Anyone can use digital possibilities to 
develop his or her own Eigenart at an unprecedented 
level of quality to manage interest groups (for special 
hobbies or special needs), for creative work (using text, 
audio, video and novel combinations), for digitally sup-
ported activities (e.g. novel, digitalized business 
models), or for self-portrayal (in fashion or one’s own 
digital images). On the one hand there is potential, on 
the other there are risks: as a result of using ICT, people 
can be either degraded to transparent and passive users, 
or equipped as individuals with substantive data sover-
eignty and a strong right to privacy (SVRV, 2017). In 
the best sense, digitalization can open up potential, e.g. 
to radically decentralize and diversify production and 
consumption (right up to the visions of a networked 
commons economy). This networking of the miscella-
neous, the sum of the diversity of local, regional or 
transnational sub-publics and counter-publics, holds 
out the promise of a free global network (Section 5.3.2).
2 .3
Dignity as the starting point and target vision of 
the normative compass 
Human dignity – as a central element of an enlightened 
and humanistic way of thinking – has hitherto  implicitly 
been the WBGU’s fundamental normative starting point 
(Figure 2.3-1). If the natural life-support systems are 
not sustained, dignified life on Earth is fundamentally 
impossible, both at the present time and for future gen-
erations (Steffen et al. 2015b). For a dignified life, indi-
viduals need fundamental opportunities to realize their 
potential and a chance to participate in shaping society, 
i.e. a minimum level of inclusion. Protecting the indi-
vidual’s Eigenart also means valuing it as endowed with 
human dignity and recognizing such fundamental cate-
gories as vulnerability or mortality as part of human 
Eigenart. 
In this report, the WBGU explicitly specifies the 
inviolability of human dignity – and the resultant right 
to be respected and protected – as an orientation aid for 
shaping digitalization in the sense of the Great Trans-
formation. 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights” (UN, 1948). The concept of 
human dignity has not yet been conclusively clarified, 
either philosophically or in terms of jurisprudence or 
history (Debes, 2017). What is certain, however, is that 
the protection of human dignity is a globally and uni-
versally valid right by dint of being enshrined in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, many state constitutions (e.g. 
Germany, Colombia, Russia), and as a component of 
international customary law (Dreier, 2013; see Box 
2.3-1 on the concept and protection of human dignity 
in Germany’s Basic Law). Moreover, human dignity has 
shaped history in many ways, not only during the Euro-
pean Age of Enlightenment (Debes, 2017), but also 
during the Roman period (dignitas, Griffin, 2017), in 
the East Asian region (Wong, 2017), and in Islamic and 
Christian doctrines (Shah, 2017). 
2 .3 .1 
Dignity as a highly controversial topic in the 
 Digital Age
The dawning Digital Age brings with it new challenges 
for the protection of human and fundamental rights. In 
the digital domain, the protected areas and possibilities 
for exercising human and fundamental rights are 
changing, so that new assurances are required here. 
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Human dignity, as the source of all other fundamental 
and human rights, is the central, immutable point of 
reference (Section 4.3). The renewed controversy over 
respect for, and the protection of, human dignity in the 
Digital Age is explained on the basis of some typical 
examples of potential benefits and risks, and later 
examined more profoundly in different arenas 
( Section 5.3).
For example, in their proposal for a charter of funda-
mental digital rights, European citizens argue that no 
technological development must undermine human 
dignity (Zeit-Stiftung, 2018). It follows from the  history 
of the proposal’s origins that this technology-neutral 
formulation is today intended to address in particular 
threats to human dignity posed by big data, AI, the pre-
diction and control of human behaviour, mass surveil-
lance, the use of algorithms, robotics and human- 
machine fusion, and the concentration of power in 
 private companies (Zeit-Stiftung, 2018). 
The effects of digitalization on social and ecological 
framework conditions (‘digital Anthropocene’) also 
show how urgent a normative return to dignity now is. 
As outlined by Capurro (2017), for example, digital 
communication can provide significant support for 
fleeing refugees; on the other hand, new technologies 
make governmental and private surveillance possible 
on an unprecedented scale. Likewise, our understand-
ing of the global climate benefits enormously from 
improved supercomputers, models, simulations and AI 
(Jones, 2017), and digital change promises efficiency 
gains and resource optimization. At the same time, 
given the great speed of digital change and potential 
path dependencies, there is also a risk of an increase in 
resource consumption that would be incompatible with 
a dignified life on Earth. 
In addition, dignity is under threat when core areas 
of human integrity (physical, psychological, emotional) 
and identity are encroached upon and autonomy is 
subverted (Christl and Spiekermann, 2016). Such 
threats can arise, for example, through scoring 
(Fourcade, 2016; Section 5.3.3) the use of automated 
decision-making and decision-making support 
(Box 4.3.3-1) and other comprehensive data compila-
tions (e.g. Section 5.3.7), when decisions about individ-
uals that are not open to scrutiny are made on the basis 
of data. The protection of life itself also remains a fun-
damental issue, e.g. in contexts ranging from possible 
armed conflicts with automated or autonomous weap-
ons systems to new, threatening possibilities of digitally 
supported mass destruction (Delahaye, 2017).
Ensuring dignity for all people and for future gener-
ations on Earth is thus a central ethical pointer for 
shaping digitalization in line with the Great Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability. 
2 .3 .2  
Two key aspects of dignity: protection against 
objectification and substantive individual rights
The WBGU regards two aspects of the concept of 
human dignity as pivotal when it comes to  digitalization. 
Firstly, human dignity relates to the protection of 
every person from objectification, i.e. from fundamental 
attacks on their subjectivity (Box 2.3-1). This defini-
tion goes back to Immanuel Kant’s formula of humanity 
in the Categorical Imperative. He argued that every 
human being should be seen as a being capable of rea-
son and morality and never simply as a means to an end 
or an object, but always as an end in itself (Kant, 1919). 
In this respect, the right to human dignity prohibits 
humiliation and ostracism, for example through torture 
Figure 2 .3-1
Normative compass for the Great Transformation towards 
 Sustainability in a digitalized society. The transformation can 
be achieved by interaction and a balance between the follow-
ing three dimensions:
 > ‘Sustaining the natural life-support systems’: Comply with 
planetary guardrails and avoid or solve local environmental 
problems.
 > ‘Inclusion’: Ensure universal minimum standards for sub-
stantive, political and economic inclusion.
 > ‘Eigenart’: Recognize the value of diversity as a resource for 
successful transformation and as a condition for well-being 
and quality of life.
Up to now, human dignity has been the WBGU’s implicit nor-
mative starting point. It cannot be realized without the three 
compass dimensions, but it is becoming an increasingly sensi-
tive issue in the Digital Age due to numerous challenges. For 
this reason, the WBGU explicitly names the inviolability, re-
spect for and protection of dignity as guidance in the sense of 
the Transformation towards Sustainability.
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or slavery. The disputes and discussions of the last two 
centuries have made it possible to overcome discrimina-
tions that still existed in the Kantian concept of human 
dignity, in particular racism and misogyny, and to 
extend the concept to all human beings, as in the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Secondly, the guarantee of human dignity not only 
protects individuals from state intervention (negative 
definition); human dignity also results in substantive 
individual rights (positive definition). This second aspect 
of the dignity concept is expressed, for instance, in Arti-
cle 22 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UN, 1948), according to which every person has “eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of [their] personality”. 
The WBGU has already enlarged upon this second pos-
itive aspect of dignity in the compass dimensions of 
inclusion (Section 2.2.3) and Eigenart ( Section 2.2.4).
Box 2 .3-1
Human dignity in Germany’s Basic Law 
Article 1 (1) of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) 
states: 
“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority.” 
Human dignity is of the highest constitutional value, the ‘fun-
damental constitutional principle’ and thus the most impor-
tant value judgement enshrined in the Basic Law (Jarass, 
2018).
Human dignity enjoys total protection (‘inviolable’) by the 
Basic Law. A violation of human dignity cannot, therefore, be 
weighed up against other conflicting constitutional rights, as 
is the case with other fundamental rights (e.g. health protec-
tion, Article 2 (2) sentence 1 of the GG). The concept of dig-
nity in Article 1 (1) sentence 1 of the Basic Law must there-
fore be interpreted very narrowly: only the core of what 
constitutes a human being is totally protected; the guarantee 
of human dignity in this sense defines taboos (Höfling, 2018). 
Animals or objects are not protected. Whether the fertilized 
ovum in the womb is already protected, or protection does 
not begin until nidation in the uterus (as stated by the Federal 
Constitutional Court), is a matter of controversy. Every hu-
man being possesses dignity; this does not depend on an 
awareness or any specific behaviour. Even after death, people 
have a right to postmortal protection of their dignity 
All state power, i.e. the legislature, government, administra-
tion and judiciary, is obliged to protect human dignity. 
 Furthermore, “German sovereignty must not help other states 
to violate human dignity” (BVerfG, 2015). 
Infringements of the core area of human dignity
As a result of the crimes committed during the Nazi period, 
the historical authors of the constitution placed human digni-
ty at the beginning of the Basic Law, thus making it clear that 
the focus of the Basic Law is on the human being and not on 
the state (Jarass, 2018). According to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, it is not compatible with human dignity to make 
a human being a “mere object of state power”. Every human 
being has a “claim to the social value and respect” (BVerfG, 
2004) which is due to him/her because of his/her being hu-
man (Jarass, 2018).
What belongs to the core area of human dignity has not 
been conclusively defined. A human being becomes an object 
of state action when s/he is humiliated, branded or ostra-
cized, i.e. when his/her claim to respect as a human being is 
denied. Accordingly, torture, slavery, bonded labour and stig-
matization violate human dignity. Not only physical, but also 
psychological, emotional and intellectual integrity is  protec ted 
from state intervention. It has also been clarified that state 
observation and listening-in to core spheres of a person’s pri-
vate life violates human dignity (BVerfG, 2004). It has not 
been clarified which digital applications permitting extensive 
conclusions on, and insights into, people’s private lives are 
now deemed to be intruding on this core area. 
Human dignity can also be violated by the state’s failure to 
act. In its ruling on Hartz IV unemployment benefit, the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court (BVerfG, 2010) clarified that every-
one has a right to a minimum subsistence level for his/her 
physical existence. This includes food, clothing, household 
goods, the maintenance of human relationships and a mini-
mum of inclusion in societal, cultural and political life. It has 
not been clarified whether this also includes a claim to inclu-
sion in the form of digital media. 
Human dignity is further violated when a person is denied 
of his or her fundamental equality with other people, i.e. 
there are no second-class people before the law. Human 
 dignity is therefore an anti-discrimination imperative (Dreier, 
2013). The more societal interactions take place in the digital 
sphere, the more important it becomes to also implement this 
anti-discrimination imperative in that field. 
Human dignity also includes rights: the right to self- 
portrayal (external; promoted by digital technology) and 
self-demarcation (internal; endangered by digital technology: 
 Höfling, 2018). 
At the level of international law, agreements are being 
(and have been) sought to limit threats to human dignity 
through rapid biotechnological progress that also benefits 
from digital technology (Dreier, 2013). A Convention on 
 Human Rights and Biomedicine by the Council of Europe has 
already come into force. There has not yet been a discussion 
on whether, and to what extent, the claim to respect resulting 
from the dignity imperative can be lost as a result of future 
human enhancement through digital technology (Topic 
box 5.3-2). 
Private actors are not directly bound by Article 1 (1) of the 
Basic Law (Jarass, 2018). However, the state must enact reg-
ulations under private and public law in order to prevent the 
impairment of human dignity by private actors; the state thus 
has a duty to protect (Jarass, 2018). This means that the state 
must also prevent threats to human dignity posed by digital-
ization and take corresponding legislative precautions. Since 
the technological transformation of the last few decades has 
been primarily driven by a small number of digital corpora-
tions, which have thus increasingly gained economic and 
formative power, this state responsibility must be particularly 
emphasized and demanded. 
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There is a tense relationship between the negative 
and positive dimensions of the protection of human 
dignity. On the one hand, the inviolability of human 
dignity means that individuals are unconditionally 
bearers of dignity from birth and can thus ward off 
 certain interventions. However, certain conditions must 
first be created to ensure a dignified life for individuals 
(Schulz-Nieswandt, 2017:  29). This tense relationship 
becomes evident when it comes to the borderline 
between the private and public spheres – which, in the 
Digital Age, must be rebalanced between the individ-
ual, the state and the market. On the one hand, the 
legislative protection of privacy from state or economic 
interference seems existentially necessary in order to 
prevent attacks on human dignity, e.g. so that people 
are not seen purely as objects of state authority or as 
profit opportunities for digital corporations. On the 
other hand, the state’s withdrawal from the increas-
ingly digitalized private world of individuals also makes 
unequal treatment and acts of violence by third parties 
possible, which, in turn, restricts the dignity of many 
people. In particular in the context of digitalization, 
these tensions between the private and public spheres 
and between dignity as a defensive right and a protec-
tive imperative should not be eliminated, but shaped 
(Schulz-Nieswandt, 2017:  63). 
Not only in the legal sciences but also in the human 
sciences, the objectification of the human being has 
been the subject of discussion and reflection since Fou-
cault at the latest (e.g. Foucault in Dreyfus and Rab-
inow, 1982). Guidelines for dealing with algorithms and 
big data can be derived from these systematic reflec-
tions both on the enlightening potential of the objecti-
fication of human beings as an object of study and on 
the threat to the integrity of the individual through 
objectification (Box 2.3.2-1). 
2 .4
Conclusions
The Great Transformation must look at digitalization 
not only to exploit its potential for – or to contain its 
threats to – sustaining the natural life-support systems. 
The megatrend of digitalization impacts on all areas of 
society relevant to transformation and can reinforce 
these areas both positively and negatively. In this way, 
the shaping of the Great Transformation and the assur-
ance of its normative foundations gain further rele-
vance. 
The WGBU bases this comprehensive transformation 
on a normative compass for sustainable development 
and shows, using examples, how digitalization can be 
shaped in the field of tension between the three 
Box 2 .3 .2-1
Human beings as subjects and objects in the 
human sciences: tensions and educational 
potential
The contradiction between studying the human being as a 
scientific object and turning towards the human being as a 
subject is fundamental to the human sciences (Foucault in 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). As soon as general laws are 
adopted to explain human functions, for example in philoso-
phy, sociology and especially psychology, and statements are 
made about ‘the human being’ (e.g. limited rationality or so-
cial determinacy), s/he is made into an object. At the same 
time, a potential for overcoming limitations and thus an en-
lightening element emerges from this perspective. This is 
demonstrated by the Rosenthal effect: only after Rosenthal 
and Jacobson (1968) had shown how stereotypes shaped 
teachers’ perception of their students, thus influencing inter-
action with them, could a pro-active, stereotype-transcend-
ing compensatory style of interaction be demanded. 
There has been a discussion in psychology for decades on 
the conditions under which – and the problems for which – it 
is justifiable to turn people into objects (e.g. Groeben and 
Scheele, 1977). One conclusion is that forms of objectifica-
tion should always be explicitly justified and discussed. They 
are permissible in situations where statements are made 
about people in general on a meta-level (e.g. young men in 
Germany have a higher risk of becoming criminal than other 
age groups). Objectification is critical when conclusions are 
drawn about a specific individual, especially when it is un-
clear whether the the justifications given have been under-
stood and voluntarily agreed upon (e.g. among children, 
Woodhead and Faulkner, 2000). From this perspective, 
Big-Data analyses that draw conclusions on individuals, for 
example, can in many cases be described as inadmissible 
forms of objectification.
The distinction between the subject perspective and the 
object perspective is also firmly established at the individual 
level in the human sciences. Therapies use theories on sub-
ject/self object relationships to enable patients to overcome 
boundaries and problems, to delimit and reflect on subjective 
experience and feeling in relation to others (e.g. Butcher et 
al., 2009).
Discussions about the relationship between subject and 
object have the potential to enable people to reveal and re-
flect on possible mistakes and limitations for themselves and 
others, whether in research or for personal well-being. This 
simultaneity of the subject and object perspective, its poten-
tial and tensions, should also be systematically reflected on in 
digitalization processes: data analyses, for example, are per-
missible aids; people and scientists use them as heuristics to 
provide orientation. At the same time, it should be taken into 
account that people’s individual dignity must not be disad-
vantaged by the use of such heuristics.
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 compass dimensions of sustaining the natural life-sup-
port systems, inclusion and Eigenart. Furthermore, dig-
italization is changing the protected areas and the 
options for exercising fundamental rights, so that new 
assurances are required here. The WBGU explicitly 
places its normative compass for this on the foundation 
of respect for human dignity as the source of all other 
fundamental and human rights. 
Finally, digital technologies also have enormous 
potential for societal development processes. They 
 enable transnational communication, networking, and 
information and knowledge growth in an unprece-
dented way. In the long term, this could stimulate the 
human capacity for a more profound culture of cooper-












































In order for digital change to be placed at the service of sustainability, the 
potential benefits and risks must be understood. The WBGU offers an analysis 
of the historical development towards the Digital Age, its basic functions, key 
technologies and essential characteristics, as well as the resulting foreseeable 
changes for key areas of human civilization. The shaping of the Digital Age 
towards sustainability involves great uncertainties, so that adaptable gover-
nance is necessary.
Digitalization is opening doors to the next epoch of 
human civilization. If digital change is to serve the UN‘s 
sustainability goals (SDGs; Box 2.1-1) worldwide, then 
the potential benefits and risks of digital technologies 
and solutions must be understood; they must be used 
and shaped as instruments of the Great Transformation 
towards Sustainability. This chapter summarizes the 
development to the Digital Age, important basic concepts 
and key technologies, its essential characteristics, the 
foreseeable changes in human civilization, and the cur-
rent state of sustainability analyses in the Digital Age. 
3 .1
Development leading up to the Digital Age
The WBGU first approaches the characteristics of the 
Digital Age from different angles: (1) the evolutionary 
history of human civilization, in order to derive paral-
lels with, and differences to, the current transforma-
tion, (2) the development of information history, in 
order to pinpoint the quantities and qualities of the 
Digital Age, and (3) the economic development, which 
illustrates the impact of the Digital Age as visible to 
date. 
The WBGU has a broad, comprehensive understan-
ding of digitalization as the development and applica-
tion of digital and digitalized technologies that dovetail 
with and augment all other civilizational technologies 
and methods. Digitalization has a profound effect on all 
economic, social and societal systems and is evolving an 
ever greater transformative power, which in turn is 
having an increasingly fundamental impact not only on 
the planet, but also on our societies and on people 
themselves, and must therefore be shaped.
3 .1 .1 
Humankind and its development as the starting 
point
In this section, we look at the evolution of human civi-
lization with regard to digital change from the perspec-
tive of humans themselves and their abilities. The deci-
sive factors for the development of human civilization 
were, on the one hand, the constantly evolving human 
abilities such as language and culture and, on the other, 
the increasing systematization and mechanization of 
work and life processes. Homo sapiens has developed 
complex languages, which can convey conceptual, abs-
tract and future content, and created increasingly com-
plex social systems using pronounced skills of learning 
and cooperation – from the first human communities 
and small settlements to cities, nation states, globally 
operating corporations and production systems, the 
UN, and global cultural, political, social and scientific 
networks. 
Equally decisive in the history of humanity was the 
successive and ever more sophisticated expansion and 
partial substitution of precisely these abilities in human 
interaction with the world. For example, the first great 
transformation of humankind, the Neolithic Revolution, 
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was characterized by the mechanization of human 
physical strength in the transition from hunter-gatherer 
societies to sedentary societies, to animal breeding and 
plant cultivation, and to the development of agriculture 
and sharp-edged stone implements. While this trans-
formation was spread over several millennia, the second 
major transformation, the Industrial Revolution, led to 
massive changes in the context of the Enlightenment in 
the space of just one century. Starting in England in the 
second half of the 18th century, industrialization pro-
cesses successively covered the whole of Europe and 
the world, with considerable effects on individual, eco-
nomic, societal and, not least, Earth-system configura-
tions (WBGU, 2011: 81ff.). 
The decisive element was again a new stage in the 
mechanization of work and life processes – this time 
through the use of fossil fuels. The substitution and 
multiplication of human and animal muscle power by 
the combustion of fossil fuels was the basis for the tran-
sition from craft and peasant manufacturing to lar-
ge-scale industrial production. In addition, technical 
innovations, especially electrification, enhanced human 
manual skills, e.g. through machine tools. The conse-
quences were unprecedented upheavals in production, 
productivity explosions, but also fundamental changes 
in economic and social conditions, population growth, 
and increasing environmental destruction. It was only 
over the course of lengthy and fundamental social and 
political conflicts in societies and as a result of two 
world wars that governance systems attempting to con-
tain these issues emerged in western societies. Indust-
rial market dynamics were steered by democracy 
(which restricted concentrations of power), social-se-
curity systems (which cushioned social exclusion and 
the consequences of permanent economic structural 
change), and environmental regulations (to limit the 
destruction of natural life-support systems). 
In 2011, the WBGU recommended actively promoting 
the Great Transformation towards Sustainability in order 
to avert Earth-system change and the ongoing erosion 
of human civilization‘s natural life-support systems 
(WBGU, 2011). In the meantime, however, a further, 
ever more powerful change through digitalization has 
been emerging, which challenges humanity as a whole 
and in which, above all, the cognitive abilities of humans 
are now being extended enormously by computers. Man-
made artificial intelligence (AI), algorithm-based systems 
(Section 3.2.3) and self-learning autonomous systems 
can extend or replace previous thought and decision-ma-
king processes and challenge and globally reconfigure 
our current ways of thinking, doing business and orga-
nizing society. For the Digital Age, too, containing gover-
nance systems will therefore be necessary. 
The question is what impact will increasingly digita-
lized automation have on labour markets and the inter-
national division of labour (Section 5.3.8)? Will there 
be a strengthening of national and international 
inequality trends? Can worldwide prosperity and 
Earth-system stability be better reconciled in the Digi-
tal Age than up to now? Does digitalization act as a ‚fire 
accelerant‘ or as a powerful instrument for achieving 
the goals of the 2030 Agenda? In whose interests are 
‚intelligent‘ systems being designed and used? Who 
controls their application and, above all, who is control-
led or manipulated by their application? And, looking 
ahead, how will the interaction, cooperation and colla-
boration of sociotechnical, self-learning systems with 
humans and the environment develop? What is it that 
constitutes humankind and human civilization in the 
Digital Age with its diverse digitalized automatisms, 
intelligent robotics and AI? It is already clear today that 
the concepts of sustainable and civilizational develop-
ment must be reconsidered and further developed, but 
also defended, in the Digital Age. The UN already must 
contain and use digitalization for the 2030 Agenda, but 
also focus on it beyond the target year 2030. It is neces-
sary to look for ways to make the Great Transformation 
to Sustainability a success using the means of digitali-
zation (WBGU, 2018a).
3 .1 .2 
The road to a digitally networked society in the 
Anthropocene
The WBGU analyses digitalization as a sociotechnical 
upheaval caused by technological progress and intert-
wined with society – an upheaval that can and must be 
shaped. Digitalization does not predetermine society. 
However, purely technology-centred approaches often 
generate unexpected new problems in the form of ‚side 
effects‘ (Mainzer, 2016: 217). These drive new pro-
blem-solving cycles and, at the same time, provide the 
momentum for further innovations and economic pro-
sperity (Mokyr, 2013: 292). In this respect, the digital 
transformation is neither a completely rational shaping 
of technology nor the uncontrolled progress of its 
development, because shaping and development are 
processes which are realized by people and for which 
people are responsible (Grunwald, 2012: 31ff.; Grun-
wald, 2018; Kehl and Coenen, 2016). Society does not 
one-sidedly determine technical progress, nor is the 
opposite the case. Nevertheless, „technological innova-
tions are greatly influenced by the social context of 
their creation,“ which is why there are „effective possi-
bilities for framing them in a political and legal context“ 
(Misterek, 2017: 3). The most relevant development 
paths of society, the economy, technology and the 
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environment are therefore presented as an overview in 
the following in relation to digitalization.
In principle, the influence of information and com-
munications technologies on society and the environ-
ment dates back to well before modern times. From 
cuneiform tablets in ancient Mesopotamia to papyrus 
scrolls in the Roman Empire and medieval codices, to 
modern printed letters, to submarine cable telegraphy 
or today‘s ICT infrastructure, ever smaller and faster 
ways of transmitting messages and information are 
used while, at the same time, mobilizing ever larger 
societal and material systems (Rosol et al., 2018). 
The economic boom after the Second World War in 
the transition from the war economy to the consumer 
society and from coal to oil led to the ‚Great Accelera-
tion‘ (Steffen et al., 2004, 2015a; Mathiesen et al., 
2015), which manifested itself as an exponential 
increase in many key socio-economic and Earth-system 
indicators. Advances in the fields of information theory, 
computer technology, semiconductor physics and 
cybernetics had a mutually inspiring effect. Gross nati-
onal product, fertilizer use and population growth 
increased enormously. To this extent, Anthropocene 
(Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000), ‚Great Acceleration‘ and 
digitalization are interlinked (Rosol et al, 2018). The 
main technological drivers of digitalization from the 
mid-1970s onwards were the continuous development 
of integrated circuits (‚microchips‘), powerful commu-
nication technologies and, most recently, big data 
( Section 3.3.2) and AI (Section 3.3.3). 
3.1.2.1 
From the first computers to the digital network
The introduction of integrated circuits (ICs) laid the 
foundation for the continuous further development of 
microelectronics in the 1950s. The circuits, which are 
projected onto silicon chips using a photolithographic 
printing process, required less and less space from year 
to year, thus allowing more complex designs. From the 
1970s onwards, this made programmable microproces-
sors possible whose speed and memory capacities have 
increased by a factor of one billion since then (Burck-
hardt, 2017: 60f.). The first digital computers of the 
1950s were developed „in close cooperation between 
state and private-sector organizations, had to be opera-
ted by a team of specialists, and were extremely expen-
sive,“ while, from 1960 onwards, far less expensive 
„cabinet-sized ‚minicomputers‘“ became widespread, 
especially at North American universities; they „could 
be operated by individuals, and simplified interaction 
with the user through new input and output interfaces 
(e.g. screens)“ (Schrape, 2016: 12). 
In addition, the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) was founded in 1958 in the context of the 
ideological competition between the eastern and wes-
tern blocks, and in particular as a result of the USSR‘s 
strong lead in space travel (‚Sputnik shock‘). The 
Agency was assigned to the US Department of Defense 
and led to the development of the ARPANET from 
1968. This networked communication infrastructure 
initially involving only four universities was based on 
the concept of packet-switching data, i.e. splitting lon-
ger messages into individual data packets – a basic prin-
ciple of today‘s internet. However, it was not foreseea-
ble at that time „that ‚the internet‘ would develop from 
the ARPANET“ (Lang, 2017: 10). Its decentralized 
architecture, created for military reasons, and the TCP/
IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), 
designed for outages, resilience and robustness, already 
contained the basics of today‘s internet with regard to 
independence from subnets and error tolerance. Never-
theless, it still took more than 20 years before a version 
was developed in the 1980s that met with broad accep-
tance and became the standard protocol. Another key 
step was the development of the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) for transferring data at the application 
level and for creating links between data. The develop-
ment initiated by Tim Berners-Lee ultimately led to the 
World Wide Web (WWW), which is commonly regar-
ded as the internet today, although it ultimately only 
represents the access to applications, services and data 
for end-users (Schrape, 2016: 14f.). 
In the subsequent years, the new technology sector 
and the internet opened up economic potential. Accor-
ding to Lang (2017: 17), the foundations for the emer-
gence of a service sector on the internet and its boom 
in the 1990s were „essentially three factors“: first, 
extremely easy access for ICT companies to credit due 
to the USA‘s low interest-rate policy; second, „open 
architecture, free software and patent-free protocols“; 
and third, „state investment in infrastructure“. Howe-
ver, high expectations of global growth potential in the 
ICT sector led to the bursting of the speculative bubble 
in the new or dotcom economy in 2000 (Goodnight and 
Green, 2010; Pierrakis, 2010). Falling share values, 
liquidity problems and insolvencies contributed to 
rising market concentration, and „Google, Amazon, 
eBay, Paypal emerged from this period as its entrepre-
neurial winners“ (Lang, 2017: 18).
With the development of the internet into a mass 
medium, „the dynamic network was finally able to assert 
itself as the leading metaphor of our time. This rise soon 
revealed itself in the political, cultural and economic 
world which imagined itself as a network in the early 
1990s“ (Apprich, 2015: 127). This also the basis of a 
modern form of data-driven, networked ‚intelligence‘ 
which has become a reality today (Rosol et al., 2018; 
Section 3.3). 
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3.1.2.2 
Origin and expansion of social platforms
The rise of networking to the new leading social meta-
phor was accompanied by the emergence of a „new 
social structure [...] consisting of networks in all signi-
ficant dimensions of social organization and practice“ 
(Castells, 2017: XXII). Against the background of an 
increasingly globalized economy, society‘s demand for 
individual freedom and open communication, and, ulti-
mately, advances in the ICT field, digitally networked 
societies emerged that allowed the development of ent-
irely new information, media, and automation systems 
(Apprich, 2015: 67). With regard to the latter, the „ini-
tially technical, and later increasingly economic, dyna-
mics of Silicon Valley [...] in the 1990s“ led to the for-
mation of a „Californian ideology“ which interpreted 
the effects of ICT in terms of technological determinism 
and attributed societal change to technical innovations 
(Misterek, 2017: 4f.). Digitalization is thus interpreted 
by some actors, e.g. ICT companies, as an inevitable 
civilizational step of evolution, emphasizing opportuni-
ties and disregarding risks as far as possible (Barbrook 
and Cameron 1996). This ideology of technological 
determinism, which developed to the extremes of 
‚trans-‘ or ‚posthumanism‘ (Box 2.1.2-1), was initially 
accompanied by utopian, even emancipatory visions 
such as increasing transparency and democratization 
(Kehl and Coenen, 2016). Since Edward Snowden‘s 
revelations in 2013 about the permanent global sur-
veillance of digital information flows by the NSA in the 
USA and by other secret services, however, the „tech-
nological-deterministic narrative of a better future has 
come under increasing pressure“ (Misterek, 2017: 1f.). 
Beyond the visions and intentions of the actors 
responsible for the positive or negative aspects of the 
development towards a digitally networked society, its 
actual dynamics and global dimension emerged as a 
result of increasing commercialization. Corresponding 
offerings were initially developed and advertised pri-
marily for the younger generation. This helped ‚e-com-
merce‘, online commerce and the market leaders in 
those fields to achieve strong growth. Numerous pri-
vate (and partly public) investments were made in the 
infrastructure in response to the rising demand. 
The expansion of broadband access and technical 
advances in multimedia platforms led to large sections 
of traditional media and communication formats 
moving from radio, television and print media to the 
internet. Further software innovations enabled inter-
active applications and social platforms that rapidly 
spread under the catchwords ‚Web 2.0‘ or New Media 
(O’Reilly, 2007). Since then, multimedia content and, in 
particular, video data have taken up a large proportion 
of data sent via the internet. According to the Cisco 
Visual Networking Index (Cisco, 2019) 6,821 petabytes 
of video and 4,691 petabytes of non-video were sent 
per month in 2017; in 2018 already as much as 12,051 
petabytes of video and 6,959 petabytes of non-video 
were transferred per month, i.e. almost twice as much 
video as non-video data. 
By the mid-2000s, the foundations had thus been 
laid for the rise of globally operating ICT companies and 
their data-driven, platform-based business models 
(Schrape, 2016: 15). For their core business, these com-
































Figure 3 .1 .3-1
Internet users as a percentage of the total population.
Source: World Bank, 2018b
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panies develop and aggregate data and offer devices 
and services in return: today, Google/Alphabet, Apple, 
Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft (also known as 
GAFAM or ‚Big Five‘ for short) provide the central 
infrastructural foundations of the Web world. In this 
way, they shape the online experience of many media 
users in a fundamental way. This concentration of pro-
viders can lead to a „concentration, unique in media 
history, of private-sector power of disposal over inter-
action data and infrastructures, ultimately amounting 
to a privatization of personal data protection“ (Schrape, 
2016: 17). While more than half of the world‘s popula-
tion is already networked via social platforms, the com-
prehensive establishment of platforms in production, 
mobility, politics and administration, for example, has 
only just begun. 
3 .1 .3 
Economic development towards the Digital Age
Since the 1980s, technological progress in ICT and its 
dissemination throughout the economy and society has 
been accompanied by a discussion about its importance 
for the economy as a whole. The general perception of 
a broad technological revolution is clearly reflected in 
indicators of microeconomic developments, such as the 
development of the market values of the largest inter-
net groups and the societal spread of technologies, e.g. 
the number of internet users. However, the importance 
of ICT and its impact on productivity and economic 
growth are not yet equally evident at the macro-
economic level. 
Microeconomic importance and societal 
penetration of ICT
The importance of ICT for the spread of new media 
described in Section 3.1.2 is directly reflected in the 
rapid development of the number of internet users and 
mobile-phone contracts (Figures 3.1.3-1 and 3.1.3-2). 
Although statistics continue to show a marked lead in 
the spread of ICT services for industrialized countries, 
the development in developing countries has been no 
less dynamic. However, the aggregated statistics do not 
reveal the differences that exist between regions and 
countries or societal groups. 
Also noteworthy is the growing decoupling of inter-
net access from computer ownership (Figure 3.1.3-3), 
which can be observed particularly in developing count-
ries and is due to the increasing importance of mobile 
internet access. As a rule, internet access via mobile 
phones is not only less expensive than via fixed-line 
devices such as PCs, it is also less dependent on tele-
communications and electricity networks, which are not 
fully developed in all countries. From a development-po-
licy perspective, mobile communications is a typical 
example of leapfrogging: it enables many people in deve-
loping countries to participate in telecommunications for 
the first time and, via mobile internet access, to use 
banking or insurance services without the country 
having to build a more capital-intensive cable-based net-
work infrastructure, as happened historically in the 
industrialized countries (World Bank, 2016). 
The rising penetration of ICT in the economy and 
society was favoured by in-some-cases massive falls in 
prices for ICT equipment based on considerable techni-
cal development progress. Over time, digital electronics 
Figure 3 .1 .3-2
Development of the number of mobile phone contracts per 100 inhabitants.
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in the form of computing, storage and transmission 
capacity has become more and more efficient, smaller 
in design and, at the same time, cheaper to manufac-
ture. One of the best-known indicators of the high 
innovation dynamics in the field of digital electronics is 
Moore‘s Law. It goes back to a prediction made by Gor-
don E. Moore, a co-founder of Intel, in 1965. Originally 
it said that the number of components or transistors on 
a given area of integrated circuits doubles every year; 
Moore later corrected this ten years later to every 18 
months (Moore, 1965; Flamm, 2018). This prediction 
has been valid since the 1960s and is expressed by the 
logarithmic linear scale in Figure 3.1.3-4a. The succes-
ses in the miniaturization of digital electronics were 
accompanied by big increases in computing capacities. 
In standardized test procedures, for example, (micro-)
processors improved their results in the second half of 
the 1990s by approx. 60% per year, and by over 15% 
in between 2005 and 2016 (Flamm, 2018). The increase 
in computer performance overall in the course of the 
20th century is no less impressive: depending on the 
underlying measure of computing capacity used, there 
are increases by factors between 1,700 and 76,000 bil-
lion compared to manual computing methods (Nord-
haus, 2007). The considerable reduction in the produc-
tion costs of digital electronics over time can be seen, 
for example, in storage costs per gigabyte of data 
volume, as shown in Figure 3.1.3-4b for the years 1982 
to 2018.
All these developments were reflected in the market 
prices of ICT components and equipment and in the 
prices of computing operations in general. Between 
2000 and 2018, ICT equipment, which includes compu-
ters and related hardware, fell in price by more than 
80% in the eurozone and the USA (Figure 3.1.3-5). 
Price falls of a similar magnitude also took place in the 
past; estimates state that the (real) price of ICT equip-
ment fell by more than 80% between 1970 and 1989 
and again by over 77% between 1989 and 2007 (Crafts, 
2018). Over the period from 1940 to 2014, standard-
ized computing operations became cheaper by an ave-
rage of 53% per year (Nordhaus, 2017). These dyna-
mics have been observed to weaken over the past years; 
the prices of microprocessors – whose prices fell by 
more than 70% per year in the late 1990s, taking qua-
lity improvements into account in the form of perfor-
mance and efficiency gains – declined by only just 
under 3% in the years from 2010 to 2013 (Flamm, 
2018: Table 6). The continuation of Moore‘s law and 
the resulting developments in costs and performance 
capacities into the future therefore no longer appears 
secure in view of the current technical approaches and 
architectures (Flamm, 2018). As early as 2016, the pro-
cessor manufacturer Intel announced the law‘s fore-
seeable end within a few years, since further miniaturi-
zation was reaching its physical limits (Walsh, 
2018: 181).
As a result of this price decline and technological 
advances, geographical distances became (in some 
cases considerably) less important for production struc-
tures, although they did not become completely irrele-
vant (World Bank, 2016: 57ff.). In particular, faster and 
more cost-effective communications since the 1980s 
made it possible to split multi-stage production chains 
and to gear their international distribution to coun-
try-specific location advantages (e.g. raw material 
deposits, wage levels, market proximity). Trade volu-






































Figure 3 .1 .3-3
Development of the percentages of households with internet access and computers in industrialized countries (blue) and devel-
oping countries (green) in selected years.
Source: ITU, 2018 
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rably; trade relations were consolidated, and develo-
ping countries were more strongly integrated into 
newly emerging global value chains (Section 5.3.8). The 
price slump and performance explosion in the field of 
digital electronics also considerably cut the cost of com-
puting operations and the applications based on them 
compared to labour (Nordhaus, 2007). Developments 
in the field of industrial robots were a pivotal example 
compared to the existing digitally supported automa-
tion of work processes. After adjusting for improve-
ments in quality and performance, their price in the six 
largest industrialized countries in 2005 was only one 
fifth of what it had been in 1990, which, of course, 
contributed to their widespread use (Graetz and 
 Michaels, 2018).
The increasing penetration of the economy and 
society by digital technologies led to an increase in the 
importance of the digital and/or technology sector 
compared to other sectors. One indicator of this increase 
was the development of corporate values. Looking at 
the companies with the highest values worldwide, 
Exxon Mobile, a company operating in the field of fos-
sil resources, was the number one in 2009, followed by 
companies from a range of sectors (Table 3.1.3-1). This 
picture has changed fundamentally in the meantime. 
Today, the top positions are dominated by representati-
ves of the digital and/or technology sector, partly by 
companies that were not even among the world‘s 100 
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Figure 3 .1 .3-4
Number of transistors per CPU and technology node generation (a), memory costs per gigabyte (b).
Source: OECD, 2019a: 38 


















Euro area: Telephone services









































Figure 3 .1 .3-5
Comparison of (consumer) price developments, basket of all goods vs. ICT goods and services (a); comparison of price develop-
ments of telephone services, and ICT devices in the eurozone countries (b), in the period 2000 to 2018. 
Source: OECD, 2019a: 38 
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Influence of ICT on macroeconomic development
Although, in microeconomic terms, digital companies 
are today among the world‘s largest companies by mar-
ket capitalization, and digital technologies are rapidly 
entering many areas of life and the economy, this dyna-
mic has hitherto only been reflected to a limited extent 
in indicators at the macroeconomic level. 
The ICT sector‘s purely statistical share of total value 
creation ranges between 4% and 8% in most countries, 
in some cases it is thus well below the shares of indus-
try or manufacturing (e.g. in the EU in 2017 according 
to OECD data: industry including energy 19.6%, manu-
facturing 16.4%; Figure 3.1.3-5a; OECD, 2017c). The 
ICT sector‘s share of employment is similarly low, 
mainly due to this sector‘s low labour intensity. The 
capital intensity of the ICT sector is reflected in the high 
proportion of total investment activity compared to its 
share of value-added (Figure 3.1.3-5b). However, the 
exact definition and delimitation of the ICT sector is 
unclear (IMF 2018), and its share of total value-added 
does not fully reflect the economic importance of digi-
tal technologies. As in the case of the energy sector, for 
example, its importance is also boosted by ICT applica-
tions in other sectors (e.g. industry, retail trade, agricul-
ture).
Evidence of the economic importance of digital tech-
nologies for economic growth and productivity has so 
far been limited. Studies of causal relationships are aff-
licted with methodological problems and inadequate 
data availability (World Bank 2016) and show rather 
weak correlations to date (Stanley et al. 2018). 
‚Growth-accounting‘ studies suggest that about 20% of 
global economic growth in the period from 1995 to 
2014 was attributable to investments in ICT (World 
Bank 2016: 56f.), whereby the contribution to econo-
mic growth increased over time, at least in the USA. 
Simulations of the US growth path show an ICT growth 
contribution of 5% during the 1980s, 10% during the 
1990s and over 30% since 2000 (Eden and Gaggl, 
2018: 27). 
Currently, increasing contributions to growth from 
ICT are coinciding with a slowing of economic growth 
and (labour) productivity (Crafts, 2018; Paqué, 2016). 
This observation is sparking a discussion about the 
importance of the digital technology revolution compa-














































































































































Figure 3 .1 .3-6
(a) ICT sector’s value-added as a percentage of total value-added in various OECD countries; (b) ICT investment as a percentage 
of total investment in various OECD countries.
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2018) and about the Solow paradox. As early as the 
1980s, Robert Solow pointed out the apparent paradox 
between declining growth rates on the one hand and 
perceived productivity increases due to computer tech-
nologies on the other: „You can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics“ (Solow, 
1987). 
Different explanations are given for the weak 
development of economic performance and producti-
vity, especially in developed economies (Crafts 2018; 
Brynjolfsson et al., 2018). In this context, problems in 
statistical data collection can also play a role, for exam-
ple (Jorgenson, 2018; {Brynjolfsson et al., 2019a, b), 
particularly since many digital products and services 
are offered free of charge; they are therefore not 
directly covered by the macroeconomic statistics, even 
though they contribute to prosperity. However, such 
problems seem to only party explain the observed 
development, if at all; the same applies to the apparent 
contradiction between technological dynamics and 
weak economic development (Syverson, 2017). 
However, it is also generally unclear whether the 
weakening of growth and productivity might reflect a 
long-term trend in developed economies that would 
have been even greater without digital progress. For 
example, there are indications that temporary increases 
in productivity growth in the USA in the 1990s were 
essentially due to the highly productive computer 
industry, without which productivity growth would 
have declined even more or even been negative (Aum, 
2018). 
Apparent contradictions between observed techno-
logical development and appearances in macroecono-
mic indicators are not completely new. Even during the 
first and second industrial revolutions, steam engines 
and electricity did not show their full potential in the 
form of boosts to growth and productivity until the 
technologies had not only been deployed, but the eco-
nomic structures and business models had also adapted 
accordingly (Crafts 2018). ICTs are often seen as gene-
ral purpose technologies which – like electricity – are 
characterized by a large, broad impact and the potential 
for long-term technological and economic stimuli (Bres-
nahan, 2010; Brynjolfsson et al., 2018). Compared to 
the earlier industrial revolutions, technological change 
in the field of ICT has already taken place faster and had 
a greater impact, for example in terms of labour pro-
ductivity (Crafts 2018: 453). It is (as yet) too early to 
say whether digital progress will generate similarly 
far-reaching, long-term stimuli from an economic point 
of view as the previous industrial revolutions (Aghion, 
2017).
3 .1 .4 
Conclusions: the Digital Age is emerging
Up to now, every age of human civilization has gone 
hand in hand with a technological boost and has been 
essentially triggered and shaped by it. More and more 
people are saying that digitalization also represents 
such a fundamental technological boost and that this is 
currently one of the first stages of a Digital Age. Howe-
ver, empirical analyses are difficult to carry out in such 
transitional situations, and findings are therefore pro-
visional. Nevertheless, the generality of digital techno-
Table 3 .1 .3-1













1 Apple 851 33 Exxon 337 12
2 Alphabet / Google 719 22 PetroChina 287 26
3 Microsoft 703 6 Walmart 204 16
4 Amazon 701 – ICBC 188 11
5 Tencent 496 – ChinaMobile 175 39
6 Berkshire Hathaway 492 12 Microsoft 163 3
7 Alibaba 470 – AT&T 149 7
8 Facebook 464 – Johnson &  Johnson 145 10
9 JPMorgan Chase 375 28 Royal Dutch Shell 139 15
10 Johnson & Johnson 344 8 Procter & Gamble 138 34
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logies and their applications in all areas of human life 
and work and the changes associated with their appli-
cations are unmistakable. 
At the same time, it is undisputed that the Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability (WBGU, 2011) 
has already begun and has reached the societal main-
stream (WBGU, 2016a: 128). In some areas, progress is 
visible, albeit not always fast enough; in others pro-
gress is not visible or too slow. In this situation, digita-
lization offers both opportunities and risks and can 
thus not only become an instrument for the Great 
Transformation, but must equally become an object to 
be shaped in the sense of the Great Transformation. As 
a result, the process of shaping the digital and digitali-
zed technosphere in a way that is in line with climate 
and sustainability goals moves to the centre of atten-
tion. Furthermore, the next push of humans influen-
cing the environment (the Anthropocene) using new 
technological means also seems likely to involve new 
possibilities for humans to influence or shape humans 
– with opportunities for therapies and healing, but also 
with risks to humans as biological beings, their Eigen-
art, societal inclusion and human dignity. 
3 .2
Selected basic terms and functions of 
 digitalization
Terms from the field of informatics or information tech-
nology are sometimes used incorrectly or falsely in the 
digitalization debate. In order to close gaps in under-
standing, this section explains selected basic terms and 
basic functions of digitalization and offers some initial 
reflections on the interaction between people and digi-
talization. They form a foundation for the subsequent 
description of key technologies, the resultant charac-
terizations of the Digital Age, and initial analyses of its 
effects in the ecological, economic and societal context. 
3 .2 .1 
Features and basic functions of digital sociotech-
nical solutions
To improve our understanding of digitalization, there 
now follows a brief excursus on the basic features and 
functions of a digital solution, i.e. on its tasks, modes of 
action and theoretical possibilities. 
Every digital solution uses calculating machines. 
One of the first, then-mechanical calculating machines 
was the pinwheel, which goes back to Gottfried Wil-
helm Leibniz (1646–1716). Today’s calculating 
machines are electronic and use semiconductor-based 
digital electronics. For interaction with the environ-
ment using sensors and actuators, analogue-to-digital 
or digital-to-analogue converters are used which con-
vert voltages that are proportionally dependent on a 
measure into numerical values or vice versa (Lee and 
Seshia, 2017: 180). Digital calculating machines (com-
puters) are widespread, and there are numerous differ-
ent types: nano-, micro- and mini-computers, high-per-
formance and supercomputers, computer farms, desk-
top computers, laptops, smart pads, smartphones, as 
well as embedded control devices, smart cards and 
other single-chip systems. Indeed, most computers are 
evidently not (domestic) PCs, but are hidden in embed-
ded systems (ESs; Lee and Seshia, 2017: x). Approxi-
mately 98% of the microprocessors produced are in ESs 
(BITKOM, 2010: 7–8). They are defined as “computer 
systems that are embedded in devices, plants and 
machines and process specific applications” (itwissen.
info, 2013). ESs are specialized minicomputers that 
often perform only one or a few functions and contain 
software and hardware designed specifically for this 
purpose (ESI, 2019).
According to Moore’s Law, the complexity of the 
integrated circuits used in digital electronics doubles 
every 1.5 years at comparable cost (Moore, 1965). 
Although this has held true since the 1960s, semicon-
ductor technology is now reaching the physical limits of 
further compaction and thus of further increases in 
performance. This is one reason why research is being 
conducted into alternative models for calculator 
machines to reach the next level of computer perfor-
mance. 
Computer hardware, i.e. a computer’s computing, 
storage and transmission units, as well as its input and 
output devices, are programmed using software that 
defines a computer’s logical mode of operation in the 
form of algorithms (calculation rules, Section 3.2.3). 
Software is essentially prepared by transformers (e.g. 
compilers) for runtime environments (e.g. for the Java 
programming language) of the hardware, and executed 
using the operating system and drivers. 
Such software-based systems are not tied to a single 
computer; they can also use a number of connected 
computers, each of which performs different tasks for 
presentation, control, business logic, data access or 
data storage (Figure 3.2.1-1). Specific computer archi-
tectures, software architectures, system architectures 
and network architectures are not dealt with here. 
Instead, references are given to further literature (Bour-
que and Fairley, 2014; Knuth, 2011; Goodfellow et al., 
2016). The actors in the development and operation of 
software-based systems are shown schematically in 
Figure 3.2.1-2; their usage contexts are shown in 
 Figure 3.2.1-3. 
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The software-based, partly networked systems pro-
cess data (Section 3.2.2) according to the programmed 
calculation rules – the algorithms (Section 3.2.3). The 
data can be permanently programmed, or be used via 
software parameters – or else they can ‘calibrate’ the 
calculation rule as training data. Data are not only gen-
erally recorded and syntactically processed by calcula-
tions, their meaning is also semantically analysed and 
processed by logical reasoning or machine learning in 
order to prepare or make decisions. To this end, data are 
also collected, aggregated, transported, transformed, 
combined and/or visualized. This is done both with 
individual values and with simple number series – or 
complex simulation models or 3D-360° visualizations 
and animations in multimedia rooms. 
As Figure 3.2.1-3 shows, the basic functions of dig-
ital systems comprise computation, storage, communi-
cation, experience, reaction and cooperation. This ulti-
mately corresponds to the development path from sim-
ple computers via the established internet of computers 
to the incipient Internet of Things and the forthcoming 
Internet of Cooperation.
(1) Computation is performed on processors based 
on different processor architectures, for example the 
well-known Von Neumann architecture with ‘single 
instruction, single data’ or the lesser known architec-
tures with ‘multiple instruction, multiple data’. Proces-
sors are often used in parallel in clusters (‘multi-core’ in 
the case of similar processors and ‘many-core’ for 
 different processors). 
The data required for computing are (2) stored tem-
porarily via sensors or networks, or permanently via 
internal and external memories; they are thus either 
temporarily passed on or made permanently available. 
Communication networks are used for (3) communi-
cation – both for the exchange of information and for 
interaction – between computers. They differ, for 
example, according to the physical transmission paths 
(wired or wireless, e.g. Local Area Networks – LANs or 
Wireless Local Area Networks – WLANs) and according 
to their ranges – from very short in Personal Area Net-
works (PANs) to very large in Wide Area Networks 
(WANs). Communication protocols such as the Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP) or the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) are used for transmissions in these com-
munication networks. These protocols control and 
secure the exchange of data at different logical protocol 
levels – from physics via bits and bytes to logical con-
nections, transactions and application logics. For exam-
ple, today’s internet is designed as a network of net-
works in which three main network types can be distin-
guished: backbones are the core networks of internet 
service providers (ISPs) and between them; intranets 
(local networks) are used by companies, organizations, 
scientific or other institutions, as well as by municipal-
ities or private individuals. They are given access to the 
internet via access networks. The hardware structure of 
the worldwide internet, in which data transport is pos-
sible with internet protocols and their applications, 
consists of wiring, transmitters/receivers and network 
nodes, as well as switches, gateways, routers and ser-
vers. It can be supplemented by overlay networks, 
which make it possible to implement logical network 
structures, often with their own address spaces and 
protocol stacks for dedicated communication require-
ments and service qualities such as throughput (e.g. in 
Mbit/s), delay (e.g. in ms) or bit-error rates (in faulty 
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Figure 3 .2 .1-1
Types of software-based 
systems: computers are 
 networked to form computer 
clusters. Computers with 
sensors or actuators form 
embedded control units (e.g. 
in automobiles, aeroplanes 
or robots); if they are in a 
network, they are called 
 cyber-physical systems. 
 Recent and current R&D 
 examines the autonomy, 
 cooperation and self-learn-
ing of these systems. 
Source: WBGU
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set up and operated more flexibly with the help of con-
cepts for virtualizing network functions and for defin-
ing networks using software. 
The ability to (4) experience is implemented by sen-
sors that use various methods, e.g. mechanical, thermo-
electric, resistive, piezoelectric, capacitive, inductive, 
optical, magnetic, optomagnetic or virtual (for data col-
lection from the internet), to measure data and make 
them available in either analogue or digital form. For 
analogue sensors, analogue-to-digital converters are 
required to process the measured physical quantities 
digitally (Lee and Seshia, 2017: 180). The data collected 
in this way from the real or virtual environment are 
forwarded in the Internet of Things (IoT; Section 3.3.1) 
to the networked, software-based systems for further 
processing – either directly at the point of data collec-
tion (fog computing), or indirectly (edge computing), or 
remotely from the point of data collection (cloud com-
puting). Examples of sensors include speedometers in 
cars, thermometers in buildings, cameras in public 
spaces, and various environmental sensors (e.g. for 
measuring air quality). These days, even a typical 
smartphone contains a variety of sensors such as accel-
erometers, rotation sensors, GPS sensors,  magnetic-field 
sensors, cameras, microphones, brightness sensors, 
proximity sensors, barometers, hygrometers, pulse 
monitors, thermometers, eye trackers or fingerprint 
sensors. 
(5) Action is implemented by actuators that generate 
effects in the real or virtual environment through 
movement, deformation or information. So while sen-
sors measure physical quantities, actuators influence 
them (Lee and Seshia, 2017: 179; Gunes et al., 
2014: 4245f.). Actuators can be based on mechanical 
(pneumatic or hydraulic), electromechanical, biological, 
optical, thermal, electronic or digital principles. They 
are digitally or analogue-controlled, whereby the latter 























Figure 3 .2 .1-2
The actors of a networked software-based system in the development and usage context. Today, a software-based, often net-
worked system, also known as a digital networked system, is typically accessible to users via graphical user interfaces. The com-
puters involved and the services offered are configured, maintained and offered by the operators according to an operation 
model. The options of the operation model are determined by the functions of the software-based system, as designed in the 
conceptual model, presented to the contractors and implemented by the developers. 
Source: WBGU
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tion from the control unit. “The best known actuators 
are electric motors and electromagnets” (Gerke, 
2012: 5). One actuator in a smartphone, for example, is 
the vibration motor. 
Input and output devices of computers that are 
equipped with sensors for experiencing and/or actua-
tors for influencing the environment, use various physi-
cal, chemical or biological measuring procedures, which 
are connected to the computer using analogue-digital 
or digital-analogue converters. Well-known input 
devices such as keyboard and mouse can also be 
regarded as sensors; monitors are actuators. Touch pan-
els or smart glasses, which are used for both input and 
output, function simultaneously as sensors and actua-
tors. The results are made available to users via output 
components or output devices (Figure 3.2.1-4).
(6) Cooperation refers to human-machine interac-
tions, machine-machine interactions, and machine-en-
vironment interactions. In the context of autonomous 
systems, such as robots in industrial automation or 
automated driving, all three forms of interaction are 
currently experiencing new developments in the design 
of cooperation forms. In human-robot interaction, for 
example, a distinction is made between forms of coop-
eration and collaboration. Forms of cooperation are 
implemented in workspaces that are permanently 
physically separated or have virtual fences, or some-
times in workspaces that can be shared, where various 
restrictions are defined for velocities and forces, and a 
suitable system of workspace monitoring is used. In 
human-robot collaboration, on the other hand, there is 
conscious, deliberate contact between humans and 
robots, with both working on a project simultaneously 
and able to coordinate their movements, e.g. through 
guidance by hand.
3 .2 .2 
Data, metadata, data catalogues and data rooms
In terms of information technology, data are rep-
resentations of information in digitalized form that are 
(machine-)readable and editable and can be (further) 
processed, stored, transmitted and (re-)interpreted. In 
general, data are represented in bit strings and can be 
understood with the help of descriptions of correct 
character strings (syntax), descriptions of correct value 
sets (type system) or descriptions of logical relation-
ships between values and value sets (ontology, Krcmar, 
2015). Data can be categorized in many different ways: 
 > according to their structure as either unstructured 
data (i.e. they do not have a given structure; e.g. 
texts), semi-structured data (i.e. data with a mix of 
specified and unspecified structures; e.g. documents 
with fixed content specifications and free contents), 
or structured data (i.e. data which completely follow 
a specified structure; e.g. data used in machi-
ne-to-machine communication);
 > according to their contents, e.g. environmental data, 
mobility data, energy data, etc.;
 > according to their reference to individuals, such as 
personal data (data that relate directly to an indivi-
dual), person-related data (data that can be indi-










Figure 3 .2 .1-3
Basic functions of digital systems in their temporal and future development. The basic functions of digital systems include, in 
order of their historical and future development, (1) computing data and (2) storing data, (3) communicating (forwarding data), 
and (4) experiencing (capturing data). They can (5) act in their environment and (6) cooperate with the environment and its ac-
tors. This ultimately corresponds to the development path from simple computers via the established internet of computers to 
the incipient Internet of Things (IoT; Section 3.3.1) and the forthcoming Internet of Cooperation. 
Source: WBGU
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or non-person-related data;
 > according to their source, such as sensor-generated, 
behaviour-generated, measured or empirically 
recorded data;
 > according to their originality in raw data (e.g. direct 
measurement results) and derived data (i.e. data 
derived from other data) or aggregated data (i.e. 
data generated from the combination of several 
data);
 > according to their consistency as transient or per-
sistent data; 
 > according to their topicality as real-time, near-real-
time or historical data;
 > according to their condition as discrete data (i.e. data 
at a countable number of points in time) or continu-
ous data (i.e. data at every point in time, also refer-
red to as data streams).
Furthermore, data that describe the structure and con-
tent of other data are referred to as metadata. For 
example, the (content) data of a telephone call includes 
the actual conversation; data on who held the conver-
sation when, with whom and where are stored in the 
metadata. 
Metadata allow data to be categorized and traced. 
The metadata can also contain copyright and usage 
rights, responsibilities, or storage locations and ver-
sions of the data (Klessmann et al., 2012: 424ff.). Just 
as books are administered using their bibliographic 
information in library catalogues, data are managed 
using their metadata in data catalogues. Data cata-
logues, too, are in turn subject to copyright and rights 
of use, and can be understood in their entirety as data 
which are in turn described using metadata (Krcmar, 
2015). 
Using data catalogues and the associated data, data 
rooms can be created, making joint technologies, tools 
and procedures for data processing available to 
 providers, processors or users. Access to such data 
rooms can be provided either within an organization, 
across organizations or to the general public (Schiefer-
decker et al., 2018; Section 5.2.7.4).
The term data market has become established for 
commercial data rooms that sell data and the services 
built upon them. Examples include mobility-data mar-
ketplaces, energy-data marketplaces and marketplaces 
for geoinformation. The term data portal is often used 
for generally accessible data rooms. From a societal 
point of view, regional data rooms are of particular 
interest because they can offer transfers between the 
various data offerings of the public sector, companies, 
academia and politics (Schieferdecker et al., 2018) and 
often reflect regional societal and economic  interactions. 
On social platforms, where value-added is often 
drawn from the behaviour-generated data of the plat-
form users, neither the data, metadata nor underlying 
commercial processes are currently made explicit; they 
thus largely elude possibilities for transparency and 
control. High-quality data, metadata and data cata-
logues have high informational, knowledge and eco-
nomic potential. They are therefore typically subject to 
special data-security requirements in terms of access 
options and/or encryption. Personal and person-re-
lated data are also subject to data-protection regula-
tions, e.g. the EU’s Basic Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). There is still no uniform worldwide data regime 
that equally covers data quality, data security, data pro-
tection and data trading. At the European level, the 
GDPR has taken the first step towards achieving greater 
data sovereignty for platform users and application 
users and the underlying commercial data markets. Dis-
cussions on the value of data and possible pricing are 
underway worldwide (Lim et al., 2018; Seibert and 
Gründinger, 2018; van Lieshout, 2015) with the aim of 
integrating the transactions associated with the data 
more seamlessly into existing economic and control 
structures. The EU is working on a European data room 
and has developed initial regulations to this end with 
the GDPR and the PSI Directive (Directive on the re-use 
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Figure 3 .2 .1-4
Human-machine interaction: Via human-machine interfaces, 
machines receive textual, verbal or gestural orders from the 
users, which are transmitted via input devices and then calcu-
lated. The results are given to the users visually, haptically or 
auditorily via output devices. The orders received by machines 
from other machines via machine-machine interfaces are not 
shown here. 
Source: WBGU (extension of Schlick et al., 2018)
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3 .2 .3 
A brief introduction to algorithms, computability 
and heuristics
Alongside data (Sections 3.2.2, 3.3.2) and AI (Section 
3.3.3), the term algorithm is currently on everyone’s 
lips. In general, this term is associated with increasing 
automation through digitalization, which extends into 
system-relevant societal areas such as finance (e.g. 
high-frequency trading), police work (e.g. automated 
video surveillance and facial recognition) and social 
systems (e.g. automated social notifications). 
In general, an algorithm is a rule of action for solving 
a given problem (or, more precisely, a class of prob-
lems). Algorithms are therefore always explicit and well 
defined, even if the respective manifestation of this 
rule of action in the application of an algorithm using 
concrete data and calculations cannot always be traced.
Algorithms already existed before digitalization. 
They were used, for example, in ancient Egypt to create 
right angles with the twelve-knot cord in civil engineer-
ing (Cantor, 1894: 64) and in antiquity to determine the 
largest common divisor with the Euclidean algorithm 
(Ziegenbalg et al., 1996: 60ff.). With the development 
of calculating machines, however, the definition of an 
algorithm was formalized mathematically by Alan 
Turing (Turing, 2008), Alonzo Church (Church, 1962), 
Noam Chomsky (Chomsky and Lightfoot, 2002), Andrei 
Markov (Markov, 1954) and others. Mathematically, an 
algorithm corresponds to a calculable function; in terms 
of information technology, an algorithm is a determin-
istic calculation rule. Based on current information, all 
definitions of algorithms are equally powerful; they can 
thus solve the same class of calculation tasks (problem 
classes) and be realized using the Turing machine, a 
basic computing model developed by Alan Turing in 
1936 (Eberbach et al., 2004; Siegelmann, 1995). The 
Church-Turing thesis states that the class of Turing-cal-
culable functions corresponds to the class of intuitively 
calculable functions, i.e. they can be calculated with a 
Turing machine. Mathematically, computability is char-
acterized by µ-recursive functions (Cooper, 2017). In 
computers, algorithms, the logical calculation rules, are 
realized by programs in software or hardware including 
the required data. At this point it is important to point 
out that verified and validated algorithms, i.e. algo-
rithms proven to be correct, can be incorrectly imple-
mented in software, hardware and/or data, or be incor-
rectly configured and used, so that the algorithm ulti-
mately used can produce incorrect results. Even if an 
algorithm is correct, this certainly does not mean that it 
is implemented or operated correctly.
The limits of computability are currently being 
explored in two directions: on the one hand, it is 
expected that quantum computing (Section 3.2.6) with 
its ‘qubits’ requires a potentially new calculation model 
– although quantum computing can be simulated with 
the existing computer infrastructure. On other hand, 
machine-learning methods (Section 3.3.3) use in par-
ticular statistical methods to classify data, which can 
apparently be realized with today’s computer infra-
structures, but could nevertheless mean a different 
access to computability. A better understanding of 
uncomputability is therefore also being sought (Soare, 
2007; Cooper and Piergiorgio, 2003; Cooper, 2012; 
Box 3.2.3-1).
3 .2 .4 
A brief history of automation and artificial 
 intelligence
While the term ‘automat’ in the sense of an inde-
pendently (autonomously) functioning machine was 
already coined in antiquity in a literary context, auto-
mation has been a practical, technical and scientific 
reality since the beginning of modern times. From 
Leonardo da Vinci’s construction plans to Baroque, 
clockwork-driven automatons to the human/machine 
imagery of the French physician and philosopher Julien 
Offray de La Mettrie, the age of mechanics laid the first 
foundation stone for a naturalistic-deterministic view 
of the world and the human self-image. The latter cul-
minated not least in Leibniz’s slogan “Calculemus!” and 
thus in a universal form of mathematics that reduced 
thought and knowledge to arithmetic and led to the 
first mechanical calculators. The next important step 
towards (algorithm-based) sequential program control 
was made in the cloth factories of the 18th century, first 
with rollers and later using wooden punch cards, which 
led to different weaving patterns. This principle was in 
turn transferred to calculating machines by the (never 
constructed) ‘analytical engine’ of the English mathe-
matician, philosopher and inventor Charles Babbage. 
Mathematician Lady Ada Lovelace, who collaborated 
with Babbage, already foresaw that such machines 
would also process other things apart from numbers 
and, for example, compose music, but would always 
only be able to obey commands (Mainzer, 2016: 7ff.)
The advances in electrical engineering at the end of 
the 19th century made novel systems possible, such as 
the Hollerith machines (electromechanical machines for 
processing punched cards) and the first automaton 
chess player in 1911, which, however, could only han-
dle a scenario involving the final moves of a match. In 
the 1930s, the breakthrough of digitalization laid a 
foundation stone for the development of universal pro-
gram-controlled computers. Now, computers could be 
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used for any algorithm to solve calculable problems 
(Section 3.2.3). 
Universal programmability also made it possible to 
start research into AI (Section 3.3.3). While its first 
phase in the 1950s and 1960s was marked by euphoric 
expectations, shortly afterwards, in the wake of the 
practical results, the theoretical principles of (non-)
computability were established with regard to comput-
ers’ ability to solve problems. 
Since specialized applications yielded better results, 
the second phase up until the mid-1970s saw a special-
ization of programming and application. Typical of this 
phase was “the construction of specialized systems, 
methods of knowledge representation and an interest 
in natural languages” (Mainzer, 2016: 12). From the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, a third phase focused 
increasingly on knowledge-based expert systems. After 
storing special knowledge, these AI programs automat-
ically draw diagnostic or problem-solving conclusions, 
although without having cross-context background 
knowledge like humans: “In the mid-(19)80s, E.A. Fei-
genbaum, one of the pioneers of this development, 
compared the development of knowledge-based expert 
systems to the history of the automotive industry. The 
world of AI was like the situation in 1890 when the first 
automobiles appeared. They were hand-operated 
horseless carriages, but already automobiles, i.e. 
self-propelled vehicles. Just as Henry Ford further 
developed the first prototypes for mass production at 
the time, so, according to Feigenbaum, knowledge-based 
systems would also go into mass production. Know-
ledge-based systems were thus understood as ‘automo-
biles of knowledge’” (Mainzer, 2016: 13).
3 .2 .5 
Algorithm-based systems in the societal context
Every digital or digitalized solution uses hardware and 
software whose logic is defined in algorithms and 
expressed by data. These are algorithm-based systems, 
also known as algorithmic systems. They are increas-
ingly incorporated into decision making and deci-
sion-making support in areas that are critical to society 
(e.g. in elections), in areas that are critical for business 
and relevant to Eigenart (Section 2.2.3; e.g. in online 
commerce, Section 5.2.4), or in areas relevant to 
self-determination (e.g. in online media). There is a 
growing discussion about necessary guard rails for 
designing, developing and operating these sociotechni-
cal systems; they lie in the interplay of technology and 
societal embedding. They address technical properties 
(such as correctness, reliability, robustness or cyber-
security), operational, organizational or regulatory 
framework conditions for the deployment of the sys-
tems (such as the rules for algorithm-based systems, 
which are described briefly below), as well as ethical 
guidelines for the design and development of the sys-
tems (such as the ACM Code of Ethics; ACM Ethics, 
2018).
Box 3 .2 .3-1
Uncomputable problems
Both theoretical and practical uncomputability play a role in 
the context of the possibilities and limits of digitalization 
(Cooper, 2017: 78). According to today’s understanding, on 
the one hand there are uncomputable problems, which do not 
sound so complicated at first sight. On the other hand, there 
are problems that are computable but whose calculation is 
very time-consuming; using today’s ICT, it can end up taking 
a matter of years, decades or even centuries to calculate a 
solution. In other words, although much can be automated by 
means of digitalization, there are also relevant problem class-
es that cannot be automated (not even in the future) because 
there are no (or no efficient) algorithms. This is important to 
note when discussing the basic possibilities of AI compared to 
human intelligence: many things are possible (mathematical-
ly), but not everything is possible with digitalization. 
Among the uncomputable problems is, for example, the 
halting problem (Cooper, 2017: 78): No program exists that 
decides for arbitrary programs and arbitrary entries whether 
the program call of this program will ever stop. Furthermore, 
there are problem classes that are very time-consuming to 
calculate: the non-polynomial problems (NP). Even polyno-
mially solvable problems (P), to which the linearly computa-
ble problems also belong, can be very complex in the calcula-
tion of a solution if their calculation polynomials contain 
complex powers. The question of whether the class of poly-
nomially solvable problems is equal to the non-polynomially 
solvable problem class (i.e. whether P = NP), i.e. whether al-
gorithms exist for all NP-complete problems in polynomial 
time, is an open question of mathematics, theoretical comput-
er science and complexity theory. It is one of the seven mil-
lennium problems of mathematics. However, it is believed 
that there are problem classes that cannot be solved efficient-
ly, i.e. that P ≠ NP. These are the NP-complete problem classes 
(Priese and Erk, 2018: 450ff.). They also include generally 
understandable problems, which are usually assumed to be 
easy to solve, such as the backpack problem or the travelling 
salesman problem. The travelling salesman problem describes 
a salesman who must find the shortest route to visit a number 
of cities in such a way that each city, apart from the first one, 
is visited only once and the first city is also the last (Cooper, 
2017: 205; Priese and Erk, 2018: 485).
Again, it is important to understand that, despite the NP 
completeness of problem classes, it is often possible to find 
efficient, exact or heuristic methods for solving smaller prob-
lem sizes and thus to efficiently calculate solutions for typical 
problems like the travelling salesman problem, despite NP 
completeness (Wendt, 2013: 16ff.).
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Figure 3.2.5-1 shows how algorithm-based systems 
function in principle. These systems are already embed-
ded into society and receive a societal connection dur-
ing design, but especially during operation and use. 
They are sociotechnical systems that can be understood 
neither purely technically nor purely sociologically, but 
always in the interplay of societal, social, economic and 
ecological relations. From the point of view of use and 
application, the current focus of societal discussions is 
particularly on the traceability, explicability and fair-
ness of algorithm-based systems and, ultimately, on 
people’s decision-making sovereignty (Box 4.3.3-1; 
Section 8.3.3). In order to reliably implement these 
properties of algorithm-based systems, various sets of 
rules are currently being drawn up, such as AI4People 
(Floridi et al., 2018), the Algo.Rules (Bertels-
mann-Stiftung and iRights.Lab, 2019) and the Ethics 
Guidelines for Trusted AI prepared by the EU’s High-
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (European 
Commission 2019c; Box 3.2.5-1).
In view of ongoing sociopolitical discourses and con-
troversies, as well as rapid technological developments, 
all three sets of rules listed as examples in Box 3.2.5-1 
are designed as dynamically updatable documents. 
Their operationalization is an open field for implemen-
tation and regulation at the national, European and 
international level. There is an urgent need for action 
here, for, important as ongoing discourses are, they 
remain ineffective if they do not lead in parallel to the 
best possible implementation in the respective time 
context, while preventing one-sided influence from 
vested interests.
3 .2 .6 
Quantum computing as a future computer 
 generation
Despite rapid technological development, ultimately 
today’s computers function “according to the same 
basic principles as the early calculating machines” 
(Homeister, 2015). “The stages along the road from the 
cogwheel via relay, tube and transistor to the miniatur-
ized circuit can therefore be regarded as different tech-
nical implementations of the same idea”, while the 
development of quantum computers (Aharonov, 1999; 
Feynman, 1986) aims at a “completely new way of 
computing: “Whereas in a classical computer a bit is set 
to either 0 or 1, a quantum bit can assume both values 
simultaneously, i.e. be in two states at the same time”. 
This is known as the superposition (Homeister, 
2015: 1f.). 
Calculating with qubits (short for quantum bits) is 
inherently probabilistic and is statistically evaluated. 
The basic calculation model is the probabilistic Turing 
machine: the Turing machine extended by random exe-
cutions. In compliance with the extended Church-Tu-
ring thesis, according to which any computability can 
be simulated mutually with polynomial effort, the 
probabilistic Turing machine is just as universal (Nielsen 
and Chuang, 2002). It would therefore correspond to 
the current understanding of computability (Section 
3.2.3). Like the Church-Turing thesis, the extended the-
sis has not yet been proven. 
The principle of entanglement allows multiple qubits 
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Figure 3 .2 .5-1
Elements of an algorithm-based system. Sensors that can be used generally via the Internet of Things (Section 3.3.1) – or via 
special digital or digitalized infrastructures or end devices – generate private or public data (Section 3.2.2), also in real time, 
sometimes provided openly as Open Data. Algorithms (Section 3.2.3) use these data in their calculations, and also as training 
data (Section 3.3.3). The performance of the algorithms is limited by questions of computability and, in certain circumstances, 
by the (in)correctness of their computational logic, data, implementation or application. Automatisms for decision making or de-
cision-making support can have an effect on the environment via the actuators. 
Source: WBGU
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Box 3 .2 .5-1
Overview of current rules and regulations on the 
use of AI and algorithm-based systems 
AI4People
AI4People is a multi-stakeholder forum launched in February 
2018, bringing together all actors interested in shaping the 
social impact of new applications of AI – including the Euro-
pean Commission, the European Parliament, civil society or-
ganizations, industry and the media (Floridi et al., 2018). The 
result is a ‘living document’, whose current preamble is as 
follows (Floridi et al., 2018): 
“We believe that, in order to create a Good AI Society, the 
ethical principles identified in the previous section should be 
embedded in the default practices of AI. In particular, AI 
should be designed and developed in ways that decrease ine-
quality and further social empowerment, with respect for 
human autonomy, and increase benefits that are shared by all, 
equitably. It is especially important that AI be explicable, as 
explicability is a critical tool to build public trust in, and un-
derstanding of, the technology.
We also believe that creating a Good AI Society requires a 
multi-stakeholder approach, which is the most effective way 
to ensure that AI will serve the needs of society, by enabling 
developers, users and rule-makers to be on board and colla-
borating from the outset. Different cultural frameworks in-
form attitudes to new technology. This document represents a 
European approach, which is meant to be complementary to 
other approaches. We are committed to the development of 
AI technology in a way that secures people’s trust, serves the 
public interest, and strengthens shared social responsibility.
Finally, this set of recommendations should be seen as a ‘liv-
ing document’. The Action Points are designed to be dynamic, 
requiring not simply single policies or one-off investments, 
but rather, continuous, ongoing efforts for their effects to be 
sustained.”
Algo.Rules 
“The Algo.Rules are a catalogue of formal criteria for enabling 
the socially beneficial design and oversight of algorithmic 
systems. They provide the basis for ethical considerations as 
well as the implementation and enforcement of legal frame-
works. These criteria should be integrated from the start in 
the development of any system and therefore be  implemented 
by design. Given their interdependence on each other, the 
Algo.Rules should be treated as a composite unit. Interested 
stakeholders and experts are invited to join us in developing 
the Algo.Rules further and to adopt them, adapt them, ex-
pand them and, above all, explore opportunities to apply 
them in practice. Dynamic by design, the Algo.Rules should 
be fine-tuned, particularly in terms of their practical imple-
mentation” (Bertelsmann-Stiftung and iRights.Lab, 2019). 
The wording when this report went to press was as follows
1. “Strengthen competency: the function and potential 
effects of an algorithmic system must be understood.
2. Define responsibilities: a natural or legal person must 
always be held responsible for the effects involved with 
the use of an algorithmic system.
3. Document goals and anticipated impact: the objectives 
and expected impact of the use of an algorithmic sys-
tem must be documented and assessed prior to imple-
mentation.
4. Guarantee security: the security of an algorithmic sys-
tem must be tested before and during its implementation.
5. Provide labelling: the use of an algorithmic system must 
be identified as such.
6. Ensure intelligibility: the decision-making processes 
 within an algorithmic system must always be comprehen-
sible.
7. Safeguard manageability: an algorithmic system must be 
manageable throughout the lifetime of its use.
8. Monitor impact: the effects of an algorithmic system 
must be reviewed on a regular basis.
9. Establish complaint mechanisms: if an algorithmic system 
results in a questionable decision or a decision that affects 
an individual’s rights, it must be possible to request an 
explanation and file a complaint.”
Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (High-Level 
 Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence of the European 
Commission)
For the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on 
Artificial Intelligence (EU-HLEG; European Commission), 
trustworthy AI is based on three necessary components that 
are ideally in harmony, despite possible conflicting goals: 
first, conformity with the law, second, ethics, and third, ro-
bustness to “ensure that, even with good intentions, AI sys-
tems do not cause any unintentional harm” (European Com-
mission, 2019c 35). The normative principles are as follows:
 > “Develop, deploy and use AI systems in a way that adhe-
res to the ethical principles of: respect for human auto-
nomy, prevention of harm, fairness and explicability. Ack-
nowledge and address the potential tensions between these 
 principles.
 > Pay particular attention to situations involving more vul-
nerable groups such as children, persons with disabilities 
and others that have historically been disadvantaged or are 
at risk of exclusion, and to situations which are characte-
rized by asymmetries of power or information, such as bet-
ween employers and workers, or between businesses and 
consumers.
 > Acknowledge that, while bringing substantial benefits to 
individuals and society, AI systems also pose certain risks 
and may have a negative impact, including impacts which 
may be difficult to anticipate, identify or measure (e.g. on 
democracy, the rule of law and distributive justice, or on the 
human mind itself). Adopt adequate measures to mitigate 
these risks when appropriate, and proportionately to the 
magnitude of the risk” (European Commission, 2019c: 2).
In addition, the current version contains sections on require-
ments, as well as technical and non-technical methods for 
implementation and evaluation. However, the philosopher 
Thomas Metzinger, who is involved in the EU-HLEG, has 
sharply criticized the current result in a bilingual op-ed in the 
Tagesspiegel newspaper on the subject. Under the title ‘Ethics 
washing made in Europe’ (Metzinger, 2019a), he deplored the 
composition of the group, the lack of non-negotiable ethical 
principles (‘red lines’ were defused), and described the guide-
lines as “lukewarm, short-sighted and deliberately vague,” 
since they glossed over difficult problems with rhetoric, vio-
lated elementary principles of rationality, and pretended to 
“know things that no one really knows” (Metzinger, 2019b). 
On the other hand, the section on long-term risks that disap-
peared from the final version showed that the same accusa-
tion could also be levelled at Metzinger: “Metzinger and 
 others had pointed out the danger that systems could eventu-
ally become so intelligent that they could become independ-
ent, develop their own consciousness or even their own mor-
als. Metzinger admits that these scenarios known from 
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larger solution spaces. With such n-qubits, quantum 
computing can solve a 2n-large solution space effi-
ciently with polynomial effort. This means that a larger 
problem class than P (Section 3.2.3) can be efficiently 
solved by quantum computing (e.g. the factorization of 
large numbers with the Shor algorithm; Shor, 1994). 
Here lies the great speed advantage over classical com-
puters, allowing complex climate models, for example, 
to be calculated more efficiently. The problem classes 
solvable with quantum computing in polynomial time 
are called bounded-error quantum polynomial time 
(BQP). It is suspected that NP ≠ BQP ≠ P, but this has 
not been confirmed (Arora and Barak, 2009). In addi-
tion, further problem classes have been identified that 
can be solved more efficiently with quantum comput-
ing (Deutsch and Jozsa, 1992). Solutions for factoring 
whole numbers, searching for routes in networks and 
the backpack problem can be efficiently calculated with 
quantum computing. 
Algorithms for quantum computing are formalized 
and realized as quantum circuits, i.e. calculation 
sequences with quantum gates that perform Boolean 
operations on qubits, or else are simulated on conven-
tional computer infrastructures. Electron-based 
approaches were pursued for a long time for the physi-
cal realization of quantum gates, but up to now it has 
not been possible to scale this to more than several 
dozen qubits. Instead, many scientists today hope for 
photon-based circuits, which seem to be making big 
advances recently (Rudolph, 2017).
With regard to the Von Neumann architecture for 
computers, quantum circuits are supplemented by com-
ponents, e.g. for error correction. However, they cannot 
store results. Quantum computers thus ultimately ‘only’ 
perform computational tasks, like the central process-
ing unit (CPU) or an application-specific integrated cir-
cuit (ASIC), so that classical computers will not be 
replaced by quantum computers for the time being in 
the vast majority of applications, only in the specifi-
cally computing-intensive ones.
3 .2 .7 
Conclusions: digitalization in a nutshell
This section describes the central technical, conceptual 
and methodological foundations of digitalization. 
Everything that is being taught over several years in 
training occupations and courses of study in computer 
science, technical computer science, applied computer 
science, etc., and is consolidated in further years of 
active learning, has been condensed here onto just a 
few pages with the aim of making the information as 
easily understandable as possible. Of course, the choice 
and depth of the description represents a challenge in 
itself. As theoretical computer science also shows, there 
are some basic concepts relating to algorithms and com-
putability, data and metadata, as well as sociotechnical 
and algorithm-based systems, which are explained to 
provide a basic understanding of the digital possibili-
ties. These each form the basis of key digitalization 
technologies that are described in Section 3.3. That the 
number of basic concepts and functions cannot yet be 
conclusively defined, even from a technological stand-
point, is shown by the brief outlook on quantum com-
puting which, according to today’s state of the art, will 
make the next qualitative stage of digitally supported 
calculations possible. 
However, despite the advances made in expanding 
human intelligence by technical means, the following 
maxim will most likely apply: “More computation does 
not makes us more ‘intelligent’, only more computa-
tionally powerful” (Ito, 2018). The intelligent use of 
new technologies is proving to be a substantial chal-
lenge for the design of sociotechnical systems, espe-
cially in the age of massively increasing computational 
capacities. Since it is only possible to calculate what has 
been computably modelled beforehand, it is necessary 
to disclose the implicit assumptions of the calculations. 
Only then does it become clear what is respectively 
(not) included in a calculation and to what extent prob-
lems arise, for example with regard to distorted catego-
ries or partial data: “We must always ask ourselves 
what had already been inscripted into these systems 
before we inscribe further models in the course of fur-
ther development” (Guagnin and Pohle, 2019: 18).
3 .3
Key technologies of digitalization (also) in the 
sustainability context
The focus of this section is on a selection of digital tech-
nologies expected to have considerable disruptive 
potential for the Great Transformation towards Sustain-
ability. The technologies described here, which were 
science fiction are very unlikely. Nevertheless, such risks 
should not be ignored. For other members of the group, this 
was going too far. In particular, computer scientist Virginia 
Dignum and philosopher Luciano Floridi [...] had threatened 
to resign if the concerns remained in the document” (Köver 
and Fanta, 2019). 
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chosen for their relevance and in accordance with per-
tinent reports (Sections 3.6.1, 3.6.2), can promote and 
accelerate the Great Transformation towards Sustaina-
bility, but they can also have a negative impact. In par-
ticular, new dynamics of digitalization are developing in 
the wake of the increasing documentation and control 
of the natural and technical environment, the associ-
ated expansion of the data pool via the Internet of 
Things (IoT), and the resulting huge amounts of data 
(big data). This is in turn leading to qualitatively novel 
results in artificial intelligence (AI) and is again based 
on increased capacity in computing, memory and trans-
mission (Kühn, 2018). Trustworthiness, reliability and 
therefore especially cybersecurity are key to every dig-
ital solution. The four technologies mentioned here – 
Internet of Things ( Section 3.3.1), big data 
( Section 3.3.2), AI ( Section 3.3.3) and cybersecurity 
(Section 3.3.4) – are seen as key technologies because 
they are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Other technologies such as monitoring, augmented and 
virtual realities, robotics, additive manufacturing (or 
3D printing), and blockchain or distributed-ledger 
technologies are important for sustainability and also 
briefly explained and evaluated (Figure 3.3-1). 
Like basic terms and functions of digitalization 
( Section 3.2), current debates on its key technologies 
are often characterized by a lack of conceptual clarity. 
This frequently leads to misunderstandings, e.g. 
through the inappropriate translation of everyday lan-
guage into scientific terms or a different understanding 
of terms in different disciplines, and sometimes to a 
humanizing use of language (Box 3.3-1).
A clear understanding of the current key technolo-
gies of digitalization is therefore indispensable, also in 
order to be able to adequately assess their respective 
potential benefits and risks. The following chapters 
provide a compact overview of these socio-technical 
systems, embedded in a broad understanding of sus-
tainability (Chapter 2). 
3 .3 .1 
Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a 
concept that describes the ever 
greater networking and thus 
fusion of digital and physical 
infrastructures in interaction 
with the natural, analogue or arti-
ficial, digitalized environment 
(Horvath, 2012: 1; Fraunhofer FOKUS, 2016: 4; Lackes, 
2017; Atzori et al., 2010: 2787). The idea was born as 
early as the 1990s. First, Mark Weiser (Weiser, 1991) 
used the term ‘ubiquitous computing’ to describe the 
future of computers in the 21st century in the form of 
omnipresent, small, lightweight and networked devices. 
The term ‘Internet of Things’ was first used at the turn 
of the millennium by Kevin Ashton to assign a digital 
identity to real objects, e.g. via QR codes or radio fre-
quency identification (RFID; Fraunhofer FOKUS, 
2016: 4; Li et al., 2015: 243f.). Since then, numerous 
other technological developments have contributed to 
the advancing realization of the IoT vision (Li et al., 
2015: 244). The IoT is therefore not an individual tech-
nology, but is based on the linking of many technolo-
gies, some of which are presented in their own chapters 
in this report. 
From a technological point of view, the IoT refers to 
objects or things of any kind that are given a distinct 
Monitoring Blockchain Augmented and virtual
realities
Robotics 3D printing
Big data CybersecurityInternet of Things Artificial intelligence
Figure 3 .3-1
The main current digital technologies that are changing the technical system. Key technologies are the Internet of Things, big 
data, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; further technologies important for sustainability are monitoring, augmented and 
virtual realities, robotics, 3D printing, and blockchain and distributed-ledger technologies. 
Source: WBGU 
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identity by means of physical identity carriers such as 
barcodes, QR codes, RFID or smartcards and which can 
be networked with the internet or with each other via 
communication technologies such as Bluetooth, Near-
Field Communication (NFC) or mobile telephony (Hor-
vath, 2012: 1; Fraunhofer FOKUS, 2016: 4; Lackes, 
2017; Li et al., 2015: 243f.). More recent standards 
such as the 5th mobile-communications generation 
(5G) and the 6th version of the internet protocol (IPv6) 
are therefore important prerequisites for a break-
through of the IoT (Atzori et al., 2010: 2787). The spec-
trum of objects to be networked is manifold and ranges 
from household and home appliances such as televi-
sions, windows, heaters and doors to objects in indus-
try, healthcare (e.g. medical sensors or devices, assisted 
living), and the entire public infrastructure (e.g. net-
worked car traffic, intelligent power networks, build-
ings; Horvath, 2012: 1; Li et al., 2015: 253ff.). Systems 
that focus on “linking physical, biological and/or struc-
tural components” (Janiesch, 2017) using (networks 
of) sensors for digital capture, and actuators for exert-
ing physical influence, are also referred to as 
cyber-physical systems, particularly in science (Gunes 
et al., 2014: 4248). Therefore, technologies are used not 
only for localization, but also for positioning things 
(Fleisch, 2014; Sprenger and Engemann, 2015). To 
ensure perfect interaction between the many different 
kinds of sensors, actuators, devices and software com-
ponents, a suitable architecture is required that ade-
quately combines the IoT elements (Li et al., 
2015: 246ff.). Moving applications into the cloud also 
plays an important role, as does the use of big data 
(Section 3.3.2) and machine learning (Fraunhofer 
FOKUS, 2016: 5).
While the IoT was still predominantly described as a 
vision around 2010 (Horvath, 2012: 2; BCS and OII, 
2013; Atzori et al., 2010: 2793), and even today the 
majority of applications are still at an early develop-
ment stage (Li et al., 2015: 243), it is expected that 20 
billion ‘things’ will be interconnected worldwide by 
2020 (Gartner Inc., 2017). Since the effects of the IoT 
are expected to be comparable to or even more revolu-
tionary than those of the internet (Hoepner et al., 
2016: 70), a look at the potential benefits and risks for 
sustainability is urgently needed.
Potential benefits and risks 
The IoT is seen as a key solution for today’s societal 
challenges (e.g. Geisberger and Broy, 2012; Li et al., 
2015: 253). Applications for the IoT range e.g. from 
industrial production, transport and logistics, to health, 
the environment, energy, agriculture and people’s per-
sonal lives (Atzori et al., 2010: 7ff.; Fraunhofer FOKUS, 
2016: 9ff.; Li et al., 2015: 253ff.). For example, sensors 
are used in agriculture to measure the moisture and 
heat content of the soil. The recorded sensor data en a-
ble farmers to see from a distance whether they need to 
take measures to water the soil or protect the plants 
against fungal attack (Gropp, 2016; Section 5.2.9). This 
makes it possible to improve and facilitate work pro-
cesses and conserve resources. The use of the IoT in the 
healthcare system has similar advantages, for example 
for monitoring patients’ health or supporting them in 
their living environment (Atzori et al., 2010: 9; Li et al., 
2015: 253ff.). In the energy sector, IoT applications are 
already being used to control the energy supply in 
‘smart grids’ according to demand (Fraunhofer FOKUS, 
2016: 10; Section 5.2.6). 
In industry, ‘Industry 4.0’ and ‘smart manufacturing’ 
are probably the best-known fields of application, but 
are not to be equated with (industrial) IoT (Liao et al., 
2018: 4523). ‘Industry 4.0’ is concerned with a 
far-reaching internal and external corporate change 
process that aims to enable largely automated, decen-
tralized, flexible and networked production as well as 
the tracking and control of entire value chains and sys-
tems (Neugebauer et al., 2016; OECD, 2016b: 81; Li et 
al., 2015: 253). From the point of view of sustainability, 
this could create opportunities for the circular economy 
(Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.5). 
In the mobility field, the IoT is being used as the 
basis for a comprehensive reorganization of traffic 
flows. This applies to both passenger and freight traffic 
as well as to logistics as a whole, where a breakthrough 
has already been made with RFID. Here, IoT technolo-
gies are expected to make it possible, among other 
things, to network means of transport with each other 
or with the transport infrastructure, which could ulti-
mately lead to autonomous driving (Section 5.2.8). 
Many of the fields of application mentioned concen-
trate in particular on the urban environment, but at 
present still exist mostly in isolation side-by-side. In 
the vision of the ‘smart city’, they and others are net-
worked via IoT (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2017; Geisberger 
and Broy, 2012; Section 5.2.7). One example is linking 
electromobility with the energy system in the context 
of sector coupling (Section 5.2.6). 
In addition to these potential benefits, there are also 
numerous challenges and risks. From a technical point 
of view, problems that need to be solved include a lack 
of interoperability and insufficient cybersecurity in IoT 
infrastructures, interfaces and protocols and their 
standards (Li et al., 2015: 243). Societal challenges 
include issues ranging from informational and personal 
self-determination to human dignity and ethical aspects 
in the interaction between (semi-)autonomous, intelli-
gent systems and things (Bendel, 2016: 109f.). From an 
environmental point of view, too, there are considera-
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ble dangers, for example in the form of rising energy 
consumption and increasing e-waste due to the 
ever-growing number of digital or digitalized ‘things’ 
(Sections 5.2.5, 5.2.6), which could cancel out any sus-
tainability gains as rebound effects.
In the potential conflict between sustainability 
potential and commercial interests, one must ask 
whether the latter are not actually the driving forces 
behind IoT development (Günthner et al., 2008) and 
what consequences this has for the realization of the 
former. On the one hand, the economic advantages 
include improved possibilities for monitoring and con-
trolling objects and infrastructures through the contin-
uous and automated collection of data, as well as pro-
cess automation and thus process optimization. For 
example, it is hoped that the large amount of data col-
lected can make better decisions possible, as correla-
tions can be established and more accurate forecasts 
made (Fraunhofer FOKUS, 2016: 12). On the other 
hand, Kagermann for example (2017: 244) states for 
the field of Industry 4.0: “However, change through 
Industry 4.0 must be actively managed. This is not just 
an industrial policy issue. Industry 4.0 also addresses 
environmental and social challenges: resource effi-
ciency and environmental protection, demographic 
change, urbanization, as well as democratic participa-
tion and better work. Accordingly, the Industry 4.0 
issue must be discussed broadly involving the most 
important stakeholders from business, science, politics 
– but also civil society.”
Issues of data protection and data security in par-
ticular are among the main topics discussed as risks of 
the IoT. The IoT is also described as a “data-collection 
and correlation engine” (Fraunhofer FOKUS, 2016: 15). 
The interlinked things also collect – possibly unbe-
known to users – a large amount of data with direct or 
indirect personal references, which can be misused, for 
example by creating user profiles or monitoring people 
(Coetzee and Eksteen, 2011: 5; Weber, 2010: 24). If 
data collection by devices and applications becomes a 
functional part of public life, effective and traceable 
data protection would be almost impossible to imple-
ment (Leopoldina, 2018: 43). Moreover, the supposed 
decentralization through universal networking para-
doxically generates economic and political concentra-
tion tendencies, both among private actors such as the 
large technology groups (GAFAM or ‘Big Five’) and in 
authoritarian states such as China or Russia, since the 
background infrastructure (e.g. data and computer cen-
tres and cloud applications) are highly centralized and 
concentrated on a few actors and locations (Sprenger 
and Engemann, 2015).
Furthermore, an increased risk of cyber attacks 
resulting from the networking of things and systems is 
under discussion in connection with the IoT (Li et al., 
2015: 255; Convington and Carskadden, 2013: 7; Atzori 
et al., 2010). As events in the past have shown, the 
focus of such attacks is on consumer goods (e.g. car 
brakes, heating systems, smart-home solutions), indus-
trial plants and critical infrastructures such as hospitals, 
energy or transport systems (Hofmann, 2017: 14). 
Inadequately secured systems, networks and infra-
structures can therefore cause extensive damage not 
only to the users themselves but also to third parties 
(Hofmann, 2017: 14). In addition to the increased risk 
of eavesdropping from the wireless communication of 
IoT systems, another subject of discussion is the poor 
energy and computing capacity of IoT components, 
which makes it difficult to implement complex security 
systems to protect the systems (Atzori et al., 2010: 15). 
For example, the new, automated forms of interaction 
increase infrastructures’ susceptibility to attack (Hoep-
ner et al., 2016: 70). Furthermore, manufacturers save 
money on necessary components for system security, 
since the damage caused by security gaps are borne by 
the users (or their insurance companies) and not by the 
manufacturers (Hofmann, 2017: 14). In addition, the 
diversity, complexity and high speed with which IoT 
products change, as well as the internationality of the 
markets, make it difficult to establish binding quality 
and safety standards (Hofmann, 2017: 14). 
However, if the risks of the IoT can be mastered, it 
can form the foundation for the delivery of the data 
(Section 3.3.2) required for further automation and 
decision-making support (Section 3.3.3), and provide 
the instruments for optimizing the technosphere using 
actuators and control circuits and systems.
3 .3 .2 
Big data
Big data is currently developing 
from hype to a basis technology 
(FZI, 2018). This development can 
also be described as ‘datafication’ in 
the sense of processes which 
increasingly – and partly in real time 
– depict the physical world in the 
form of large quantities of machine-readable and quan-
tifiable data (Section 3.2.2; Reimsbach-Kounatze, 
2015). 
According to estimates by the US consulting firm 
International Data Corporation, the volume of data 
generated worldwide could double every two years and 
rise to 180,000 billion gigabytes worldwide in 2025 
(IDC, 2014; Press, 2017). Whereas a great deal of data 
has so far been obtained by elaborate collection proce-
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dures such as surveys or experiments, today every 
object in the IoT (Section 3.3.1) can be converted into 
a data source with a network connection and a sensor. 
The use of sensors is increasing rapidly. They are used 
in areas such as security, healthcare (in the future pos-
sibly also inside the body as ‘smart pills’), the environ-
ment and transport, and allow a detailed representation 
of the measured processes and objects in real time. 
For example, cameras make it possible to observe 
public spaces (in London, 40% of public space was 
already being video-monitored in 2004; Kees, 2015) or 
to monitor natural areas (Steenweg et al., 2016; Section 
5.2.11). Sensors in a smartphone generate data that can 
be used to determine the owner’s mood, stress level, 
socio-demographic characteristics, smoking habits, 
sleep patterns, physical movements and much more 
(World Bank, 2016). In addition, there is an increasing 
availability of data that has not been collected for a 
specific purpose, but was created as a by-product of 
digital processes. As a result of increasing digitalization, 
every social interaction leaves a data trace behind. 
Using a mobile phone, the internet or any inter-
net-based application generates e.g. communication 
and connection data, log files from websites, or health 
data. In public administration, labour-market data can 
be obtained from the social-security registration proce-
dure, and traffic data can be derived from the toll data 
collected by the Toll Collect system (Sarreither, 2015). 
The resulting data allow applications that go beyond 
the context in which they occur. Mobile-phone data, 
for example, are used for traffic monitoring and plan-
ning (Schmidt and Männel, 2017). Since mobile-phone 
penetration in most OECD countries is over 100%, it is 
already possible to conduct a full survey of, say, peo-
ple’s whereabouts and movement patterns. 
‘Big data’ is currently interpreted in different ways 
more as a leitmotif or even a slogan than as a clearly 
defined term (Pietsch and Wernecke, 2017). The early 
definition according to Laney (2001) based on the three 
Vs included a large data volume (volume), high hetero-
geneity as regards data types and sources (variety), and 
a high speed of data generation and processing (veloc-
ity). Other authors speak of ‘five Vs’, including data 
quality (veracity) and the added value that data analy-
sis promises (value); others or seven or even more Vs. 
(Eckert et al., 2014: 6f.). Irrespective of how many Vs 
such a definition covers, it cannot reflect the funda-
mental epistemological and methodological challenges 
posed by big data and data-intensive science (‘data sci-
ence’) when it comes to collecting and processing large 
amounts of data (Pietsch and Wernecke, 2017: 39). Big 
data is often associated with great potential for busi-
ness, science and society, e.g. for the optimized plan-
ning and control of processes (Eckert et al., 2014: 5; 
Lohr, 2012). Some also speak of ‘evidence-based deci-
sion making’ without taking sufficient account of 
potential risks and problems. Thus, “academics from 
different disciplines see a range of societal, ethical and 
legal problems [...] from data protection and security, to 
transparency and accountability, to problems of bias 
and discrimination” (Rieder and Simon, 2018: 162). 
Despite such concerns, the historical embedding of big 
data into a long culture of measurement and quantifi-
cation is discussed comparatively rarely. A change of 
definition beyond the Vs has recently been proposed to 
reach a better understanding of “the norms and values 
underlying the current data hype” (Rieder and Simon, 
2018: 163): “Instead of a narrow definition of big data 
according to purely technical notions [...], it seems more 
productive to regard the term as the terminological 
manifestation of a complex socio-technical phenome-
non based on an interplay of technological, scientific 
and cultural factors.” 
Potential benefits and risks 
In precisely this socio-technical context, the potential 
benefits and risks of big data also become apparent in a 
more precise way, especially in view of the “widespread 
belief that comprehensive data sets offer a higher form 
of intelligence and knowledge which can bring insights 
that were previously impossible” (Boyd and Crawford, 
2012). Big data undoubtedly has great innovative 
potential in automated pattern recognition – but only if 
ethical and epistemological boundaries are handled 
responsibly and with methodical competence. Other-
wise, a data set – regardless of its size – does not auto-
matically generate new or better insights, but irrele-
vant, misleading or even false ones. In this respect, the 
hitherto widespread practice in dealing with big data is 
often inadequate from a scientific point of view, 
because, “instead of the mere collection of mass data or 
masses of data, the focus must be on content that is 
actually valuable. The targeted evaluation, application 
and use of protective measures,” implementing con-
cepts like privacy and security ‘by design’ and ‘by 
default’, “must take the place of exploratory analyses” 
(Federrath, 2018: 18). Only if these core elements and 
work steps are an obligatory part of big data technolo-
gies can they become smart data. Such a concept of 
smart data, as represented by the accompanying 
research of the BMWi’s Smart Data Programme (Begleit-
forschung Smart Data, 2018), goes beyond a purely 
technical understanding. In the face of often heteroge-
neous and poorly annotated data sets, this targets big 
data that is either generated with a clear semantic 
structure or is structured subsequently to enable faster 
and more comprehensible decisions for data-analysis 
applications. A broader understanding also creates 
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Box 3 .3-1
Humanization and misleading use of language
When names are given to aspects the capabilities of digital 
systems, terms are often used that were previously used pri-
marily to describe human abilities; prominent examples in-
clude AI and machine learning (Rehak, 2016; Section 3.3.3). 
Terms like ‘intelligence’ or ‘learning’ are embedded in many 
scientific discourses, especially those influenced by philoso-
phy and psychology. As a rule, they are ‘charged’ with many 
accompanying connotations that cannot be derived from the 
technical performance itself. For example, ‘learning’ is associ-
ated with human achievements (such as curiosity, spontanei-
ty) that serve competence and self-determination (Deci and 
Ryan, 2000, 2008) or human free will. Computers, however, 
have no free will beyond speculations, e.g. via thought 
 experiments (Bostrom, 2014), and corresponding conceptual 
associations are inappropriate in the field of machine ‘learn-
ing’, because up to now this has been primarily about model-
ling, calculation and optimization (Walsh, 2018).
Charged concepts and exaggerated associations have been 
– and still are – often intended, as in the case of the term AI, 
to promote a research project (Section 3.3.3). Such language 
use is problematic because it can arouse exaggerated expecta-
tions and fears (Burchardt, 2018) and indicate future devel-
opment possibilities that cannot be described in technical 
terms. The term ‘superintelligence’ (Bostrom, 2014), for ex-
ample, implies a possible future superiority of technical sys-
tems, yet its threat potential can be neither precisely de-
scribed technically nor, therefore, precisely assessed (Section 
7.4). One part of threat scenarios is often the attribution of 
‘goals’ or even ‘consciousness’ to technical systems. The lat-
ter, however, is a term that requires a very differentiated de-
bate. In this context, the recognisability of technical systems 
as such plays an important role (Box 9.3.1-1).
Then as now, the language of information processing affects 
the humanities, especially cognitive psychology – and not the 
other way round, as might be expected. Information processing 
models have been used to explain psychological phenomena 
such as perception (as the reception of information), processing 
(by means of the working memory) and remembering (as stor-
age). Concepts and metaphors of information technology and 
cognition then co-evolved (Winograd and Flores, 1986). A 
proximity was seen between computer science and cognitive 
science: assumptions about perception processes, representa-
tion and further processing steps were modelled and pro-
grammed. The functionality of the assumptions was tested, 
sometimes forgetting the difference between the defined model 
and reality – a phenomenon that can still be observed today 
in discussions about the boundaries between humans and ma-
chines. In order to assess the risks and potential benefits of 
digital technology, decision-makers should therefore also ad-
dress the underlying language use. Examples of terms that are 
used metaphorically and differently charged in different dis-
ciplines include AI, machine learning and superintelligence, 
but also cognitive computing and even neural networks – which 
do not consist of neurons but of simplified models of neurons 
( Section 3.3.3). Some of these terms are taken up here as 
examples. 
Example: intelligence and machine learning
In such disciplines as psychology and cognitive sciences, there 
is a long tradition of discourses on the appropriate definition 
of human intelligence (intelligence theories, e.g. Spearman, 
1904; Thurstone, 1924; Wechsler, 1958; Cattell, 1987; Stern-
berg, 2013). ‘Emotional’ aspects are not usually included in 
these theories. The theories are predominantly concerned with 
‘cognition’, i.e. perception and attention, absorption of infor-
mation, memory retention and problem solving. The concept 
of intelligence proves to be “blurred [...],” also from a philo-
sophical point of view, “because there is no satisfactory theory 
of intelligence” (Kornwachs, 2009: 37). Beyond the blurriness 
with regard to humans (which becomes apparent in contro-
versies about uncertainty in intelligence tests), applying the 
term to computers often leads to humanizing misinterpreta-
tions both in science and among the public, or conversely to 
a technologized reduction of what is human to form a ‘hu-
man-machine’, which disregards or even devalues human 
characteristics (Ullrich, 2017: 188). Research on AI did not 
begin until the late 1950s. Learning here is not meant in the 
sense of human learning, but rather in the sense of character-
ization, classification or optimization by machines. Since the 
1990s, the term ‘machine learning’ has been used to describe 
a sub-methodology in AI; systems are ‘trained’ with ‘training 
data’ using new mathematical and probabilistic methods (big 
data), for example to recognize patterns and process images. 
Research on human memory, intelligence, AI and machine 
learning can be reciprocally related: “what we learn about hu-
man intelligence suggests extensions to the theory of machine 
intelligence, and vice versa” (Cohen and Feigenbaum, 2014). 
Example: empathy
The core of empathy is ‘to empathize with other people’. Em-
pathy makes it possible to resonate along with other people’s 
positive feelings like joy, but also with their suffering. The 
term empathy received special attention when ‘mirror neu-
rons’ were discovered, first in monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 
1996) and later in humans (Botvinick et al., 2005). Technical 
developments such as avatars and robots are also sometimes 
referred to as ‘empathic systems’ (e.g. the BMBF projects Em-
paT – visual empathic training system for job applications, or 
SenseEmotion – emotion management for senior citizens). 
‘Empathy’ here means the imitation of an emotional feed-
back, for example that the avatar smiles with someone or fol-
lows their movements. The avatar itself is not empathic, but 
triggers in humans feelings of being empathetically under-
stood by means of (programmed or self-learned) reactions. 
Study participants also react empathetically when pain is in-
flicted to a robot hand (Suzuki et al., 2015). Even with mini-
mal humanization, such as when an object is given a human 
name, experiment participants react empathetically (neural 
reaction when a vegetable with a human name is ‘painfully’ 
stimulated; Vaes et al., 2016).
Example: consciousness
Consciousness is an ancient problem that researchers in phi-
losophy and psychology and the neurosciences are still con-
cerned with. Simplified consciousness can be understood as a 
state of recognition of inner events and the outer environment. 
Waking consciousness includes perceptions, thoughts, feelings 
and desires. Self-awareness is referred to as the highest level 
of consciousness and designates the recognition of the auto-
biographical character, personal history and identity (Zimbardo 
and Gerrig, 2004). However, speculations about artificial con-
sciousness are still unclear, not least because – even if we could 
model it – we would still be dealing with a model. The assump-
tions and value inscriptions on which this model is based and 
their potentially serious consequences would then have to be 
questioned – as would those in today’s modelling of the world 
by socio-technical systems (Section 3.2). 
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“confidence in and acceptance of smart-data solutions, 
from which we will all benefit in the future – be it in 
medicine, industry or mobility” (Federrath, 2018: 18). 
Ultimately, user confidence can determine the success 
or failure of big data (Kranich, 2018: 32ff.), particularly 
in view of big data’s share in what is historically prob-
ably the largest range of technical possibilities available 
for a totalitarian dictatorship (Grunwald, 2018: 57; 
Zuboff, 2018). To this extent, “in view of big data, there 
is an obligation to reflect on the fact that we are respon-
sible not only for doing what we do, but also for not 
doing good things” (Dabrock, 2018: 41). This is also 
true for AI, which is currently hard to separate from big 
data, as the latter serve as training data for machine 
learning. 
3 .3 .3 
Artificial intelligence
The term artificial intelligence 
(AI) was coined in 1956 as part of 
the Dartmouth Summer Research 
Project on Artificial Intelligence 
organized by John McCarthy. The 
basic theory was that “every 
aspect of learning and other char-
acteristics of intelligence can be described so precisely 
that they can be simulated with the help of machines” 
Burgard, 2018: 2). In view of the unsatisfactory defini-
tion of human intelligence (Kornwachs, 2009), AI, then 
as now, is “not a completely unproblematic term,” even 
for AI researchers (Walsh, 2018: 23), and often arouses 
exaggerated expectations and fears among the public 
(Burchardt, 2018; Box 3.3-1). As in the case of ‘intelli-
gence’, there is still no uniform definition of AI; it is 
understood in many different ways. Definitions gener-
ally begin by looking at “a research question aimed at 
the autonomous solution of problems using technical 
systems” (Djeffal, 2018). Basically, intelligent systems 
are characterized by the ability to solve problems 
autonomously and efficiently (Mainzer, 2016: 2). In 
line with its conceptual genesis, AI is “a discipline 
within computer science that deals with the develop-
ment of software systems which provide functions 
whose execution requires what is typically referred to 
as intelligence” (Burgard, 2018). Such algorithm-based, 
data-based or machine-trained functions can be 
 realized purely on the software side, but can also be 
coupled with hardware, e.g. in robotics. AI thus proves 
to be a “collective term for those technologies and their 
applications that ascertain a result by digital methods 
on the basis of potentially very large and heterogene-
ous data sets in a complex machine-based processing 
method that imitates human intelligence and may be 
automatically applied if necessary” (Datenethikkom-
mission, 2018: 1). The ‘Turing test’ proposed by Alan 
Turing in 1950 (Box 3.3.3-1) is, at least according to his 
intention and contrary to widespread misunderstand-
ing, “not a test that a computer practically has to pass” 
in order to be considered ‘intelligent’ (Walsh, 2018: 69); 
rather, it shows how easily people can ascribe intelli-
gence or other abilities to a machine once a certain level 
has been reached. 
The Turing test, however, illustrates the human ten-
dency, recognizable then as now, to regard programs as 
more intelligent than they are when they, at least at 
first glance, approach our level of intelligent behaviour. 
In doing so, “we succumb to the false conclusion that 
they are human-like. The more tasks computers take 
over from us, the more willing we are to believe that 
they are more intelligent than they really are” (Walsh, 
2018: 78). Apparently, machines are often overesti-
mated, since people are tempted to create references to 
similar human achievements and encourage an 
unfounded humanization of machines. Such humaniza-
tion can evoke emotions such as sympathy or fear 
(Box 3.3-1).
Potential benefits and risks 
In most application areas of AI, the aim is not to imitate 
human abilities as accurately as possible anyway. In 
some areas, technology (and not only digital techno-
logy) is far superior to humans. The speed of data pro-
cessing and the higher storage capacity alone enable AI 
systems to, for example, calculate, translate texts and 
recognize and predict patterns faster than humans and 
handle larger amounts of data. They remain, however, 
only “a tool that expands the possibilities of humans 
and supports their decisions” and, despite some suc-
cessful applications, e.g. in medicine, “have absolutely 
no understanding of medical interrelationships and 
cannot provide any explanations for the diagnoses” 
(Burchardt, 2018: 13). AI systems solve many problems 
differently than humans, which is why, according to 
Moravec’s paradox, many actions that are simple for 
humans are difficult for AI, and difficult tasks for 
humans are often easy for AI to carry out (Moravec, 
1988). An AI-based system always solves just one sin-
gle task (e.g. chess) and is not universally applicable 
(e.g. for chess, speech recognition and image classifica-
tion). Accordingly, during the application of AI specific 
problems and sources of error appear that require spe-
cial scientific attention. Since these often stem not from 
the AI procedures themselves, but rather from their 
incorrect use or the underlying data, the limits of com-
puter science are inevitably exceeded here (Mainzer, 
2016; Broussard, 2018).
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AI is not only embedded as a socio-technical system 
in its societal applications, but also in the actors’ ideas 
about the present and future world. This is shown both 
by the impact of science-fiction discourses in Silicon 
Valley (Kehl and Coenen, 2016), and by often implicit 
philosophical assumptions about the predictability of 
the world (Pietsch et al., 2017) – from the ‘general 
problem solver’ to speculations about various stages of 
a future ‘superintelligence’ (Bostrom et al., 2016; Sec-
tion 7.4). Similar to today, the first phase of AI research 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s was driven by 
euphoria, for example when, within the framework of 
the General Problem-Solver Program, general prob-
lem-solving methods for computers were to be formu-
lated along the lines of Leibniz’s ‘Mathesis Universalis’. 
This failed, however (Mainzer, 2016: 11). Leibniz’s 
‘ Calculemus’ – in the sense of the mathematical resolv-
ability of differences of opinion – could also be inter-
preted as a “wicked satire against his contemporaries” 
(Ullrich, 2017: 153). Nevertheless, even today such 
ideas of an ‘AI global formula’ can be observed in pop-
ular scientific writings, for example in speculations 
about a ‘master algorithm’ (Domingos, 2015), AI merg-
ing with humanity to form a ‘singularity’ (Kurzweil, 
2005), or even a ‘Homo deus’ (Harari, 2015; Section 
7.4) resulting from ‘data-ism’ (Brooks, 2013). What all 
these notions have in common is the concept of a com-
pletely computable world, including biology, biochem-
istry and physics and humans themselves. However, 
this idea is fundamentally criticized by both philoso-
phers and computer scientists (e.g. Królikowski et al., 
2017; Mainzer, 2018; Ullrich, 2019). 
After the failure of the General Problem Solver Pro-
gram in the face of disappointing practical results, the 
second phase from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s 
was characterized by specialized systems for specific 
fields of application, such as mathematical problems or 
natural languages, as well as methods of knowledge 
representation. In the third phase, from the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1980s, expert systems were increasingly 
developed which could store knowledge (e.g. in the 
form of facts and rules) about a certain field and draw 
conclusions automatically (Mainzer, 2016: 12). How-
ever, these systems only had rule-based special know-
ledge without any connection to general global or back-
ground knowledge and thus had no “sense of the whole 
as the basis for correct decisions” (Mainzer, 2016: 53f.). 
This approach changed in the 1990s with the use of 
new mathematical, especially statistical, methods, with 
which machine learning began. This has become the 
most prominent approach of AI in recent years, not 
least due to big data (Section 3.3.2), although ‘learning’ 
in ‘machine learning’ is no less misleading than ‘intelli-
gence’ in AI. For example, reinforcement learning, a 
method of machine learning (Kaelbling et al., 1996), is 
the basis for solving classification problems; it makes 
pattern recognition and image processing possible and, 
on this basis, facial and speech recognition. In rein-
forcement learning there is a step-by-step assessment 
of target achievement by giving “feedback from the 
environment at each step as to how well or badly it is 
achieving the goal. Its strategy is to ‘optimize’ this feed-
back” (Mainzer, 2016: 119), and the algorithm thus 
‘learns’ something more – so-to-speak (Burgard, 2018). 
For this, the system requires large amounts of corres-
ponding training data, i.e. data or examples on the basis 
of which learning can take place. 
The accelerated calculations by GPU computers – 
which use the computing power of graphics processing 
units and large amounts of data via IoT (Section 3.3.1) 
and big data (Section 3.3.2) – can be seen as key to the 
recent breakthrough in machine learning. The funda-
Box 3 .3 .3-1
Turing test and ELIZA
The Turing test is a thought experiment devised in 1950 by 
the British mathematician and AI pioneer Alan Turing in which 
a human being is connected via a computer interface either to 
a real person or to conversation-simulation software. If it was 
not possible to distinguish between human and machine, the 
computer would have passed the ‘test’. Contrary to the 
 reception over the last decades, Turing’s intention was not to 
practically test computers for ‘intelligence’, but only, in the 
context of his time, “to gain clarity about what is understood 
by a ‘thinking machine’ and what its existence would mean” 
(Walsh, 2018: 69). Rather, it becomes clear that subjectively 
attributing human intelligence in human interaction with a 
software simulation is not a good criterion for ‘intelligence’. It 
is therefore necessary for people to know when they are 
 interacting with machines.
This was also shown by the ELIZA speech-analysis system 
developed by Joseph Weizenbaum from 1964 to 1966. Today 
it would be called a ‘chatbot’, which, in simulated psycho-
therapeutic conversations, syntactically converts the state-
ments of the patients into questions without having any se-
mantic understanding (Walsh, 2018: 47ff.). By revealing the 
source code of the program, Weizenbaum hoped that users 
would be able to see through its relatively simple structure 
(even though it was a big step in speech analysis at the time) 
and understand that computers could not have real conversa-
tions but only a syntactic simulation that could be interpreted 
as such. In principle, nothing has changed in this situation to 
this day; even current digital assistants (Alexa, Cortana, Siri) 
and current (psycho-)’therapeutic’ chatbots are nothing more 
than technically refined simulations of a conversation  without 
actual speech comprehension.
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mental methods, however, are models of artificial neu-
ral networks, which were initially virtually unusable at 
the end of the 1950s. These models are based on a sim-
plified structure of a nerve cell (neuron) that had been 
modelled for the first time more than ten years previ-
ously (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943). Today’s ‘deep learn-
ing’ (Goodfellow et al., 2016), which refers to mul-
ti-layer neural networks, shows “an impressive perfor-
mance that often eclipses other well-tried technologies” 
(Walsh, 2018: 95), not least thanks to massively 
increased computing power, storage capacity and data 
availability. However, this statistical technique for clas-
sifying data patterns using many layers of artificial 
neural networks (Marcus, 2018: 3) is hardly comparable 
with human ‘learning’. Artificial neural networks con-
sist of input and output units, between which there is a 
variable number of hidden levels, the depth of which, 
in the sense of deep learning, refers to their large num-
ber of possible links. A typical case of the application of 
such networks would be, for example, image data of 
handwritten numbers, which are on the input side, 
while the output unit consists of the numerical catego-
ries from 1 to n to which these are assigned. 
In addition to image recognition, deep learning is 
increasingly being used successfully in speech recogni-
tion and processing, as well as in learning complex 
game rules. However, the successes always apply only 
in certain domains or contexts – and as long as no 
attempt is made to deceive the AI system by means of 
more or less subtle attempts at manipulation (adver-
sarial examples), some of which are not recognizable to 
human senses (Box 3.3.3-2). Furthermore, the preci-
sion of deep-learning methods (Schmidhuber, 2015) 
has grown enormously compared to traditional meth-
ods of machine learning, but only in special applica-
tions does it exceed that of human classifications. Deep 
learning currently faces many challenges (Marcus, 
2018: 6ff.; Box 3.3.3-2). 
Thus, despite spectacular progress in selected 
domain-specific AI applications, it would be “wrong to 
now assume that machine learning has brought think-
ing machines within reach and that techniques such as 
deep learning need only a little more refining and the 
problem of intelligence has been cracked” (Walsh, 
2018: 95). All today’s applications are based on special-
ized AI, so-called ‘weak’ AI. The endeavour to achieve 
the same intellectual abilities as humans or another 
‘greater’ intelligence, on the other hand, is embodied by 
the term ‘strong’ AI. Whether and when ‘strong’ AI as 
a domain-spanning form superior to human intelligence 
might be realized and even form an artificial conscious-
ness (Searle, 1980, 1990) can only be speculated on 
scientifically from today’s point of view. The same 
applies to artificial general intelligence (AGI). Unlike 
‘superintelligence’ (Bostrom et al., 2016), which is 
associated with reason, consciousness and self-set 
goals, AGI could solve any problem solvable by humans 
equally well or better, even without these qualities 
(Walsh, 2018: 130ff.). The initially failed idea of a gen-
eral problem solver proves to be powerful, at least on a 
visionary level (Chapter 6). On the other hand, the cur-
rently pressing questions about designing AI as a 
socio-technical system tend to be overlooked: who will 
feel the positive or negative effects of using AI, and 
when, how and where? Apprehension, ignorance, false 
fears or overreaction could lead, not to a ‘Good AI Soci-
ety’ (Floridi et al., 2018; Figure 3.3.3-1), but to the 
underuse of AI, which would waste its potential if dan-
gers caused by overuse or misuse were attributed to the 
technology and not to the socio-political conditions 
governing its design, e.g. by setting the wrong incen-
tives.
On the other hand, confidence-building (European 
Commission, 2019) and responsible use of AI offers 
increasing potential for an extension of human intelli-
gence and improvement of human ability to act in the 
sense of ‘augmented intelligence’ or ‘smart agency’, as 
well as for human well-being and dignity – and also for 
sustaining the natural life-support systems (Floridi et 
al., 2018; Cath et al., 2017). However, research on this 
subject, particularly on the latter topic, is only just 
beginning (Chapter 10; Hilty and Aebischer, 2015). 
Research into ‘explainable AI’ is somewhat more 
advanced, but also still in its initial phase. It is aimed at 
methods for creating transparency in deep learning, 
which has so far often been regarded and applied as a 
‘black box’ (Box 3.3.3-2). Ultimately, explainable AI 
could achieve both a further demystification of AI and, 
above all, great epistemological and methodological 
progress. Currently, AI ‘cheats’ in over 50% of the cases 
tested by an interdisciplinary team (Lapuschkin et al., 
2019) when it arrives at correct categorizations on the 
basis of false premises (e.g. rails as an indicator for the 
recognition of a train). Several frequently used training 
data sets for image recognition and simple computer 
games were used for the test. The sobering conclusion 
is that the usual evaluation metrics are blind to such 
circumvention strategies, which is why “the current 
broad and sometimes rather unreflecting application of 
machine learning in all industrial and scientific domains” 
should be questioned (Lapuschkin et al., 2019: 7). In 
the view of the team of authors, such analyses in the 
area of ‘explainable AI’ are a first significant step 
towards the future development of trustworthy, fair 
and accountable AI systems in accordance with such 
regulatory requirements as the EU-GDPR (Lapuschkin 
et al., 2019: 7). In view of these methodological deficits 
and the high energy requirement for data processing 
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Box 3 .3 .3-2
Possible applications and limitations of AI and 
deep learning 
Games
Success stories, such as AI having independently learned to 
play chess or Go, have contributed to the distorted public 
 image of what it can do. From a technical point of view, this 
field of application should be assessed much more soberly. 
Games are a popular testing field for AI research with a rela-
tively simple world – ideal for AI. This is due to precise rules, 
the still limited number of possible actions (although some-
times highly complex for human players), and simple ways to 
evaluate success. By contrast, the real world is much less or-
dered, not always precisely regulated, and sometimes even 
characterized by an unlimited number of possible options for 
action. Its evaluation, too, is usually by no means very clear 
and dualistic. The effort required to obtain large amounts of 
high-quality training data is many times greater than in a 
game. When neural networks compete against themselves or 
against each other in order, in the end, to play exactly this 
(but no other) game better than human players, they only 
optimize the course of the game; they do not understand a 
single rule of the game in the human sense (Walsh, 
2018: 118ff.; Marcus, 2018).
Machine vision 
Machine vision basically comprises several general subtasks 
(recognition of objects, analysis of movements, position de-
termination). In addition, there are specialized applications 
such as optical character recognition (especially traffic signs), 
face recognition, and recognition of spatial elements (scene 
labelling). In the field of image recognition, good progress is 
also being made in the real world, largely with deep learning. 
However, illustrations like those in the AI Index (Shoham et 
al., 2018: 47) on the ImageNet competition, in which AI was 
supposedly superior to humans as early as 2014, are by no 
means generalizable. Although the error rate of the respective 
winners fell sharply (from 28.2% in 2010 to 3.57% in 2015), 
according to Walsh (2018: 113) it will “probably take a while 
before human performance is achieved,” given error rates of 
up to 20% in “top 1 accuracy, which measures the percentage 
of images where the most likely label has been misallocated.” 
Adversarial examples (Hosseini and Poovendran, 2018:  5; 
Eykholt et al., 2018: 7) show that even minimal changes, be 
they conscious manipulations or different conditions in the 
(in this respect incomplete) training data set, can massively 
increase the error rates up to total failure.
The fact that the consequences of an inadequately trained 
neural network can be serious is shown not only by the exam-
ple of manipulated traffic signs (Eykholt et al., 2018), which 
often hardly exist in their pure form in major cities. Several 
accidents (including fatal ones) in the field of autonomous 
driving – ranging from an unrecognized white truck to a col-
lision with the central crash barrier on a construction site – 
have shown that AI can only recognize objects in contexts in 
which it has been trained. On the other hand, major technol-
ogy corporations are now also warning about the societal 
risks of face recognition. Irrespective of how well it works 
under real conditions, it is a risk technology in terms of pos-
sible surveillance (Kees, 2015). However, deep learning is not 
only susceptible to manipulation, it is also a possible way to 
manipulate images, video or audio material. Well-made for-
geries, e.g. videos in which politicians say completely differ-
ent things than in the original (deep fakes), are not only a new 
methods of disinformation or even slander (e.g. changing 
faces in pornographic videos), but also a challenge both in 
face recognition and in the new field of research on the tech-
nical recognition of deep fakes (Korshunov and Marcel, 2018; 
Li and Lyu, 2018). 
Automatic language processing
Machine processing of natural language comprises the areas 
of speech recognition and machine translation, as well as text 
summary and answering questions. In the first two areas, pro-
gress has already been so good, at least for the most interna-
tionally prominent languages with a correspondingly large 
pool of training data (thanks to deep learning), that voice 
control of devices such as smartphones or digital assistants 
has entered the everyday lives of many people in the western 
world. Machine translation also achieves good results in many 
areas, depending on the language combination (e.g. English/
French) and context. However, challenges remain where lan-
guages are differently structured, the semantics are complex, 
complete paragraphs need to be translated, or long spoken 
texts need to be put into writing (Walsh, 2018: 115ff.). 
Current challenges in deep learning
The first aspect that must be emphasized in this field is the 
enormous need for data. Currently, this requires thousands, 
millions or even billions of training examples, most of which 
are assigned by humans. Furthermore, the lack of process 
transparency has been under intense discussion for years. In 
view of millions or even billions of parameters relating to re-
lations within neural networks, the majority of researchers 
agree that ‘deep learning’ is a ‘black box’ whose processes and 
results are not comprehensible to humans. A separate re-
search area called ‘Explainable AI’ has been developed to 
counteract this lack of transparency. Although in general the 
distinction between correlation and causality is of great im-
portance, e.g. with regard to algorithmic decision making, it 
has received surprisingly little attention in the literature on 
deep learning, apart from a few exceptions (Marcus, 2018). 
This could be due to the fact that what machines learn there 
are particularly highly complex correlations. Prior knowledge 
has so far been minimized, and it would be unclear how it 
might be appropriately integrated into the system. Answers to 
complex open questions cannot be found in training data sets. 
Inference problems where the answer to a given question is 
not explicitly present in the text, or is distributed over several 
sentences in the text, have therefore caused great difficulties 
up to now. The combination of rule-based AI and ma-
chine-learning-based AI is therefore also a current area of 
research. Deep learning is furthermore blind to dynamic 
changes because it works best in highly static worlds with 
stable rules, such as games. Yet social worlds such as politics 
or business are subject to constant changes in their rules; they 
therefore elude AI systems – at least they have done so up to 
now (Marcus, 2018). 
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and storage, the decisive step to be taken to further 
develop AI is not a supposed international ‘race’ in 
machine learning, the endpoint of which is difficult to 
imagine, but “the responsible further development of 
AI based on ethical principles and human rights” 
( Dignum, 2019; Section 9.3.2). First drafts for regula-
tions on this basis have already been developed 
(Box 3.2.5-1).
3 .3 .4 
Cybersecurity
Realizing the sustainability 
potential of digitalization stands 
and falls with the security of the 
underlying technical systems. 
Even though, as in society, there 
can never be hundred-percent 
security in the ICT sector, secur-
ity is essential in view of ever greater interconnectivity; 
it must at least be maximized and implemented as well 
as possible. It is no exaggeration to say that cybersecu-
rity (also known as IT security) is a necessary precon-
dition for the functioning of all other technologies out-
lined in this Section 3.3. As already became clear at the 
outset, especially in the case of the Internet of Things, 
which is notoriously insecure in its current form 
( Section 3.3.1), the success or failure of ongoing digital-
ization will depend on cybersecurity. The term cyberse-
curity refers to the entire field of security in informa-
tion and communication technology (BSI, 2019a) and 
describes the aim of reducing the risks caused by 
threats to and vulnerabilities in the use of IT to an 
acceptable level by taking appropriate security meas-
ures (BSI, 2019a). 
Scenarios in which (inadequate) cybersecurity plays 
a role include criminal activities such as data theft, 
deliberate manipulation of systems, and espionage. 
Cybersecurity is impaired by organizational and techni-
cal deficiencies such as operating or configuration 
errors, security gaps caused by faulty software, techni-
cal failures and faulty reactions by technical systems as 
a result of construction or design errors, or force 
majeure, e.g. catastrophic failure of (sub)systems 
(Menz et al., 2015: 7; Festag et al., 2017: 46f.). In other 
words, the much-quoted hacker attacks are just one of 
many problems.
In general, a distinction is made in the security dis-
cussion between functional safety and cybersecurity 
(or information security). Functional safety refers pri-
marily to the physical protection of people and the 
environment from a system, i.e. external protection. 
Cybersecurity, on the other hand, refers to the protec-
tion of the internal values of a system, i.e. internal pro-
tection, the misuse of which can also cause immaterial 
damage externally, for example when a person’s privacy 
is violated. Due to the increasing digital networking and 
fusion of the digital and physical worlds in the Internet 
of Things, the two can no longer be clearly distin-
guished from each other; they influence each other. 
Cybersecurity is the protection against attacks or inten-
tionally performed interventions on a system from out-
side (e.g. zero-day attacks or distributed denial-of-ser-
vice attacks). By contrast, functional safety (also 
known as operational safety) focuses on protecting 
people and the environment from a system’s possible 
negative effects (e.g. due to technical faults or faulty 
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Figure 3 .3 .3-1
Overview of the four core opportunities offered by AI, four corresponding risks, and the opportunity cost of underusing AI.
Source: Floridi et al., 2018
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systems; Menz et al., 2015: 3, 7f.). If, for example, a 
vehicle’s brakes are impaired by a hacker attack via a 
Bluetooth interface within the vehicle, this cybersecu-
rity attack directly reduces the vehicle’s functional 
safety (Checkoway et al., 2011). 
In the following, the focus lies on cybersecurity, and 
relevant, related terms include in particular data secur-
ity, data protection and general information security. 
Although it is difficult to define the terms precisely, as 
they can be interpreted differently according to the 
author or the context, the following definitions are 
given here as a guide:
 > The classical protection goals of information security 
include confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Confidentiality means the protection of data, infor-
mation and resources from unauthorized access. 
Integrity refers to the protection of data, information 
and resources from unauthorized changes. The avail-
ability aspect, on the other hand, refers to the fact 
that access to data, information and resources should 
be possible when required (Sackmann, 2014). 
 > In data protection – protecting natural persons from 
violations of their personal rights – further objec-
tives include authenticity (certain identification of 
the author), attribution (indisputability of author-
ship), transparency (traceability, verifiability and 
evaluation of data processing), non-linkability (no 
data link beyond the original purpose) and inter-
venibility (users’ ability to ensure data protection; 
Opiela et al., 2016: 10). 
 > Data security, which involves the protection of tech-
nical systems and in particular the protection of data 
from loss, destruction or manipulation by unauthor-
ized persons – and thus also data protection in the 
case of personal data – can be challenged by weak 
points in software, malware, identity theft and tar-
geted complex attacks (Rescorla, 2005). 
Procedures for anonymization, such as randomization 
and generalization, are available to irrevocably elimi-
nate personal references in data. Randomization refers 
to technologies that make it impossible to directly con-
nect data to a specific person, while generalization 
refers to technologies that allow the reduction of infor-
mation by changing scale and magnitudes (Hoepner, 
2017: 19). Pseudonymization technologies make it pos-
sible for personal data to be changed by an assignment 
rule in such a way that individual information can no 
longer be assigned to a person without knowledge or 
use of the assignment rule (Ernestus et al., 2019). 
There are many different mechanisms for secure 
networking, secure internet access, client and server 
security, and mobile security. One example is perimeter 
security: protection e.g. by means of firewalls. A fire-
wall is a security system consisting of software and/or 
hardware components that protects networks against 
unauthorized network intrusions (BSI, 2019a). An 
intrusion detection system (IDS) detects an intrusion or 
attempted intrusion by unauthorized persons or com-
puters into a computer system or network (Heasman 
and Movle, 2009). An intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) detects attacks and prevents or blocks them. In 
many systems and applications, perimeter security is 
only partially possible or not possible at all, which is 
why the resilience of systems is gaining in importance 
(Hoepner et al., 2016). Resilience refers to the ability of 
systems to deal with, prevent, protect themselves from, 
cope with and adapt to adverse events, i.e. human, 
technical or natural disasters (e.g. terrorist attacks, 
major industrial accidents) or change processes with 
catastrophic consequences (e.g. extreme weather con-
ditions resulting from climate change (Scharte et al., 
2014: 121f.) and thus their ability to “work towards 
minimizing potential or existing damage to the physical 
and material well-being of the population” (Scharte et 
al., 2014: 54). In order to guarantee resilience, resil-
ience engineering must include technological concepts 
of security problems early on in planning and imple-
mentation activities in societal projects (Scharte et al., 
2014: 125). In this way, it is supposed to be possible to 
keep critical subcomponents of technical systems in 
controlled operation in the event of damage, even out-
side the standard requirements. The technological solu-
tions for increasing the resilience of individual infra-
structures include self-healing, adaptive transmission 
networks, and constructions smartly designed by ener-
gy-autonomous, automated sensor networks (Scharte 
et al., 2014: 125). 
In order to design suitable security measures in the 
respective impact classes according to the required 
security levels and to minimize the potential target for 
cyber attacks in this way, the idea in security by design 
is to already take security requirements into considera-
tion during software and hardware development; this 
makes security independent of the respective user and 
the specific application (Hoepner et al., 2016: 100).
For example, digital identities and possible identity 
thefts are part of current work on security by design. 
Identity thefts are aimed at digital identities, which 
include “all procedures in which people, objects and 
processes authenticate themselves online via certain 
attributes in order to prove their own identity” (Bun-
desdruckerei, 2019). Digital identities protect technical 
systems and infrastructures and ensure the trustwor-
thiness and security of sensitive data (Rieger, 2015: 6). 
For example, objects in the IoT (Section 3.3.1) also 
require a unique identity in order to identify and 
describe them, communicate with them and control 
them (Hoepner et al., 2016: 54). 
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Identity management (IdM) technologies are used to 
ensure the identity of a person or of IT components and 
confirm their authorized access to data, information 
and other resources. IdM is the management of the 
information necessary for identification and authenti-
cation (BSI, 2016: 170). “An IdM system provides the 
functions to store, manage, retrieve and protect iden-
tity information” (Fraunhofer FOKUS, 2017: 137f.). 
One of the challenges of IdM is to ensure the protection 
of identities while, at the same time, enabling person-
alization in digital spaces (Hoepner et al., 2016: 54f.).
When using services, it must be ensured that only 
legitimate access is permitted. The process of verifying 
whether a user actually possesses the identity claimed 
when attempting to log in is called authentication. The 
users prove their legitimacy by presenting one or more 
authentication factors, e.g. user name plus password 
(knowledge), smart card (possession) plus PIN (know-
ledge) – also known as two-factor authentication – or 
biometric features such as a fingerprint or iris geometry 
(Rieger, 2015: 5).
In addition to identity management, there is also 
access management, which refers to processes that are 
necessary for assigning, withdrawing and controlling 
the rights of a user with regard to entry or access to 
information or services. Both procedures consist of 
organizational and technical measures and can be sup-
ported by IT applications. In order to ensure the highest 
possible level of security, the granting of rights must be 
handled sparingly and in a task-related manner. Back-
ground systems allow the storage, evaluation and 
therefore traceability of activities that have taken place 
(BSI, 2016: 170).
Cryptographic methods, procedures and tools can be 
used for protection against unauthorized data access or 
misuse. The aim of cryptography is to protect against 
manipulation and unauthorized reading of information 
or to authenticate a person, e.g. by making them 
unrecognizable with the help of an encryption key (Box 
3.3.4-1). The encrypted text can be converted back to 
plain text using a (possibly different) decryption key 
(Jahnke, 2014).
Potential benefits and risks 
With regard to the issue of cybersecurity, it can be said 
that, in view of IT threats (e.g. malware) and the grow-
ing digital vulnerability caused by manipulated operat-
ing systems or network nodes, the protection of 
increasingly digitally networked critical infrastructures 
such as energy or water supply systems is becoming 
Box 3 .3 .4-1
Cryptography
In classical cryptographic methods without the use of elec-
tronic computers, the character sequence was changed (trans-
position) and/or characters were replaced (substitution). 
These procedures are now considered insecure. In modern 
cryptographic encryption methods, by contrast, individual 
bits are used, so that the number of possible changes is in-
creased and non-textual data processing is also possible. 
Modern cryptographic methods can be divided into sym-
metric and asymmetric methods. In symmetric processes, a 
single secret key is used per communication relationship for 
encryption and decryption. In asymmetric procedures, on the 
other hand, one private and one public key are generated per 
user (Jahnke, 2014). 
Files encrypted with the recipient’s public key can then 
only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. The 
sender’s private key, in turn, allows data to be digitally signed. 
The public key can be used to verify the originality (authen-
ticity) of the data. To transmit messages securely, communica-
tion partners can exchange their digital certificates, with the 
result that messages can be encrypted in such a way that only 
the opposite side can decrypt the message and verify the 
sender’s digital signature. A digital certificate consists of the 
user’s public key and other information, such as the person 
who issued the certificate and the validity period of the cer-
tificate. Public-key infrastructures (PKIs) are used to simplify 
and enable the exchange of certificates between mutually 
unknown communication partners (BSI, 2019c).
A public-key infrastructure is a hierarchy of digital certifi-
cates based on asymmetric encryption. First, a root certificate 
with a private and public key is generated at a certificate au-
thority (CA) that is regarded as trustworthy by all communi-
cation partners and acts as a trust anchor (BSI, 2019c). 
Between the potential certificate user and the CA there is 
an intermediary registry (registration authority – RA) which 
records and authenticates the identity of the potential certi-
ficate user and forwards the certificate request to the CA 
(GBS, 2016). The other certificates are then signed with the 
private key belonging to the root certificate or with another 
private key whose certificate was signed with the private key 
of the root certificate. A signature is only issued by the certi-
fication authority if special requirements defined by the CA 
(e.g. proof of the identity of the potential certificate user and 
the secure storage of the key by them) are met (BSI, 2019c). 
A PKI can be used to establish the integrity and confidential-
ity of information as well as its authenticity (identification 
and indisputability).
One application in which a PKI can be used is secure com-
munication in virtual private networks (VPN; itwissen.info, 
2017). VPNs are networks that are physically operated within 
another network (e.g. the internet), but are logically separa-
ted from it. They enable the integrity and confidentiality of 
data to be guaranteed by means of cryptographic procedures 
during transmission in untrustworthy networks (e.g. the in-
ternet). A distinction is made between three types of VPN: (1) 
site-to-site VPN where two computer networks are connected 
via a VPN, (2) end-to-end VPN where a VPN is created be-
tween two end devices, and (3) end-to-site VPN or re-
mote-access VPN where a VPN is created between an end 
device and a network (BSI, 2016: 332).
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more and more important. Furthermore, targeted 
security measures (such as security by design or BSI 
IT-Grundschutz) are required, which, in turn, can be 
secured by security certificates (such as ISO Common 
Criteria). In addition, massive identity thefts, reported 
surveillance activities that are not democratically legit-
imized, and digitally caused supply failures have led to 
a loss of confidence in societies worldwide. The use of 
digital technologies to achieve sustainability goals must 
therefore be based on a well-founded cybersecurity 
strategy. The necessary funds and resources must be 
available in order to implement it effectively and thus 
restore trustworthiness and reduce risk in the face of 
increasing digital networking.
3 .3 .5 
Other relevant technologies
After the detailed description of the key technologies 
in the previous sections, further technologies that are 
also relevant in connection with sustainability are pre-
sented in compact form below. These include monitor-
ing and modelling (Section 3.3.5.1), augmented and 
virtual realities (Section 3.3.5.2), robotics (Section 
3.3.5.3), 3D printing and additive manufacturing (Sec-




Monitoring is the systematic obser-
vation of objects, processes or 
environments, for example to 
record their properties, behaviour 
or compliance with threshold val-
ues. It can collect data to gain 
knowledge or form the basis of 
control processes. Monitoring the Earth system and 
environmental conditions is of particular importance 
for sustainability and is expanding rapidly as a result of 
the fast-growing use of ICT. The combination of long-es-
tablished monitoring technologies (e.g. remote sensing 
by satellites) with new data-acquisition options (e.g. 
networked sensors of the IoT; Section 3.3.1) and new 
data-analysis options is already being discussed under 
the term ‘smart Earth’ (Bakker and Ritts, 2018). Hun-
dreds of terabytes of Earth-system data are generated 
daily, while the capacity to analyse them meaningfully 
is a long way from keeping pace (Reichstein et al., 
2019). Monitoring benefits from automated data acqui-
sition and analysis, and the ongoing process of digitali-
zation and networking allows large amounts of data to 
be aggregated, while interpreting this data often 
requires complex modelling.
Remote sensing is usually based on the evaluation of 
electromagnetic waves (e.g. light, infrared or UV radia-
tion, radio waves) or sound waves, from which conclu-
sions can be drawn about the observed objects. Remote 
sensing can be carried out by satellites, from flying or 
floating platforms such as drones, or from the ground. 
The systems can be active, i.e. emitting radiation and 
analysing what is reflected back (e.g. radar); however, 
most function passively, i.e. reflected sunlight or the 
radiation emanating from the observed object itself is 
analysed. The quality of the information obtained 
about the observed objects depends to a considerable 
extent on the efficiency of the (usually computer-aided) 
evaluation, as well as on the availability of supplemen-
tary information, e.g. from in-situ measurements.
In-situ measurements are measurements that are 
carried out directly on site. A wide variety of detectors 
can be used to record chemical and physical parameters, 
for example temperature, pressure, brightness, acceler-
ation, pH or humidity. In the course of digitalization, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the dissemination 
of sensors, which are increasingly being networked via 
the internet and provide data in near real-time (Section 
3.3.1). Today, sensors can be found almost everywhere: 
in the traffic infrastructure, in ocean buoys, in trees and 
in the ground, on vehicles – and in smartphones 
(Gabrys, 2016: 7). Smartphones alone already contain a 
large number of sensors such as cameras, microphones, 
acceleration and pressure sensors which are also 
 suitable for citizen-science projects (Cartwright, 2016).
Measurements and simulations have long played an 
important role in the climate field. Satellites can perma-
nently observe different atmospheric components such 
as CO2, ozone or aerosols, achieving almost global cov-
erage, but require supplementary measurements from 
the ground or from the air, as they cannot resolve pro-
cesses and material flows on a smaller scale (Kulmala, 
2018). For example, the possibility is currently being 
discussed of obtaining a complete picture of green-
house-gas emissions from measurement data (combi-
nations of in-situ measurements with ground-based 
and satellite-based remote-sensing data), which ini-
tially only measure their concentrations, with the aid of 
inverse modelling (i.e. calculation methods intended to 
trace an observed result back to its causes). The increas-
ing amount of data combined with greater computing 
power suggests that this can develop from research 
projects and pilot operations into stable monitoring 
systems within a few years.
At the EU level, the Copernicus Earth Observation 
Programme, operated jointly by the European Commis-
sion and the European Space Agency (ESA), is currently 
key. Copernicus is based on a specially created network 
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of European satellites, but also uses data from national 
and commercial satellites and measuring stations (ESA, 
2019). Parts of the system are still under construction. 
The aim of the programme is to bring together a large 
amount of data from remote-sensing and in-situ meas-
urements and to make information available to differ-
ent user groups in real time via ‘services’. ‘Core serv-
ices’ are land monitoring, marine surveillance, disaster 
and crisis management, monitoring the atmosphere and 
climate change, and security services (surveillance of 
borders, resources and critical infrastructure, and mon-
itoring of international agreements). Many observation 
systems also already exist at the global level, such as 
the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) at the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS), which are 
continuously being further developed to integrate new 
technologies, achieve better regional coverage and 
make data accessible.
Digitally supported technology is also increasingly 
being used to monitor biodiversity and nature conser-
vation (Section 5.2.11). Here, the possibilities range 
from the spatially and temporally high-resolution 
observation of land-use changes, by analysing satellite 
data (Hansen et al., 2013), to the tracking of individual 
wild animals. In many cases the animals themselves are 
used as carriers for sensors, the results of which can 
then be read out via satellites (Curry, 2018). In addition 
to industrial processes, other areas in which monitoring 
already plays a major role today include transport 
( Section 5.2.8), buildings (Section 5.2.7), agriculture 
(Section 5.2.9) and the human body (Section 5.3.7).
Real-time monitoring systems can form the basis for 
early-warning systems such as underwater sensors that 
can issue tsunami warnings (Witze, 2019). The increas-
ing availability of data streams and real-time data 
 analysis also makes real-time environmental regulation 
possible, i.e. regulation that can react to unforeseen 
developments (Bakker and Ritts, 2018). The evaluation 
and use of the data, however, requires considerable 
(energy) resources and often cannot keep pace with the 
ever more cost-effective data acquisition. The qualita-
tive added value that AI (Section 3.3.3) can provide in 
this respect is an open research question. It also raises 
issues of accessibility, interoperability and quality of 
data and evaluation results.
Ideas in research even go so far as wanting to record 
the human environment as completely as possible with 
sensors, model it comprehensively, and make it availa-
ble as a virtual image or as augmented or virtual reality 
(Section 3.3.5.2), thus transforming the real world into 
a ‘browseable environment’ (Zuboff, 2018: 242; 
 Paradiso, 2017). But this supposed digital omniscience 
can have its downsides. For example, it is not always 
clear whether and how it is always possible to ensure 
the privacy of people living in the observed regions or 
interacting with the observed objects, plants, animals 
or processes. Nowadays, sensors are often so small that 
they can easily be overlooked. In addition, sensor tech-
nologies themselves have an ecological footprint and 
generate considerable amounts of e-waste 
( Section 5.2.5).
3.3.5.2 
Augmented and virtual realities
The term virtual worlds includes 
augmented reality (AR) and virtual 
reality (VR). AR and VR have 
gained in importance in many 
areas outside the entertainment 
industry as a result of falling prices 
for electronic hardware (e.g. dis-
plays, graphics processors, tracking systems, CPUs and 
camera systems), while functionality has simultane-
ously increased (Dörner et al., 2016: 31, 37). In addi-
tion to the military, these areas include the automotive 
industry, science, medicine, the education sector and 
many other fields in which simulations are necessary 
(Brill, 2009: 2; Kaminski, 2016: 274; van Looy, 
2017: 54ff.). 
AR describes an interactive environment in which 
end devices (e.g. smartphones, special glasses, PCs or 
televisions) are used to display virtual content in the 
correct perspective in the user’s environment, thus 
enhancing reality (Dörner et al., 2016: 33). The proxim-
ity to reality is reinforced by the fact that the display is 
adapted to the new perspective in real time when the 
user moves. AR serves to enable users to access impor-
tant data, information and images via an interface (van 
Looy, 2017: 52). An example of an AR application is 
head-up displays used in aircraft or cars to project 
important information onto an additional glass panel in 
an aircraft or onto the windscreen in a car. This might 
be, for example, the speed limit, the most efficient route 
to the destination, or the car’s distance from the vehicle 
in front. AR intelligently combines large-volume data 
from different sources with powerful output options (e.g. 
animations, text, language). This is done using techno-
logies such as big data, analytics (a sub-area of big data 
that serves to predict or evaluate behaviour), or cognitive 
computing as a sub-area of AI, which allows human 
thought processes to be simulated (Winkelhake, 
2017: 69). AR systems consist of hardware and software 
components. They include input systems that are used 
to capture the real environment, such as cameras, sen-
sors, keyboards, touch screens and mechanical devices. 
Processing systems are used to track the situation and 
to include virtual elements and other data to represent 
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the overall situation. Output systems present the overall 
situation for the observer. They include data glasses, 
monitors or contact lenses with a display (Winkelhake, 
2017: 70).
While AR applications augment reality, VR applica-
tions go one step further. Here, the real world is hidden 
and a completely different virtual world is created (van 
Looy, 2017: 57). The WBGU defines VR as “a world sim-
ulated by computers and corresponding programs which 
is imparted to users using special techniques and inter-
faces and with which they can interact” (Brockhaus, 
2017). Interaction with VR, such as the possibility to 
move within it or to influence it to a limited extent, is 
made possible by input and output devices. They include 
data gloves, full-body suits, head-mounted displays such 
as VR glasses, positioning systems, earphones, interac-
tion and navigation devices, or devices that record ges-
tures or address the user’s haptics (Rizzo et al., 2002: 244; 
Schreier, 2002: 43). Technologies like sensors or 
machine-vision methods serve to determine the user’s 
position in relation to their surroundings. Based on this, 
the position, perspective and orientation of the virtual 
contents are calculated and presented (Dörner et al., 
2016: 33). This is used, for example, in intelligent facto-
ries in Industry 4.0 and supports interaction between 
humans and machines (Section 5.2.1)
Immersion – “the users’ feeling of actually being 
within the virtual environment” (Brill, 2009: 6) – is made 
possible by the input and output technologies mentioned 
above. According to Brill (2009: 6), it depends on the 
one hand on the correspondence between the real and 
virtual world, and on the other hand on the extent to 
which the users can influence the virtual world. The main 
thing is that users accept the representation as real. It is 
less relevant whether the representation is actually com-
pletely realistic (Brill, 2009: 6f.).
The input and output technologies trigger stimuli 
that appeal to the user’s different senses e.g. visual, 
auditory, olfactory, thermo-receptive or haptic percep-
tion (Dörner et al., 2016: 30). Multi-user VR enables 
multiple users to become part of virtual worlds using 
avatars (Lattemann, 2013). An avatar is a graphic rep-
resentation, animation or caricature through which the 
user is embodied in whole or in part (Duden, 2017). In 
order to generate presence in single-user VR, on the 
other hand, all that is needed is an interactive represen-
tation of hand-held interaction devices that is correct in 
terms of perspective, and vision tracking in agreement 
with the body’s perception of its own position. 
Potential benefits and risks
According to van Looy (2017: 56) the VR could “have a 
transformative effect similar to that of the internet; and 
perhaps VR will even revolutionize the internet [...].” In 
general, virtual worlds have the potential to expand the 
possibilities of the real world and create new worlds 
(Welzel, 2017). For example, VR offers physically 
restricted persons an opportunity to appear in the virtual 
world as physically intact persons and thus overcome 
physiological limitations. New ranges of possibility also 
emerge with regard to individual self-portrayal. All in 
all, VR creates new potential for action and design, as 
well as potential for overcoming physical borders (Zweck, 
2006: 24). 
In the field of education, VR and AR applications can 
impart knowledge visually (van Looy, 2017: 57). In 
 medicine, for example, they can be used for training 
purposes in preparation for difficult surgery. In this way, 
operations can be tested on virtual patients without risk 
(van Looy, 2017: 54, 57). VR technologies can also be 
used to treat psychological disorders. In the case of an 
anxiety disorder, users can be moved into a  virtual world 
where they are confronted with their fears (van Looy, 
2017: 58). In construction projects, VR and AR can be 
used to visualize designs more realistically and thus 
avoid planning errors – or eliminate them more cost-
cheaply (Dörner et al., 2016: 31). Virtual  prototypes can 
also be created using AR (van Looy, 2017: 54). VR can 
be used to visualize conditions in crisis regions. For 
example, the UN and UNICEF have produced 360° VR 
documentation entitled ‘Clouds over Sidra’. It enables 
viewers to gain an insight into life in a refugee camp. 
Donations to UNICEF increased by 100% after the video 
was  published (van Looy, 2017: 59). 
Accordingly, VR is said to have the potential to 
 promote empathy and pro-social attitudes by giving 
users an opportunity to put themselves in the position 
of individuals in a foreign group, to understand them 
and empathize with their experience (Hagendorff, 
2016: 25f.). However, VR can also reduce social cohesion, 
because immersing oneself in a virtual reality makes it 
necessary to isolate the user. VR users can be removed 
from their social context, with potential negative 
 consequences for social cohesion (Hagendorff, 2016: 25). 
The literature, too, assumes that VR will also have cul-
tural effects (Zweck, 2006: 40f.). For example, the way 
in which VR is designed can be expected to have an 
impact on structures, hierarchies, and communication 
and interaction processes, as well as on the way the users 
think. Further risks lie in security issues. As AR glasses 
have spread, for example, the aspect of data protection 
has been critically scrutinized, because there is a 
 possibility that photos can be taken, videos recorded or 
other sensitive data accessed via AR glasses without the 
 wearer’s knowledge. 




Robotics or robot technology 
“deals with the design, creation, 
control, production and operation 
of robots, e.g. industrial or service 
robots. In the case of human-like 
robots it is also a question of the 
production of limbs and skin, facial 
expressions and gestures, as well as natural language 
abilities” (Bendel, 2016: 191f.). The overriding purpose 
is to “promote the development of systems that advance 
the automation of human activities” (Kehl and Coenen, 
2016: 120). Already at this point it becomes clear to 
what extent, for example, industrial robots or even 
telerobots differ from human-like robots in terms of the 
possible degree of autonomy intended. In this respect, 
the definition of the term ‘robot’ has by no means been 
clarified, although, since it was coined by the artist 
Josef Capek and his brother Karel Capek in 1920/21 – 
meaning humanoid apparatuses that take over human 
work or services (Sombetzki, 2016: 357) – it has become 
more and more embedded in everyday language with 
fictional, utopian and mythical associations 
(Box 3.3.5-1). In this respect, robotics also marks 
anthropological border issues relating to reflecting on 
and clarifying the human self-image (Chapter 2).
Potential benefits and risks 
Since the price of industrial robots is lower than the 
annual wage of the workers to be replaced in many 
countries today, the advances in robotics have led to 
‘dark factories’, for example in Japan, where in some 
cases industrial robots are even used to produce indus-
trial robots. In many of the factories with human work-
forces, which are still far more numerous, industrial 
robots already took over assembly-line jobs like weld-
ing or painting years ago because they are faster and 
more precise. The presence of industrial robots is also 
increasing in warehouses, agriculture and mining 
(Walsh, 2018: 108). However, opposite trends are also 
discernible. After considerable quality problems,  Toyota 
has switched its production to a hybrid concept of col-
laboration between humans and machines (Bork, 
2019). 
Another current area of application is automated 
driving, where cars can drive on motorways or in city 
traffic – in some cases fully automatically without any 
human intervention. Apart from the potential benefits 
and risks for innovative mobility concepts 
( Section 5.2.8), the aim is to avoid or at least reduce 
accidents, especially those that cause injuries. There is 
a risk that an over-hasty general construction or recon-
struction of a networked mobility infrastructure may 
lead to people being forced to adapt to it – even though, 
in the interests of the common good, for example with 
regard to life in cities, the infrastructure should be 
adapted to human needs and not vice versa (Section 
5.2.7; Daum, 2018). Autonomous mobility is also a 
dual-use technology, since automated vehicles and 
weapons systems are, in many respects, not far apart 
from a technical point of view: “In the meantime, mili-
tary personnel are developing and testing the use of 
robots on every conceivable theatre of war – in the air, 
on land, at sea and underwater. An arms race to auto-
mate war is underway” (Walsh, 2018: 109). Already, 
drone warfare that is ‘only’ remote-controlled and not 
fully automated has long been a deadly reality. The Kal-
ashnikov Concern has recently produced a ‘kamikaze 
drone’ which is comparatively inexpensive even for 
Box 3 .3 .5-1
Typology of the term ‘robot’
Technical definitions, e.g. “robots are sensomotoric machines 
for extending the human capacity to act” (Christaller et al., 
2001: 19), are, according to Remmers (Remmers, 2018b), 
 often either too unspecific or too narrowly defined. The term 
covers the reality of robotics from industrial robots to service, 
household and care-giver robots, to nanorobots and social 
robots, includes the current state of anthropomorphic robot-
ics, but also remote-controlled machines (telerobotics), as 
well as visions known above all from science fiction (Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016). The degree of human-machine interaction al-
so differs – greatly in some cases. As Kehl and Coenen 
(2016: 100) stress, the three criteria typically associated with 
robots, “autonomy, embodiment and (artificial) intelligence 
[...] can be attributed to a multitude of systems, not least be-
cause of their vagueness.” For example, autonomy (Lin et al., 
2012) does not adequately include classical industrial or 
telerobotics, especially since the concept of autonomy is am-
biguous and unclear from a philosophical point of view. This 
also applies to the associated attribution of intentional 
 characteristics, which would be necessary at least for an 
 action-theoretical interpretation. Robots do not act in the real 
sense because their movements are not based on an intention, 
i.e. they do not make real (i.e. free) decisions and do not pos-
sess intentionality. According to Remmers (2018b), however, 
robots can certainly be understood as machines whose func-
tions are interpreted in relation to actions. This compact un-
derstanding, which does not describe a supposed essence of 
the robot, but rather its attribution by humans, is based on a 
two-part definition (Remmers, 2018a), according to which 
robots are firstly “technological tools for the simulation or 
spatial transmission of actions,” and secondly “different from 
purely automated systems in that, in their interactions, they 
require certain attitudes on the part of humans that are nor-
mally only adopted towards persons (or animals).”
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“small armies”(Bünte, 2019). The further miniaturiza-
tion and automation of such weapons systems is being 
strongly promoted by the arms industry and, regardless 
of the medium in which they will operate, it can be 
assumed that – like today’s drones (Box 3.3.5-2) – they 
will not make the world a safer place.
3.3.5.4 
3D printing and additive manufacturing
The term additive manufacturing 
refers to various processes in 
which “the desired component is 
successively constructed on the 
basis of a digital 3-D model by the 
targeted layer-by-layer applica-
tion of the starting material” 
(Caviezel et al., 2017: 9). Since the manufacturing pro-
cess has some similarities with 2D printing, the term 
‘3D printing’ is also commonly used (Bourell, 2016: 2). 
Additive manufacturing is computer-aided in three 
phases: data preparation (e.g. 3D model), application of 
the materials (printing) and post-processing (Caviezel 
et al., 2017: 29; acatech, 2016: 12; ÖFIT, 2016). The lay-
er-construction principle makes it possible to produce 
complex geometric structures that cannot be made 
using conventional subtractive manufacturing pro-
cesses (where the material is removed, e.g. by milling, 
drilling, lathing) or can only be produced with great 
effort (Bauer et al., 2016: 4). The commercially most 
important processes at present are, for example, fused 
deposition modelling and laser beam melting (acatech, 
2016: 6). The various additive manufacturing processes 
differ with respect to the starting materials (‘filaments’ 
such as plastics, metals, ceramics, building materials), 
the size and geometry of the workpieces, the accuracy, 
speed and cost of production, and the properties and 
applications of the products (Caviezel et al., 2017: 12, 
79). 
Despite such differences in details, the processes 
have common features: single pieces, small series, pilot 
Box 3 .3 .5-2
Drones – robotics in the air
One type of robot that is currently the subject of much re-
search is the drone. The use of drones has increased consider-
ably as a result of the miniaturization and price reductions of 
sensory devices (Sandbrook, 2015). Drones generally refer to 
reusable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned 
aerial systems (UASs). The latter include not only the aerial 
vehicle itself but also the control station on the ground and 
communication systems. The following remarks refer to 
drones in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles or systems 
which either fly autonomously or are controlled (remotely) 
by a pilot (Sandbrook, 2015; Finn and Wright, 2012: 184) and 
can be used for both military and civilian purposes. Drones 
vary in terms of e.g. weight, maximum altitude, range, endur-
ance, speed, production costs, possible wing loading and size 
– they can be as small as an insect or as big as an aircraft (Finn 
and Wright, 2012: 184; Sandbrook, 2015; Hassanalian and 
Abdelkefi, 2017: 100). Drones can carry cameras, sensors, ac-
tuators (including weapons), communication hardware (such 
as loudspeakers), or user interfaces for operating the drone 
(Finn and Wright, 2012: 184; Beard and McLain, 2012: xi; 
Sandbrook, 2015). As a rule, drones are equipped with imag-
ing sensors and probes adapted to the respective area of ap-
plication, e.g. for measuring temperature, humidity or pres-
sure. With the aid of built-in actuators, drones can convert 
electrical signals into movements and thus clear emergency 
escape routes, for example. Drones equipped with signalling 
systems can warn of dangers (Schmoll, 2017). 
Drones are versatile in terms of their deployment. In the 
military context, they are used for reconnaissance and target 
location, target simulation, and for combating radar installa-
tions and other ground targets (even including individual hu-
man beings; Brockhaus, 2016). In many cases, however, 
drones are used for civilian purposes, for example in logistics, 
agriculture, in the film and entertainment sector, in the fields 
of ‘security’ and ‘disaster control’, or, in the environmental 
sector, in climate research (Beard and McLain, 2012: xi, 
Brockhaus, 2016) and ecosystem monitoring (Section 5.2.11). 
Drones can also be used in hostile places such as outer space 
or in deserts. Facebook has experimented with a solar-pow-
ered drone that was to stay in the air for over three months 
and provide people in remote locations with access to the in-
ternet (Winkelhake, 2017: 76; Herbig, 2019). In addition to 
being deployed in places that are not accessible to humans or 
in hazardous situations, drones can also be used to make cer-
tain activities easier. For example, the use of drones has in the 
past been tested in agriculture and for transporting parcels. 
The advantage of drones is their precision, constancy and the 
robustness with which they work in different situations. 
From an ethical point of view, the use of drones can be 
problematic, especially their use in armed conflicts. This topic 
received a great deal of media attention following the target-
ed killing of terror suspects by the USA using drones (Steinke, 
2013). Critics of drones state that their use lowers the inhib-
iting killing threshold (Hickmann, 2013). In the case of the 
targeted killing of terror suspects, it is added that they were 
executed without a prior trial (Steinke, 2013). However, argu-
ments in favour of the use of drones are also put forward in 
the debate. According to their advocates, drones could reduce 
the number of civilian casualties because targets could be hit 
with greater precision (Brockhaus, 2016). On the other hand, 
critics of the use of drones point out that civilians are repeat-
edly injured in attacks and that it is often impossible to make 
a clear distinction between civilians and fighters (Steinke, 
2013). Risks also exist involving the possible illegal use of 
drones for terrorist purposes, such as assaults or air attacks on 
opponents. Furthermore, because of the surveillance possibil-
ities offered by drones, their use can contribute to the viola-
tion of civil liberties, such as the right to privacy, and the 
discrimination and marginalization of certain groups of peo-
ple (Finn and Wright, 2012: 189f.), especially in view of the 
fact that non-experts are increasingly using drones.
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series or spare parts can be manufactured on demand. 
This shortens development and production times and 
makes it possible to realize lightweight construction 
concepts and complex geometries or individualized 
products (Bauer et al., 2016: 17). This can also be seen 
in the development of additive manufacturing, which 
took place – and is still taking place – in four overlap-
ping and complementary phases (Rayna and Striukova, 
2016: 216f.). Additive manufacturing has been used in 
industry for about 30 years: first, since the 1990s in 
product development (rapid prototyping); second, in 
the manufacture of tools and casting moulds (rapid 
tooling); and third, since the turn of the millennium, 
increasingly in the manufacture of end products (rapid 
manufacturing or direct digital manufacturing) such as 
small components, small series, unique specimens in 
the jewellery industry or in medical and dental techno-
logy (Caviezel et al., 2017: 10, 29; acatech, 2016: 10; 
Rayna and Striukova, 2016: 216f.). In the fourth phase, 
additive manufacturing in the form of comparatively 
inexpensive ‘3D printers’ has been increasingly used 
for personal or home fabrication in private households, 
as well as at places of experimentation and decentral-
ized collaborative production, e.g. schools, universities, 
maker spaces, fab labs and open workshops (Caviezel et 
al., 2017: 14, 29f.; Kohtala, 2015). Specialized online 
platforms – and increasingly brick-and-mortar shops – 
are further important offers (Rayna and Striukova, 
2016: 217).
Potential benefits and risks 
Additive manufacturing creates a special link between 
the ‘digital’ and ‘physical’ worlds and therefore has 
many sustainability implications. Compared to conven-
tional production methods, additive manufacturing has 
both advantages and disadvantages for sustainability. 
Opportunities are seen primarily in improved resource 
efficiency through improved products and processes, 
extended product life (e.g. through reparability) and 
reconfiguration to shorter, simpler and more local value 
chains (Ford and Despeisse, 2016: 1573). Additive 
manufacturing requires less material input and gener-
ates less production waste (Gebler et al., 2014: 166), 
which holds potential for the transformation to a (digi-
tal) circular economy (EEA: 17; Section 5.2.1). Exploi-
ting these opportunities involves a number of chal-
lenges to sustainable manufacturing which need to be 
addressed together with general technological and eco-
nomic requirements (Weller et al., 2015: 44ff.). This 
applies, for example, to the environmental impact of 
the filaments used (Ford and Despeisse, 2016: 1573; 
Kellens et al., 2017: 5) and to the selection and design 
of the procedure and related processes (Kellens et al., 
2017: 8). In particular, account must be taken of spe-
cific energy consumption, which can be one or two 
orders of magnitude higher as that of conventional 
 production processes and must be offset by ‘sustain-
able’ use or the product’s life cycle (Kellens et al., 
2017: 15). The legal framework is also challenged in 
terms of product liability, the protection of intellectual 
property (e.g. against the theft of product designs), and 
the safety and health of persons who could be endan-
gered, for example by privately manufactured weapons 
or pollutant emissions during production (Kellens et al., 
2017: 14; Bourell, 2016: 14; Kietzmann et al., 
2015: 213). As an essential element of decentralized 
digital production, additive manufacturing also opens 
up opportunities for inclusion (e.g. in fab labs; Section 
5.2.2), but there is also a risk of a growing digital divide. 
The latter could affect above all the future of work and 
the international division of labour (Sections 5.3.8, 
5.3.9), because work may be redistributed between 
employees with different levels of skill or between 
countries if production is relocated or reorganized by 
multinational enterprises using additive production 
(Gebler et al., 2014: 166; Rehnberg and Ponte, 
2017: 19). It is still unclear whether home use will 
spread in a similar way to PCs, (paper) printers or inter-
net routers (Rayna and Striukova, 2016: 216). This also 
applies to undesired or rebound effects like those that 
have occurred in the above-mentioned comparative 
examples as increasing quantities of e-waste and 
energy or paper consumption. 
3.3.5.5 
Blockchain and distributed-ledger technology
Blockchain, or to use the more 
general term distributed-ledger 
technology is seen as an inno-
vation that is expected to lead 
to far-reaching societal and 
technological changes (Schlatt 
et al., 2016). In addition to 
cryptocurrencies, there are numerous possible applica-
tions in other societally or economically relevant sec-
tors. These include, for example, the creation of land 
registers, securing health data, and elections (Schlatt et 
al., 2016: 5, 30; Boucher, 2017: 18f.). Assessments vary 
greatly, however, as to whether this technology actually 
will (or should be) widely used (Chapron, 2017; 
Boucher, 2017). Distributed-ledger technology makes 
it possible to overcome a certain characteristic of digital 
objects, namely their almost unlimited and cost-free 
copiability, and to create digital objects that exist only 
once or are unequivocally identifiable (Schwab, 
2018: 88). Thus, this technology enables the creation of 
cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin (Box 3.3.5-3), which is 
only one of many conceivable applications. Using cryp-
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tographic methods, transactions of the corresponding 
digital objects are verified and stored decentrally in a 
peer-to-peer network. There is therefore no single cen-
tral person or institution of trust that exercises control 
over the processes (intermediary). In a way, the role of 
the intermediary, such as a bank, is fulfilled by the pro-
gram code (Zimmermann and Hoppe, 2018: 39), while 
decentralized verification and storage in the network 
promises transparency and traceability for all parties 
involved. 
Distributed-ledger technology furthermore allows 
the creation of smart contracts, i.e. the connection of 
programmable actions and transactions (Schwab, 
2018: 88). For example, the system can automatically 
recognize whether the conditions specified in the con-
tract have been fulfilled. Subsequently, the correspond-
ing contractual performance, such as the payment of a 
quid pro quo, is set in motion by the program (Welzel 
et al., 2017: 25). In bitcoin and most other blockchain 
applications, the transactions are verified by the net-
work via ‘proof-of-work’, in which participants in the 
network compete for the verification, which promises 
them a quid pro quo (Schwab, 2018: 91; Box 3.3.5-3). 
Other methods aimed at reducing energy consumption 
are currently being developed (CLI, 2018: 85), includ-
ing, for example, the proof-of-stake method, in which 
for each verification only one participant in the net-
work has to make a calculation (Zimmermann and 
Hoppe, 2018). At present, however, it is still unclear 
which methods will prevail in the future. 
Potential benefits and risks 
Protection against manipulation and the transparency 
of transactions are particularly emphasized in the dis-
cussion on blockchain and distributed-ledger technol-
ogy. Information is also protected against influence, e.g. 
in the form of censorship and control (Welzel et al., 
2017: 19, 26; Purvis, 2017). Server failures are less 
problematic because the digital signature verification 
and the database entries are no longer stored centrally 
in only one place; rather, copies are stored decentrally 
on each participant’s server. In this respect, the block-
chain guarantees a high level of reliability and thus a 
high level of data availability (Schlatt et al., 2016: 35). 
Possible application examples of this technology can 
be found, for example, in the field of certification, 
record-keeping or the administration of land registers. 
It makes it possible, for example, to prove the legality 
of ownership relations transparently and comprehensi-
bly by recording them in the blockchain. It could also 
make production and value chains or maintenance 
cycles traceable, or allow the sustainable management 
Box 3 .3 .5-3
Bitcoin
Cryptocurrencies are the best-known application of block-
chain technology. Bitcoin especially is widely discussed by the 
public. Bitcoin is a public blockchain without access restric-
tions. Up to now in finance it has been mainly intermediaries, 
the banks, that have recorded, executed and secured financial 
transactions (Welzel et al., 2017: 7). As central instances 
trusted by all the parties involved, such intermediaries are 
responsible for recording, executing and securing transaction 
inputs and outputs (Boucher, 2017: 5). For example, a bank 
makes sure that the sender’s account is covered when a trans-
fer is made, that the payment arrives with the payee, and the 
transferred amount is debited from the sender’s account 
(Welzel et al., 2017: 7). For users, the functionality of the 
classical accounting system and the data used are non-trans-
parent and not fully traceable (Boucher, 2017: 5). 
Blockchain technology, on the other hand, enables bitcoin 
transactions to be handled in a decentralized and transparent 
way by the users themselves, thus potentially simplifying and 
accelerating the process (Welzel et al., 2017: 7). The legality 
of a transaction is ensured by the participants in the block-
chain (Boucher, 2017: 5). A decentralized record on their own 
PC and those of all other users enables each participant to 
track all transactions conducted. Transactions are secured on 
the basis of a combination of technical procedures that are 
carried out automatically and on behalf of the users. These 
include digital signatures (encryption), coding solutions, and 
peer-to-peer networks (computer networks without interme-
diaries; Schlatt et al., 2016: 8; Welzel et al., 2017: 7). In order 
to participate in the blockchain for bitcoins, the user must 
install a certain software program and provide computer pow-
er (Stratmann, 2017).
Users who wish to carry out a transaction must first digi-
tally sign it and thus verify themselves (cryptography;  Section 
3.3.4). Each transaction is recorded together with other trans-
actions in a block, which is connected with the blocks that 
already exist. The blocks are linked chronologically by a cryp-
tographic signature, so that the chain of blocks, the block-
chain, contains all previous transactions (Schlatt et al., 
2016: 7). The accounting, i.e. checking and logging initiated 
transactions, is carried out by miners. These create new trans-
action blocks and monitor transactions that have been made 
(Welzel et al., 2017: 8). 
Mining, i.e. the process of creating new blocks by solving 
a cryptographic puzzle (the hash value), is complex and re-
quires a lot of computation. The effort required to create new 
blocks is intended to ensure that the blockchain is tam-
per-proof, because new, incorrect transactions cannot be add-
ed easily. The miner receives a reward for the effort of creat-
ing a new block, e.g. in the form of a financial allowance, 
perhaps in bitcoins (Boucher, 2017: 5; Welzel et al., 2017: 9). 
A new block will only be accepted by the other users if it has 
been ensured that all transactions are correct. The correct 
transactions are added back to the list of open transactions 
(Welzel et al., 2017: 9). The already mentioned linkage of the 
blocks via the hash value guarantees that the security of the 
blockchain cannot be tampered with.
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of supply chains. For example, blockchain allows the 
documentation of the origin of products and goods: by 
assigning a digital identity to a product, it is possible, 
after a transaction, to trace how and into what the 
product was processed (Welzel et al., 2017: 20). Cryp-
tocurrencies could replace institutions such as banks 
and enable people who do not have a bank account to 
conduct banking transactions, thus gaining access to 
the global trade and financial markets. This is particu-
larly relevant for developing countries, where the 
ne cessary infrastructure is often lacking. The UN World 
Food Program is experimenting with blockchain-based 
payment systems in refugee camps (Juskalian, 2018). 
Decentralized control, distribution and billing systems 
for electricity, water or gas, for example, are being dis-
cussed as areas of application for smart contracts. For 
example, electricity generated locally by a private pro-
vider from a photovoltaic system could be fed into a 
local grid and then purchased by people in the neigh-
bourhood for a small fee in a virtual currency. Without 
an intermediary entity in the form of a large energy 
utility, transaction costs would be much lower than if 
electricity were purchased by a large utility (Diermann, 
2016). The use of smart contracts is also being dis-
cussed in the field of climate-change mitigation and 
adaptation, for example for success-based payments 
for adaptation (CLI, 2018). They could also dismantle 
existing barriers to a circular economy by facilitating 
the formation of business networks. Overall, hopes are 
pinned on blockchain technology to create institutional 
structures that have not previously existed, or to 
strengthen confidence in existing, not-very-trustwor-
thy institutions.
Criticism of the blockchain technology is expressed 
in particular with regard to its consumption of resources 
and the effects on the environment (Zimmermann and 
Hoppe, 2018: 45). Estimates for bitcoin range up to 300 
kWh of electricity needed to conduct a single transac-
tion (de Vries, 2018), which, with 200,000 transactions 
per day, would represent a level of electricity consump-
tion of around 60 million kWh per day and 22 TWh per 
year. High electricity consumption due to increased 
blockchain use could thus jeopardize the necessary 
transformation of energy systems and climate protec-
tion (Section 5.2.6). There is also controversy over the 
extent to which blockchain technology actually prom-
ises a time advantage. In the meantime, for example, 
the blockchain in which bitcoin transactions are docu-
mented has become so long that processing transac-
tions is comparatively slow (Schulz, 2016). It remains to 
be seen how new approaches to verification can solve 
these problems.
Security and susceptibility to manipulation are also 
central issues for blockchain applications. Experience 
with blockchain has shown that programming errors in 
blockchain implementations have already led to major 
security gaps and considerable financial losses (Dier-
mann, 2016; Rehak, 2018: 56). Security gaps also arise 
in small blockchain networks if a user manages to bring 
more than 50% of the computing power under his con-
trol, enabling him to confirm his own, and thus also 
false, transactions (Welzel et al., 2017: 26). Another 
problem in this context is that, in the distributed net-
work of the blockchain, the users themselves are 
responsible for the security of their IT and must ensure 
that their private key with which they sign transactions 
is not spied out by third parties or lost (Welzel et al., 
2017: 26). In addition, a blockchain always verifies only 
the correctness of transactions of virtual values, but 
not the truth of the information entered and the real 
existence of its equivalent outside the blockchain 
(Rehak, 2018: 56). Thus, for applications relating to the 
physical world, the problem of the ‘last mile’ (Schwab, 
2018: 96), i.e. ensuring congruence between the digital 
and the real identity, remains. 
The use of this technology in elections poses prob-
lems in terms of ensuring the anonymity of voters, as 
well as the possibility of strategic voting and vote-buy-
ing (Welzel et al., 2017: 22). Other open issues include 
liability for technical problems, risk management and 
unintended impacts arising with applications in the 
financial field, the real economy or the humanitarian 
field. Questions are also raised on standard-setting and 
interoperability between different applications 
(Schwab, 2018: 96). The hope that intermediaries are 
no longer needed is partly deceptive. Ultimately, the 
intermediaries are replaced by program codes, and the 
question arises as to who controls these codes and is 
responsible e.g. for necessary adjustments or quality 
controls.
A further criticism is that, contrary to the original 
idea of greater decentralization, blockchain technology 
has led to centralization and a concentration of power 
due to the financial incentives associated with the cre-
ation of new blocks, because large companies with 
computing power much higher than individual actors 
have assumed a dominant role in block creation (Rehak, 
2018: 55). Hence, Rehak (2018: 57) criticizes that “the 
absence of institutions that balance out power asym-
metries [...] ultimately leads here to the anarcho-liberal 
law that (computing) might is right.” 
To sum up, it can be said that blockchain is a 
resource-intensive technology – a fact that must be 
borne in mind and weighed up carefully in supposedly 
‘sustainable’ applications. It should be used where the 
integrity of information and transactions storage can-
not be ensured otherwise. For various applications, it 
must be specified in detail who can verify entries and 
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check their content for correctness. The legitimation of 
the miners and those who do the job of verification 
plays a prominent role here. The traceability of transac-
tions also leads to the question of how sensitive infor-
mation should be handled. Overall, blockchain technol-
ogy is still in its early stages, so that final evaluations 
are not possible.
3 .3 .6 
Conclusions: key technologies must be shaped 
with sustainability in mind
Section 3.3 has described from today’s perspective fun-
damental digital technologies in terms of how they 
relate to sustainability issues, and assessed them with 
regard to selected potential benefits and risks. No one 
can predict what innovation surges can be expected in 
the future. Nevertheless, emergent characteristics of 
the Digital Age are already taking shape today – new 
characteristics that emerge from the interaction of 
technical and societal components in their socio-tech-
nical context and are recorded as core characteristics in 
the following Section 3.4. 
Whether further core characteristics will emerge 
remains open; the same applies to future technologies 
and their relevance. According to evolutionary econom-
ics, socio-technical innovations develop in a similar way 
to biological evolution: innovations are similar to muta-
tions and are selected by markets (Mainzer, 2016). The 
societal, economic and/or political framework influ-
ences innovation, just as ecosystems influence bio-
logical evolution. Unlike biological evolution, however, 
socio-technical innovations involve people and their 
values – people who can consciously or unconsciously 
control or influence technological change as the basis 
for socio-technological innovation. Conversely, 
socio-technical innovation influences human values 
and in turn, with this feedback effect, future develop-
ment – something which is also called the normative 
power of the factual (Mainzer, 2016). In the same way 
that biological evolution allows for diverse, sometimes 
contradictory futures, socio-technical innovations are 
open to different visions of the future. This possibility 
of shaping the future correlates with the responsibility 
to actively use it. To this end, the changes in key areas 
of life that digitalization can bring about must be 
understood (Section 3.5) and proactively shaped (Sec-
tion 3.6).
3 .4
Core characteristics of the Digital Age
The interactions of digitalization with key civilizational 
areas of life (Earth system, economy, society, human 
beings, technology; Section 3.5) can be understood via 
core characteristics of the Digital Age. These are essen-
tially defined by the basic functions of the underlying 
digitalized technical systems, but not determined by 
them (Schieferdecker and Messner, 2018). Five charac-
teristics (Figure 3.4-1) that result from the basic func-
tions of digitalization (computing with data, storage, 
communication, sensing, interaction and cooperation; 
Section 3.2.1) and the key technologies (Section 3.3) 
appear so crucial that they will decisively influence and 
reconfigure all areas of civilization.
None of these five characteristics are fundamentally 
new; rather, they are all designed to meet people’s var-
ious needs and are often embedded in history, but have 
been further developed and accelerated, or addressed 
in a new way, using the means of digitalization. Driven 
by the rapid dynamics and the considerable scale of 
digital transformation, qualitatively and quantitatively 
new developments are emerging in all areas of civiliza-
tion and their interactions. 
3 .4 .1 
Interconnectedness
The first core characteristic is the 
comprehensive interconnected-
ness of technical systems, which 
also makes it possible to network 
objects, people and organizations 
in their different roles and at 
many different actor levels. Inter-
connectedness is already so advanced that its effects 
could easily be overlooked. For decades it has been pos-
sible for machines to communicate with one another 
and in this way extend or copy people’s basic commu-
nicative abilities, or even develop more advanced com-
municative skills (Ellison, 2007; Leiner et al., 2009; 
Tennenhouse et al., 1997). In the course of the devel-
opment and spread of the internet and the increasing 
expansion of the Internet of Things (Section 3.3.1), 
interconnectedness is becoming more and more com-
prehensive, permeating all areas of life and work (Aky-
ildiz et al., 2002; Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015; Chen and 
Kotz, 2000). 
This is also evident on a global level: e.g. the internet 
is accessible even in remote regions of the world. Eco-
nomic globalization and transnational opportunities for 
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cooperation between societies are both the result and 
drivers of this digital interconnectedness. Similar to the 
structures in the internet, which can be characterized as 
a network of networks, increasingly complex, digitally 
supported connections are developing in society in the 
course of digital interconnectedness. There is an 
increasing interweaving of individual actors and actor 
structures, which differ in size and type. This intensive 
interconnectedness contributes to the emergence of 
completely new, large-scale exchange and cooperation 
relationships. This makes it all the more important to 
regulate the diversity of dependencies between actors, 
which often exist transversely to existing (national and 
international) regulatory systems. This affects, for 
example, relationships between digital corporations 
and individuals (e.g. Facebook), between states or com-
munities of states and large multinational corporations, 
or between individuals among themselves (e.g. in social 
networks).
The increasing interconnectedness of technical sys-
tems can raise the criticality of public infrastructures. 
For example, critical infrastructures in the fields of 
energy, water, heat, food, mobility or health care depend 
on reliable, safe and efficient ICT and can no longer 
function without it (Byres and Lowe, 2004; Roman et 
al., 2011). A high degree of cybersecurity is therefore 
required (Section 3.3.4). Regulations for the necessary 
resilience of public infrastructures must be called for and 
further developed (BSI, 2017). Cyber attacks should be 
prevented with the necessary consistency and prohibited 
under international law (Bothe, 2016). 
3 .4 .2 
Cognition
The second core characteristic con-
cerns the development of cognitive 
abilities by technical systems and the 
extension of human cognitive abili-
ties by means of technical systems. 
Beyond controversies within and 
between scientific disciplines, cogni-
tion is generally understood to mean grasping, recog-
nizing and learning. Cognition aims at the collection, 
processing and use of information by humans or, within 
the framework of corresponding models (Section 3.2), 
also by software-based systems and thus machines. 
From a human point of view, the latter, if we think in 
terms of a mirror of reality, have “by and large become 
externalized intelligence and imagination,” whose 
image “turns out to be the original of the projection or 
a further possible construction of what evidently pro-
duced it” (Capurro, 2017: 20). In the sense of an expan-
sion of human intelligence, sensor technology, big data 
and AI (Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3) can often be used 
to ‘perceive’ more precisely or more comprehensively 
than human sensory organs. However, this does not 
mean that the breadth and diversity of human ‘intelli-
gence’, which has by no means yet been scientifically 
clarified, can be reduced to machine models (Ito, 
2018: 6; Box 3.3-1). By contrast to humans, however, 
technical systems with cognitive abilities are character-
ized – also in the sense of the current ‘knowledge 
explosion’ (Section 3.4.5) – by an infinitely scalable 
quantitative ‘memory’ and an ‘ability to concentrate’ 
that remains stable even over long-term calculations. 
For the time being, however, they have neither emo-
tions nor physical experiences. Even if attempts at 
modelling are being made in this direction, the belief 
that it is possible to reproduce ‘artificial life’ without 
AutonomyCognition VirtualityInterconnectedness Knowledge explosion
Figure 3 .4-1
Core characteristics of the Digital Age: (1) the all-embracing interconnectedness of things, systems, processes, persons and organ-
izations, (2) digital technology’s increasing cognitive capabilities, (3) the growing autonomy of digitalized systems such as robots 
or vehicles, (4) the increasing use of virtual spaces and virtualized technical services– and, as a result of all these (1)-(4), the 
equally revolutionary further development of many scientific disciplines that are leading to a hitherto unknown (5) explosion in 
knowledge.
Source: WBGU
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selection processes remains a myth from today’s per-
spective, as does “the belief that using different mate-
rials or processes in imitating other living beings makes 
no difference between the natural and the artificial” 
(Capurro, 2017: 24; Kehl and Coenen, 2016).
Accordingly, many of the cognitive technical appli-
cations today still involve a very simple form of cogni-
tion. Although current developments in AI and deep 
learning show the possibilities of more advanced cogni-
tive abilities of technical systems, these are still very 
training-intensive and essentially refer to very concrete 
tasks (Burgard, 2018; Section 3.3.3). For example, 
AI-based recognition of speech or image patterns can 
handle large amounts of data and work more precisely 
than humans as long as the pattern recognition problem 
to be solved is adequately covered by the training data. 
Applications include handwriting recognition, speech 
recognition, machine translation and automatic image 
description. They are used in industrial robotics, auton-
omous driving or medical technology. However, classi-
fication, pattern recognition, characterization or a logi-
cal conclusion will always fail in situations involving 
special data or patterns, for example when recognition 
of traffic situations is made difficult by poor visibility, 
unexpected movements or unexpected objects in traf-
fic. A universal form of AI that can solve arbitrary and 
not only specific problems (Sections 3.2.2–3.2.5) is not 
in sight at present, although the search for it continues 
(Schmidhuber, 2009; Hutter, 2012) and significant 
 successes are being achieved, although they all refer to 
selected problem classes such as classifications or logi-
cal reasoning.
The development of technical systems that can rec-
ognize and reflect people’s emotions and use them in 
interaction with people, for example in working, train-
ing, educational or traffic situations, is still in its 
infancy; however, there are already some interesting 
approaches in care-giving and therapy (Bernard-Opitz 
et al., 2001; Minsky, 2007; Mayer et al., 2016; Wang et 
al., 2018). By contrast, brain machine interfaces (BMI; 
brain computer interfaces – BCI) and brain-controlled 
neuroprostheses (Birbaumer, 2017) are becoming more 
suitable for everyday use. They are increasingly being 
used to support disabled people (e.g. with locked-in 
syndrome) or to help paraplegics steer wheelchairs via 
EEG-caps (Stamps and Hamam, 2010; Lebedev and 
Nicolelis, 2017) and could potentially lead to a funda-
mentally new kind of ‘technologization of human 
beings’ (Topic box 5.3-2).
3 .4 .3 
Autonomy
The third core characteristic of 
the Digital Age is the increasing 
autonomy of technical systems. 
Essentially, this refers to inde-
pendent decisions and independ-
ent movements and (re-)actions 
by technical systems like those 
used in industrial robotics, automated driving, air traf-
fic control or train control systems (Dumitrescu et al., 
2018). 
In addition to autonomous driving (meaning fully 
automated driving in every driving situation), the pub-
lic debate is currently looking at decision-making in 
banking (e.g. granting loans or share trading) and the 
social sector (e.g. awarding unemployment pay). The 
application areas of autonomous machines are continu-
ously expanding thanks to the interaction between dig-
ital networking technologies (e.g. Internet of Things, 
Section 3.3.1), AI (Section 3.3.3) and big data (Section 
3.3.2). Technical systems equipped with sensors can 
identify patterns based on correlations which cannot be 
made accessible to humans directly (in some cases not 
even indirectly via technology). Such autonomous 
technical systems are deployed, for example, in crisis 
detection and management. 
A high level of development dynamics can also be 
seen in the field of robotics, where great advances are 
being made in functionality, sensor technology and 
motor skills (Section 3.3.5.3). Physically strenuous 
activities and tasks that could not be done by humans 
were transferred to machines centuries ago; the current 
developments in the field of intelligent robotics can be 
understood as the next logical step. Intelligent robotics 
is said to have the potential to solve social and environ-
mental problems, for example through increased effi-
ciency, but also through the higher resilience, reliability 
and safety with which robots operate. While the trans-
fer of responsibility for the implementation of physical 
tasks by robots is comparatively uncontroversial, the 
transfer of responsibility for solving societally relevant 
decisions to such machines as decision-making systems 
is the subject of intense public debate (Section 3.2.5). 
In particular, the (functional) safety of autonomous 
technical systems, i.e. whether they pose a threat to 
people, society or the environment, is regarded as a 
risk. It is discussed whether the automatisms of such 
technical systems are robust and resilient enough to 
function smoothly even in exceptional situations. 
Research is therefore looking at security mechanisms of 
autonomous technical systems on different security 
levels, but also at ethical and liability issues of algo-
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rithm-based systems (Section 3.2.5). Concerning the 
question of the responsibility of autonomous technical 
systems, the discussion considers when it makes sense 
to transfer responsibility to technical systems and when 
the final decision should be left to humans. Dystopian 
scenarios, for example, conjure up the danger that data-
based, automated governance means the end of the 
political public sphere and democratic decision-making 
processes between people (Section 6.2).
3 .4 .4 
Virtuality
Another core characteristic of the 
Digital Age is the virtualization of 
physical elements and (sub)sys-
tems, i.e. their displacement or 
partial substitution into virtual 
space, or their digital extensions. 
Even if a certain continuity can be seen here, stretching 
from writing books and producing theatre plays, mov-
ies and other media to comprehensive 3D, 360° and 
real-time virtualization in multimedia, the technical 
developments are much more far-reaching: for instance, 
virtualization enables individuals to meet at different 
locations and, in the future, at different times. Large 
events can be held in virtual spaces, and discussions 
can be held between individuals, avatars and social 
bots. Virtualization can thus promote the transnational 
interconnectedness of individuals and organizations. 
Furthermore, the use of digital AR and VR technol-
ogy (Section 3.3.5.2) makes it possible to shift plan-
ning, design or production processes into the virtual 
world, e.g. to develop suitable designs, make more 
accurate predictions, carry out optimizations, and thus 
save costs. In addition, products and production can be 
designed in line with requirements, and circular econ-
omies can be realized. To exploit this potential, accu-
rate, realistic digital representations and models of sec-
tions of the physical world must be generated, further 
developed and calibrated by monitoring, simulation 
and validation. 
Virtualization also has the potential to virtually cre-
ate previously inaccessible parts of the world (e.g. at 
the macro-, meso-, micro- or nano-level or in other 
time periods), to virtually create completely new envi-
ronments (e.g. alternative worlds) extrapolated from 
the world (e.g. to predict possible futures), which can 
be used in the fields of entertainment, education and 
further training, or for decision-making. Virtualization 
makes virtual or hybrid experiences possible for this 
purpose. For example, it enables the vulnerability of 
people, groups, ecosystems or the planet to be directly 
felt and conveyed like real experiences. A global (envi-
ronmental) awareness (Section 5.3.1 can develop in 
this way.
However, virtualization can also have a negative 
effect if key aspects of human life are shifted to the 
virtual world and completely replace analogous experi-
ences with humans and nature.
3 .4 .5 
Knowledge explosion
The fifth core characteristic of the 
Digital Age is the considerable 
increase in human knowledge in 
all fields of science and research. 
The Digital Age is generating a 
massive increase in data and 
information (Beath et al., 2012), driven by the internet, 
the Internet of Things (Section 3.3.1) and satellite 
observation (Section 3.3.5.1). For example, “the 
amount of data produced daily in genomics [doubles] 
approximately every seven months. The amount of data 
required to sequence a single genome is thirty times 
greater than the genome itself. By 2025, the genomes 
of more than a billion people will have been sequenced. 
The storage requirements for this are estimated at 2–40 
exabytes per year” (Schadhauser and Graefen, 2017).
This massive data growth is a driver and the result of 
far more extensive transformations. For example, the 
majority of scientific disciplines are developing to a 
considerable extent by means of computing, network-
ing, virtualization and AI. New disciplines are emerging 
at the interfaces between traditional science and digi-
talization. For example, present-day climate research, 
genetic engineering, modern physics and material 
sciences are largely based on digitalization, particularly 
on the digitally supported modelling and simulation of 
different scenarios. These make it possible to uncover 
previously unknown connections, to prove assump-
tions or to formulate and substantiate new theorems 
(Hey and Trefethen, 2003). 
Supported by new possibilities in processing and 
acquiring knowledge, as well as the far-reaching digital 
possibilities for accessing humankind’s level of know-
ledge and new scientific findings, the quantity, but also 
the quality of the available knowledge can increase, 
because knowledge and scientific results are becoming 
directly comprehensible, and new ideas or assumptions 
can be reflected upon, discussed or cooperatively 
developed worldwide (Nosek et al., 2015; Fecher and 
Friesike, 2014). 
However, there is also the risk of falsified data or 
facts, manipulated models or analyses. As a result, the 
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increase in knowledge could be hindered by the increase 
in untruths. Another major challenge is preserving and 
safeguarding humankind’s digital memory, which is 
part of the digital commons (Section 5.3.10).
3 .4 .6 
Conclusions: the digitalized technosphere as a 
central building block of society
The technosphere, further developed by digitalization, 
has become a key societal building block in the Digital 
Age, just as other key technologies like energy and 
automation technology have had a major impact on all 
areas of civilization since the Industrial Revolution. 
While societal analyses in the past often referred to 
societal structures, actors and their interrelationships, 
this is not enough in the Digital Age: the socio-technical 
nature of all areas of life has become a new momentum 
of human civilization. Digitally supported intercon-
nectedness, cognition, autonomy, virtuality and the 
resulting knowledge explosion affect all areas of life in 
the Digital Age, as further explained in Section 3.5, and 
must therefore be examined systematically. 
3 .5
Changes in key areas of life in the Digital Age
Understanding the Digital Age cannot stop at the devel-
oping core characteristics, but must be complemented 
by a critical analysis of the interactions of digitalization 
with the Earth system, the economy, society, individuals 
and formerly analogue technical systems ( Figure 3.5-1). 
This analysis is initiated in this section and will be further 
developed in the course of the report. 
Digitalization has consequences for each of the key 
areas of life – the Earth system, the economy, society, 
people and technology. Without wishing to fall into 
blind technological determinism, these consequences 
can have the power to significantly change the estab-
lished characteristics of each of these areas. Many of 
these foreseeable changes could be used positively to 
leave established pathways in the sense of a Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability. However, many are rad-
ical challenges with an uncertain outcome. In the long 
term, great potential benefits as well as risks are possi-
ble in each area. Timely action to shape developments 
is therefore important in order both to contain the risks 
involved and to harness the disruptive power of digital-
ization for global sustainability transformation and for 
overcoming path dependencies.
3 .5 .1 
Digitalization and the Earth system perspective
In the Anthropocene, digital 
innovation encounters an Earth 
system whose guard rails are 
being fundamentally being put 
to the test. The additional 
effects of digital and digitalized 
technology systems on the geo-
physical, biological and atmos-
pheric processes of the planet and local environments 
must therefore be critically scrutinized. These include 
not only direct effects of the material flows and energy 
consumption that accompany the new infrastructures, 
devices and their use, but also indirect effects on the 
economy and society as a result of increased know-
ledge or changes in behaviour (Hilty, 2008). The follow-
ing three core issues seem to be key: 
 > (Over)use of resource- and ecosystems: In the Digital 
Age, there is a need to study the cumulative effects 
of digitalization on the global use of resources and 
the pollution of the ecosystems. The potential of 
digital technologies to support the Great Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability should be weighed 
against the risks of digitalization, such as path 
dependencies and rebound effects – although the 
current availability of data on energy and resource 
consumption is not yet sufficient for a final, let alone 
global assessment (Köhler et al., 2018). There is 
TechnologyEarth system Economy Society People
Figure 3 .5-1
The key areas of civilization influenced by digitalization: the Earth system, the economy, society, people and technology.
Source: WBGU
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potential, for example, for increasing the efficiency 
of energy use and material cycles. Their improved 
design, control and monitoring can create opportu-
nities for an energy-system transformation, a circu-
lar economy and a more sustainable global consump-
tion of raw materials (Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.3). Howe-
ver, there is nothing automatic about whether these 
opportunities will indeed be taken; rather, appro-
priate innovation incentives and regulatory frame-
work conditions will be required. For example, with 
appropriate policies, digitalization can pave the way 
for a climate-friendly energy system (Section 5.2.6). 
Among other things, risks are seen in the direct con-
sumption of resources by digital technology and by 
digital and digitalized infrastructures (Section 5.2.5). 
In addition to emissions, immissions also have great 
explosive power: the widespread release of techno-
logically used materials into the biosphere and pos-
sible bioactivity by these materials can lead to con-
siderable pollution from toxic substances and have a 
serious impact on humans and the environment 
(Section 5.2.5). Furthermore, toxic and persistent 
substances in digital and digitalized infrastructures 
and devices should be replaced wherever possible by 
alternatives (e.g. carbon nanomaterials instead of 
rare metals, Arvidsson and Sandén, 2017; Section 
5.2.5.3). 
 > Gaining knowledge and changing environmental 
images: Digital technologies increase, accelerate and 
facilitate the process of gaining knowledge about the 
Earth system and could thereby revolutionize the 
relationship between humankind and the planet in 
the long term. Global interconnectedness with sensi-
tive sensors and petaflop computing capacity ena-
bles the (live) monitoring (Section 5.2.11), model-
ling and simulation of planetary cycles and proces-
ses for the first time in human history (Hu et al., 
2010; Kramer, 2002; Belward and Skøien, 2015). 
This increase in knowledge can improve our unders-
tanding of the Earth system and thus of the plane-
tary guard rails. This has the potential not only to 
improve our understanding of humankind’s impact 
on the Earth system, but also to rethink and change 
it. Whether the change of perspective points in the 
direction of a Great Transformation towards Sustai-
nability is a matter of controversy. In principle, indi-
vidual and collective knowledge gains are the basis 
for more awareness in handling the Earth system. In 
the sense of the Anthropocene, however, this com-
prehensive view of the planet could also encourage 
the hubris of the human species and lead to increa-
singly risky and intensive interventions in the Earth 
system. The increasing virtualization of environ-
mental experiences also represents a key change in 
the relationship between humans and the Earth sys-
tem, with humans replacing basic physical experien-
ces of the environment with virtual replicas (Bau-
drillard, 1981). Yet digitalization also holds out the 
hope that people will, for example, be able to better 
experience and comprehend the diversity and inter-
connectivity of planetary life through digital inter-
connectedness and virtual simulation. For the first 
time, a kind of global (environmental) awareness 
could be created, promoting respectful, empathic 
treatment of the planet’s different life forms (Section 
5.3.1). 
 > Reduction of environmental impacts through virtual-
ization: Digitally supporting increases in knowledge 
and changing images of the environment and the 
world, as described, are important building blocks of 
the Transformation towards Sustainability. It is also 
essential that environmentally harmful consumption 
and production practices are replaced (Section 
5.2.3). Digitalization could contribute to dematerial-
izing the satisfaction of human needs by means of 
sharing models oriented towards eco-sufficiency 
(Section 5.2.2) and the virtualization of social and 
economic interactions. First, digital support is 
increasingly being offered as a service. In ‘mobility 
as a service’ (Section 5.2.8), for example, multimodal 
route-planner apps make environment-friendlier 
mobility possible (Duan et al., 2015; Xu, 2012). Sec-
ond, virtualization is seen as an opportunity, e.g. by 
moving processes to the cloud as far as possible and 
only keeping those physical components on site that 
are absolutely necessary (EMF, 2016: 39). Further-
more, digitally supported home-working is seen as a 
way of avoiding traffic. Similar hopes rest on 
resource savings through the ‘paperless office’ and 
the virtualization of a wide range of services (Duan 
et al., 2015; Xu, 2012). All this must take due 
account of the risks of resource and ecosystem (over)
use and of risks to data protection and privacy. 
3 .5 .2 
Digitalization and the reconfiguration of the 
 market and the economy
There is little doubt that digital 
change is having a considerable 
impact on economic systems 
and markets and, in some cases, 
is fundamentally transforming 
them. A multitude of new goods 
and services are being created, 
some directly connected to 
physical goods, others in digital, virtual space. Thanks 
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to technical advances in the acquisition and processing 
of information, data can be obtained and used econom-
ically to an unprecedented extent. Digital interconnect-
edness and communication reduce transaction costs, 
information deficits and asymmetries. The processes 
triggered by digital technological change at the eco-
nomic level are not always new, but they usually occur 
at an unprecedented speed and with a broad impact. 
In aggregate terms, there are three main areas in 
which digitalization can lead to key changes: 
 > Market structure and concentration: Digital change 
does not always create completely new market 
forms: the basic principles of platforms or general 
‘two-sided markets’ (Box 4.2.2-1), and non-mone-
tary barter transactions are known. However, by 
blurring the boundaries between goods and services 
or making the temporary use of (durable) goods 
instead of ownership possible and easier to organize 
in the digital space (e.g. sharing economy, pro-
duct-service systems), such market forms are beco-
ming more widespread and more important. The 
advance of digital technologies is also changing mar-
ket structures in general. In the longer term, the 
competition-promoting effects of digitalization are 
in danger of being overshadowed by strong drivers 
of increasing market concentration, which are also 
inherent in digitalization. The low or often negligible 
marginal costs of digital goods and services contri-
bute to their scalability and their high potential for 
disruption. However, the consequence can also be 
that in the longer term only individual dominant 
providers prevail (‘winner-takes-all’, ‘superstar 
companies’, Autor et al., 2017). Network effects that 
characterize platforms, for example, and the increa-
sing dependence on data of digital goods and ser-
vices, as well as further digital technical develop-
ments, further intensify these concentration ten-
dencies (Section 4.2.2; Prüfer and Schottmüller, 
2017). Moreover, with the advance of digital inter-
faces, complementary digital services and digital 
alternatives, these concentration tendencies are 
spreading to non-digital markets. 
 > (Re)distribution of value creation: Digital change 
creates a new and ever-more-important factor of 
value creation: data, which competes with the classic 
production factors of labour and capital. In addition, 
increasingly ‘intelligent’ machines can be used to 
replace human labour in more and more areas. Alt-
hough it is as yet unclear how far this substitution of 
labour by machines will extend and whether the loss 
of employment will be compensated by new activi-
ties and forms of work, this development is associa-
ted, at least in a transitional phase, with manifold 
distributional implications at various levels (Section 
5.3.9; Berg et al., 2018). The boundaries between 
winners and losers run between the ‘classical’ pro-
duction factors of labour and capital, between wor-
kers with different qualifications, but also between 
groups with different opportunities to use data and 
digital technologies (Section 5.3.8). The financing of 
the state’s leeway for action and social-security sys-
tems, the importance of which will increase in the 
future with the need to cushion the consequences of 
technological progress, will be affected by this 
change in the labour market, as will the other socie-
tal functions of work that go beyond economic 
inclusion (e.g. societal inclusion and self-esteem; 
Section 5.3.9). In addition to new systems of social 
security and the need to ensure economic inclusion, 
a change in the societally embedded and accepted 
concept of work seems necessary in the longer term. 
 > Public framework: Development and market dyna-
mics are sometimes extreme as a result of the high 
speed of digital technological progress, the fast sca-
lability of business models in the digital space, and 
the ever-closer global interconnectedness of humans 
and machines. Market regulation, competition regu-
lation and tax systems are often unable to keep pace 
with these dynamics. There is a danger that they will 
be unable to cope with the increasing importance of 
intangible assets and markets with strong network 
effects. Tax and duty systems, for example, are con-
fronted with new challenges resulting from the need 
to document the economic value of data transac-
tions, or to allocate profits from the global deploy-
ment of algorithms to a certain region (Box 4.2.2-2). 
At the same time, there is a risk of traditional bases 
of tax assessment being eroded by the redistribution 
of value creation away from labour (Section 5.3.9). 
However, more comprehensive monitoring options 
and timely information also open up new approa-
ches to taxation, particularly in the fields of pollu-
tion and resource use. 
 > New economic practices and ways to direct or coordi-
nate economic activities: On the one hand, reducing 
information, search and transaction costs in the 
course of digitalization considerably improves the 
functionality of markets (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Ramge, 2017; Goldfarb et al., 2019). On the other 
hand, markets, hitherto the dominant way of coordi-
nating the economic activities of production and 
consumption, are being challenged anew by digitali-
zation and new, data-based forms of control and 
cooperation (Section 4.2). Algorithm-based met-
hods, such as the extension of scoring systems (Sec-
tion 5.3.3), offer opportunities to implement societal 
or governmental goals directly in the distribution of 
goods and resources (Chalvatzis et al., 2019). This 
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raises fundamental, ultimately societal questions, 
e.g. which will be the areas in which the distribution 
of goods and factors takes place via markets, and in 
which areas should these markets be withdrawn in 
order not to link them (for societal or ethical rea-
sons) to individual (economic) performance. Such 
debates are sparked, for example, in the field of the 
sharing economy. However, the discussion must also 
take into account the disadvantages and dangers of 
the new data- and algorithm-based control options, 
which are associated with a loss of individual free-
dom of decision, anonymity and privacy, as well as 
with the dangers of a high concentration of power 
and manipulation (e.g. of preferences). At the 
microeconomic level, digital change can lead to the 
reorganization and restructuring of coordination and 
production processes within and between enterpri-
ses. With the growing importance of goods with no 
– or with deliberately avoided – direct rivalry, forms 
of collaborative production processes also seem to 
become more important (Sections 5.2.2, 5.3.10). 
Last but not least, digitalization could also promote 
the transformation from a linear economy to a circu-
lar economy (Section 5.2.1, 5.2.5).
3 .5 .3 
Digitalization and the change of societal order
The core characteristics of the 
Digital Age described in Section 
3.4 also have consequences 
from a socio-political perspec-
tive. Interconnectedness is man-
ifested as greater interdepend-
ence between different actors 
– as the driver of a polycentric 
system structure within and beyond state entities (Sec-
tion 4.4). The aspects of cognition are realized in the 
increasingly pronounced coexistence of automated 
(including autonomous) systems and humans in almost 
all areas of society, even involving the societal conse-
quences of a comprehensive collaboration between 
humans and machines. Automation, autonomous sys-
tems and in particular data acquisition and algorithmic 
decision making (ADM) can become new, often ambiv-
alent drivers of society and the economy (Section 
5.3.3). Virtuality changes the spatial structure of 
 society and its state and real-life spheres of action (Sec-
tion 5.3.1). Finally, the increase in available information 
and emerging knowledge requires individual and collec-
tive processing skills and literacy (Section 5.3.4). For 
societies, there are four main areas in which  digitalization 
leads to key changes: 
 > Privacy: A protected private sphere is socio-politi-
cally not only necessary as an expression and pro-
tection of individual freedom, but also as a prerequi-
site for the possibility of collective action in a demo-
cratic community (Jacob and Thiel, 2017). The pro-
tection of privacy in the Digital Age is challenged 
and partly questioned e.g. by algorithmic pattern 
recognition, data economy and practices of a digita-
lized public sphere (Section 5.3.2). Privacy is threa-
tened by various actors: by one’s own self, by fellow 
human beings and companies, as well as by public 
authorities and states (e.g. Sections 5.3.7, 5.3.3). 
There seems to be division between the total trans-
parency and interconnectedness of a post-privacy 
world on the one hand, and the search for functio-
ning individual and institutional measures for the 
sustainable protection of privacy on the other (Sec-
tion 8.3.1). The decision on which direction to take 
will have a key impact on dignity, inclusion and, in 
particular, on Eigenart.
 > Democratic inclusion, public sphere, participation and 
autonomy: After the initial euphoria over participa-
tion opportunities, democratization and transnatio-
nalization through digital technologies in the 1990s 
and 2000s (Siedschlag et al., 2002; Vowe, 2014; Zip-
fel, 1998), critical debates are increasingly taking 
place in view of far-reaching changes in the struc-
ture of the democratic public sphere – for example 
on the accessibility of the digital public sphere and 
the dangers of increasing fragmentation, polariza-
tion and trivialization in digital communication 
(Jacob and Thiel, 2017; Section 5.3.2). Increasing 
interconnectedness and ICT – including virtuality – 
could on the one hand enrich democratic communi-
ties; on the other hand, it could also shake their basic 
constitution through algorithmic control, the data 
economy and the attention economy (Section 5.3.3, 
5.3.6). Societies face the important task of re-streng-
thening their overall integrity and ‘collective auto-
nomy’ (Section 5.3.2). Institutional and media-po-
licy reforms are just as relevant here as education 
policy (Section 5.3.4).
 > Statehood, (state) sovereignty, patterns of order: In 
the initial phase of the spread of the internet and 
ICT, the emerging cyberspace was celebrated and 
feared as a space beyond state claims to sovereignty; 
in the meantime, digital space is regarded as a “place 
of hypersovereignty” (Thiel, 2014b), which makes it 
possible for states to conduct comprehensive sur-
veillance in situations where the democratic rule of 
law is lost. Further relevant topics regarding the (re)
ordering of state sovereignty include cybersecurity 
and digital warfare, as well as new negotiation and 
regulation processes in the field of internet gover-
3 Understanding the Digital Age
94
nance (Jacob and Thiel, 2017; Box 4.2.7-1). In addi-
tion, digitalization acts as a multiplier for practically 
all elements of globalization. Interconnectedness, 
digital communication and virtualization accelerate 
the further denationalization of economic processes 
and thus undermine state governance elsewhere, 
which is often still closely bound to territorial fron-
tiers (Section 4.2.6). In the course of digital change, 
however, not only are temporal and spatial processes 
compressed; in addition, the spectrum of active, 
involved actors is broadening: national institutions 
and business enterprises are interacting in the poly-
centric network of actors, as are sub-state and 
inter-governmental authorities, civil-society groups, 
individuals and the tech community (Chapter 4). 
 > Inequality and inclusion: Inequality is an overar-
ching, socio-politically explosive issue, both natio-
nally and globally. Inequality issues – both between 
and within societies – are key in relation to the 
societal dimensions of digitalization. At the global, 
inter-societal level, in addition to a digital divide 
between states with different levels of development 
(access to digital infrastructures, end devices and the 
necessary education), there is also discussion on the 
more general question of the winners and losers of 
digital change. Within societies, however, digitaliza-
tion also affects other dimensions of inequality, such 
as discrimination based on wealth, age or gender. On 
the one hand, existing patterns of societal discrimi-
nation are reproduced in the domain of digital tech-
nology; on the other hand, there is potentially also 
room to overcome them there (Section 5.3.6). Key 
for questions of distribution and inclusion are also 
changes in economic structures, as, for example, 
described in catchwords such as ‘data capitalism’ or 
‘digital precarization’ on the one hand (Hofmann, 
2017; Ehrlich et al., 2017) and positive visions of 
digital commons on the other (Section 5.3.10). The 
changes in the world of work and the social effects 
of digitalization require additional societal attention, 
especially in view of the above-mentioned challen-
ges for state governance and welfare-state mecha-
nisms – not least in order to contain inequality 
dynamics in good time. 
3 .5 .4 
Digitalization on and in humans
Central to the view of digital 
change – also and especially in 
the context of the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability – is 
the way it is perceived by 
human beings, as explained in 
detail in Section 3.1. At the per-
sonal level, the interactions 
with the digital technology system range from many 
small conveniences and positively perceived empower-
ments to possible restrictions of self-determination or 
Eigenart driven by violations of data protection (Sec-
tion 5.3.7; Topic box 5.3-2). In aggregated terms, there 
are three main thematic areas in which change through 
digitalization can lead to key challenges:
 > Human-machine interaction: Individual or collective, 
in some cases collaborative interaction with techni-
cal interfaces, robots and AI is already a pivotal and 
constantly evolving topic today. In this context one 
can observe extensions of human practices into 
technical and virtual spheres, and an expansion of 
technical elements into individual everyday life. By 
blurring these boundaries and improving the inter-
faces, there is a lot of potential that could enable 
people to handle technology in an integrative and 
successful way. However, there is also a risk of pro-
blematic developments: the increasingly sophistica-
ted imitation of human communication by artificial 
systems makes it necessary to explicitly identify 
machines in their interaction with people.
 > Individual autonomy and self-determination: In par-
ticular, data-driven services challenge an individu-
al’s opportunities for individual autonomy and a 
self-determined lifestyle, for example through profi-
ling and big nudging (Helbing, 2017; Section 5.3.3). 
In addition, the acquisition and analysis of data, 
which is already almost universally possible today, 
endangers privacy, even if national and international 
laws represent obstacles in this regard. Here, aspects 
of education play a role, as do further developed 
concepts of well-being or solidarity-based quality of 
life in the Digital Age (Section 5.3.4, 5.2.3). 
 > Technologization of human beings: Digital solutions 
can already compensate some people’s disabilities, 
but they also enable the ‘optimization’ of human 
abilities, from prosthetics to implants and on-body 
interfaces. In the future, new ways for the further 
development of humans themselves will be devised 
(Topic box 5.3-2;Section 7.4). The main critical 
aspect here is the possible emergence of individual 
and social pressure as a result of new societal norma-
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tive ideas and potentially rising inequality – not only 
between poor and rich, but also between non-opti-
mized and optimized individuals respectively. The 
question of the fundamental value, preservation and 
potential dynamics of human biological nature must 
also be raised here (Box 7.3-2). 
3 .5 .5 
Digitalization of human-made technological 
 systems  
More than forty years ago, 
Friedrich Rapp (1978) already 
described the technosphere as 
‘second nature’ that does not fit 
seamlessly into the natural pro-
cesses as it did in earlier epochs. 
The term technosphere, which 
makes up the technical envi-
ronment of humans, is generally used to describe the 
totality of technical systems produced by humans and 
the associated formative changes in nature (Rapp, 
1978; Zalasiewicz et al., 2017). 
It comprises the technical systems in urban and rural 
areas, mines, the oceans and the air. These systems 
include urban infrastructures such as mobility trails, 
supply and disposal systems, houses and buildings, 
health facilities, production plants, machines and prod-
ucts. According to Jan Zalasiewicz (2017), the techno-
sphere is a system with its own dynamics and its own 
energy flows; humans have long been dependent on 
this system to survive.
Like any other area of life, these technological sys-
tems are being significantly influenced, changed and 
further developed by digitalization. Selected technical 
systems or parts thereof will disappear or only exist in 
niches. For example, most films are produced digitally, 
analogue control technology is giving way to digital, 
analogue communications centres and radio and televi-
sion stations are being replaced by digital ones. New 
technology systems such as the world wide web have 
emerged. From a sustainability perspective, there are 
above all three areas that are undergoing changes 
through digitalization: 
 > Communication, information and education: Digitali-
zation has radically changed the possibilities of com-
munication and information. Today it is possible to 
communicate almost immediately from anywhere, 
with any person worldwide and at any time (Pope-
scu-Zeletin et al., 2004) using texts, sound, audio-
visual means, multimedia – or interactively on a bila-
teral or multilateral basis, and soon even haptically. 
The wide variety of information opens up access to 
all human knowledge, brings people closer to natio-
nal and international cultural and natural commons, 
to current developments, political, economic and 
scientific facts; in this way it also supports informed 
decisions on sustainability (Fuchs, 2008). Online 
services can surpass existing ways to access educa-
tion and further training (Section 5.3.4; Moore and 
Kearsley, 2011). Reliable ways of accessing commu-
nication and information services should be open to 
everyone and are discussed in different contexts as 
part of digital fundamental rights (Hoffmann and 
Schulz, 2015). It is also important to ensure that 
individuals can rely on the quality and correctness 
of information, and that people’s opinions remain 
recognizably distinct from statements made by 
machines. To this end, personal sovereignty in hand-
ling communication possibilities and the information 
available must be strengthened and supported by 
training and further-education programmes (Kerres, 
2018). 
 > Public infrastructures: The digitalization of public 
infrastructures, e.g. for water or electricity supply, is 
driven by initiatives such as smart cities and munici-
palities (Chourabi et al., 2012; Zanella et al., 2014), 
smart mobility (Burns, 2013) and smart energy net-
works (Siano, 2014). What these approaches have in 
common is that the infrastructures used for adminis-
tration, mobility or energy supply are digitalized via 
sensors and actuators in such a way that status infor-
mation can be collected in close-to real time and used 
for traceability, forecasts, simulations and decisi-
on-making support right up to (partially) automated 
control (Kitchin, 2014; Zygiaris, 2013). The digitali-
zed observation and control of infrastructures and 
public spaces will only be reliable, scalable, secure 
and trustworthy if the standards and regulations for 
the further use of information, for data security and 
data protection of personal, person-related, commer-
cial and public data are complied with or demanded. 
Data sovereignty and data protection and security, as 
well as inclusivity, accessibility, net neutrality, resi-
lience and robustness of digital and digitalized infras-
tructures are key requirements for the operation of 
digitalized public infrastructures (Lewis, 2014). The 
development of public-service ICT infrastructures 
could be an option here (Section 5.3.5). 
 > Production, logistics and products: The Industry 4.0 
vision addresses the digital interconnectedness of 
production, logistics and products and their intelli-
gent control and optimization (Section 5.2.1; Drath 
and Horch, 2014). Industry 4.0 and related digitali-
zed traceability could make the circular economy 
possible on an unprecedented scale (Kagermann, 
2015). On the other hand, Industry 4.0 not only 
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makes the improvement of production, logistics and 
products possible, but also lot-size one production, 
i.e. the product is designed to meet the individual 
needs of customers or users. This allows both more 
targeted and longer product use through stronger 
identification, but also increased consumption. Thus, 
the increases in demand associated with Lot-Size 
One production, as well as further efficiency in pro-
duction, logistics and products, can be to the detri-
ment of the environment and employees (Gabriel 
and Pessl, 2016). But it can also raise the potential 
for sustainable consumption (Section 5.2.3), since 
individualized products support targeted consump-
tion and the minimization of non-use or waste. A 
further perspective on the interconnectedness of 
products, logistics and production is a possible 
increase in behavioural analyses, behaviour influen-
cing or behaviour control of consumers or emp-
loyees, which can and should be countered by the 
protection of (digital) privacy.
3 .5 .6 
Conclusions: Understanding and accepting 
 formative tasks
Section 3.5 spans the range of possibilities of how dig-
italization can affect the ecological, economic, societal 
and technical systems, as well as individuals, and how 
it can help humans to comply with planetary guard rails. 
Decarbonization, resource and emission efficiency and 
the circular economy could be achieved more easily and 
quickly with digital innovations than without them. Dig-
italization could also help to tap societal modernization 
potential. Globe-spanning knowledge, globe-spanning 
communication, and global societal interconnectedness 
in virtual and hybrid spaces can accelerate sustainability 
transformations, improve human inclusion, strengthen 
global environmental awareness, and create a transna-
tionally networked society in which intergovernmental 
organizations, transnational networks and science com-
plement each other and develop and use a culture of 
global cooperation. These possibilities for a digitally 
supported Great Transformation towards Sustainability 
must be rapidly and comprehensively mobilized.
However, this Section also shows that there is no 
technological determination per se relating to the major 
challenges facing humankind. The digitalization of the 
past decades – the internet, a wide variety of end 
devices, the increasing automation of production – has 
resulted in a constantly growing use of energy and 
resources, as well as in global production and consump-
tion patterns that are increasingly placing a massive 
burden on ecosystems and the Earth system as a whole. 
The current surge of digital innovation is not being auto-
matically translated into sustainability transformations. 
That requires closely linking sustainability models with 
technological breakthroughs. Nor is the societal innova-
tion potential of digital change automatic. At present, 
societies seem to be overwhelmed by the speed and 
depth of technological upheavals and their use by pow-
erful actors – particularly from the private sector, but 
also from the public sector.
Consequently, digitalization for implementing the 
2030 Agenda is a major formative task that requires a 
modernization boost at almost all actor levels in order 
to create digital competencies and link them with the 
requirements of sustainability transformation. If this 
does not succeed, technology-oriented and short-term-
oriented self-dynamics will prevail; then it will no 
longer be possible to link digital transformation with 
the sustainability transformation. 
3 .6
The Digital Age and sustainability from the 
 perspective of international organizations 
The sustainable shaping of the above-mentioned and 
other areas of life is at the heart of the 2030 Agenda 
and the activities of various international organiza-
tions. International organizations are increasingly 
focusing on digitalization as a field of action and a man-
date for action. This Section uses some examples to 
illustrate the state of discussion among international 
organizations on digitalization issues in the context of 
the Great Transformation to Sustainability. 
3 .6 .1 
Selected reports
Global digital change is increasingly attracting the atten-
tion of international organizations concerned with sus-
tainable development. This is indicated by the increasing 
number of reports addressing the effects of the Digital 
Age on the economy, societal development and the 
attainability of SDGs. The following section discusses, 
as examples, ten reports on digitalization and sustainable 
development published between 2016 and 2018 
(Box 3.6-1). The selected studies consistently pursue an 
application- and solution-oriented approach offering 
advice for policy-makers from an international perspec-
tive. The idea behind the comparative review of these 
reports is to gain an impression of the framework within 
which the topic is being covered and the range of recom-
mendations being made for the (political) shaping of the 
 Digital Age. 
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3 .6 .2 
Key messages and recommendations of the 
reports
World Bank’s ‚Digital Dividends’ World Development 
Report 2016 
The thematic priorities of the World Bank’s annual 
World Development Reports, published since 1990, 
have often reflected the respective topic’s importance 
in the corresponding period of international coopera-
tion. The choice of digitalization as the focus of the 
2016 World Development Report is an indication that 
the topic has reached the strategic departments of 
international organizations. The World Development 
Report 2016, ‘Digital Dividends’ (World Bank, 2016), 
focuses on digitalization’s potential for development 
and poverty reduction and identifies growth, employ-
ment and services as the most important returns on 
digital investments. However, the report states that 
these digital dividends are still spreading very slowly 
(almost 60 per cent of the world’s population still does 
not have access to the internet, World Bank, 2016: 5) 
and that their spread depends on income, gender and 
the place of residence: “The internet remains unavaila-
ble, inaccessible, and unaffordable to a majority of the 
world’s population” World Bank, 2016: 8). 
If all regions of the world and all societal groups are 
to benefit from digital technologies, the remaining dig-
ital divide must be overcome, especially in the case of 
internet access (Figure 3.6.2-1). Affordable access to the 
internet for all is important, but not enough on its own 
to achieve progress in development. Digital investments 
therefore require additional support from ‘analogue sup-
plements’ in order to become effective, according to one 
of the central messages of the World Development 
Report 2016. Such analogue additions include (1) a com-
petitive environment, (2) digital competence of the 
users, and (3) responsible governments that use the 
internet to strengthen civil society. According to the 
World Development Report, the creation of these frame-
work conditions is a necessary formative task for every 
country. An internet accessible to all population groups 
can improve inclusion, efficiency and innovation; at the 
same time, however, it involves risks that must be pre-
vented, such as massive surveillance or control, increas-
ing inequality, concentration of power, or the develop-
ment of monopolies ( Figure 3.6.2-2).
In addition to national policy requirements, the 
World Development Report stresses the importance of 
the internet for global cooperation. On the one hand, 
the internet can facilitate the solution of global prob-
lems; on the other, the regulation of the internet itself 
requires global cooperation (World Bank, 2016: 292ff.). 
To achieve this, it is necessary, first, to establish inter-
national internet governance, since the internet requires 
technical coordination and harmonized standards to 
ensure smooth operation worldwide. Second, global 
digital markets need to be shaped, in particular by 
removing barriers to cross-border data flows, setting 
global standards for data exchange, and adapting the 
protection of intellectual property rights to the chal-
lenges of the Digital Age. Third, digital technologies 
allow much better and more extensive collection and 
use of data and information for sustainable develop-
ment. The two greatest global challenges, sustaining the 
natural life-support systems and poverty reduction 
(World Bank, 2016: 303), require close global coopera-
tion, which can be intensified and improved using dig-
ital technologies. This applies equally to the analysis 
Box 3 .6-1
Ten examples of reports on digitalization and 
sustainability published between 2016 and 2018 
by international organizations
1. UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (2018): Technology and Innovation Report 
2018: Harnessing Frontier Technologies for Sustainable 
Development.
2. GSM Association und Boston Consulting Group (2017): 
Embracing the Digital Revolution: Policies for Building 
the Digital Economy.
3. IEA – International Energy Agency (2017): Digitalization 
& Energy.
4. OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2017a): Key Issues for Digital Transforma-
tion in the G20. Report Prepared for a Joint G20 German 
Presidency/OECD Conference.
5. OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2017b): The Next Production Revolution. 
Implications for Governments and Business.
6. OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2017c): Digital Economy Outlook 2017.
7. UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (2017): Information Economy Report 
2017. Digitalization, Trade and Development.
8. The Earth Institute und Ericsson (2016): ICT & SDGs – 
How Information and Communications Technology can 
Accelerate Action on the Sustainable Development Goals, 
Final Report.
9. World Bank (2016): Digital Dividends. World Develop-
ment Report 2016.
10. WEF – World Economic Forum (2016): Digital Transfor-
mation of Industries: Societal Implications. White Paper.
3 Understanding the Digital Age
98
and monitoring of global problems (e.g. with more 
accurate and comprehensive data) and to multilateral 
efforts to solve problems and implement the 2030 
Agenda (e.g. running programmes, dialogues and 
exchanges of views).
UNCTAD’s Technology and Innovation Report 
The United Nations’ ‘Technology and Innovation 
Report 2018: Harnessing Frontier Technologies for Sus-
tainable to implement the 2030 Agenda. A package of 
priority measures is proposed to achieve this. Here, the 
areas of development, energy, climate protection and 
inclusion have been selected by way of example. 
According to the report, the necessary framework con-
ditions have to be created. First, a roadmap should be 
developed to ensure that all public facilities and serv-
ices have a broadband connection by 2020. Second, the 
ten recommendations of the UN Broadband Commis-
sion Task Force on Sustainable Development (ITU and 
UNESCO, 2014: 20) should be taken into account 
(including those on affordable connectivity, strategy 
development, facilitating broadband expansion, market 
incentives and standardization). Third, the foundations 
for digital transformation should be laid by rapidly inte-
grating digital technologies in the public sector (primar-
ily in administration and the provision of public serv-
ices such as health, education and infrastructure). 
Fourth, the authors of the report advocate public-pri-
vate partnerships to support broad-based ICT provision 
tailored to local circumstances and needs. Fifth, the 
MINT subjects (mathematics, information technology 
natural sciences and technology) should be upgraded in 
education systems in order to improve technological 
competence (Section 5.3.4). Sixth, the use of large 
amounts of data should be promoted. In particular, 
open databases using large quantities of data from the 
public sector and satellites, mobile networks, sensors 
and other network devices of the Internet of Things 
should be created (The Earth Institute and Ericsson, 
2016: 11). 
‘Embracing the Digital Revolution’ report by GSM 
and Boston Consulting
The digital revolution is a policy-building task; this is 
the message of the report entitled ‘Embracing the Digi-
tal Revolution: Policies for Building the Digital Econ-
omy’ (GSM, 2017). Without political control, the gap 
between the profiteers of digitalization and those who 
are digitally dependent threatens to widen. Govern-
ments should therefore focus in particular on accelerat-
ing the introduction of technology and mitigating the 
negative economic and social impacts of technological 
change (GSM, 2017: 2). The goal is an ‘inclusive digital 
economy and society’. Inclusion, efficiency and inno-
vation are described – in an analogous way to the World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2016 – as the main 
mechanisms with which digital technologies can pro-
mote development processes (GSM, 2017: 19). The 
report sees a particular need for action in the areas of 
network investment, legislation (adaptation to the dig-
ital world), promotion of the digital economy (data 
security and data protection, digital literacy, lifelong 
learning, digitalization of enterprises) and the digital 
governance of countries (“leading digital economies 
have leading digital governments”; Figure 3.6.2-3; 
GSM, 2017: 33ff.). 
Figure 3 .6 .2-1
Access to mobile phones and the internet (a) by population and (b) by country.
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OECD report: ‘Digital Economy Outlook 2017’ 
The OECD’s ‘Digital Economy Outlook 2017’ (2017c) 
takes the Cancún Ministerial Declaration (OECD, 2016a) 
as its point of reference. The declaration by the OECD 
ministers identifies the digital economy as a catalyst for 
innovation, growth and social prosperity, and argues 
for a stronger orientation towards sustainable and 
inclusive growth geared towards prosperity and equal 
opportunities. At its core, the declaration contains nine 
commitments, including the free flow of information, 
broadband expansion, security-risk management and 
digital literacy. Following on from this approach, the 
‘Digital Economy Outlook 2017’ states that the digital 
transformation affects all facets of economic and soci-
etal life and requires an integrated approach. This can 
only succeed if traditional policy silos are abandoned, 
so that cross-sector, nationwide visions and strategies 
for the digital transformation can be developed (OECD, 
2017c: 27). It is essential to create a basis for this: the 
digital economy can only develop fully if the macroeco-
nomic framework conditions are right (free trade, open 
financial markets and functioning labour markets). 
According to the report, the role of governments is to 
make investment in digital infrastructures possible in a 
competitive environment. At the same time, it is neces-
sary to promote digital applications as well as the 
development of digital literacy among the population 
(OECD, 2017c: 31). Finally, the report highlights the 
need for enhanced cooperation among OECD countries 
to develop coherent policies on digital security and the 
protection of privacy, data security and the protection 
of critical infrastructures. The issue of adapting society 
to the profound societal consequences of digitalization 
is briefly mentioned, but no solution is offered (OECD, 
2017c: 33). 
OECD report: ‘Key Issues for Digital Transformation 
in the G20’ 
The OECD report entitled ‘Key Issues for Digital Trans-
formation in the G20’ commissioned in 2017 by the 
German G20 presidency is also to be seen in the context 
of multilateral cooperation (OECD, 2017a). The report 
is based on the view that ongoing digital change in the 
economy and society will not only foster growth and 
innovation, but that successful digital change is also a 
prerequisite for inclusive and sustainable growth, the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda, and for prosperity 
(OECD, 2017a: 6, 11). At the same time, it highlights the 
disruptive potential of digitalization, for example in 
terms of data protection and security (e.g. OECD rec-
ommendations on digital security management: OECD, 
2015), consumer policy and competition, innovation, 
jobs and qualification. If these problems are not ade-
quately addressed, the report says, this could lead to 
economic crises, reactionary politics, a worsening of 
inequalities, and a further weakening of societal cohe-
sion. The challenge is to contain these risks politically. 
The report gives eleven policy recommendations for the 
G20 (OECD, 2017a: 145–149). 
OECD report: ‘The Next Production Revolution’ 
The OECD report ‘The Next Production Revolution. 
Implications for Governments and Business’ (OECD, 
2017b) stands out from the reports discussed here by 
dint of the explicit reference to the need for long-term 
thinking and planning beyond 2030. Governments 
should prepare for disruptive change with profound 
societal consequences: “[...] such adjustment might be 
highly disruptive, although the precise pace and scale 
of inevitable future adjustments are unknown. It may 
be that, in the worst case, labour will be displaced on a 
scale and at a speed not seen before, that robots will 
make income distribution vastly more unequal than 
today, and that the market wages of the unskilled will 
fall below socially acceptable levels. Policy makers need 












Figure 3 .6 .2-2
Why digital dividends are not spreading rapidly – and what can be done.
Source: World Bank, 2016: 4
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to monitor and prepare for such possibilities” (OECD, 
2017b: 34). The report recommends integrating fore-
sight processes into political decision-making systems 
in order to better prepare for unpredictable develop-
ments with systemic long-term analyses and scenarios 
(OECD, 2017b: 50). This requires changes to organiza-
tional structures and strategy-building processes. Fore-
sight processes should be linked to policy cycles to 
ensure that future information is available at the right 
moment in time. Participatory elements and an 
exchange between stakeholders and decision-makers 
are essential to initiate and establish change processes 
in politics, society and business. Finally, according to 
the report, a form of institutionalization is needed in 
order to create a foresight culture and to promote and 
disseminate future-oriented thinking (OECD, 
2017b: 321). 
UNCTAD’s ‘Information Economy Report 2017’
Three of the reports on digitalization discussed below 
focus on a global view of the themes ‘Trade and Devel-
opment’, ‘Energy Systems’ and ‘Industrial Production’. 
The UN’s ‘Information Economy Report 2017: Digitali-
zation, Trade and Development’ (UNCTAD, 2017) deals 
with the effects of digitalization on trade, labour and 
education, especially with regard to small and medi-
um-sized enterprises in developing countries. The ini-
tial observation is that this group of countries is inade-
quately equipped for the Digital Age. Political action is 
particularly important here to ensure that developing 
countries do not fall even further behind in their 
socio-economic development in the wake of digital 
change. The challenge for policy-makers is especially to 
keep pace with the speed of technological change. For 
many smaller companies in developing countries, the 
primary objective is to gain access to the net and to 
improve understanding and skills within the companies 
themselves on the potential use of digital technologies. 
The report identifies improving network access, adapt-
ing education systems to digital change, and integrating 
digital solutions into export promotion as priority areas 
for action for governments in developing countries (e.g. 
UNCTAD’s ‘eTrade for all’ initiative). An important pre-
requisite is improving the knowledge of decision-mak-
ers about the interface between trade, logistics, digital-
ization and e-commerce (UNCTAD, 2017: xv). At the 
same time, the report says, it is up to governments to 
ensure data security and the protection of privacy. As 
data-protection law differs considerably from country 
to country and, in particular, developing countries 
often do not yet have legislation in this area, the report 
proposes a bundling process: “In addition, many devel-
oping countries still lack legislation in this area alto-
gether. Instead of pursuing multiple initiatives, it would 
be preferable for global and regional organizations to 
concentrate on one unifying initiative or a smaller num-
ber of initiatives that are internationally compatible.” 
(UNCTAD, 2017: 7). Finally, the report says there is a 
need for dovetailing between multilaterally agreed 
trade policies on the one hand (WTO; bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements), and internet governance negoti-
ated in multi-stakeholder processes on the other, in 
order to ensure that future trade agreements and the 
digital economy are designed coherently and 
 sustainably.
IEA report: ‘Digitalization & Energy’
The starting point of the International Energy Agency’s 
report on ‘Digitalization & Energy’ (IEA, 2017a) is the 
observation that digitalization can fundamentally 
change energy systems. The electricity sector is at the 
centre of this change, i.e. where digitalization is increas-
ingly blurring the difference between generation and 
consumption (Section 5.2.6). At the same time, digital 
technologies are themselves energy consumers. Politi-
cal action is decisive as to whether the efficiency gains 
can compensate for the rising demand for energy that 
comes from digitalization: “Policy and market design 
Table 3 .6 .2-1
Key policy levers to promote widespread digital benefits and inclusion.
Source: GSM, 2017: 33 f.
Encourage network 
investment






Have broadband policy 
with  clear goals
Adopt functionally based 
regulation
Support data safety and 
security




Prefer ex-post approaches 
(over ex-ante prescriptive 
regulation)
Push digital literacy and 
 life-long learning





 consistency throughout  
the ecosystem
Encourage digitalisation of 
companies
Introduce and push digital 
government services
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are vital to steering digitally enhanced energy systems 
onto an efficient, secure, accessible and sustainable 
path” (IEA, 2017a: 19). Since the structure of a digital-
ized energy world cannot be accurately predicted, and 
roadmaps with concrete time and target horizons can-
not be developed, the IEA recommends ten no-regret 
policies to help governments better prepare for the dig-
ital transformation of energy systems (IEA, 
2017a: 163f.). 
WEF white paper: ‘Digital Transformation of 
Industries’ 
The white paper entitled ‘Digital Transformation of 
Industries: Societal Implications’ from the World Eco-
nomic Forum (WEF, 2016a) focuses on the disruptive 
societal potential of digital change in industrial produc-
tion. In areas such as the future of work, income, ine-
quality, health, resource efficiency and security, digital 
change will confront societies with entirely new chal-
lenges (WEF, 2016a). The key question is how digital 
change in industrial production can be shaped in such a 
way that it can make a positive contribution to societal 
development. The white paper identifies a need for 
action in three areas: (1) training employees for the age 
of digitalization, (2) using digital technologies for the 
Transformation towards Sustainability, and (3) building 
confidence in the digital economy (data protection, 
data security). The growing ecological footprint of dig-
italization is cited as a key challenge for the transition 
to a sustainable world, mainly due to electronic waste 
and the energy consumption of large data centres 
(WEF, 2016a: 22). Four measures are proposed to steer 
the digitalization of industrial production in a sustain-
able direction, reduce environmental impact, and 
uncouple growth from resource consumption: (1) 
embed principles of the circular economy in companies, 
(2) make a commitment to transparency across the 
entire production and supply chain, (3) cooperate in 
the joint use of overcapacity or waste streams, and (4) 
agree on sector-specific and cross-sector environmen-
tal standards for the IT sector (WEF, 2016a: 22).
3 .6 .3 
Selected charters
In addition to detailed reports on sustainability and 
digitalization, and in some cases following on from 
them, a number of international organizations have 
drafted charters for sustainable development in the 
Digital Age. This Section 3.6.3 provides an overview of 
them (Table 3.6.3-1). A ‘charter’ is understood here as 
a superordinate term for a document whose main pur-
pose and content is to postulate general principles for 
dealing with digital technology. Such documents are 
often also called principles, manifestos, guidelines or 
commitments. The transition to other types of docu-
ments is sometimes fluid. Scientific studies and political 
position papers, too, generally contain recommenda-
tions for action and demands. This section, however, 
only considers documents that are charters in the sense 
defined above.
In the current charter landscape, several drafts are 
already devoted to many critical sustainability issues 
that are identified in this report. These include, for 
example, the Charter of Digital Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (published by the Zeit-Stiftung, 2018), which 
formulates principles on human dignity, privacy, work, 
education and dealing with AI. However, this proposal’s 
perspective is not one of dedicated and comprehensive 
sustainability either. Such a draft is not yet discernible 
in the existing charter landscape. Also important is the 
process to which existing charter drafts belong, or 
which they are supposed to initiate, as well as the 
intentions they aim to pursue. There are also some rel-
evant drafts of this kind. The UN’s Internet Governance 
Forum, for example, occupies precisely the global gov-
ernance space that the WBGU regards as urgently 
needed with regard to digitalization, and has published 
a Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Inter-
net based on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (IGF, 2018). A more detailed consideration of 
these and other draft charters follows at the end of this 
section. On the whole, however, it should be noted that 
– although several organizations have already drawn up 
a number of drafts of their charter – up to now no draft 
has been, first, thematically comprehensive enough to 
offer holistic guidelines on sustainability in the Digital 
Age – thereby covering all three Dynamics as outlined 
by WBGU (Chapter 7) – and, second, institutionally 
located at the multilateral level which, like the 2030 
Agenda, can offer a target system with the necessary 
global perspective.
Thematic priorities
The thematic breadth of existing charter drafts varies 
greatly. While some are broad in scope, others concen-
trate on specific areas of digitalization such as how to 
deal with AI (e.g. the ‘Asilomar AI Principles’ from the 
Future of Life Institute, 2018), or potential for develop-
ment cooperation (e.g. the ‘Principles for Digital Devel-
opment’: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation et al., 
2017). Within the thematic range, three focal points 
can be identified that are particularly prominent in the 
existing charter landscape: AI, human and civil rights 
and, in particular, data protection and privacy.
In view of the technical developments in recent 
years – and their societal perception – there is a clear 
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Table 3 .6 .3-1
Overview of selected charters for the Digital Age. 
Source: WBGU
Title Year Publisher Type of 
publisher
Key points
ADM manifesto 2016 Algorithm Watch Civil society Algorithmic decision making is never 
neutral, the creators are responsible, 
processes must be traceable and demo-
cratically controllable. Debate is needed 
on how much freedom should be trans-
ferred to algorithms.
African Declaration on 




Civil society The internet should be a space for the 
free exchange of views and knowledge, 
accessible to all, respecting, inter alia 
cultural and linguistic diversity, privacy 
and gender issues.
AI at Google: Our 
 Principles
2018 Google IT industry Use AI only for the benefit of people, ta-
king into account security, privacy, etc.; 
do not develop AI for military use.
AI Now 
 Recommendations
2017 Campolo et al. Academia Do not use AI systems as black boxes; in-
stead, research, test, monitor and ethi-
cally frame them.
AI Policy Principles 2017 Information 
 Technology 
 Industry Council
IT industry IT industry is accountable for the re-
sponsible development and use of AI; AI 
systems must be controllable; govern-
ments must promote research and use of 
AI systems; security and privacy must be 
respected.
Asilomar AI Principles 2017 Future of Life 
Institute
various Research is needed to work towards so-
cietally beneficial AI. In addition, think 
about AI politically, culturally, ethically. 
Ensure human values, privacy and 
freedoms.
Charter of Digital 




 Zeit-Stiftung various Comprehensive charter based on the 
German Basic Law with rights and goals 
in the Digital Age: respect human digni-
ty, freedom, equality, freedom of expres-
sion in the Digital Age. Protect people's 
rights. The aim is to establish a legally 




2014 Deutsche Telekom 
et al.
IT industry Digital technology generates prosperity 
(location factor). Economic use of data 
benefits society; responsibility and fra-
mework conditions must correspond.
Contract of the Web 2019 Civil society Governments, businesses and citizens 
should keep the internet (especially the 
web) open and freely accessible for all, 
while respecting privacy.
D64 Charter 2012 D 64 Civil society Promote an open network society that 
enables inclusion and applies fundamen-
tal-rights-oriented data protection. The 
internet should be a space for network 
policy and the public sphere.




2016 IEEE IT industry AI must contain ideals of human rights 
and benefit humanity and the environ-
ment. This principle is applied to value 
systems in AI, AI research, security, pri-
vacy and control, autonomous weapons, 
economics and law.
Geneva Declaration of 
Principles
2003 WSIS International 
organization
Harness the potential of digital informa-
tion and communication technologies to 
achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).
Human Rights Princip-
les for Connectivity 
and Development
2016 Access Now et al. Civil society Nine principles that investors should fol-
low to shape the internet and its infras-
tructure in accordance with human 
rights and economic development goals.
Internet Rights Charter 2006 APC Academia,  
civil society
The internet should be an open space for 
all to exchange views and share know-
ledge freely, where open standards are 
developed and the privacy of users is 
respected.
Magna Carta for the 
 Digital Age
2015 British Library Civil society Protect the web from corporate control 
and government censorship to ensure 




2017 Montréal Academia AI should only be developed to ultimate-
ly increase the well-being of all sentient 
beings. This principle is applied to justi-
ce, privacy, knowledge, democracy and 
societal responsibility.
Principles for Algorith-
mic Transparency and 
Accountability
2017 Association for 
Computing 
Machinery
Academia Principles on which stakeholders (deve-
lopers, governments, users) should base 
their behaviour to enable transparent 
and accountable AI and to be able to 
adapt those principles where necessary.










Develop digital instruments in develop-
ment cooperation together with users, 
gear them towards sustainability, make 
them scalable and secure, etc. Target: ef-
fective and inclusive digital development 
cooperation.
The Charter of Human 
Rights and Principles 
for the Internet
2014 IGF International 
organization
Protect freedom of expression, social 
justice, privacy, diversity on the internet.
The Japanese  Society 
for Artificial 
 Intelligence Ethical 
Guidelines
2017 Japanese Society 
for Artificial 
Intelligence
Academia Commitment to conduct research only 
to serve peace, security, welfare and the 
public interest. This principle is fleshed 
out for various areas (law, communicati-
on, security, fairness, etc.).




European Commission's contribution to 
the discussion on the Eigenart of the hu-
man being: “What does it mean to be hu-
man in a hyperconnected era?” More a 
trigger for a debate (there is also an an-
thology) than a charter.
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thematic focus on AI. Examples include the ‘Toronto 
Declaration’ (Access Now and Amnesty International, 
2018), the ‘Asilomar AI Principles’ (Future of Life Insti-
tute, 2018), the ‘AI Now Recommendations’ (Campolo 
et al., 2017) and ‘Artificial Intelligence at Google 
(Google, 2018). None of the charters reviewed argues 
categorically against the use of AI. Instead, there is 
sometimes a sharp warning about the risks, but also an 
emphasis on the opportunities and thus the need for a 
societal debate. The ADM manifesto from the NGO 
AlgorithmWatch (2016), for example, stresses that 
automated decision-making is never neutral, that its 
use should be carefully considered, and that traceabil-
ity and democratic control must be ensured. AI should 
be used in such a way that problems that already exist 
today can be better solved; at the same time, it must be 
ensured that people retain control over AI systems in 
the future. In this context, many charters also call for 
research on AI to be promoted in this direction.
Human rights and civil liberties are another priority 
of existing charter drafts. The focus here is not so much 
on dealing with the fundamentally new challenges that 
digitalization involves (as with AI); rather, the issue is 
how existing human and civil rights can be guaranteed 
under the changed framework conditions of the Digital 
Age – e.g. interconnectedness, mass evaluation of data 
– (e.g. Zeit-Stiftung, 2018; IGF, 2018; Campolo et al., 
2017; D 64, 2019).
The third main point of emphasis is a special case of 
this focus on human and civil rights. The key question 
here is how can data protection and privacy be designed 
in the Digital Age when data is collected and evaluated 
automatically on a massive scale (e.g. Digital Charter of 
the Zeit-Stiftung, 2018)? As with the broader charters 
on civil rights, formulations often remain abstract: a 
certain fundamental right should not be affected by 
digitalization. Although the objectives pursued by the 
authors of the charter – e.g. to maintain an open, free, 
democratic society – are often formulated, due to the 
nature of a charter there is no explicit reference to how 
the required rights can be guaranteed in the Digital Age.
Some topics that are very relevant for this report, 
such as the effects of digitalization on the environment 
or work, are indeed included in some charter proposals, 
but are not represented as priority topics. 
Formats
The majority of the charter drafts come, in roughly 
equal parts, from the IT industry, civil society, academia 
and think tanks. In general, two categories of address-
ees can be distinguished. In the first category, the 
sender and addressee are identical. Some drafts origi-
nating from business or academia are meant as volun-
tary self-commitments, particularly e.g. to advance the 
development of AI only if certain principles are main-
tained. Examples include ‘AI Policy Principles’ (Infor-
mation Technology Industry Council, 2017), ‘AI at 
Google’ (Google, 2018), and the ‘Japanese Society for 
Artificial Intelligence Ethical Guidelines’ (Japanese 
Society for Artificial Intelligence, 2017). In the second 
category, the postulated rights and obligations are to 
apply to society as a whole – be it institutionally 
embedded on a global scale (IGF, 2018) or at the Euro-
pean level (Zeit-Stiftung, 2018). By contrast to volun-
tary commitments, these drafts – partly because they 
do not as yet have any legally binding character – are 
generally intended to initiate a societal debate. Many of 
the drafts therefore include interactive elements: you 
can sign them as an open letter, vote for certain princi-
ples, or discuss them on the internet. A number of char-
ters are designed to be continually revised to take into 
account developments in technology, the current state 
of research and societal debates (living documents). 
Some drafts also declare the legally binding establish-
ment of the rights and obligations negotiated in this 
way as their long-term goal (e.g. Zeit-Stiftung, 2018).
The Partnership of the 
Future
2016 Nadella IT industry AI must be designed to serve humanity; 
it must be transparent, respect human 
dignity and privacy, make understanda-
ble decisions, and not discriminate 
against anyone.
The Toronto Declarati-
on: Protecting the 




2018 Access Now und 
Amnesty 
International
Civil society States have a duty to protect human 
rights. They must take measures to pro-
tect against discrimination through ma-
chine learning.
Top Ten Principles for 
Ethical AI
2017 UNI Global Union Trade union AI systems should be transparent, proto-
col ethical decisions, serve human 
beings and the planet; humans should 
retain both control and responsibility 
over decisions; AI should be unbiased
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Some charters that seem particularly relevant in the 
context of this report are presented individually below.
‘Charter of Digital Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union’
The ‘Charter of Digital Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union’ (Zeit-Stiftung, 2018), published by the 
ZEIT-Stiftung, is a thematically very comprehensive 
charter; its structure and language are based on the 
fundamental rights and state goals in Germany’s Basic 
Law. For example, it covers human dignity, freedom, 
equality and freedom of expression in the Digital Age. 
The focus is on safeguarding existing fundamental 
rights under the new framework conditions of the Dig-
ital Age. A revised version of the digital charter was 
presented to the public in 2018, two years after the 
first draft. It is intended to further stimulate debate in 
society and to be continuously revised on this basis. 
You can vote on and discuss individual articles on the 
internet. The aim is to make a charter of fundamental 
digital rights legally binding in the EU.
‘The Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the 
Internet’
The Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the 
Internet (IGF, 2018b) is relevant in two respects. First, 
it comes from the UN’s Internet Governance Forum and 
thus from precisely the global governance space which, 
in the WBGU’s opinion, urgently needs to be further 
developed in the context of digitalization (Chapter 8). 
Second, the contents of the charter – based on the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – are geared 
towards equality, justice, access, freedom of expression, 
data protection, etc., and are thus thematically close to 
the WBGU’s compass dimensions of inclusion and dig-
nity (Section 2.2).
‘Asilomar AI Principles’
Cosmologist Max Tegmark’s Future of Life Institute 
deals with existential risks for humankind, such as 
climate change or a possible nuclear war, which would 
endanger the survival of mankind should they go 
unchecked and become reality. Also relevant in this 
context are the Institute’s ‘Asilomar AI Principles’, 
which regards AI as one such risk (Future of Life Insti-
tute, 2018). The signatories of this charter do not reject 
AI on principle, but emphasize that without the respon-
sible development of AI, the consequences could be 
catastrophic. Against this background, they call for a 
number of principles to be observed in the develop-
ment of AI, such as security, transparency, human val-
ues, freedoms and privacy, and ultimate human control, 
in addition to common-good-oriented AI research. The 
‘Asilomar AI Principles’ have prominent supporters 
such as the late physicist Stephen Hawking and entre-
preneur Elon Musk. The charter is meant as a draft that 
is constantly being revised. 
‘Geneva Declaration of Principles’
The ‘Geneva Declaration of Principles’ (WSIS, 2003), 
adopted as early as 2003 at the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS), aims to harness the poten-
tial of digital ICT for the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The Geneva Declaration was supported by the 
UN and is a relatively early charter in multilateral coop-
eration. However, much criticism of the declaration 
came from civil society in particular, because its general 
understanding of ICT in development cooperation was 
not shared by the development community (Souter, 
2008). The Geneva Declaration is historically relevant 
as a relatively early document, and some lessons on the 
importance of stakeholder involvement can be drawn 
from its negotiation process.
‘Principles for Digital Development’
The ‘Principles for Digital Development’ charter (Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation et al., 2017) is a good 
example of a charter with a strong connection to the 
active society, as called for in the WBGU’s ‘Dynamics of 
the Digital Age’ (Section 7.5). In development coopera-
tion, digital instruments are to be developed in cooper-
ation with their future users, geared to sustainability, 
scalability and security. The aim is to use digital tech-
nology effectively and inclusively for development 
cooperation. The ‘Principles for Digital Development’ 
charter is also a good example of the plurality of authors 
that characterizes many charters. In this case, these pri-
marily include civil society and international organiza-
tions such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
UNICEF, UNDP, the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization, but also the national development agen-
cies of Sweden and the USA. 
3 .6 .4 
Conclusions: Contours of a landscape of 
 recommendations
Evaluating a selection of reports by international 
organizations and of charters on the subject of digitali-
zation and sustainable development cannot, of course, 
provide a complete picture of the current ‘landscape of 
recommendations’. Nevertheless, contours have 
become visible which show that there is extensive con-
vergence both in the description of the challenges and 
in the temporal scope of the considerations. It has also 
become clear that digitalization is a policy field in which 
constitutive action by policy-makers often lags behind 
the rapid technological change processes and the sheer 
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speed of digital change; indeed, many of the societal 
effects of digital change cannot yet be assessed in terms 
of how they will be manifested in practice. This also 
raises the question of how to shape political deci-
sion-making processes in uncertain and dynamically 
developing conditions.
Convergence in the description of key challenges
Many of the reviewed reports are characterized by con-
vergences in how they describe the key challenges of 
digitalization (Section 3.6.2). All the reports evaluated 
emphasize the need to actively shape global digitaliza-
tion, referring to key challenges such as overcoming the 
digital divide and developing digital infrastructures 
everywhere, developing digital skills and education, 
creating confidence in digital technologies, handling a 
world of work in flux and a changing international divi-
sion of labour; they mention the role of digitalization in 
the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the (interna-
tional) regulation of digital applications, and the con-
nection between digitalization, innovation, growth and 
prosperity. They also all identify the risks of digital 
change, above all data protection, data security, pri-
vacy, and distortions of competition. 
Dominance of a relatively short-term perspective
With one exception, the time horizons of all the reports 
evaluated reach to 2030; their analyses are limited to 
the ‘First Dynamic of the Digital Age’ as identified by 
the WBGU (Section 7.2). The OECD report entitled ‘The 
Next Production Revolution’ occupies a special position 
and explicitly recommends a long-term perspective and 
the use of foresight processes in order to be better 
equipped to deal with any surprising twists or turns of 
digital change (OECD, 2017b). In this context, it assigns 
a key role to research, technology and innovation poli-
cies in ensuring the accessibility of SDGs (UNCTAD, 
2018: 29). 
Speed as a challenge
Several reports highlight the possibility that the speed 
of digital change might place excessive demands on 
decision-makers and institutions, and that this is a key 
challenge (UNCTAD, 2017; OECD, 2017b: 35; OECD, 
2017c: 26): “Digital acceleration takes place against 
 legacy time frames, slow institutional processes, 
entrenched behaviours and limited human attention” 
(OECD, 2017c: 26). Particular reference is made in this 
context to the unprecedented speed of the future 
restructuring of labour markets (OECD, 2017b: 35; 
World Bank, 2016: 118). 
Digital change versus the Transformation towards 
Sustainability
Digital change is predominantly described as a global 
megatrend that needs to be responded to, managed in 
the sense of a positive economic development, pro-
moted by expanding the infrastructure, and whose 
potential negative effects must be regulated (GSM, 
2017; UNCTAD, 2017). In this type of report, the envi-
ronment and development are little more than accom-
panying aims of policy-making. Successful digital 
change is seen as a prerequisite for inclusive and sus-
tainable growth and prosperity (OECD, 2017a: 6, 11). 
Digital change is seen overall as simply an instrument: 
no attention is paid to its more far-reaching significance 
for the reorganization of societies and for shaping the 
future beyond 2030. 
Accordingly, few attempts are made to draw atten-
tion to the implications that the potentially disruptive 
power of digital technologies will have on a post-2030 
agenda and the global transformation towards a sus-
tainable society. The same applies to the question of 
which digital development trends should absolutely be 
avoided to ensure that planetary guard rails are not vio-
lated and the application of digital technologies does 
not lead to rebound effects and more energy and 
resource consumption. The solution proposed by some 
reports of speeding up the spread of digital technolo-
gies without creating a suitable framework seems 
unconvincing in view of the risks to the environment, 
climate-change mitigation and social cohesion (The 
Earth Institute and Ericsson, 2016; World Bank, 2016). 
Shaping the Digital Age using search methods
The evaluated reports also show that in many cases 
there are no conclusive answers to guide the necessary 
sustainable shaping of the Digital Age; this is because 
many of the effects of digitalization on the develop-
ment of societies and the planet are still unknown. In 
this respect, some reports should better be read as 
instructions for designing search processes. The char-
ters indicate the general direction these might initially 
take. In particular, reports that limit themselves to core 
messages or core topics, or recommend no-regret meas-
ures, face the challenge of acting in a framework of 
uncertainty (IEA, 2017a; UNCTAD, 2017a, 2018). On 
the other hand, concrete individual recommendations 
are given for individual topic areas, such as ICT and 
climate protection, development and participation (The 
Earth Institute and Ericsson, 2016). Several reports 
explicitly emphasize the limits placed on digitalization’s 
potential by the economic and social realities of the 
analogue world (World Bank, 2016; UNCTAD, 2018). 
Because of the existing uncertainties and regional 
and cultural differences, none of the reports gives gen-
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eral answers to the impending, far-reaching, socio-eco-
nomic changes that will be brought about by digital 
change. In many cases, the challenge of disruptive 
developments is pointed out, but no differentiated 
solution is offered. So the bottom line is the insight that 
steering the Digital Age towards sustainability is in 
many respects a search process that requires adaptable 
and step-by-step policy-making, as well as a global 
understanding of the ‘common digital future’. Accom-
panying research and foresight processes will have to 
play an important role with regard to early warnings 
and identifying major risks. This will need to be backed 
up by a robust international institutional structure that 
above all subjects the hitherto largely unregulated mul-
tinational digital economy to stronger democratic and 
regulatory control (Sections 8.1, 8.4).
Charter landscape
A number of drafts in the existing charter landscape are 
devoted to many of the critical sustainability issues 
which this report also confronts (Section 3.6.3). How-
ever, none of the charters has yet adopted a dedicated 
and comprehensive sustainability perspective. Further-
more, the background against which the charters were 
formulated must also be considered. The WBGU believes 
it is urgently necessary to merge global governance on 
climate and sustainability goals with digitalization; it 
has therefore formulated its own draft charter for a 
 sustainable Digital Age in Box 9.3.1-1.
3 .7
Conclusions
A new era of human civilization is emerging with 
advancing digitalization and the associated large-scale 
changes: the Digital Age (Section 3.1), which must be 
classified and shaped – also and especially in the con-
text of climate and sustainability goals. This also 
becomes evident from the global reports and charters 
analysed (Section 3.6). The Digital Age is essentially 
marked by a digitalized technosphere (Sections 3.2, 
3.3), which is characterized by more and more intercon-
nectedness between technical systems and technically 
supported processes, further developed cognitive abili-
ties of technical systems and their growing autonomy, 
the growing virtualization of spaces and technical serv-
ices, and, as a result, by an enormous knowledge explo-
sion, the digitally supported further development of all 
scientific disciplines (Section 3.4). There, for example, 
new opportunities for participation are emerging 
through citizen science (Section 3.3.5.1) and the emerg-
ing paradigm shift towards open science ( Sections 5.3.10, 
10.2.4.1).
In view of the rapid upheavals of the Digital Age, 
however, individual autonomy faces new challenges. 
For example, the appropriate design and use of digital 
technologies is more important than ever due to their 
enormous social penetration. In this context, a basic 
understanding of their basic functions (Section 3.2), 
including the limits of predictability and modelling, is 
essential. On the one hand, only on this basis can the 
potential benefits and risks of individual technologies 
be realistically reflected and discussed in an overall 
context (Section 3.3). On the other hand, it becomes 
clear which values have been, could be and should be 
written into technology. This question is currently being 
addressed mainly in the fields of AI and automated 
decision-making (Box 3.2.5-1). Ultimately, however, 
this is of key importance for the overall orientation of 
research and development (Chapter 10), especially 
when questioning repeatedly from a broad sustainabil-
ity perspective “whether we have the technology we 
need, or whether we need the technology that we 
have” (Kornwachs, 2009: 39).
With the effects of digitalization on all areas of life, 
key formative tasks are emerging (Section 3.5) in order 
to combine digital change with the necessary Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability, i.e. the develop-
ment of welfare, security and democracy within the 
limits of the Earth system for a global population which 
will soon reach 10 billion. Even if the development of 
digital technologies progresses dynamically and cannot 
be evaluated conclusively, it is already apparent that 
the unguided further development and application of 
technologies oriented exclusively towards economic 
goals must be replaced by a technological change ori-
ented towards climate and sustainability goals – and 
the societal change necessary for this. 
In particular, the challenges of the Digital Age for the 
protection of fundamental and human rights should be 
highlighted. In the digital domain, the protected areas 
and opportunities to exercise these rights are changing 
(Chapter 4), so that new assurances and perhaps new 
frameworks are required (Chapter 8). Human dignity is 
– and will remain – the focal, unchangeable point of 
reference in this context. In this report, its inviolability 
and the resulting respect and right to protection consti-
tute explicit orientation for the sustainable shaping of 
digitalization. Closely linked to this is the need to 
ensure that the digital revolution is oriented towards 
the common good and embedded in a strategy of sus-
tainable development. This requires suitable frame-
works and demarcations (Chapter 9). Unless actively 
shaped, global digital change involves the risk of fur-

















The question arises as to who will shape the Digital Age: are the scopes of 
action available to individual groups of actors shifting? In addition to indivi-
duals, business and civil society, the WBGU focuses on tech communities. The 
WBGU identifies significant power shifts in the multi-level system of cities 
and municipalities, states, international organizations and transnational ac-
tor groups. In some cases, they lead to blockades and path dependencies, but 
they also open up new potential for sustainability transformations. 
Digitalization processes are not a force of nature; they 
are driven by different actors and their different, some-
times conflicting interests. The key questions are there-
fore not only how digitalization has an impact 
( Chapters 3, 5) and could have an impact (Chapter 6), 
but how these processes can be shaped. The main issue 
for the WBGU is to gear the technological-digital revo-
lution towards a successful Transformation towards 
Sustainability (Chapter 3). This chapter examines the 
challenges facing the shaping of transformative change 
(Section 4.1), the functions performed by the actors of 
digital change, how important they are for this trans-
formative change (Section 4.2), and what opportunities 
they could currently seize for a Transformation towards 
Sustainability (Section 4.3).
4 .1
Transformative change as a formative task 
As early as 2011, the WBGU looked into the precondi-
tions and strategies that would enable a societal reor-
ganization towards sustainability (WBGU, 2011). 
Today, the 2030 Agenda offers 17 internationally 
agreed and differentiated Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) with indicators that are continuously 
being further developed (UNGA, 2015; Box 2.1-1). The 
implementation of these goals and strategies is a polit-
ical project aiming on the one hand to overcome the 
forces of inertia behind unsustainable developments 
and trends, and on the other to enable and explicitly 
support new developments and trends towards sustain-
ability. Corresponding strategy developments are being 
driven forward at the global, national and local levels, 
with an international review process reflecting both 
successes and implementation difficulties. 
The terms ‘transformation’, ‘transforming’ and 
‘transformative’ can be found throughout the 2030 
Agenda. Transformation comprises not only the results 
to be achieved (e.g. a reduction in CO2 emissions), but 
also the fundamental (re-)configuration of processes 
and organizational patterns with which results are 
achieved (e.g. progression from a largely centralized 
supply of fossil-based energy to a flexible, decentral-
ized supply of renewable energy). Such transforma-
tions include economic, socio-cultural, political, tech-
nological and ecological aspects and are described and 
analysed in terms of their dynamic and complex inter-
action (Tanner and Bahadur, 2013). As processes, they 
cannot therefore be precisely planned or predicted. 
Nevertheless, it is analytically possible to distinguish 
between the conditions resulting in relatively slow 
adaptive societal change and the conditions of trans-
formative change, thus anticipating or supporting the 
latter (O’Brien and Sygna, 2013: 16). 
In this context, the term path dependencies aims to 
describe the overall economic, socio-cultural, political, 
technological and ecological components of current 
societal configurations when they act as forces of 
 inertia. Specifically, path dependencies will vary from 
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country to country and from village to village. Exam-
ples include established societal and political institu-
tions, market structures and actors, physical infrastruc-
tures, knowledge resources, and cultural and normative 
influences (WBGU, 2011: 394f.). Understood as 
 structures of a society, they have been created for cer-
tain goals and tasks in the context of certain circum-
stances. At the same time, they form the environment 
and reality of the actors who are socialized within them 
and make decisions about future developments. The 
term ‘path dependencies’ thus illustrates the fact that 
societal developments are triggered and driven in a cer-
tain direction (Avelino et al., 2018 ; Göpel, 2016: 4ff.).
Transformations are likely to occur when multiple 
path dependencies are simultaneously affected by 
changes. Corresponding ‘concurrences of multiple 
changes’ (Osterhammel, 2009) indicate tipping points 
or windows of opportunity for breaking path depend-
encies, thus making the reconfiguration of societal 
(sub)systems possible or even unavoidable. The follow-
ing list contains examples of key areas of societal 
change from the energy sector.
 > New knowledge and new values change the assess-
ment both of the current situation and of the scope 
of opportunities for imaginable futures; deviating 
solutions become conceivable and convincing, e.g. 
through computer simulations of climate change. 
 > Regulatory measures change conditions for individ-
ual business models, civil-society practice and tech-
nological developments, e.g. state subsidies for feed-
ing renewable energy into the electricity grid.
 > Economic processes become critical as a result of 
changes in context conditions, stimulating a search 
for alternative products or business models; e.g. 
pressure is put on energy companies whose business 
models are based on the use of fossil fuels by shifts 
in investment activities and subsidy programmes for 
renewable energy and a possible pricing of CO2 or 
fossil fuels.
 > Civil-society projects focus on alternative values, 
narratives and solutions, so that new forms of coop-
eration emerge, e.g. the anti-nuclear movement or 
citizen-energy cooperatives for renewable energy in 
Germany.
 > New technologies enable alternative products and 
production processes, new knowledge generation, 
communication and networking, e.g. photovoltaics 
or fuel cells (sector coupling) and smart grids that 
combine different renewable energy sources.
This list should not be understood hierarchically or 
sequentially; rather, it shows variants of the breaking 
up and destabilization of existing path dependencies in 
the energy sector that can lead to mutually reinforcing 
interactions. In the context of the sustainability trans-
formation, for example, questioning the status quo 
with new knowledge is highly relevant, since measure-
ment data and computer simulations make it possible to 
understand and predict the consequences of ecosystem 
overuse. In the case of digitalization, by contrast, it is 
the rapid technological development that enables new 
forms of production, consumption and communication 
and a multitude of new business models. Seen from a 
dynamic angle, a transformative breakthrough is accel-
erated when actors from different fields come to similar 
visions, goals and narratives through consensus in the 
areas of knowledge, values and interests. Technologies, 
investments and production patterns, laws and incen-
tives also become realigned, and public opinion and 
consumer decisions change accordingly (Figure 4.1-1). 
The more conscious and coordinated these many differ-
ent incremental steps are, the more radical or trans-
formative the expected change will be.
Transformative governance through new actor 
constellations
In the process of overcoming forces of inertia, actor-cen-
tred approaches to transformation research attribute a 
central function to pioneers of change (WBGU, 2011). 
From their different innovation niches, they open up 
perspectives and pathways for new thinking and 
actions, which can successively have a broad effect at 
the regime level (points marked in light blue in 
 Figure 4.1-1). From this perspective, organizations and 
institutions do not appear as monolithic units, but as 
groups of people with (to some extent) conflicting 
ideas, convictions and reservoirs of creative power 
(Köhler et al., 2019). Pioneers are those among them 
who explicitly deviate from the respective status quo, 
i.e. want to interrupt or break path dependencies. The 
direction in which they deviate is irrelevant at first. 
Normative assessments as to whether the deviations 
are positive or negative depend on the respective situ-
ation and prevailing knowledge, value systems, world 
views and societal objectives. From this strictly analyt-
ical perspective, both sustainability protagonists and 
digital disruptors, even right-wing populists, are con-
sidered pioneers – albeit in completely different direc-
tions in terms of their concrete target perspective and 
normative profile. Initiating systemic change from dif-
ferent innovation niches was and is highly relevant for 
the sustainability transformation in order to open up 
pathways for new thinking and action and have a broad 
impact successively in different areas of society 
( Figure 4.1-2). 
To further consolidate these stimuli, coalitions of 
change are of great importance. In the implementation 
of specific changes, they mobilize creative power as 
coalitions of actors across organizational boundaries 
Transformative change as a formative task   4.1
111
and sectors, e.g. resources from the private sector, 
authority from the legislative apparatus and legitimacy 
from public opinion (Then and Kehl, 2012). Promising 
actor coalitions often go against typical divisions such 
as the state versus companies or bottom-up niche activ-
ities versus top-down regulation. The interaction with 
veto players and corresponding coalitions also matters. 
Subsequently, central support processes also include 
changes in regulation and market structures. Overarch-
ing visions and new narratives frame and motivate 
transformation processes from the outset to a possible 
stabilization.
As early as 2011, the WBGU stressed the role of the 
proactive state (authority) in sustainability transforma-
tion, which at least initially protects pioneering initia-
tives competing with established market players and 
sets the main structural course (e.g. energy system 
transformation). Also, the reduction of structural 
advantages and subsidies for non-sustainable actors 
not only improves the competitive position of estab-
lished, resource- and energy-efficient companies, but 
also of the pioneers of change, thus promoting the 
redistribution of resources. As long as, for example, 
there is a financial competitive advantage in largely or 
completely ignoring environmental and social costs, 
sustainability pioneers will have a systematic disadvan-
tage and thus little chance of escaping the niche of 
environmentally conscious customers with purchasing 
power. Adjustments to the regulatory framework 
should therefore promote the systematic integration of 
all environmental and social costs into corporate and 
individual decisions. In order to ensure the legitimacy 
and acceptance of the necessary legal changes, this 
structural reorientation should be normatively sup-
ported by the inclusion of all societal groups, e.g. 
through a new societal contract (WBGU, 2011). The 
importance of societal movements and the general pub-





































World views, visions, paradigms
Ecosystems
Figure 4 .1-1
Multi-level perspective on transformation processes. Individuals (mini level), who make up every institutional structure, are the 
starting point for change. They provide ideas and action stimuli for changes at all levels. The micro or niche level is the most in-
novation-friendly level where smaller units can try out new ways, as long as the overall system creates space for pioneering ac-
tivities. The meso or regime level consists of grown structures and subsystems that change more slowly and tend to stabilize the 
status quo. The macro or landscape level delineates the background for the developments at lower-lying levels and encompasses 
comparatively long-term development paths, such as environmental conditions, fundamental infrastructural or market condi-
tions. At the meta level there are world views, visions and paradigms that mediate between the different levels. The violet ar-
rows symbolize the predominant, the light-blue arrows new ideas and action stimuli which penetrate from the individual level 
into the subsystems of the micro and macro levels. These world views, visions and paradigms form a kind of link between the 
different units of the overall system. 
Source: Göpel, 2016, modified
4 Actor Constellations in the Digital Transformation
112
 currently being demonstrated by the many ‘For Future’ 
movements in Germany and worldwide. 
To give global transformative processes normative 
orientation, the WBGU has further developed its 
actor-centred perspective on pioneers of change into a 
polycentric governance approach (‘polycentric respon-
sibility architecture’) that goes beyond vertically con-
ceived multi-level approaches (WBGU, 2016a: 384ff.). 
For successful sustainable urban development, the 
WBGU’s flagship report on urbanization (WBGU, 
2016a) proposed that not only should as many urban 
actors as possible be given more participation and 
responsibility for the sustainable transformation, but 
that cities and their networks should also be incorpo-
rated into governance processes for sustainable devel-
opment at the national and international level. With the 
help of this polycentric concept, pioneers and coalitions 
for sustainability can then be identified across different 
levels and in all societal groups, which – in a more or 
less coordinated manner – drive different innovations 
and interventions forward and thus encourage a 
‘ concurrence of multiple changes’ towards transforma-
tive change. 
4 .2
Actors in the Digital Age between power and 
impotence
In the following, the creative power of actors in the 
Digital Age will be analysed in relation to the transfor-
mation perspective introduced in Section 4.1 and to the 
process of overcoming path dependencies. In the inter-
play between an analysis of digital change ( Chapter 3) 
and sustainability challenges (Section 4.1), the aim is to 
identify on the one hand unsustainable concentrations 
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Phases and core processes of transformative change. Transformation processes can typically be represented by an S curve that 
illustrates different processes and phases of transformation. In the pre-development phase, societal development moves within 
the path dependencies. These are rarely challenged. Important processes here are pioneering activities and the emergence of 
new visions, new knowledge and new narratives. In the initial phase, the overall system picks up on new ideas and concepts. 
There is no common understanding of routes to a solution or to development pathways; strong resistance against the new solu-
tion routes is possible from established forces. Once a certain tipping point has been reached, the transformation enters the ac-
celeration phase: new solutions are recognized and penetrate into the mainstream. At the same time, a strong counter-move-
ment can occur during this phase, initiated by those who may suffer disadvantages as a result of the transformation. In the final 
phase of the transformation, it becomes apparent whether (a) a new system will become established as a result of the transfor-
mation (stabilization), (b) the only change will be innovations becoming embedded in the old system, or (c) the transformation 
will fail completely (setback). Overall societal/political formative measures and coalitions of change are necessary to facilitate 
pioneering activities in the pre-development phase and particularly during the initial and acceleration phases. 
Source: Göpel, 2016, modified
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of power and, on the other, coalitions of actors and 
windows of opportunity that are already focusing the 
possibilities of digital change on common-good- 
oriented objectives – such as the SDGs. The following 
outlines show that digital change can lead to a concen-
tration of power on a previously unimaginable scale, 
through which many innovation niches with state-like 
authority (e.g. based on control over new infrastruc-
tures), financial resources (e.g. resulting from the 
 economic potential of global network effects), and 
ostensible legitimacy (e.g. through increasingly impor-
tant decision-making processes such as multi-stake-
holder processes) can be influenced in parallel. 
This section shows how the scope for formative 
action is changing in favour or to the detriment of indi-
vidual actor groups with a view to sustainable and dig-
ital transformation (Figure 4.2-1). After looking at indi-
viduals (Section 4.2.1), companies (Section 4.2.2), civil 
society and science (Section 4.2.3), the WBGU looks at 
the tech communities (Section 4.2.4) to analyse the role 
played by this new group of actors in the Digital Age. In 
addition, the WBGU analyses constellations of actors 
that can be more closely assigned to the sovereign 
sphere like cities and municipalities (Section 4.2.5), 
states (Section 4.2.6) and international organizations 
(Section 4.2.8), and finally the transnational groups of 
actors that act independently of (and between) them 
(Section 4.2.7). 
4 .2 .1 
The ability to act and the formative capacity of 
individuals in the Digital Age
In the Digital Age, the conditions for individual auton-
omy and self-determination, as well as for individuals’ 
scope for action, are changing with the use of digital 
solutions (Section 3.5.4). For the WBGU, the questions 
that arise are where, how and by what means the 
autonomy and self-determination of individual actors 
are strengthened or weakened by digitalization pro-
cesses. Individuals take on different roles within soci-
ety: as citizens, they participate ‘offline’ and ‘online’ in 
the community and in political opinion-forming and 
decision-making processes; in economic life they par-
ticipate as consumers. In the context of digitalization, 
individuals become users of public or private digital and 
digitalized services and consumer goods and can act in 
economic life on the supply and demand sides simulta-
neously as prosumers of digital or digitally mediated 
goods. 
4.2.1.1 
Loss of sovereignty and violations of privacy as 
risks for users
The consumption and use of digital technology involves 
a wide variety of risks for individuals – ranging from 
loss of sovereignty in consumer decisions to unwanted 
disclosures of personal data that can lead to privacy 
violations. An individual’s digital sovereignty is threat-
ened if consumers are restricted in their self-determi-
nation, e.g. freedom of choice (the freedom to do or 
refrain from doing something), or if this freedom is 
completely abolished – if they become the object of 
automated decisions (SVRV, 2017). In individuals’ dig-
ital spheres of action, the world views of powerful 
actors, e.g. digital corporations, can exert influence and 
become dominant (Lenk, 2016, 2017: 28; Section 4.2.4). 
These spheres of action include social networks, search 
engines and online marketplaces whose design and 
configurations exert an influence over which data are 
transmitted, which consumption options are displayed, 
and how interactions with others take place. The rea-
sons behind concrete decisions cannot usually be traced 
or monitored, and this results in asymmetry vis-à-vis a 
small number of private companies and, in some cases, 
states (Leopoldina, 2018: 40; Section 5.3.3). The decen-
tralized situation of individuals in this context also 
means a lower degree of organization compared to the 
well-organized platform operators, who also have a 
knowledge and information advantage. 
The digital disclosure of personal information 
exposes users to the risk of privacy violation 
( Sections 2.2.3.1, 3.5.3; Leopoldina, 2018). Meta and 
content data of individuals can be merged using big-
data applications (Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3) in ways that 
allow intimate insights into an individual’s personal life. 
This significantly changes the position of individuals 
vis-à-vis those (e.g. governments and business enter-
prises) that have control over these data (Baumann, 
2015: 12). Misuse and the unwanted publication of 
personal data, e.g. in social media, can have direct neg-
ative social and/or financial consequences (e.g. bully-
ing or theft). A further risk for users is that they can be 
accused of being the ones at fault, e.g. for lack of media 
literacy. Such accusations can be associated with shame 
and deflect responsibility from providers (e.g. social 
platforms) to users.
Categories in which privacy is regulated offline, e.g. 
protection of the fundamental rights of the home, do 
not yet function in the use of digital media – e.g. 
because the necessary security mechanisms have not 
yet been comprehensively provided or are not legally 
required, or because they are too complex to use, or 
users do not understand why they are necessary. 
On the other hand, there is also potential for a Trans-
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formation towards Sustainability in networking with 
other individuals (Section 4.2.1.2). Individuals can 
appear online as important actors for change and, for 
example, mobilize support for sustainability projects in 
social media. The topic of privacy and promoting its 
potential for identity, self-determination and creativity, 
must therefore be discussed in a new and broad way in 
society (Trepte, 2016a). 
4.2.1.2 
Users and prosumers as creative enablers of 
change 
Individuals are important for the necessary transforma-
tion processes (Section 4.1), especially as pioneers and 
artists. A digital space enables individuals as well as 
groups to develop Eigenart (Section 2.2.3) by providing 
them with a stage enabling them to influence society, 
for example via social media. As prosumers, individuals 
can generate online content themselves, or (co-)design 
and mediate goods and offers. Thus, anyone can pub-
lish content independently and have a significant 
impact as a blogger or influencer, or, as a home owner, 
install solar cells on the roof and feed excess energy 
into the electricity grid. The room for manoeuvre of 
these change-makers is considerably strengthened by 
the fact that they have a variety of online resources at 
their disposal and can share them with one another, for 
example through the simple provision of instructions 
and content or the possibility of being financed by an 
online group of supporters (crowd funding).
4.2.1.3 
Citizens as digitally supported actors of change 
The classic way in which citizens can influence politics 
in democracies like Germany is through elections and 
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Change 
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Figure 4 .2-1
Key actor groups in the 
 Digital Age. The middle ver-
tical axis comprises the indi-
viduals and the classic state 
governance levels, ranging 
from municipalities to states 
to  international organiza-
tions; civil society and com-
panies are also included, as 
are the tech communities and 
transnational actors that 
transcend the classic attri-
butions to political levels. 
Pioneers of change can ap-
pear anywhere, and innova-
tive alliances can emerge.
Source: WBGU 
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the state and its administration involve citizens, 
 businesses and civil society in decision-making pro-
cesses through other participatory procedures. Digital 
participation instruments open up new, additional 
 possibilities for supporting both simple (e.g. online 
 consultations, surveys) and complex processes of dem-
ocratic participation initiated by the state. Inclusive and 
barrier-free ICT-based forms of citizen participation, 
e.g. implemented by professional mediators, a repre-
sentative selection of participants, and support in deal-
ing with digital technology, enable the state and the 
administration to identify needs, interests and concerns 
and to incorporate them into decisions. By actively 
inviting individuals to influence ongoing decision- 
making processes, governments and administrations 
provide themselves with a more complete information 
base for their decisions and make a form of public hear-
ing possible that can potentially lead to the positive 
experience that a person’s individual contributions are 
valued and valuable. This can help people accept state 
decisions. 
At the same time, such digital participation formats 
give the individuals involved access to information, as 
well as an opportunity to evaluate and monitor state 
decisions. As niche actors, citizens can also monitor the 
execution of state decisions. In this way, individuals can 
communicate grievances more easily – if necessary 
anonymously – and help to collect data (civil science, 
Section 5.3.10) and provide information. They can also 
join interest groups and organize themselves. 
Collective self-efficacy, i.e. the efficacy of individu-
als in a community (van Zomeren et al., 2010), can help 
encourage individuals to embrace these possibilities. It 
can develop when many actors network and mutually 
support each other in this way (e.g. collective action; 
Bamberg et al., 2015). The digital possibilities can lead 
to citizens not only being actively involved in shaping 
the Transformation towards Sustainability, but also in 
being able to drive it forward themselves, especially 
through extended participation opportunities.
4.2.1.4 
The risk of discrimination if citizens are excluded 
from digital technology 
In terms of the role of participating citizens, there is a 
risk of discrimination through the exclusion of people 
who do not use digital technology. Social groups and 
milieus that do not have the knowledge or skills to use 
digital technology, or have no access to digital services, 
are at risk of being marginalized to the extent of being 
refused inclusion. In order to also benefit from the 
potential of digitalization in the field of inclusion, 
measures should be taken to ensure that broad partici-
pation is achieved and that discrimination against cer-
tain people is excluded. Digital forms of participation 
(e-participation, liquid democracy, e-petitions, partici-
patory budgeting) also require resources such as relia-
ble and trustworthy digital services (Section 5.3.5) and 
know-how (Section 5.3.4). Not only a lack of digital 
skills, but also a limited availability of hardware and 
software can lead to a massive societal divide between 
poor and rich if only the wealthy can afford them. 
There is a further aspect of digital discrimination in the 
global context: the risk of a digital divide is particularly 
high in developing countries, as can be seen, for exam-
ple, in the lack of access to appropriate ICT and educa-
tion in some African countries (Section 5.3.8). 
Guaranteeing professional process control, e.g. by 
independent mediators (Horelli, 2002), the early 
involvement of the participants, transparent rules, and 
avoiding the exclusion of groups (the public) are suc-
cess factors for digital participation (that are transfera-
ble from the non-digital field). Individuals must be 
given help to prepare them to make sovereign decisions 
in everyday situations (e.g. in digitalized consumption, 
Section 5.2.3) and in transformation processes (e.g. in 
the areas of work of the future, Section 5.3.9 or the 
mobility turnaround, Section 5.2.8). 
4.2.1.5 
Interim conclusion
In order to be successful, the Transformation towards 
Sustainability must be supported and accepted by indi-
viduals (WBGU, 2011: 67). Digital change opens up 
new opportunities for individuals to participate – not 
only in the sense of being involved, but also in terms of 
information, monitoring (in the sense of traceability) 
and initiative. As pioneers of change, individuals can 
take advantage of these new opportunities and actively 
shape the Transformation towards Sustainability, for 
example through online involvement. At the same time, 
however, digitalization risks losing acceptance if indi-
viduals are instrumentalized and become mere objects 
for decision-makers over whom they have no influence. 
Privacy protection and the preservation of individual 
decision-making sovereignty are indispensable prereq-
uisites for human participation and pioneering activi-
ties.
4 .2 .2 
Enterprises between market concentration and 
competition
Interaction between companies, between companies 
and consumers in markets, and between companies and 
states can develop a high dynamic of change. The 
dynamics and broad impact of digitalization itself illus-
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trate this all too clearly (Section 3.1). The application of 
digital technologies is no longer limited to businesses in 
the technology or ICT sector, but increasingly encom-
passes businesses in all sectors of the economy (OECD, 
2019c). For example, new market structures, new busi-
ness models and new behaviour patterns are becoming 
established. From the perspective of sustainability 
transformation, this change dynamic represents both 
an opportunity and a challenge (WBGU, 2011).
4.2.2.1 
Enterprises as actors in digital change: market dis-
ruptions
The disruptive potential of digital technologies is ini-
tially based on their mostly rapid scalability using econ-
omies of scale and network effects (Box 4.2.2-1; Bryn-
jolfsson and McAfee, 2014). Another decisive factor is 
the high economic potential that lies in the considerable 
increase in information gained from comprehensive 
data collection and evaluation, as well as by improved 
networking of actors and markets. The use of this 
potential is already seen today as one, if not the deci-
sive competitive factor (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Ramge, 2017; Goldfarb et al., 2019; Wambach and 
Müller, 2018; OECD, 2019c; Niebel et al., 2019). It also 
offers external actors specializing in the economic use 
of information and networking routes into existing 
industries and market segments, especially if they 
 recognize the potential at an earlier stage. By linking 
information from other markets, they can create added 
value and perhaps make more creative decisions as a 
result. This is often not possible for incumbent compa-
nies in a certain market segment (Schweitzer et al., 
2018; Farboodi et al., 2019). 
With the help of new networks, information acquisi-
tion and new digital technologies, internal corporate 
processes can also be redesigned. This applies to 
 production and distribution as well as to company 
 decision-making processes. For example, production 
processes and logistics can be better coordinated. 
 Complex manufacturing processes, e.g. using new 
 production processes such as additive manufacturing, 
can also be automated and production tailored more 
individually to customer requirements (WEF, 2017c; 
WTO, 2018;  Section 5.2.1). 3D printing, for example, 
engenders much more decentralized and individualized 
production processes and can blur the boundaries 
between consumers and producers (Sections 3.3.5.4, 
5.2.1, 5.2.2). It is a challenge, particularly for estab-
lished companies, that networking and information 
gains affect the companies’ own organizations, i.e. the 
way in which business decisions are made and imple-
mented, even if it is not yet clear to date in which direc-
tion (Bloom et al., 2014; Brynjolfsson and McElheran, 
2016). They facilitate inner-company coordination and 
thus permit flatter hierarchies and market-like organi-
zational forms with more agile units with more deci-
sion-making responsibility. Especially when combined 
with the use of technical systems that assist decision 
making or make decisions autonomously, they can work 
towards a greater centralization of corporate manage-
ment (Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017).
But it is not only the internal use of information and 
networking to optimize internal company workflows 
and production processes that will be decisive in com-
petition. Rather, it will be of greater importance in 
almost all industries to create added value and, building 
on this, new successful business models by collecting 
and linking information or networking actors. This is 
reflected particularly clearly in the success of platforms 
and the data-based business models that underlie them 
(Levin, 2013; Einav et al., 2016; Schweitzer et al., 
2018). With the help of appropriate information sys-
tems, platforms bring together suppliers and consumers 
in a wide variety of life situations and economy sectors 
faster, more exactly and almost without geographical 
restrictions compared to ‘analogue marketplaces’. 
Information deficits and, in general, the effort required 
for search and information processes can be substan-
tially reduced for the users in this way (Goldfarb et al., 
2019). The success of platforms can also be explained 
by the fact that, for example, rating options by users or 
fundamental guarantees from operators build trust and 
thus often remove prohibitively large obstacles in the 
interaction of completely anonymous actors in the ana-
logue world (Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017; 
Peitz and Schwalbe, 2016; OECD, 2019c). As market 
intermediaries, on the other hand, platform operators 
obtain particularly detailed information on the rela-
tionships and profiles of users who are active on their 
platforms. 
Operators often use this particular wealth and depth 
of information according to data-based business models 
(Kretschmer et al., 2018): the digital services and access 
to the platform itself appear to be made available to the 
users free of charge. However, these offers are financed 
by the site’s further use of the data generated by the 
use of the platform and services, e.g. for advertising or 
to develop more pay-services in other markets. The 
(ostensibly) free access to the platform and the digital 
services boosts their dissemination. However, such 
offers below production costs, and ‘cross-subsidization’ 
by other customer groups of the operating company, 
are generally typical of such bilateral or multilateral 
markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009; 
Box 4.2.2-1). 
Platform-based business models have contributed to 
the rapid spread and establishment of search engines, 
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messenger services and map services as natural com-
panions of many people’s everyday lives. One example 
of the disruptive effect of platforms and new digital 
business models is the radical changes in the media and 
music industry and in retailing that were associated 
with the rise of streaming services and e-commerce or 
online marketplaces following the market entry of com-
panies like Apple or Amazon (Waldfogel, 2017; Gilbert, 
2015; WTO, 2018). As a result of data-based services 
and platforms, similar radical changes in business 
models are expected – or already partly visible today 
– in many other industries. Data-based services such as 
special maintenance services are becoming increasingly 
important, e.g. as a competitive factor for the sale of 
plant and machinery, and extend traditional suppli-
er-customer relationships beyond mere sales (WEF, 
2017c). The spread and acceptance of sharing the use 
of such durable goods as vehicles (sharing economy) is 
also essentially based on the coordination of different 
users and on building a reputation via ratings on plat-
forms (Peitz and Schwalbe, 2016; Horton and Zeck-
hauser, 2016; Einav et al., 2016). In this context, the 
users’ focus is shifting away from buying goods towards 
the services that are available with the help of these 
goods: in the transport sector, for example, mobility is 
becoming more important than owning a vehicle. This 
has serious consequences for the business models of 
vehicle manufacturers, who e.g. must develop into 
mobility providers if they want to avoid missing out on 
part of the economic potential of the future mobility 
market (Section 5.2.8). Similar disruptive changes 
caused by platforms and digital and digitalized services 
are also emerging in the banking, insurance and energy 
sectors (Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017; OECD, 
2018a; Doleski, 2017; Box 5.2-1; Section 5.2.6).
4.2.2.2 
Companies as digital pioneers of sustainable 
change?
The decisive question when bringing digital change and 
sustainability transformation together is the direction 
in which the above-described disruptive potential of 
digitalization will affect the economic level in general 
and businesses in particular. Will breaking up market 
structures and business models lead to a change towards 
sustainability, or will the new business models, too, not 
follow sustainable development paths? The answer is at 
least ambivalent.
There is no doubt that the described changes at the 
economic level offer great potential for more sustain-
able development paths. The reorganization of 
inner-company workflows and transport routes and the 
automation of production processes offer potential for 
considerably increasing the resource efficiency of pro-
duction (UNCTAD, 2018). Together with the greater 
transparency of production processes and materials, 
Box 4 .2 .2-1
Economies of scale and network effects 
The rapid scalability of digital services, often referred to as 
positive economies of scale, derives from the cost structure of 
intangible, digital and digitalized goods and services: invest-
ment costs are usually offset by low to negligible costs of re-
producing or expanding the product range (Levin, 2013). In 
most cases, purely digital or digitalized goods and services can 
be scaled up very quickly, i.e. unless there are restrictions on 
hardware and infrastructure requirements. At the same time, 
the increasing size of a supplier results in considerable poten-
tial for reducing the costs of producing a single unit of a good 
or service. In the field of classic network industries like the 
energy grid or rail network, these advantages have the effect 
that only a private provider prevails in the longer term. Nat-
ural monopolies (Wambach and Müller, 2018) develop. 
Economies of scale also play a role in data-based business 
models, i.e. the widespread barter transactions where services 
are exchanged for data. More comprehensive data sets prom-
ise additional information gains. However, saturation effects 
can also occur with data, so that the increase in value and 
information from additional data as data volumes rise is 
(greatly) reduced once a certain minimum volume is exceeded 
(Varian, 2018). On the other hand, the diversity of the data 
collected on an actor or an area is of great importance, since 
additional knowledge can be gained from linking them 
( economies of scope; Duch-Brown et al., 2017). Correspond-
ingly big incentives exist for companies to cover different 
areas of the economy and/or life with their digital and digi-
talized offers and to combine different offers (Dewenter and 
Lüth, 2018; Bourreau et al., 2017: 33).
When it comes to network effects, a fundamental distinc-
tion must be made between direct and indirect network ef-
fects (Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014). Ultimately, network 
effects again form the basis of economies of scale that can 
favour large actors over small ones and established actors over 
new ones. Direct network effects describe the rising value of 
a good or service as the number of users (on the same side of 
the market) increases. For example, a service for composing 
and sending messages becomes more attractive the more us-
ers are able to receive them. Indirect network effects, on the 
other hand, describe increases in value for individual users 
resulting from growth on the other side of the market. Indi-
rect network effects are characterized by so-called bilateral 
markets, i.e. markets where one supplier or intermediary 
serves two or more different – but interdependent – groups 
of players (Rysman, 2009; Schweitzer et al., 2018). Concrete 
examples in connection with digitalization include in particu-
lar digital platforms, the success of which is linked to the 
 effects of indirect network effects: the attractiveness of sales 
platforms, for example, increases for suppliers as more and 
more people make purchases on the platform and vice versa.
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there are also far-reaching possibilities for closing 
material cycles (WEF, 2019; Section 5.2.1). The same 
applies to approaches based on the sharing economy, 
which in principle can reduce resource requirements by 
intensifying the utilization of goods (Sections 5.2.2, 
5.2.3). New opportunities for the shared use of capi-
tal-intensive assets, such as servers in cloud computing, 
also facilitate access to new markets and technologies 
for businesses in developing countries (World Bank, 
2016).
Sustainability pioneers on the corporate side can 
also benefit from the general increase in market trans-
parency. Diversity and availability of information, as 
well as direct interactions with interested parties even 
over long distances, allow a greater differentiation of 
goods and services – also along sustainability criteria. 
Since the scope and visibility of such offerings also 
increases, groups with special interests or preferences 
in sustainable development can be targeted, for exam-
ple through more extensive sustainability reporting or 
certification. At the same time, the increasing availabil-
ity and diversity of information can in principle help 
make private actors more aware of the sustainability 
impacts of their actions and enable them to make better 
informed decisions in this respect (Section 5.2.3). Deci-
sion-assisting technical systems can prevent actors 
being overtaxed by the diversity of digital information 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017; Stiglitz, 
2017b). 
From the point of view of sustainability, there is thus 
every hope that the compatibility of entrepreneurial 
action with sustainability goals will increasingly 
develop from a niche into a competitive criterion. How-
ever, all these positive aspects must not hide the fact 
that the basic objectives of entrepreneurial activity are 
not changed by digitalization. Businesses in the digital 
economy also primarily follow business interests and 
develop goods and services with the aim of serving the 
interests of consumers or arousing their needs, ulti-
mately generating income and profits. The new actor 
constellations on markets and platforms, or the organi-
zational changes at company level, are no guarantee 
that more account will be taken of sustainability goals 
in decisions than has been the case up to now. Reflect-
ing resource use in the prices for goods and services can 
support the necessary change (Section 5.2.2).
Decisions on the automation or re-shoring of pro-
duction processes, i.e. the relocation of production 
stages back to industrialized countries, ultimately fol-
low long-known rationalization strategies, without 
companies always taking the overall societal value of 
gainful employment or development-policy dimensions 
fully into account (Sections 5.3.8, 5.3.9). The same 
applies to more resource-efficient, digitally supported 
manufacturing processes (Section 5.2.1), the deploy-
ment of which depends on the business’s profit pros-
pects: for example whether they offer cost advantages 
or serve certain demand groups that have a corres-
ponding willingness to pay. Not least, the current suc-
cess of some asset-sharing platforms and approaches is 
also based on the fact that existing, cost-driving regu-
lations, particularly in the form of labour or safety 
standards, do not adequately cover these business con-
cepts. This can be seen, for example, in the different 
conditions imposed on digitally mediated driving serv-
ices compared to taxis, or on privately rented apart-
ments compared to hotels (Eichhorst and Spermann, 
2016; Peitz and Schwalbe, 2016). 
According to current knowledge, it is completely 
open how autonomously acting or assisting deci-
sion-making systems will affect the way sustainability 
goals are taken into account in corporate decisions. The 
use of self-learning systems in entrepreneurial deci-
sion-making can lead to a perpetuation of known 
behaviour patterns, as they draw conclusions from past 
data (Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017). However, 
some of these systems reveal completely new interrela-
tionships that are not discernible to humans and could, 
in principle, also serve to reconcile economic interests 
with sustainability goals. The reorganization of busi-
nesses offers more concrete opportunities, especially 
with regard to the development dimensions of inclusion 
and Eigenart. Flatter hierarchies and re-organization 
into independent, more responsible groups can pro-
mote employees’ creativity and sense of self-efficacy 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017). As the net-
working and coordination of process steps become eas-
ier, spaces are also created for further-reaching, alter-
native corporate forms based on collaboration and 
interaction between users or consumers, or in the form 
of a revitalization of cooperative corporate forms, 
which can also strengthen the economic participation 
of employees (Peitz and Schwalbe, 2016; Section 5.2.2).
4.2.2.3 
Challenges: new path dependencies and the 
 societal power of businesses to shape the future
On the one hand, the disruptive economic effects of 
digital technologies and the business models based on 
them as described above promote greater decentraliza-
tion and competition through greater market transpar-
ency and consumer sovereignty, through lower coordi-
nation and transaction costs (even over long distances), 
and thus generally by dismantling market-access barri-
ers and frictions in market mechanisms (Goldfarb et al., 
2019; Jerbashian and Kochanova, 2017). On the other 
hand, the key drivers of the disruptive effect, the cost 
structures of digital solutions and their business models, 
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the economic potential of networking and information, 
also strong drivers of increasing market concentration.
For some time, several indicators, such as rising price 
markups and profits, have indicated increasing market 
concentrations, not for all countries but globally (De 
Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). Although their causes 
have not been unequivocally identified, these develop-
ments are already being explained today by the increas-
ing importance of intangible assets and the effects of 
ever stronger economies of scale and networks 
(Box 4.2.2-1; Díez et al., 2018; Bessen, 2017; Guellec 
and Paunov, 2017). 
Due to the growing importance of intangible assets 
and the effects of economies of scale and networks, 
competition in an increasingly digitalized economy is 
developing a ‘winner-takes-all’ character (Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2013; Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014; 
Box 4.2.2-1): businesses compete not so much for indi-
vidual users, i.e. within a market, but for entire markets 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Bourreau et al., 2017; 
Van Reenen, 2018). This, too, is reflected in the disrup-
tive effect on markets and business models, especially 
in the fact that even businesses from completely differ-
ent industries can dominate markets in a comparatively 
short time (Farboodi et al., 2019). However, there are 
increasing fears that this (innovation-driven) competi-
tion for markets will become less intense and that the 
pro-competitive effects of digitalization will increas-
ingly recede into the background. The main reason for 
these fears is the increasing economic importance of 
data for innovative services and business models and, 
above all, for the (further) development of digital tech-
nologies themselves, especially for big-data applica-
tions and AI systems (Dewenter and Lüth, 2016; 
 Kretschmer et al., 2018; Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3). Busi-
nesses that, for example, have been able to secure (de 
facto) access to data via once-successful data-generat-
ing services threaten to continuously win the competi-
tion for ‘their’ markets in view of these data-driven 
indirect network or feed-back effects (Prüfer and 
Schottmüller, 2017; Graef and Prüfer, 2018; 
 Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017). The penetra-
tion of big-data evaluations into the financing sector 
can also contribute to the dominance of established 
businesses if they obtain more favourable financing 
conditions thanks to the availability of broader data 
sets (Begenau et al., 2018).
Already today, individual businesses and especially 
the so-called Big Five (also known as ‘GAFAM’ – Google/
Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, Amazon,  Microsoft) have 
achieved considerable size and high  capital-market 
 valuations in a very short time using digital technologies 
and business concepts ( Section 3.1.3). While Exxon 
Mobile, a fossil-resource company, topped the list of the 
world’s ten most valuable companies in 2009, that list 
has changed dramatically since then: today, the top posi-
tions are dominated by representatives of the technology 
sector, partly by companies that were not even among 
the world’s 100 most valuable companies in 2009 (OECD, 
2019c; PWC, 2018; Table 3.1.3-1). This again illustrates 
the high dynamics and broad impact of digital change. 
Although the high market valuations of these companies 
do not supply any direct information about their actual 
power to shape developments, they do reflect profit 
expectations which are ultimately only justified if the 
companies can maintain or even expand their current 
market positions, which are already dominant in indi-
vidual segments (Wambach and Müller, 2018: 39; Shap-
iro, 2018). It can also be observed that established busi-
nesses are buying up potential competitors in a targeted 
manner and at an increasingly early stage, even before 
innovation-driven competition for markets has been able 
to develop. The strategy of young entrepreneurs them-
selves is also increasingly geared to such acquisitions 
(Wambach and Müller, 2018). 
At least in part, these concentration processes have 
been favoured by the fact that competition-law pro-
ceedings have so far often only inadequately done jus-
tice to the special economic structures in digital markets 
and data-based business models (Nyeso and Capobi-
anco, 2017). The competition-law problems involved in 
dealing with the new actors in the digital economy and 
new business models in the digital space relate to both 
the appropriate demarcation of the relevant market and 
the identification of a dominant position about which 
high price markups on the (marginal) costs or high mar-
ket shares have only limited informative value. Among 
other things, they are based on often unclear and in 
some cases asymmetrical substitution relationships 
between different digital offerings, the bundling of dif-
ferent services, the existence of network effects, or 
often lacking market prices (Bertschek et al., 2016; 
Krämer and Wohlfarth, 2018). There is also discussion 
on deficits in merger control, which has not effectively 
limited the targeted acquisition of young, potential 
competitors (Schweitzer et al., 2018).
Changes in companies’ power to shape 
development and societal challenges
The extent to which this increasing concentration has 
an impact on the innovative strength of businesses is at 
least controversial (Autor et al., 2017a; Bessen, 2017; 
Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2019) in view of the research 
and development activities of the main current repre-
sentatives of the digital economy and the described 
advantages of information links in innovation processes 
– by contrast to the classical idea of not-so-dynamic 
monopolies. On the other hand, it is largely undisputed 
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that increasing market concentration and the resulting 
information advantage for individual companies have a 
distributional effect. For example, the decline in the 
percentage contribution of employees’ remuneration to 
overall value creation in the economy – which has long 
been observed in many countries – is linked to the 
increase in market concentration, the shift from value 
creation to intangible, digital assets, and the rise of 
‘superstar companies’ such as the Big Five (Autor et al., 
2017b; Autor et al., 2017a; Guellec and Paunov, 2017; 
 Section 5.3.9). Moreover, with the help of digital tech-
nologies and their information advantage over other 
actors, powerful companies can determine individual 
preferences more precisely and skim off individual will-
ingness-to-pay with the help of decision-assisting sys-
tems or correspondingly differentiated pricing (Stiglitz, 
2017; Kretschmer et al., 2018; Goldfarb et al., 2019; 
Wambach and Müller, 2018).
Furthermore, it is precisely the success of their 
applications and services across the broad spectrum of 
society that gives companies, their behaviour and their 
values in technology shaping ever greater societal rele-
vance, and this engenders challenges to the market 
power of individual companies that go beyond the 
purely economic level. The digital technologies and 
applications essentially created by companies, such as 
internet search engines, communication services or 
social platforms, have in the meantime become ubiqui-
tous and thus taken for granted components of private, 
business and political life in many countries and bear 
the characteristics of goods (and infrastructures) meet-
ing basic human needs (Section 5.3.5). They represent 
key sources of information, offer at least ostensibly 
objective help with e.g. (consumer) decisions in the pri-
vate and public spheres, and create new spaces for 
social and political interaction.
This special scope gives the key providers of digital 
solutions, infrastructures and services an information 
advantage over other actors – individuals, competing 
companies and government institutions – as well as 
influence on core societal areas. This concerns ques-
tions of data and privacy protection (Section 4.2.1; 
Acquisti et al., 2016), as well as questions of deci-
sion-making sovereignty at the individual and societal 
level (Box 4.3.3-1). At the same time, it remains largely 
non-transparent which data and information are (fur-
ther) processed, which criteria the processes of redact-
ing and designing data and information flows are based 
on, how decisions are supported, and whether societal 
principles such as freedom from discrimination are 
respected (GCIG, 2016; Kretschmer et al., 2018). 
Threats to individual and societal decision-making sov-
ereignty can thus emanate from the providers of the 
services and technologies themselves and be very sub-
tle in view of their information advantage. Today, how-
ever, more concrete threats are mainly characterized by 
the fact that individual companies have created digital 
spaces and platforms which, due to their reach (but also 
their great lack of transparency), open up opportunities 
for third parties to exert influence on information flows 
and shape opinions. This applies, for example, to the 
manipulation of political disputes in election campaigns 
( Section 5.3.2) or targeted disinformation and damage 
to reputations (Section 4.2.6; Box 4.2.6-1).
There is currently a lack of regulation and control of 
companies by democratically legitimated state authori-
ties commensurate with the societal importance of dig-
ital technologies, infrastructures and services. This may 
be due to a lack of political awareness or will. Many 
digital services and networks deliberately or uncon-
sciously elude existing national regulation 
( Section 4.2.6). On the one hand, digital services and 
networks in general operate internationally and are 
therefore difficult to regulate and control nationally. On 
the other hand, the decreasing importance of physical 
presence for entrepreneurial activities in the digital 
space increases the bargaining power of companies vis-
à-vis regulatory state authorities. It allows companies 
to deliberately evade regulatory intervention – for 
example in the enforcement of social standards on 
labour markets (Section 5.3.9) or the taxation of profits 
(Box 4.2.2-2) – by relocating to a different country. The 
intensified internationalization of entrepreneurial 
activities already gives greater credibility to the mere 
threat of emigrating, making it possible to exert influ-
ence on the political process. 
Too great an information advantage for individual 
companies, combined with the societal significance of 
their offerings and services, is neither compatible with 
the free interaction of supply and demand on markets 
nor with the principles of democratic societies and the 
framework-setting role of the state (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Ramge, 2017). In addition to the distribution impli-
cations and the dangers to privacy and the public sphere, 
as well as to individual and societal decision-making, 
the strong concentration of information control among 
individual providers must also be viewed critically for 
systemic reasons. Although some former restrictions on 
the collection and processing of information streams 
have ceased to exist through digital networking and data 
processing, nevertheless, the danger of wrong decisions 
and self-reinforcing dynamics decreases if the available 
information is always evaluated by several independent 
decision-making actors or technical systems (May-
er-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017) – an aspect of com-
petition between decisions and decentralized informa-
tion processing that also characterizes the discussion 
about the susceptibility to crises or resilience of financial 
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markets that are already dependent on algorithm-based 
systems (Kirilenko and Lo, 2013).
4.2.2.4  
Interim conclusion
Digital technical progress and the associated societal 
and economic changes do not guarantee that economic 
structures, behaviour patterns and path dependencies 
are always changed and broken up in a way that fur-
thers sustainable development. Despite exceptions, the 
positive sustainability effects that digitalization has 
today are often ‘by-products’, e.g. more efficiently 
designed goods production or falling access barriers to 
markets or education. In addition, there is a certain dis-
crepancy between many actors’ claims to be creating 
something disruptive and their tendency to refuse to 
take responsibility for the societal effects of these inno-
vations. 
In the Digital Age in particular, it is therefore neces-
sary to lay down appropriate framework conditions for 
economic activity that are geared to the sustainability 
goals: “A sharing economy is not a substitute for envi-
ronmental policy, but makes it more necessary than 
ever if sustainable economic activity is to remain an 
economic-policy objective” (Eichhorst and Spermann, 
2016). Ultimately, this is the only way to reliably rec-
oncile the interests of private-sector actors with the 
challenges and goals of sustainable development, and 
thus to prevent the emergence of new, unsustainable 
development paths with new path dependencies that 
are difficult to correct. In this context, full use should 
be made of the new possibilities for monitoring, infor-
mation provision and regulation that result from digital 
technologies and data availability. 
Regulation and framework conditions are also neces-
sary to counter the processes and drivers of concentra-
tion and to limit the excessive formative societal power 
of individual companies. The key starting point lies in 
the need to maintain or strengthen competition that 
really functions. This requires frameworks of effective 
competition policy, but may also require more funda-
mental (structural) changes in market conditions in the 
Digital Age. As the boundaries between the private and 
economic spheres become increasingly blurred in the 
course of digitalization, e.g. in the context of the shar-
ing economy, the limits of the market and competition 
as control mechanisms must also be renegotiated. Oth-
erwise, there is a danger that private-sector actors will 
introduce markets as steering mechanisms in areas of 
life that should definitely not – for societal reasons – be 
controlled by private-sector interests and individual 
(economic) performance (e.g. in the insurance industry 
or the health system, Section 5.3.7).
With corporate actors becoming increasingly inter-
national and powerful, however, the need to regulate 
and monitor the framework conditions poses challenges 
that threaten to overtax nation-state actors. Without 
enhanced international cooperation, many of their 
 initiatives and efforts are likely to remain ineffective.
4 .2 .3 
Civil society between emancipation and paralysis 
In its great heterogeneity, civil society is a pluralistic 
societal area made up of voluntary associations, located 
between the private sphere on the one hand and state 
institutions and private-sector organizations on the 
other (Keane and Merkel, 2015). One of its core func-
tions is to identify, process and communicate societal 
problems in the pre-institutional sector. It is thus firstly 
a bridge, gateway and amplifier between broad society 
(as an association of many private individuals) on the 
one hand and the political and institutional core area 
(e.g. parliament and government) on the other (Haber-
mas, 1992). Civil-society initiatives, movements and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) organize, 
bundle and represent certain interests, become active 
themselves and besiege the political system with their 
messages. The individual civil-society actors are pro-
tected by fundamental rights such as freedom of con-
science, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly 
and association, but also by freedom of the press, free-
dom of the arts and freedom of research and teaching. 
Secondly, civil society itself creates a plural public 
sphere in which even marginalized or hardly institu-
tionalized interest groups and issues are given a public 
place to present themselves and negotiate. 
4.2.3.1 
Civil-society commitment to sustainability
In the field of environmental, climate and sustainability 
policy, the pioneering and driving force of civil-society 
actors is historically and currently extremely relevant 
worldwide. In Germany, the environmental and anti-nu-
clear-power movement was an important nucleus for 
ideas, demands and developments that had long been 
marginalized in society, but which today have become a 
societal, political and legal reality in many areas. Today, 
NGOs play many important roles in national and global 
climate policy: from agenda setting, providing know-
ledge and pioneering innovation, to campaigning, edu-
cation and public relations work, to critically monitoring 
the implementation of climate policy (WBGU, 2011: 260). 
The power of civil-society engagement is also evident 
beyond the established NGO structures , for example in 
the recent protests by schoolchildren in the Fridays for 
Future movement. The fact that civil-society involve-
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Box 4 .2 .2-2
Taxation of corporate profits and reform options
The state requires stable financial room for manoeuvre in or-
der to shape the transformation of the Digital Age into a sus-
tainable Digital Age, as well as for new state tasks, e.g. with 
regard to public-service ICT and digital commons 
( Sections 5.3.5, 5.3.10). However, today’s tax and contribu-
tion systems are likely to become less and less able to provide 
this: contributions to public financing from taxes on (paid) 
work are likely to fall in the long term (Section 5.3.9). At the 
same time, the digitally supported internationalization and 
virtualization of entrepreneurial activities are creating con-
siderable challenges for the taxation of corporate profits. 
Many people today complain that digital and non-digital 
business activities are subject to unequal tax burdens, and 
that there is a growing divergence between a country’s possi-
bilities to tax a company and the scale of that company’s ac-
tivities in that country. This perception of fiscal injustice is 
also reflected by current initiatives by the European Commis-
sion (European Commission, 2018e) to reduce tax inequality. 
However, this discussion does not always make sufficiently 
clear distinctions between unjustified preference given to 
digital business models and justifiable differences and the 
general problems of international tax competition. Some of 
the cited differences in the tax burden between digital and 
non-digital business models are due, for example, to deliber-
ate tax incentives for research and development expenditure 
and the relatively high research intensity of companies in the 
digital economy, or to depreciation rules that are deliberately 
more favourable for short-lived intangible capital goods 
(Fuest et al., 2018).
Challenges like international tax competition and tax 
avoidance by international corporations have not just arisen 
recently in the course of digitalization, but they are intensify-
ing. In contrast to public perception, the reason for these 
problems lies not so much in the power of individual compa-
nies in the digital economy as generally in the principles of 
corporate taxation and the growing importance of data, in-
tangible, digital and digitalized assets, and business models 
based on them. Today, internationally active companies are 
taxed according to the source-state principle: corporate prof-
its are to be taxed where they are generated. Since it has al-
ready been impossible hitherto to determine this location 
precisely, e.g. due to synergy effects within companies, tax 
law approaches the problem by looking at a company’s phys-
ical presence in the form of its business establishments (‘nex-
us’), e.g. its production sites or sales outlets. Profits are allo-
cated to an establishment using internal transfer prices, 
according to which services between establishments are in-
voiced according to the ‘arm’s length principle’: transfer prices 
may not be set higher than if the service provided by the es-
tablishment had been provided externally.
The growing economic importance of intangible assets and 
input factors, such as data, is driving internationalization and 
mobility, i.e. the ability to relocate entrepreneurial activities 
(Devereux and Vella, 2017). The connection between physical 
presence and the place where corporate profits are generated 
and value created is thus becoming ever weaker. This is partly 
caused by possible – but hitherto quite difficult to define – 
contributions to value creation that can be traced back to the 
users of digital services or to network effects (OECD, 2015a). 
At the same time, the new intangible components of the value 
chains raise valuation issues. For example, the value of data, 
software or the digital infrastructures used is fundamentally 
difficult to quantify. Attempts to determine internal transfer 
prices on the basis of the arm’s length principle often already 
fail because of the need for a suitable basis for comparison 
outside the company (Becker and Englisch, 2017b), so that 
individual case assessments become necessary that give com-
panies greater scope for tax structuring. 
Possible reform steps are currently being intensively dis-
cussed at different levels. Proposals specifically designed to 
tackle the challenges posed by digitalization range from spe-
cial regulations to targeted reforms of individual elements of 
the existing principles of company taxation – to changes in 
these basic principles themselves. It is widely recognized that 
an internationally harmonized approach should be sought 
here. At the OECD level, the BEPS (base erosion and profit 
shifting) project has already launched a corresponding pro-
cess to curb international tax competition, but this has not yet 
led to a solution to the taxation challenges posed by digitali-
zation (OECD, 2015a,b). 
In view of these difficult international processes, the Eu-
ropean Commission has proposed, as a transitional solution, a 
separate digital tax (European Commission, 2018a), which, 
instead of taxing profits of companies in the digital economy, 
would tax the transactions above certain global and EU-wide 
revenue thresholds, irrespective of their physical presence. 
Although the motivation behind the proposal is understand-
able, the WBGU shares the critical attitude of several observ-
ers towards such special provisions for companies in the dig-
ital economy (OECD, 2015a; Devereux and Vella, 2017; 
Wambach and Müller, 2018; Fuest, 2018; Wissenschaftlicher 
Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2019). Given 
the widespread impact of digitalization, the distinction be-
tween the digital and non-digital economies is arbitrary and 
becomes increasingly unclear over time. Moreover, such an 
unequal treatment of digital and non-digital business models, 
unlike tax incentives for R&D, is hardly economically 
justifiable.
A much more effective approach, by contrast, might be a 
further development of international tax rules as a whole in 
order to adjust the international allocation of tax-access 
rights and reduce the possibilities of profit transfer. To do jus-
tice to the declining importance of physical presence for value 
creation, there is also a discussion on further developing the 
concept of the establishment into a ‘digital establishment’ or, 
as proposed by the European Commission, basing taxation on 
the establishment of a “significant digital presence” ( European 
Commission, 2018f). In addition to risks like over-complicat-
ing the tax system, as well as new questions – such as wheth-
er individual, data-transmitting vehicles should be seen as 
taxable establishments (Fuest, 2018) – a further challenge is 
to continue focusing on concrete local value creation and dis-
tinguishing the transactions of digital establishments from 
those of simply importing goods and services. Location-spe-
cific input factors, e.g. data collection or the provision of 
services, for instance in the form of individualized advertis-
ing, are seen as starting points (Becker and Englisch, 2017b), 
whereas transactions and user or contract figures, as men-
tioned in the proposal of the European Commission, are 
viewed critically (Fuest, 2018). Furthermore, the definition 
of digital establishments is unlikely to have much effect with-
out a reform of the rules on internal transfer pricing (Olbert 
and Spengel, 2017).
An international agreement on minimum tax rates at the 
EU, G20 or OECD level – including a right to subsequent tax-
ation in the sales market if these minimum tax rates are not 
complied with – is also compatible with the current tax  system 
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ment is often not conflict-free and in confrontation with 
state or private-sector actors can be seen all over the 
world (e.g. HRW, 2018). All too many activists for citi-
zens’ and human rights, freedom of the press and opin-
ion, against land seizure, environmental destruction and 
resource exploitation are exposed to massive repression 
and state and private violence under the conditions of 
weak, corrupt or authoritarian statehood (Global Wit-
ness, 2017). Nevertheless, it is precisely the diverse, 
decentralized civil-society movements which, with their 
commitment, address the most explosive ecological and 
social problems, the disclosure of which is often not in 
the interests of either the  private sector or the state. 
4.2.3.2 
Digitalization and civil-society action and 
 organization
For civil-society organizations, digitalization means, 
above all, broadening their scope for campaigning and 
action by using ICT, incorporating digital themes and 
interactions into their work, and transferring and digi-
tally developing their own practices (Züger et al., 
2017: 267). External communication, mobilization and 
campaigning work, as well as member recruitment, are 
increasingly – or even exclusively – taking place 
 digitally. Whether digitalization as a complex and highly 
stratified socio-technical process has an overwhelm-
and is being introduced into the OECD processes, for example 
by the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF, 2019). However, for 
minimum tax rates to be effective in curbing tax competition, 
an additional agreement on the assessment base would have 
to be reached, a narrow definition of which could otherwise 
undermine minimum rates – although these minimum rates 
would not directly counter the criticized deficits in tax justice 
caused by the divergence between the location of transac-
tions and the location of taxation (Becker and Englisch, 
2018).
If the possibility of back tax being paid subsequently in 
the sales market (if a company’s minimum taxation rate is un-
dercut in the country of its registered office; (Becker and Eng-
lisch, 2018) is included in the considerations for a minimum 
taxation concept, then this concept also contains elements of 
a more far-reaching proposal. Under this idea – in view of the 
problems with the proper allocation of contributions to value 
creation and the high international mobility of entrepreneur-
ial activities in the digital field – there would be a stronger 
general focus on the location of transactions. A moderate step 
in this direction could also be e.g. to make the exchange of 
digital services for data taxable under VAT law. Compared to 
the taxation of data flows, this can be justified insofar as it 
puts such transactions on an equal footing with conventional 
business relationships. However, it does not solve the prob-
lem of the valuation of the underlying data (Fuest, 2018). 
The proposal of a ‘destination-based cash flow tax’ (Auer-
bach et al., 2017; Auerbach and Devereux, 2018) pursues the 
idea of a complete switch to the location of transactions. In-
stead of taxing the profits of multinational companies, this 
concept targets their transactions at the location of the end 
consumer. A company’s export transactions are exempt from 
taxation in its home country, i.e. at the place of manufacture. 
At the same time, when domestic transactions are taxed, the 
costs of total production, i.e. including production costs for 
export, are tax deductible. Conversely, imports to end con-
sumers, but not imports of intermediate products to domestic 
companies, are fully taxed domestically. If implemented glob-
ally, this switch to the country-of-destination principle, in-
cluding border tax compensation, would mean that key 
tax-avoidance strategies, e.g. relocating patents and other 
intangible assets, even entire establishments, to low-tax 
countries, would become completely ineffective. If intro-
duced unilaterally, the forces of tax competition would con-
tinue to work, but mainly in favour of the countries imple-
menting this reform (Auerbach et al., 2017). A switch to the 
country-of-destination principle goes far beyond the reform 
steps currently being discussed at the EU and OECD level and 
raises numerous unanswered, detailed questions, for example 
with regard to administrative aspects (Auerbach et al., 2017) 
or to compatibility with WTO rules in the case of unilateral 
introduction (Becker and Englisch, 2017a). In some cases, 
far-reaching macroeconomic implications are also expected 
from the adjustment of international economic structures, as 
countries with export surpluses would be threatened with a 
reduction in their tax base (Becker and Englisch, 2017a). Par-
ticularly with regard to developing countries, special provi-
sions would have to be made for taxing profits from the ex-
traction and sale of natural resources. To this end, the 
source-state principle could simply be retained, since resource 
deposits already constitute a tax base that can hardly be relo-
cated internationally (Auerbach et al., 2017).
New regulations for international corporate taxation are 
unavoidable to ensure that companies continue to make an 
appropriate contribution to financing states and communities 
in the future. However, corporate taxation is not an all-pur-
pose remedy. The challenges posed by the concentration of 
power, possible violations of privacy or the environmental 
impact of entrepreneurial activities, for example, can only be 
inadequately met by taxing corporate profits. A better ap-
proach is to use more targeted instruments such as further 
developed competition law or effective data-protection regu-
lations. In the WBGU’s view, the consistent and, wherever 
possible, international taxation of emissions and other un-
documented (external) effects of private business activities, 
should be used to address adverse environmental impacts 
(Section 9.2.3.2), using all digital monitoring options availa-
ble (Section 3.3.5.1). Additional inclusion in the taxation of 
company profits would then lead to unjustified double taxa-
tion. Not least against this background, the WBGU takes a 
critical view of the proposal to tax data traffic, which is sug-
gested for the tax assessment of companies in the digital 
economy, but also to strengthen data protection or reduce 
energy consumption from data flows. Sheer quantities of da-
ta, especially without context, do not provide any informa-
tion about their value, or about any company profits. In ad-
dition, a flat-rate burden on data traffic contradicts the 
sustainability promises of digitalization, which are largely 
based on the collection, exchange and processing of data. 
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ingly positive effect here on civil society’s ability to act 
is a controversial question. It is true that the basic char-
acteristics of networked communication – especially 
overcoming the one-way communication of previous 
mass media with mutual communication possibilities 
and universal access to information and processes – 
itself makes essential civic engagement and its develop-
ment possible (Winkel, 2015: 412). However, the early 
euphoria about the worldwide liberal-emancipatory 
opportunities of the internet, freedom from hierarchies 
and elites, and digitally organized protest and resist-
ance has given way today to sober realism in the face of 
the “hypercommercialization of the net and [...] the dis-
covery of extensive surveillance practices” (Thiel, 
2014a: 459; Section 3.1.2.2). In principle, the use of 
ICT enables the participation of a large number of citi-
zens. The internet and social media at least potentially 
allow decentralization and global public mutual com-
munication on an unprecedented scale. The visibility 
and networking of interests and protest is no longer 
necessarily dependent on reputation and resources, 
which previously could often only be provided by 
established civil-society organizations (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013). At the 
same time, fragmentation and polyphony can result in 
a loss of significance or polarization – i.e. and conse-
quently also a loss for public discourse and civil-society 
interest organizations (Section 5.3.2). Here, the clear 
advantages of professional support, timely consolida-
tion and the organization of civil-society voices can 
prove themselves anew, also in the Digital Age. 
4.2.3.3  
Civil society as a driver of transformation in the 
Digital Age
In the Digital Age, too, civil-society actors are indispen-
sable as creative thinkers, active pioneers and socio-po-
litical drivers of a Transformation towards Sustainabil-
ity. Productive synergies can result from the mutual 
rapprochement of, and exchanges between, civil-soci-
ety movements. Tech communities (Section 4.2.4) also 
have long-standing traditions of common-good-ori-
ented civic work and critical commitment. The open-
source movement, the joint procedures in Wiki pro-
jects, the strong voice in net policy of the Chaos Com-
puter Club, which has existed since 1984, or the FIfF 
(Forum of Computer Scientists and IT Professionals for 
Peace and Social Responsibility), which has also been 
active since 1984, are just a few examples of the credi-
ble and committed “role of civil-society actors in the 
further development of the organizational and techni-
cal infrastructure of the information society” itself 
(Winkel, 2015: 416). Not only in the field of political 
whistle blowing is the power of (and power over) infor-
mation and data a “recurring leitmotif of digital civil 
disobedience” (Züger et al., 2017: 269). Access to and 
the availability and processing of relevant information 
and digital data for civil society also play a major role in 
the field of environment, climate and sustainability 
policy. New innovative approaches emerge from civ-
il-society niches that creatively challenge and drive 
established politics (e.g. 2030-watch.de) or facilitate 
individual commitment (e.g. betterplace.org or 
 toogoodtogo.de). At the same time, strong networks of 
civil-society actors, both national and global, can 
become a critical sensorium for ecological, societal and 
human grievances all over the world on a scale unprec-
edented in the history of humankind (Section 4.2.7). In 
the polycentric responsibility architecture, civil-society 
organization and civic action are essential all over the 
world, specifically as a link between the individual and 
society (‘school of democracy’), but also as a counter-
balance and controlling authority of state and economic 
power, also in the Digital Age. In addition to the valua-
ble civil-society engagement of scientists, there is also 
an important role for science as such and in its national 
and transnational alliances.
4 .2 .4 
Tech-Communities – new pioneers of change?
The WBGU uses the term tech communities for actors 
with technical expertise who are grouped in networks 
made up of companies, NGOs, state institutions, etc. 
They are key actors in the technical system 
( Section 3.5.5). As the digital penetration of society 
proceeds, the architects of technical systems are digi-
tally pre-structuring more and more areas of life and 
contextualizing key decisions. For example, the techni-
cal design of social networks influences spaces of public 
discourse (Section 5.3.2), and the development and use 
of algorithmic decision-making systems influences the 
financial, health and legal systems (Box 4.3.3-1; 
 Section 5.3.3). 
4.2.4.1 
Value inscriptions in technology
Digital solutions cannot be understood as transparent 
and neutral media of human intentionality, since “even 
the design and not just the use of technical artefacts 
can have moral consequences” (Simon, 2016: 359; Brey, 
2010; Section 3.2.7). Initial ethical, epistemological 
and scientific analyses in the big-data context show, for 
example, that value decisions are already applied and 
manifested in the process of data collection, as well as 
in the further processing of data and the conclusions 
drawn from them (Mittelstadt and Floridi, 2016). Selec-
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tion decisions, evaluations and values thus already play 
an important role (Brey, 2010; Mittelstadt and Floridi, 
2016) during the conception and development of tech-
nical solutions – i.e. well before they are actually used. 
They are ‘hardwired’, so to speak, so that the imple-
mented values are fixed in the operation and use of the 
systems (Simon, 2016: 359): “Because technologies 
contain values does not mean that they themselves 
become moral actors or bear moral responsibility.” 
Responsibility lies with the system designers, not least 
because of the challenges of formalizing ethics in 
machine-readable form. However, the tech communi-
ties have thus moved to the centre of societal life. With 
the increasing digital penetration of everyday life, this 
group of actors continues to gain influence and has 
attained a ‘unique selling point’. 
Strategic decisions about the development of new 
technologies and systems are often made at the man-
agement level of digital companies or within research 
institutions. Later technical design also incorporates 
unconscious values of the participating developers. A 
very concrete example of this is the choice of voice col-
our in the design of human-machine interfaces using 
voice assistants (voice computing), which (usually 
unconsciously) convey gender roles and can become 
widely disseminated in society (Section 5.3.6). Actors 
in the tech communities thus shape key social environ-
ments through conscious and unconscious decisions 
without any societal debate, since the concrete decision 
is often outside direct observation or control.
New research fields such as values in design (Simon, 
2016) or value sensitive design (Friedman et al., 2006) 
are developing to systematically determine, analyse 
and evaluate conscious and unconscious value inscrip-
tions in the development of hardware and software, the 
underlying algorithms and the data used. The result is 
that actors in the tech communities – from the manage-
ment level of a technology company to developers, 
(software) engineers, data scientists, etc. – have shaped 
key social environments. As digital technologies con-
tinue to spread, the ability of tech communities to 
shape and design is likely to increase.
4.2.4.2 
Ethical discourses in tech-communities 
Actors with technical expertise have been addressing 
the issue of their responsibility to society for some time 
now. This is exemplified by civil-society organizations 
like the FIfF (Forum of Computer Scientists and IT Pro-
fessionals for Peace and Social Responsibility), which 
emerged from the peace movement in 1984, the 
 Digitalcourage association founded in 1987, and the 
Open Knowledge Foundation; all are committed to soci-
etal concerns and contribute to political discourses. Up 
to now, dedicated ‘techies’ have focused primarily on 
topics such as privacy, (cyber-)security and trust 
(Simon, 2016). They also influence ethical technology 
design, ethical areas of application and professional 
guidelines. This is particularly true in the context of AI 
development: “When it comes to AI, we have to have a 
set of principles that guide the development of AI and 
its use. We want to make sure that anything that we do 
doesn’t amplify bias, doesn’t hijack our attention, 
doesn’t sway opinion. These are things where we need 
to not only build the tools, the technologies – but it’s 
also a set of design principles, a set of ethical principles 
that we as builders of technology need to have” (Satya 
Nadella, CEO of Microsoft, Corenote at the ‘Inspire 
2018’ conference). 
At the same time, tech communities and their values 
are repeatedly criticized. Technology companies and 
expert forums are criticized, for example, for their han-
dling of diversity, sexist attitudes and lack of inclusive-
ness (Daumé III and Heller, 2018). The digital economy 
repeatedly finds itself at the centre of public attention 
because of aggressive business models that are often 
detrimental to the common good, for tax avoidance or 
poor working conditions (Berg et al., 2018b; OECD, 
2018f.). This reveals the discrepancy between norma-
tive commitments, some of which are embedded in cor-
porate guidelines, and the digital economy’s commercial 
interests. 
These discourses testify both to a more critical 
reflection by society of the values represented in tech 
communities and to an increasing sensitization of actors 
with technical expertise to the societal consequences of 
their actions. However, aspects relating to ecological 
sustainability, such as resource and energy consump-
tion or the impact on climate change, have so far played 
only a subordinate role in this context. 
4.2.4.3 
Interim conclusion
These issue are key for the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability: the application areas of digital technologies; 
whose and which values are inscribed into the design, 
development and operating processes; and how value 
conflicts are recognized and decided. Sustaina bility-
savvy tech communities could be natural allies for the 
Transformation towards Sustainability and become new 
pioneers of change. On the one hand, they can develop 
technologies for applications that support sustainable 
development; on the other, they can embed sustain-
ability values, such as resource efficiency, in the design 
process and act as pioneers of change in other tech 
communities. Because of this actor group’s growing 
influence, the WBGU believes that sustainability-rele-
vant discourses in the tech communities should be pro-
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moted institutionally and more systematically to boost 
their ability to shape the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability. For example, in addition to greater corporate 
social responsibility, technological social responsibility 
could also be established. The discussions within the 
tech communities on values by design, corporate social 
responsibility, the responsible use of technology, and 
the development of a professional ethic offer good 
starting points for leveraging potential for the ability to 
act, shape and plan in efforts to move towards sustain-
ability transformation (Box 4.3.1-1). 
4 .2 .5 
Cities and municipalities between technology 
sovereignty and technology dependence 
In the current urban century, cities and municipalities 
are regarded as key actors in shaping the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability (WBGU, 2016a; 
 Section 5.2.7). Development problems become concen-
trated in many cities around the world, e.g. socio- 
economic disparities between gated communities and 
informal neighbourhoods (digital divide, provision of 
basic services and infrastructure, etc.), unregulated 
growth, weak local governance capacity, poor urban 
and transport planning. Cities also contribute signifi-
cantly to global environmental problems: they are 
responsible for about 70% of global energy use and 
global energy-related CO2 emissions (Seto et al., 2014). 
Digital solutions can make a contribution to solving 
these problems; other key problems of urban develop-
ment, such as the supply of living space, can still only 
be solved by ‘analogue’ means. In any case, competent 
and capable urban societies acting in the interests of 
the common good are crucial.
4.2.5.1  
Global technology providers: a new challenge for 
city governments
Urban development is shaped on the one hand by sov-
ereign actors such as mayors, city governments and 
administrations, architects and urban planners, and on 
the other hand by non-sovereign actors, such as urban 
civil society, (international) investors, the real-estate 
industry and construction companies. A new group of 
actors – which is becoming significant with the spread 
of digital solutions and ‘smart city’ strategies – is made 
up of large, often global technology and consulting 
firms. Digitalization presents many city governments 
with new formative challenges: Which digital solutions 
are oriented towards the common good and can help 
solve key problems of urban development? What risks 
are involved? How can actors contribute to the success 
of digitally oriented strategies? In addition to the 
potential for, e.g., better traffic management, mul-
ti-modal mobility services, the circular economy, digital 
networking among actors, and decentralized urban 
power generation, relevant issues also include potential 
dependencies on individual technology providers and 
the need to strengthen the technological sovereignty of 
cities and municipalities (Section 5.2.7). But it is also a 
question of sovereignty over data in communal areas, 
the dangers of total surveillance, and the resilience of 
critical infrastructures against cyber attacks (e.g. com-
munal electricity, gas or water supply). 
4.2.5.2  
Effective local governments
There is no blueprint for urban and municipal develop-
ment, especially when it comes to moving towards sus-
tainability. It is therefore all the more important that 
cities and municipalities are and remain able to act, also 
under the specific conditions of rapid digital change. 
They do not only need technological skills and qualifi-
cations (Section 5.3.4), but also sufficient financial 
capacity to make the necessary investments in (digital 
and digitalized) infrastructures. Public expenditure by 
municipalities in Denmark makes up 62% of overall 
government expenditure and 32.9% of GDP. In a devel-
oping country like Kenya, where tax revenues are 
already lower than in industrialized countries, the share 
of public expenditure allocated to cities and municipal-
ities is only 1.2%, or 0.06% of GDP (UCLG and Dexia, 
2007). The less able the public sector is to shape devel-
opment, the more digital urban and community devel-
opment is left to the free play of forces.
In addition to raising their share of public spending 
from the state budget, the consistent use of fiscal 
instruments by local governments is an important lever 
for improving the financial situation of local budgets in 
order to strengthen their influence (WBGU, 2016a: 163). 
This concerns in particular levying taxes on land and on 
the value of real estate, which has seen sharp increases 
in recent years. In addition, it is also necessary to close 
tax loopholes such as share deals designed to circum-
vent land-transfer taxes (WBGU, 2016a: 163). 
Cities and municipalities also need more responsibil-
ity of their own (WBGU, 2016a: 359), for example 
through the consistent application of the subsidiarity 
principle and the recognition of local autonomy by 
national constitutions, for example the right to local 
self-government (WBGU, 2016a: 360f.). This facilitates 
community development that is geared to local needs. 
In addition, a more efficient allocation of resources and 
a democratization of decision-making processes are 
decisive advantages of a decentralized state organiza-
tion (Porras, 2009: 556). In many developing countries 
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and emerging economies in particular, establishing an 
effective administration is therefore a major challenge.
4.2.5.3  
The digital municipality and the Transformation 
towards Sustainability
Strengthening urban civil society as a key player in sus-
tainable urban development is an important prerequis-
ite for maintaining and improving sustainability and 
quality of life in cities and municipalities. In the sense 
of Eigenart (Section 2.2.3; WBGU, 2016a: 142ff.), this 
is not about creating acceptance, but rather about 
self-determination. Eigenart means “that, within this 
framework, every city can and must look for its ‘own 
way’ (in German ‘eigene Art’) towards a sustainable 
future”(WBGU, 2016a: 132). Furthermore, cities and 
municipalities play a key role, if societal inclusion and 
participation rights are part of their municipal constitu-
tion. Embedding a digitally oriented municipal develop-
ment policy in a human-rights-based approach is an 
important prerequisite, especially in developing coun-
tries and emerging economies, to enable sustainable 
development and strengthen the ability of municipal 
poverty groups to act and participate (HLRN, 2018; 
Section 5.3.8).
The introduction and use of digital technologies in 
cities and municipalities should be consistently embed-
ded from the outset in cross-sector concepts of sustain-
able municipal development (Section 5.2.7). In particu-
lar, technology commissioners and smart-city commis-
sioners, who have recently been appointed in many 
cities and municipalities, should only make decisions in 
close cooperation with the respective environmental 
and sustainability authorities. In this context, digital 
applications could be subjected to a sustainability 
review before being deployed.
4 .2 .6 
States between power and loss of sovereignty 
As institutions that define and enforce formal, gener-
ally binding rules for societal coexistence within terri-
torial borders, states have a special role to play in the 
Transformation towards Sustainability. Because they 
are fundamentally binding in nature, state-government 
decisions and state legislation represent powerful 
means for establishing the framework conditions for 
sustainable development. The WBGU has called for a 
proactive state offering extended participation possibili-
ties, i.e. states should act decisively and simultaneously 
in a way that activates others (WBGU, 2011: 203ff.; 
 Section 4.1). In addition, global environmental and 
development problems such as climate change require 
global solutions negotiated by state governments, often 
within the framework of the United Nations 
( Section 4.2.8). 
The state’s aspiration to shape development faces 
challenges as a result of globalization processes. 
Because of their global mobility and resource wealth, 
companies can evade national legislation in intrinsic 
areas of state responsibility such as taxation and envi-
ronmental protection (Strange, 1996; Section 4.2.2.3). 
The effectiveness of setting frameworks for sustainable 
development by legislation is therefore limited. Fur-
thermore, in the past there has been a lack of interna-
tional political will and unity. In view of the overall 
weakness of climate legislation, hopes are increasingly 
being pinned on sub-state and non-state actors such as 
cities and companies – also within the framework of the 
Paris Agreement (Chan et al., 2016; Schlacke, 2016). 
Due to structural limitations and a lack of political will, 
states are not the driving force behind the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability that they could be.
4.2.6.1 
State capacity to act under the pressure of econo-
mically driven deterritorialization
State power structures face particular challenges from 
digitalization (Owen, 2015). Many conventional policy 
instruments are becoming less effective in the context 
of digitalization. Legislation and governance are linked 
to national territoriality (Weber, 1980 [1922]). The 
laws of a country apply only within its territorial bor-
ders. Just as globalization has de facto weakened the 
state’s ability to act by physically shifting the activities 
to be regulated to other countries (or threatening to do 
so; Strange, 1996), in the course of deterritorialization 
digitalization shifts many processes and decisions rele-
vant to state governance not only beyond territorial 
borders, but also into the internet (Sassen, 2000, 2002; 
Choucri, 2012; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2017). These 
virtual spaces and their infrastructures, platforms and 
contents are largely created and controlled by private 
actors. In the course of digitalization, the state’s power 
to act therefore finds itself in a particularly tense rela-
tionship with the growing power of private-sector 
actors. Legislation as a central means of state govern-
ance loses its assertiveness in virtual, borderless spaces 
(Boehme-Nessler, 2009). The private-sector providers 
of digital services are internationally mobile and there-
fore difficult to define in regulatory terms; they are also 
generally uncooperative (de la Durantaye, 2011; Hodg-
son, 2015; Section 4.2.2.3). This restricts the state in its 
intrinsic areas of action, such as taxation (Box 4.2.2-2). 
In addition, services are used across borders and 
 potentially misused in virtual space. The challenges of 
regulating misinformation and hate speech on the 
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Box 4 .2 .6-1
Unprecedented state measures: The German 
Network Enforcement Act and the French Act to 
Combat Manipulated Information on the Internet
Laws and voluntary measures are in place within the EU to 
combat the dissemination of false content (fake news) and hate 
speech. These are intended to protect social platforms from 
being made liable for content posted by their users – as long 
as they have no knowledge of the content – and, at the same 
time, to involve them in the fight against these phenomena 
through voluntary commitments (Echikson and Knodt, 2018). 
The EU is tightening up legal requirements particularly in cer-
tain sectors, for example in the fight against terrorist content 
and child pornography. 
The German Network Enforcement Act against hate 
speech
The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), which came into 
force on 1 October 2017 and was to be implemented over a 
transitional period of three months, aims to combat hate 
speech on the internet; it thus primarily serves to protect per-
sonal rights. Since self-commitments by the commercial pro-
viders of social networks to eliminate such hate speech 
proved to be insufficient, the NetzDG obliges providers with 
2 million or more users registered in Germany to remove or 
block access to illegal content in social networks within 24 
hours, or, where cases are unclear, to react within seven days 
as soon as they become aware of the content (Section 3 (2) 
nos. 2 and 3 of the NetzDG). The illegal contents that must be 
removed include criminal offences targeting the democratic 
rule of law, public order, personal honour or sexual self-deter-
mination (Section 1 (3) of the NetzDG), i.e. for example def-
amation (Section 186 of the StGB), incitement to hatred (Sec-
tion 130 of the StGB), and distribution of child and juvenile 
pornography (Section 184b-d of the StGB). Furthermore, the 
operators must set up a complaints mechanism that allows 
users to draw attention to violations (Section 3 (1) of the 
NetzDG), report every six months in German on the  complaints 
filed and how the complaints mechanism is functioning, 
( Section 2 of the NetzDG), and appoint an authorized agent in 
Germany as recipient for complaints and official notifications 
of fines. This agent’s contact data must be published and eas-
ily accessible (Section 5 of the NetzDG). The obligation to 
appoint a domestic authorized agent is intended to solve one 
of the main problems of enforcement in social networks, 
namely the lack of responsible contact persons among the 
platform providers (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017b). If 
 providers of social networks violate these concrete compli-
ance  requirements or fail to appoint a domestic authorized 
agent, supervisory authorities may impose fines (Section 4 of 
the NetzDG). Furthermore, in the event of violations of the 
obligation to delete content, the responsible regulatory 
 authorities can legally oblige the operators of intermediaries 
responsible for content (e.g. social networks) to delete.
The NetzDG has attracted media attention worldwide (Eddy 
and Scott, 2017; Kugelmann, 2018), although individual 
 regulations from the NetzDG have been used as templates for 
dubious purposes. For example, the obligation of service pro-
viders to delete content has been incorporated into a Russian 
law and extended to include infringements of civil law, with 
harsh penalties for infringements (Reporter ohne Grenzen, 
2017; Article 19, 2017). The Russian law thus goes much 
 further than the German law and can lead to extensive 
 censorship of content. Germany went it alone in the EU with 
the NetzDG. Although the European Commission has now pre-
sented a comparable draft law in the EU against terrorist online 
propaganda, its scope is much narrower (Echikson and Knodt, 
2018). 
The French Act to Combat Manipulated Information on 
the Internet (especially during election campaigns)
On 22 November 2018, the French parliament passed a law to 
combat manipulated information on the internet (especially 
during election campaigns). Manipulated information is de-
fined as false or misleading information, or the attribution of 
a fact to adversely affect the veracity of a future election or 
vote (Article L. 163-2 of the French Electoral Code as amend-
ed). During the three months preceding elections, this French 
law obliges operators of social platforms to identify the au-
thors of content in the public interest, to disclose remunera-
tion for paid contributions above a certain threshold, and to 
establish a public register for this purpose (amendment of 
Article L. 163-1 of the French Electoral Code). During this 
period, the judges responsible for the summary proceeding 
must, at the request of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, order 
measures within 48 hours to prevent the dissemination of 
false information relating to the election (Article L. 163-2 of 
the French Electoral Code). The law also amends the French 
Freedom of Communication Act. The operators of social net-
works are required to take measures to combat the dissemina-
tion of false information that can lead to a disturbance of the 
peace or compromise the outcome of elections or votes, and 
to introduce an easily accessible and visible mechanism for 
reporting false information (Article 8 bis of the Freedom of 
Communication Act). In addition, measures were introduced 
on the transparency of algorithms, on the regulation of con-
tent advertising, on combating user accounts used intensively 
to disseminate false information, on the provision of informa-
tion on authors of contributions that shape public opinion, on 
the nature, origin and modalities of content dissemination, 
and on education through media and information. 
Operators must disclose what measures have been taken 
and what resources were used for them, and document them 
in an annual report to the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel 
(Freedom of Communication Act, Article 8 bis). The French 
authorities were given additional powers to combat fake news 
(Article 9 of the Freedom of Communication Act). As in the 
NetzDG, operating companies must designate domestic author-
ized agents (Article 9 bis A). Operators using algorithms for 
recommending, categorizing and/or listing content related to 
public opinion forming must publish statistics revealing, for 
each part, what percentage of data was accessed directly (with-
out recourse to algorithmic sorting) and how much indirectly 
(i.e. through mediation by algorithms for searching or sorting 
content) (Article 9bis B). Furthermore, learning content about 
misinformation on the internet was included in the French 
Education Act (Article 9ter-9septies Code de l’éducation). 
Like the NetzDG, the French law was criticized before and 
after its adoption by Parliament for the risk of restricting 
freedom of expression and communication and because of 
uncertain legal concepts relating to the criminal offences at 
both the national and the UN level (Kaye, 2018; Abgeordnete 
der Nationalversammlung, 2018; Mitglieder des französis-
chen Senats, 2018). The French law was submitted by 
 members of the Senate and Parliament to the French Consti-
tutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) for review. The Court 
declared the law constitutional, but issued guidelines for 
 interpreting various articles, which must be observed in its 
 application (Conseil constitutionnel, 2018a, b). 
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internet (Box 4.2.6-1 illustrate the challenges of coun-
tering infringements in the digital domain. 
The guiding principle of the proactive state (WBGU, 
2011) is thus challenged in the Digital Age. The EU, for 
example, is trying to counteract deterritorialization by 
introducing the principle according to which the user’s 
place of residence is decisive, not the company’s regis-
tered office (Klar, 2017; Pollmann, 2018). Large inter-
net groups are also responding to increasing public 
pressure with voluntary commitments to counteract 
agitation, disinformation and a lack of data protection 
(Dehmel, 2013; Die Zeit, 2018). However, the limited 
enforcement power of state governments remains a 
challenge in the Digital Age. A controversial strategy of 
some states therefore involves transferring elements of 
law enforcement to private actors (e.g. German  Network 
Enforcement Act: Box 4.2.6-1).
Another aspect is the fact that new technical possi-
bilities in the Digital Age can also be used for state gov-
ernance (e-government; Esteves et al., 2013; Frach et 
al., 2016; Lenk, 2017). This possibility has so far been 
embraced very differently in different countries – 
intensively in Estonia, for example (Eixelsberger, 2010; 
European Commission, 2015a). In general, different 
strategies for dealing with digitalization can be identi-
fied at an aggregated level ranging from laissez-faire to 
precautionary balancing and active use (Linkov et al., 
2018; Goodwin and Spittle, 2002). Technology compa-
nies in the USA, for example, benefit from weak regula-
tion (Czada, 2015; Dudenhöffer and Schneider, 2015). 
In the EU there are signs of a middle course in which the 
balance of power is to be shifted in favour of the regu-
lating state actors by means of harmonization within 
the EU and through cooperation (Newman, 2015; 
 Goddard, 2017; Section 8.1.6). The Chinese govern-
ment, for example, is attempting to use the so-called 
‘great firewall’ not only to extend the state’s ability to 
act and control into virtual space, but also to use it itself 
as an instrument of control of the physical world 
through social scoring (Meissner, 2017; Chorzempa et 
al., 2018; Box 4.2.6-2; Section 5.3.3).
4.2.6.2 
Ways to strengthen the state’s ability to act 
 sustainably
In dealing with the above-mentioned restrictions on 
their ability to act, states have a number of ways to 
compensate for the de facto restriction of their forma-
tive power. For example, the power of large technology 
companies should be seen relative to that of the regu-
latory institutions. States can regain their capacity to 
act by acting together. No company can ignore regula-
tion at the EU level if it wants to keep this important 
market. Measures like the Basic Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) enable the EU to counter the power of 
technology companies (Box 4.2.6-3). In principle, coor-
dinated regulation of important markets can in turn 
have a positive spill-over effect outside the participat-
ing countries. Contrary to fears, globalization has not 
led to a general softening of environmental standards 
(Vogel, 1995; Vogel and Kagan, 2004; Konisky, 2007; 
Dong et al., 2011; Holzinger and Sommerer, 2011). 
Transnational companies or firms with a high export 
share often apply globally the strictest environmental 
standards they have to comply with in any one country, 
because differentiation would entail additional costs. 
As a result, in less regulated markets, these companies 
even push for stricter standards to avoid being at a dis-
advantage vis-à-vis local suppliers (Vogel, 1995; 
Holzinger and Sommerer, 2011; Bradford, 2012; 
Saikawa, 2013). In the past, there has indeed been a 
‘Brussels effect’ in which EU rules have de facto been 
adopted outside the internal market (Bradford, 2012). 
The EU has also made practical use of its influence in 
negotiations on trade agreements, for example to 
enshrine basic workers’ rights or economic develop-
ment strategies in partner countries (Meunier and 
Nicolaïdis, 2006).
However, an analogy to environmental protection 
should be drawn with caution. Model legislation on 
data protection, for example, takes the GDPR 
(Box 4.2.6-3) into account as an important reference 
point (Privacy International, 2018a). However, since no 
physical goods are produced, the costs of differentia-
tion in the handling of data are no longer prohibitively 
high. Furthermore, the core business of many digital 
companies is the collection of as much data as possible, 
so that there is a particularly strong incentive to avoid 
legal restrictions. Whether spill-over effects will also be 
seen in digital markets is yet to be researched. And 
whether the GDPR will also apply outside the EU (espe-
cially in the USA) therefore remains a relevant – and 
still open – question.
Beyond simply reacting to the changed conditions, 
states can also use the new technical possibilities to 
actively contribute to the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability. However, there is currently no broad under-
standing or technical knowledge of the opportunities 
and risks of digitalization, which would first need to be 
mainstreamed by all state institutions in order to fully 
tap the sustainability potential of digitalized state 
action. Unless it is effectively shaped, the intensive use 
of digital technology could become problematic in 
terms of civil and human rights and privacy. State mon-
itoring and social control (e.g. Box 4.2.6-2) can have 
implications for individual development and public dis-
course (Section 5.3.2) and thus in shaping the Second 
Dynamic (Section 7.3). 37% of the world’s population 
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live without freedom under authoritarian regimes 
(Freedom House, 2018) that can use digital technology 
to monitor and control them (Section 6.2). But demo-
cratic states also use invasive mass surveillance tech-
nology, as shown by the revelations on American and 
British espionage in summer 2013 (Lucas, 2014; Lyon, 
2014).
4.2.6.3 
Untapped formative potential of states
When it comes to sustainability-relevant problem areas, 
states are currently still insufficiently active within 
their de facto scope for action in view of the dominance 
of private-sector actors (Section 4.2.6.1). On the other 
hand, their legislative and executive powers give them 
especially strong instruments for establishing the 
framework conditions for sustainable development. 
Just as the potential for the Transformation towards 
Sustainability has not yet been exhausted, government 
action has so far only been used to a limited extent to 
shape digitalization in a sustainable manner. In order to 
change this, states would have to act together and 
regain their capacity for action through multilateral 
cooperation, setting guidelines for their actions which 
ensure that existing problems regarding civil rights and 
privacy are not exacerbated.
4 .2 .7 
Transnational actors between world society and 
fragmentation?
Transnational actors are non-state, societal actors 
engaged in international or even global activity, net-
working and influence. Unlike intergovernmental inter-
national organizations (Section 4.2.8), they are not 
primarily founded by or dependent on state actors, but 
act as social movements, networks, businesses or for-
Box 4 .2 .6-2
China’s social credit system
Since the Chinese central government presented its plan in 
2014 to set up a nationwide social credit system by 2020 (Ko-
stka, 2018), forms of governance supported by data and tech-
nology have been attracting increasing international atten-
tion. In China, the social credit system aims to integrate 
individuals, companies, social organizations and state author-
ities into a centralized points system, which provides behav-
ioural incentives using reward and punishment mechanisms. 
The individual score assigned to the individual actors changes 
dynamically depending on their behaviour, and is to be used 
as a basis for decision-making in various (public) spheres in a 
similar way to the credit-score system used widely in the fi-
nancial sector. The aim is to establish an “economy and socie-
ty based on trust” (Meissner, 2017; Ohlberg et al., 2017). 
At present, there is no single national social credit system 
(yet); rather, a multitude of systems coexist (653 in total, 
 according to the Social Credit Summit held in 2017), adminis-
tered by both local governments and commercial enterprises 
(Ahmed, 2017; Creemers, 2018). While the systems of com-
mercial providers such as Tencent, Sesame, etc. are based on 
voluntary participation, participation in state social credit 
systems is compulsory for all residents of the respective areas. 
In July 2018, more than 40 district and provincial govern-
ments were running pilot projects (Kostka, 2018).
The number of studies investigating the effects and con-
sequences of already established social credit procedures is 
currently still small. A recently published field study of the 
social credit system in Rongcheng – a city of 650,000 inhab-
itants and 50,000 businesses in the Chinese province of Shan-
dong, selected as a model in January 2018 – reveals a report-
ing system based largely on human labour (with several 
hundred certified data collectors) and a complex catalogue of 
behaviours (with 150 behaviour categories) as a basis for 
scoring (Knight, 2018). A survey of over 2,200 Chinese inter-
net users has shown that individuals living in an area with a 
social credit system are changing their behaviour. 94% of 
 respondents stated that they had changed their behaviour, 
e.g. with regard to purchasing decisions. 18% of respondents 
said they had changed their behaviour on social networks and 
removed contacts from their social media network in order to 
minimize potential negative influences on their score (Knight, 
2018). 
There is a broad consensus in the scientific community 
that a centralized social credit system or even several decen-
tralized social credit systems have the potential to radically 
transform the state governance of both the economy and so-
ciety (Meissner, 2017; Chorzempa et al., 2018). However, 
assessments of the social system that has successively 
changed differ. Some experts see it as a return to a planned 
economy, since the social credit system gives companies 
strong incentives to gear their activities to politically set goals 
(Heilmann, 2017). Others stress that with the introduction of 
the social credit system, China is entering a new phase of sur-
veillance and social control (Kühnreich, 2017) with implica-
tions that extend beyond China’s territory (Hoffman, 2018). 
In the Chinese population, on the other hand, the social credit 
system is currently seen less as a monitoring system than as 
an instrument for more effective law enforcement in order to 
remedy grievances such as corruption, crime or a lack of trust 
in public institutions (Kostka, 2018). Approval rates are as 
high as 80% (Alpermann and Thünken, 2018; Kostka, 2018), 
although large-scale studies are still lacking. Even in regions 
where a social credit system is in place, there is little know-
ledge within the population of its existence and how it 
functions. 
In western liberal societies, the idea of such a governance 
system triggers strong defensive reactions, as it contradicts 
fundamental principles of the rule of law and is classified as 
an instrument of power of a totalitarian surveillance state due 
to the collection of extensive personal data and the determi-
nation of desirable behaviour by the central state. Score-
based sanctions, as applied in social credit systems, meet with 
rejection, in Germany for example by 91% of the population 
(SVRV, 2018). 
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mal organizations across national borders. Their heter-
ogeneity corresponds in principle to the diverse area of 
non-state groups in the national context. Civil-society 
movements and organizations such as peace, women’s 
and environmental movements – e.g. attac, Greenpeace 
or Amnesty International – are part of this, as are mul-
tinational business enterprises or supranational associ-
ations from the fields of science, the media, founda-
tions, business, trade unions, religion and tech commu-
nities (e.g. ICANN, Box 4.2.7-1). These alliances of 
decentralized actors’ interests, which have grown in 
very different ways, make contact with states and 
international organizations as well as with business and 
(global) society. Transnational actors are a prime exam-
ple of the polycentric structure and functioning of 
today’s governance, for example in the field of climate 
change (Dorsch and Flachsland, 2017). 
4.2.7.1 
Transnationalization of sustainability policy and 
digitalization
The transnationalization of global sustainability policy 
is demonstrated by the many forms of involvement of 
non-state actors in intergovernmental processes of sus-
tainability policy, and of initiatives that emerge inde-
pendently of them. For example, the United Nations 
has initiated a ‘Global Compact for Sustainable Devel-
opment’ between companies (unglobalcompact.org). 
By signing up, companies commit themselves to ten 
common principles in the areas of human rights, labour, 
the environment and anti-corruption, and report regu-
larly on their compliance. In the negotiations on inter-
national climate-change mitigation, which are domi-
nated by the signatory states, e.g. to the Paris Agree-
ment, non-state actors are increasingly gaining access 
to consultations, albeit without voting rights of their 
own. Novel forums for exchange between states and 
civil society and private actors are being developed 
(e.g. the Presidency’s Open Dialogue at the Conferences 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement); however, in most 
cases no decision-making powers are transferred to 
them.
Transnational climate governance in particular has 
developed very dynamically in the last decade in view 
of the strong differentiation of the subject area and the 
manifold (also digitally enabled) participation possibil-
ities (e.g. Bulkeley et al., 2018). Often linked to policy 
processes within the framework of the UNFCCC, but 
also independent of it, various initiatives are emerging, 
for example in the area of regional emissions-trading 
systems like the RGGI, certification models like the FSC, 
greenhouse-gas inventories such as the Climate Regis-
try, or voluntary environmental and sustainability 
reporting such as the CDP (Bulkeley et al., 2018: 63). 
Civil-society participation in global environmental and 
development conferences regularly breaks records – 
developing from the UN Rio Conference in 1992 with 
an exceptional 1,500 registered NGOs, to 6,000 regis-
trations at the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in 2002, and peaking at 12,000 registered NGOs 
at the Climate Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 (Bäck-
strand, 2015). Although the example of the climate 
conference in Copenhagen in particular clearly showed 
that states still bear the greatest responsibility for the 
success and failure of an ambitious climate policy, the 
large number – and even more the great quality – of 
transnational commitments makes an important contri-
bution to climate policy. NAZCA, the UN portal for cli-
mate-change-mitigation projects of non-state actors, 
lists around 20,000 registered projects involving cities, 
regions, companies, investors and NGOs (UNCCS, 
2018). Especially associations of subnational actors – 
such as the transnational Cities Climate Leadership 
Group (C40), Local Governments for Sustainability 
(ICLEI), an association of over 1,500 cities, towns and 
regions or the World Mayors Council on Climate Change 
– are catalysts for climate-change mitigation in many 
countries, often despite or precisely because of the less 
ambitious policies of many national governments (Aust, 
2018). Academia, which is also transnationally net-
worked to a high degree, is closely linked to the inter-
governmental negotiation process via the IPCC, par-
ticularly in the field of climate governance. With his 
encyclical Laudato si’, Pope Francis also showed that 
religious associations and prominent individuals, as 
transnational actors, can also exert significant influence 
on sustainability policy (Edenhofer et al., 2015; Heim-
bach-Steins and Stockmann, 2019). 
For transnational business enterprises, general or 
sector-specific (e.g. mining, finance, textiles) CSR com-
mitments create fragmented transnational regulatory 
systems that bring environmental and social sustain-
ability issues into business relations (Spiesshofer, 
2017). Nevertheless, they suffer from inconsistencies 
and contradictions compared to the common standards 
(Spiesshofer, 2017) developed by the UN, OECD, ISO or 
other organizations. Current CSR guidelines and tools 
often ignore issues of digital change in this context 
(Knaut, 2017). 
Digital networking and the provision of information 
have a variety of effects on the ability to act of the 
growing network of transnational governance actors; 
for example, they can improve awareness, attract atten-
tion or strengthen advocacy for different (e.g. local, 
economic, particular or marginalized) interests in the 
global sphere (Talberg and Jönnson, 2010). For all these 
transnational groups of actors, digital networking very 
fundamentally creates the possibilities for the dynamic 
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Box 4 .2 .6-3
The EU Basic Data Protection Regulation as the 
EU’s approach to shaping digitalization
In the field of data protection and the protection of privacy, 
the EU’s Basic Data Protection Regulation (GDPR; EU, 2016) 
is without precedent anywhere in the world. It aims to em-
body a Europe that “effectively protects and defends values 
and fundamental rights vis-à-vis the commercial and state 
data-collection mania” (Selmayr, 2018: 197). Since 25 May 
2018, the Basic Data Protection Regulation has been directly 
applicable for all citizens throughout the EU, without the 
Member States needing to transfer it into national legislation. 
The GDPR pursues a dual objective: (1) the protection of pri-
vacy and (2) the promotion of the free movement of data 
across the EU’s internal borders by harmonizing data-protec-
tion standards (Article 1 of the GDPR). It only applies to data 
relating to individuals, but not to data relating to other ob-
jects, such as companies. Member States may adopt comple-
mentary national rules in certain areas, for example for data 
processing by public authorities (Kühling and Martini, 2016). 
The most important contents of the GDPR concern the ex-
tension of the scope of application and the mechanisms and 
institutions for the enforcement of the data-protection law; 
the data-protection provisions were further developed in an 
“evolutionary rather than a revolutionary manner” (Kühling 
and Martini, 2016). 
Scope of application 
With the introduction of the principle, according to which the 
user’s place of residence is decisive, not the company’s regis-
tered office, in Section 3 II of the GDPR, the scope of applica-
tion is also extended from processing operations within the 
EU to all operations in which data of persons located in the 
EU are processed outside the EU. The application of the GDPR 
no longer depends on where companies that process data 
have their headquarters, but on where the customers live. Eu-
ropean data-protection standards are thus becoming more 
important for non-European companies. The introduction of 
the principle, according to which the user’s place of residence 
is decisive, not the company’s registered office, initially only 
extends the protection of users in the EU on paper. It remains 
to be seen whether such a broad scope of application can also 
be consistently enforced outside Europe (Ernst, 2017). How-
ever, this standard-setting legislation can be expected to have 
an impact on third countries, especially developing countries 
(Kuner et al., 2017). 
Data-protection regulations
The GDPR hardly tightens the content of European data-pro-
tection law; rather it integrates requirements already estab-
lished by the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
e.g. the ‘right to be forgotten’ (right to erasure), an obligation 
to delete unlawfully processed data (Article 17 of the GDPR). 
One innovation is the right to data transferability (also called 
data portability) in Article 20 of the GDPR. A user may re-
quest all personal data from one provider in machine-reada-
ble form so that it can be transferred to another provider. For 
example, it must be possible to transfer data (e.g. an address 
book) from the smartphone of one brand to the smartphone 
of another brand. The GDPR thus obliges providers to develop 
and apply interoperable formats for data in order to reduce 
barriers for users wanting to switch providers (recital 68 of 
the GDPR). Article 25 of the GDPR enshrines the often de-
manded principles of ‘data protection by design’ and ‘data 
protection by default’. Data protection by design means that 
new products are to be developed in such a way that they 
enable data protection. Data protection by default means that 
the default settings of a product must always provide the 
highest level of data protection, which users can then actively 
change in their data-protection settings. Article 32 of the GD-
PR obliges responsible company officers to ensure the secur-
ity of data during processing operations by taking appropriate 
technical and organizational measures. In order to prove that 
these obligations have been fulfilled, these officers are re-
ferred to the certification procedures regulated in Article 42 
of the GDPR (Article 25 (3), 32 (3) of the GDPR). By intro-
ducing the certification procedures in the GDPR, the legisla-
tive bodies are focusing on an alternative to the previous da-
ta-protection model, which was characterized by strict 
supervision, and are becoming more active from an advisory 
rather than a sanctioning perspective (Raschauer, 2018). The 
embedding of information rights in the form of a right of in-
formation for the data subject (Articles 13–15 of the GDPR), 
extensive documentation obligations for data processing and 
protective measures (e.g. Article 5 (2)), and obligations to re-
port violations of the protection of personal data to the su-
pervisory authority and the data subject (Article 33 of the 
GDPR) lead to more transparency and control for data sub-
jects. This strengthens their position vis-à-vis all those who 
process data. 
For high-risk data processing, those responsible must fur-
thermore carry out data-protection impact assessments in 
advance, on the basis of which the data-protection authori-
ties carry out a prior check (Articles 35 and 36 of the 
GDPR). 
Enforcement of the GDPR
Articles 51 to 76 of the GDPR strengthen the national super-
visory authorities and their cooperation. With a view to im-
proving enforcement, Articles 77ff. of the GDPR lay down 
regulations on the legal protection of the data subjects vis-à-
vis the data-processing companies and organizations and 
their responsible officers. In addition, Articles 82–84 of the 
GDPR provide for higher fines and penalties for breaches of 
data protection than in the previous legal situation and ex-
tend obligations backed by fines; this means of enforcement 
is now much more important than under Europe’s previous 
data-protection law (Eckhardt and Menz, 2018). Fines im-
posed on companies are set out in Article 83 of the GDPR. 
Group profits are treated uniformly by the authorities when 
determining the level of sanctions, and the amount of the 
fines is based on the turnover of the group as a whole (Article 
83 of the GDPR). In the case of Facebook, for example, fines 
of up to 1.3 billion euros could be imposed (Kugelmann, 
2018). 
Non-EU managers operating on the European market 
must appoint a representative within the EU. This makes the 
company more accessible for authorities and affected users. 
The Basic Data Protection Regulation strengthens the nation-
al supervisory authorities and their cooperation in a European 
Data Protection Board, which can now issue guidelines for a 
uniform interpretation of the GDPR (Article 70 of the 
GDPR).
Assessment
The GDPR can be understood as the rather late regulation of 
a socially important area. At the same time, the emergence of 
the GDPR illustrates the duration of societal negotiation pro-
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emergence, organization and multiplication of trans-
national initiatives and connections in the polycentric 
governance system. Digitally supported environmental 
monitoring (Sections 3.3.5.1, 5.2.11) or support for 
policy implementation, for example, can be used to 
build up effective transparency, accountability and 
pressure to act within the framework of the ‘REDD+’ 
mechanism or the implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment. The relationship with national governments and 
companies can also be powerfully reinforced here. The 
Climate Action Network, an umbrella organization of 
over 1,300 environmental NGOs, monitors the UNFCCC 
process closely, critically and competently, e.g. with an 
extensive digital newsletter service covering the 
UNFCCC negotiations. The Emissions Gap Report, pre-
pared by renowned climate scientists and published by 
UNEP, is a prominent example of how in future not 
only the status of climate change, but also the imple-
mentation of climate policy can be better monitored 
and made transparent by non-state actors (UNEP, 
2018). 
4.2.7.2 
Transnational organizations in the management of 
digital infrastructures 
Transnational organizational structures and networks 
play a decisive role not only in the immediate sustain-
ability context. With globalization, transnational coop-
eration is becoming increasingly important for the 
development and management of basic digital and dig-
italized infrastructures, such as the internet. Under the 
heading ‘Internet Governance’, the discussion focuses 
on how and which common principles and standards 
can be adopted by governments, the private sector and 
civil society for decisions and decision-making proce-
dures relating to the internet (WGIG, 2005; Hofmann, 
2017). Actor groups involved in this governance include 
private companies, associations and organizations of 
the tech community, states and intergovernmentally 
initiated organizations and forums (e.g. Internet 
 Governance Forum – IGF, NETmundial) as well as civil 
society (Hofmann, 2017). In particular, the technical 
development of the internet and the international man-
agement and allocation of domain names and IP 
addresses is mainly characterized by cooperation 
between private actors, so that this is often used as ref-
erence material for transnationalization (e.g. Viellech-
ner, 2013;  Spindler, 2014). These non-state alliances 
cesses in areas that are sensitive to both business and human 
rights. Negotiations on the GDPR took from 2012 to 2016; it 
became valid EU-wide in 2018. It thus took six years for this 
European law to be drawn up and adopted. The GDPR is per-
ceived as the most influential data-protection regulation that 
has ever existed; it could influence the development of da-
ta-protection law worldwide (Kuner et al., 2017; Privacy In-
ternational, 2018b). For example, it has been extensively 
taken into account in the preparations for the currently 
emerging Indian Data Protection Act (Kipker, 2018). It re-
mains to be seen whether the high level of data protection will 
also be perceived as a competitive disadvantage and there will 
thus be pressure to weaken the rules (Selmayr, 2018). The 
GDPR’s success and effectiveness will depend primarily on 
how it is fleshed out and enforced by the supervisory author-
ities, the European Data Protection Board and the courts, as 
well as on how ambitiously the certification procedures and 
joint rules of conduct to promote data protection supple-
menting the GDPR are designed. The latter are being devel-
oped in cooperation between the Member States, companies, 
the European Commission and interest groups. The introduc-
tion of the GDPR has also led to extensive debates within 
Europe. Criticism of inadequate support for the introduction 
process has been voiced, as the extensive documentation ob-
ligations under the GDPR have led some small providers, e.g. 
blogs, to give up in view of the technical requirements of data 
protection and take their sites down as a precaution (Dachwitz 
and Kurz, 2018). Professional technical support during the 
introduction of regulation seems necessary to promote the 
acceptance of complex regulatory regimes. 
The GDPR shows that state or supranational data protec-
tion is possible and appears to be becoming increasingly ef-
fective across the board. The GDPR will have to prove its ef-
fectiveness above all vis-à-vis major data-processing 
corporations such as Facebook or Google. Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg calls for an active role of governments in the 
regulation of companies operating on the internet and a 
worldwide data-protection regulation similar to the GDPR 
(Zuckerberg, 2019). Yet Facebook has hitherto only recog-
nized changes for the EU and only at the level of terms and 
conditions, so that a consistent enforcement at the data-pro-
tection level remains open (Privacy International, 2018c). The 
GDPR has already succeeded in drawing attention to data 
protection and broadly embedding the topic in institutions. 
Its introduction has also generated many side effects that 
could affect acceptance by the population. By applying the 
principle, according to which the user’s place of residence is 
decisive, not the company’s registered office, the GDPR now 
also applies to companies based outside the EU that process 
data on EU citizens. It remains to be seen whether companies 
operating inside and outside the EU will now apply data pro-
tection uniformly under the GDPR (Privacy International, 
2018b). The GDPR has the status of reference material in in-
ternational data-protection development (Privacy Interna-
tional, 2018a) and should therefore be the starting point and 
subject for international cooperation in the field of data pro-
tection and data-protection law; this can include a platform 
with associated case law, support for transfer to other legal 
systems and international convergence processes in data- 
protection law (Kuner et al., 2017). 
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Box 4 .2 .7-1
The ICANN as a transnational player in internet 
governance
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) is responsible for the central administration of the 
internet’s basic functions. ICANN manages or oversees the 
internet addresses for the global community, the internet’s 
unique names and numbers (internet protocols, IP addresses, 
top-level domains), and root servers as storage locations for 
the names and numbers, thus ensuring that the content and 
recipients mediated via the internet can be unequivocally al-
located. The ICANN is a non-profit organization under private 
law based in California. Its primary objective is to ensure sta-
ble and secure internet infrastructures (Section 1.1. (a) 
ICANN Bylaws; ICANN, 2019). In a nutshell, its interest is 
focused on the standardization, stability, reliability, security, 
global interoperability, resilience, openness, and usability of 
the internet and its components (Section 1.2 (a) ICANN By-
laws, ICANN, 2019).
The fact that the internet is administered by a private or-
ganization like ICANN is a result of the initially informal de-
velopment of the internet by the military and scientists (Sec-
tion 3.1.2.1). The tasks performed by ICANN were entrusted 
to it in 1998 not by the international community but by US 
authorities (Hofmann, 2017: 25). ICANN has only been oper-
ating independently of US regulatory supervision since 2016 
(NTIA, 2016), when the USA yielded to long-standing criti-
cism of US influence. Transparency and accountability are 
now to be established through a complex compliance proce-
dure, which was also a prerequisite for its release into inde-
pendence. The ICANN network is made up of numerous com-
panies and organizations that work together to develop 
guidelines and form the link to ICANN’s directories. 
Decision-making at ICANN
ICANN decides on the basic guidelines for the allocation of 
unique names and numbers in the internet and on the organ-
ization and procedure within ICANN. ICANN’s internal deci-
sion-making is based on a multi-stakeholder process where, 
as a rule, anyone can participate in negotiation processes. The 
basic assumption is that no individual interest can dominate 
if many stakeholders are involved in an inclusive, open, trans-
parent bottom-up process (GCIG, 2016: 80). Although ICANN 
thus offers opportunities for all to participate, the composi-
tion of the decisive Board of Directors is weighted, which is 
why not all interests are represented in a balanced way. The 
stakeholders with voting rights on the ICANN’s decisions are 
the (association of) Regional Internet Registries, which ad-
minister the IP address areas, the association of regional reg-
istrars for country-specific domain names (e.g. ‘.de’), the as-
sociation of central registrars for other domain names (e.g. 
‘.org’), and the organization in which internet users can con-
tribute to ICANN’s work. The user community can cast one 
vote out of a total of 16 vis-à-vis the mainly technical and 
business stakeholders. Government representatives, security 
experts, technical experts and developers participate in 
ICANN’s decision-making processes in a purely advisory cap-
acity. The individual stakeholder groups are represented by 
volunteers from all over the world (ICANN, 2018). ICANN’s 
policies are not subject to government supervision, nor are 
they binding in themselves. They become valid through civ-
il-law contracts (including penalties for violations) with the 
organizations involved in enforcement (Lahmann et al., 
2016), in which the ICANN has given itself extensive author-
ity rights (Jacob, 2018). 
ICANN’s controversial role and the future of internet 
governance
The question of whether decisions taken by ICANN are suffi-
ciently legitimate and transparent is a recurring one (GCIG, 
2016: 78). Decisions are taken without the direct influence of 
states or the international community. The question of legiti-
macy is also raised with regard to decision-making via mul-
ti-stakeholder procedures, as not all interests can be repre-
sented to the same extent (Hofmann, 2017), partly because 
of the unequal distribution of power and resources. 
In response to criticism and as a condition of independ-
ence from the US authorities, ICANN introduced mechanisms 
in 2016 to ensure transparency and verifiability. Since then, 
the stakeholder groups involved in ICANN (whether with or 
without a vote on the Board of Directors) have been able to 
use the ‘empowered community’ mechanism to form their 
own organization under Californian law. They can demand 
accountability from the ICANN Board of Directors and indi-
vidual organizational units, reject strategies, budgets and im-
portant changes to the rules of procedure, replace members of 
the ICANN Board of Directors and enforce these rights in 
court against ICANN (Hofmann, 2017). In addition, any per-
son materially affected by an ICANN decision has the right to 
appeal to an ombudsperson, demand the re-submission of 
decisions and guidelines for re-decision by the executive 
board, and request access to a large proportion of ICANN doc-
uments (ICANN Bylaws). However, the tightened compliance 
rules also create further barriers for newcomers to participate 
in ICANN processes (Hofmann, 2017). 
At the ITU Conference in 2014, some states, including Chi-
na, India and Russia, and some developing countries, called 
for the amendment of the ITU Founding Treaty with the aim 
of transferring internet administration to the ITU. Some of 
these states were perhaps seeking greater influence over the 
internet’s open and liberal organization to their own advan-
tage. Others, particularly less developed countries, criticized 
the fact that participation and the intensity of stakeholder 
participation in the multi-stakeholder process depends on 
their respective economic strength and that the interests of 
poorer people are thus under-represented (Lahmann et al., 
2016: 20). The same also applies to the interests of weakly 
organized groups like consumers, so that consumer-protec-
tion concerns such as data protection and net neutrality can 
be under-represented in the multi-stakeholder process 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2013). The growing private power 
structures in the societally important area of internet admin-
istration could require an increase in intervention by state 
authorities or the EU, particularly to open up the possibility 
of protecting the interests of all (Hoffmann-Riem, 2016). 
Nevertheless, there is a consensus among western countries 
to continue with the multi-stakeholder approach (Lahmann et 
al., 2016: 20), which is justified, inter alia, by the already ex-
isting blockade between the different factions (Jacob, 2018). 
Criticism is not only levelled at the balance of power and the 
implementation of the interests of the common good, but also 
at the system’s functionality. ICANN has not succeeded in en-
suring a rapid global transition from the IPv4 to the Ipv6 In-
ternet Protocol standard, despite the urgent need to switch to 
IPv6 in view of the growing number of internet users, end 
devices (e.g. rising demand for IP addresses in the IoT), and 
newly emerging markets (e.g. in developing countries: GCIG, 
2016: 52). There is no hierarchical coordinating authority that 
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are organized in the form of associations and organiza-
tions of the tech communities; the WBGU takes a closer 
look at one example of these: the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN; Box 4.2.7-1). 
The private organization of digital infrastructures raises 
questions about the legitimacy of actors – especially 
since states and civil society, including users, can only 
have a limited impact on these actors (Hofmann, 2017). 
However, the provision of services and administration 
of the infrastructure, network access and communica-
tion services – organized without the direct influence 
of states or the international community – sometimes 
produces suboptimal results, e.g. lack of transparency 
and security risks (Hofmann, 2017). 
4.2.7.3  
Interim conclusion
Transnational actors fulfil numerous functions in the 
global governance of the sustainability transformation. 
As activists and lobbyists they campaign transnation-
ally for their interests in the global public sphere, and 
as experts they support international processes or par-
ticipate directly in negotiations as stakeholders. Since 
the adoption of international environmental agree-
ments, particularly climate agreements, they have been 
involved as a critical public in monitoring and as actors 
themselves in implementation (Bäckstrand, 2015). 
With many companies and administrations committing 
to corporate social responsibility and providing digital 
infrastructures, transnational business and digital 
actors de facto often perform tasks in the common 
interest.
In the best-case scenario, digital networking, virtu-
ality and knowledge growth (Section 3.4) can be posi-
tive drivers for the formation and diversification of 
transnational structures that have already been set in 
motion and which, in the future, could cumulate in a 
kind of critical global society or global (environmental) 
awareness (Section 5.3.1). Global cooperation for com-
mon global goals, such as the SDGs, could thus be 
driven by a multitude of actors from all sectors. As is so 
often the case, however, digitalization and its technolo-
gies are only the means and do not in themselves auto-
matically have a meaningful purpose. Transnational 
actors and governance, too, are not emancipatory or 
legitimate per se. It is true that this sphere is a sounding 
board for transformation pioneers and policy experi-
ments, and a post-national public sphere for mutual 
understanding and the building of trust; however, the 
digitalized public sphere can also lead to more abrupt 
fragmentation, societal polarization and a weakening of 
shared norms in the global arena (Section 5.3.2). In 
other words, the conscious use of digital means for the 
common good is also important in the transnational 
area to make it easier to achieve environmental and 
development goals in the long term.
In the field of transnational sustainability govern-
ance, digital solutions should be used to enable more 
empirical knowledge, cooperation and transparency. 
More and better participation formats for stakeholders 
are particularly important in the polycentric system of 
global sustainability policy, in order to include conflicts 
between very different local, social, national and global 
demands in the dialogue. In this way, effective and, 
where possible, legitimate pathways can be jointly 
developed, for example with regard to shaping struc-
tural change through climate change and climate-change 
mitigation (WBGU, 2018b).
However, the transnational internet governance 
architecture lacks the participation and influence of 
civil society, user associations and states. The actors 
lack viable joint structures in which decisions can be 
made and societal standards set. 
4 .2 .8 
International organizations as actors in sustaina-
bility governance
The role of international sustainability-governance 
organizations is changing in two ways in the Digital 
Age: first, international organizations are important for 
shaping the new policy field of globally sustainable dig-
italization (Section 8.1); second, digital technology can 
not only improve these organizations’ ability to act, but 
also change their global role and function. 
can order and enforce updates (Hofmann, 2017: 10). ICANN’s 
rules on the publicly accessible registration of domain holders 
also conflict with more stringent data-protection legislation, 
for example the GDPR (Kramer, 2018; Sarac and Strömer, 
2018; Box 4.2.6-3). Furthermore, the Domain Name System 
(DNS) also has technical data-protection concerns (DNS Pri-
vacy Project, 2018).
The question of how ICANN’s shortcomings – e.g. the ob-
stacles to participation, the limited influence of states and 
civil society – can be remedied is the subject of divergent 
proposals. They range from the creation of a fully decentral-
ized system of internet governance (Verhulst et al., 2014) to 
a UN declaration that the ICANN should be made an inde-
pendent United Nations regulator (Jacob, 2018). The IGF un-
der the UN umbrella is a central forum for discussing these 
issues, although no decisions can be made there 
(Section 8.1.2). 
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4.2.8.1 
International organizations and sustainable digita-
lization
Since the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, global sustainability governance has 
made great progress with the adoption of Agenda 21, 
the Rio Declaration and the three Rio Conventions on 
climate, biodiversity and combating desertification. In 
recent years, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 
the Aichi biodiversity targets (CBD, 2010; Section 8.2.3) 
and the aim of land degradation neutrality (SDG 15.3; 
UNCCD, 2016) have been adopted. The 2030 Agenda 
provides a catalogue of goals for global sustainability 
policy in the next decade. On the other hand, the effec-
tiveness of international organizations is insufficient, 
given the size and complexity of global environmental 
and social problems. Climate change, in particular, has 
not been sufficiently contained up to now. An intergov-
ernmental agreement – for example on the establish-
ment of an international organization – does not neces-
sarily overcome dynamics of interests and power 
(Bernstein, 2002; Marcoux, 2011; Purdon, 2017).
The challenge is therefore to implement and enforce 
the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement (Beisheim, 
2018). The United Nations, particularly the High-Level 
Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF), is 
the central forum for this. Other key actors in interna-
tional sustainability governance include the Bretton 
Woods institutions (World Bank, International Mone-
tary Fund), the World Trade Organization (WHO), the 
OECD, the G7 and the G20 (Section 8.1). 
Almost 30 years after the Rio Summit, the question 
now arises as to whether international organizations, 
particularly the United Nations, which is in the process 
of reform, need to reposition themselves in order to 
shape the Digital Age in a sustainable way. This also 
involves how the international community deals with 
new, powerful players in the global digital economy 
(Box 8.4-1). Similar to sustainability, digitalization 
involves shaping a cross-cutting task and a policy area 
with new challenges, including its own institutions and 
processes. Here, too, crisis phenomena occur when nei-
ther national policy nor the international system offers 
an adequate regulatory framework (Anheier et al., 
2018). This applies particularly to rapid and fundamen-
tal technological developments that can overtake and 
overstrain the dynamics of institutional arrangements. 
A critical public that includes watchdog groups, think 
tanks and activists and demands transparency and 
accountability is also a decisive corrective here 
( Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.7). 
Overall, the international community’s ability to 
cope with global challenges has tended to weaken in 
recent years. There are two main reasons for this: first, 
areas like digitalization or climate change currently 
pose immense challenges to the governance capacities 
of national governments and international organiza-
tions and require new modes of governance (Anheier et 
al., 2018); second, the legitimacy of international 
organizations – as well as that of the liberal, regu lation-
led world order as a whole – has been increasingly 
called into question in recent years by nationalistic and 
globalization-critical movements in Europe and the 
USA (Hale and Held, 2017; Ikenberry, 2018; Norris and 
Inglehart, 2018). The key challenge is therefore how to 
shape digitalized sustainability societies despite the 
current crisis of multilateralism. However, the crisis of 
the multilateral system does not mean its end, as new 
multilateral institutions can be set up at the same time 
(Brühl, 2019). Examples include the establishment of 
new multilateral institutions such as the New Develop-
ment Bank (NDB) or the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB), which are a response to the Bretton 
Woods system that emerged after the Second World 
War and reflect the shifts in the global balance of 
power, e.g. the rise of China. The same applies to the 
G20’s call for the WHO rules to be adjusted to take Chi-
na’s current global importance into account ( Anbumozhi 
et al., 2017). Seen in this light, the moment of crisis also 
offers an opportunity to permanently embed the issue 
of digitalization in international organizations, espe-
cially within the framework of the United Nations (e.g. 
the UN Fit for Purpose debate; Sections 8.1.3, 8.4). In 
concrete terms, this will involve embedding the issues 
of sustainable digitalization and digitalization for sus-
tainability, as well as creating a central authority in the 
United Nations system. Although the UNFCCC process, 
for example, was protracted and continues to be so, it 
was a prerequisite for climate change to establish itself 
as a subject of international policy and for internation-
ally coordinated measures of climate-change mitigation 
to be agreed upon (Hamilton, 2017). A similar process 
could also be initiated to deal with privacy or autono-
mous systems and AI. This would also be a long process, 
but, as with climate change, the impetus also for digi-
talization can come from the scientific community, 
which must go on the offensive and communicate its 
findings before they can become the subject of political 
cooperation at international level.
4.2.8.2 
Changing role and function of international orga-
nizations
Digitalization simplifies and accelerates global commu-
nication and information flows – and this applies to all 
societal actors, organizations, business and individuals. 
In particular, the expanded possibilities for monitoring 
will further facilitate and accelerate the reporting sys-
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tem required for reviewing global environmental 
regimes and enable observations to be made in real time 
( Section 5.2.11). In addition, digital technologies open 
up new possibilities for creating global (environmental) 
awareness (Section 5.3.1), which could, at least poten-
tially, have a positive effect on global sustainability pol-
icy. Furthermore, multilateral negotiations have become 
much more transparent through live transmissions on 
the internet – as practised, for example, by the Green 
Climate Fund of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change – and could also have a beneficial effect on 
global cooperation culture. In view of the currently 
increasing frequency of false information and targeted 
disinformation campaigns (e.g. on man-made global 
climate change), international sustainability-govern-
ance organizations, which provide central global know-
ledge resources with their fact-based reporting and 
reports, will in future have to assume a new role in 
terms of informational quality assurance. 
4 .3
Use windows of opportunity for sustainability 
transformation 
Analysis of the actor structures influenced by the 
dynamics of digitalization in today’s societies points to 
situations of upheaval in which contradictory trends 
become visible. Sustainability breakthroughs are 
becoming possible while, at the same time, path 
dependencies are perpetuating established growth pat-
terns. Digitalization itself also promotes constellations 
of actors that can inhibit transformations towards sus-
tainability. Digitalization and disruptive technological 
advances by no means automatically create sustainable 
behaviour by the actor groups and the alliances and 
guiding principles of sustainability outlined in 
 Section 4.2, but they do open up windows of opportu-
nity for change. Sustainability strategies and policies 
must take these moments of dynamic change into 
account in order to support actor constellations that 
favour sustainability breakthroughs. Digital change 
generates change processes characterized by three pat-
terns; these are outlined in the following Sections 4.3.1 
to 4.3.3. 
4 .3 .1 
New options and change alliances
The dynamics of digitalization change actor constella-
tions and quickly create new actor groups, often with 
disruptive effects. In just one or two decades, digital 
companies have become the largest corporations in the 
global economy and thus transnational actors 
( Sections 3.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.7). They are transforming pro-
duction, business models (e.g. with digital startups or 
virtual value chains), trade and investment flows. In 
this context, a new group of actors has emerged: the 
tech communities. They consist of algorithm experts 
and other digital experts, who influence and change the 
economy, society and consumption patterns through 
their work as programmers and software developers, 
for example. Many people around the globe can now 
network, exchange ideas, learn and organize them-
selves politically via social media. Such changes made 
possible and accelerated by digital technologies are 
modifying national and transnational networks of peo-
ple, companies and organizations. Long-established 
actor constellations and path dependencies are being 
broken up, a new range of options and opportunities 
for change in the economy and society are being cre-
ated. Change alliances, new perspectives and visions of 
the future can develop. The disruptions caused by dig-
ital technology thus also open up opportunities for 
advancing sustainability processes. 
 > There is a general tendency for corporate business 
models and technologies – particularly those of dig-
ital companies – to be less directly dependent on the 
use of natural resources, especially fossil fuels, than 
in the traditional economy. Knowledge is at the cen-
tre of digital business models, not the extraction of 
(natural) raw materials or the combustion of fossil 
fuels, although digitalization is associated with con-
siderable energy and resource requirements. Digital 
companies are more likely to be convinced by ideas 
of post-fossil and cycle-oriented management than 
classical industrial companies and can thus become 
allies in the Transformation towards Sustainability. 
 > The innovative spirit and power of the tech commu-
nities can be combined with sustainability innova-
tions and renewed prospects for the future. The sus-
tainability community demands transformations 
towards sustainability. The digital economy is creat-
ing new, different markets, standards and changing 
patterns of behaviour. Opportunities could arise 
here if the digital community’s willingness to change 
and dynamics for change could be combined with 
sustainability models and perspectives (Box 4.3.1-1).
 > Digitalization makes new forms of economic activity 
and consumption possible. Digital companies ori-
ented towards the common good emerge in which 
the inclusion of employees is strengthened. Prosum-
ers can manufacture their own products or media 
offers and thus create their own public spheres. Dig-
ital technologies increasingly make it possible to 
check, document and reveal to consumers where and 
under what circumstances products have been man-
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ufactured. All these possibilities of combining digital 
changes with sustainability transformations have 
not yet been exhausted. But the conditions for the 
possibility of digital sustainability societies are 
emerging (Section 4.2.4).
 > Digital communication allows sustainability move-
ments – such as Fridays for Future activists or com-
mitted cities – to network around the world and thus 
push societal change across borders. Digital tech-
nologies can enable NGOs from developing countries 
to document and globally communicate environ-
mental degradation anywhere on Earth.
 > Global communication opportunities allow interna-
tional organizations to network better with local 
actors. Global reporting is made easier and multilat-
eral negotiations more transparent through live 
transmissions on the internet (Section 4.2.8).
New opportunities are emerging for sustainability pol-
icy, sustainability movements and sustainability-ori-
ented companies to form alliances in order to initiate 
changes towards sustainability that are far from 
exhausted.
4 .3 .2 
Shadows of the past: path dependencies 
 perpetuate destructive growth paths
Path dependencies also persist in open, disruptive 
moments of societal development. Old business models, 
forms of unsustainable management and consumption 
are being continued with digital methods. Traditional 
industrial companies are using digital technologies not 
only to increase their resource and energy efficiency, 
but also to scale up traditional, resource- and emis-
sion-intensive business models. Consumers are expand-
ing their consumption of resources via online com-
merce. High energy consumption, overexploitation of 
limited raw-materials reserves, and market power used 
to push through low wages and social standards are not 
limited to traditional sectors of the economy; they also 
continue in the business models of digital corporations 
with market power. Digital communications also facili-
tate the establishment of global value chains that can 
multiply resource consumption and greenhouse-gas 
emissions. Not only sustainability movements use 
global communication channels; enemies of democracy 
and aggressive nationalists do so, too. States can also 
continue promoting resource- and climate-damaging 
developments and strengthening path dependencies, 
Box 4 .3 .1-1
Institutionalize the tech communities’ sense of 
responsibility for sustainable development
The WBGU sees the following possible building blocks for 
mainstreaming and institutionalizing sustainability issues in 
the tech communities: 
Sustainability by design
Since values inscribed into digital systems affect society as 
socio-technical realities (Brey, 2010), a critical examination of 
these value inscriptions should be carried out as a basis for 
consciously promoting and establishing well-thought-out 
values, also in order to be able to understand values from the 
sustainability context (Section 4.2.4). In addition to promot-
ing privacy, trust and (cyber) security by means of appropri-
ate technology design, a concept for ‘sustainability by design’ 
could already embed sustainability at the design stage, for 
example by taking energy and resource efficiency into ac-
count at the development phase. This also includes develop-
ing guidelines for the value-sensitive development of e.g. 
data collections, algorithms or heuristics, particularly “in are-
as in which far-reaching decisions are made on the basis of 
precisely these data situations and forecasts” (Simon, 
2016: 363).
Technological social responsibility
At the company level, technological social responsibility 
could be established in addition to an increase in corporate 
social responsibility. Under this label, digital companies in 
particular should address how their business models and 
practices affect wider society.
Responsible technology development 
Strategic support for the responsible use of digital technolo-
gies also comes from research funding. Currently, national 
and international sponsors are increasingly promoting re-
sponsible research and innovation, i.e. research and innova-
tion that is oriented towards societal goals and ideals, includ-
ing sustainability goals (Responsible Research and Innovation 
– RRI). The UN’s sustainability goals should also be explicitly 
embedded and demanded (Section 8.2.1).
Weizenbaum oath – a professional ethic for the sustai-
nable design and use of digital technologies
Professional organizations like the Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM), the first scientific society for computer 
science with 78,000 members worldwide, or the German So-
ciety for Computer Science (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Infor-
matik) want to give orientation to people who design, manu-
facture, operate or use ICT systems with recently updated 
ethical guidelines (ACM Ethics, 2018; GI, 2018). These and 
similar initiatives provide starting points for the development 
of professional ethics for the sustainable design and use of 
digital technologies. A Weizenbaum oath could commit the 
tech communities to general principles guiding the develop-
ment and application of digital technologies. These principles 
should also be an established part of the education and fur-
ther training of experts.
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e.g. by subsidizing the combustion of fossil fuels, thus 
preventing digital technologies from being mobilized 
for climate protection. 
4 .3 .3 
Digitalization itself creates power alliances and 
barriers against sustainability transformations
Digitalization is opening up opportunities for sustain-
ability transformations in the current situation of 
upheaval. At the same time, it is being used to perpet-
uate unsustainable economic activity and create new 
power alliances and blocking mechanisms that make 
the transition to sustainability more difficult. States’ 
ability to act is of key importance for sustainability 
transformations. States create framework conditions 
and incentive systems, and are responsible for imple-
menting an orientation towards the common good, 
without which transitions to sustainability cannot suc-
ceed. The ability of nation states to act has already been 
weakened by globalization, as more and more problem 
constellations, financial flows and actor networks are 
becoming international, while states’ decision-making 
sovereignty remain restricted to national territories. 
Digitalization seems to be shifting the potential for 
shaping the economy and society further in the direc-
tion of private actors:
 > Societally crucial infrastructures of the Digital Age 
– e.g. information sources and communication chan-
nels such as the internet – are being created by pri-
vate organizations and companies, without states 
exerting enough influence, laying down a socially 
and environmentally compatible framework, or 
offering public-service infrastructures based on 
their obligation to advance the common good and 
their guarantee responsibility (Sections 5.3.5; 4.2.2; 
4.2.6; 4.2.7; Box 4.2.7-1). In addition, the public 
sector is often dependent on the know-how and 
financial strength of the private sector when it comes 
to implementing IT projects such as digitalizing the 
transport sector (Section 4.2.5). This transfer of 
responsibility for the infrastructure to the private 
sector in the digital sphere tends to work against the 
idea of shaping digital infrastructures in a way ori-
ented towards the common good in the broad sense.
 > One can observe the increasing power of large digital 
corporations to exert influence on core areas of soci-
ety such as the media landscape, digital security 
infrastructures and the use of big data. For example, 
digital companies are documenting human behav-
iour to an unprecedented extent, evaluating per-
sonal data and trying to influence users’ and con-
sumers’ decision making (Sections 5.2.3, 5.3.7). This 
results in invasions of privacy, and democratic prob-
lems can arise if it is not possible to limit corporate 
power in a way that is oriented towards fundamental 
rights and the common good. 
 > Many countries’ room for manoeuvre in corporate 
taxation has already been significantly reduced in 
the past by globalization dynamics impacting on the 
tax base. The further decline in the importance of a 
company’s physical presence in generating profits as 
a result of virtualization further weakens the ability 
of countries to tax companies appropriately 
(Box 4.2.2-2; Section 4.2.6). 
 > The individual is situated in an area of tension 
between changing values and knowledge, the digital 
economy’s business models, state regulation and 
technology. In particular, the conditions for exercis-
ing and protecting fundamental human rights are 
changing in the digital sphere. Because of the use of 
digital services, different privacy-protection catego-
ries become relevant from those that have hitherto 
regulated privacy offline (e.g. the special protection 
of the home to ensure privacy). The right to privacy 
and the associated risks to identity, self-determina-
tion and creativity must therefore be discussed anew 
and intensively (Trepte, 2016a). Negotiations must 
also be conducted on the scope of freedom of 
expression and the prerequisites for equal inclusion 
opportunities. In the Digital Age, the right to the 
protection of and respect for human dignity (e.g. 
Article 1 of the Basic Law) is of particular relevance 
for the interpretation and application of the funda-
mental and human rights just mentioned 
( Section 2.3): human dignity must always be 
respected – in the sense of an ultima ratio – in all 
political negotiation processes and legal evaluation 
and assessment processes. Otherwise the pendulum 
might swing in the other direction. Digital surveil-
lance systems based on big data and AI enable 
authoritarian states to comprehensively control their 
citizens and punish them for ‘inappropriate 
 behaviour’. When thought through to the end, the 
freedom of the individual, the protection of privacy 
and democracy itself are called into question in such 
contexts (Box 4.2.6-2).
Digital innovations create additional, new democratic 
problems in the Digital Age. Automated decision-mak-
ing systems, which are increasingly being used (or can 
be used) by companies, courts of law, the police or even 
in the design of autonomous mobility systems, raise 
diverse questions of democracy and transparency that 
affect interactions between people, institutions and 
AI-controlled technical systems ( Section 4.2.1) – and 
challenge the decision-making sovereignty of individu-
als and societies (Box 4.3.3-1). Key questions are 
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Box 4 .3 .3-1
Decision-making sovereignty in core societal 
areas
Since about 2013, developments in AI – especially the analy-
sis of large amounts of data (big data: Section 3.3.2) by means 
of (deep) machine learning (Section 3.3.3) – have also been 
widely discussed with regard to their societal impacts (May-
er-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013; Domingos, 2015; Tegmark, 
2017 Harari, 2018). Indeed, the implications of automated 
decision making and decisionmaking support in societally rel-
evant areas deserve special attention. In clearly definable 
technical processes, the aim of a decision is usually clear and 
undisputed. An undesirable result would be relatively easy to 
identify and classify as such. An example of such a process 
might be self-driving vehicles or production processes in fac-
tories. In the defined scenarios and contexts, such systems are 
supposed to function without direct human intervention. 
In societal processes, by contrast, the use of machines for 
decision making and decision-making support is more prob-
lematic. Implementing societal goals, like defining them, is a 
political negotiation process determined by ideas, norms and 
interests. Political and normative issues are always character-
ized by potentially conflicting interests and values. Against 
this background, when machines are used in decision making 
and decision-making support, goals cannot be universally de-
fined and results cannot be universally evaluated – unlike, for 
example, in the case of a self-driving car. Yet machine-based 
decision-making support also holds great potential for gov-
ernance: people work slowly, they can be wrong or biased. 
Automated decision-making support – e.g. in police work, in 
court proceedings or in economic-policy distribution deci-
sions – removes these weaknesses from the equation, at least 
in principle because a possible bias can still remain in the 
training data. However, automated decision making in the 
context of societal processes – in addition to dealing appro-
priately with general technical challenges and limitations 
(Schinzel, 2017; Zweig, 2019) – is fundamentally confronted 
with the question of where the boundary lies between tech-
nically solvable problems on the one hand and normative, 
political and legal questions and responsibilities on the other. 
This boundary is not clear-cut and is itself dependent on so-
cietal priorities. Against the background of this lack of clarity, 
a number of problem areas arise for the use of automated 
decision making and decision-making support and for the use 
of AI in societal contexts, which are outlined below. Then fol-
lows the question of how these problem areas can be con-
tained and which framework conditions and intervention 
points can ensure human decision-making sovereignty.
Potential problem areas 
To begin with, there is the potential problem that automated 
decisions lack transparency and traceability – in two ways: 
First, automated decision making and decision-making sup-
port in societal processes is to some extent detached from the 
normative and political character of these processes, because 
automatisms are subject to rules and data which operate in a 
‘black box’, making them practically inaccessible to the gen-
eral public (Pasquale, 2015; Lischka and Klingel, 2017). In 
cases where social perception attributes special precision and 
objectivity to corresponding systems, the mere fact that a de-
cision was brought about with the aid of machines lends a 
certain authority to this decision (Beer, 2016) – in a similar 
way to the already observed quantification of societal deci-
sion making (Rieder and Simon, 2016; Mau, 2017). The fact 
that decisions in core societal areas are characterized by po-
tentially conflicting interests and values can thus be sidelined 
in society’s perception in view of a decision-making process 
that seems purely technical – which would complicate an ap-
propriate societal debate (Pasquale, 2018). “If there is no 
room for discourse until after a design process is completed, 
decisions are more likely to be accepted as given” (Lischka 
and Klingel, 2017). In addition, problems such as an inherent 
bias in the underlying data or an insufficient amount of data 
(Schinzel, 2017; Schwarz et al., 2019; Zweig, 2019) may re-
main unresolved unless there is appropriate auditing, certifi-
cation and decision-making sovereignty (Bertels-
mann-Stiftung and iRights.Lab, 2019).
Second, challenges for automated decision making and de-
cision-making support in core societal areas can stem not only 
from the perhaps non-transparent use of technology, but also 
from the characteristics of the technology itself. Certain forms 
of AI are not directly comprehensible because of their intrin-
sic complexity (Domingos, 2015). Solution pathways found 
through machine learning are mathematically, but not neces-
sarily objectively, comprehensible. Experts can understand 
the individual steps in the decision-making process, but this 
does not necessarily make the overall picture accessible. This 
requires a representative explanation of each case. The ques-
tion must be asked: according to what measure is a particular 
solution preferable to the immense number of alternatives? 
The challenge of making automated decision making and de-
cision-making support comprehensible and verifiable in view 
of this intrinsic complexity is all the more important – but also 
more difficult – given the limited institutional capacities and 
technical knowledge on the part of both the users and those 
affected by machine-based decision making in societal con-
texts (Lischka and Klingel, 2017). As a consequence, ques-
tions of accountability also arise at the institutional level, i.e. 
the ability to explain and justify decisions proposed or made 
(Doshi-Velez et al., 2017; Vedder and Naudts, 2017). 
Strategies for maintaining decision-making 
sovereignty
In view of the problem areas outlined here, it must be ensured 
that societal decision making and decision-making support, 
even if they are machine-based, are ultimately the responsi-
bility of people, or at least that people have the knowledge 
and ability to intervene at all times. It is therefore a question 
of ensuring decision-making sovereignty. “Decision-making 
sovereignty refers to the ability to understand the origins of 
and justifications for decisions and recommendations for ac-
tion made by autonomous systems and assistants, and to in-
fluence them through human intervention if necessary” (Bey-
erer et al., 2018). Responsible, forward-thinking handling of 
automated decision making and decision-making support 
must not be limited to simply referring to existing regulations. 
Rather, it is entirely in line with the Second Dynamic of the 
Digital Age (Chapters 2 and 7) to ensure as a precautionary 
measure that the necessary societal framework conditions are 
created. 
In addition to societal debate and technology-oriented ed-
ucation, it is particularly necessary in this context to ensure 
that automated decision making and decision-making support 
in societal processes is always comprehensible, that responsi-
bilities are clearly defined, and that corrective measures can 
be taken. This requires the establishment of an appropriate 
institutional framework for accountability within existing le-
gal and political systems covering the use of automated 
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therefore: How can people’s ultimate control of soci-
etally relevant decisions be ensured? What standards 
are needed in order to develop, implement and monitor 
algorithms that are compatible with democracy and 
human rights?
4 .3 .4 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the changes in actor constellations 
driven by digitalization dynamics shows that today’s 
societies are in motion. Technological developments are 
profoundly and rapidly changing business models, 
guiding principles and actor networks. Sustainability 
transformations no longer only take place in situations 
of conflict between the climate-damaging and 
resource-intensive economy and sustainability alli-
ances, but also in societies undergoing digital upheaval. 
An open situation is emerging in which three interre-
lated trends are becoming visible. First, digital change 
and sustainability transformation could be brought 
together by new change alliances linking sustainability 
and tech communities. Starting points, manifold oppor-
tunities, areas where there is ample leeway, and win-
dows of opportunity for such a path to digital sustain-
ability are identifiable. Second, it can also be observed 
that climate-damaging and resource-intensive business 
models, growth processes and consumption patterns 
are being continued with digital technologies – this still 
seems to be the key trend that needs to be reversed. 
Third, it is becoming clear that digitalization can also 
create new barriers and challenges for sustainability 
transformations. The use of digital systems can encour-
age private and governmental abuse of power, under-
mine the rights of individuals, and create entirely new 
design challenges, e.g. when it comes to controlling 
automated technical decision-making systems. All 
these trends must be anticipated and turned around 
productively in the sense of the Transformation towards 
Sustainability (Chapter 7).
Seldom have there been so many opportunities for a 
fresh start. Sustainability actors who have so far largely 
neglected digital change dynamics must use the out-
lined upheavals to steer developments towards sustain-
ability: it is necessary (1) to form new alliances – locally, 
nationally, trans- and internationally; (2) to develop 
new guiding principles for the digitalized sustainability 
society with new partners, so that polycentric respon-
sibility architectures for sustainable digital societies can 
emerge; (3) to advance institutional and regulatory 
innovations in the context of this upheaval in order to 
open up and consolidate sustainability paths; (4) to 
understand the new challenges of digitalization for a 
development that is compatible with both humans and 
the Earth system; and (5) to develop solutions that will 
at the same time lead to a changed understanding of 
sustainability.
The Digital Age is an age of networking and it 
requires shaping in diverse ways using both well-
known and completely new governance mechanisms 
and actor relationships. Instead of a purely top-down 
approach or relying on the self-healing powers of mar-
kets, a polycentric responsibility architecture makes it 
possible to incorporate the large number of actors who 
determine the Digital Age as responsible (co-)designers 
in the Transformation towards Sustainability.
 decision making and decision-making support (Scherer, 2016; 
Doshi-Velez et al., 2017; Kroll et al., 2017; Vedder and 
Naudts, 2017; Saurwein, 2019). The chance of reasonable 
traceability can be increased, for example, by ‘labelling’ the 
use of automated decision making and decision-making sup-
port, disclosing information about underlying data, and giv-
ing access for independent third parties to check the quality 
of machine-based decision making and decision-making sup-
port (Lischka and Klingel, 2017; Bertelsmann-Stiftung and 
iRights.Lab, 2019, Section 3.2.5). Legal responsibility in the 
sense of liability for machine-based decision making and de-
cision-making support would also create economic incentives 
to minimize the consequences in societally sensitive areas 
(Scherer, 2016). Possibilities for correction are offered in par-
ticular by defined intervention points in the decision-making 
process. According to the principle of ‘meaningful human 
control’, human beings should retain the right to make the 
final decisions and the responsibility for machine-supported 
or machine-made decisions (this is currently the subject of 
intense discussion with regard to autonomous weapons sys-
tems: Horowitz and Scharre, 2015; Crootof, 2016; Santoni de 
Sio and van den Hoven, 2018). In addition to such specific 
measures to maintain decision-making sovereignty in soci-
etally relevant areas, technical requirements, which should be 
applied generally in automated decision making and deci-
sion-making support, should also be considered in the case of 
societal issues. These include decentralized decision-making 
structures, for example in the financial sector, in order to 
avoid chain reactions or a single point of failure (Contratto, 
2014; Section 9.2.2.2). 
Finally, however, any application of automated decision 
making and decision-making support must be critically 
thought through in view of its societal implications. The solu-
tion to the associated challenges may lie not only in the revi-
sion or restriction of technical processes, but also in a con-
scious societal decision never to delegate certain questions to 
machines. “No algorithmic system can circumvent the neces-
sary and endless conversations that these ultimately political 
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In view of the broad scope of the two topics of digitalization and sustainabi-
lity, in this report the WBGU uses an approach based on examples, which it 
calls arenas of digital change. These are thematic 'deep drillings' that illustrate 
the prospects and challenges of digitalization in selected areas and provide 
a multifaceted impression of how they can be shaped in the service of the 
Transformation towards Sustainability. They deal with interactions between 
digitalization and the environment, key social and economic dimensions, and 
issues that will not have an impact on society until the longer term.
5 .1
Introduction
This chapter presents examples of ‘arenas of digital 
change’ relating to digitalization and sustainability. It 
gives concrete examples based on scientific evidence to 
illustrate the status, prospects and challenges of digital-
ization in view of the need for a global Transformation 
towards Sustainability. The arenas provide a varied 
impression of the manifold possibilities, on the one 
hand, of how digitalization can be shaped in a positive 
way and, on the other, of the dangers that digitalization 
can pose in the context of the Transformation towards 
Sustainability. The arenas of digital change are places or 
fields of action that have three things in common: (1) 
they allow an in-depth scientific view of specific sub-
ject areas, (2) they are significantly influenced by digi-
talization, albeit in very different ways, and (3) they 
have a connection with sustainability and illustrate how 
digitalization can be shaped in the service of the Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability. Furthermore, 
these insights provide a background that makes it pos-
sible to better identify the future Three Dynamics of 
the Digital Age (Chapter 7). 
At the centre of the arenas are initially topics at the 
direct interface between digitalization and sustainabil-
ity, such as monitoring biological diversity, e-waste and 
the circular economy, climate-change mitigation, the 
energy transformation and agriculture. In addition, fur-
ther arena topics have been identified where potential 
for both digitalization and sustainability will already 
become relevant in the near future (e.g. workplaces of 
the future, sustainable consumer behaviour, smart 
cities and urban mobility). Finally, topics are presented 
which, although their full effect will not be felt until the 
longer term, they will have repercussions for the envi-
ronment and the Earth system, so that the societal dis-
course should begin now (e.g. the technologization of 
human beings). 
The selection of the arenas was based, among other 
things, on the relevance and urgency of the topics at 
the interface of sustainability and digitalization, their 
potential and risks for social cohesion and environmen-
tal protection, but also their ubiquity and international 
significance. The sustainability goals of the 2030 
Agenda were always kept in mind during the process 
(Table 5.1-1). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out 
that the arenas do not claim to be a complete set, nor 
do they follow a systematic approach; rather, they are 
intended to provide examples to create an impression 
of the diversity of digitalization and concrete ways in 
which it can be shaped in the service of sustainability.
A total of 21 arenas were analysed, and roughly 
divided into two categories: ‘Sustainable economic 
activity and the environment’ (Section 5.2) and ‘People 
Arenas of Digital Change 5
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Table 5 .1-1
Connections between the 2030 Agenda's sustainability goals (SDGs) and the arenas of digital change, with references to their 
sections in brackets. Some of the names of the arenas have been abbreviated for reasons of space. 
Source: WBGU
Sustainable economic activity and the 
environment
People and society
SDG 1  
No poverty 
 > Agriculture in developing  
countries (5.2.10)
 > Public-service ICT (5.3.5)
SDG 2  
Zero hunger 
 > Precision agriculture (5.2.9)
 > Agriculture in developing  
countries (5.2.10)
SDG 3  
Good health and 
well-being 
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Digital self-tracking (5.3.7)
 > Technologization of the human  
being (Topic box 5.3-2)
SDG 4  
Quality education
 > Promotion of a collective global 
awareness (5.3.1) 
 > Digitalization and public discourse 
(5.3.2)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Public-service ICT (5.3.5)
 > Digital commons (5.3.10)
SDG 5  
Gender equality
 > Digital technology as a gender 
bender (5.3.6)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
SDG 6  
Clean water and 
sanitation
 > Enforcement of environmental law 
(Topic box 5.3-1)
SDG 7  
Affordable and  
clean energy 
 > Digitalization for climate-change 
 mitigation and the energy  
transformation (5.2.6)
SDG 8  
Decent work and  
economic growth  
 > Industrial metabolism (5.2.1)
 > Sustainability in online commerce 
(5.2.4)
 > Electronic waste and the circular 
 economy (5.2.5)
 > Sustainable urban mobility (5.2.8)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > International division of labour 
(5.3.8)
 > Sustainable working environments 
of the  future (5.3.9)
 > FinTech in the context of sustainable 
financing (Topic box 5.2-1)
SDG 9  
Industry, innovation 
and infrastructure 
 > Industrial metabolism (5.2.1)
 > Sustainability in online commerce 
(5.2.4)
 > Electronic waste and the circular 
 economy (5.2.5)
 > Sustainable urban mobility (5.2.8)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Public-service ICT (5.3.5)
 > International division of labour 
(5.3.8)
 > Sustainable working environments 
of the  future (5.3.9)
 > Digital commons (5.3.10)
SDG 10  
Reducing inequalities 
 > FinTech in the context of sustainable 
financing (Topic box 5.2-1)
 > Scoring society (5.3.3)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Public-service ICT (5.3.5)
 > Digital technology as a gender 
bender (5.3.6)
 > International division of labour 
(5.3.8)
 > Digital commons (5.3.10)
 > Technologization of the human being 
(Topic box 5.3-2)
SDG 11  
Sustainable cities and 
communities 
 > Sustainability in online commerce 
(5.2.4)
 > ‘Smart city’ and sustainable urban 
 development (5.2.7)
 > Sustainable urban mobility (5.2.8)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Public-service ICT (5.3.5)
 > Digital commons (5.3.10)
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and society’ (Section 5.3). Each arena concludes with 
recommendations for action and research. In addition, 
there are three Topic boxes (5.2-1, 5.3-1, 5.3-2), which 
highlight focused areas in a more concise form.
Table 5.1-1 shows the relationship between the are-
nas and Topic boxes and the 2030 Agenda’s 17 SDGs. 
All sustainability goals are addressed, although individ-
ual arenas often involve several SDGs. A sharp dividing 
line in the allocation of the arenas to the SDGs would 
not be useful, especially since the SDGs themselves are 
interdependent. The allocation to the SDGs becomes 
clearer in individual cases when one looks in detail at 
the quite hetero geneous 169 targets of the 17 SDGs 
(UNGA, 2015). For example, the arena ‘Monitoring 
ecosystems and biological diversity’ (Section 5.2.11) 
has a very direct  reference to SDGs 14 and 15, which 
deal with life underwater and on land. Indirectly, how-
ever, it is also linked to further targets of other SDGs 
such as  climate-change education (SDG 13.3) or crime 
prevention (SDG 16.5). The section number provided in 
brackets behind the abbreviated arena names is 
intended to make it  easier for readers to search 
SDG 12  
Responsible consump-
tion and production 
 > Industrial metabolism (5.2.1)
 > New forms of digital economy (5.2.2)
 > Digitalization of consumption and 
 sustainable consumer behaviour (5.2.3)
 > Sustainability in online commerce 
(5.2.4)
 > Electronic waste and the circular 
 economy (5.2.5)
 > FinTech in the context of sustainable 
financing (Topic box 5.2-1)
 > Promotion of a collective global 
awarenes (5.3.1)
 > Digitalization and public discourse 
(5.3.2)
 > Scoring society (5.3.3)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Sustainable working environments 
of the future(5.3.9)
 > FinTech in the context of sustainable 
financing (Topic box 5.2-1)
SDG 13  
Climate action
 > Digitalization for climate-change 
 mitigation and the energy  
transformation (5.2.6)
 > Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity 
(5.2.11)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > FinTech in the context of sustainable 
financing (Topic box 5.2-1)
SDG 14  
Life below water 
 > Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity 
(5.2.11)
 > Enforcement of environmental law 
(Topic box 5.3-1)
SDG 15  
Life on land 
 > Electronic waste and the circular 
 economy (5.2.5)
 > Precision agriculture (5.2.9)
 > Agriculture in  developing countries 
(5.2.10)
 > Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity 
(5.2.11)
 > Enforcement of environmental law 
(Topic box 5.3-1)
SDG 16  
Peace, justice and 
strong institutions  
 > ‘Smart city’ and sustainable urban 
 development (5.2.7)
 > Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity 
(5.2.11)
 > Promotion of a collective global 
awareness (5.3.1)
 > Digitalization and public discourse 
(5.3.2)
 > Scoring society (5.3.3)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > Public-service ICT (5.3.5)
 > International division of labour 
(5.3.8)
 > Digital commons (5.3.10)
 > Technologization of the human being 
(Topic box 5.3-2)
 > Enforcement of environmental law 
(Topic box 5.3-1)
SDG 17  
Partnerships for the 
goals
 > New forms of digital economy (5.2.2)
 > Sustainability in online commerce 
(5.2.4)
 > Promotion of a collective global 
awareness (5.3.1)
 > Future-proof education (5.3.4)
 > International division of labour 
(5.3.8)
 > FinTech in the context of sustainable 
financing (Topic box 5.2-1)
 > Enforcement of environmental law  
(Topic box 5.3-1)
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 specifically for references to interconnected SDGs.
Finally, it should be emphasized again that the are-
nas cannot claim to be complete. The intention is only 
to give examples – an approach that nevertheless offers 
an up-to-date overview of important topics at the 
interface between sustainability and digitalization. 
5 .2
Sustainable economic activity and the 
 environment
5 .2 .1 
Sustainable Industry 4 .0 and the  circular 
 economy – how digitalization is changing 
 industrial metabolism 
5.2.1.1 
Context: digitalization as a driver of an  
eco-industrial turnaround? 
Digitalization is in the process of changing material 
aspects of goods production, as well as related logistic 
and other services, by fundamentally transforming the 
consumption of resources and materials in value chains 
(Malecki and Moriset, 2008). Despite several highly 
problematic trends in resource demand in the Digital 
Age (Köhler et al., 2018), digitalized control of produc-
tion has raised high expectations as regards potential 
for making savings and recycling. There is already talk 
of a ‚transition to a more sustainable industrial system‘ 
(Ford and Despeisse, 2016) and of a ‚sustainable fourth 
industrial revolution‘ (Herweijer et al., 2017). By influ-
encing the material flows and cycles of ‚industrial meta-
bolism‘ (Ayres and Simonis, 1994; Sterr, 2003) and 
making the input-output relations of goods production 
more controllable, digitalization might achieve some 
objectives that have long been envisaged from an 
eco-industrial point of view: production that is highly 
resource-efficient, low-waste and low-emission, cha-
racterized by eco-industrial networks and synergies 
throughout the entire production system and/or sup-
plier network (Clift and Druckman, 2016; Despeisse et 
al., 2012; Dumoulin and Wassenaar, 2014; Gallaud and 
Laperche, 2016; Gleich and Gößling-Reisemann, 2008; 
von Hauff, 2012). The increasingly prominent concept 
of the circular economy has the same aim, building on 
ideas from industrial ecology (Ghisellini et al., 2016) 
and focusing on sustainability effects via digital tech-
nologies (Antikainen et al., 2018; Lopes de Sousa Jab-
bour et al., 2018; Neligan, 2018; Section 5.2.5). So how 
can digitalization decisively drive the necessary eco-in-
dustrial turnaround towards resource-saving produc-
tion at the global level? This section will examine selec-
ted sustainability implications of digitalization for the 
production of goods in industrialized and developing 
countries, taking into consideration the material requi-
rements for digital devices and the effects of new, digi-
tally coordinated production concepts (Industry 4.0), 
and focusing especially on additive manufacturing pro-
cesses (‚3D printing‘, Section 3.3.5.4).
5.2.1.2  
Changing material requirements through digital 
devices and infrastructures 
The large material requirements of the digital economy 
create considerable sustainability problems on a global 
level, not only due to the quantity but also to the nature 
of the raw-material requirements (Köhler et al., 2018; 
Manhart et al., 2016; Yi and Thomas, 2007). For two 
decades now, the volumes of hardware and infrastruc-
ture required have been increasing at a rapid rate; furt-
hermore, demand has been growing for electronic end 
devices (for data on smartphones and wearables: Sta-
tista, 2018a, b), servers, computing centres and trans-
mission networks. In addition, devices are required for 
cooling and powering these systems. The growing 
demand for materials is also due to the progressive 
embedding of electronic control elements into every-
day objects, especially into vehicles (Köhler et al., 
2018). Even simple consumer goods are now being 
upgraded with electronic components for digital functi-
ons, as illustrated by the trend towards ‚smart‘ textiles 
(Schneegass, 2017).
The highly dynamic developments in many ICT 
fields make it difficult to offer reliable forecasts about 
the raw-material requirements of advancing digitaliza-
tion (Köhler et al., 2018), but there are some worrying 
trends. According to forecasts, in 2050, for example, 
three times as much copper will be needed than in 
2010; four times as much lithium, an important battery 
raw material, will be needed in 2035 than in 2013 
(DERA, 2017; Schmidt, 2017). In the case of ICT end 
devices, for example, other important raw materials 
include not only certain precious metals but also vari-
ous plastics and glass (Manhart et al., 2016; Wäger et 
al., 2015). Studies also show the increased consump-
tion and toxic pollution of water and higher CO2 emissi-
ons from the production of ICT goods (Higon et al., 
2017; Yi and Thomas, 2007). The volumes that are not 
only in use, but ultimately also in waste to be disposed 
of, are shown by the estimated figure for 2017 of 46 
million tonnes of e-waste worldwide, which is expected 
to rise above 52 million tonnes by 2021 (Baldé et al., 
2017; details in Section 5.2.5). In addition, the opera-
tion of digital devices and systems is driving up demand 
for electricity, which could grow globally by up to 18% 
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per year over the next two decades, depending on the 
scenario (Andrae and Edler, 2015). On the one hand, 
structural change away from traditional industries such 
as steel production and processing towards the manu-
facture of ICT products may reduce some CO2 emissi-
ons, e.g. in parts of China (Zhang and Liu, 2015); on the 
other hand, if traditional goods production continues to 
relocate internationally, this need not necessarily have 
a positive impact on the global balance sheet. Overall, 
ICT could change from a ‚low-carbon enabler‘ to a 
‚power drainer‘ (Bekaroo et al., 2016).
From the point of view of sustainability, the exten-
sive use of critical metals and rare earths, most of which 
are only produced in a few places in the world or in 
small quantities (DERA, 2017; Köhler, 2013; Manhart 
et al., 2016), is particularly problematic. In many deve-
loping countries, mining them causes considerable eco-
logical damage (destruction of the landscape, use of 
toxic substances to release the raw material) and invol-
ves the exploitation of human labour for low wages; 
there are also considerable health risks. Particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, mining activities often provide 
little impetus for development or employment, with 
mechanization leading to ‚jobless growth‘ and currency 
appreciation leading to the ‚resource curse‘. Further-
more, the rising demand for resources tends to drive 
corruption and exacerbate social and political conflicts 
(OECD, 2008). In principle, the trend of combining and 
fusing different, primarily metallic, raw materials to 
design certain material properties, e.g. alloys, is also 
problematic because this reduces recyclability and 
creates new challenges for waste treatment. For exam-
ple, a mobile phone contains around 60 different raw 
materials in a mixture of various metals, plastics, glass 
and ceramics. The RFID tags that are essential for 
Industry 4.0 control processes alone can include over a 
dozen different materials (Köhler et al., 2018). Even 
products which, in the sense of ‚eco-innovations‘, are 
regarded as environmentally friendly or low-emission 
in operation (Faucheux and Nicolaï, 2011; Jesus et al., 
2018) are often not really manufactured in a resour-
ce-saving manner or easy to recycle when the entire 
value chain or life cycle is considered right through to 
disposal (e.g. digitalized cars require a particularly large 
number of critical metals; Köhler et al., 2018).
5.2.1.3  
More efficient production processes through 
Industry 4.0 and a digitally coordinated circular 
economy 
While sustainability risks predominate in the field of 
digital end devices, the further development of digitally 
controlled manufacturing processes could change the 
industrial metabolism or the organization of the circular 
economy positively and offset disadvantages (Higon et 
al., 2017; Neligan and Schmitz, 2017). Potential is seen 
especially in reducing material inputs through increa-
sed resource efficiency in production, for example 
based on improved ‚eco-design‘ of products and better 
coordinated, multiple use of resources in the course of 
the circular economy (Section 5.2.5). 
The trend theme of Industry 4.0, strongly driven by 
German companies and business associations (e.g. 
Dorst, 2016; Kagermann, 2017; Manzei et al., 2017; 
Schwab, 2018), promises digitally controlled and opti-
mized production processes throughout. All supply and 
service partners within the value chain or the produc-
tion system are integrated into the exchange of data via 
cyber-physical systems or the industrial Internet of 
Things (Section 3.3.1), and the processed (preliminary) 
products themselves are capable of communicating 
with companies and machines. It is true that the expec-
tations of the extensive restructuring of goods produc-
tion appear in principle excessive, because information 
deficits and resistance from some actors are still ham-
pering the implementation of Industry 4.0 technologies 
(Mertens et al., 2017). There is also uncertainty about 
the cost-benefit balance of production based on Indus-
try 4.0. However, the trend is probably unstoppable 
and is also receiving massive political support in many 
regions, such as the EU (Horizon 2020), the USA (Nati-
onal Network for Manufacturing Innovation) and China 
(Made-in-China 2025). It is precisely for this reason 
that international control approaches are needed to 
steer Industry 4.0 towards sustainability and the circu-
lar economy. Furthermore, industrial sectors differ con-
siderably in their capacity to absorb such technologies, 
with mechanical engineering, vehicle construction, the 
steel industry and the manufacture of technical textiles 
leading the way (Schwab, 2018). The cross-sectional 
sector of environmental technology and resource effi-
ciency should also be able to increase its efficiency 
through digitalization, but the lead markets in particu-
lar – the circular economy (waste disposal and recyc-
ling) and (raw-)material efficiency – are still poorly 
positioned for this (BMU, 2018: 165f; Büchele and 
Andrä, 2016).
The potential of Industry 4.0 to also improve envi-
ronmental effects by digitally optimizing the organiza-
tion and coordination of industrial value chains is 
increasingly a subject of discussion and included in 
considerations and research (Beier et al., 2018a; IFOK 
GmbH, 2016; UNECE, 2018; VDI ZRE, 2017; WEF, 
2018). For example, in combination with cost savings, 
it seems possible to increase resource efficiency and 
reduce material and energy requirements in the pro-
duction process, e.g. by reducing waste (Kagermann, 
2017; VDI ZRE, 2017). However, concrete data on this 
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are still scarce and furthermore point to a quite low 
potential for reducing material inputs, even using all 
the technical possibilities. Production companies in 
Germany estimate the potential at 3–4% for material 
input and costs (Neligan, 2018: 104; 589 companies 
were surveyed). Even among companies with a gene-
rally high affinity for digitalization, only up to 14% use 
digital approaches for resource-saving product design 
or improved management of material cycles. However, 
companies that are committed to sustainable produc-
tion often rely on digital technologies (43% in the case 
of resource-saving product designs and up to 27% for 
cycle management; Neligan, 2018: 105). In general, 
however, the cost-benefit ratio of possible resource 
savings through digital technologies is difficult to 
determine empirically due to complex process interrela-
tionships; they cannot be estimated in general terms.
From the point of view of industrial ecology, better 
management of supply chains is also regarded as a key 
factor for a worthwhile circular economy (Aminoff and 
Kettunen, 2016; Gallaud and Laperche, 2016), with 
‚smart‘ processes facilitating reuse and recycling (EEA, 
2017c; Pagoropoulos et al., 2017; Section 5.2.5). Like-
wise, Industry 4.0 and digital platforms can be used to 
improve coordination of inter-company eco-industrial 
networks for the subsequent use, e.g., of waste heat, 
by-products or waste products, in the sense of ‚closing 
the loop‘ and ‚cash for trash‘ strategies, thus supporting 
systems of ‚industrial symbiosis‘ (Dumoulin and Wasse-
naar, 2014; von Hauff, 2012; Marconi et al., 2018; 
Rajala et al., 2018). In general, efficient logistics reduce 
the number of transport journeys and optimize the use 
of production factors (Dehmer et al., 2017). Industry 
4.0 could thus set in motion novel, regenerative ‚eco-
systems‘ of digital goods production that spare the 
natural life-support systems (Moreno and Charnley, 
2016). In particular, additive manufacturing 
( Section 3.3.5.4) promises material sustainability 
effects with a global reach (Despeisse et al., 2017; 
Gebler et al., 2014; Kellens et al., 2017). It offers great 
potential for resource-saving process and product inno-
vations, including economical use of materials, on-de-
mand production (‚batch size 1‘), and business models 
and product designs that are better geared to the circu-
lar economy. The novel interaction of consumption and 
production – e.g. in makerspaces or fab labs – is also 
made easier (Ferdinand et al., 2016; Kohtala, 2016; 
Petschow et al., 2014; Section 5.2.2). However, critical 
questions are whether this will stimulate rebound and 
overproduction effects (where analyses on the cost and 
energy balance are still lacking), a lower quality of 
‚printed‘ products will reduce their service life, or pro-
duction stages will be eliminated or relocated.
Locational changes as a result of Industry 4.0 could 
also promote sustainability, especially the propagated 
trend towards ‚urban production‘ (Fraunhofer IAO, 
2016; Matt et al., 2014). This term, coined by produc-
tion engineers, refers to chances of ‚reshoring‘ by relo-
cating the digitally controlled, ‚clean‘ production of 
goods back to locations close to cities in industrialized 
countries – driven by the advantages of proximity to 
supplier partners, potential young recruits and R&D 
partners (Eickelpasch, 2015; Spath and Lentes, 2012; 
Stiehm, 2017). This process makes the settlement of 
modern business enterprises and smart factories (Wang 
et al., 2016a) that generate skilled jobs close to residen-
tial areas a sustainability-enhancing component of the 
‚smart city‘ (Bronstein, 2009; Graham et al., 2017a); it 
also supports an ‚urban metabolism‘ (Newell and Cou-
sins, 2014), which is advantageous from both an 
eco-industrial and socio-ecological point of view 
( Section 5.2.7). Additive manufacturing also favours 
urban location trends, since the required raw materials 
or granulates are easy to deliver and there is a wide 
range of market potential in the direct vicinity (Ferdi-
nand et al., 2016). Industry 4.0 could generally encou-
rage a more decentralized distribution of production 
locations at the global level by dividing production into 
small units that are closer to the market and densely 
networked via ICT (distributed or redistributed manu-
facturing; Freeman et al., 2016; Moreno and Charnley, 
2016; Rauch et al., 2015). However, for developing 
countries this tends to have a negative effect on inter-
national production based on the division of labour, for 
example when additive manufacturing transforms ent-
ire supplier networks and favours re-shoring back to 
high-wage countries, and when the discontinuation of 
component production streamlines value chains (Ferdi-
nand et al., 2016; Gebler et al., 2014; Laplume et al., 
2016; Rehnberg and Ponte, 2017).
5.2.1.4 
Conclusions: What can digitalization do for the 
global transformation of industrial metabolism? 
The sustainability effects of digitalization in the pro-
duction of goods can ultimately only be assessed ambi-
valently; they also differ according to a country‘s level 
of development (Higon et al., 2017). The pollution and 
negative health effects associated with the material 
requirements of ICT hardware production primarily 
affect mining and electronics-industry sites in develo-
ping countries and emerging economies. On the other 
hand, the potential for an eco-industrial turnaround 
that the resource-saving coordination of material flows 
and the circular economy can achieve though ‚smart‘ 
product designs and Industry 4.0 still lies primarily in 
industrialized countries and their knowledge-intensive 
urban locations. It is therefore necessary, especially in 
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developing countries and emerging economies, to 
increasingly integrate production activities into a digi-
tally optimized and efficient value-creation system that 
is consistently geared to the circular economy; this 
helps to save material and energy inputs there, secures 
jobs and raises the value of work. The risks of job losses 
due to the relocation of production stages back to 
industrialized countries (Section 5.3.8) can be reduced 
in this way.
Additive manufacturing based on digitalization, too, 
offers not only opportunities for sustainable produc-
tion, it also entails some risks. On the one hand, it pro-
mises advantages in material input and resource effi-
ciency, although these are yet to be proven by analyses. 
The same applies to expectations that individualized 
production that can be co-designed by consumers pro-
motes inclusion, self-efficacy and a solidarity-based 
quality of life. On the other hand, additive manufactu-
Box 5 .2 .1-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘ Industrial metabolism’
 > Monitor and limit the material and energy consumption of 
digitalization: The trends in resource consumption for the 
production of digital devices and systems should be recor-
ded at the international level and – similar to other com-
ponents of production statistics – regularly documented 
and accounted for in life-cycle analyses. In conjunction 
with this monitoring, international (approval) standards, 
legal frameworks and environmental guidelines should be 
tightened up – e.g. rules that restrict the overexploitation 
of rare earths in mining and the use of critical metals and 
many composite materials – urging a product architecture 
that is conducive to recycling and the circular economy 
(EEA, 2017c). Similarly, standards and regulations must 
be developed for additive manufacturing that limit highly 
material- and energy-intensive production processes and/
or rebound overproduction.
 > Expand additive manufacturing as a driver of a digitally 
enhanced circular economy: In order to use the opportu-
nities of new product designs and the production methods 
associated with additive manufacturing specifically for 
sustainability goals, this production method should in prin-
ciple be placed under a ‘circularity proviso’ at the natio-
nal and international level. Existing EU approaches to the 
circular economy can be specifically used as a model for 
additive manufacturing in order to lay down a ‘circular-
economy proviso’ or ‘sustainability proviso’ on the use of 
materials and product design, above all relating to the recy-
cling possibilities of the materials used.
 > Bolster sustainable digital production in developing coun-
tries and emerging economies: Approaches of international 
development cooperation and technology-transfer promo-
tion should increasingly integrate resource-saving modern 
production methods in Industry 4.0 and additive manufac-
turing. In this way, digitalization can also be used in deve-
loping countries and emerging economies specifically for 
sustainably designed value-added steps and production 
systems, resulting in eco-industrial, labour- and qualifi-
cations-related improvements. Moreover, these upgrading 
processes in developing countries can protect them against 
the expected toughening of an unequal international divi-
sion of labour. While ‘fab labs’ and similar formats are 
already being used in some countries as breeding grounds 
for digitally enhanced innovation (Irie et al., 2018), they 
should be more widely disseminated and more focused on 
sustainability and/or environmental aspects. In develo-
ping countries that mine raw materials (e.g. rare earths) for 
industrial goods in the digital economy, measures should 
also be taken to allow larger sections of the local population 
to benefit from the activities, e.g. vocational training for 
work in mechanized mining, or benefit sharing of mining 
profits to enable public investment in social services and 
infrastructure (OECD, 2008). Starting points can be pro-
vided by contractual arrangements (e.g. mining contracts 
or mining codes) or the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), which supports public-private partner-
ships for greater transparency in payment and distribution.
 > Strengthen and reward corporate responsibility: By means of 
concerted information and incentives, production and ser-
vice companies at home and abroad should be made aware 
of their great responsibility for the sustainable design of 
digitalized goods production. A veritable responsibility cul-
ture should be established in large parts of the economy 
that takes into account the threat posed to the environ-
ment and the world of work by the use of digital techno-
logies as a special factor in all business decisions. National 
and international industry associations can exert political 
and economic pressure as important information brokers 
and opinion formers. In addition, incentives should incre-
ase companies’ willingness to take responsibility for sustai-
nable production in the Digital Age. Approaches that have 
already been considered – e.g. further developing corpo-
rate social responsibility into corporate socio-environmen-
tal responsibility (CSER; Mazurkiewicz o. J.) – can be made 
effective, for example, by offering better terms in tenders 
to companies with high CSER quality values. Tax breaks can 
generally promote industrial ‘greening’, i.e. the adoption 
of environment-related business and management models 
(Demirel et al., 2017), or the formation of circular, digitally 
coordinated business ecosystems. Prizes should be exten-
ded internationally as incentives and be endowed with lar-
ger sums, e.g. according to the model of the German Raw 
Material Efficiency Award of the Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics and Energy, which, among other things, awards 
prizes for digital solutions to improve the recyclability of 
goods. 
 > Set up or expand dialogue platforms that spread knowledge 
on the influence of digitalization on industrial material 
cycles: The growing literature (and with it the acquired 
knowledge on sustainability and environmental aspects of 
Industry 4.0 and additive manufacturing) should be made 
more widely known among sponsors, business users and 
R&D actors to sensitize them to sustainability aspects. In 
order to achieve this, internationally oriented dialogue 
platforms specializing in these aspects can be established or 
expanded, e.g. ‘Sustainable Industry 4.0’ or ‘Sustainable 
additive manufacturing’ as a sub-topic of the Industry 4.0 
platform.
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ring could also cause rebound effects and redundant 
manufacturing, which must be contained and overcome 
together with other technological and economic chal-
lenges. Despite the broad opportunities offered by 
domestic production, there are dangers of a widening 
digital divide and labour-market exclusions due to the 
redistribution of work between employees of different 
qualification levels or in different countries (Gebler et 
al., 2014; Rehnberg and Ponte, 2017). The integration 
of companies as spatially effective actors plays a special 
role in designing an eco-industrially sustainable form of 
goods production in the Digital Age. 
5 .2 .2
New forms of digital economy: approaches to 
sustainable economic activity in the Digital Age
This arena takes a look at current community-oriented 
forms of economic organization (Figure 8.4.1-2). It 
gives examples of new or ‘alternative’ business models, 
corporate forms and forms of production, including 
sustainable digital entrepreneurship, platform coopera-
tives, prosumers, and commons-based peer production. 
A special focus lies on new forms of participatory value 
creation in the sharing economy, since they in particu-
lar clearly show the potential and limits of private-sec-
tor and community-oriented economic organization.
Box 5 .2 .1-2
Research recommendations on the arena  
‘Industrial metabolism’
 > Launch a research offensive on sustainability impacts of 
Industry 4.0 and additive manufacturing: The expectations 
of resource- and energy-saving production using digi-
tal technologies have so far not been challenged by solid 
empirical analyses or data evaluations. Research activities 
funded by the BMBF or other organizations should the-
refore systematically record the concrete sustainability 
effects of the introduction of Industry 4.0 technologies. A 
separate priority within the Research for Sustainable Deve-
lopment (FONA) programme of the BMBF could be deve-
loped for this purpose. Similarly, additive manu facturing 
could, for example, be a building block in an overarching 
research programme on digital transformation that scien-
tifically examines all the key technologies considered in 
this flagship report (Section 3.3) from a transdisciplinary 
sustainability perspective (analogous to programmes such 
as ‘Zukunftsstadt’: City of the Future). With regard to the 
normative compass (Section 2.2), empirical research should 
be conducted on various implementation options for Indus-
try 4.0 and additive manufacturing, materials used, pro-
duct types and sectors of industry, and on their impact on 
jobs in different parts of the world. Different location con-
stellations should also be considered, from urban to rural, 
under- to highly developed. The focus should be on syste-
mic effects and the entire life cycles of manufactured pro-
ducts, possibly based on approaches such as the ecological 
rucksack or footprint. 
 > Research the potential of digital technologies for improved 
industrial metabolism and/or industrial symbiosis and esta-
blish them on markets: While the dialogue platforms men-
tioned above promote the discourse on sustainable Indus-
try 4.0, digital business and market platforms combined 
with other digital technologies can help make industrial 
metabolism more sustainable. Ongoing research on digi-
tally enhanced ‘industrial symbiosis’ (Marconi et al., 2018) 
should  therefore be expanded as an element of the research 
into the digitally enhanced circular economy, which should 
be developed on principle. It should be designed as applied, 
transformative research, integrate different sectors of 
industry, and identify the opportunities, barriers and risks 
of digitalization for industrial symbiosis. The electrical 
and electronics industry should be prioritized as a field of 
research because of the duality between the problem of 
e-waste and the solution potential offered by digital tech-
nologies ( Section 5.2.5). 
 > Carry out social-science studies on prosumer behaviour: 
Since the sustainability effects of trends such as private 
3D printing and fab labs depend to a large extent on the 
commitment of the population, prosumer behaviour in 
particular should be examined in detail. Social and beha-
vioural analyses can, for example, take into account dif-
ferent societal milieus or local contexts in order to deter-
mine tendencies towards rebound effects and redundancy. 
In this way, the potential, e.g. of additive manufacturing 
in shaping the sustainability transformation, can also be 
researched in a targeted manner to seek promising star-
ting points for actors and institutions (e.g. how can impro-
vements in the life-cycle assessment of digitalized manuf-
acturing be achieved and by whom?). 
 > Create real-world laboratories for a digitally enhanced circu-
lar economy in an urban context: The chances of developing 
a sustainability-oriented digital production and an associa-
ted circular economy supported by spatial proximity, speci-
fically for urban locations, deserve in-depth studies. For 
concepts such as fab labs (Kohtala, 2016) can be interpre-
ted as urban transformation initiatives which, in the course 
of social innovation, may offer good potential for sustaina-
ble additive manufacturing. Their potential impact at the 
level of companies, makers’ collectives and individuals 
must be evaluated and, where appropriate, tested using 
experimental formats such as real-world laboratories and 
prepared for upscaling. This should explicitly include cities 
in developing countries, possibly integrated into internati-
onal partnerships for sustainable urban production based 
on digital manufacturing technologies.
Sustainable economic activity and the  environment  5.2
151
5.2.2.1  
Re-embedding as a challenge of sustainable econo-
mic activity
The current form of global economic organization is 
closely linked to the breaching of planetary guardrails 
and ecological boundaries. The systemic causes of these 
developments are the ‘disembedding mechanisms’ of 
the modern economic order, which are analysed in 
detail by Polanyi (1944) in ‘The Great Transformation’: 
by removing economic processes from their immediate 
social and ecological contexts, there is an increased risk 
that they may have negative social and ecological con-
sequences (externalities; Figure 5.2.2-1).
The great challenge of sustainable economic activity 
is to strengthen the ‘re-embedding’ of the economy 
through “radical incremental change” (Göpel, 2016). By 
internalizing external effects, ecological and social con-
sequences can be translated into existing economic 
control systems. This can be done, for example, by pric-
ing resources or introducing minimum standards for 
working conditions. Environmental impacts and social 
consequences would thus be reflected in the economic 
costs and taken into account by market players in their 
economic actions. On the one hand, such control meas-
ures are currently difficult to implement in the short 
term, especially at the global level. On the other hand, 
there are chances that pioneers of change might be able 
to help us catch up with sustainability goals in the 
medium to long term. This could be the case, for exam-
ple, with social and cooperative entrepreneurship, 
which combines entrepreneurial activity with owner-
ship structures that allow a consistent orientation 
towards sustainability challenges (Dyllick and Muff, 
2016). The following sections provide examples of how 
such approaches interact with digitalization.
5.2.2.2 
Sustainable digital entrepreneurship 
Sustainable entrepreneurship includes entrepreneurial 
activities that explicitly make aspects of sustainability 
an object of the business model and go well beyond 
conventional approaches such as efficiency measures 
or corporate social responsibility in the process (Demirel 
et al., 2017: 2). Depending on the focus of the enter-
prise, other terms used here include ‘common-good 
entrepreneurship’ (Felber, 2018), ‘social entrepreneur-
ship’, ‘eco-entrepreneurship’ or ‘transformative entre-
preneurship’ (Burch et al., 2016; Santini, 2017). A sus-
tainability orientation is particularly relevant during 
the start-up process, because here business models are 
institutionalized that can adopt sustainability goals in 
different ways (Behrendt et al., 2017). In addition to 
the transformation of established companies, business 
start-ups thus play an important role in the regenera-
tion of the economic structure and the Transformation 
towards Sustainability (Borderstep Institut, 2017; 
Hörisch, 2015; Schneidewind, 2018: 361ff.; Trautwein 
et al., 2018: 8). 
The category ‘green digital start-ups’ or ‘sustainable 
digital entrepreneurship’ needs to be defined more pre-
cisely in future, but it covers a broad field of activities, 
as the following examples show. It can include suppliers 
Figure 5 .2 .2-1
Disembedding mechanisms and their non-sustainable consequences, such as ecological land seizures, and possibilities for re-em-
bedding the economy via 1st and 2nd order decoupling. 
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of sustainable hardware like Fairphone and Shift 
( Section 5.2.5), digital marketplaces for sustainable 
products like avocadostore.de (commercial) or fair-
mondo.de (cooperative), crowdfunding platforms such 
as betterplace.org or sharing sites like foodsharing.de, 
as well as greenapes.com, a “social network rewarding 
sustainable actions and ideas” (greenApes, 03.05.2019). 
Initiatives like wechange.de, which make software and 
communication solutions available for civil-society ini-
tiatives, are another example. The category should also 
include companies from the broad field of environmen-
tal technology (‘clean tech’) which use digitalization to 
contribute, for example, to the transition in agriculture, 
energy and mobility, as well as to the circular economy 
(BMU, 2018).
Despite their undisputed importance for the Trans-
formation towards Sustainability, green start-ups are 
eclipsed by start-ups in digitalization and IT in public 
perception and in terms of funding (Borderstep Insti-
tut, 2017). Where they overlap is where the above-men-
tioned sustainable digital entrepreneurship forms. A 
key for its success, in addition to direct promotion, is 
the existence of supporting framework conditions in 
the form of sustainable business ecosystems – consist-
ing of corresponding networks of actors made up of 
entrepreneurs, customers, suppliers and the public sec-
tor, as well as institutional, informal and socio-eco-
nomic contexts (Volkmann et al., 2017).
5.2.2.3  
Platform cooperatives as a special expression of 
collective entrepreneurship
Platform-based business models of digital companies 
could make important contributions to sustainability 
(e.g. climate-change mitigation). However, they are 
often criticized because organizational forms that focus 
on maximizing their return on equity can consciously or 
unconsciously evade regulation and thus open up ‘par-
allel legal spaces’ (e.g. Uber’s penetration into the reg-
ulated taxi market). This involves the threat of ecologi-
cal and, in particular, social externalization, such as the 
exploitation of workers and more difficult participation 
for people affected (Gegenhuber et al., 2018; 
 Section 4.2.2). On the other hand, the number of plat-
form cooperatives has increased in recent years. They 
are owned by stakeholders (e.g. employees, users, 
locally affected people) who jointly decide on the com-
pany’s direction and profit intentions. From a technical 
point of view, they are similar to capital-market-ori-
ented platforms, except that they are based on the 
cooperative model. They are embedded in the commu-
nity and characterized by an orientation towards the 
common good, and thus towards more balanced value 
creation and value distribution (van Doorn, 2017a; 
Scholz and Schneider, 2016). Ideally, this prevents 
externalization effects, but cooperative forms of organ-
ization like platform cooperatives do not automatically 
guarantee an orientation towards sustainable develop-
ment goals. Examples of platform cooperatives with a 
sustainability orientation that have already been men-
tioned here include the initiative wechange.de and the 
online marketplace fairmondo.de (van Doorn, 2017a).
Basically, this approach tries to combine the positive 
effects of platforms (economies of scale, network 
effects, accessibility) with the advantages of coopera-
tives. Cooperatives are particularly suitable for the pro-
sumer economy (Section 5.2.2.5) because they explic-
itly aim to link the benefits for the members with those 
for the platform users. Some academics also regard 
platform cooperatives as highly promising because of 
their superiority in an expected ‘zero marginal cost 
economy’ (Rifkin, 2014), the potential for data auton-
omy and/or protection (VZBV, 2015: 36), or their abil-
ity to provide digital commons in the sense of ‘open 
cooperativism’ (Kostakis et al., 2016).
Although platform cooperatives have societal advan-
tages, they face a number of challenges that are cur-
rently hampering their dissemination. They rarely have 
the capital resources to quickly reach a critical mass of 
members. In digital markets with network effects and 
economies of scale, they thus have a structural disad-
vantage compared to investor-based platforms and are 
also at a disadvantage when it comes to the current 
public funding for start-ups, which is geared to the like-
lihood of economic success (Kagel et al., 2018). On the 
other hand, business ecosystems are formed around 
platform cooperatives which embed them in a condu-
cive environment through (open-source) software, 
financing possibilities and legal advice. Examples 
include the Platform Co-op Development Kit (Platform 
Cooperativism Consortium, 2018), launched in 2018 
and sponsored by Google with US$1 million, or the 
Internet of Ownership Project Council (ioo.coop). 
5.2.2.4  
Sharing economy between the classical and the 
collective economy
Modern sharing projects are also essentially based on 
digital platforms, which both promote the implementa-
tion of longer-existing concepts (e.g. car sharing) and 
open up new opportunities and perspectives. Currently, 
four basic fields of sharing can be distinguished in the 
sharing economy: (1) reuse of goods, (2) better use of 
existing objects, (3) exchange of services (e.g. time 
banks as presented below; Seyfang, 2004; Gregory, 
2014; Diniz et al., 2018; Arcidiacono, 2018), and (4) 
sharing productive goods (Schor, 2016). Sharing 
approaches are distinguished not only according to 
Sustainable economic activity and the  environment  5.2
153
their degree of commercialization (Theurl et al., 2015) 
between money-free, cost-covering and profit-oriented 
transactions (Gerwe and Silva, 2018; see Table 5.2.2-1), 
but also according to the actors involved: busi-
ness-to-consumer approaches are similar to the tradi-
tional renting model, while in peer-to-peer sharing 
users lend goods to each other themselves (e.g. cars in 
peer-to-peer car sharing; Section 5.2.8).
Sharing economy for goods
Most activities in the heterogeneous field of the shar-
ing economy (Behrendt et al., 2017) relate to goods. 
According to the sharing economy’s basic principle of 
using instead of owning, value consists in access to 
goods, not in owning them (Behrendt et al., 2017). In 
the narrower sense, sharing goods is an intensification 
of use by hiring-out, co-use or lending; in the broader 
sense, it is also an extension of an object’s service life 
by giving it away, exchanging it or reselling it (Scholl et 
al., 2015). This can refer to living space as in the case of 
airbnb.com or couchsurfing.com, but also, for example, 
to clothing (kleider-kreisel.de), food (foodsharing.de), 
or vehicles in the field of mobility (e.g. car and bike 
sharing). As a result, the sharing economy is credited 
with ecological potential (Sections 5.2.5, 5.2.8). 
Whether it can live up to this claim will depend, among 
other things, on whether there are rebound effects 
(Section 5.2.3) as a result of additional consumption. 
This could be the case, for example, if the money or 
time saved by sharing is channelled into additional 
activities or consumption (Buhl, 2014). Also relevant 
are the ecological costs of the possible increase in trans-
actions (e.g. emissions from the multiple transport of 
goods) and the provision of overcapacity to cover peak 
demand. Both run counter to the goal of intensifying 
use and must be compared with ‘conventional’ con-
sumption. Displacement effects must also be taken into 
account: in addition to social distortions, such as the 
conversion of residential space for short-term rentals, 
the spatial displacement of the local population also 
implies that they will probably have to travel further 
commuting distances, with corresponding environmen-
tal consequences. Sharing approaches are therefore by 
no means always socially and ecologically more advan-
tageous. However, non-commercial sharing offers tend 
to be more environmentally friendly than commercial 
ones because they have more of an environmental and 
community orientation (Rückert-John et al., 2014; 
Behrendt et al., 2017). 
Originally, the idea of the sharing economy grew out 
of a community-spirit perspective. It aims to re-embed 
forms of exchange into social relations (Arcidiacono, 
2018). Digital technologies have strongly supported 
these economic practices in recent years. Through the 
rise of commercially oriented, mostly platform-based 
sharing approaches such as airbnb.com and uber.com, 
the currently dominant sharing economy has moved 
away from the original idea of community and reciproc-
ity. There are therefore few signs that a “fundamental 
change towards a community-based consumer culture 
is taking place in the sense of a collaborative economy 
freed from the constraints of growth and profit” 
(Behrendt et al., 2017). The success of commercial shar-
ing models lies only partly in the more efficient use of 
goods or more complete capacity utilization, for exam-
ple by creating more marketable services with the same 
input (e.g. car sharing: more journeys per car instead of 
parking); it is also largely achieved by passing on costs 
and risks (Schor, 2017), i.e. avoiding taxes or ignoring 
labour standards (e.g. accident insurance, health insur-
ance). Furthermore, their business models are often 
based on leveraging hitherto non-marketable goods or 
services as tradable goods (e.g. one’s own home). This 
approach is problematic when the (in)ability of market 
participants to pay is exploited and people are forced to 
sell or rent their labour or goods out of financial neces-
sity (Schor, 2017), or to market protected temporal and 
social spaces such as their own home or leisure time. 
This kind of sharing economy can be understood as an 
intensification of an on-demand economy, which tries 
to justify flexible and precarious work by an ambiguity 
of market-economy exchange processes on the one 
hand and altruistic values on the other (Cockayne, 
2016). Consequently, it is not clear whether the com-
mercial sharing economy contributes to an increase in 
the common good. Rather, in some areas, it is merely a 
Table 5 .2 .2-1
Differentiation between sharing approaches according to their degree of commercialization.
Source: according to Gerwe and Silva, 2018, shortened 
Sharing Capital or good Labour or time
Money-free Couchsurfing (overnight stays) Time-exchange circles (various 
activities)
Cost covering BlablaCar (offering lifts) Piggybee (transporting objects)
Profit-oriented AirBnB (overnight stays) Uber (taxi-like ride hailing)
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commercialization and externalization strategy that 
passes on costs to the community.
Sharing economy for services: time banks 
Parallel to the development of a sharing economy for 
goods, a sharing economy for the reciprocal exchange 
of services is also emerging. While this has so far mostly 
taken the form of neighbourly help in local time banks, 
barter circles and time-provision systems (Seyfang, 
2004; Gregory, 2014; Diniz et al., 2018), the exchange 
of services can increasingly shift to virtual platforms 
through digitalization and thus overcome spatial 
restrictions (Arcidiacono, 2018). Via time banks, peo-
ple can help each other and receive corresponding time 
credits in return, which they can redeem later to find 
help themselves. Unlike in voluntary work, the people 
involved have the prospect of receiving something that 
takes the same amount of time in return for their help. 
Thus, time banks help to diversify the sources of peo-
ple’s livelihood by using the ‘currency of time’, which 
puts a value on various forms of work, some of which 
today are not remunerated via labour markets (gainful 
employment, collaborative work, voluntary work, 
nursing care and supervision). In this way, time banks 
offer a good opportunity to strengthen the inclusion 
and integration of citizens (Behrendt et al., 2017), par-
ticularly in the event of impending losses of earned 
income through automation (Section 5.3.9), and to 
make them more independent of changes in the labour 
market 
On the basis of new technologies, however, a new 
type of digital, non-profit time banks is emerging (Time 
Banking 2.0, e.g. Time Republik, Cronobank, Bliive; 
Arcidiacono, 2018). They – like some other commercial 
sharing-economy approaches – are not based on values 
like reciprocity and mutual help, but rather on a culture 
of self-entrepreneurship, i.e. marketing one’s own abil-
ities (Moral and Pais, 2015; Arcidiacono, 2018). By 
contrast, commercial time banking has the potential to 
aim at a more equal payment for different services, 
using the time spent on the work as the ‘wage’ or ‘cur-
rency’. Above all, decentralized, e.g. blockchain-based 
time banks (Moral and Pais, 2015) – platform coopera-
tives supported by the users themselves or provided by 
such public actors as trade unions or social insurance 
funds (Section 5.2.2.4) – could contribute to a more 
balanced distribution of income by using ‘time’ as an 
alternative means of exchange to ‘money’. 
5.2.2.5  
Collaborative forms of production: prosumers and 
commons-based peer production
Digital technologies have contributed to the develop-
ment of alternative forms of decentralized collective/
collaborative production, which are strongly based on 
the commons idea. Most prominently, ‘commons-based 
peer production’ emerged at the interface between the 
do-it-yourself (DIY) trend, Web 2.0 and digital produc-
tion. In the context of digital goods production, the 
‘maker movement’ can be counted among these forms 
(Kohtala, 2016: 28f.; Petschow et al., 2014: 15). This 
novel form of value creation differs considerably from 
conventional industrial production (Kostakis et al. 
2016) in terms of its political/economic characteristics, 
and could initiate a change in economic processes away 
from competition towards more cooperation (Stengel, 
2016). Already today, there are many collaborative 
projects that – especially in economically difficult times 
(Kummer et al., 2015) – deliver societal added value 
through the creation of digital commons (e.g. Wikipe-
dia, OpenStreetMap), but whose services or goods 
experience considerable financing difficulties. Since 
these activities are not covered by market transactions, 
they are not included in macroeconomic accounts and 
only incompletely covered by existing economic indica-
tors (Brynjolfsson et al., 2017).
The rise of commons-based peer production also 
means that the distinction between consumers and pro-
ducers that has been typical for decades is disappear-
ing. Consumers are increasingly (co-)designing and 
(co-)producing products themselves and thus becoming 
co-designers, makers or prosumers. Users themselves 
often also contribute to value creation when using dig-
ital products (Brousseau and Pénard 2007). Initially, 
commons-based peer production referred mainly to 
non-material products such as open-source software 
(Section 5.3.10). In the context of the maker move-
ment, it is now expanding to include material goods, 
which, with the help of lower-cost 3D printers and 
other production technologies, can be developed and 
produced in places such as open workshops/maker-
spaces (Buxbaum-Conradi et al., 2016: 40; Erdmann 
and Dönitz, 2016: 15; Millard et al., 2018: 3). Open 
workshops are also important spaces for discourse and 
experimentation. Among the formats that advance 
experimentation with digital production technologies, 
fab labs (an abbreviation of fabrication laboratories) in 
particular are expected to make a contribution to the 
circular economy (Kohtala, 2016: 6, 24f.; Moreno and 
Charnley, 2016: 573; Petschow et al., 2014: 24; Pren-
deville et al., 2016: 578f.). The official Fab Lab Network 
includes approximately 1,000 fab labs in 78 countries, 
many of them in developing countries and  emerging 
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Box 5 .2 .2-1
Recommendations for action on the arena  
‘New forms of digital economy’
 > Embed the digital economy in ecological and social fra-
mework conditions: As an important basis, an ecological 
tax reform should be promoted which consequently also 
favours a sustainable digital economy. Its effect on pri-
cing could provide incentives to reduce consumption and 
avoid rebound effects from sharing. From an ecological per-
spective, it is also important that sharing is embedded in a 
sustainable consumer culture, for example through impro-
ved search functions in online platforms that place more 
emphasis on environmentally friendly products (Section 
5.2.3; Henseling et al., 2018). Furthermore, existing regu-
latory measures must be better enforced and gaps closed; 
a new framework for sharing and platform offers must be 
created wherever the regulatory framework is inadequate. 
Ultimately, a greening of the entire range of economic 
development instruments will also help ensure that digi-
tal key technologies (Section 3.3) and the digital economy 
are put at the service of sustainability to a greater extent 
than before. For example, the ‘Economic Development 4.0’ 
model (Kopatz, 2017) could provide orientation here; it 
proposes the systematic promotion of cooperative econo-
mic forms as a supplement to classical economic develop-
ment promotion (e.g. marketing of commercial sites, loca-
tion and maintenance of businesses, cluster promotion).
 > Change the orientation of start-up funding in the field of 
digitalization towards sustainable digital entrepreneurship: 
Business start-ups play an important role in the renewal 
of the economic structure. Funding efforts should be 
directed towards sustainable digital entrepreneurship in 
order to embed sustainability firmly and permanently in 
the business models of companies from the outset. On the 
one hand, funding decisions should be more focused on 
the potential contribution to sustainability (e.g. on the 
SDGs). On the other hand, activities that run counter to 
these objectives should no longer be funded. Ecosystems of 
sustainable entrepreneurship (Volkmann et al., 2017) must 
be promoted to turn start-ups into transformation actors. 
During the often financially difficult initial start-up pha-
ses, special financing instruments are conceivable (e.g. spe-
cial funds, sustainability bonuses such as tax or interest 
relief, exemptions), as are services in kind and consultation 
services, preferential treatment in the allocation of sub-
sidies, and cheap, publicly-owned rented premises; they 
can also include access to green digital infrastructure, e.g. 
green computer centres, software and other benefits. Fur-
thermore, the establishment of suitable formats and places 
(physical and virtual) should be supported where sustaina-
ble digital entrepreneurs can flourish, for example sustai-
nable co-working spaces, hubs, platform cooperatives or 
open workshops, fab labs and repair cafés. 
 > Strengthen sustainable platform cooperatives: Platform coo-
peratives are a particularly interesting form of sustainable 
digital entrepreneurship that can be developed into effec-
tive instruments of socio-ecological entrepreneurship. For 
example, they could be boosted by common-good certifi-
cation, confirming, among other things, that sustainability 
goals are already enshrined in their business purpose. Such 
a certification could be a prerequisite for access to certain 
forms of government support. Platform cooperatives need 
additional support from the establishment of model pro-
jects and the same opportunities as shareholder-oriented 
start-ups as regards access to state funding (Kagel et al., 
2018). The above recommendations on start-up and busi-
ness promotion apply correspondingly here.
 > Institutionalize commons-based peer production and provide 
it with enough freedom: The activities of common-good-
oriented commons-based peer production should be pro-
tected by a suitable (legal) framework which, for exam-
ple, regulates the non-exclusivity of property rights to the 
products of prosumers and commons-based peer produc-
tion, and supports professionalization. Experience with the 
environmental impacts and the functionality of commons-
based peer production can be gained by realizing a pro-
gramme for 1,000 open workshops. If successfully imple-
mented, this will also promote the spread of commons-
based peer production (fab labs, makerspaces, repair cafés, 
etc.). The hitherto insufficient consideration of environ-
mental aspects can be addressed in this case by integra-
ting environmental-management systems and joint bench-
marking tools, which also provide important research data. 
Open workshops should also be increasingly used in deve-
lopment cooperation to bridge the digital divide and make 
inclusion possible. In general, the visibility of these activi-
ties should be strengthened with more users and contribu-
tors and expanded through public-relations work. Places 
and events for exchange between existing initiatives can 
stimulate mutual learning across borders. In order to ena-
ble people to participate in the collaborative economy, free 
spaces need to be created, for example by making wor-
king hours more flexible and creating new forms of social 
 security. 
 > Build democratic platforms via institutionalized actors such 
as municipalities or trade unions: In addition to private 
actors in the sharing and platform economy, public institu-
tions such as cities or trade unions, and civil-society NGOs 
can promote the development of an ecologically sustaina-
ble and socially acceptable digital economy by acting as 
platform operators themselves. For example, basic services 
could also be contracted out as cooperative forms of orga-
nization or passed on to the public sector (e.g. mobility ser-
vices, circular-economy services). If successfully imple-
mented, this could promote the reinvestment of profits 
resulting from network effects in platforms oriented 
towards the common good and support data protection, 
while at the same time putting basic public services back 
into democratically legitimized hands (Sections 5.2.7, 
5.3.5). The establishment of digital time banks with the 
participation of social partners can provide a good way to 
move forward when it comes to sharing services. Vouchers 
for free access to services issued via these platforms can 
create network effects and thus initiate the necessary par-
ticipation in these platforms. Such a model can keep more 
economic value creation local and help contain negative 
side effects such as the misappropriation of housing. To 
make regional sharing services easier to find, a public-ser-
vice search platform can be established as part of a broader 
platform ecosystem (Section 5.3.5). This should ensure that 
only reputable providers are accepted who adhere to 
socially acceptable working conditions and are financially 
reliable
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economies (Fab Foundation, 2019). The focus is mainly 
on education and experimentation, but it is only when 
all environmental dimensions are taken more fully into 
account that fab labs and similar formats can realize 
their full sustainability potential (Kohtala, 2016: 100; 
Millard et al., 2018: 27). Other forms of open work-
shops are design centres, sewing combines or repair 
cafés (Erdmann and Dönitz, 2016: 15). The latter are 
playing an increasing role in the repair of electrical 
appliances, for example, and thus in the prevention of 
e-waste (Section 5.2.5; Charter and Keiller, 2016). Such 
collaborative formats often regard themselves as an 
alternative model to the usual combination of mass pro-
duction and consumption, consequently also to the 
‘large-scale project’ called Industry 4.0 and its main 
goal of individualized and/or personalized mass pro-
duction (Baier et al., 2016; Buxbaum-Conradi et al., 
2016: 41f.; Kohtala, 2016: 5; Petschow et al., 2014). In 
order for commons-based peer production to be possi-
ble on a larger scale and to offer appropriate incentives 
for collaborative project work, prosumers must be pro-
vided with enough free time, and the non-commercial-
ization of the products manufactured must be guaran-
teed (Sassower, 2013: 54).
5.2.2.6  
Conclusions
Digitalization is having a significant impact on the 
emergence of collective/community-oriented forms of 
sustainable economic activity. Their potential for 
re-embedding the economy into societal and ecological 
boundaries depends not only on the business strategy 
chosen, but also on the company’s organizational form. 
Most of these are currently still niche approaches. In 
order to open up enough creative space and scalability 
potential for these pioneers of change (WBGU, 
2011: 242ff.), it is necessary to enlarge the experimen-
tal scope available to these new forms of economic 
activity and thus improve their action options 
(Boxes 5.2.2-1, 5.2.2-2). 
5 .2 .3 
Digitalization of consumption and sustainable 
consumer behaviour: promotion of solidarity-
based lifestyles
The term ‘digitalization of consumption’ used here refers 
to a broad range of changes in individual consumption 
involving digital support: from the consumption of dig-
ital and digitalized goods (e.g. products networked on 
the Internet of Things) to orders via online commerce 
and digitally supported, ecologically informed consump-
tion, ‘going without’, and sharing (sharing economy: 
Section 5.2.2.4). The focus is not on the means of pro-
duction but on consumer goods, i.e. material goods that 
directly serve to satisfy human needs (Morato Polzin et 
al., 2016). Individual consumer behaviour includes the 
use and consumption of these goods as well as their 
selection, purchase, utilization, repair, exchange and 
disposal (Defila et al., 2011; Reisch and Scherhorn, 
2005). Changes in the supply landscape and the disposal 
Box 5 .2 .2-2
Research recommendations for the arena  
‘New forms of digital economy’
The WBGU recommends increased research at the interface 
between new forms of the digital economy and sustainability. 
These should address the following questions and topics, 
among others:
 > How can sustainable digital entrepreneurship be defined 
and identified? What is its status quo and what opportu-
nities or risks does digitalization offer in this area? Which 
economic ecosystems (e.g. legal frameworks, financing 
instruments) do sustainable digital enterprises need?
 > Does sustainable digital entrepreneurship need its own 
legal form on the basis of which other forms of promotion 
can be provided? Against this background, how can coope-
rative legislation be transferred to digital spaces and fur-
ther developed?
 > Expansion of sustainability-oriented platform research and 
development of criteria, an evaluation scheme, guidelines 
and a seal/certificate for social-ecological platforms. 
 > How can the common-good-oriented approach of time 
banks, which has emerged independently of digitalization, 
be maintained and promoted in the Digital Age? What kind 
of regulation, institutionalization or funding is needed for 
this? What meaningful links between time banks and digi-
talization would be conceivable in the finance field (e.g. 
Bitcoin or Faircoin)?
 > What risks and opportunities are involved in sharing models 
with regard to their incentives for consumption reduction, 
their social integration function and different dimensions 
of justice (income, time wealth, working conditions)? What 
possibilities do digital technologies have to offer to steer 
this in a positive direction and avoid negative effects?
 > Under what conditions does commons-based peer produc-
tion contribute to a comprehensive reduction of energy 
and resource consumption? What best-practice approaches 
can be identified in this area, and what role does re-loca-
tion play? Are local or decentralized production patterns/
value-creation systems more sustainable than others? 
What new forms of basic social-security cover might incre-
ase involvement in the collaborative economy (e.g. creation 
of experimental areas for a basic income)?
 > How can cultures of sustainable economic activity in the 
field of the growing digital economy be identified and fur-
ther disseminated via network-based diffusion processes?
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of products are taken up elsewhere in this report 
( Sections 5.2.4, 5.2.5). This arena aims to show how the 
deployment of digital technologies can help consumers 
today and in the future to gear individual consumer 
decisions on the choice, type, quantity and use of prod-
ucts towards the concept of a solidarity-based quality 
of life. The WBGU defines ‘solidarity-based quality of 
life’ as a quality of life that is not only oriented towards 
one’s own needs and those of one’s immediate environ-
ment (e.g. family environment), but also takes into 
account the principles of intra- and intergenerational 
fairness (WBGU, 2016a: 133ff.). Furthermore, it is 
assumed that digitally supported consumption will 
increase (e.g. Section 5.2.4) and also generate new forms 
of consumption (e.g. sharing). Due to a lack of quanti-
tative studies, this section does not provide a compre-
hensive quantification of digitalized consumption in 
relation to sustainability and the effects of digital inno-
vations on consumer behaviour. Reliable statements 
cannot yet be made here. 
5.2.3.1 
Digitalized consumption for sustaining natural 
life-support systems
The WBGU has repeatedly shown that the natural 
life-support systems can only be sustained if consumer 
behaviour as a whole becomes less resource-intensive 
and more environmentally friendly (WBGU, 2014a; 
2016a). Individual consumption has significant poten-
tial here.
There are numerous examples that show that digital-
ization can in principle be used to improve the resource 
and energy efficiency of consumer goods and services 
over a product’s life cycle (Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.6, 
5.2.9). In the digitalization field, the WBGU regards 
five areas as especially relevant when examining the 
potential of individual consumption in the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability (Figure 5.2.3-1). 
1. Strengthen system knowledge and create problem 
awareness: Digital media can provide information 
on global consumption and environmental trends, 
as well as on the basic availability of alternative, 
sustainable products and services (creation of prob-
lem awareness; arena of ‘Global environmental 
awareness’ (Section 5.3.1). System knowledge on 
the consequences of resource-intensive consumer 
behaviour can be widely disseminated via trustwor-
thy digital information sources.
2. Support for resource-conserving purchasing deci-
sions: However, digitalization can also directly influ-
ence consumers’ choice of goods and purchase deci-
sions by providing knowledge for concrete behav-
iour choices, and in this way support a preference 
for resource-efficient and socially compatible prod-
ucts. Since products can be compared better online, 
impulsive or mispurchases could be reduced. Studies 
Figure 5 .2 .3-1
Digitalized consumption and sustainable consumer behaviour: systematic diagram showing the areas of digitalized and sustain-
able consumption to be investigated. The WBGU sees possible opportunities of digitalization for sustainable consumption in the 
way that digitalization can serve as a tool for (1) system knowledge and problem awareness on sustainable products and services 
and their (worldwide) consumption, (2) an individual or/and collective preference for resource-saving products by consumers,  
(3) an individual reduction in consumption (eco-sufficient use), (4) a collective reduction in consumption through collective use, 
 re-use, repair, sharing and exchanging. It is not yet clear how much potential for sustainability lies in (5) the consumption of  
new digital services, such as social networks or streaming services, and the dematerialization and/or virtualization of certain 
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on online shopping, for example, indicate that the 
wide range of choices available in the online context 
leads to more rational, informed and less impulsive 
shopping (Chan et al., 2017b). For example, portals 
aiming to promote sustainable consumption, such 
as EcoTopTen for white goods (large electrical appli-
ances such as refrigerators), can reduce search and 
comparison costs and increase consumers’ freedom 
of choice and flexibility (SVRV,  2016: 17). How-
ever, the provision of sustainability-relevant prod-
uct information is not well-developed on the most 
important German online shops to date; only the 
‘eco online shops’ offer comprehensive information 
about the environmental quality of the products on 
offer (Hagemann, 2017).
3. Eco-sufficient use: Consciously reducing consump-
tion is an expression of a modest, i.e. ‘eco-suffi-
cient’ lifestyle. This too can be supported by the 
provision of easily accessible information on the 
internet. For example, ICT can reveal the specific 
consequences of individual consumer behaviour 
and point to alternatives (e.g. online platforms like 
Box 5 .2 .3-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘ Digitalization of consumption and sustainable 
consumer behaviour’
Digital solutions should be used specifically to increase sys-
tem knowledge and problem awareness relating to the sus-
tainability of products and services. Digital platforms should 
be used to make information available on the (worldwide) 
individual and collective consumption of resource-saving 
products, on how to reduce consumption (eco-sufficient use), 
and on the collective reduction of consumption through col-
lective use, re-use, repair, sharing and exchange. In this con-
text, the potential of new digital services, such as social net-
works or streaming services and dematerialization or 
virtualization, should also be used specifically to enable con-
sumers to judge the sustainability potential of consumer 
goods (Figure 5.2.3-1). The WBGU recommends the 
following: 
 > Improve the online provision of system knowledge and pro-
blem awareness about sustainable consumption patterns: 
Credible and reliable information sources about resource 
intensity and the long-distance effects of products should 
above all also be made available online to enable resource-
saving purchasing decisions and eco-sufficient use. Dis-
tributors and traders could be legally obliged to provide 
digital information, so that, for example, the CO2 emissi-
ons generated during the manufacture and transport of the 
product, the resources used and the social implications of 
production – also in online commerce – are made transpa-
rent. For example, data collected by manufacturers for their 
business reports should be made easily accessible to consu-
mers or consumer organizations using digital platforms, e.g. 
via links to sales platforms or codes on products. The provi-
sion of socio-ecological product information on online-tra-
ding platforms should be encouraged, since online traders 
currently provide very little information on sustainability 
aspects of their product ranges (Hagemann, 2017). Com-
panies that differ from traditional distribution methods in 
that they assume societal responsibility should use digital 
distribution and marketing strategies to spread information 
about the eco-sufficient use of their products, and thus 
contribute to the dissemination of methods of eco-suffi-
cient use (Gossen and Schrader, 2018). This also includes 
digital information about products that is accessible to con-
sumers and third parties and makes repairs possible (Kurz 
and Rieger, 2018b).
 > Encourage resource-efficient collective use, re-use, repairs, 
sharing and exchange of products using reliable digital solu-
tions: For example, the spread of collective use could be 
accelerated by positive tax incentives for concepts of ‘using 
instead of owning’, or by resource-taxation schemes that 
give privileged status to less resource-intensive collective 
use. A supportive societal and legal environment should be 
created for digital tools such as peer-to-peer sharing plat-
forms, in particular by avoiding legal uncertainty (Leis-
mann et al., 2012; Section 5.2.2). Consumer protection, 
competition (particularly the prevention of monopolies), 
and the protection of privacy must also be guaranteed 
for community sharing (Meller-Hannich, 2014; Peuckert 
and Pentzien, 2018). In particular, commercial platform 
operators should not be able to evade this responsibility 
( Peuckert and Pentzien, 2018: 53). In addition, the public 
sector could also provide practical support for sharing con-
cepts by refraining from acquiring ownership and purcha-
sing services instead. Public sharing infrastructures could 
also be created by the public sector or public-private part-
nerships (Peuckert and Pentzien, 2018: 56; Section 5.3.5). 
Sharing platforms should make use of ecologization poten-
tial by improving the labelling of sustainable sharing ser-
vices (Henseling et al., 2018). 
 > Ensure the Eigenart of consumption and analogous inclu-
sion in sustainable consumption: Transparency obligations 
and rights of objection can also strengthen the sovereignty 
of consumers in the field of digital consumption (SVRV, 
2016: 28). For people who consume primarily via the inter-
net, for example, it must be ensured that the trend towards 
personalized or profile-based offer and price structures 
in online commerce does not restrict the scope for indivi-
dual sustainability-oriented consumer behaviour. For peo-
ple who do not participate in online commerce, alternative 
consumption structures should be created or maintained 
that make differentiated – i.e. also sustainable – consump-
tion decisions possible. 
 > Ensure the representation of consumers’ interests: This is 
key to enforcing consumer and environmental interests and 
to enabling the Eigenart of consumption and inclusion in 
sustainable consumption in algorithmicized online com-
merce (SVRV, 2016: 28). Consumer-protection organiza-
tions should be supported financially and institutionally so 
that they can exercise their control function – e.g. in the 
form of the right to issue warnings and the right of associ-
ations to initiate legal proceedings 8also for new forms of 
digitalized consumption) – and can reveal abuses at an 
early stage.
Sustainable economic activity and the  environment  5.2
159
https://klima ohnegrenzen.de/english). A number 
of platforms also provide information on how mate-
rials are re-used. However, this depends on the lon-
gevity and reparability of consumer goods. Obsoles-
cence, i.e. premature product ageing, is nowadays 
not only the result of producers’ policies; it can also 
be a result of consumer behaviour (Box 5.2.5-1).
4. In some cases, the collective use, re-use, repair, 
sharing and exchange of products among consum-
ers (peer-to-peer sharing) is only made possible 
by digitalized consumption and can help reduce 
resource consumption (Ludmann, 2018; Reisch et 
al., 2016). The use of individual products can be 
intensified or their useful life extended if products 
are given away, sold, exchanged, lent out, rented 
out or shared (Scholl et al., 2015), or if services, e.g. 
repairs, are exchanged. However, not every form of 
sharing contributes to resource efficiency (Lud-
mann, 2018), which is why distinctions should be 
made between different forms, e.g. between com-
mercial sharing services and non-commercial shar-
ing (Section 5.2.2). 
5. Consumption of new digital services and demateri-
alization: The term dematerialization was first used 
in this context in the 1990s (Herman et al., 1990) 
to describe the reduction in the material weight 
of functionally similar end-devices over time (e.g. 
from room-filling computers to smartphones). More 
concrete definitions link dematerialization with the 
need to develop new processes, equipment and 
products that are designed from the outset to min-
imize material flows (Schmidt-Bleek, 1994). The 
idea is that the demand for new (digitalized, vir-
tual) products such as music or film streaming, vis-
its to social networks or the use of virtual realities 
could replace the demand for more material-inten-
sive analogue products, distribution channels or 
services. Frequently discussed fields of consump-
tion include media consumption via ICT (streaming 
to smartphones, replacing DVDs or CDs, e.g. Lange 
and Santarius, 2018,) and the replacement of travel 
by video conferences or virtual experience (e.g. 
Beck et al., 2018).
However, in addition to digitalization’s foreseeable 
potential for sustainability mentioned above 
( Figure 5.2.3-1: (1)-(4), the discussion also looks at 
challenges. For example, a switch to more resource-ef-
ficient or shared products may lead to rebound effects: 
if a more resource-efficient production method or the 
shared use of goods leads to lower costs for the con-
sumer, this may increase demand for these goods. 
Resource consumption will then decrease less than 
expected (direct rebound effect) or even increase in 
extreme cases. Empirical studies show that direct 
rebound effects vary in strength depending on the area 
of consumption and the country, and can cut the effect 
of increased efficiency on resource consumption by 
10–30% (estimate of ‘direct rebound effects’: Sorell, 
Box 5 .2 .3-2
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘ Digitalization of consumption and sustainable 
consumer behaviour’
Research should be stepped up on quantifying the impact of 
digitalized consumption on the sustainability of consumer be-
haviour. Following the WBGU’s systematic classification 
( Figure 5.2.3-1) a study is needed to determine whether and 
how digital tools can be used (1) to broaden system know-
ledge and problem awareness of sustainable products and 
services and whether the (worldwide) consumption of such 
products can be increased, (2) to support individual and/or 
collective consumer preference for resource-saving products 
via digital technologies, (3) to promote individual reductions 
in consumption (eco-sufficient use), and (4) to achieve a re-
duction in consumption through collective use, re-use, repair, 
sharing and exchange. Furthermore, it is as yet unclear how 
much potential for sustainability lies in (5) the consumption 
of new digital services, such as social networks or streaming 
services, and the dematerialization/virtualization of certain 
consumer goods, e.g. experiencing virtual worlds instead of 
travelling. This raises the following questions for research: 
 > How do digital applications influence the resource intensity 
of aggregated consumer behaviour? For example, hitherto 
it is unclear by how much and in which fields the resource 
intensity of aggregated consumer behaviour is rising ove-
rall as a result of online commerce. In the area of collec-
tive consumption, scientific research should be conducted 
to determine how and to what extent resource-efficiency 
potential along value chains really can be realized by prac-
tising ‘using instead of owning’ (Peuckert and Pentzien, 
2018).
 > How can people’s willingness to develop and maintain a 
style of consumption based on solidarity be supported? 
How can networking with others and collective use in par-
ticular be promoted for this purpose? Can (and, if so, how 
can) identity and cohesion be promoted by making it pos-
sible for people to network and to consciously shape soli-
darity-based consumption styles.
 > Can motives, norms and emotions that play a role in e.g. 
non-digitalized consumption (e.g. recreation, fascination 
when travelling) be satisfied in dematerialized forms of 
consumption, and how do these motives, norms and emo-
tions influence consumer choices between material and 
non-material consumption?
 > Do rising levels of networking lead to a loss of regional 
identity, to a quasi-standardization of preferences and thus 
of demand-related behaviour? This is a reference to the 
global availability of the same goods, which can force local 
suppliers out of business, since consumers can switch 
online to globally available, ‘perfect’ and cheap goods.
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Topic box 5 .2-1
FinTech in the context of sustainable financing
New financial technologies based on digital technologies 
called FinTechs are increasingly changing the market for fi-
nancial services and the financial system as a whole (WEF, 
2017a). FinTechs are also increasingly a topic of climate and 
sustainability policy. The term FinTech usually covers both 
digital financial technologies and the new services and busi-
ness models based on them. In some cases, the term is also 
used solely as a synonym for new, innovative participants in 
the financial services market (Paul et al., 2016). Often, but 
not exclusively, these are start-ups. FinTechs also open up the 
market for financial services to established, non-sector-spe-
cific companies, especially technology groups (FSB, 2019). 
FinTechs affect almost all functions and services in today’s 
financial system. They challenge the business models of es-
tablished private actors in the financial system essentially by 
opening up alternatives to the current role of market interme-
diaries (He et al., 2017; Box 4.2.2-1), for example, mediating 
between savers and investors or in handling payments/trans-
actions. This applies to banks in particular. The general view 
is that the changes in customer contact and branch structures 
caused by the increasing spread of online banking are only 
the first signs of major upheavals in the business models of 
banks (Paul et al., 2016; Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 
2017; Anagnostopoulos, 2018). FinTechs open up new, more 
direct payment channels and systems; automated trading and 
decision-making systems offer new opportunities for asset 
management; and platforms such as peer-to-peer lending or 
crowdfunding offer new possibilities for financing (Paul et al., 
2016; He et al., 2017). In the insurance sector, FinTechs are 
creating new ways of risk spreading and risk identification, 
for example through more individualized insurance products 
(OECD, 2018b). Compared to today’s financial system, Fin-
Techs promise above all lower transaction costs (which are 
still surprisingly high, e.g. in international payment transac-
tions), a significant increase in market transparency through 
increasing data diversity and availability, and generally a 
broader access to and variety of financial services. In addition 
to these performance-related competitive advantages and 
digital technological progress, FinTechs are currently also 
benefiting from the fact that, in the wake of the 2007/2008 
financial crisis, established financial market players are in 
some cases subject to stricter regulatory requirements, and 
that FinTechs have so far only been covered by financial mar-
ket regulation to a limited extent, if at all (Philippon, 2016; 
Buchak et al., 2018). 
The appropriate further development of financial market 
regulation to fill these gaps and avoid possible problems from 
new digital shadow banks is currently a major challenge (Paul 
et al., 2016; Anagnostopoulos, 2018). For example, the sys-
temic implications of FinTechs are still largely unclear. One 
fear is that, despite initially more intense competition in the 
financial services market, in the longer term there will be an 
increase in market concentration and new risks to financial 
market stability, such as new and more networked players in 
the financial services market who also often elude existing 
regulation (FSB, 2019). At the same time, FinTechs raise 
questions about the future role of central banks and the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy, as illustrated not least by the 
development of digital currencies (Brühl, 2017; Raskin and 
Yermack, 2016). However, some of the approaches of Fin-
Techs must also be viewed critically for reasons of data pro-
tection, for instance when the range of digitalized financial 
services is linked with other business divisions 
( Section 9.2.3.3), or when behavioural data are collected for 
increasingly individualized insurance solutions (OECD, 
2018b). The latter also threaten to further link access to in-
surance solutions with individual economic performance, 
thereby ultimately losing the societal balance of individual 
risks achieved through insurance.
The sometimes very far-reaching structural effects of Fin-
Techs in the financial system also raise the question of the 
importance of FinTechs for sustainable financing. The risks 
associated with FinTechs mentioned above demonstrate that 
they do not contribute in principle and from the outset to 
creating a more comprehensively sustainable financial sys-
tem. At the same time, however, almost all the promises made 
to the current financial system by FinTechs today point to the 
possibilities that FinTechs could remove key obstacles to sus-
tainable financing and thus bring the financial system as a 
whole more into line with the goals of sustainable develop-
ment. The fact that the financial system is of great importance 
for the implementation of climate-change-mitigation goals 
and general sustainable development goals has in the mean-
time been widely acknowledged by many actors and institu-
tions within the financial system and also at the political lev-
el. For example, the Paris Climate Agreement prominently 
enshrined the goal of “making financial flows consistent with 
a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and cli-
mate-resilient development” (UNFCC, 2015: Article 2(1)). 
Not least for this reason, ‘sustainable finance’ is now a topic 
in the banking sector (EBF, 2018), as well as in central banks 
and supervisory authorities. Examples include the ‘Network 
for Greening the Financial System’ (Banque de France, 2019) 
founded in 2018, and the Task Force on Climate-related Fi-
nancial Disclosure set up by the International Financial Sta-
bility Board (fsb-tcfd.org). Germany’s Federal Government is 
pursuing this issue as a strategic goal for Germany as a finan-
cial centre (Bundesregierung, 2019). On the basis of the final 
report of the EU’s High-level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance published in 2018, the European Commission has de-
veloped its own action plan on sustainable finance (European 
Commission, 2018b). The G20 has set up a Sustainable Fi-
nance Study Group (G20 Sustainable Finance Study Group, 
2018). However, the potential benefits and risks of FinTechs 
have only recently been finding their way into these initia-
tives and discussions on sustainable financing. One expres-
sion of this is the establishment in 2018 of a separate UN Task 
Force on the Digital Financing of the SDGs (digitalfinancing-
taskforce.org). 
In terms of content, ‘sustainable financing’ basically 
means not only mobilizing sufficient financial resources for 
the objectives of sustainable development, but also strength-
ening the resilience of the financial system to the stability 
risks of unsustainable developments, and promoting access to 
financial services. For example, in the EU alone, the addition-
al annual investment needed to reduce CO2 emissions across 
all sectors by 40 % by 2030 amounts to some €180 billion 
(EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, 2018). 
At the global level, estimates assume, for example, that the 
financing gap for the necessary investments for the imple-
mentation of the SDGs is currently around 4 billion US dol-
lars, mainly in developing countries and emerging economies 
(UNEP Finance Initiative, 2018). Even today, substantial sec-
tions of the world’s population still lack access to basic finan-
cial services, which are often basic prerequisites for inde-
pendent economic development or an insurance against 
economic or health risks. More than 1.7 billion adults world-
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2007; Semmling et al., 2016). 
If the cost of using goods falls, consumers can spend 
the money saved on consuming other (potentially also 
resource-consuming) goods (‘indirect rebound effect’). 
Time saved by shopping online can, for example, be 
used for other resource-consuming activities (Dost and 
Maier, 2017). However, fewer direct and indirect 
rebound effects are to be expected when sustainabili-
ty-conscious people are involved (Friedrichsmeier and 
Matthies, 2015). 
In a discourse similar to that on efficiency and 
rebound effects, it is sometimes claimed that the impact 
of dematerialization (Figure 5.2.3-1: (5)) is nullified by 
an intensification of consumption, or even that new 
wide do not have a bank account of their own (World Bank, 
2018a). At the same time, there is a growing awareness that 
both ecologically and societally unsustainable developments 
can endanger the stability of the financial system, at least in 
the longer term (EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance, 2018).
Overall, the aim of the discussion on sustainable financing 
is to bring financial flows more into line with the objectives of 
sustainable development and to embed sustainability objec-
tives more firmly in the decisions and assessments of the ac-
tors and institutions of the financial system (TCFD, 2017). At 
present, there are still several problems hampering a sustain-
able design of the financial system (G20 Sustainable Finance 
Study Group, 2018). In the absence of any consistent regula-
tion of the external, social costs of private-sector action, 
there is still little awareness of the relevance of sustainable 
development issues. Moreover, there is often a lack of suffi-
cient or sufficiently verifiable information on sustainable in-
vestment or general decision-making alternatives. One major 
obstacle is the discrepancy between the long-term returns on 
sustainable investments and the more short-term deci-
sion-making horizons of many actors, which is closely related 
to the aforementioned obstacles. In developing countries es-
pecially, broader access to financial services is hindered by 
high payment-transaction costs or a lack of economic biogra-
phies on the part of many people, e.g. needed for calculating 
credit default risks. 
FinTechs have the potential to reduce these barriers 
through improved and more comprehensive possibilities for 
data compilation and processing and a greater accessibility of 
information (UNEP, 2016; SDFA, 2018). This applies both 
with regard to the availability and evaluation of sustainable 
investment projects and returns, and with a view to the rele-
vance of sustainable development issues, especially for long-
term financial returns and the stability of business models 
and financial markets. Increasing data availability and trans-
parency can at the same time help to identify risks earlier, 
quantify them more precisely and, on this basis, find solu-
tions for spreading and reducing the risks of unsustainable 
developments. Digital payment systems also offer new ways 
to track and monitor financial flows, so that funds really are 
used for sustainable investment (SDFA, 2018). All this can 
serve to generally embed sustainability criteria more firmly in 
financial-market decisions and also help to reduce apparent 
lower returns or conflicts between short-term return expecta-
tions and the long-term advantages of sustainable 
investments.
Finally, FinTechs can also significantly improve access to 
financial services, not only in industrialized countries but also 
in developing countries and emerging economies (World 
Bank and IMF, 2018). Improving access to the financial sys-
tem is in itself an important step towards a more sustainable 
financial system in a broader sense by promoting economic 
autonomy and inclusion. It can also be used to mobilize the 
financial resources needed to implement the SDGs (UN Envi-
ronment Inquiry, 2018). The spread of digital payment sys-
tems and online banking via mobile phones, for example in 
African countries (e.g. Kenya) already illustrates the potential 
of FinTechs today (World Bank, 2016; Björkegren and Gris-
sen, 2018; Maino et al., 2019): Thanks to lower (transaction) 
costs, poorer people can also use these systems to make quite 
small payments. Digital networking via the mobile internet 
also considerably reduces the costs of providing services to 
people, even in more remote regions, and represents a form 
of leapfrogging, since the more capital-intensive expansion of 
cable-based infrastructures can be dispensed with 
( Section 5.3.8). By the end of 2013, 219 companies were al-
ready offering mobile payment services in 84 countries 
worldwide (GSMA, 2014). Crowdfunding and peer-to-peer 
lending platforms (World Bank, 2016) offer new possibilities 
for financing that are independent of the data-intensive cal-
culation of credit scores and, in part, of expectations on 
short-term returns. At the same time, the data collected via 
digital devices and applications can help reduce information 
problems in determining credit default risks (Björkegren and 
Grissen, 2018; FICO blog, 2019). 
In some cases, however, the sustainability risks and po-
tential of FinTechs are closely related. The use of mo-
bile-phone data, for example, allows the development and 
expansion of markets for credit and microfinance in develop-
ing countries, but it also highlights the critical data-protection 
implications of some FinTech approaches. The WBGU also has 
similar concerns about ideas and projects to collect sustaina-
bility-relevant data at the individual level and use them with 
the help of FinTechs to influence individual behaviour to-
wards more sustainable decisions (GDFA, 2017; SDFA, 2018). 
In addition to the general risks to financial-market stability 
from FinTechs already mentioned, the World Bank also points 
out that broader access means that many people who are 
largely inexperienced in dealing with financial services are 
integrated into the financial system; appropriate information 
services and regulation of FinTechs are therefore necessary 
for their protection. Finally, the World Bank also sees the 
danger that, despite the fundamental increase in market 
transparency, digital payment services or currencies may be 
misused for illegal transactions such as money laundering and 
tax evasion (World Bank, 2016).
Further systematic analysis of the potential and risks of 
FinTechs for sustainable finance is desirable. This should in-
clude more studies on how the disruptive potential attributed 
to FinTechs can be used to improve the financial architecture 
and mobilize sufficient investment for sustainable develop-
ment. Only with a framework that consistently takes into 
account external effects of private-sector action, short-term 
incentive structures and sustainability-relevant risks can Fin-
Techs be expected to change the rules of the game of the 
global financial architecture in the interests of sustainability. 
Initial approaches are currently being developed in the con-
text of the sustainable finance debate. 
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additional consumption domains are created (Lange 
and Santarius, 2018). The key issue here is whether the 
‘substitution’ of old ways by new ways of satisfying 
needs really works at all. This relates, for example, to 
the question of whether needs associated with the con-
sumption of products (e.g. media consumption for 
entertainment) can be satisfied just as well or even bet-
ter or more easily by using online media (e.g. streaming 
or virtual reality). There is no reliable scientific evi-
dence to back such assumptions (Trepte and Reinecke, 
2018), so that a lot of research is needed here. For 
example, it is unclear whether motives and emotions 
that are satisfied by spending time in natural environ-
ments (e.g. recreation, fascination, ‘being away’; Kaplan 
and Kaplan, 1989) can also be experienced in virtual 
realities.
Finally, there is the question of whether the person-
alized advertising often used on the internet (e.g. Pap-
pas et al., 2014), i.e. advertising that has been adapted 
to the respective user on the basis of their online 
behaviour, might strengthen incentives to buy and thus 
raise the overall level of consumption. Although the 
function of advertising is rather to increase market 
shares, and therefore does not necessarily lead to a 
general increase in consumption, it is possible that indi-
vidualized offers coupled with individualized pricing 
might ultimately lead to an increase in consumption 
(SVRV, 2016: 21). At present there are no studies that 
might consolidate these speculations. 
5.2.3.2 
From sustaining the natural life-support systems 
to the concept of solidarity-based quality of life
The WBGU sees the spread of an extended concept of 
quality of life, prosperity and community – the solidar-
ity-based quality of life – as key to making the most of 
the transformation potential that lies in individual con-
sumption. A prerequisite and important aspect for the 
development of solidarity-based quality of life is con-
scious reflection on one’s own lifestyle, understanding 
its impact, and a conscious acceptance of consumption’s 
limits in society as a whole. 
Initial successes in promoting sustainable consump-
tion made possible by digitalization can already be 
observed. For years now, there have been approaches 
to revealing the consequences of individual consumer 
behaviour using digitalization, for example platforms 
for calculating one’s personal CO2 footprint (KlimAktiv, 
2018; Carbon Footprint, 2018). These information plat-
forms can create an understanding of the problem and 
strengthen people’s motivation to engage in solidari-
ty-based consumption by favouring resource-saving 
products, eco-sufficient product use, and collective 
consumer action (Figure 5.2.3-1). In order for such 
motivation to be turned into corresponding behaviour, 
information about alternatives must be available in the 
purchase setting, i.e. perhaps in the shop itself. Here, 
too, the first apps are being developed, for example for 
the purchase of fish, or for checking whether products 
are ecologically recommendable (e.g. Seafood Watch, 
codecheck, NABU seal check, Utopia). In the future, 
more products and services could be evaluated by man-
ufacturers and consumers with the help of apps. This 
could mean information being available for every con-
sumer decision on the consequences of consumption 
and the alternatives, thus helping to develop solidari-
ty-based quality of life. 
In addition to the provision of problem awareness 
and action knowledge via forums or apps, networking 
with others is also conducive to the realization of soli-
darity-based quality of life. A sense of community can 
contribute to accepting limits and jointly developing 
new sustainable modes of behaviour (e.g. Reese and 
Junge, 2017), for example by participating in networks 
reflecting on the local and global consequences of con-
sumption, jointly testing sustainable lifestyles, or offer-
ing local and global support to others (donations, 
knowledge sharing, etc.). Ground-breaking examples 
are networks organized via peer-to-peer-sharing plat-
forms which organize various joint actions to avoid 
food waste with the help of suitable apps (Foodwaste.
ch, 2018), or applications that show the amount of CO2 
emissions that can be (collectively) saved by linking 
individual and joint sustainable activities (New Earth 
Handprinter, 2018). Jointly giving preference to 
resource-saving products, and using products in an 
eco-sufficient manner increase the perceived self-effi-
cacy of a person’s own actions (Reese and Junge, 2017). 
5.2.3.3 
Opportunities and risks of digitalized consumption 
for inclusion and Eigenart 
Digitalization can enable – or restrict – the substantive, 
economic and political inclusion (Section 2.2.2) of pre-
viously disadvantaged groups. For example, people on 
low incomes in particular can make greater use of free 
sources of information and education on the internet 
(OECD, 2017b) and thus also access knowledge about 
sustainable consumption. ICT gives groups that can 
otherwise only participate in consumption with the 
support of other people (e.g. people who are not 
mobile) new opportunities for inclusion. However, a 
lack of suitable media literacy can make access to infor-
mation and consumer goods more difficult. This applies, 
for example, to older people who do not use the inter-
net when local shopping opportunities disappear. 
The digitalization of consumption can also have both 
a positive and a limiting influence on Eigenart. On the 
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one hand, creative autonomy and self-efficacy can 
potentially be increased through digitalization, since 
individuals can make more targeted online choices and, 
in some cases, themselves influence which products 
they consume. Identity and cohesion could be sup-
ported by enabling people to consciously shape their 
solidarity-based styles of consumption and network-
ing. On the other hand, where internet literacy is low, 
legal guarantees of consumer protection are insuffi-
cient, and technology design is consumer-unfriendly, 
there is a risk that freedom of choice, self-determina-
tion, self-control and security – as components of con-
sumer sovereignty – cannot be realized in digital con-
sumer activities (SVRV, 2017). Here too, the potential 
of digitalization could lie in creating greater transpar-
ency and strengthening the chances of individuals to 
exert influence, for example by enabling them to deter-
mine for themselves which advertising, if any, they 
wish to receive. A kind of sustainability filter, used vol-
untarily, would also be conceivable here. 
5 .2 .4 
Sustainability in online commerce: status quo and 
prospects
SDG 9 of the 2030 Agenda refers to innovation, markets 
and value chains, while SDG 12 aims at sustainable con-
sumer behaviour. The pursuit of both goals is rapidly 
changing as a result of digitalization. More and more 
consumers are choosing digital distribution channels to 
purchase goods and services. What are the consequences 
of digital commerce for sustainability? How does online 
commerce affect the environment and society? How 
does online commerce influence consumer behaviour? 
5.2.4.1 
Role and growth of online commerce 
Online commerce, also known as e-commerce or online 
trading, describes the purchase and sale of products on 
the internet (HDE, Association of German Retailers). It 
can be divided into three categories: (1) between busi-
nesses (business-to-business – B2B), (2) between busi-
nesses and consumers (business-to-consumer – B2C), 
and (3) between consumers (consumer-to-consumer – 
C2C). This arena focuses on B2C online commerce, e.g. 
consumer shopping on Amazon, Alibaba and eBay, 
which, due to the increasing proportion of retailers 
(75%), has developed from a C2C into a B2C platform 
(Behrendt, 2017). Companies use online commerce 
particularly because they can reduce transaction costs, 
increase efficiency, and achieve economies of scale 
(Lang and Ebneter, 2012). In this way, formerly bricks-
and-mortar companies become online traders or 
 multi-channel providers. 
According to the ‘online market attractiveness score’, 
the top countries in online commerce are the USA 
(79.3), China (77.8), the UK (74.4), Japan (70.1) and 
Germany (66.6). The ‘online market attractiveness 
score’ was developed by the consulting firm A.T. Kear-
ney (2015) and measures online-commerce potential 
on a scale from 0 to 100. In several of these countries, 
more than 70% of the population already buy products 
and services online, while the ratio in most developing 
countries is less than 2% (UNCTAD, 2017; Kwarteng 
and Pilik, 2016). However, online commerce is also 
growing rapidly in developing countries, as shown by 
the examples of online mail-order companies such as 
Lazada, Tiki and Sendo in Vietnam (Choi and Mai, 
2018), MercadoLibre in Latin America (WTO, 2018), or 
Bidorbuy, Takealot, Konga, Kaymu and Zando in South 
Africa and Nigeria (Enders, 2018).
In China and the USA, online commerce has been 
growing at an annual rate of about 20% for a decade. It 
is dominated by the companies Alibaba in China and 
Amazon in the USA (The Economist, 2017a). In China, 
Alibaba generated an estimated daily turnover of 
US$14 billion in 2015 on discount days like the ‘Singles 
Day’. This corresponds to about 20 million parcels in 
one day. In 2017 Alibaba’s turnover on that day already 
amounted to US$22 billion (Hua, 2017) and in 2018 to 
over US$30 billion (Cazzoli, 2018). 
The clothing sector is the product group with the 
highest turnover in B2C e-commerce, although ICT (e.g. 
smartphones) and electrical goods (e.g. electrical 
household appliances), books and e-books are also very 
frequently sold via the internet. In addition, the food 
trade is increasingly moving to the digital world. More 
and more grocery chains are offering a range of durable 
and fresh foods online (Kolf, 2017b). In addition, exclu-
sively online providers (e.g. DHL, Amazon) have estab-
lished themselves in the food sector in the meantime. 
The online share of the total food trade is expected to 
grow – in Germany at an estimated rate of 10% – by 
2020 (Ernst & Young, 2014; Kolf, 2017a). 
The turnover of online commerce is strongly concen-
trated on a few companies such as Amazon, Alibaba or 
eBay, and products in online commerce are largely pur-
chased internationally (WTO, 2018). Online commerce 
has therefore also become an important topic in the 
international negotiations of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (Berger and Brandi, 2018).
In addition to the strong concentration of power 
among a few companies, there is also strong competi-
tion for new sub-sectors. Companies like Amazon and 
Alibaba are increasingly diversifying their range of 
products and services from online commerce to other 
areas of the digital economy, such as online payments, 
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video streaming, search engines and social media. This 
diversification into new areas is also being pushed by 
competitors. Tencent, a rival of Alibaba’s, is diversifying 
from the video-streaming and messaging business into 
online commerce, the payment sector and gaming (The 
Economist, 2017b). Companies are also increasingly 
trying to expand into other countries. Alibaba has 
announced that it is increasing its investment in India, 
while Amazon has been investing more in Germany, 
Japan and the UK (The Economist, 2017c). 
5.2.4.2 
Environmental impact of online commerce
Increasing online commerce has a number of negative 
environmental impacts. Packaging waste is generated 
especially when sensitive, perishable or fragile prod-
ucts are sent, and they are often packed with polysty-
rene or plastic cushioning in packages that are far too 
large. Although the proportion of recycled cardboard 
material is relatively high at around 75%, costs and 
emissions are nevertheless caused by the collection of 
cardboard and the use of other raw materials, including 
water and energy, in its manufacture (Nestler, 2016). In 
addition, marketing aspects play a role in packaging, as 
consumers often attach a higher value to an elaborately 
packaged product (Bertram and Chi, 2018). Fresh food, 
refrigerated and deep-frozen goods pose particular 
challenges for packaging and logistics (Ernst & Young, 
2014). 
The Packaging Act has been in force in Germany 
since January 2019 and includes new deposit regula-
tions, higher recycling quotas, and a central body for 
registering packaging and paying licence fees, which 
also apply to online retailers. It aims to take the first 
step in reducing packaging waste (FAZ, 2018). How-
ever, it is estimated that “tens of thousands of compa-
nies (mainly internet retailers) have, illegally, not 
licensed their packaging at all so far” (Bethge et al., 
2019: 15).
With regard to the volume of traffic, the environ-
mental impact in the form of air pollution, noise, vibra-
tion, road wear and particle emissions has not yet been 
clearly determined (Sühlmann-Faul and Rammler, 
2018). In the USA, it has been found that online com-
merce in the city of Newark has led to an increase in 
traffic volume and emissions of greenhouse gases and 
air pollutants (Laghaei et al., 2016; Sections 5.2.6, 
5.2.8). A comparison of energy consumption between 
B2C online commerce and the traditional retail trade in 
the book sector in densely populated areas of Japan 
shows that online commerce consumes much more 
energy per book than the traditional retail trade. This is 
caused mainly by additional packaging, but also 
depends on how well courier vehicles are loaded and on 
the number of journeys required per delivery (Williams 
and Tagami, 2003). In rural and peri-urban areas, how-
ever, energy consumption is comparable, which is 
attributed in particular to the multipurpose use of pri-
vate vehicles. In the USA, too, the environmental 
impact of the online book trade has proved to be com-
parable to that of using a private vehicle for shopping 
(Matthews and Hendrickson, 2001). 
Not only the transport sector is responsible for the 
poor energy balance of online commerce, but also 
changes in customers’ leisure and shopping behaviour. 
It is estimated, for example, that doubling online com-
merce’s share of total retail sales to 20% in Germany 
would push up energy consumption by 5.6% as a result 
of increased leisure activities on the part of customers 
(Dost and Maier, 2017). Similarly, consumer behaviour 
(Section 5.2.3) has changed considerably over the last 
20 years as a result of online commerce, and this has 
had negative effects on the environment (Bertram and 
Chi, 2018). In the clothing sector, for example, 
‘fast-fashion’ companies have emerged as a result of 
simplified communication and the chance to quickly 
collect information on fashion trends. These companies 
offer cheap clothing with the result that consumers buy 
more clothes, which in turn are soon thrown away, 
resulting in considerable negative environmental exter-
nalities (Bertram and Chi, 2018). 
At the same time, digital solutions can significantly 
reduce the ecological footprint of online deliveries by 
optimizing transport logistics. However, the shorter the 
delivery time, the more difficult it is to optimize the 
routes, which is why delivery vehicles are often only 
loaded half full (Kontio, 2013). A positive environmen-
tal balance can only be achieved if online shopping 
replaces 3.5 traditional shopping trips, if 25 orders are 
delivered at the same time, or if the driving distance is 
further than 50 km (Plepys, 2002; Newcastle Univer-
sity, 2010). Another study claims it is worthwhile for 
clothing buyers to switch from stationary to online 
retailing from as little as 14 km driving distance (Wiese 
et al., 2012). Due to the strong competitive pressure in 
online commerce, however, more and more online trad-
ers are offering delivery on the same day or within a 
few hours as express delivery.
Considerable journeys into cities can also be saved if 
online consumers drive or go to town to shop less fre-
quently. In a survey in Germany, 40% of over 1,000 
online consumers surveyed stated that this was the case 
(Bolz et al., 2017). However, it is also conceivable that 
they often first go to bricks-and-mortar shops to 
 examine the products, and then order them online more 
cheaply. 
Consideration must also be given to the frequent 
unsuccessful deliveries of orders to customers (Bertram 
Sustainable economic activity and the  environment  5.2
165
and Chi, 2018) and the many returns (Kontio, 2013). It 
is estimated that in Germany, on average, every tenth 
order goes back to the supplier, in the case of clothing 
as many as every second parcel (Kontio, 2013). A rep-
resentative survey of 1,054 online consumers in Ger-
many (Kontio, 2013) shows that the return rate has 
actually increased slightly over time. According to this 
survey, one in eight items purchased online is returned. 
This trend is especially pronounced among younger 
online customers. In addition, about half of all online 
consumers indicated that they make online purchases 
with the firm intention of returning them (e.g. clothing 
in different sizes; Kontio, 2013). In order to avoid 
returns and the associated costs, providers offer live 
chat sessions to advise customers or try to describe 
their articles as precisely as possible and present them 
visually. 360° shots and virtual changing rooms are 
being developed depicting clothes with the help of 
mannequins with the consumers’ measurements (Kon-
tio, 2013). 
Further damage to the environment is caused by the 
construction of access roads, large storage warehouses 
for online commerce companies, and by sealing the soil. 
In many places, goods centres or hubs are created for 
the interim storage of ordered parcels. Amazon and 
Zalando alone currently have a total storage area of 
almost a million square metres in Germany (Morganti et 
al., 2014). However, digital solutions can help reduce 
storage space by better adapting production volumes to 
demand and avoiding overproduction. In addition, stor-
age in interim storage facilities is usually more ener-
gy-efficient, as less heating and lighting is used than in 
bricks-and-mortar stores (Mottschall, 2015). 
The role of customer loyalty is also becoming 
increasingly important in online commerce; it is meas-
ured by the Customer Lifetime Value (Ernst & Young, 
2014). Increasingly, marketing strategies are being 
developed to boost consumption via online retailers’ 
internet platforms, thus leading to an increase in pro-
duction and consequently in transport and the associ-
ated emissions (Weth, 2016). However, apps, informa-
tion platforms and online shopping guides may also 
make it easier for customers to search for sustainable 
offers, so that positive environmental effects can be 
achieved via the product effects. Global trading plat-
forms for used goods such as eBay even aim directly at 
changing consumer behaviour away from a disposable 
culture towards a resale culture. Furthermore, eBay 
regards itself as an important building block for a circu-
lar economy (Behrendt, 2017) due to its subsequent 
orientation towards sustainability. 
Environmental pollution is also generated by the 
increasing transport of goods over long distances in 
global online commerce. Since certain goods are only 
available in some countries, or because prices are lower, 
consumers are increasingly ordering products abroad. 
Transformation of the
value chain
Production → logistics → recycling
• Transport system, delivery, utilization of




• Recycling and reuse of packaging &
 end products
Changes in consumer and
leisure behaviour
• Rise in consumption
• Returns
• Short service life of end products
Environmental impact
• Energy requirements
• Transport requirements, emissions &
 road abrasion
• Demand for raw materials
• Land use & land sealing
• Energy requirements
• Transport requirements & emissions
• Demand for raw materials
Figure 5 .2 .4-1
Environmental effects of B2C online commerce.
Source: WBGU based on Fichter (2003) and Tiwari and Singh (2011)
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Of more than 1,000 online consumers surveyed in Ger-
many, 40% stated that they had ordered from a foreign 
retailer in the last 12 months, particularly from China 
(35%) and the USA (20%; Bolz et al., 2017). As a rule, 
consumers cannot precisely check the extent to which 
environmental, health and social standards are com-
plied with in the production and processing of such 
products. Unlike bricks-and-mortar trading companies, 
Amazon or Alibaba, which act as internet platforms, do 
not assume any responsibility if the goods offered do 
not meet certain standards – and checks by state 
authorities are only carried out very irregularly.
Figure 5.2.4-1 summarizes the various environmen-
tal effects of B2C online commerce.
New ideas for online deliveries have been developed 
to address sustainability goals in online commerce 
(Hegmann, 2016; Schlautmann, 2016). Amazon, for 
example, has filed a patent for a hovering depart-
ment-store blimp positioned in the sky over areas of 
high demand from which unmanned drones could 
deliver their goods. In China, Alibaba already uses 
drones for customer deliveries. In Iceland, food orders 
are also delivered by drones, and the company Uber 
plans to enter the food-delivery service with drones in 
the USA (The Economist, 2018). The idea of using cool-
ing boxes as collection stations for food ordered online 
is under consideration, e.g. at filling stations (Nitsche 
and Figiel, 2016). Delivery robots have been tested that 
transport parcels weighing up to 15 kg. Deutsche Post 
already has electric utility vehicles and street scooters 
as well as pedelec cargo bikes in operation. In 2018, the 
number of street scooters totalled 8,000; with over 35 
million kilometres driven, this meant an estimated 
annual CO2 saving of 23,000 t (Sebastian, 2018). 
Major changes are expected from the development 
of concepts for city and crowd logistics, with ‘people in 
Box 5 .2 .4-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘ Sustainability in online commerce’
To ensure that online commerce creates more opportunities 
than risks for sustainable development, the WBGU makes the 
following recommendations for action: 
 > Strengthen consumer awareness of the impact of online 
commerce on sustainability: In order to avoid negative 
effects in online commerce, consumers should be better 
informed about the impact of their purchasing decisions on 
sustainability, so that they are more aware while shopping. 
This could be achieved, for example, by including infor-
mation on the product’s environmental and/or social foot-
print with each purchase. For example, a footprint account 
could be introduced for each citizen to increase transpar-
ency about their own footprint and avoid unnecessary 
returns. The introduction of an explicit return fee should 
also be discussed in order to individualize (and not social-
ize) the costs.
 > Improved monitoring of environmental, social and health 
standards for online commerce; mandatory labelling and 
traceability: Guaranteeing the quality of the merchan-
dise, environmentally friendly packaging materials, cli-
mate-friendly shipping (e.g. using e-vehicles), and fair 
wages for employees in the delivery services can increase 
the sustainability of online commerce while at the same 
time creating more transparency for consumers. This also 
applies in particular to international online commerce, 
because here there are no checks or guarantees of prod-
uct quality – unlike in bricks-and-mortar commerce. State 
quality controls of imported products should therefore be 
stepped up and legislation adapted if necessary. In addition, 
online retailers should be encouraged to develop and imple-
ment sustainability strategies (e.g. corporate social respon-
sibility). Initiatives like the United Nations Global Com-
pact should become more visible and be implemented at a 
decentralized level.
 > Reduction of packaging waste: Targets should be set 
for waste reduction, and compliance with these targets 
(including recycling) should be monitored more closely. 
One possibility might be to introduce a deposit system 
for packaging. In addition, ideas should be developed for 
the reuse of packaging material. Plastic and polystyrene 
must be replaced by easily degradable bio-based materi-
als ( Bertram and Chi, 2018). Packaging avoidance and the 
effects of packaging waste must be made a global issue with 
the aim of changing consumers’ environmental awareness 
and purchasing behaviour in the long term. Licensing of 
packaging in online commerce must be monitored, whereby 
cross-border regulations seem sensible. Exports of pack-
aging waste to developing countries should be effectively 
prevented. 
 > Cities and municipalities need support in the development 
and implementation of strategies to create alternative 
offers for the urban population and to maintain or revive 
the traditional retail trade (e.g. with mobile retailers). In 
addition, cities and municipalities should inform consumers 
on public platforms about what is on offer from sustaina-
bly producing companies and/or shopping facilities in the 
region. This can be promoted by active marketing.
 > Further develop concepts of city and crowd logistics: Cen-
trally located parcel collection points with long opening 
hours are already being established in empty shop build-
ings to reduce the number of deliveries. The logistics sec-
tor is also being used as a testing ground for electromobil-
ity. These ideas should be further developed towards zero 
emissions and climate neutrality. Rail transport should be 
promoted as an alternative to fuel-based transport using 
trucks. 
 > Avoid trips with low capacity utilization and reduce multiple 
trips: To protect the environment, transport companies 
should only make deliveries when a certain degree of their 
vehicles’ load potential has been reached; multiple jour-
neys to deliver online goods should be reduced or, if possi-
ble, avoided. For this purpose, the already known options 
(parcel stations, delivery at a desired time, e-mobility) 
should be exploited and further advanced. 
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a crowd’ ordering or providing a service (Mehmann et 
al., 2015; Ernst & Young, 2014; Hausladen et al., 2015). 
For example, parcels to be delivered are placed in the 
boot of a vehicle located via GPS. ‘Crowdshipping’ links 
dealers, suppliers and customers via (mobile) software. 
Anyone who is already on the road can take parcels with 
them for others – for a fee. It is expected that environ-
mental pollution caused by emissions from delivery 
traffic can be at least partially reduced in this way in the 
future. Sustainability solutions for online delivery 
already exist today. At the beginning of the millennium, 
DHL introduced parcel stations where customers can 
pick up their parcels, thus avoiding multiple deliveries. 
According to a study conducted in 2006, such parcel 
stations in Cologne, most of which are within walking 
distance for the customers, can save more than 35,000 km 
a year in car trips (Folkert and Eichhorn, 2007). 
5.2.4.3 
Social effects
Consumers benefit from online commerce because prices 
are lower and comparable, the range of products is more 
varied, and the act of buying is both independent of 
business opening hours (Berg, 2015) and much more 
convenient (Lang and Ebneter, 2012). Inclusion of 
elderly and handicapped people in particular increases 
because of the possibility of home delivery. 
However, the growth of online commerce in general 
and pure online retailers in particular is also upping the 
economic pressure on bricks-and-mortar retailers, espe-
cially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
those based in smaller towns. As a result, more and more 
retail stores are closing in towns and villages, but also 
in major shopping centres (which are becoming ‘dead 
malls’). For society, this can mean a cultural loss if urban 
flair and popular places for meeting and discussion are 
Box 5 .2 .4-2
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘ Sustainability in online commerce’
There are only a small number of scientific studies that meas-
ure or evaluate the impact of online commerce on sustain-
ability. Since the empirical evidence on this impact is far from 
clear, the WBGU proposes that the Federal Government pro-
vide funding support for research into the following concrete 
issues:
 > What short-, medium- and long-term ecological and social 
effects does online commerce have? What concepts or strat-
egies are conceivable to promote the sustainability of online 
commerce? Knowledge about the impact of online com-
merce on sustainability is still very limited, and results to 
date are inconclusive. Furthermore, there is a lack of the 
primary data needed to understand the relationship bet-
ween online commerce and sustainability (Bertram and Chi, 
2018). The latest developments and innovations must be 
taken into account in studies (including real-world labo-
ratories for urban logistics) on the sustainability of online 
commerce.
 > How can packaging waste be drastically reduced or recy-
cled? The aim should be to achieve a circular economy. Can 
the goal be achieved at all in global online commerce, and 
if so, how? 
 > Plastic packaging waste: what consequences does micro-
plastic intake have for the health of humans and animals? 
It is already known that plastic particles are absorbed by 
humans and animals through food, water and the air and 
that these particles can be detected in the human body (e.g. 
the liver and brain), yet little is known about the health 
effects (Waring et al., 2018). 
 > What effects do online retailers’ marketing strategies to 
increase consumption (immediate delivery or personalized 
prices and offers) have on consumer behaviour? Digitali-
zation influences consumer behaviour with direct conse-
quences for the environment. Is consumption increasing as 
a result? How are consumption patterns changing? 
 > Which urban concepts should be promoted that counteract 
the cultural loss of the inner cities and allow for some kind 
of dovetailing with online commerce and other online offer-
ings? In order to keep up with the fast-moving develop-
ment in countries like Germany, changes will be necessary 
in the municipalities that are struggling most with the loss 
of the bricks-and-mortar retail trade. By developing alter-
native urban development concepts, it might be possible to 
counteract the cultural loss of inner cities in time. 
 > What sustainability measures are companies taking in view 
of increasing online commerce? Research in this area inclu-
des the analysis of sustainability concepts within value 
chains, how to deal with returns, and the optimization 
of logistics in order to internalize negative environmen-
tal externalities. The use of digital solutions, such as 3D 
simulations or computer-aided augmented reality, could be 
included in the analysis. 
 > What impact does online commerce have on sustainability in 
developing countries? Which factors hinder or promote sus-
tainable online commerce? What data should be collected in 
order to adequately reflect the impacts? Data availability in 
this area is still very low. This applies in particular to deve-
loping countries, where little data on online commerce is 
available. This makes it difficult for politicians and compa-
nies to make strategic investment decisions. 
 > What role does online commerce play in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)? What impact is digitalization having 
on world trade? Will the discussion on online commerce lead 
to a new block formation of country groups? Increasing 
online commerce has become an important and much dis-
cussed topic in the international negotiations of the WTO 
and the World Economic Forum. The WTO sees AI, the IoT, 
3D printing and blockchain technology as the key techno-
logies of digitalization in commerce and the ones that will 
have a significant effect on it (WTO, 2018). The 2018 
World Trade Report highlights not only the benefits, but 
also a number of dangers, such as the increasing concentra-
tion of power and the loss of privacy and security (WTO, 
2018), which need to be further explored. 
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lost (Weth, 2016). In addition, there is a danger that 
people who predominantly shop online will become 
 isolated and no longer maintain external contacts, 
 leading to loneliness in society. 
Structurally, city centres and the retail trade are 
closely linked. Shopping opportunities determine the 
attractiveness of an inner city for about 66% of the 
population (Mensing, 2010). Furthermore, the 
 municipalities benefit from trade tax revenues ( Stepper, 
2016). Many municipalities find it difficult to optimally 
counteract fast-moving developments by making alter-
native offers in their city, since infrastructural planning 
is more geared towards the medium and long term and 
the bureaucratic hurdles are often difficult to overcome 
(Stepper, 2016). 
At the same time, jobs are being lost in the retail 
trade (in Germany alone, more than three million 
 people are employed in the bricks-and-mortar retail 
trade; HDE, 2015), jobs that are considered more 
attractive than in the logistics sector. However, it must 
be borne in mind that online commerce also opens up 
new sales markets for SMEs. In China, for example, 
thousands of new  producers have emerged in the hor-
ticultural sector,  marketing their fresh products via the 
Alibaba online platform (Weise and Reindl, 2017). It is 
also becoming easier for small booksellers and sec-
ond-hand  bookshops to find customers for their niche 
products via online platforms like Amazon or eBay. 
Likewise, innovative niche providers of sustainably 
produced products find it easier to find and advertise to 
a larger number of customers in online commerce.
5.2.4.4 
Conclusions
Online commerce is growing rapidly. It not only raises 
efficiency and generates economies of scale, but also 
causes negative environmental externalities through 
increased delivery traffic, packaging waste, the 
 numerous returns and the increasingly cross-border, 
 international exchange of goods. On the other hand, 
there are positive effects from optimized logistics sys-
tems, people making fewer private trips to town, and 
improved control options, product and process labelling 
according to  sustainability criteria, and traceability 
along supply chains. The empirical evidence of the 
overall effects on the environment is not yet 
 unequivocal. 
Negative social impacts in cities and municipalities 
can be observed in the displacement of bricks-and- 
mortar commerce. Furthermore, the turnover of online 
commerce, and thus its market power, is concentrated 
on a few companies; a not insignificant proportion of 
product purchases in online commerce are international 
and cross borders – with little chance to monitor 
 compliance with environmental, health and social 
 standards in the  country of origin. 
5 .2 .5 
Digitalization: from the electronic waste problem 
to a solution for the circular economy?
5.2.5.1 
Electronic waste in the context of the circular 
 economy
This arena illustrates the potential, but also the chal-
lenges, of digitalization for the circular economy using 
the example of a more sustainable approach to elec-
tronic waste (e-waste). Digitalization is leading to a 
sharp increase in the production of electrical and elec-
tronic equipment, in the corresponding demand for 
strategic metals, and to growing amounts of toxic 
e-waste (Section 5.2.5.2; Baldé et al., 2017). At the 
same time, however, it also offers valuable potential 
and a set of tools for improving the circular economy 
(Section 5.2.5.3). The circular-economy approach is 
taken up by SDG 12 ‘Ensuring sustainable consumption 
and production patterns’ (UNGA, 2015). An overarch-
ing view of industrial material flows is provided by the 
arena ‘Sustainable industry 4.0 and circular economy’ 
(Section 5.2.1).
For the WBGU, the rapid transition to a circular 
economy that is as complete as possible is seen as a 
central building block in the Transformation towards 
Sustainability (WBGU, 2016a: 21). The circular econ-
omy offers alternatives to the dominant form of ‘linear’ 
value chains, in which mineral raw materials are 
extracted from the Earth’s crust by mining, processed 
into products, and incinerated at the end of their useful 
life or disposed of as waste (EMF, 2014). Especially the 
beginning (mining) and end (waste management) of 
this chain create considerable sustainability problems 
for the environment, health and development (UNEP, 
2010). Furthermore, mineral deposits of metals and 
other technical raw materials are limited, requiring 
strategies such as the reduced and efficient use of 
resources, a circular economy and substitution, and 
sustainable consumption (UNEP IRP, 2017: 150ff.; 
 Section 5.2.3). 
The ‘3Rs strategy’ (reduce, reuse, recycle) called for 
by the UN, among others (e.g. UN, 2016a: 47; UNEP IRP, 
2017: 150ff.), is regarded as a guiding principle of the 
circular economy. Products should remain in use for as 
long as possible, keeping resource consumption per uti-
lization unit low, and unnecessary production should be 
avoided by eco-sufficiency strategies (reduce). This can 
be achieved, among other things, by the joint use of 
goods by several persons (sharing economy: 
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 Section 5.2.2.4). Afterwards, the devices should be 
repaired or their components refurbished and reused, 
which should already be provided for in the products’ 
design. At the end of the longest possible lifespan, the 
technical raw materials (e.g. metals) in the product 
should be recycled as far as possible and used for the 
production of new goods (EEA, 2016a; Geissdoerfer et 
al., 2017). However, a completely closed cycle cannot 
be achieved because of the impossibility of both com-
pletely loss-free production and a 100% recovery of all 
technical raw materials (Korhonen et al., 2018). In addi-
tion, the diversity of technical materials used (e.g. alloys) 
is constantly increasing, making recycling considerably 
more difficult and further increasing the loss of strategic, 
rare resources (Reller and Diessenbacher, 2014). 
Nevertheless, this ‘3Rs strategy’ can reduce raw-ma-
terial requirements and the quantity of waste generated, 
as well as the related damage to health and the environ-
ment (EMF, 2015). The return of biological materials to 
ecosystems (e.g. by composting; EMF, 2013) should be 
made possible by avoiding  contamination. 
5.2.5.2 
Digital technologies as a cause of the global 
e-waste problem
E-waste is an issue at all stages of the product life cycle 
of electrical and electronic equipment. Many problems 
arise at the beginning of this cycle. The rapidly increas-
ing demand for digital devices such as computers, tab-
lets and smartphones, and the electronics and batteries 
integrated into everyday objects, together with inade-
quate recycling (e.g. the strategic metal lithium is not 
currently recycled in Germany), is leading to an increas-
ing consumption of metals like gold, cobalt and tanta-
lum. The extraction of these raw materials causes con-
siderable environmental and health damage in the 
countries of origin (mostly developing countries or 
emerging economies) and is also a major cause of con-
flicts, violence and even military disputes (UNEP, 
2012: 24; WBGU, 2016a: 182f.).
The main problem driver is the interplay between a 
growing number of electronic devices with shortening 
service lives and the fact that most devices cannot be 
repaired due to ‘obsolescence’, i.e. because they are 
intentionally or unintentionally designed in such a way 
that they do not last long (Box 5.2.5-1). As a result, 
e-waste (end-of-life electrical and electronic devices) is 
one of the fastest growing waste streams in the world 
(Kumar et al., 2017; Cucchiella et al., 2015). In 2016, 
the volume of e-waste worldwide totalled 44.7 million 
tonnes, and is expected to rise to 52.2 million tonnes in 
2021 (Baldé et al., 2017). The growth rates of 3–5% 
per year correlate with GDP (Kumar et al., 2017). Only 
20% of global e-waste was collected and recycled via 
official take-back programmes in 2016. 4% ended up in 
household waste, and the whereabouts of the remain-
ing three quarters are unknown (Baldé et al., 2017). 
They were probably dumped in landfills, exported, or 
recycled under poor working, health and environmen-
tal conditions. Even in Europe, the e-waste recycling 
rate was only about one third in 2012 (Huisman et al., 
2015). Despite a mature framework, the EU still has 
major difficulties in implementing the circular econ-
omy. However, the EU is increasingly recognizing waste 
as a strategic source of raw materials and attaching 
greater importance to reparability and pollutant reduc-
tion (e.g. in the action plan on the circular economy; 
European Commission, 2019d).
After the often illegal export to emerging economies 
and developing countries (e.g. China, Ghana, India), 
devices are frequently recycled in informal workshops 
with low efficiency levels and insufficient compliance 
with environmental and health standards, leading to 
considerable human exposure to, and environmental 
pollution with, toxic substances and heavy metals 
(UNEP, 2012: 182; Heacock et al., 2016). The e-waste 
dump in the Agbogbloshie slum in Ghana’s capital Accra 
– one of the ten worst contaminated slums in the world 
– is often cited as a drastic example of intolerable con-
ditions (Heacock et al., 2016; Daum et al., 2017). 
The provisions of the Basel Convention on the con-
trol of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes 
and their disposal are circumvented in the case of illegal 
exports (BAN, 2018). National regulations in this field 
are often inadequate or absent (e.g. in China, India and 
African countries; Wang et al., 2016b). China, the larg-
est importer of e-waste, appears to be gradually chang-
ing its policy and, for environmental reasons, is increas-
ingly preventing waste imports (Wang et al., 2016b; 
Mathews and Tan, 2016; Larson, 2014; Xiao and Zhao, 
2017). 
E-waste (including batteries and accumulators) does 
contain valuable metals such as gold, silver, copper, 
cobalt, tantalum and rare earths, but recycling is costly 
and, given the current incentive structures, of little 
economic interest in industrialized countries. E-waste 
holds great, largely untapped potential for the circular 
economy – the raw materials it contains alone were 
worth €55 billion in 2016 (Baldé et al., 2017: 54ff.). 
The insufficient degree of implementation of the cir-
cular economy is mainly due to a lack of the right eco-
nomic framework (Box 5.2.5-1), but also to informa-
tion deficits. The latter could be eliminated by the (real-
time) provision of the necessary data – which has often 
been lacking in the past – about location, condition, 
availability and material composition in a digitalized 
circular economy; electronic devices are particularly 
suitable for this (EMF, 2016: 19, 30f.; WEF, 2019; Wilts 
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and Berg, 2017). Digital technologies offer new oppor-
tunities for an intelligently supported, integrated circu-
lar economy (e.g. BMU, 2018; Wilts and Berg, 2017) 
along the entire product life cycle. In particular, the 
Internet of Things (IoT), which allows an unequivocal 
assignment of identity and networking also for electri-
cal appliances (Section 3.3.1), is considered to have a 
key role to play here (Baumgartner, 2016  70; EEA, 
2017a: 28; EMF, 2016: 30). However, there are only a 
few cases where this has been done and correspond-
ingly little knowledge about how digital technologies 
can actually be used in the circular economy or whether 
they might even have negative effects (EEA, 2017a: 28; 
Pagoropoulos et al., 2017: 20; RNE, 2017: 29). Further-
more, the established recycling companies are as yet 
inadequately positioned for digitalization, while some 
ICT start-ups such as Rubicon are discovering the busi-
ness potential for themselves, creating opportunities 
for a digitally supported circular economy (Büchele and 
Andrä, 2016; Rajala et al., 2018; Wilts and Berg, 2017. 
The digitalized circular economy is thus still in its 
infancy. Most of the solutions described below along 
the lines of the 3Rs strategy are therefore pilot projects 
and include equally important ‘analogue’ approaches.
Reduce 
A central strategy for reducing e-waste – insofar as vir-
tualization does not reduce the number of devices – is 
ecodesign (‘design out waste’: EMF, 2013: 22, 2016: 39). 
Decisions on a product’s ‘circularity’ and its consump-
tion of energy and resources are already made at the 
beginning of the life cycle or at the product-develop-
ment stage (RNE, 2017: 14), i.e. including sustainable 
product features like longevity or reparability. Digitali-
zation can offer solutions here, e.g. if a design opti-
mized using digital tools takes into account several cir-
cular-economy loops such as reuse, remanufacturing 
and recycling (EMF, 2016: 37ff.). Today, IoT-generated 
data already flow back into design processes, so that 
new or further developed products can be optimized at 
an early stage with regard to the circular economy. The 
replacement of strategic metals with nano-carbons 
(Arvidsson and Sandén, 2017) or the use of biodegrad-
able or transient electronics should also be already 
taken into account during design (Irimia-Vladu, 2014; 
Homrich et al., 2018; Tan et al., 2016).
Closely linked to waste avoidance and ecodesign is 
the movement for an ‘open-source circular economy’. 
With its “[...] common vision of a collaborative econ-
Box 5 .2 .5-1
Obsolescence as a cause of the short lifespans of 
electrical appliances in the Digital Age 
The causes of the ever-shorter product cycles of electronic 
devices are discussed under the term ‘obsolescence’ (Prakash 
et al., 2016). Not every case of obsolescence is intended by 
the manufacturer (‘planned obsolescence’). The service life of 
electrical devices can also be limited by the wear and tear of 
the hardware (‘mechanical obsolescence’). In addition, elec-
trical devices are replaced for economic reasons when the use 
of product-related resources, necessary repairs and other 
maintenance are no longer worthwhile (‘economic obsoles-
cence’; Prakash et al., 2016: 64). For example, permanently 
installed batteries make smartphones more difficult to repair 
(Primus, 2015: 44). Laws have already been proposed in Ger-
many and the EU to promote the material longevity and rep-
arability of all products (Brönneke, 2015; Schlacke et al., 
2015), as well as for environmental requirements laying 
down minimum service lives for digital products and services 
(Kurz and Rieger, 2018b).
Even apart from the lifespan of the hardware, e-waste is 
also generated by the shortened service life of electronic de-
vices. Perfectly functioning devices are increasingly replaced 
for reasons of status, fashion or a desire to be up-to-date 
(‘psychological obsolescence’). For example, 40% of users in 
Germany buy a new smartphone every two years at least (Pri-
mus, 2015: 45). A return to the product loop is regularly pre-
vented by the lack of proper disposal and collection systems 
for old devices (Primus, 2015). Although many consumers 
desire a longer service life, many devices become obsolete 
because they no longer meet the requirements of innovative 
services and products (‘functional obsolescence’). This in-
cludes, for example, incompatibility with the latest soft- and 
hardware of other electronic devices (Prakash et al., 2016: 64). 
If a smartphone is upgraded to the latest operating system (a 
prerequisite for using the latest apps and security standards), 
the processes can slow down because of the greater strain 
placed on hardware capacity (‘software obsolescence’). When 
the hardware is older, upgrades are no longer possible, so that 
an (unavoidably) obsolete operating system leads to a lack of 
data security and incompatibility with new software (Ax et 
al., 2018). 
In order to counter obsolescence, the WBGU believes not 
only that the minimum service life and reparability of the 
hardware should be legally guaranteed, but also that operat-
ing systems and software should remain upwardly compatible 
in the longer term and updates made available (Kurz and 
Rieger, 2018b). Corresponding obligations on the manufac-
turers should be introduced. Software should be designed in 
a modular and maintainable way during the development 
phase, designed to be resource- and energy-efficient and ab-
stracted as far as possible from hardware in order to be com-
patible with both old and new devices for a longer period of 
time (Ax et al., 2018; Hilty et al., 2017; Kurz and Rieger, 
2018b). In addition, manufacturers of obsolete equipment 
should make the manufacturer-specific design tools, software 
frameworks, documentations and software source codes 
available to third parties to ensure their further reparability 
and use (Kurz and Rieger, 2018b). Software must be incorpo-
rated into an integrated product policy like that promoted by 
the EU (Ax et al., 2018).
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omy of networked cycles and open information” 
(Majewski, 2016: 97), it transfers the open source idea 
to the circular economy (Section 5.3.10) and pursues 
strategies against obsolescence (Box 5.2.5-1). A suc-
cessful example of this is the Fairphone, which is doing 
pioneering work with its ecodesign and circular-econo-
my-oriented business model (Fairphone, 2019; Majew-
ski, 2016; Wiens, 2016) and has imitators like the Ger-
man company SHIFT (SHIFT, 2016). 
A key reduce strategy is the transition from product 
to user orientation. Based on the IoT, some companies 
have begun converting their business models into prod-
uct-service systems, i.e. they sell the use of a product 
instead of its physical existence – in an analogous way 
to the sharing-economy idea (EEA, 2017a: 24: Pagoro-
poulos et al., 2017: 19). Although product-service sys-
tems seem to make important stimuli for the circular 
economy possible, they cannot guarantee success 
either (EEA, 2017a: 26ff.; Tukker, 2015: 87f.). In the 
commercial field, digitalization could drive concepts 
such as result-oriented contracts (Tukker, 2015: 81), 
predictive maintenance or remanufacturing (here, the 
product is restored to its original condition and a guar-
antee given, e.g. toner for a laser printer; ERN, 2015: 4). 
Such ideas are already in use for high quality vehicles, 
office communications, equipment or machinery (EMF, 
2016: 37ff.). An example for private customers is 
‘Washing as a service’. Digital monitoring of machine 
use ensures an extended service life through preven-
tive and predictive maintenance as well as software 
upgrades, including (energy-) use optimization and 
estimating the remaining service life of the washing 
machine and its components (Bressanelli et al., 2018). 
Yet even simpler approaches have great potential. For 
example, it is estimated that a circular-economy-based 
rental model for routers could avoid up to 80% of 
raw-material losses and 45% of CO2 emissions, while 
suppliers would save about a third of the costs (RNE, 
2017: 14f.). In some cases, however, the question arises 
as to whether a purchased product that has a long ser-
vice life and is finally returned to a suitable collection 
point makes more sense for private customers and the 
environment. In addition, a compromise must be found 
between data protection and a circular economy that is 
coordinated via data (Bressanelli et al., 2018: 220). 
Product service systems also frequently promote closed 
systems, such as subscriptions for printer cartridges, 
which bind customers to individual manufacturers 
instead of enabling them to refill at low cost (ERN, 
2015: 70f.). The aim here should be to create more sys-
tem openness, also with a view to repairs. 
Reuse
E-waste should no longer be treated as waste, but con-
sidered as a source of potentially useful products where 
reuse and recycling can be effectively integrated (Cole 
et al., 2017: 156; Parajuly and Wenzel, 2017: 279). Pio-
neering work is being carried out by the eReuse.org 
initiative, which uses digitalization primarily to increase 
reuse rates (Franquesa et al., 2016: 8). Linked to an app, 
the system provides tools for device inventory and 
diagnostics, device management, and matching supply 
and demand; it also supplies data for device tracking 
and urban collection points.
Facilitated repair is a key promotional factor for the 
circular economy. Demands for a ‘right to repair’, a 
‘repair culture’ or a ‘repair society’ should be seen, inter 
alia, as a reaction to the obsolescence of electrical appli-
ances (Baier et al., 2016; Bertling and Leggewie, 2016; 
Charter and Keiller, 2016; Kurz and Rieger, 2018b; 
Wiens, 2016; Box 5.2.5-1). Worldwide, around 1,000 
repair cafés in 25 countries (approx. 300–400 in Ger-
many; Charter and Keiller, 2016: 1) are making a contri-
bution to increasing repairs of electrical appliances, 
avoiding e-waste and to the associated discourse. 
Online information (videos, manufacturers’ manuals, 
social media) and platforms such as ifixit.com, which 
provide self-created repair information and sell spare 
parts and tools, also make a key contribution and sup-
port the work of the repair cafés (Charter and Keiller, 
2016: 9; Wiens, 2016). 
Recycle 
In order to avoid the most environmentally harmful 
solutions – landfills and incineration – when dealing 
with e-waste at the end of the product cycle, as many 
materials as possible should be recycled. In this context 
reverse logistics (i.e. logistics from the customer back to 
manufacturer/disposer) and waste management are 
crucial, but should ideally be digitally networked with 
earlier usage loops (EMF, 2016: 47ff.). In reverse logis-
tics, for example, sensors (satellite technology, RFID, 
mobile devices) and IoT or blockchain solutions can be 
used for process tracking, as is already standard prac-
tice in other areas of logistics. This helps to overcome 
problems of waste-mixing and to optimize resource uti-
lization in real time. In waste management and recy-
cling, more precise sorting is facilitated by sensor tech-
nology and real-time route optimization of waste col-
lection by mobile communication, and intelligent waste 
containers provide incentives for better waste behav-
iour (EMF, 2016: 47ff.). Earlier ideas of a purely RFID-
based ‘e-waste recycling passport’ could now be 
extended to include the IoT (Löhle et al., 2009: 68ff.; 
Schneider and Steinwender, 2009: 167). A product 
passport on the device, in the cloud or via blockchain 
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solutions could provide information on origin, constit-
uents and condition, as well as disassembly and repair 
instructions throughout the life-cycle, e.g. fluores-
cence, RFID or DNA markers that make unequivocal 
labelling and identification possible (WEF, 2019: 11). In 
addition, the use of AI is being tested in on-demand 
e-waste collection systems (Król et al., 2016). NGOs 
and telecommunications companies are jointly involved 
in the collection of old devices (Teqcycle Solutions, 
2018). A simple existing solution is the free return 
option for e-waste by post (Deutsche Post, 2018). 
In addition to sorting, a major challenge in recycling 
is the dismantling of products consisting of several 
components. In the case of highly standardized devices 
such as smartphones, this can be technically done 
entirely by robots, as Apple’s pilot projects Liam and 
Daisy show (Alvarez-de-los-Mozos and Renteria, 
2017: 59; Becker, 2018; WEF, 2019: 15). In the most 
common case of very different compositions of electri-
cal waste, research is being carried out into the use of 
collaborative, adaptive robots that support humans in 
the identification and sorting of materials and compo-
nents, but, above all, take over physically strenuous or 
hazardous dismantling work (Alvarez-de-los-Mozos 
and Renteria, 2017: 61). A product passport can make 
this much easier (WEF, 2019: 15). For both forms of 
Box 5 .2 .5-2
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘ Electronic waste and the circular economy’
The WBGU recommends that a clear course be set for the 
e-waste problem in the direction of a circular economy that is 
as complete as possible, as well as a cautious digitalization 
offensive and its embedding in legal framework conditions 
and economic incentives. 
 > Promote environmentally friendly design and the circular 
economy: A sustainable circular economy should become 
an explicit innovation goal of digitalization. Compatibility 
with the circular economy is already determined when a 
product is designed, so that sustainability and ‘circularity’ 
criteria must be integrated early on in the design phase. 
Longevity, substitution of toxic substances, the reparabi-
lity and recyclability of devices, as well as the promotion 
of a sharing economy (Section 5.2.2.4), are essential points 
which are already largely determined at the design stage. 
New technologies (e.g. IoT, AI) and approaches (e.g. pre-
dictive maintenance, reverse logistics, remanufacturing) 
should be examined to determine their effects on the circu-
lar economy system before they are introduced.
 > Framework, rules and incentives: Government frameworks 
should include rules and incentives on resource efficiency 
to avoid or substitute toxic and environmentally hazar-
dous substances, and on the use of rare or non-recyclable 
resources. Another goal should be to create a repair cul-
ture and train repairing skills so that consumers can repair 
products and use them for longer (Kurz and Rieger, 2018b; 
Bertling and Leggewie, 2016). To do this, they need easily 
understandable information about the service life of elec-
tronic products (e.g. reparability) in order to take this into 
account when making a purchase decision. Extended pro-
ducer responsibility for the circular economy should be 
enshrined in law, including an obligation of electronic-
equipment manufacturers to ensure sustainable product 
design, taking into account energy consumption, longe-
vity, reparability, and proper take-back and recycling. This 
also includes the publication of data and information (such 
as manuals, construction plans, functionality, components, 
constituents) as well as the long-term supply of spare parts 
and tools for repair and recycling. Software should be desi-
gned in a modular and maintainable way during the deve-
lopment phase, designed to be resource- and energy-effi-
cient and abstracted as far as possible from hardware in 
order to be compatible with both old and new devices for a 
longer period of time. Authorized and independent repair 
workshops, repair cafés and individuals should be trea-
ted equally from a legal point of view. The ‘right to repair’ 
during the warranty period and a reduced tax rate on repair 
services should be examined and repair cafés promoted. In 
the field of electronic products, the mandatory open-source 
publication of product designs and source code after the 
end of commercial support is particularly important. Long 
warranty periods for devices and software (updates) create 
incentives for sustainable product innovations. Public pro-
curement should also be consistently geared towards cor-
responding sustainable criteria. 
 > Ensure transparent material flows: Transparency regar-
ding the resource use of ICT-based products and services 
should be improved (e.g. availability of market statistics, 
studies on the material inventory of digital hardware, life-
cycle assessments; Köhler et al., 2018). The collection and 
recycling rates of e-waste should be made transparent and 
significantly extended, inter alia to reduce the extraction of 
raw materials and the associated environmental and health 
problems. Improved monitoring of material flows (e.g. digi-
tal product passports) can make it easier to avoid conflict 
minerals, curb illegal export flows of e-waste from indus-
trialized countries, and help identify and combat imminent 
shortages and harmful environmental impacts at an early 
stage. The long-term goal should be to establish a global 
monitoring system for e-waste, including the documenta-
tion and control of the recycling chain for old devices. 
 > Stop exports of e-waste: E-waste generated in Europe must 
be recycled as effectively as possible in Europe itself and 
reused locally. The implementation gaps in the European 
export ban on e-waste from Europe should be closed as far 
as possible. Strict monitoring of exports of old electronic 
devices is crucial to prevent illegal export flows of e-waste. 
The mandatory certification of the functionality of old 
devices should be examined as a prerequisite for exports. 
 > Support developing countries and emerging economies: 
Within the framework of development cooperation, infor-
mal, non-governmental collection systems should be used, 
formalized and improved, particularly with regard to occu-
pational health and safety and local environmental pollu-
tion. Improvements in the implementation of the import 
ban on defective and non-repairable electrical equipment 
should be promoted.
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robotics use, problems of economic efficiency in par-
ticular still represent a barrier compared to existing 
practices. Innovative approaches from bio- and mate-
rial science, e.g. microbiological processes to recover 
rare earths and metals, could be used to recycle raw 
materials (Bohnet, 2018).
In future, extracted raw materials and ‘waste’ could 
be traded (regionally) via digital platforms between 
companies at different stages of the value chain and in 
different sectors, thus promoting an ‘industrial symbi-
osis’ in the field of e-waste (Marconi et al., 2018; 
 Section 5.2.1). Some people even suggest automated 
market and logistics platforms for secondary raw mate-
rials or intelligent products that virtually generate their 
own market; distributed-ledger technologies 
( Section 3.3.5.5) could provide the necessary anonymi-
zation of company and customer data (Wilts, 2018: 11; 
Rajala et al., 2018).
5.2.5.4 
Conclusions 
A clear course should be set in the direction of a circular 
economy that is as complete as possible and has as 
much target-oriented digital support as possible. This 
should be a fundamental component of the pathway 
towards future-proof sustainability. Digital technolo-
gies can help to make circular options more recogniza-
ble and traceable, support better coordination, and 
close process gaps. Policies should pursue a systemic 
and transformative strategy that looks at the whole life 
cycle of products and services – outlined here using the 
example of electronic and electrical products. Where 
appropriate, these policies should use digital technolo-
gies as tools. Starting points for this can be found in 
intelligent product design geared towards saving energy 
and resources and towards recyclability (Reller et al., 
2013), in the coordination of an extended service life, 
and at the end of the life cycle, when digital solutions 
can also help ensure that toxic, environmentally haz-
ardous substances do not pollute the environment and 
endanger health during recycling or disposal. 
Box 5 .2 .5-3
Research recommendations on the arena  
‘ Electronic waste and the circular economy’
The WBGU recommends a broad-based, transformative re-
search offensive on e-waste in the context of the digitally 
enhanced circular economy. 
 > Demand for materials and material flows: There should be 
more research into the causes of the rising demand for 
materials in the ICT sector – e.g. accelerated product cycles, 
(not intended) obsolescence due to software and over-
functionality. Globally oriented research on material flows 
in the context of e-waste is also recommended. 
 > Material substitution: Materials research should increasin-
gly focus on promoting substitution by less rare, less toxic 
and less environmentally hazardous materials and by bio-
degradable electronics. For example, there are indications 
that some strategic metals could be substituted by carbon-
based nanomaterials (Arvidsson and Sandén, 2017). Corre-
sponding materials research should be accompanied by the 
investigation of possible environmental and health effects 
of novel substitutes. 
 > Recycling technologies: There should be more research and 
development on technical solutions for the use of robotics 
and machine learning and/or AI in the circular economy, as 
well as for recycling strategic metals and rare earths from 
e-waste and batteries (e.g. bioleaching). 
 > Strategic approaches: The theoretical and practical limits 
of the circular economy should be sounded out to assess 
the need for further accompanying measures, such as effi-
ciency and eco-sufficiency strategies. Research projects 
in the field of waste prevention (particularly on rebound 
effects) – and on the influence of product information on 
longevity, reparability and recyclability on consumer deci-
sions – should be initiated or intensified. The development 
of an indicator of ecological obsolescence should be exa-
mined. 
 > Effectiveness of regulation: Studies on economic incentives 
for reducing demand at the beginning of the design phase 
and for extending product life could help to increase recy-
cling rates in the long term. The results could lead to impro-
ved urban and national regulations in the field of waste 
governance (e.g. collection systems, levies to control waste 
generation). 
 > Criteria and standards: There should be increased promo-
tion of applied research and corporate research in the areas 
of green ICT, (open) source for product designs, and digi-
tally supported recycling with regard to sustainability cri-
teria and standards, including sustainable and long-lasting 
(open) software and hardware. 
 > Access to data and information: Publicly accessible data and 
information on resources, material flows and e-waste are 
important prerequisites for research work (Section 5.3.10). 
One example is the quantitative analysis of material flows 
in the electronics industry. How much potential is there for 
reuse in the highly diverse waste streams? What informa-
tion is or should be available on the existing data platforms 
(materials used, construction plans)? At what cost and by 
whom can the information be used?
 > Participation and actors: The opportunities for inclusion 
and the effects of different options for shaping the circular 
economy on different groups of actors such as civil-society 
initiatives (e.g. repair cafés), manufacturers and indepen-
dent repair workshops and individuals should be examined, 
especially with regard to the impact potential of social 
innovations.
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The handling of e-waste is still predominantly 
 oriented towards the end-of-life phase of the product 
cycle, but this does not adequately address the e-waste 
problem. A digitally supported circular economy should 
be increasingly geared to the early phase of a product’s 
life cycle with strategies such as eco-sufficiency, eco-
design, repair and reuse. Not only technical and legal 
solutions, but also new business models, consumer 
education, social innovations and changes in cultural 
practices are needed, e.g. changes in behaviour and 
sustainable consumption (Sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3). The 
circular economy will not be successful without accom-
panying strategies for eco-sufficiency and changed 
consumption patterns (Schneidewind, 2018). 
The WBGU recommends making timely political and 
economic decisions: clear regulation and incentives 
(national, European and international) to move away 
from toxic substances in product design and towards 
resource efficiency and modular products; a new, also 
digitally supported sharing economy and product-ser-
vice systems; setting trends away from the throwaway 
mentality towards durable products and repair, and 
moving away from illegal exports of e-waste to emerg-
ing economies and developing countries towards effec-
tive recycling at the locations of consumption. Legal 
and fiscal incentives will play an important role in this 
change of direction. Among the prerequisites for such a 
fundamental change are a cautious digitalization offen-
sive to leverage the positive potential of digitalization 
along the entire product life cycle and to counter 
rebound effects (Box 5.2.5-2), as well as a research 
offensive that looks at options for improved informa-
tion accessibility, product reparability and solutions 
such as the development of biodegradable electronics 
(Box 5.2.5-3). 
5 .2 .6 
Digitalization for climate-change mitigation and 
the energy transformation
SDG 7 aims to provide all people with access to afforda-
ble, reliable, sustainable and modern energy; SDG 13 
aims to combat climate change and its impacts. Both 
goals can only be achieved in combination, and digital 
technologies such as smart grids, smart meters and 
digit ally supported energy storage can play an impor-
tant role.
Successful implementation of the Paris Agreement 
requires a transformation of energy systems and 
changes in land use, urban infrastructure and industrial 
production (IPCC, 2018; WBGU, 2011). In the case of 
relatively short-lived greenhouse gases like CH4 and 
N2O, which are produced in agriculture for example, it 
is sufficient to stabilize emissions at a low level. How-
ever, anthropogenic CO2 emissions must be reduced to 
zero to stop further global warming (IPCC, 2018: 14f). 
The main sources of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are 
the use of fossil fuels such as coal, crude oil and natural 
gas and, to a lesser extent (12%), emissions from 
changes in land use (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Depending 
on how quickly greenhouse-gas emissions decrease, it 
will be necessary in addition to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere in the medium term to achieve the Agree-
ment’s objectives (IPCC, 2018; Box 5.2.6-1). The WBGU 
believes that the need for such ‘negative emissions’ 
should be kept to a minimum (WBGU, 2016b). The 
extensive decarbonization of global energy systems by 
the middle of the 21st century is therefore crucial, and 
this will only be possible if demand for energy does not 
rise too sharply in the same period (WBGU, 2016b). 
Just under 80% of global energy demand is still met by 
fossil fuels and only about 10% by modern renewable 
energies (hydropower, wind, sun, biomass/biofuels, 
geothermal energy, ocean energy; REN21, 2018a: 34). 
At the same time, access to sustainable and modern 
energy for all by 2030 must be ensured in order to meet 
SDG 7. Almost a billion people worldwide still have no 
access to electricity, and about three billion people 
depend on harmful forms of energy such as traditional 
biomass or coal for cooking (UN, 2018c). Scientists 
have developed various scenarios of how all sectors 
could be 100% supplied with renewable energy by 
2050 (WBGU, 2016b; Jacobson et al., 2017). Core ele-
ments of such scenarios are electricity generation based 
on renewable energies, the integration of electricity 
with other sectors such as mobility, heating and indus-
try (‘sector coupling’), and technologies and instru-
ments to reduce energy demand. Such a global energy 
revolution could also prevent millions of deaths from 
air pollution (Jacobson et al., 2017). 
Digital technologies play a key role in enabling such 
a global transformation of energy systems. They can set 
the course for the decarbonization of energy systems 
(Section 5.2.6.1) and contribute to a reliable energy 
supply in off-grid regions (Section 5.2.6.2). At the 
same time, however, digitalization can also jeopardize 
the energy transformation if it leads to a sharp increase 
in energy demand (Section 5.2.6.3). Digital technolo-
gies and applications can also contribute to cli-
mate-change mitigation outside the energy sector, 
although possible rebound effects must also be criti-
cally examined in other sectors. For example, sustain-
able intensification in agriculture with the help of digi-
tal technologies could reduce the pressure on changes 
in land use and thus avoid emissions (Section 5.2.9). 
Integrated smart-city concepts (Section 5.2.7) could 
reduce urban emissions. There is also considerable effi-
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ciency potential in industry which could serve cli-
mate-change mitigation, for example in the field of 
goods production (Section 5.2.1). There is further 
potential in logistics in buildings and in the transport 
sector (Section 5.2.8; de Coninck et al., 2018: 370). Fur-
thermore, digital technologies are not only relevant for 
climate-change mitigation, but can also play an impor-
tant role in providing information for climate adapta-
tion and disaster preparedness, e.g. through improved 
weather forecasting and early warning systems 
(Lourenço et al., 2015).
5.2.6.1 
Use digital technologies for the energy 
 transformation
The digitalization of energy systems is already in full 
swing. Global investment in digital electricity infra-
structure and software has increased by 20% per year 
in recent years (IEA, 2017a: 21). Digital technologies 
influence almost all aspects of energy systems (IEA, 
2017c, 2017) and are considered to have considerable 
transformative potential for the entire energy system 
(IEA, 2017a). 
In the past, the electricity sector was dominated by 
large power plants supplying electricity on demand. In 
the meantime, more than 26% of the world’s electricity 
is already generated from renewable energy sources 
(REN21, 2018b: 41), and the trend is rising. Due to the 
decentralized and fluctuating availability of renewable 
energies, their large-scale integration into existing 
grid-connected electricity systems poses increasing 
challenges to existing infrastructures and regulations. 
The management of system integration is a prerequis-
ite, for example, for tapping the potential of photovol-
taics, which is underestimated in many scenarios 
(Creutzig et al., 2017). Conceptually, the problem can 
be met with ‘virtual power plants’, i.e. intelligent inter-
connection and joint control of different decentralized 
power generators and storage facilities. Virtual power 
plants can react flexibly to changes in the grid and con-
tribute significantly to a stable energy supply by joint 
control of decentralized energy plants. By bundling and 
combining them with storage facilities, volatile energy 
flows can balance each other out and provide electrical 
power reliably. Another purpose of integration is the 
joint marketing of electricity and flexibility as well as 
the provision of system services such as the operating 
reserve. Solutions for digital networking and intelligent 
control are supporting the paradigm shift in 
 energy-supply flexibility (Farhangi, 2010).
Moreover, the electricity sector today is still largely 
isolated from the other energy sectors like heating/
refrigeration and transport, and accounts for only about 
20% of global final-energy demand (REN21, 2018a). In 
the future, a much more complex, decentralized system 
is conceivable, in which supply is no longer exclusively 
adjusted to demand, but demand can simultaneously 
follow supply via ‘smart’ systems. Furthermore, sector 
boundaries are becoming more permeable as a result of 
sector coupling: heat and mobility are increasingly cou-
pled with electricity, and provide new storage capacity 
at the same time (e.g. batteries of electric cars). In such 
a system, the digitally supported transmission networks 
are expected to play a central balancing role in stabiliz-
ing the overall system (IEA, 2017a: 86). 
These developments could pave the way for a fully 
renewable and largely emissions-free energy future, 
provided that the appropriate incentives and frame-
work conditions are put in place. It is also important to 
consider systemic linking with other sectors that are 
relevant for climate-change mitigation, as well as the 
impacts on other aspects of sustainability. For example, 
not only electrification but also the substitution of fos-
sil fuels by biomass or synthetic fuels based on renew-
able energies is being discussed as a possibility for sec-
tor coupling. The WBGU recommends maintaining a 
holistic view of the requirements of climate-change 
mitigation, biodiversity protection and the SDGs. The 
use of bioenergy must be assessed in the context of 
competition for land use (food production, ecosystem 
services, species protection; Smith, 2018; WBGU, 
2009b). The potential of carbon-based synthetic fuels 
should be assessed in the context of the long-term chal-
lenges of climate-change mitigation (Box 5.2-1). 
5.2.6.2 
Use digital technologies to overcome energy 
poverty in developing countries
The combination of renewable energy sources and 
digit al solutions can make an important contribution to 
overcoming energy poverty (Hafner et al., 2019; 
UNIDO, 2017). Although the percentage of the global 
population with access to electricity is steadily increas-
ing (from 79% in 2000 to 87% in 2016; IEA, 2017b), 
current efforts will not be sufficient to ensure access to 
affordable, reliable and sustainable energy for all peo-
ple by 2030 (SDG 7) (UN, 2018c). As recently as 2016, 
more than 65% of the population in the UN group of 
least developed countries (LDCs) had no access to elec-
tricity (World Bank, 2017b). Rural areas are clearly at a 
disadvantage in this context: 80% of those who have 
been given access since 2010 live in cities, and the rural 
population accounts for 87% of the access deficit (UN, 
2018c). 
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Reliable power supplies in off-grid regions: solar 
home systems and mini-grids
Much of the above-mentioned potential of digitalized 
technology for the energy transformation can enable 
regions with an underdeveloped network infrastruc-
ture to ‘leapfrog’ in the technical expansion of their 
networks, reducing not only CO2 emissions, but also 
power outages and losses (IEA, 2017a; IRENA, 2019). 
However, the nationwide expansion of the network in 
non-electrified areas is economically and technically 
difficult, which is why off-grid rural regions are increas-
ingly turning to a decentralized energy supply with dig-
ital support (Alstone et al., 2015). The focus is on two 
approaches: the expansion of relatively small local net-
works, mini-grids, and household-based stand-alone 
solutions such as solar home systems (Nerini et al., 
2016). 
ICT is key to the provision and financing of solar 
home systems (SHSs), which usually consist of a solar 
module and a battery. SHSs often use the already wide-
spread infrastructure for mobile phones. Typical busi-
ness models are pay-to-own systems (where off-grid 
devices are paid off in instalments via mobile phone) 
and solar-as-a-service systems (electricity is paid for as 
a service via mobile phone, but the device is never 
owned; IEA, 2017b). These systems are suitable for 
regions with a low population density and can provide 
basic services at the household level relatively quickly. 
Except in regions with a very low population density, 
however, they are seen only as a short-term measure 
due to their cost intensity and the relatively low electri-
city volumes per household (Chattopadhyhay et al., 
2015; Nerini et al., 2016). 
More reliable long-term energy access is provided 
by mini-grids, i.e. local energy networks that can oper-
ate independently of a main grid and are based on mod-
ular power-generation technologies, e.g. photovoltaics, 
wind turbines, small hydroelectric power plants and, 
currently, often diesel or gas generators. To enable a 
stable flow of electricity, they use either these emis-
sions-intensive generators or, increasingly, battery sys-
tems as storage facilities (IEA, 2017b). In 2016, 133 
million people were already supplied with off-grid 
renewable energy, including 2.1 million from solar pho-
tovoltaic mini-grids. The market for this innovation is 
growing: in just eight years, the number of people sup-
Box 5 .2 .6-1
The conflicting priorities between ‘negative 
 emissions’ and synthetic fuels
Digital technologies play an important role in climate-change 
mitigation in transport, for example by enabling new mobility 
concepts that potentially reduce the volume of traffic. They 
should also be used to make new forms of propulsion possible 
in the context of sector coupling, while avoiding path de-
pendencies that could make long-term climate-change miti-
gation more difficult.
Hardly any climate-change mitigation scenario that meets 
the objectives of the Paris Agreement will be able to do with-
out ‘negative emissions’, i.e. removing CO2 from the atmos-
phere, in the second half of this century (IPCC, 2018). This 
involves hundreds of billions of tonnes of CO2 that would 
have to be removed from the atmosphere in the course of the 
21st century. By way of comparison, current global annual 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels amount to 
around 36 billion tonnes of CO2. At present it is as yet unclear 
which technologies can actually be used to remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere in the long term. On the one hand, the com-
bination of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS) is being discussed; on the other hand, large-scale 
afforestation is being considered. These two options are al-
most the only ones that are considered in model studies on 
climate-change mitigation (Fuss et al., 2014). Both methods 
compete with other land uses, such as food and biodiversity. 
Other technologies, such as the direct technical capture of CO2 
from the atmosphere (Direct Air Capture, DAC) are currently 
not economically feasible; they are also extremely energy-in-
tensive and only capture tiny amounts (e.g. climeworks.com: 
900 t of CO2 per year). Corresponding projects usually aim to 
use the captured CO2 (de Coninck et al., 2018: 346; Wilcox et 
al., 2017). It will therefore be difficult to remove the required 
quantities of CO2 from the atmosphere permanently. 
At the same time, the use of synthetic fuels based on re-
newable energies is increasingly being discussed in the frame-
work of the energy transformation as an option for a cli-
mate-friendly transport sector (WEC 2018). This could be 
hydrogen produced by hydrogen electrolysis, or carbon-based 
synthetic fuels such as methane, methanol, diesel, petrol or 
kerosene. The latter require CO2 during production and then 
release it again during use. To keep these fuels CO2-neutral, 
the CO2 used must therefore come from the atmosphere, i.e. 
from biomass or DAC. This CO2 from the atmosphere is thus no 
longer available for generating the necessary ‘negative emis-
sions’, but is released back into the atmosphere when the 
corresponding synthetic fuels are used. The World Energy 
Council expects global demand for synthetic fuels to reach 
between 10,000 to 20,000 TWh per year by 2050. If these are 
carbon-based fuels, this corresponds to a considerable amount 
of CO2 that would not be available for long-term storage: as-
suming, for example, that it is exclusively synthetic methane 
(this releases approx. 500g of CO2 per KWh; WBGU, 2011), 
this would correspond to approx. 5–10 billion tonnes of CO2 
per year.
The WBGU therefore recommends that the focus for sector 
coupling in the transport sector should not be on carbon-based 
synthetic fuels, but primarily on other solutions (e.g. batter-
ies, hydrogen). However, aviation, long-distance transport 
and shipping (Davis et al., 2018) present particular challeng-
es. To this end, more research should be done into the contri-
bution that digital technologies can make to minimizing the 
need for carbon-based synthetic fuels, for example in materi-
al or battery research.
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plied via mini-grids tripled in Asia and grew sixfold in 
Africa (IRENA, 2016). 
Mini-grids based on renewable energy offer some 
advantages compared to solar home systems. They can 
provide high quality power to multiple households at 
the same time and are less expensive. They also provide 
basic services such as street lighting; the electricity is 
stable enough for industrial purposes and can be inte-
grated into the national grid in the medium term. Even 
in areas with a grid connection, they offer a reliable 
replacement system for supply disruptions and increase 
resilience (IRENA, 2016; IEA, 2017b). 
Digital innovations can make an important contribu-
tion to regionally expanding and accelerating the trans-
formation to such systems. Similar to the main grid, ICT 
can improve the performance standards of mini-grids 
(e.g. flexible load control, smart meters) and, similar to 
SHSs, consumers can become more actively involved 
and informed via the mobile network (IEA, 2017a). 
Current research efforts are aimed at refining short-
term control systems with intelligent control and more 
accurate performance forecasts for solar and wind 
energy, at adapting meter technologies, improving ICT 
and interoperability standards, and simplifying the 
linking of different technologies (IRENA 2016). In con-
junction with the falling costs of photovoltaic and bat-
tery systems, there is great potential here for achieving 
SDG 7. However, here too, emerging ‘digital’ risks to 
network resilience and privacy should also be 
researched and addressed more intensively.
Although the technological foundations largely 
exist, a favourable political framework and investments 
are needed for mini-grids to achieve market maturity 
and market penetration. The regulation of mini-grids is 
still in its infancy. The International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) recommends that newly introduced 
standards should be sufficiently flexible to enable fur-
ther development and innovation (IRENA 2016). 
 Governments should boost capacity building and the 
dissemination of expertise through international coop-
eration and industry promotion. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) also emphasizes that mini-grid 
systems should be linked to long-term plans for strate-
gic grid expansion by the respective state government 
(IEA, 2017b). The dynamic development of the energy 
markets and digital innovations pose a challenge for 
political decision-makers that should not be underesti-
mated. 
5.2.6.3 
Contain the demand for energy generated by 
 digitalization
Too great an increase in global energy demand can 
undermine the energy transformation by making it 
more difficult to fully decarbonize energy systems in 
good time. There is no global estimate of how digitali-
zation, with its direct and indirect effects, will influence 
global energy demand (Köhler et al., 2018). Various 
studies show potentially significant positive and nega-
tive effects of digitalization on energy demand in dif-
ferent sectors, and there is great uncertainty. The pos-
sible higher efficiency thanks to intelligent control and 
electrification is offset by increases in energy demand 
caused by new devices, software applications and 
changes in behaviour (Köhler et al., 2018). The future 
development of energy demand will therefore greatly 
depend on the framework conditions.
Change in energy demand in selected sectors 
caused by digital technologies
The effects of digital technologies on energy use in the 
transport sector, which currently accounts for 28% of 
global demand for final energy (IEA. 2017a), stem, for 
example, from expected automation, networking and 
electrification, as well as the possibilities of sharing. 
They could be considerable, but it is not clear whether 
they will increase or decrease demand. Scenarios devel-
oped by Wadud et al. (2016) show, for example, that in 
the US transport sector, energy demand could halve or 
even more than double as a result of vehicle automa-
tion, depending on what assumptions are made about 
technological and societal developments. For example, 
partial automation could reduce energy demand as a 
result of efficiency effects, while fully autonomous 
vehicles offer increased incentives to travel. Urban 
mobility is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.8.
Buildings currently account for about a third of 
global final-energy demand and 55% of electricity con-
sumption. If full use is made of the efficiency potential 
made possible by digital technologies (e.g. smart con-
trol, use of real-time data for heating, cooling and light-
ing), according to an IEA calculation the total energy 
demand in this sector could be reduced by 10% in the 
period 2017–2040 compared to a reference scenario in 
which this potential is not used. This presupposes, 
however, that there is only a small rebound effect. 
According to the IEA, these savings could equally be 
offset by new digital services and rising standby con-
sumption (IEA, 2017a: 29). 
A third important sector is industry, which currently 
accounts for 38% of global final-energy demand. Auto-
mation has a long history in this sector, and there are 
numerous examples of how efficiency gains can be 
5 Arenas of Digital Change
178
 realized, for example by optimizing process control (IEA, 
2017a). Furthermore, digitalization can support targeted 
innovations, for example by transferring energy- and 
resource-intensive test series to a ‘digital twin’, i.e. con-
ducting them virtually. Section 5.2.1 provides an over-
view of digitalization’s potential for industrial production 
and the circular economy: production processes could 
be made more efficient by digital ization, but these 
improvements could also be offset by an increase in 
energy demand generated by computer use, data trans-
mission and data storage, so that the net effects are 
unclear (European Parliament, 2016). In addition, much 
of the efficiency potential is associated with considera-
ble initial investments and requires special technical 
expertise, which can be particularly challenging for small 
and medium-sized enterprises (IEA, 2017a).
The energy demand of the digital infrastructure 
The digital solutions that hold the potential for rapid 
decarbonization themselves require energy. If billions 
of new devices are networked in the coming years, the 
demand for energy from data centres and network 
services will increase. The IEA quantified the global 
electricity demand of data centres alone at 194 TWh 
(1% of global demand) in 2014, that of network serv-
ices at 185 TWh in 2015. Furthermore, more than 20 
billion networked IoT devices are expected by 2020, all 
of which will need power. However, it is difficult to 
Box 5 .2 .6-2
Recommendations for action for the arena 
 ‘Digitalization for climate-change mitigation  
and the energy transformation’ 
 > Strengthen climate- and energy-policy framework condi-
tions: Without clear framework conditions, digitalization 
can act as a fire accelerant, driving both the increase in 
greenhouse-gas emissions and in the demand for energy 
and resources. Strong framework conditions for climate 
and energy policies, as already outlined by the WBGU in 
previous reports (WBGU, 2011, 2016b), are therefore the 
basic prerequisite for exploiting the potential of digitali-
zation for the energy transformation and climate-change 
mitigation. Among other things, this involves a long-term 
political, economic and regulatory framework for a com-
plete decarbonization of energy systems, which should be 
largely completed by the middle of the century. An appro-
priate innovation policy should also be used to push ahead 
with targeted technological developments that address sec-
tors which are currently difficult to decarbonize. Timely 
infrastructure investments are also necessary to enable an 
energy transformation towards sustainability.
 > Establish energy and resource efficiency as innovation tar-
gets for digital technologies and applications: In view of the 
exponential increase in the use of digital technologies and 
applications, which are encompassing more and more areas 
of everyday life, limiting the respective ecological footprint 
must be given a high priority. The WBGU therefore recom-
mends explicitly establishing energy and resource effici-
ency as an innovation target for all digital technologies 
and applications. At the same time, appropriate, forward- 
looking regulatory framework conditions should be crea-
ted, such as efficiency standards for digital solutions and 
digitalized infrastructures, as well as regulations on stand-
by energy consumption. These should take into account the 
rapid pace of development in the digital field. New device 
types and applications are being produced in quick suc-
cession; this is inherently different from the situation with 
classic electrical appliances such as refrigerators or air con-
ditioners (IEA 2017a). Certification, e.g. for particularly 
efficient data centres, could also play a role. With a view 
to the possible limits of current ICT efficiency trends resul-
ting from the physical prerequisites of transistors (IEA, 
2017a: 115) and the environmental impact of ICT beyond 
energy demand, a selective limitation of digital networking 
must also be discussed.
 > Contain the risks of digital energy systems – security by 
design, comprehensive data protection and data economy: 
In order to contain the security risks of increasingly digita-
lized energy systems, security and resilience considerations 
should play an important role in the development of tech-
nologies and the design of new systems. Comprehensive 
safety standards should be established for devices, vehi-
cles, etc. that are networked with the energy system (IEA, 
2017a: 115). The stability of the energy system should not 
be based primarily on ICT. Users must be guaranteed com-
prehensive data protection and protection against surveil-
lance. Access to energy must not be linked to the disclosure 
of data. The principle of data economy should be establis-
hed as a model for future energy systems.
 > Use mini-grid systems for overcoming energy poverty: Mini-
grids based on renewable energies can provide people in 
rural and off-grid regions with access to modern energy 
services. They achieve higher levels of service performance 
than solar home systems, for example, and can thus lay the 
foundations for productive energy use that goes beyond a 
basic provision of light, for example (IRENA, 2016). Digi-
tal technologies are at the heart of such mini-grids, which 
in many cases currently still combine fossil fuels like diesel 
with renewable energies; in the future, however, they can 
be based 100% on renewable energies. Measures for deve-
loping such climate-friendly mini-grid systems should be 
linked by the respective state governments with long-term 
plans for strategic network expansion (IEA, 2017a: 115). 
Regulatory frameworks should also provide reliable incen-
tives for innovation (IRENA, 2019). The WBGU recom-
mends that the further development of such systems 
be accelerated in order to make a contribution to global 
energy-system transformation and SDG 7.
 > Appoint an expert commission to examine the digital poten-
tial for decarbonization: In order to systematically measure 
the potential benefits and risks of digital change for cli-
mate-change mitigation, and to derive starting points for 
political action, the WBGU recommends that the Federal 
Government should establish a Commission of Experts to 
critically assess the potential of digital change for decarbo-
nization. In particular, opportunities for accelerating the 
energy transformation should be examined.
Sustainable economic activity and the  environment  5.2
179
forecast future energy demand as a result of ICT over 
the next few years, since, on the one hand, there is 
great uncertainty about the strong growth in data vol-
umes and, on the other hand, it is hardly foreseeable 
whether further improvements in efficiency will be 
possible (IEA, 2017a: 103). However, there are cur-
rently no signs of a trend reversal in the ICT sector, 
despite high efficiency gains. On the contrary, the 
direct energy demand of the ICT sector continues to rise 
rapidly (Köhler et al., 2018). Both energy efficiency 
and resource efficiency should therefore be established 
as a firm innovation goal of digitalized systems and 
applications, and flanked by a corresponding  regulatory 
framework.
5.2.6.4 
Risks of a digitalized energy system: resilience and 
privacy
How much digitalization does an effective ‘intelligent’ 
energy system need? The growing digitalization of 
energy systems in the course of the diversification and 
decentralization of energy technologies, the integration 
of millions of energy prosumers and billions of IoT 
devices into energy networks, and the ever more exten-
sive use of digital monitoring and control elements are 
creating a complex ‘energy internet’ (IEA, 2017a). This 
highly ICT-dependent energy system poses new risks 
for resilience and privacy: ‘smart grids’ are not neces-
sarily the more robust or efficient systems and can even 
represent an obstacle to strengthening individual deci-
sion-making power and literacy in the sense of sustain-
able action.
Resilience of the energy supply
Energy systems are among the most critical infrastruc-
tures, since not only the energy supply itself, but also 
all other critical infrastructures, such as the water sup-
ply or communication networks, depend on them. 
Increasing digitalization and networking of energy sys-
tems may lead to additional risks with regard to their 
reliability and stability (European Parliament, 2016). 
The expansion of the energy networks into an ‘energy 
internet’ in which, for example, end devices are also 
integrated, can increase the vulnerability of the net-
works to digital risks such as geomagnetic storms, 
hacker attacks and viruses (Jacobson et al., 2017; IEA, 
2017a). In the context of the global WannaCry attack in 
2017, for example, more than 20,000 petrol stations of 
the China National Petroleum Corporation were forced 
offline (IEA, 2017a). A second problem can arise from 
a higher susceptibility to errors and so-called emergent 
behaviour: if different systems are networked to form a 
‘system of systems’, the interaction of the systems can 
lead to unexpected behaviour, for example through 
feedback loops. A dramatic example of this fragility of 
interdependent systems was the power outage in Italy 
on 28 September 2003, which affected over 50 million 
people. The failure of power plants led to the break-
down of network nodes on the internet, which in turn 
caused the failure of further power plants and triggered 
a large-scale cascade of failures (Buldyrev et al., 2010). 
In view of these new digital risks, the resilience of dig-
italized systems should be increasingly integrated into 
research and development. 
Box 5 .2 .6-3
Research recommendations for the arena 
‘ Digitalization for climate-change mitigation  
and the energy transformation’ 
The goals for climate-change mitigation agreed in the Paris 
Agreement will require not only the decarbonization of the 
global economy, but also, in the long term, the actual removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere (IPCC, 2018). Research on the 
contribution made by digitalization to the global energy 
transformation should therefore be organized in a systemic 
way, i.e. going beyond the sectors of energy, mobility and 
heating. The WBGU recommends consistently pursuing the 
vision of an energy system that is based 100% on renewable 
energies and enshrining it as a central research mission. Key 
issues to which digital technologies can contribute are sector 
coupling, energy and/or electricity storage, the integration of 
fluctuating energy sources into the electricity grids, and deal-
ing with increasing fluctuations in demand when other sec-
tors are electrified (e.g. electromobility). Furthermore, there 
is a lack of innovative solutions in the transport sector (e.g. 
for ships, aircraft or heavy-goods vehicles). Focusing on car-
bon-based synthetic fuels would not be adequate here, as the 
use of CO2 for this purpose conflicts with the long-term need 
to permanently remove CO2 from the atmosphere in order to 
meet the climate objectives of the Paris Agreement.
In addition to the targeted use of digital technologies to 
limit energy demand and for energy efficiency, research 
should also focus on cost-effective and robust solutions for a 
reliable power supply in off-grid regions in emerging econ-
omies and developing countries. A wide variety of digital 
technology applications is important here, e.g. for mini-grids 
based on renewable energies (IRENA, 2016).
Finally, in the course of digitalization, greater emphasis 
should be placed on the reliability and stability of the energy 
supply, as well as on the protection of privacy. Furthermore, 
smart grids, smart meters and other intelligent applications 
lead to new complexities in energy supply and use. The impli-
cations of increasing complexity represent a further research 
topic.
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Privacy and data protection
Comprehensive system integration in the sense of the 
‘energy internet’, like the internet in general, involves 
possible violations of the right to privacy and data pro-
tection. In principle, data from smart meters can be 
used to monitor behaviour (Greveler et al., 2012); for 
example, they can be used to determine which films or 
television series users consume. Strict security require-
ments must therefore be laid down for these data (e.g. 
encrypted transmission, etc.; European Parliament, 
2016), and possible privacy-protecting smart-meter 
data must be processed (Kalogridis, 2010). In addition, 
the principle of data economy should serve as a model 
for future energy systems. In order to enable individu-
als to be informed and act responsibly in the sense of a 
rapid energy transformation, priority should also be 
given to making information on local energy consump-
tion accessible. “If ‘smart’ systems are perceived as 
instruments of surveillance, enforcing conformity and 
maximizing profit, they cannot have a resounding suc-
cess in the sense of sustainability” but will inevitably 
be rejected (Kurz and Rieger, 2018b). Accordingly, dig-
ital instruments should not be promoted exclusively to 
set the course for decarbonization; rather, their poten-
tial for strengthening the individual literacy of users 
and for self-sufficient and semi-autonomous local 
energy systems should be examined. 
5.2.6.5 
Conclusions
Digital solutions can make positive contributions to cli-
mate-change mitigation and the energy transformation 
in many areas. Obstacles to effective climate-change 
mitigation, however, are predominantly not of a tech-
nological nature, but lie in the political, economic and 
institutional spheres (WBGU, 2011). Digitalization will 
therefore only promote decarbonization, the global 
energy transformation and access for all people to mod-
ern forms of energy if the corresponding political, reg-
ulatory and economic framework conditions are put 
into place. This involves well-known – but insuffi-
ciently used – climate-policy instruments such as CO2 
pricing and the abolition of subsidies for fossil fuels, 
but also targeted technology promotion. The concept of 
‘Mission-Oriented Innovation’ (Edler and Fagerberg, 
2017; UNEP, 2018; Section 10.2.1) is particularly suit-
able for technology promotion in order to overcome 
unresolved problems, e.g. in sector coupling 
(Box 5.2.6-1). In order to be able to exploit the poten-
tial of demand management in intelligent networks in 
the future, regulatory and market-related prerequisites 
must be fulfilled at the national level (Shen et al., 
2014). Long-term targets must be clearly and reliably 
set in order to steer investment and innovation in the 
right direction. Timely infrastructure investments are 
also necessary. The danger for the global energy trans-
formation is a potentially fast-growing demand for 
energy as a result of digitalization. Policies that aim to 
keep global energy demand from rising too sharply are 
therefore of great importance.
5 .2 .7 
‘Smart city’: sustainable urban development with 
digitalization?
5.2.7.1 
Sustainable urban development in the Digital Age: 
challenges
As urbanization progresses, it is estimated that new 
urban infrastructures will have to be built for some 2.5 
billion people by 2050 (UN DESA, 2014). Unless wisely 
and sustainably designed, this will have a big impact on 
resource use, greenhouse-gas emissions and ecosys-
tems. Proportionately, cities consume the most 
resources and are responsible for about 70% of both 
global energy demand and greenhouse-gas emissions 
(Seto et al., 2014). At the same time, sustainability 
measures with large leverage and scalability effects can 
be implemented in cities. Cities are therefore crucial for 
the Transformation towards Sustainability (WBGU, 
2016a). Ignoring the concerns of cities and excluding 
urban actors would jeopardize the implementation not 
only of SDG 11 (‘Making cities and settlements inclu-
sive, safe, resilient and sustainable’), but also of many 
other SDGs (Misselwitz et al., 2015). How can digitali-
zation be used to improve the living conditions of urban 
populations, ensure sustainable urban development, 
and avoid unsustainable path dependencies in view of 
the huge global impact of urbanization (WBGU, 2016a)? 
What opportunities and risks do concepts like ‘smart 
cities’ offer, and how can people-oriented urban devel-
opment be ensured even in times of digitalization? 
Does the greatly increased use of labelling combina-
tions with the word ‘smart’ stand up to critical scrutiny 
from the sustainability point of view?
5.2.7.2  
Smart city: concept, application examples, 
 distribution and drivers
Most applications of digital technologies aimed at meet-
ing urban concerns have some reference to the guiding 
principle of the ‘smart city’ (Bauriedl and Strüver, 2018; 
de Jong et al., 2015: 34; Schweitzer, 2015: 7). Although 
the term does not have a standard definition (Albino et 
al., 2015: 5ff.; Cocchia, 2014: 18; Dameri, 2017b: 7ff.), 
the systemic merging of approaches of ‘digital’ (e.g. dig-
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ital city, intelligent city, virtual city, ubiquitous city; de 
Jong et al., 2015; Albino et al., 2015; Cocchia, 2014) 
and ‘sustainable’ urban development forms a common 
denominator for a wide range of variants, including dif-
ferent angles on the ‘smart and sustainable city’ (Ange-
lidou, 2015 2018; de Jong et al., 2015; Marsal-Llacuna 
and Segal, 2016;  Neirotti et al., 2014). Germany’s Federal 
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and 
Spatial Development (BBSR) has developed a definition 
that combines different perspectives: “By ‘smart cities’ 
we mean equipping and upgrading cities and their infra-
structures with digital technology, linking previously 
separate infrastructures or their subsystems. The term 
‘smart cities’ also incorporates the modernization of 
municipal decision-making, planning and management 
processes by involving citizens and private capital, and 
making intensive use of data” (BBSR, 2018).
Dimensions and application examples
A characteristic feature of smart cities is that a large 
number of functional dimensions, such as mobility, 
security, administration, energy and water supply, 
logistics, etc., are digitally upgraded, labelled ‘smart’, 
and often linked to sustainability objectives (e.g. to the 
SDGs, (Table 5.2.7-1); Komeily and Srinivasan, 2017). 
What is special about these functional dimensions, 
some of which are summarized as ‘smart everything’ or 
‘smart X’, is the systemic networking of many areas of 
urban life and work via cyber-physical systems (CPS) or 
the Internet of Things (IoT), urban platforms and e-gov-
ernment (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2017; Geisberger and 
Broy, 2012: 29).
Digital technologies can help to significantly improve 
the protection of the urban environment, specifically 
the use efficiency of many resources. However, other 
fundamental changes are also necessary in addition to 
technology deployment, for example in the organiza-
tion of urban mobility systems (mobility behaviour), in 
waste generation (consumption behaviour) or thermal 
insulation (energy consumption). Digital technologies 
deployed in environmental protection can be integrated 
as projects into smart-city initiatives; some of them are 
treated as separate arenas in the report. Examples 
include digitally supported circular economy systems 
(Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.5) or more efficient urban energy 
and water use, which has already been virtualized in 
many cities, with distribution controlled by intelligent 
networks (e.g. by means of virtual power plants; 
 Section 5.2.6). Different systems can interlock in the 
field of mobility: automated driving using GPS, net-
worked vehicles and infrastructures; the networking of 
information on location, environment and traffic (e.g. 
with Google Maps); and traffic monitoring and control 
with cameras and sensors (Section 3.3). Housing, too, is 
increasingly becoming digitally controlled, with e.g. 
coordinated (remote) control of heating, blinds and 
doors, automated needs assessment by smart refrigera-
tors, or energy-optimized control of electricity-con-
suming devices such as heat accumulators, batteries or 
washing machines. Surveillance of public spaces with 
cameras or drones (Section 3.2), in some cases using 
face recognition and data storage, is also becoming 
increasingly widespread with the aim of improving 
public security. Supermarket shopping, including pay-
ment and inventory management, is being fully auto-
mated; purchasing behaviour is recorded and analysed 
so that customers receive customized offers on their 
smartphones. Often unregulated private-sector online 
platforms are increasingly becoming established in 
cities as agencies for holiday accommodation (e.g. 
 Airbnb), or offering mobility or sharing services (e.g. 
the Uber transport service, bicycle rentals, car sharing; 
 Section 5.2.8). Furthermore, smart-city initiatives are 
being launched to improve the inclusion of the urban 
population, e.g. by making urban administration more 
accessible and efficient, both internally and externally, 
through e-government and by interacting with compa-
nies and the urban population. 
Global distribution
At present, it is not possible to say exactly how many 
smart cities there are, but the upper limit of estimates 
Table 5 .2 .7-1
Typical dimensions of smart-city concepts and their possible links to the SDGs.
Source: Dimensions according to Fromhold-Eisebith, 2017; SDGs according to UN DESA, 2016 
Relating to . . . Smart-city dimension Relating to . . .
IT infrastructure SDG 9 Industry SDG 9
Energy SDG 7 Economic structure SDG 8
Mobility SDG 11 Education SDG 4
Building (urban districts) SDG 9 Consumption SDG 12
Security SDG 11 Health SDG 3
Material cycles SDG 12 Administration and governance SDG 16 & 11
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seems to be around 250 (Angelidou et al., 2018). Up to 
now, smart-city projects have developed primarily in 
cities in Asia (about half of all current projects world-
wide), Europe (about one third) and North America 
(about one tenth) (Cocchia, 2014). Although their 
number is rising worldwide, by 2015 only 79 had rea-
sonably comprehensive smart-city strategies – in other 
words, there is a lack of integrated approaches (own 
calculations based on Statista, 2018c; Roland Berger, 
2017b; Dameri, 2017b: 3ff.). All in all, the development 
of smart cities is still in its infancy and is mainly limited 
to pilot projects or real-world-lab experiments in a few 
countries, pioneering cities or individual sectors 
(Schweitzer, 2015; Box 5.2.7-1 on India’s ambitious, 
often critically commented ‘100 Smart Cities Mission’). 
During implementation, the digital infrastructure is 
usually integrated into the existing infrastructure (e.g. 
sensor installation in street lamps, digital moderniza-
tion of existing traffic-control or energy systems). This 
applies both to developed cities (e.g. in Europe) and to 
newly planned ones such as Songdo (South Korea) or 
Masdar City (UAE/Abu Dhabi). 
Drivers
On the one hand, smart-city strategies are often initi-
ated by city governments themselves or by national 
authorities (Bauriedl and Strüver, 2018). In many cases, 
digital technologies are intended to help address the 
specific problems of growing or shrinking cities (e.g. 
creating good living and working conditions to encour-
age the influx of new inhabitants). On the other hand, 
global technology groups (e.g. IBM, Cisco, ABB, HP, 
Siemens, Ericsson, Google) are significant drivers of 
urban digitalization (Townsend, 2013; Cocchia, 2014; 
Schweitzer, 2015). They see smart cities as sales mar-
kets for digital and networking technologies and as a 
source of comprehensive data collections which they 
want to use for exclusively commercial purposes. Over-
all, the implementation of digital technologies in cities 
can increase dependence on individual (global) provid-
ers (Bauriedl and Strüver, 2018; Viitanen and Kingston, 
2014). Therefore, the European Commission warns: “In 
particular, the concentration of power in the hands of a 
few companies, and the relative lack or abandon of con-
trol of citizens on their own personal data, [...] raise 
concerns.” (European Commission, 2019e). A change in 
awareness can now also be observed in numerous 
municipalities, leading to a more critical approach to 
major technology providers. In addition to a data pro-
tection officer many city governments now have a chief 
technology officer, a chief digital officer or a digital 
innovation officer, in order to systematically drive and 
control their city’s digital transformation (e.g. Rio de 
Janeiro, Barcelona, Berlin, Vienna). The aim is to 
strengthen the local authorities’ ability to act and make 
them more efficient (e.g. by digitalizing administration 
and supply infrastructures) and to bolster the common 
good in the digital transformation (e.g. wider access for 
all citizens, participation in democratic processes; Bau-
riedl and Strüver, 2018).
5.2.7.3 
Selected areas of tension in digitally supported 
urban development
City governments must ask themselves which digital 
technologies can make a substantive contribution to 
achieving goals of urban development and, above all, 
sustainability, and which technologies, system architec-
tures and implementation strategies are unsuitable – or 
even restrict the autonomy and quality of life of urban 
societies. The main points of criticism of the smart city 
are (1) an often one-sided fixation of projects on tech-
nologies that (usually) cannot solve the key problems 
of urban development (e.g. affordable housing, segre-
gation, lack of participation), (2) the potential danger 
posed by state and private surveillance and data storage, 
and (3) a growing dependence on – especially a small 
number of major, international – technology providers. 
Box 5 .2 .7-1
Excursus: the Indian Smart Cities Mission – 
 example of the challenges in a developing 
country
In 2015, the Indian government launched the Smart Cities 
Mission to create 100 ‘intelligent cities’ in the country. In a 
case study, the Housing and Land Rights Network India (HL-
RN) investigated and evaluated the Indian Smart Cities Mis-
sion (99 cities). The report notes a blatant neglect of the in-
terests of the urban poor and makes the following 
recommendations to the government (HLRN, 2018):
1. The Smart Cities Mission needs a human-rights-based 
framework to ensure sustainable development.
2. The mission must place a special focus on the needs, con-
cerns and rights of the marginalized urban population.
3. Participation should be a priority in the selection and 
implementation of smart-city projects. 
4. All projects within the Mission must undergo a human-
rights-based social-impact assessment and an environ-
mental impact assessment before being approved.
5. It must be ensured that the implementation of smart-
city projects does not lead to violations of human rights, 
including evictions, forced relocations and displacement.
6. The provision of adequate, affordable housing in all 
smart-city proposals must be enhanced.
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Based on experience gained up to now and critical 
reflections from science, people involved on the ground, 
and from civil society, the guiding principle of the smart 
city is constantly changing. This has at least partially 
led to a strengthening of social and environmental 
aspects compared to the focus on ICT implementation 
(Albino et al., 2015; Angelidou et al., 2018). One exam-
ple is ‘Barcelona Digital City’, where the digital devel-
opment of the city has been strongly focused on the 
interests of the common good, such as ‘city data com-
mons’, ‘digital empowerment’, ‘digital inclusion’ and 
‘digital rights’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona, undated).
Privacy and data protection
Through the networking of urban and digital infra-
structures and the introduction of sensor systems (such 
as cameras, air pollution, noise and other environmen-
tal monitoring devices), as well as geo-localizable apps 
on private end-devices and in public spaces (e.g. navi-
gation systems), more and more everyday actions, hab-
its and movement patterns of the urban population are 
being digitally registered (WBGU, 2016a; Box 2.1-5). In 
a smart city, citizens can hardly avoid or control the 
generation of data because this is a condition for using 
urban services, utilities or public spaces (Bauriedl and 
Strüver, 2018). The right to informational self-determi-
nation is being challenged and must be continuously 
safeguarded in accordance with the basic data-protec-
tion regulations. The amount of available data also 
makes their anonymization difficult, since the exchange 
and merging of different data sets enables companies 
and public authorities to create personality profiles 
and, perhaps, make predictions about the behaviour of 
individual people (Kitchin, 2016). Public administra-
tions should pay attention to transparency relating to 
how data are handled. On the other hand, extensive 
observation and measurement of the environment can 
encourage compliance with laws (e.g. protection against 
excessive particulate pollution; Balestrini et al., 2017; 
Box 5.3.1-2). The use of blockchain technologies 
( Section 3.3), for example, can also improve adminis-
trative procedures and reduce corruption, as well as 
facilitate co-determination by the urban population, for 
example in infrastructure projects. 
Inclusion in the ‘smart city’
Inclusion must be a central element of digital urban 
development (WBGU, 2016a); Normative Compass). 
The Smart City Charter, inspired by the WBGU report 
‘Humanity on the Move: the transformative power of 
cities’ (WBGU, 2016a), also emphasizes that barri-
er-free digital urban development oriented towards the 
common good requires transparency and the inclusion 
of the urban population (BBSR and BMUB, 2017: 18). 
This requires overcoming the digital divide that exists 
primarily in developing countries and emerging econ-
omies. There, smart-city concepts of municipalities or 
national governments often fail to meet the basic needs 
of the majority of the population due to a lack of 
opportunities for inclusion. The Smart Cities Mission 
launched by the Indian central government, for exam-
ple, was strongly criticized for its lack of inclusion, 
equal opportunities and distributive equity 
(Box 5.2.7-1). When properly applied, the digital trans-
formation of cities can be used effectively to make deci-
sions in local politics de facto transparent, i.e. to com-
municate and thus contribute to democratic opin-
ion-forming. At the same time, no-one should be forced 
to use digital structures. This means that municipalities 
should continue to enable the urban population to use 
services by analogue ways of access (BBSR and BMUB, 
2017).
Digital urban infrastructures
The predicted doubling of urban infrastructures over 
the next two to three decades (WBGU, 2016a) will also 
be marked by the expansion of digitalized infrastruc-
tures. The threat of a growing dependence on individ-
ual technology providers has already led many cities to 
set up decentralized digital facilities (e.g. storage for 
open data, bottom-up networking, free WLAN, collec-
tive clouds and decentralized data-management sys-
Box 5 .2 .7-2
Excursus: The right to the city
The term ‘right to the city’ goes back to Henri Lefebvre (‘Le 
droit à la ville’, 1968) and sees itself as an explicitly inclusive 
model of urban development (WBGU, 2016a: 143). Lefebvre 
addressed the situation of the marginalized urban population 
in the new large housing estates built on the outskirts of the 
metropolises in the post-war years. For about 20 years, the 
concept has been intensely discussed and further developed 
internationally; it has given rise to new social movements. In 
South Africa, for example, the shack-dwellers movement was 
created to fight evictions and promote public housing. Similar 
movements have emerged in Istanbul, New Orleans, Madrid 
and Hamburg. The US-based ‘Right to the City Alliance’ (since 
2007) is a nationwide alliance against gentrification processes 
at the expense of the poorer urban population. The ‘right to 
the city’ concept was also discussed during the United Na-
tions’ 2016 Habitat III Conference and is embedded in the 
related New Urban Agenda. Seen from a digital angle, the 
right to the city means that “technologies are recognized in 
their ambivalence and used with an openness oriented to-
wards digital common goods” (Dobusch, 2017b).
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tems). Free WLAN under municipal or civil society con-
trol has been installed, for example, in Catalonia (guifi.
net), Vienna (FunkFeuer), Berlin (Freifunk) and Athens 
(AWMN) (Morozov and Bria, 2017). Individual munic-
ipalities (e.g. Emden) have themselves become active in 
setting up digital infrastructures and are expanding the 
fibre-optic cable network themselves according to the 
so called municipal utility model. This business model 
has the advantage that municipalities themselves ben-
efit from the value-added. In general, municipal pro-
curement is an important field of action and a good way 
for municipal authorities to manage digitalization (e.g. 
in the EU the volume of this investment represents 
14% of GDP; European Commission, 2017).
The European Commission promotes cooperatively 
organized digital platforms with a programme called 
‘Collective Awareness Platforms for Sustainability and 
Collective Action’ (CAPS) (Section 5.2.2). Its topics are 
open democracy (participation of citizens in democratic 
processes, e.g. via online consultation), open poli-
cy-making (better decision-making on the basis of 
open data), collaborative economy (granting of loans, 
Box 5 .2 .7-3
Recommendations for action on the arena  
‘Smart city and sustainable urban development’ 
The digitalization of cities should not be understood just tech-
nocratically as an optimization task; rather, every use of tech-
nology should be explicitly embedded in ecologically sustain-
able urban development. Especially the control of traffic 
flows (Section 5.2.8) offers an opportunity to rethink urban 
transport in terms of sustainability and the reduction of emis-
sions and congestion. Likewise, with the help of digital con-
trols, resource and energy consumption could be reduced in 
the future and resources and energy used more efficiently 
and in a more climate-friendly way.
However, ‘smart city’ should certainly be prevented from 
degenerating into a ‘surveillance city’. Accordingly, privacy 
issues must already be taken into account at the planning 
stage of such projects. The individual’s freedom from surveil-
lance must be embedded in the technologies used. In addi-
tion, preventive measures should be taken not only against 
unauthorized access to the personal data of the respective 
city dwellers and visitors, but also against future ideas on sur-
veillance that could arise from the data collected after the 
implementation of smart-city schemes.
The following recommendations are addressed not only to 
city governments and urban civil society, but also to all actors 
in international cooperation in urban development processes 
(e.g. UN, World Bank, regional development banks, EU, 
BMZ).
 > Combine digitalization agendas with sustainability 
agendas:The implementation of the New Urban Agenda 
and the SDGs (especially SDG 11) is strongly influenced by 
global digital change. Digitalization agendas should there-
fore be combined with sustainability agendas. In order to 
ensure that the digitalization of cities is used for the com-
mon good and that municipalities are capable of shaping 
the Transformation towards Sustainability, the principle of 
digital (technological) sovereignty must be firmly embed-
ded in urban-development processes. The ‘right to the city’ 
approach, extended by a digital dimension, should be pur-
sued, and the efficacy of corresponding civil-society and 
science-driven initiatives and/or movements should be 
promoted. In particular, sustainability targets should be an 
integral part of urban digitalization strategies. 
 > Make an inventory of municipal data and ICT infrastructure 
and create urban data spaces: Urban data spaces are the 
foundation of a participatory, scalable and future-oriented 
digitalization of the public space. The prerequisite for the 
development of an urban data space is an inventory of the 
municipal data pool and the local ICT infrastructure. Buil-
ding on this, a strategy should be developed for the use 
of the urban data space based on identifying the strategic 
fields of action that are central to urban development. From 
a global perspective, such an approach is also recommen-
ded for urban development policy, as well as for the imple-
mentation of the New Urban Agenda and the SDGs. 
 > Raise city governments’ awareness of dependency risks: If 
municipalities rely on individual manufacturers or ope-
rators to design their ICT infrastructures, a cost-intensive 
dependency can arise. As a general rule, openness in the 
sense of standards-based interfaces, formats and services 
that are accessible not only to manufacturers or opera-
tors but also to a wide range of actors should be deman-
ded when purchasing systems and products or when out-
sourcing, in order to avoid ‘vendor lock-ins’ (Fraunhofer 
FOKUS et al., 2018). In the WBGU’s view, private providers 
that collect data in the public domain should be required 
to report to local authorities and submit aggregations of 
the data.
 > Ensure openness of urban digital platforms: In order to inte-
grate all actors of urban development via urban digital 
platforms, the openness of the standards, architecture and 
components used is a compulsory prerequisite (Fraunhofer 
FOKUS et al., 2018). This can be achieved, for example, 
by ensuring that open interfaces and formats, as well as 
standard conformity for interoperable value-added offers, 
are mandatory requirements in the realization of compon-
ents of the urban digital platform. Furthermore, every soft-
ware component of an urban digital platform commissioned 
by the public sector should also be made available by the 
public sector as open-source software for use or further 
development by third parties. This is the only way to create 
a dynamic ecosystem of different products without ending 
up with a producer dependency that excludes potentially 
relevant actors from the urban digital platform (DIN, 2016).
 > Equip municipal administrations for digitalization in terms of 
personnel and institutions:In order for municipal admini-
strations to become, or remain, capable designers of urban 
digitalization, it is necessary to increase personnel and 
boost institutions in the digitalization field – something 
which has already been done by many municipalities. This 
applies in particular to cities in developing countries and 
emerging economies. Municipalities should make it a prio-
rity to create posts for data officers, data-protection offi-
cers and digital-innovation officers, as well as competence 
centres for digitalization in municipal administrations.
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exchange economy), collaborative making (develop-
ment of new production processes), collaborative con-
sumption (rethinking consumer behaviour), environ-
mental protection (acting together to save the planet) 
as well as new collaborative approaches for inclusion, 
agriculture, health and disaster management (see also 
section 5.2.2). 
In addition to the development and use of digital 
infrastructures to serve the common good, the ongoing 
digital transformation is also concerned with the criti-
cality and fragility of urban infrastructures. Since the 
number of possible security gaps and targets for attack 
increases with the size of the network, the danger of 
cyber-attacks on the highly networked infrastructures 
in cities will increase (Kitchin, 2016. This is particularly 
problematic when digital infrastructures form the prin-
cipal basis of urban organization. In order to maintain 
the crisis resilience of cities and their creative sover-
eignty in shaping the future, the WBGU believes that 
both the digital (technology) sovereignty of municipal-
ities, sovereignty over urban data, and open standards 
and interfaces must be defined and resolutely guaran-
teed, as laid down in the German Specification for Open 
Urban Platforms (DIN SPEC 91357: DIN, 2016).
5.2.7.4 
Digital sovereignty and the ‘right to the city’
In the course of the extensive digitalization of the cities, 
the list of requirements for ‘people-oriented’ sustain-
able urban development (WBGU, 2016a) is also grow-
ing. In the WBGU’s view, the opportunities and risks 
described therefore require an additional framework in 
the sense of ‘digital urban governance’, in which the 
focus is not only on ‘digital sovereignty’ but also on the 
‘right to the city’. The discourse on the ‘right to the city’ 
(WBGU, 2016a: 143; Box 5.2.7-2) requires the addition 
of the topic ‘digitalization’, according to the WBGU. 
Apart from overcoming the ‘digital divide’, central com-
ponents should be the design principles of digital, data, 
infrastructure and platform sovereignty, which focus on 
the management, monitoring and (in part) use of digital 
solutions by city governments, administrations and 
civil society. The focus should be on usability, accessi-
bility, transparency with the aim of open data, decen-
tralization, the application of cooperative structures in 
the use of digital technologies (e.g. cooperatively 
organized platforms such as sharing services; Section 
5.2.2), participation, and the environmental compati-
bility of digital technologies. The first urban and 
Box 5 .2 .7-4
Research recommendations for the arena  
‘Smart city and sustainable urban development’
 > Expand Research and Development on ICT integration for 
urban sustainability: While R&D activities aimed at maste-
ring the technological challenges of networking ICT sys-
tems for smart cities have been strongly promoted natio-
nally and abroad for some time now, the inclusion of sustai-
nability goals must be emphasized in the future. Research 
on the appropriate linking and integration of various digi-
tal ICTs (hard- and software) should be directed towards 
reduced environmental impacts (e.g. material consumption, 
emissions), higher resource efficiency, broader usability for 
the urban population, and technological sustainability.
 > Support empirical analyses of the opportunities and risks 
of the smart city The academic debate on smart cities and 
urban digitalization has recently been characterized pri-
marily by a critical view of the urban development model. 
However, there are still too few empirical studies show-
ing in detail not only the risks, but also the opportunities 
associated with such urban digital innovations. The WBGU 
therefore recommends placing the emphasis on promoting 
empirical studies that take a critical and constructive look 
at the economic, social and ecological implications of digital 
smart-city approaches and investigate them empirically in 
situ. Inter- and transdisciplinary approaches can also take 
account of the fragmentation of smart-city research (Mora 
et al., 2017).
 > Advance international learning processes for smart-city 
approaches: The broad international spread of the smart-
city concept suggests that international learning processes 
on sustainability issues in urban strategy and project deve-
lopment should be promoted even more strongly than in 
the past. These should be based on research activities, be 
highly inter- and transdisciplinary in orientation, and also 
take account of the special features of smart-city imple-
mentation in developing countries and emerging economies 
(Vu and Hartley, 2018). Crucial for this are internationally 
comparative studies on significant differences in the moti-
vation, portfolios of measures, actor structures and imple-
mentation dynamics of smart-city approaches in different 
countries or regions. In this way, broad, reliable knowledge 
of factors for positive and negative developments in the 
sense of sustainability transformation can be gained and 
good-practice examples identified that can be incorporated 
into internationally oriented further-education initiatives.
 > Focus on people – acceptance research on the smart city: In 
terms of acceptance and diffusion research, the extent to 
which large sections of the urban population are willing 
and able to adequately deal with the various ICT applica-
tion fields of a smart city in their everyday lives in the 
future deserves special attention. Thus, the focus should be 
on studies on the acceptance of different ICT applications 
(e.g. for mobility, housing, work, security/safety, environ-
mental monitoring) in order to be able to assess their broad 
enforceability across population strata. For only if the new 
digital possibilities are used widely can significant environ-
mental effects be achieved (e.g. savings in energy and 
water requirements, more efficient use of many other 
material resources). Here, too, acceptance should be exa-
mined in different context situations and cultural areas in 
order to identify good-practice approaches and implement 
them in applications.
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 civil-society initiatives on these issues have been 
formed and are developing concrete solutions for sus-
tainable urban development (examples can be found in 
Morozov and Bria, 2017). Governments and municipal-
ities are also increasingly devoting their attention to the 
socio-political controversy involved and the need for 
regulation on the subject of digitalization in cities. In 
Germany, the BMUB adopted a ‘Smart City Charter’ in 
2017 as part of a long-term research and participation 
process (BBSR and BMUB, 2017). This serves as orien-
tation for the design of digital change in the sense of 
integrated and sustainable people-oriented urban 
development, and contains numerous actor-specific 
recommendations for action. 
Urban data commons – the right to data as a 
common good
As the importance of the platform economy grows, 
there is also a growing need for clarification as to who 
has access to data of any kind, who can exploit it, and 
how it is managed and secured. The digital ecosystems 
and the Internet of Things (Section 3.3.1) follow very 
different standards of (private-sector) data manage-
ment. Municipalities, municipal companies and end 
users often cannot use their data in a self-determined 
way. One option for data acquisition and transmission is 
the promotion of decentralized data infrastructures and 
data accounts that rely on open architectures (open 
standards, open formats, open interfaces and some-
times open source; Section 5.3.10). There are many 
examples of cities that are actively moving in this direc-
tion: DECODE in Barcelona and Amsterdam, MyData in 
Helsinki, DataCités in Paris or Health Knowledge Com-
mons in the UK.
The Code for Europe initiative aims to promote the 
use of open data and the sharing of existing codes 
through cooperation between technology experts and 
municipalities. The focus is on closed code-sharing plat-
forms (repositories for program codes) which are then 
available to the participating cities. Up to now, Amster-
dam, Berlin, Barcelona, Coburg, Helsinki, Manchester, 
Rome and cities in Scotland are involved. The British 
Government Digital Service initiative aims to introduce 
new service standards and codes of conduct that 
strengthen the use of open standards and open source. 
Urban data spaces
The development of ‘urban data spaces’ (Fraunhofer 
FOKUS et al., 2018) is an essential prerequisite for the 
use of data for urban development for the common 
good. In most cities there is usually no overview of the 
possibilities and availability of municipal data. Informa-
tion on open-source software, data-access standards 
and data portability is also lacking. Furthermore, exist-
ing data are hardly being used (Fraunhofer FOKUS et 
al., 2018). The idea of developing urban data spaces is 
to bundle all the data relevant for municipal politics, 
citizens, administration and business and make it avail-
able as a common database. 
5.2.7.5 
Conclusions
These examples illustrate that – apart from the oppor-
tunities offered by digitalization – a growing number of 
cities are also aware of the threat to their formative 
autonomy and are actively investing in decentralized 
digital urban platforms, open architectures and pub-
lic-welfare orientation, in order to maintain their tech-
nological, data, infrastructure and platform sovereignty. 
If this trend prevails, there is justified hope that the 
digital revolution can be used for an urban develop-
ment that strongly supports sustainability in many 
respects.
Digital technologies – when properly used – enable 
improved environmental protection, more efficient 
resource use, new business models, information and 
service opportunities, and new administrative control 
and optimization. The extent to which the various 
smart-city initiatives meet the objectives of inclusion, 
preservation of Eigenart and sustaining the natural 
life-support systems in practice depends in each case 
on a strategic objective, intelligent management and 
precise monitoring. Smart-city strategies differ greatly, 
for example, in their orientation, the ‘smart services’ 
they provide, and the participation of the urban popu-
lation. The spectrum of digital urban development 
ranges from primarily private-sector driven to primarily 
municipally controlled and participatory co-creative 
variants (Cohen, 2015). However, not every urban dig-
italization measure is automatically ‘smart’ in the sense 
of serving the common good and being suited to local 
conditions. Risks exist in the areas of data security, data 
protection, data sovereignty and operational security, 
as well as in undesirable ecological effects (such as 
increased resource consumption due to digitalization 
and rebound effects; Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.5). Therefore, 
in order to ensure long-term sustainable urban devel-
opment (housing quality, social development, inclu-
sion, climate and environmental protection, etc.), it is 
necessary to constantly monitor the effects of urban 
digital transformation and, if necessary, to implement 
appropriate regulatory control. Whether smart-city 
strategies can be assessed as sustainable (in the sense 
of the WBGU’s normative criteria) therefore depends 
on each individual case. Here, too, as in urban develop-
ment in general, there can be no blueprints (WBGU, 
2016a).
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5 .2 .8 
Sustainable urban mobility in the Digital Age
Sustainable mobility is an important aspect of the 2030 
Agenda. It concerns not only SDG 9 (Industry, Innova-
tion and Infrastructure) and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities 
and Communities), but also, indirectly, goals such as 
health (SDG 3) or economic development (SDG 8). In 
the following, the WBGU concentrates on the aspect of 
urban personal mobility, which is particularly relevant 
for sustainability considerations, i.e. it only marginally 
addresses digital mobility concepts for rural areas. 
Aspects of urban logistics are also discussed in Section 
5.2.4 ‘Online commerce’. 
5.2.8.1 
Guiding concept of a sustainable urban mobility 
turnaround
Problems caused by motorized private transport – high 
CO2 and air-pollutant emissions (above all particulate 
matter and nitrogen dioxide), land consumption, noise 
pollution, rising travel and transport times – are more 
concentrated in cities due to high traffic density and 
accident risks. These problems can also be regarded as 
external costs and often affect poorer countries and 
population groups disproportionately. For example, 
more than 80% of people living in urban areas screened 
for air pollution are exposed to levels of pollution that 
exceed WHO limits, posing increased risks of stroke, 
heart disease, lung cancer and acute respiratory dis-
eases (WHO, 2016). In low and middle-income coun-
tries, 98% of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants 
do not meet WHO air quality guidelines. Poorer popu-
lation groups are particularly affected, for example 
because they live on busy roads. They are more often 
dependent on inadequate public transport or non-mo-
torized transport and are therefore exposed to higher 
accident risks. Worldwide, an estimated 1.25 million 
people die and 50 million are injured each year as a 
result of road accidents, with 90% of fatalities occur-
ring in low- and middle-income countries (Sharpin et 
al., 2018). 
Core elements of sustainable urban mobility are 
described similarly by many actors, for example in the 
New Urban Agenda (UN-Habitat, 2017). This agenda 
and related initiatives offer global stimuli, some relating 
to ICT, for the expansion of a safe, affordable infra-
structure for pedestrian, bicycle and public transport. 
One aim of such an environmental network is to make 
inclusion in and via mobility possible, especially for 
poorer population groups, and to create attractive alter-
natives to motorized private transport and a better 
urban quality of life (BMZ, 2017; UN-Habitat, 2016a, 
2017, 2019; WBGU, 2016a) After all, future mobility 
will have to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement 
and be decarbonized. Integrated traffic and land-use 
planning can make mobility (i.e. spatial accessibility) 
possible, while simultaneously reducing the volume of 
traffic (WBGU, 2016a; UN-Habitat, 2017). 
Future mobility and transport systems in cities will 
differ considerably from today’s. The disruptive poten-
tial of digital technologies encourages the discourse on 
the future of mobility; data-based business models of 
the digital economy open up options for sustainable 
mobility innovations (Flügge, 2016). A mobility turna-
round accompanied by appropriate framework condi-
tions can support all the sustainability objectives 
defined by the WBGU, i.e. sustaining the natural 
life-support systems, inclusion and Eigenart 
( Section 2.2). However, digitalization could also per-
petuate or even reinforce existing unsustainable mobil-
ity patterns. The following section discusses the possi-
bilities and risks of digital options for a sustainable 
urban mobility turnaround. 
5.2.8.2 
Elements of the digital mobility turnaround 
Digital innovations affect all modes of transport that 
are also potential ‘data suppliers’. The mobile internet 
and smartphones have brought about a breakthrough 
for new mobility concepts, as they often give people 
access to up-to-date information for the first time. Fur-
thermore, they are the basis of many needs-based serv-
ices (Jacoby and Wappelhorst, 2016; Lenz and 
Fraedrich, 2015: 177). So far, such services have been 
developed primarily to improve urban (personal) mobil-
ity, although some digital mobility concepts are also 
suitable for rural areas, as long as the often patchy 
broadband coverage allows this. The mobility problems 
in rural areas are very different from those in larger 
cities, for the low population density means less con-
gestion and relatively low traffic-related air pollution. 
However, here too, especially the high motorization 
rates of rural regions and the problems of maintaining 
adequate public transport services require digitally 
enhanced mobility solutions for the benefit of greater 
sustainability (Gross-Fengels and Fromhold-Eisebith, 
2018).
Smart mobility
Numerous digital mobility innovations are discussed 
under the term ‘smart mobility’ as part of the ‘smart 
city’ (Section 5.2.7; Papa and Lauwers, 2015: 543ff.; 
Dameri, 2017a: 105). Yet there is neither a uniform 
definition nor a uniform understanding of the concept 
of smart mobility, and the relationship to sustainable 
mobility is also sometimes questioned (Lyons, 2016). 
However, some common core elements or fields of 
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action can be identified (e.g. Janasz and Schneidewind, 
2017: 253; EEA, 2015b: 60; Fulton et al., 2017: 1; 
Flügge, 2016: 92; Docherty et al., 2017: 5; Nikitas et al., 
2017; Finger and Audouin, 2018): intelligent transport 
systems, shared mobility and mobility as a service, new 
drive technologies, autonomous driving, as well as 
cross-cutting issues such as data, information and digi-
tal business models. The different elements are dis-
cussed below.
Intelligent transport systems 
Intelligent transport systems refer to the use of ICT to 
meet overarching mobility objectives and are already in 
wide use (Dameri, 2017a: 101ff.; Festag et al., 2016: 23, 
144; BMVI, 2015; Flügge, 2016: 29; Behrendt, 
2016: 158). They range from intelligent traffic-light 
control systems, parking guidance systems, electronic 
signs, traffic monitoring and traffic control to the crea-
tion of virtual vehicle groups (platooning) and elec-
tronic toll collection (e.g. e-tickets, electronic toll sys-
tems, usage-based invoicing systems, licence-plate rec-
ognition). Other elements include information systems, 
passenger information for local public transport or nav-
igation systems, and driver-assistance and safety sys-
tems such as distance controllers, cruise controls and 
collision detectors (BMVI, 2015; Dameri, 2017a: 101; 
Grant-Muller and Usher, 2014: 162f.). Intelligent trans-
port systems also include traffic data analysis, which 
produces traffic forecasts for dynamic traffic manage-
ment on the basis of historical or real-time data (Flügge, 
2016). With the new digital technologies, instruments 
are available that can also record and price negative 
external effects such as emissions, land consumption, 
loss of time, etc., in almost real-time by, for example, 
linking intelligent traffic-control systems with time- 
and congestion-dependent toll systems. The pricing of 
road use (e.g. ‘city tolls’ like the London Congestion 
Charge), which varies with the time spent in the ‘zone’ 
or with the volume of traffic, is exemplary (Cramton et 
al., 2018; Bauriedl, 2017: 23; Flügge, 2016: 32; Box 
5.2.8-1). The further development of intelligent trans-
port systems is regarded as an essential prerequisite for 
future mobility innovations. Autonomous driving, for 
example, requires communication, networking and 
cooperation both between individual vehicles and 
between vehicles and the transport infrastructure via 
sensor data and mobile communication technologies 
(Alam and Ferreira, 2017; Grant-Muller and Usher, 
2014: 150f.; Festag et al., 2016: 6, 71).
Demand-oriented services and shared mobility
New forms of mobility which change the classic provi-
sion and use of the means of transport are developing 
primarily in the direction of shared mobility (Sharing 
Mobility; Santos, 2018: 2; Nikitas et al., 2017: 2; Baede-
ker et al., 2018). This involves using, instead of owning, 
a means of transport such as a car or a bicycle. Impor-
tant forms, mostly mediated via internet platforms, are 
car sharing and similar systems for (electric) bicycles or 
electric scooters, which are offered either from fixed 
rental stations or on a non-stationary basis. In addition, 
there are systems for sharing private cars – online 
ride-sharing/car-pooling centres such as BlaBlaCar or 
Waze, and ride-hailing services like Uber, Lyft or Didi 
Chuxing. A more recent approach is flexible call or col-
lection systems (ride splitting). These mobility con-
cepts, whose operation greatly depends on the use of 
modern ICT, can in particular also make passenger 
transport in rural areas more sustainable because they 
make mobility possible that is spatially and temporally 
demand-oriented but nevertheless shared (Gross-Fen-
gels and Fromhold-Eisebith, 2018). 
Mobility as a service
Mobility as a service (MaaS) goes one step further 
(EEA, 2016b: 63; Flügge, 2016: 212; Nikitas et al., 
2017: 14; Giesecke et al., 2016: 3, 8ff.). This approach, 
which integrates different modes of transport, includes 
Box 5 .2 .8-1
London Congestion Charge 
The London Congestion Charge (LCC) is an example of road 
pricing. Its introduction in 2003 sought to avoid congestion in 
the city centre by initially charging a static fee, which was 
collected and monitored by automatic licence-plate recogni-
tion (Flügge, 2016: 32). Because this simply moved the traffic 
jams to other parts of the city, the toll area had to be extended 
and the toll increased. A special feature of the LCC is the link-
ing of the system to dynamic environmental data (Bauriedl, 
2017: 23) from London’s air-monitoring network, which now 
comprises 150 measuring stations. It records and evaluates 
numerous parameters, e.g. air pollutants, weather data (hu-
midity, solar radiation, temperature) and traffic-relevant in-
formation (days of the week, major events, etc.). A key ele-
ment is the prognosis software based on neural networks 
(Section 3.3.3), which links these data and automatically ini-
tiates the appropriate traffic-control measures. In addition to 
temporarily increasing the city toll, this also includes, for ex-
ample, transit barriers for trucks, public transport options and 
warnings to citizens about air pollution. The acceptance and 
enforcement of such measures should be closely monitored. It 
should also be the responsibility of policy makers to deter-
mine which data are collected and processed by the system 
and what action is taken (Bauriedl, 2017: 23).
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(1) the integration and simplification of previously 
fragmented ticket and payment systems, (2) the crea-
tion of mobility packages (comparable to data volume 
packages or flat rates in mobile communications), and 
(3) the centralization of traffic information on an ICT 
platform with the provision of an intermodal travel 
planner (Kamargianni et al., 2016: 3295; EEA, 
2016b: 63; Nikitas et al., 2017: 14; Giesecke et al., 
2016). 4; Flügge, 2016: 211ff.). Ideally, this happens 
close to real time, on demand, ‘from a single source’ and 
from ‘door-to-door’. It enables seamless intermodal 
mobility, i.e. the use of several, possibly shared, means 
of transport on a single route. A well-known pioneer of 
mobility as a service is Ubigo, which emerged from a 
pilot project in Gothenburg (Sweden) and is now being 
relaunched in Stockholm. Via its platform, Ubigo offers 
households a mobility subscription that includes both 
public transport and car rental, car sharing, taxis and 
rental bikes (UbiGo, undated). Another example is 
Daimler AG’s moovel platform. This combines services 
from Daimler and other partners including car sharing, 
taxi services, ride sharing, bike sharing and rail travel. 
The announcement by the BMW Group and Daimler AG 
that they were bundling their mobility services shows 
just how difficult it is to implement MaaS and how 
competitive the digital mobility market can be (moovel 
Group, 2019; Tatje, 2019). 
Alternative drive systems: electromobility
Although electric mobility is not dependent on digital-
ization per se, it is nevertheless closely linked to digital 
trends. First, the shift towards electric drives is a key 
lever for decarbonizing transport and reducing emis-
sions (Nikitas et al., 2017: 2; WBGU, 2016a) Second, 
electric vehicles can play an important role in the 
energy system transformation via the digitally enhanced 
sector-coupling of power generation and mobility (Sec-
tion 5.2.6). Third, electromobility and new-vehicle and 
mobility concepts mutually promote each other: for 
example, in car- or bike sharing, users don’t have to pay 
the purchase costs, so that electric vehicles become 
more easily accessible. New vehicles are also being 
developed, such as small electric vehicles in neighbour-
hood mobility and urban logistics (Section 5.2.4), which 
also blur the borderline between cars and bicycles 
(Jacoby and Braun, 2016: 44; Lenz and Fraedrich, 
2015: 192; Nikitas et al., 2017: 6 f). Electric buses in 
local public transport can also make an important con-
tribution to improving urban air quality. They are still 
produced and used almost exclusively in China, but 
other countries and manufacturers are gradually catch-
ing up (Manager Magazin, 2018; GIZ, 2018; Forst, 
16.02.2018).
Autonomous driving
In a narrower view, digital mobility is often equated 
with autonomous driving and therefore dominates the 
discourse on smart mobility (Flügge, 2016: 113) and 
the future of mobility as a whole (Fraedrich et al., 
2015: 4). The technological challenges and uncertain-
ties suggest that autonomous driving will develop grad-
ually. After the initial increase in the number of driv-
er-assistance systems (e.g. ABS, lane assistants, parking 
aids), more and more tasks are being transferred from 
the driver to the vehicle (Festag et al., 2016: 71; 
Fraedrich et al., 2015: 10f.; Milakis et al., 2017: 325; 
VDA, 2015). New applications in car sharing such as 
delivering and fetching vehicles are also becoming pos-
sible; this can save costs and time and facilitate inter-
modality (e.g. in combination with rail transport). Local 
public transport offers the potential for flexible call and 
collect services that are independent of timetables and 
lines (Lenz and Fraedrich, 2015); this relates to both 
urban and rural needs. Flight taxis and drone taxis are 
a special form of autonomous (electric) mobility. They 
are about to be put into operation for the first time 
soon, and their benefits and effects are currently being 
discussed (Stüber and Schmiechen, 04.06.2018). The 
revolution in new drives, new forms of mobility, and 
the discourse on networked autonomous driving in 
road traffic are closely linked, because the engines of 
autonomous vehicles and their integration into mobility 
concepts such as car sharing play a decisive role in 
determining their sustainability (Lenz and Fraedrich, 
2015; Milakis et al., 2017: 330; Fulton et al., 2017: 1). 
5.2.8.3 
Status quo and challenges of sustainable digital 
mobility in urban areas
Shared mobility holds the promise that fewer vehicles 
and thus less space will be used for transport, while at 
the same time vehicle utilization and thus the efficiency 
of resource use will increase (Lyons, 2016: 10). Despite 
the growing number of offers and a high user accept-
ance, however, shared mobility is still in its infancy 
because it is not yet regarded as a fully-fledged form of 
mobility, but only as a supplementary element (Santos, 
2018: 5; Nikitas et al., 2017: 2f.). In Germany, for exam-
ple, only about 3% of the population are members of a 
car-sharing organization, and the percentage of jour-
neys and kilometres travelled is extremely low (BMVI, 
2018b: 83ff.). The effects of car sharing on traffic are 
therefore still very local and individual, but will have to 
be taken into account if there is further growth. The 
environmental balance of car sharing is usually better 
in the case of station-based systems (e.g. no cars 
searching for parking spots, potential for e-charging 
stations) – and when combined (intermodally) with 
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environment-friendly means of transport – than in the 
case of non-station-based systems. However, the bal-
ance generally depends largely on factors such as fuel 
consumption, emissions and the intensity of vehicle 
use, as well as on whether there is a shift away from 
eco-mobility (Baedeker et al., 2018). 
On the one hand, the unplanned boom in non-sta-
tionary bike sharing shows the need for flexible, emis-
sion-free mobility; on the other hand, it has already 
caused resentment because of the uncontrolled parking 
of rental bikes in city centres and the corresponding 
countermeasures. Ride-sharing services are a typical 
example of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
platform economy (Section 4.2.2); they are criticized 
worldwide primarily because of competition with con-
ventional taxi services and poor working conditions for 
drivers. Environmental and CO2 effects are difficult to 
identify, because the growth of ride-sharing services 
corresponds to the decline in taxi rides, which often 
only account for a small proportion of traffic (Santos, 
2018: 5). In some cities in developing countries, such as 
Mexico City, taxis are a mainstay of the transport sys-
tem due to a lack of public transport services, and here 
too ride-sharing services compete with them (Puche, 
2018: 42).
The effects of new services first have to be studied 
for a while, as does the development of mobility as a 
service, which is still highly fragmented and in a 
(dynamic) preliminary or early stage (Kamargianni et 
al., 2016). Therefore, the sustainability effects of the 
services offered have hardly been empirically 
researched and are therefore of a more theoretical 
nature (Giesecke et al., 2016: 4; Nikitas et al., 
2017: 14ff.). The expansion and scaling-up of mobility 
as a service is made more difficult above all by a lack of 
cooperation between mobility actors, by obstructive 
legislation (e.g. tax incentives for driving) or a lack of 
financing (Nikitas et al., 2017: 15f.). 
The market share of battery-electric vehicles is still 
small due to their relatively high purchase price, limited 
range and sparse charging infrastructure. However, 
innovations and cooperation in these areas are contin-
uously making these vehicles more attractive. Subsidies 
and falling battery prices are driving sales up, and the 
global market share of such vehicles is now at about 1% 
(Canales et al., 2017: 13). Greater difficulties are posed 
at present by such sustainability risks as sourcing the 
raw materials for batteries, the stability of the energy 
network, or consequences for the automotive industry 
and its employees (Manthey-Kloppenburg, 2018: 105ff.; 
Nikitas et al., 2017: 7f.). The eco-balance also depends 
on how quickly the energy system transformation in 
power generation succeeds. 
Autonomous driving in particular is still fraught with 
many open questions, challenges and uncertainties 
with regard to quantitative effects (Nikitas et al., 
2017: 4f.; Festag et al., 2016; Maurer et al., 2015; 
Fraedrich et al., 2015: 11; Milakis et al., 2017). In the 
short term, significant improvements in traffic flow and 
the utilization of the transport infrastructure can save 
time and fuel (estimated at a reduction of up to 31–45% 
for vehicles with internal combustion engines and more 
than 90% for (hybrid) electric vehicles), so that emis-
sions are avoided in this way; in addition, the technical 
systems improve the level of safety (Milakis et al., 
2017). In the long term, however, autonomous driving 
seems to involve a particularly serious danger of 
rebound effects through changes in cost structures and 
time use (Wadud et al., 2016). It is estimated that the 
demand for transport in terms of distance travelled 
could increase by between 3% and 27% (Milakis et al., 
2017). Ethical and safety issues, as well as legal impli-
cations (e.g. with regard to human-machine relation-
ships, liability, decisions in critical accident situations, 
mixed traffic, especially with pedestrians and cyclists) 
are also increasingly coming into focus (Fraedrich et al., 
2015: 5; Milakis et al., 2017: 339f.). 
How data are handled is also a fundamental chal-
lenge of digitally enhanced mobility. In many cases, it is 
not clear to users which data are collected by providers 
under new business models and how they are used (e.g. 
Breitinger, 2018). Furthermore, positional and mobility 
data are particularly sensitive because, even after 
anonymization, they can in certain circumstances be 
used to identify the user and even to assign further 
unrelated data sets to a person (Kondor et al., 2018; 
Matheson, 2018). Solutions must be found and imple-
mented here in order to preserve the privacy of the 
users. 
Box 5.2.8-2 illustrates the options for digital mobil-
ity in developing countries and emerging economies, 
using China as an example.
5.2.8.4 
Conclusions: Setting parameters for a  sustainable 
digital mobility turnaround in the urban 
 environment
The introduction of digitally enhanced forms of mobil-
ity is still in its infancy in many areas. In addition, many 
developments are running parallel. The driving forces 
behind this development include automobile manufac-
turers, ICT companies and ride-sharing services that 
simultaneously promote e-mobility, autonomous driv-
ing and mobility as a service (Box 5.2.8-2; Nikitas et al., 
2017: 4). However, solutions to key urban transport 
problems (e.g. high CO2 and air-pollutant emissions, 
land consumption, noise pollution, increasing travel 
and transport times and accident risks) are not a purely 
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technological matter; rather, they depend on how digi-
tal solutions are embedded into comprehensive con-
cepts of sustainable urban mobility. What is needed 
first is a clarification of action competences: develop-
ment should be guided by democratically legitimized 
institutions, not by technology companies. They should 
promote an urban mobility turnaround that focuses on 
people’s well-being and the protection of natural 
life-support systems. Shared mobility can play an 
important role in reducing or limiting both urban and 
rural traffic. The necessary decarbonization of urban 
mobility can be achieved by prioritizing public trans-
port, walking and cycling, and by electrifying motor-
ized transport on the basis of renewable energies. In 
addition, a change in business models towards mobility 
as a service should be directed towards the goal of a 
sustainable urban mobility turnaround. In developing 
countries and emerging economies, the first priority 
must be the development of sustainable urban mobility 
systems and, in particular, access to mobility services 
also for the poor population, as well as the connection 
of informal urban neighbourhoods to local public trans-
port. The safety of non-motorized traffic is also of key 
importance. Moreover, sustainable, digitally enhanced 
urban mobility will only emerge if the digitalization 
potential is fully harnessed in the service of integrated 
sustainable mobility concepts. Digitalized and net-
worked urban passenger transport must be embedded 
in new work and leisure models that make use of digi-
talization opportunities to drastically reduce the vol-
ume of traffic, in integrated urban planning concepts 
that reduce distances and routes, and in transport plan-
ning that actively promotes forms of mobility that 
improve the ecological and urban quality of life (espe-
cially pedestrian and cycle traffic and innovative, emis-
sion-free vehicles). Only within the framework of such 
‘smart mobility governance’ can digital and autono-
mous mobility lead to positive sustainability effects.
Box 5 .2 .8-2
China’s digital mobility turnaround – a model 
(not only) for developing countries and emerging 
economies?
Despite or perhaps even because of its relatively unfavoura-
ble environmental balance, China is increasingly establishing 
itself as an important global player in the ICT and mobility 
sector (Ibold and Retzer, 2018). The country is trying to curb 
the negative effects of the rapid growth of population, cities, 
the economy (with its own car industry) and transport – ef-
fects that are particularly noticeable in megacities like Beijing, 
Shanghai or Guangzhou (Gao and Kenworthy, 2017; Tyfield, 
2014). Intelligent transport systems have been integrated 
since the beginning of the comprehensive development of 
transport infrastructure in the mid-1990s (Wang et al., 
2017: 38ff.). The two most recent Five-Year Plans for Eco-
nomic and Social Development show a marked sustainability 
change in transport policy (Ibold and Retzer, 2018). The 12th 
Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) laid the foundation for more sus-
tainable infrastructure development and a move away from 
car-focused policies (Gao and Kenworthy, 2017: 40, 51). The 
13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) and the ‘Intended Nation-
ally Determined Contributions’ (INDC) to the Paris Climate 
Agreement, which were submitted in 2015, are currently im-
portant milestones. In particular, the item on ‘smart transport’ 
and the associated programme to promote smart transporta-
tion reflect the importance of digitalization for China’s mobil-
ity turnaround and, at the same time, the country’s ambitions 
for global innovation leadership in ICT, big data, smart mobil-
ity and smart-city technologies (Ibold and Retzer, 2018: 3ff.; 
for further examples: Perez-Cerezo, 2018). China is regarded 
as a pioneer in shared mobility and mobility services because, 
on the one hand, it has a partially restrictive car policy (low 
level of car ownership) and, on the other, it is very open to 
digital technologies, and (sharing) apps like the ‘all-in-one’ 
platform WeChat are widely used (GIZ, 2018; Roland Berger, 
2017a). For example, the boom in bike-sharing providers 
such as Mobike (3.65 million bikes), Ofo (10 million planned) 
or Bluegogo, as well as a stock of approx. 250 million electric 
bicycles, is seen as an opportunity for a renaissance of the 
bicycle – in both areas China is the global leader in terms of 
production and demand (Gao and Kenworthy, 2017: 49ff.; 
Zuev et al., 2018: 2; Tyfield, 2014: 597; chinadialogue.net, 
09/06/2017). However, for a long time, e-bikes were hardly 
promoted, and sometimes even restricted by measures such 
as removing wrongly parked rented bicycles. A similar situa-
tion can also be observed in Germany and Europe, where 
Asian and Chinese suppliers are entering the market (DW, 
2018; GIZ, 2018). In the field of ride-sharing services, a sim-
ilar development of boom and readjustment can be observed 
(Chong, 2018). The best-known company is Uber’s competi-
tor Didi Chuxing, which has been operating since 2012 and 
took over Uber’s Chinese subsidiary in 2016 for US$35 billion 
(the following statements are based on Roland Berger, 
2017and Gao and Kenworthy, 2017: 51). Didi Chuxing also 
wants to expand internationally and is continuously extend-
ing its range of services beyond the provision of travel serv-
ices. It includes repair services, charging stations, traffic-man-
agement solutions for cities, as well as research and 
development on autonomous electric vehicles and artificial 
intelligence. The two above-mentioned bike-sharing provid-
ers Ofo and Bluegogo already belong to the group. Didi Chux-
ing is thus an impressive example of the emergence of inte-
grated ‘mobility as a service’. At the same time, it is also an 
example of the risks that networked mobility creates with 
regard to data security and the formation of monopolies, not 
least against the background of comprehensive state scoring 
(Section 5.3.3).
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Box 5 .2 .8-3
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘ Sustainable urban mobility’
 > Set up models and transformation roadmaps for digitally 
enhanced, sustainable urban mobility: The WBGU recom-
mends developing guiding principles and implementation 
plans for digitally enhanced, sustainable urban mobility at 
the city level in cooperation with the national level. Such 
urban, spatial and transport planning focuses on health 
and quality of life. It avoids individual motorized traffic 
and puts eco-mobility (local public transport, cycling and 
pedestrian traffic) at the centre of attention. The focus 
should be on the reachability of the destinations and access 
to mobility in itself; motorized transport should become 
emissions-free (e.g. electric, based on renewable energies) 
in the long term. The planning should explicitly include the 
role of digital technologies and applications for the sustai-
nable urban mobility turnaround. In smart mobility, much 
more attention should be paid to the financial and plan-
ned promotion of walking and cycling. Based on a forward-
looking, reflexive ‘transformation roadmap’, capacity gains 
should be used to redeploy no-longer-needed road lanes 
and parking spaces for pedestrian and cycle traffic as well 
as other sustainable land uses. By setting up an intermodal 
traffic-management system that also includes pedestrian 
and cycle traffic, land uses can be flexibly adapted to suit 
demand and, for example, converted to space-saving means 
of transport at times when demand for mobility is high. 
Environmental, transport, societal and industrial-policy 
frameworks should be adapted in order to use digital tech-
nologies specifically for a sustainable mobility turnaround. 
 > Create cost transparency, internalize external effects, abolish 
environmentally harmful subsidies: The WBGU regards the 
creation of cost transparency in the transport sector as an 
essential lever for promoting sustainable mobility, together 
with a related reform of transport-system financing inclu-
ding the abolition of environmentally harmful subsidies. 
With the new digital technologies, instruments are availa-
ble across the board to internalize – even close to real time 
– external effects such as emissions, land consumption, loss 
of time, etc., for example in the form of intelligent toll sys-
tems (Cramton et al., 2018) or by means of tariff structu-
ring for mobility as a service. Distribution-policy effects 
must also be taken into account and alternatives created in 
the public sphere.
 > Ensure the municipal common good in data-based mobility 
business models, take into account the strategic role of mobil-
ity data: In view of the dynamic development of new actors 
and business models, it is extremely important to incorpo-
rate and implement the objectives of sustainable mobility 
in the planning and design of the public sphere and infra-
structure. In order to preserve the formative sovereignty 
of public decision-makers in shaping sustainable mobility, 
action should furthermore be taken to prevent and coun-
teract data concentration and dominant market positions 
on the part of individual private-sector actors. In addition, 
public actors themselves must be enabled to collect and use 
digital data for specific purposes (Section 5.2.7). For exam-
ple, city authorities should have access to, and sovereignty 
over, essential parts of mobility data. They should be able 
to oblige private mobility providers to make their data 
available to public planners or to provide citizens them-
selves with the possibility of a voluntary ‘data donation’. 
In this way, new (digital) public-private partnership oppor-
tunities can be exploited and forces combined to promote 
sustainable mobility. One step in this direction is the joint 
efforts of municipalities, transport companies and mobi-
lity service providers to integrate shared mobility into local 
public transport season tickets. Particular attention must 
furthermore be paid to data protection and to protecting 
people from surveillance. 
 > Develop decentralized, interoperable, standards-based traf-
fic databases and a data and booking system for local and 
long-distance public transport as the basis for a European 
mobility service system: Low-threshold mobility inclusion, 
especially in public transport, should also be possible wit-
hout having to disclose sensitive personal data. Decentra-
lized databases could guarantee this and, at the same time, 
reduce concentration tendencies in the data economy. The 
still-complex structure of fare, booking and information 
services in public transport currently makes it subjectively 
less attractive than individual transport. In order to coun-
ter this and increase the attractiveness of local and long-
distance public transport, the WBGU recommends the esta-
blishment of a European data and booking system, which 
would form the basis for a European mobility service sys-
tem.
 > Developing countries and emerging economies should 
develop or redesign their mobility systems at an early stage 
on the basis of the sustainable-mobility model: Transport 
systems in developing countries and emerging economies 
are often unable to keep pace with rapid population and 
traffic growth, so that many problems are particularly pres-
sing there. They should be guided by the sustainable-mobi-
lity model, introducing or further developing solutions tai-
lored to their specific needs with the help of digital techno-
logies such as shared mobility, intelligent transport systems 
and, above all, (electric) fast bus systems: (Bus Rapid Tran-
sit: Stead and Pojani, 2017: 291; Nikitas et al., 2017: 8). 
Ideally, they should develop these themselves with the 
involvement of (potential) users and adapt them to local 
conditions. A particular focus therefore lies on developing 
adapted technologies, acquiring specialist knowledge and 
developing monitoring and enforcement skills. Access to 
(public) mobility services, especially for poverty groups, 
should play a prominent role. International collaborations 
are supporting the countries along the road described. For 
example, the ‘Initiative for Transformative Urban Mobility’ 
with the participation of the BMZ, and other activities 
within the framework of the New Urban Agenda, can be 
used as a basis (BMZ, 2017; UN-Habitat, 2016a, 2017, 
2019).
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5 .2 .9 
Precision agriculture: the next step towards 
industrialized agriculture?
5.2.9.1 
The context: global, sustainable land use
The ‘transformation field’ of land use (WBGU, 
2011: 234ff., 299ff.) will become one of the most 
important arenas for sustainability and securing the 
future in this century. Digitalization in agriculture, here 
called simply ‘precision agriculture’, promises to pro-
vide an important building block for the sustainable 
intensification of agricultural production and thus to 
achieve increases in yield while, at the same time, 
reducing environmental damage (Schrijver 2016: 30ff.).
Agriculturally usable soils are a scarce, indispensable 
and non-substitutable resource of the Earth system 
that is closely linked to water resources and on which 
the well-being of the entire human race depends. In 
principle, sufficient food can currently be produced for 
the world’s population (Grote, 2014; SDG 2: ‘Zero hun-
ger’). This threatens to change in the future, as consid-
erable increases in demand are predicted, among other 
things due to population growth and increasingly 
land-intensive dietary styles (above all through increas-
ing consumption of animal products). The corres-
ponding expansion of agricultural production required 
by the middle of the century is estimated at approxi-
mately 50–100% (FAO, 2018; Valin et al., 2014; Alex-
andratos and Bruinsma, 2012; Tilman et al., 2011; 
IAASTD, 2009). The demand for agricultural goods is 
also increasing due to the biomass requirements of the 
bio-economy (e.g. as a result of switch to bio-based 
products and the use of bioenergy), as well as the need 
for ‘negative emissions’ to help mitigate climate change 
(SDG 13: ‘Climate action’) through large-scale affores-
tation or the combination of bioenergy with carbon 
capture and storage (Bioenergy with Carbon Capture 
and Storage – BECCS; WBGU, 2016b: 11). 
Irrespective of the rising demand, a decline in agri-
cultural production can be expected as a result of soil 
degradation, water scarcity and unchecked climate 
change (WBGU, 1994; IPBES, 2018; UN-Water, 2018; 
Porter et al., 2014: 488). So far, part of the increasing 
demand has been met by expanding agricultural land 
into near-natural ecosystems (e.g. tropical forests, 
savannah). However, there is a broad international con-
sensus that this option must be stopped to protect bio-
diversity and ecosystem services (SDG 15: ‘Life on 
land’; Aichi targets 5 and 7: CBD, 2010; WBGU, 
2014b: 29). Another option for increasing yields is to 
intensify production on existing agricultural land with 
the simultaneous aim of minimizing environmental 
damage (‘sustainable intensification’: The Royal  Society, 
2009; Tilman et al., 2011; FAO, 2018). 
Studies on this second option offer hope that the 
increase in production on existing land can make a sig-
nificant contribution to sustainable food security, so 
that the destruction of further near-natural ecosystems 
Box 5 .2 .8-4
Research recommendations on the arena 
 ‘Sustainable urban mobility’
The WBGU sees a great need for research, especially on the 
sustainability impact of ‘digital’ mobility:
 > Create data pools, set up monitoring: Because digitally 
enhanced mobility is quite new, there is a lack of suita-
ble data. Data pools should be created promptly by setting 
up a monitoring system for sustainable digital mobility; it 
should be differentiated according to urban and rural areas 
and countries with different levels of development. Valua-
ble foundations for this are, for example, IoT and big data, 
e.g. from internet-based, mobile-communications or mobi-
lity service providers. The aim is to explore ways in which 
this can be done without the risk of exposing individuals 
to surveillance. 
 > Expand research on sustainability impact: (Empirical) 
research on the sustainability effects of digital mobility 
must be greatly expanded and networked. This applies, for 
example, to changes in the demand for mobility and should 
also take into account freight transport (new concepts 
of urban logistics, new production structures and value 
chains, shift from value creation to intangible assets). Envi-
ronmental and resource implications, distribution-policy 
aspects and data-protection issues must be researched in 
particular.
 > Conduct research into obstacles, potential and effects for 
changes in mobility behaviour (e.g. rebound effects) through 
digitalization and examine change strategies in practice 
(real-world laboratories): This also involves questions of 
acceptance, for example with regard to the technologies 
used, or questions of possible behavioural reactions to 
changed or newly created price signals.
 > Develop transdisciplinary development research and cooper-
ation on sustainable digital mobility: Especially in selected 
cities in developing countries and emerging economies, 
real-world laboratories for sustainable, digitally enhanced 
mobility should be set up and the foundations laid for inte-
grated spatial and transport planning. 
 > Promote research on ‘smart mobility governance’ and 
promptly put findings into practice: The coordination and 
control requirements associated with the manifold systemic 
possibilities of smart mobility call for a high degree of both 
conceptual and empirical research. This can and should also 
be embedded in corresponding smart city research projects.
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could be significantly reduced (Egli et al., 2017; Henry 
et al., 2018; Mauser et al., 2015; Foley et al., 2011). 
However, intensification is also a major factor in the 
rapid decline in terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem 
services observed worldwide (IPBES, 2019; CBD, 
2014: 10; WBGU, 2001: 3). 
In industrial agriculture, precision agriculture can 
contribute to the sustainable intensification of agricul-
tural production (Schrijver, 2016: 30ff.). The subse-
quent arena in this report (Section 5.2.10) discusses the 
different, but also interesting potential of digitalization 
in predominantly smallholder agriculture in developing 
countries. 
5.2.9.2  
Precision agriculture: methods, dissemination and 
potential 
The term ‘precision agriculture’ was coined around the 
mid-1980s. It involves the precise application of seeds, 
water, fertilizers and pesticides via digital systems 
according to the needs of the plants and the soil quality 
(Gebbers and Adamchuk, 2010), and aims to facilitate 
harvesting. For this purpose, digital systems are used 
for the networking and intelligent control of agricul-
tural machinery; these comprise sensors (e.g. instru-
ments measuring soil moisture and nutrients, fruit rec-
ognition), monitoring (e.g. digital documentation and 
evaluation of meteorological data, use of drones for 
image recognition), and satellite-based positioning (e.g. 
Box 5 .2 .9-1
Precision animal husbandry 
Digitalization has been making its way into livestock farming 
for several decades with the primary goal of increasing pro-
duction efficiency. Electronic animal identification using ra-
dio frequency identification (RFID) makes it possible to mon-
itor animal health and feed dosage. The quantity and quality 
of milk and meat can be optimized by dosing feed (including 
the ingredients and energy content of the feed) using feed 
and pasture robots. An increase in livestock output is achieved 
via factors such as comfortable surfaces to lie on, healthy sur-
faces to move on, mechanical aids for body care, and a 
health-promoting, stable climate. The animals’ movement 
profiles, feeding times and amount of feed eaten are also tak-
en into account. Digitalization also improves precision in the 
documentation of livestock population and traceability along 
the value chain, e.g. using origin-documentation and quali-
ty-assurance programmes. Marking farm animals with RFID 
chips also helps prevent livestock theft (Grote and Neubacher, 
2016). In addition, the ‘virtual fencing’ of animals in open 
fields makes it easier to avoid overgrazing, control weeds and 
manage nutrients. Banhazi et. al. (2012) give an overview of 
many technical possibilities in precision animal husbandry.
On the other hand, digitalization and the associated econ-
omization in livestock farming also have some downsides: 
 > An increasing concentration can be observed in livestock 
farming worldwide; this is reflected in rising average herd 
sizes and a higher output per animal. In addition to suc-
cesses in breeding, digitalization is a major driver of this 
regional and operational concentration. In Germany – espe-
cially in the southern Weser-Ems region – more than three 
quarters of all chickens are fattened on farms with more 
than 50,000 animals (BMEL, 2019). It is even estimated 
that, in future, several million broiler chickens, 25,000 
dairy cows or 200,000 fattening pigs will be able to be kept 
on a single farm (Berckmans, 2017). 
 > Livestock concentration poses the risk of diseases spread-
ing, so that antibiotics are sometimes administered as a 
preventive measure. However, the frequent administra-
tion of antibiotics in animal husbandry can result in mul-
ti-resistant germs, which can also be dangerous for humans 
(Cassini et al., 2019). In Germany, the German Antibiotics 
Resistance Strategy (‘DART 2020’) has been introduced to 
curb the spread of antibiotic resistance. However, despite 
a more-than-50% reduction in antibiotic doses given since 
2011, the annual volume was still around 800 tonnes in 
2015 (BMEL, 2019). In other important producing coun-
tries, such as the USA, the use of antibiotics is still permit-
ted even to promote output (BMEL, 2019). 
 > Various forms of environmental damage are caused by the 
high concentrations of emissions. Over 90% of NH3, 37% 
of CH4 and 65% of N2O in the atmosphere comes from ani-
mal husbandry, and up to 30% of all land, up to 70% of 
agricultural land and 8-15% of water resources are used 
for animal husbandry (Berckmans, 2017; Steinfeld et al., 
2006; Sharma et al., 2018). Moreover, the quality of drink-
ing water and groundwater suffers due to excessive nitrate 
pollution, particularly in regions with concentrated animal 
farming (Taube, 2018; Hermanowski et al., 2018). 
 > Concerns are also repeatedly expressed about data protec-
tion and data security, as well as farmers’ high degree of 
dependence on a few large corporations, since all a farm’s 
data are recorded digitally (Roosen, 2017). A company that 
develops an attractive platform combining the sale of vari-
ous input factors with advisory services and in-house com-
plex data has very good prospects of establishing a mono-
poly (A.T. Kearney, 2016). 
 > Critics also stress that digitalization and the concentration 
of livestock is changing the relationship between humans 
and animals. Digital skills are more important to farmers 
than knowledge of husbandry methods and animal health, 
which are increasingly being digitally controlled and moni-
tored. The importance of a bioethical analysis of precision 
animal husbandry is seen against this background (Wathes 
et al., 2008). 
 > Ultimately, the massive concentration trend in animal hus-
bandry means that meat is offered at relatively low prices 
and demand continues to rise. It is estimated that by 2050 
an additional 200 million tonnes of meat and one billion 
tonnes of cereals for animal feed will have to be produced 
annually to meet global demand (FAO, 2009a). Consump-
tion of animal protein increased by 69% between 2003 and 
2013, compared to an increase in the population growth 
rate of around 29% over the same period (Behrens et al., 
2017).
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digital maps of fields, autonomous driving of agricul-
tural machinery; Walter et al., 2017). Furthermore, pre-
cision agriculture also offers potential in animal hus-
bandry (Box 5.2.9-1). 
The degree of digitalization in agriculture varies 
widely, and very different definitions and indicators are 
used for its measurement, such as the percentage of 
areas used, the proportion of users, or the intensity of 
machine use. Precision agriculture, however, is used 
primarily in industrialized countries (USA, Canada, 
Australia, northern and central Europe; Reichardt 
2010), but also has potential in emerging economies 
oriented towards the export of agricultural products 
(e.g. Brazil, Argentina; McBratney et al., 2005; Silva et 
al., 2007). In England, for example, around one fifth of 
farms were already using precision agriculture methods 
in 2012 (UK DEFRA, 2013); in the EU, the proportion 
was around a quarter in 2016 (Schrijver, 2016). Preci-
sion agriculture appears to be profitable in the majority 
of cases studied (Gebbers and Adamchuk, 2010). 
Precision agriculture uses a number of approaches to 
make more efficient use of resources and to contribute 
to sustaining the natural life-support systems 
( Section 2.2.1). Digitally supported, targeted water 
management offers above all regions lacking water the 
prospect of higher yields, lower costs and sustainability 
(Monaghan et al., 2013). Soil cultivation, harvesting 
methods and timing can be optimized by precision agri-
culture, reducing harvest losses and improving food 
quality (King, 2017; Monaghan et al., 2013). 
Fertilizers and pesticides can be dosed more pre-
cisely and thus more economically with the aid of digi-
tal technology (Robertson and Vitousek, 2009; Khosh-
nevisan et al., 2013), e.g. the targeted microdosing of 
herbicides using robotics can lead to potential savings 
of over 90%. The use of laser technology or mechanical 
systems can in some cases even make it possible to 
avoid using herbicides completely (King, 2017). 
According to a study commissioned by the BMEL, the 
savings are in the low single-digit percentage range 
(BMEL, 2017). These methods are already being used at 
the laboratory scale and, in some cases, are already 
available. 
There is also potential for increasing efficiency and 
quality in fruit and vegetable cultivation (both outside 
and in greenhouses; Zude-Sasse et al., 2016), for exam-
ple by mechanically harvesting the fruit at the optimum 
time (this is already possible e.g. with grapes, apples, 
tomatoes, strawberries and olives; King, 2017).
These methods of precision agriculture can reduce 
operating costs and increase yields per hectare (Bram-
ley, 2009; Haboudane et al., 2002). In Brazil, for exam-
ple, sugar-cane yields have been increased by an esti-
mated 5–10% (Demattê et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
soils, energy and water resources, surrounding ecosys-
tems and food are less polluted (CBD, 2014: 13). 
5.2.9.3 
Efficiency versus sustainability
For industrialized agriculture, this digital revolution 
could mean a new technological stage and trigger dis-
ruptive changes (Walter et al., 2017; Wolfert et al., 
2017; BMEL, 2016). Precision agriculture offers poten-
tial in the cultivation of large-scale monocultures. The 
main incentive for farmers is more efficient manage-
ment, since considerable costs can sometimes be saved 
on the input side (fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, labour 
costs; UK DEFRA, 2013). The development of technol-
ogies for precision agriculture is progressing rapidly in 
line with the progress of digitalization, but their appli-
cation in practice is linked to capital-intensive invest-
ments. These can be carried out more easily by large 
farms than by small ones, and this can reinforce struc-
tural change (BMEL, 2017). A key question, therefore, 
is how all farms, regardless of their size, can benefit 
from digital technologies (Schrijver, 2016). Smaller 
farms, for example, can benefit from these technologies 
by merging into cooperatives and forming machinery 
pools. 
The use of big data in agriculture aims to make it 
possible for production systems and value chains to 
network– also beyond the farm level (Wolfert et al., 
2017; TAB, 2018). Discussions are currently ongoing 
on the risk of farms becoming increasingly dependent 
on major agricultural corporations (e.g. agricultural 
machinery manufacturers, agrochemical and seed com-
panies), on questions of ‘data sovereignty’ (rights of 
access to, and rights to use, the growing amounts of 
valuable agricultural data accumulated on farms) and 
data security (DBV, 2019; BMEL, 2017; Kritikos, 2017; 
WD, 2018; TAB, 2018; FBI, 2018). The rising numbers 
of mergers of agricultural machinery manufacturers, 
and seed and agrochemical companies, with the inclu-
sion of digital platforms, harbour the danger of new 
monopolies and positions of power that can create 
additional dependencies for agricultural operations. For 
example, methods of digital rights management (DRM) 
are increasingly also being used in the field of agricul-
tural machinery; among other effects, this undermines 
the possibility of independent repair and adaptation 
(Kurz and Rieger, 2018b). Not least, the digitalization 
of agriculture, as in other sectors, is associated with ris-
ing electricity consumption and an increased volume of 
electronic waste (Section 5.2.5). 
A particularly interesting approach from the per-
spective of sustainable development is a trend in the 
opposite direction to large-scale industrial agriculture: 
MacMillan and Benton (2014) say that the next wave 
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of agricultural innovation should concentrate on the 
small scale. Precision agriculture offers a chance to 
return agriculture to more ecologically compatible, 
small-scale landscape design with greater diversity in 
cultivation (e.g. mixed cultivation, crop rotation; King, 
2017; Walter et al., 2017), e.g. through the use of 
autonomous, intelligent, lightweight machinery. In 
view of the unchecked loss of biodiversity in the coun-
tryside (BfN, 2018: 50), including dramatic declines in 
the number of insects (Hallmann et al., 2017; Rada et 
al., 2018) and birds (Birdlife International, 2018; Gross, 
2015), the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services should furthermore be at the focus of agricul-
ture in the future. 
Given the resources and potential of digitalization 
and robotics, it should therefore not be a question of 
adapting the landscape and agriculture to ever-larger 
machines (e.g. in the course of land consolidation), but, 
conversely, there is a chance that machines can adapt to 
a smaller-scale landscape and diversified agriculture in 




To prevent biodiversity loss, a global, systemic approach 
to sustainable intensification, as advocated by the FAO 
(2018: 10ff.) seems to promise the best results (The 
Royal Society, 2009; Egli et al., 2017; TEEB, 2018). 
However, there is a contradiction in the concept: agri-
cultural intensification is usually also associated with 
an increase in environmental problems (e.g. soil degra-
dation, water pollution, loss of biodiversity through 
pesticides) and is therefore not sustainable. Precision 
agriculture, which is only made possible by digitaliza-
tion, offers a possible solution for this with the promise 
of a triple synergy: operating costs can be reduced e.g. 
by a more economical use of agrochemicals; yields and 
quality can be increased by more precise management; 
and, at the same time, environmental damage, e.g. from 
nutrient and pesticide inputs, can be reduced. 
Agriculture is characterized by (1) very tight regula-
tion at national and regional levels, (2) considerable 
environmental damage combined with massive subsi-
dies, and (3) only a partly open world market. In view 
of this complexity, the question arises as to how plausi-
ble and comprehensive the hoped-for global potential 
benefits for sustainability really are, and what incen-
tive structures can be used to implement them. The 
answer to this question depends not least on the objec-
Box 5 .2 .9-2
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Precision agriculture’
At present, the opportunities offered by digitalization appear 
to be used primarily to further intensify industrial agriculture. 
The focus is on improving efficiency and cutting costs. Yet 
digitalization also offers potential for more sustainable agri-
culture; however, this is not a priority for many actors. The 
potential for increasing yields while at the same time reducing 
environmental damage (sustainable intensification) should be 
further investigated and comprehensively exploited. The aim 
should be to give preference to more small-scale, ecologically 
compatible farming methods, to promote animal welfare, and 
to use agrochemicals as sparingly as possible.
 > Make sustainability an explicit goal of precision agriculture: 
Support should be given to forms of precision agriculture 
that are geared to the strategic goal of global sustainability 
and embedded in a systemic approach to sustainable land 
use. In particular, the focus should be on avoiding agro-
chemicals, using soil- and resource-conserving methods, 
and promoting agricultural diversity. The chances for re-
diversification and a return to smaller scales should be 
explored. Precision agriculture technologies that can make 
a particular contribution to sustainability and are environ-
mentally friendly should be promoted and widely used. To 
do so, the framework conditions and incentive structures 
should be restructured in the direction of sustainable agri-
culture; this applies in particular to EU agricultural subsi-
dies. 
 > Find solutions for handling agricultural data: The protec-
tion of non-personal business data is not yet sufficiently 
regulated (TAB, 2018). The increasing amount of agricu-
ltural data being generated should remain in the hands 
of farmers, and they, like other businesses, should make 
data available for uses that are oriented towards the com-
mon good (Section 5.3.10). The data sovereignty and secu-
rity of farms should be promoted and safeguarded. Agri-
cultural corporations should be prevented from monopo-
lizing data, as this involves the risk of farmers becoming 
more dependent on powerful agricultural companies. To 
this end, emphasis should be placed on international, open 
standards and platforms for the exchange of data and on 
the collaborative digital interoperability of different actors, 
software and machines (Schrijver, 2016; BMEL, 2017). The 
potential for common-good-oriented and cooperative solu-
tions should also be explored and implemented (e.g. open 
data, open source).
 > Create the right conditions for digitalization in rural areas: 
Broadband structures should be set up or expanded in rural 
areas in order to cope with the increased data flows associ-
ated with precision agriculture and the necessary commu-
nication and control requirements. In addition, the use of 
drones should be regulated.
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tives and priorities. At present, the focus seems to be 
primarily on increasing business efficiency; the envi-
ronmental benefits are apparently seen mainly as posi-
tive ‘collateral benefits’. There seems to be little pros-
pect at present of a systemic approach with a form of 
precision agriculture that is primarily oriented towards 
the goal of global sustainability, with the result that the 
triple synergy promise has not been fulfilled 
(Box 5.2.9-2).
Other important questions remain (Box 5.2.9-3): 
How big is the sustainability potential of precision agri-
culture in industrialized countries and emerging econ-
omies if it is essentially regarded as a further develop-
ment of industrial agriculture for large areas? To what 
extent does precision agriculture enable a return to 
smaller-scale landscape design and agriculture without 
yield losses but with more biodiversity? How should 
the framework conditions be designed so that small-
scale, biodiverse agriculture becomes competitive vis-
a-vis large-scale, industrial agriculture (balancing the 
economies of scale)? How can the EU’s agricultural pol-
icy be changed so that the conservation of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services becomes an explicit objective of 
precision agriculture? 
What potential emerges for developing countries? 
Smallholder agriculture in developing countries, which 
is the basis of more than 80% of food security there 
(IFAD and UNEP, 2013), will hardly be able to follow 
the capital-intensive, high-tech pathway of industrial-
ized precision agriculture (Mondal and Basu, 2009). 
Relevant potential benefits are likely to be long term 
here. The next Section 5.2.10, on the arena ‘Digitaliza-
tion in agriculture in developing countries’, provides 
some insight. 
Attention should be concentrated on the many open 
questions concerning the safeguarding of data sover-
eignty and independence of farmers, as well as the risk 
of data-based innovations further increasing farmers’ 
dependence on agricultural corporations (Schrijver, 
2016; Kritikos, 2017; TAB, 2018). However, many 
solutions to the problems described at the beginning of 
this arena will lie outside the narrow areas of digitaliza-
tion and mechanization (e.g. plant breeding, land man-
agement, soil restoration, adaptation to climate change). 
Further very important potential lies beyond higher 
production in agriculture, above all in a reduction in 
demand, e.g. by avoiding the considerable food losses 
after harvesting, or by changing nutrition styles to 
fewer animal products (Springmann et al., 2018; Willett 
et al., 2019). In order to solve the pressing problems, 
these different proposed solutions should be combined 
in an integrated approach and embedded in the broader 
context of globally sustainable land use (Godfray et al., 
2010; WBGU, 2011: 234ff., 299ff.; Searchinger et al., 
2018; Springmann et al., 2018). 
Box 5 .2 .9-3
Research recommendations for the arena 
‘Precision agriculture’
Investment in research and development will be a key driver 
for the agriculture of the future and should be strengthened 
in the EU (Schrijver, 2016). The Federal Government should 
set up a research programme for the sustainability, resource 
conservation and re-diversification of agriculture using digi-
tal methods and machines. In particular, the focus should be 
on the following open questions: 
 > Potential benefits and risks of digitalized industrial agricul-
ture: How big are the potential benefits and risks of pre-
cision agriculture if it is essentially designed (especially 
in industrialized countries and emerging economies) as 
a further development of industrial agriculture in large-
scale monocultures? Does this reinforce the trend towards 
industrialized agriculture, which would mainly benefit large 
farms? How can technology (e.g. intelligent, autonomous, 
small, lightweight machines) be developed that focuses on 
a diversified, small-scale agricultural landscape with gre-
ater biodiversity and ecosystem services? Could precision 
agriculture of this kind make a significant contribution to 
world food security, given that the bulk of global food pro-
duction is generated by small farms?
 > Potential benefits and risks of a decidedly sustainable pre-
cision agriculture: How big are the potential benefits if the 
primary target of digitalization and autonomous machines 
is a biodiverse form of agriculture, focusing on mixed cul-
tures, crop rotation, animal welfare, agroforestry, smal-
ler scales and re-diversification? Can sustainable precision 
agriculture be a response to the biodiversity crisis and cli-
mate change, and to strengthened ecosystem services, bet-
ter resilience and healthier nutrition? What opportuni-
ties and risks exist for small-scale, automated, function-
ally diverse and sustainable agricultural production? Which 
low-cost ICT solutions are suitable to help small farmers set 
up their own recycling chains? Can new opportunities for 
smallholder agriculture also be identified in this context? 
 > Regulation, framework conditions and incentives: In view of 
the unresolved questions concerning the handling and use 
of data – in this context especially agricultural data – the 
need for an adaptation of national, European and interna-
tional regulations should be examined. Besides, the que-
stion should be asked as to how the incentive structures 
should be shaped in the context of strongly state-regulated 
agriculture so that decidedly sustainable, small-scale, 
diverse precision agriculture becomes competitive with 
large-scale, industrial precision agriculture (balancing the 
economies of scale)?
5 Arenas of Digital Change
198
5 .2 .10 
Digitalization in agriculture in developing 
 countries
Most of the world’s farms are smallholdings and culti-
vate less than two hectares of land each (FAO, 2014a). 
Smallholders produce the largest amount of food (about 
80% in Asia and Africa) and farm about 60% of the 
world’s arable land. The main problems of smallholders 
in developing countries are the lack of access to land 
and difficulties in securing land titles, as well as a lack 
of access to water, energy, capital, fertilizers, seeds or 
markets. In addition, losses in harvesting, processing 
and storage, especially in Africa, are high at almost a 
third (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 2018). In view of the 
growing global demand for food and biomass, a chal-
lenge for small-scale agriculture in developing countries 
is the need to significantly increase yields – without 
colliding with sustainability requirements (e.g. avoiding 
soil degradation, using water sustainably and, in par-
ticular, conserving biodiversity and near-natural eco-
systems). Non-sustainable agriculture, on the other 
hand, risks compromising the security of supply in the 
future. 
Digitalization has the potential to increase market 
transparency via access to information and capital, to 
lower transaction costs, and to reduce information asym-
metries. This would raise agricultural productivity 
(Ekekwe, 2017) and increase sustainability (Nwagwu 
and Soremi, 2015), which would contribute to the pos-
itive development of the agricultural sector in develop-
ing countries. In addition to improvements for large 
landowners, digitalization has the potential to increase 
the inclusion of many other, often marginalized popula-
tion groups, especially smallholders, farm workers, but 
also the younger, more technology-oriented generation. 
This is particularly important in developing countries, 
where the agricultural sector has the greatest potential 
to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of 
large population groups dependent on agriculture (FAO. 
2014b). Thus, many new start-ups in Africa offer a vari-
ety of digital solutions for the smallholder agricultural 
sector and the food industry (Ekekwe, 2017; Rose, 2016; 
Mittal and Mehar, 2012). These innovations often focus 
on smallholders’ access to information and finance. In 
this respect, opportunities for digitalization arise from 
a combination of access to information and improved 
microfinancing, e.g. in the conversion to microfertiliza-
tion or microirrigation. Opportunities lie above all here 
because there is usually too little capital available to 
operate an industrialized form of agriculture, as is cus-
tomary in many industrialized countries and emerging 
economies. The significance of digitalization in this con-
text is discussed in the previous arena (Section 5.2.9). 
5.2.10.1 
Access to innovative digital technologies
Digitalization has the potential to supplement or pro-
mote the mechanization of the agricultural sector in a 
completely new way via drones, sensors, robotics, AI 
and the Internet of Things (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 
2018). However, in Africa especially the degree of 
mechanization in agriculture is still very low; these dig-
ital technologies have not been accessible for the 
majority of smallholders in Africa up to now. Excep-
tions are countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, 
where IT applications are already being used to facili-
tate the joint use of agricultural machinery by network-
ing machine owners with farmers (Malabo Montpellier 
Panel, 2018).
The deployment of improved technologies (e.g. soil 
sensors that measure and optimize fertilizer and water 
needs, or drip irrigation systems driven by solar pumps) 
is also a way to increase agricultural productivity. Pre-
cision agriculture is not necessarily dependent on high-
tech solutions. In the cultivation of small areas, it can 
also consist of a combination of labour-intensive, man-
ual technologies with digitally-supported advice. In 
Africa, increases in millet yield of 44–120% have been 
achieved through the manual microdosing of fertilizers 
(ICRISAT, 2016). 
5.2.10.2 
Access to production-related information and agri-
cultural advisory services 
Agricultural advisory services are one of the most 
important ways to increase the productivity of small-
holder agriculture and thus the income of the rural 
population (Evenson and Pingali, 2007). The use of 
mobile phones, internet platforms and social networks 
makes it possible to reach poor and marginalized farm-
ers in remote villages – and to do so at more regular 
intervals (Cole and Fernando, 2012; Aker, 2011). In 
India, the annual income of farmers has been increased 
by almost 40% through mobile-phone-based advice on 
new agricultural practices and better management 
(Grimshaw and Kala, 2011; Vashisth et al., 2013). Even 
uneducated farmers use mobile phones to access agri-
cultural information (Islam, 2011; Nyamba and Mlozi, 
2019). In Sudan, text-message-based advisory services 
have increased the efficiency of water use and increased 
agricultural productivity by 300% (CTA, 2015).
At present, lack of access to information is hamper-
ing the introduction of technologies (Baumüller, 2015). 
The rapidly increasing spread of mobile phones offers 
opportunities: if farmers have mobile phones, it is eas-
ier for them to exchange experience and also possible to 
organize targeted agricultural counselling (Fu and 
Akter, 2012). For example, the use of mobile phones 
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can mitigate or even prevent agricultural risks due to 
pests and disease outbreaks or soil erosion (Fu and 
Akter, 2012). Digital photographs of plants help to 
determine nutrient requirements and treat pests. In 
Mexico, consultants use equipment that measures the 
health status and nitrogen content of plants in order to 
fertilize and use pesticides as needed, thereby reducing 
groundwater pollution and protecting the environment 
(van Vark, 2014). Targeted advice via mobile phones 
can also be used to prevent the rapid spread of diseases, 
as in the case of Avian ‘flu in Asia (FAO, 2009b). 
5.2.10.3 
Access to weather information and disaster prepa-
redness 
Crop losses often occur when rain falls after harvesting 
and before storage (in India, for example, 10–35% of 
total turnover). This can be avoided by improved access 
to weather information via mobile phones or the inter-
net (Mittal et al., 2010). In Colombia, farmers receiving 
weekly weather information via text messages had 
4–7% lower weather-related crop losses than a control 
group without weather information (Camacho and 
Conover, 2011). Early warnings of extreme weather 
Box 5 .2 .10-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Agriculture in developing countries’
If the digitalization of agriculture is to have a broad-based 
effect on development, it must be embedded in a strategy for 
sustainable land use and geared to the needs and opportuni-
ties of smallholder agriculture (Cassman, 1999). In order to 
ensure that digitalization overall offers more opportunities 
than dangers for agriculture in developing countries, which is 
predominantly small-scale, the WBGU makes the following 
recommendations for action to the Federal Government:
 > States – supported by digital enterprises and within the fra-
mework of international development cooperation, e.g. as 
public private partnerships (PPPs) – should expand their 
mobile communications infrastructure and make internet 
access possible on a large scale, so that farmers can gain 
digital access to information and advice. The promotion of 
local micro-grids for the energy supply based on renew-
able energies can generate synergies. Digital access to e.g. 
weather forecasts, advisory services and education enables 
efficiency gains and sustainable management in smallhol-
der agriculture. 
 > In Africa, investment in mechanization and innovative 
technologies should be promoted as a priority along the 
agricultural value chain. Development cooperation can help 
governments to improve framework conditions and pro-
mote cooperation with the private sector, so that smallhol-
ders can also benefit from digital technologies. 
 > The WBGU recommends the promotion of cooperative 
associations of smallholders. Successful adaptation of digi-
tal solutions to smallholder structures would be facilitated 
by the formation of cooperative structures (e.g. producer 
groups). This expands the scope for area-based planning 
and design, enables economies of scale, and reduces imple-
mentation costs for individual smallholders (World Bank, 
2007). 
 > It must be ensured that smallholders own the personal and 
technical data they generate when using digital devices.
 > The WBGU recommends improving access to open-access 
data, as this has great potential for benefiting marginalized 
population groups in particular (IFPRI, 2018). 
 > The WBGU also recommends actively promoting women’s 
access to digital networks, as they bear most of the wor-
kload in the agricultural sector in many developing coun-
tries and would thus benefit disproportionately from infor-
mation of all kinds.
Box 5 .2 .10-2
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘Agriculture in developing countries’
Research on the digitalization of agriculture should be geared 
to the goals of globally sustainable land use and poverty re-
duction. The Federal Government’s research programme 
should aim to overcome the digital divide in agriculture. In 
particular, the following open research questions should be at 
the focus of attention: 
 > Which factors promote or inhibit digitalization for sustai-
nable development in agriculture in developing countries?
 > Will digitalization make the workplace in the agricultural 
system more attractive in the future? Will digitalization in 
agriculture reduce the rural exodus and the trend towards 
urbanization in developing countries? 
 > What efficiency gains can be achieved in smallholder 
 agriculture through precision agriculture?
 > Should the priority in research and development in deve-
loping countries be given to precision agriculture in the 
future? Or are research investments in other areas of small-
holder agriculture even more important? Opinions diverge 
here (Cassman, 1999 versus Chen et al., 2011).
 > How can precision agriculture make a significant contribu-
tion to poverty reduction?
 > What barriers hinder the adoption of digital innovations at 
the smallholder level?
 > To what extent does digitalization promote or inhibit land 
grabbing (WBGU, 2011: 61f.) in emerging economies and 
developing countries? 
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events help farmers to take timely action (Klasen and 
Waibel, 2015). In Vietnam, villagers have been pro-
vided with mobile phones so that they can react more 
effectively to floods and, for example, protect their 
livestock and crops (Ospina and Heeks, 2010). In West 
Africa, too, weather forecasts via mobile phone have 
increased resilience to weather risks; in one third of 
cases, losses have been reduced and yields increased 
(Roudier et al., 2014). In the event of a disaster, crowd 
mapping can be used to make spatial information visi-
ble on a map, so that aid can be coordinated better and 
more efficiently (Sutter, 2010). 
5.2.10.4 
Access to market and price information
Mobile phones also make it easier and cheaper to use 
financial services in rural, often under-served areas and 
to compare different suppliers (Nair and Fissha, 2010), 
which in turn increases agricultural productivity (Dun-
combe, 2014; Maree et al., 2013). Mobile phones 
improve access to information along the entire value 
chain, from production to the marketing of the prod-
ucts (Mittal and Mehar, 2016). This saves time and 
money, reduces transaction costs and increases produc-
tivity (FAO, 2013). For example, a group of women in 
Bangladesh have been able to significantly increase 
their profits from marketing chickens (World Bank, 
2011). In India, welfare increases for producers and 
consumers have been measured along the value chain 
in the fishing sector (Jensen, 2007). 
Information asymmetries about current market prices 
often limit farmers’ bargaining power (Ali and Kumar, 
2011). The Southern African Confederation of Agricul-
tural Unions has developed a digital aggregation platform 
that functions like a ‘virtual cooperative’. This allows 
farmers to aggregate their products for sale and achieve 
higher prices with their trading partners (Sunga, 2017). 
5.2.10.5 
Access to land and capital
Blockchain technologies in developing countries make 
it possible to have reliable land registration in land reg-
istries, to fight against and improve control of corruption, 
and to provide people with a formal identity by means 
of e-identification. These technologies have the poten-
tial to provide secure access to land rights and thus to 
microcredits or microinsurance (Kshetri, 2017). Secured 
land rights for smallholders, e.g. via blockchain technol-
ogy, would be an option to counteract the problems of 
large-scale land grabbing by foreign direct investors, 
which often involve the expulsion of smallholders 
(WBGU, 2011: 61f.; Feist and Fuchs, 2013). However, 
avoiding land grabbing is a political rather than a 
 technical issue. 
Mobile payment systems, such as M-Pesa in Kenya, 
make it possible to pay for services and goods without 
a bank account. An M-Pesa customer can transfer 
money to the account of another M-Pesa user by mobile 
phone, and this credit can be paid out, for example, in 
supermarkets or kiosks. Access to capital in connection 
with other goods that remain limited in many develop-
ing countries, such as fertilizers, pesticides, water and 
energy, only leads to real efficiency gains in the context 
of digitalization (Deichmann et al., 2016). 
5.2.10.6  
Conclusions
Precision agriculture can achieve increases in efficiency 
through digitalization primarily in large, input-inten-
sive enterprises, and these are found mainly in indus-
trialized countries and emerging economies, only occa-
sionally in developing countries (Section 5.2.9). Capi-
tal-intensive high-tech precision-agriculture solutions 
are not directly suitable for smallholder agriculture in 
developing countries (Chen et al., 2011). However, ele-
ments of digitally supported agriculture can still be 
used meaningfully in smallholder agriculture in these 
countries, especially when the smallholder farmers are 
organized as cooperatives. 
Overall, it can be seen that the use of digital innova-
tion can increase the efficiency, productivity and sus-
tainability of small businesses, particularly through 
improved access to information and advice (Nwagwu 
and Soremi, 2015). Access to mobile telephones plays a 
key role here. It is difficult to assess the significance of 
these innovations in the light of the urgent need to 
increase yields in smallholder agriculture in developing 
countries. However, it can be observed that the number 
of medium-sized agricultural enterprises is also increas-
ing in Africa and that the demand for processed food is 
rising in the growing cities (Malabo Montpellier Panel, 
2018) so that the use of components of precision agri-
culture could also rise more strongly there in the future. 
5 .2 .11 
Digitally enhanced monitoring of ecosystems and 
biodiversity 
5.2.11.1 
The biodiversity crisis 
Digitalization changes nature conservation in a funda-
mental, transformative way (Arts et al., 2015; Joppa, 
2015). The digital revolution in nature conservation is 
taking place against the background of a global, highly 
dynamic, anthropogenic loss of biological diversity, 
which is being compared with the great extinction 
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events of the Earth’s history (Ceballos et al., 2017; Bar-
nosky et al., 2011). The rate of species extinction today 
is approx. 1,000 times the Earth’s geological average 
and still accelerating (Pimm et al., 2014; De Vos et al., 
2015). The planetary network of ecosystems as a whole 
is undergoing radical and unpredictable change (Bar-
nosky et al., 2012). Half of the world’s most biodiverse 
regions have lost 90% of their vegetation (Sloan et al., 
2014). This has led to significant restrictions in the dis-
tribution range of wildlife populations (Dirzo et al., 
2014; Ceballos et al., 2017), which have been depleted 
by 60% over the last 40 years (WWF, 2018). Large-
scale changes in land use for agriculture, infrastructure 
development and mining are leading to the disappear-
ance of natural ecosystems and the fragmentation of 
habitats (IPBES, 2019; Marques et al., 2019). Overuse 
of biological resources by, for example, fishing (Worm, 
2016), hunting and poaching (Ripple et al., 2019; Chase 
et al., 2016) or illegal logging (Brancalion et al., 2018), 
as well as the spread of invasive alien species, are fur-
ther important causes of the biodiversity crisis (Early et 
al., 2016). Anthropogenic climate change alone could 
mean the extinction of a sixth of all species (Urban, 
2015). 
There is now a broad consensus in international 
environmental policy on the causes and effects of the 
biodiversity crisis. The Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (CBD) has presented a clearly defined and quanti-
fied catalogue of political objectives in the Aichi Targets 
(CBD, 2010). The 2030 Agenda also sets clear goals 
with SDG 14 (Life below water) and SDG 15 (Life on 
land; UNGA, 2015; Box 2.1-1). Monitoring ecosystems 
and biodiversity is a global priority of the CBD, for it is 
a challenge to measure the status and trends of biodi-
versity and the degree to which policy objectives are 
achieved in a standardized and comprehensive way 
(Bush et al., 2017). Aichi Target 19 specifically addresses 
the knowledge base and technologies, e.g. for monitor-
ing the status and trends of biodiversity (CBD, 2010). 
5.2.11.2 
Improved knowledge through digitally enhanced 
monitoring
The detailed processes of the biodiversity crisis are not 
sufficiently known, and this makes it difficult to assess 
their impacts on ecosystem services and human welfare 
(Dirzo et al., 2014). We know too little about ecosys-
tems, their functioning and services, the composition of 
species, their population sizes and distribution, about 
environmental factors and threats (Pereira et al., 2013). 
This knowledge is crucial for effective and efficient 
nature conservation (Turner, 2014), e.g. in identifying 
threats, setting priorities in the selection of protected 
areas or the use of scarce financial resources (Joppa et 
al., 2016), or assessing the impact of interventions in 
the sense of adaptive management (Bush et al., 2017; 
WBGU, 2001: 135). This knowledge is also a strategic 
prerequisite for developing science-based rules for the 
sustainable use of biological resources (e.g. in fishing: 
ICES, 2018). This analysis of ecological processes and 
impacts requires huge amounts of data and therefore a 
considerable amount of data acquisition, storage, pro-
cessing and modelling (Kelling et al., 2009). The skilful 
use of information technology and the networking of 
data records can bring considerable advantages here 
(Joppa et al., 2016). 
Environmental monitoring (abbreviated to ‘monitor-
ing’ here) makes valuable contributions to this know-
ledge and is therefore an essential part of nature con-
servation (Section 3.3.5.1; Secades et al., 2014). Mon-
itoring helps us when taking stock of ecosystems and 
populations, when supervising management regula-
tions and bans to prevent overuse. Monitoring also 
contributes to the prevention of environmental crime, 
e.g. the trade in endangered species (Box 5.2.11-1). 
Digitally enhanced, continuous monitoring is, for exam-
ple, also very valuable in identifying and certifying the 
origin of biological resources (Bush et al., 2017). Com-
prehensive scientific advisory services for policy-mak-
ers and assessments (e.g. by IPBES, ICES) are also 
dependent on digitally enhanced monitoring, so that 
political objectives can be set and verified on a sound 
scientific basis (Secades et al., 2014). Last but not least, 
knowledge about nature inspires and motivates many 
people and creates an incentive for political commit-
ment or participation in citizen science projects 
( Section 5.3.1.1). 
The aim is that successful nature conservation 
should no longer be hindered in the future by a lack of 
knowledge about biological diversity and its manage-
ment (Pimm et al., 2014). The vision of a continuous 
and comprehensive global system for the monitoring of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, as well as for the 
aggregation, storage and evaluation of large amounts of 
 biological data, is becoming more and more feasible 
through digitalization and international cooperation 
(Bush et al., 2017; Pereira et al., 2013). 
5.2.11.3 
Techniques and examples 
Digitally enhanced technology for nature conservation 
has made tremendous progress in recent years. Elec-
tronic devices have become more powerful, smaller, 
lighter and cheaper by several orders of magnitude, 
generating new, efficient technologies for biodiversity 
monitoring (Bush et al., 2017; Snaddon et al., 2013). 
Digitally enhanced monitoring systems linking remote 
sensing (e.g. satellites, aircraft, drones; Box 3.3.5-2) 
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with in-situ sensors (e.g. camera traps, GPS trackers, 
acoustic recorders, smartphones, DNA barcoding) are 
making new and valuable contributions to knowledge 
about biodiversity and ecosystems (Turner, 2014). In 
the following, some examples are given that illustrate 
how digital technology is enabling progress to be made 
in nature conservation (Figure 5.2.11-1).
Remote sensing by satellites, aircraft and drones 
Satellites have long provided photographs and remote 
sensing data that make large-scale, repeated and 
cost-effective information available on, for example, 
land cover, land use, the dimensions and clearing of for-
ests, and ecosystem types. This valuable information 
helps analyse threats to nature conservation and 
improve the surveillance of progress towards interna-
tional policy objectives (Secades et al., 2014; O’Connor 
et al., 2015). Although data are increasingly made 
available free of charge by public authorities (Joppa et 
al., 2016), generally free access to satellite data would 
be an important prerequisite for better exploitation of 
their potential (Secades et al., 2014; Turner et al., 
2015). 
Satellite data are particularly informative if they are 
linked to environmental sensors in the air, on the 
ground or on water (cameras, acoustic sensors, tags; 
Turner, 2014). Combined with high-resolution images 
from aircraft or drones, it is possible, for example, to 
analyse species of vegetation right down to individual 
trees and large animals (Turner et al., 2015). 
Aircraft and unmanned drones are used, inter alia, to 
monitor illegal activities (poaching, illegal logging), for 
mapping terrain and taking stock of populations (Wich 
and Koh, 2018; Dandois and Ellis, 2013; Schiffman, 
2014). Last but not least, they provide great images for 
nature films (‘virtual experience of nature’: Section 
5.3.1.1). 
Digital photography
Camera technology has experienced a revolution in 
recent years as a result of digitalization. In parallel, this 
has revolutionized the possibilities of monitoring indi-
viduals, populations and species. Statically installed 
camera traps produce large quantities of individual 
images of wild animals, which can be aggregated into 
very interesting data sets to provide, for example, 
information on population sizes and migration. Steen-
weg et al. (2016) imagine a network of camera traps 
that would allow globally coordinated monitoring of 
large areas and different habitats and populations. 
Current developments include the networking of 
actors and projects, the organization of data manage-
ment and the automation of image analysis using artifi-
cial intelligence (e.g. Wäldchen and Mäder, 2018). The 
WWF is currently testing infrared cameras in Kenyan 
national parks to track down poachers at night. The 
application of artificial intelligence makes it possible to 
automatically distinguish between humans and animals 
and to recognize vehicles (WWF, 2019; MacDougall, 
2018). One example from Germany is Flora Incognita, 
which enables the classification of thousands of plant 
species using a smartphone app (Flora Incognita, 2019). 
Acoustic recorders
Calls and songs are characteristic features of many ani-
mal species. Automatic acoustic recorders for recognizing 
animals are already in use today, e.g. for bats (O’Farrell 
et al., 1999), whales (Vester et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 
2009), birds (Oliver et al., 2018), fish (Bolgan et al., 
2018) and even for monitoring entire ecosystems (e.g. 
Box 5 .2 .11-1
Environmental crime and its prevention using 
digital technologies
ICT has made environmental crime easier and more global – 
with negative impacts on biodiversity. This applies, for exam-
ple, to the illegal trade in endangered animal and plant spe-
cies. Europe has become not only one of the largest 
transshipment centres, but also one of the biggest consumers 
worldwide (Siepe, 2017; Sina et al., 2016). Police crime statis-
tics for Germany for 2015 show just under 7,500 registered 
crimes under Germany’s Nature Conservation, Animal Wel-
fare, Federal Hunting and Plant Protection Acts (BKA, 2015). 
Having remained more or less constant for several years, the 
figures on the trade in endangered animal and plant species 
published by the Customs Service have recently shown an 
alarming increase. For example, the number of confiscations 
in the field of protected species rose from 63,000 in 2013 to 
around 580,000 in 2015 (Zollverwaltung, 2015). The trade in 
endangered animal species on the internet is also booming 
(Section 5.2.4). In a survey of 280 internet platforms in 16 
countries, around 33,000 threatened wild animals or animal 
parts or products were discovered – and more than half of 
them were alive (IFAW, 2014). It is estimated that the illegal 
trade in wild animals turns over more than €13.8 billion a year 
(IFAW, 2014).
However, digitalization can also be used to prevent envi-
ronmental crime. Just as perpetrators make use of digital 
technologies, authorities or owners can do so too. To protect 
plants such as cacti against theft in the USA’s national parks, 
they are equipped with RFID microchips (Ziegler, 2008). In 
Germany’s forestry sector, GPS transmitters are installed in 
felled tree trunks (HAZ, 2018). These examples show that 
digital solutions can help better monitor biodiversity conser-
vation regulations.
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coral reefs: Bertucci et al., 2016). The acoustic recorders 
are now so small that they can even be used for behav-
ioural research in individual animals (Couchoux et al., 
2015). The large amounts of bioacoustic data are suita-
ble for the application of artificial intelligence, opening 
up possibilities for automated monitoring and species 
recognition (Oliver et al., 2018; Aide et al., 2013). How-
ever, it is also possible to detect noises from poachers 
and wood thieves (e.g. shots, chainsaws); here, too, 
automation and networking make it possible to monitor 
large areas (Hill et al., 2018). 
Tracking individual wild animals
The automatic tracking of animals by GPS has revolu-
tionized the study of the behaviour and migratory 
movements of individuals and populations of endan-
gered species (Joppa, 2017; Turner, 2014). In the mean-
time, miniaturization has progressed to the extent that 
even very small animals, e.g. insects, can be traced 
(Arts et al., 2015). The international ICARUS initiative 
aims to provide real-time satellite-based observations 
from the International Space Station (ISS) of the loca-
tion and migration of small animals (e.g. birds, bats or 
turtles) tagged with radio chips (ICARUS-Initiative, 
2019; Curry, 2018). 
DNA barcoding and digital sequence information
Genetic analyses and evaluations of digital sequence 
information have become so inexpensive and fast that 
they are suitable for large-scale application in making 
inventories (Hebert et al., 2003; Pimm et al., 2014). 
DNA barcoding, a method for determining species by 
individual genes (e.g. in mitochondria), can be used to 
identify species simultaneously – individually or in 
thousands – to detect the presence of protected species 
and monitor the spread of invasive alien species (Creer 
et al., 2016; Bush et al., 2017). This technique also 
offers valuable potential in the fight against the trade 
in endangered species (e.g. sharks: Steinke et al., 2017) 
and for many other scientific questions (Hebert et al., 
2016). The International Barcode of Life Initiative 
maintains an international, freely accessible database 
of DNA barcodes and aims to cover all species by 2040 
(Hebert et al., 2016). 
Digital data management 
The digital techniques described have led to an expo-
nential growth in the amount of data available worldwide 
in the field of biodiversity research (Nelson and Ellis, 
2018). Big data approaches are becoming increasingly 
important for addressing the high complexity of ecosys-
tems and the threats they face (Joppa et al., 2016; Kel-
ling et al., 2009). Accordingly, networked data-manage-
ment systems that bring together decentralized data 
collections from institutions, projects or researchers and 
integrate them into global, publicly accessible databases 
are also gaining in importance (Pimm et al., 2014; Hamp-
ton et al., 2013). The aggregation and management of 
data by internationally coordinated projects brings sig-
nificant benefits for biodiversity research (James et al., 
2018). 
The international Global Biodiversity Information 
Facility (GBIF) is one of these initiatives that aim to 

















Figure 5 .2 .11-1
Overview of digitally enhanced techniques for monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity.
Source: P. Huey/Science from W. Turner, Science 346: 301,( 2014). Reproduced with the permission of the AAAS
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natural-history collections (Nelson and Ellis, 2018). The 
complete digitalization of the collections is in progress, 
and they will be made digitally available (James et al., 
2018). The Group on Earth Observations, an association 
of states, with its Biodiversity Observation Networks 
(GEO BON), is building up a global biodiversity- 
monitoring system that will integrate existing regional 
monitoring projects to create a coordinated and harmo-
nized system based on standardized ‘essential 
 biodiversity variables’ (EBV; Pereira et al., 2013; Navarro 
et al., 2017). 
5.2.11.4 
Risks 
Digitally enhanced monitoring is not good or bad per se, 
but certainly a transformative development that 
requires shaping and controlling. The above-mentioned 
digitally enabled technical methods (e.g. camera traps, 
drones, GPS navigation) for locating and tracking bio-
logical diversity, as well as the use of open-source bio-
diversity data are, of course, not only available to 
nature conservationists but also to those who make a 
profit from biological resources and wish to carry out 
resource extraction (Arts et al., 2015). A further prob-
lem with the increased use of sensors could be  electronic 
waste. A solution currently under discussion is the use 
of biodegradable electronics that decompose after a 
predefined period of use (Section 5.2.5).
Digital techniques facilitate the identification – for 
legal and illegal actors alike – of valuable natural 
resources such as shoals of fish, high-grade woods, or 
populations that would be of great value for poachers 
(e.g. rhinoceros or ivory). Data protection is therefore 
also a relevant issue when it comes to data from moni-
toring; for example, information from the real-time 
tracking of endangered species, rare plant populations 
or nesting sites of endangered birds should not fall into 
the wrong hands (Berger-Wolf et al., 2017; Pimm et al., 
2015). There are doubts as to whether drones are effec-
tive in combating poaching (Humle et al., 2014). 
The availability of the described digital solutions 
could be used as an argument for the loss of profes-
sional taxonomic expertise that has been going on for 
decades (Hopkins and Freckleton, 2002), despite the 
fact that taxonomic expertise remains indispensable for 
building, training, developing and applying monitoring 
technology (Arts et al., 2015). 
Respect for the privacy of the local human popula-
tion is essential in all monitoring and surveillance activ-
ities (Sandbrook, 2015). When planning and imple-
Box 5 .2 .11-2
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity’
Digital solutions should be rapidly and widely deployed in 
order to contribute to the protection of endangered species 
and ecosystems and arouse the interest of societal actors, par-
ticularly the public, in the biodiversity crisis. 
 > Strategic approach to remote sensing: A strategic research-
policy approach can help to improve the networking of com-
munities in the fields of remote sensing, biodiversity and 
AI, in order to move towards the overarching goal of a con-
tinuous and comprehensive global system for monitoring 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. The rapid continua-
tion of efforts to improve access to valuable satellite data 
and make it free of charge is an important building block in 
this context. An important product would be a long-term, 
consistent and regularly updated global database on land 
use and land-use change, which should be used to monitor 
success and also provide interfaces for AI applications. The 
initial costs for global biodiversity monitoring and the cor-
responding products and data centres should continue to 
be borne by the public sector. Close networking with inter-
national scientific advisers (e.g. IPBES, WCMC) and multi-
lateral policy processes (e.g. CBD, CITES) is key. 
 > Development cooperation for nature conservation: The big-
gest share of biological diversity is found in developing 
countries, but the drivers of its loss come mainly from 
industrialized countries and emerging economies. Indus-
trialized countries have a special responsibility to jointly 
develop the technological and organizational knowledge 
that is needed and to provide appropriate financial support 
within the framework of development cooperation. Deve-
loping countries have the greatest need for monitoring, as 
the biggest gaps in inventories and practical conservation 
solutions are to be found there. Priority should be given to 
the active involvement of actors from developing countries 
in development-cooperation projects and to private nature-
conservation projects for monitoring and data exchange. 
 > Promotion of citizen science: Citizen science will become 
even easier and more interesting for the participants thanks 
to the digital possibilities in monitoring and, above all, net-
working, and will become even more valuable for research 
due to the increasing amounts of data collected. This trend 
should be further supported, not only in industrialized but 
also in developing countries. The promotion of coordinated 
participatory monitoring projects should be intensified and 
the collections of data made available worldwide as digital 
commons (Section 5.3.10).
 > Protect privacy: The risks described in Section 3.5.3 with 
regard to invasions of privacy and surveillance may also 
apply to some of the monitoring instruments described 
here. For example, the vision of a total surveillance of 
nature parks can also affect the people living there or in the 
surrounding area. Therefore, when implementing digital 
surveillance technologies outdoors (e.g. drones, camera 
traps; Section 5.2.11.4), it should be ensured that those 
affected are involved in the projects and their privacy pro-
tected (e.g. through privacy by design; Sections 3.5.3, 
8.3.1, 8.4.2.2).
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menting digital monitoring, concepts such as privacy 
‘by design’ and ‘by default’ should therefore be applied 
(Sections 3.5.3, 8.3.1, 8.4.2.2). Due to concerns about 
private monitoring, African governments (e.g. in 
Namibia) have already stopped some drone conserva-
tion projects (WWF, 2019; MacDougall, 2018). 
Last but not least, it is important to note that the 
richest biodiversity is found in developing countries; 
hence, the advantages of more expensive digital solu-
tions are most difficult to implement in those areas 
where they would be most beneficial. 
5.2.11.5  
Conclusions 
New technologies alone will not save threatened spe-
cies or ecosystems (Pimm et al., 2015). The political will 
to conserve and sustain ecosystems and biological 
diversity and to implement the agreed objectives 
remains a prerequisite for the success of the CBD and 
the 2030 Agenda. 
Digitally enhanced monitoring opens up completely 
new possibilities for helping us understand biodiver-
sity. The new techniques promise more data in real 
time, faster processing, better access to information and 
networking, new visualizations, and support for deci-
sions via machine learning (Kwok, 2019; Joppa, 2017; 
Arts et al., 2015). These do not replace traditional 
methods, e.g. manual inventories made by observation, 
but they can powerfully support and complement 
them. Digitalization already provides valuable tools for 
management strategies and decision-making, as well as 
for improved ecosystem modelling (Secades et al., 
2014). A global monitoring system with automated 
inventories of species using image recognition, acous-
tics and DNA barcoding is now considered possible 
(Section 5.2.4.2; Bush et al., 2017; Snaddon et al., 
2013). 
The knowledge gained in this way can be used, 
among other things, to develop scientifically better 
substantiated rules for the sustainable use of biological 
diversity. In addition, digitally enhanced monitoring 
offers completely new potential in the enforcement and 
supervision of these management regulations and bans. 
A decisive starting point is to win people over to 
nature conservation. Here, too, digitalization offers 
valuable opportunities (Section 5.3.1.1). The increas-
ingly visible commitment of citizens can strengthen the 
motivation of political decision-makers to place the 
biodiversity crisis higher up on the political agenda and 
thus trigger positive feedback with the urgently needed 
improved implementation of the politically set goals. 
Without a much stronger political will to conserve bio-
logical diversity, better monitoring would merely 
improve our knowledge of the biodiversity crisis with-
out preventing it.
Box 5 .2 .11-3
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity’
Given the rapid pace of technological development, there is 
still insufficient research on the medium- to long-term poten-
tial benefits and risks of digitally supported nature conserva-
tion (Arts et al., 2015). The race between digitally enhanced 
overexploitation and the sustainable use of biological diversi-
ty must also be kept in mind. The following points deserve 
special attention: 
 > Building blocks for global monitoring: The WBGU recom-
mends the promotion of concrete research projects as buil-
ding blocks for global and comprehensive biodiversity 
monitoring. This includes the development and applica-
tion of new technologies, e.g. for remote sensing, tracking, 
image recognition and analysis. Remote sensing of vegeta-
tion types and land use should remain a priority (Secades 
et al., 2014). 
 > Data acquisition and management: Strategic, longer-term 
promotion of the standardization (e.g. metadata and data 
formats) and international networking of existing collec-
tion and storage projects (e.g. GBIF, GEO BON) is recom-
mended. In general, the use of open, international stan-
dards to promote interoperability and re-usability, and 
free access to data (e.g. satellite data) should be promoted 
(Turner et al., 2015; Secades et al., 2014). However, possi-
ble risks related to threatening scenarios such as resource 
extraction or poaching should be taken into account. 
 > Digital instruments for nature conservation: The research, 
development and testing of digital tools for practical nature 
conservation in the rapid assessment and management of 
threatened species and ecosystems deserve further sup-
port. Particular attention should be paid to new methods of 
combating poaching (e.g. use of algorithms from the field 
of AI to optimize patrols by gamekeepers; Nguyen et al., 
2016). Pattern recognition via machine learning also offers 
great potential for digitally enhanced monitoring for other 
applications (Section 5.2.11.3; Kwok, 2019). This opens up 
an interesting and dynamic field of research that deserves 
increased support. 
 > Taxonomy: Despite all the enthusiasm for new digital tech-
nologies, biological taxonomy as a science must not be neg-
lected. It remains an indispensable scientific basis in the 
digital context, and the application of taxonomic know-
ledge will become much more efficient (e.g. ‘digital field 
guide’). The WBGU recommends the expansion of taxono-
mic institutes and professorships, with a focus on digital 
methods.




5 .3 .1 
Digitalization as an opportunity to promote 
a collective global awareness of sustainable 
 development 
This arena looks at the potential of a global and/or 
environmental awareness newly generated or strength-
ened by digitalization to stimulate action to conserve 
the Earth system and to develop a solidarity-based life-
style. The connection between awareness and action is 
an old topic in social psychology and, in relation to 
environmental protection and sustainability, also a 
well-researched field of environmental psychology. The 
large number of empirical studies shows that problem 
awareness only leads to appropriate action under cer-
tain circumstances, e.g. by knowing how to act, and 
that many distinctions need to be made here. In this 
context, the WBGU takes into account the state of 
knowledge based on studies of environmental and 
intervention psychology on the motivation to act in a 
way that conserves the Earth system. It also outlines 
which new digital opportunities could contribute to 
environmental awareness, such as rapid interactivity 
and/or gaming, virtually experiencing nature, and citi-
zen-science projects. The WBGU poses the overarching 
question of whether networking can facilitate a new 
social awareness and willingness to cooperate (global 
citizenship). 
5.3.1.1  
Raising awareness through digitalization 
Since the 1970s, environmental psychologists have 
considered the cognitive preconditions of ecological 
action to conserve the Earth system, and under what 
circumstances knowledge is beneficial here (e.g. 
 Maloney and Ward, 1973; Hines et al., 1987). 
How can knowledge change environment-related 
action and where does the potential of digitalization 
lie?
Meta-analyses (Bamberg and Möser, 2007; Hines et al., 
1987) show that simply knowing about the threat to 
natural life-support systems usually has only a weak 
influence on everyday action to conserve the Earth sys-
tem (researched predominantly under terms like envi-
ronment-friendly action, private-sphere behaviour, 
according to Stern, 2000). Just hearing in the media 
about the threat of environmental problems, e.g. disas-
ter images of floods or hurricanes, can even lead to peo-
ple distancing themselves (Klöckner, 2015; O’Neill and 
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). On the basis of these studies on 
environmental problems and knowledge, the WBGU 
asks how digitalization might be able to support envi-
ronment-friendly action. 
Against this background one can assume that – if at 
all – only concrete action knowledge (i.e. knowledge 
about what actions can be taken to counter the prob-
lems) is relevant for everyday actions, but that simply 
knowing about the problems is hardly enough. How-
ever, being aware of a problem is an important pre-
requisite for people to feel morally obliged to act in an 
environment-friendly way, to develop a ‘personal norm’ 
(e.g. Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz and Howard, 1981). 
Personal moral obligations (personal norms) for ‘politi-
cal actions’ in the broadest sense are clearly very rele-
vant for taking action (Stern, 2000) and for the accept-
ance of political measures (Steg and Vlek, 2009). It 
would therefore be important – together with making it 
possible for people to experience problems via depic-
tions of them – to directly point out solution areas 
(political and everyday actions) and to make it possible 
to experience them as concretely as possible (Rogers, 
1975). The WBGU sees this as a possible (enabling) 
potential of digitalization for a global environmental 
awareness. Let us imagine that we could experience 
future worlds – virtually and interactively – in such a 
way that decarbonization, comprehensive inclusion 
and the recognition of diversity are already (virtual) 
‘reality’ and where the roads leading there can be expe-
rienced – and preferably selected and explored. People 
learn best when they are actively involved and receive 
immediate feedback on newly learned behaviour, i.e. 
when they are self-effective. In the health sector, initial 
meta-studies point to the positive benefits of digital 
educational games (e.g. ‘serious digital games’: DeSmet 
et al., 2014). In the environmental field, however, there 
are few games so far – and a lack of research on their 
effectiveness (Fjællingsdal and Klöckner, 2017). Exam-
ples include the game collection called Strange Loop 
Games (2018), the use of the cult computer game Mine-
craft for participative urban planning in cooperation 
with UN-Habitat (Block by Block Foundation, 2019), or 
explaining the global e-waste problem in political youth 
education (Evangelische Akademie Sachsen-Anhalt, 
2018; Section 5.2.5).
In the WBGU’s view, the potential of the digitally 
enhanced acquisition of environmental knowledge lies 
above all in making political action possible, in under-
standing the need to take measures, and in accepting 
those measures. Digital applications that reliably point 
out resource-conserving alternatives for action can 
support individual everyday actions. 
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Can virtually experiencing nature act as a 
motivation for environmental protection?
Experiencing nature (e.g. combined with positive emo-
tions) seems – like knowledge – to have little influence 
on environment-friendly actions in everyday life (e.g. 
Kals et al., 1999; Nisbet et al., 2009; Sparks et al., 
2014). However, experiencing nature could be relevant 
for indirect, i.e. political action (e.g. for nature conser-
vation; Nisbet et al., 2009). In this respect, the WBGU 
asks whether spending time in a digitalized natural 
environment or in digitally mediated interaction with 
natural environments (e.g. IPGarten (online garden): 
Box 5.3.1-1) can promote an awareness of nature and 
thus encourage direct or indirect environment-friendly 
action. 
Up to now it is not clear whether nature can be sim-
ulated in such a way that environmental awareness is 
also promoted in virtual environments. There are initial 
indications that experiences of nature made possible 
with ICT (images or films) increase a closeness to nature 
and promote behaviour to conserve national nature 
(particularly attractive national parks, Arendt and Mat-
thes, 2016), but reduce the perceived attractiveness of 
local nature (Levi and Kocher, 1999). Initial studies also 
report that watching nature films, images or simula-
tions is associated with positive feelings. Naturalness 
and the feeling of being in a continuous space, and ele-
ments such as immersion (i.e. how completely or  vividly 
a reality is depicted) and larger viewing surfaces (Cum-
mings and Bailenson, 2016) seem to be relevant ele-
ments for virtual realities to be valued positively (e.g. 
De Kort et al., 2006). Virtually experiencing nature 
with positive emotions could thus awaken personal 
norms and a willingness to act. Examples would be vir-
tual experiences with otherwise inaccessible and 
impressive natural landscapes and creatures, which, in 
such a virtual encounter, trigger empathy and feelings 
such as pride and majesty, e.g. the image of the planet, 
swimming with dolphins, or flying over a waterfall from 
a bird’s perspective. 
Citizen science – raising problem awareness 
and strengthening collective effectiveness by 
participating in knowledge building 
When non-professional ‘scientists’ independently get 
involved in – or are incorporated into – science, this is 
often referred to as citizen science. Prominent examples 
include the mostly very successful calls for bird sur-
veys. Digital platforms (e.g. Buergerschaffenwissen.de, 
2019; SciStarter.org, 2019) offer a whole range of citi-
zens’ research projects where interested people can 
participate and report (e.g. Bonney et al., 2015). 
On the one hand, such experience-based, involved 
learning has the potential to give people a knowledge 
boost and a fascination for system knowledge. How-
ever, here too the newly acquired knowledge can only 
be expected to be directly converted into sustainable 
action relevant to everyday life if knowledge of how to 
act is imparted at the same time (Section 5.3.1.1). Since 
citizen science presumably supports the idea of experi-
encing collective effectiveness, one would expect polit-
ical action in particular to be promoted by such forms of 
scientific environmental experience. One such trans-
formative force of digitalization for environmental pro-
tection or global environmental awareness can cur-
rently be seen in the area of air-quality monitoring in 
public spaces (Box 5.3.1-2). 
5.3.1.2  
The individual and the cosmopolitan society: can 
digitalization promote empathy and solidarity? 
The WBGU assumes that networking and virtuality can 
create a proximity to problem areas (situations, individ-
uals, groups, life situations) that are far away in terms 
of space and time, i.e. the ‘psychological distance’ 
(Uzzell, 2000) is reduced. The question arises whether 
this new form of proximity can promote collaborative 
and environment-friendly behaviour or, in a broader 
sense, solidarity (Gifford, 2014)? 
Does the expansion of social networks promote 
international cooperation? 
Social and neuropsychological studies (Dunbar, 2018) 
indicate that social networks do not increase in size as 
a result of digitalization (e.g. through social media), but 
are likely to become more heterogeneous (Haerter et 
al., 2012). Digitalization can facilitate contact with peo-
ple from different groups, because, among other things, 
passport controls do not play a role online, ethnicities 
and other group affiliations can be deliberately con-
cealed, and physical contact, which may be fear-laden 
as a result of prejudices or simply costly, no longer takes 
place (spatial distance). In the following, the WBGU 
discusses whether this expansion of social networks 
promotes international cooperation.
Since the 1950s, psychological studies (in particular 
Allport, 1954) have shown that intergroup contacts 
reduce prejudices, especially under ideal conditions 
such as equal status in the contact situation and com-
mon goals. Recent overview studies confirm that con-
tact alone between individuals of different groups 
reduces prejudice and promotes affection (meta-analy-
ses: Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Lemmer and Wagner, 
2015). Studies on intergroup contact, however, almost 
exclusively relate to personal (face to face) contacts or 
‘indirect contact’; for example, the knowledge that a 
person close to us is in close contact with people of 
other ethnicities also promotes a positive attitude 
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towards this group (Lemmer and Wagner, 2015). Little 
research has been conducted on virtual forms of con-
tact, but initial studies indicate that virtual contact with 
individuals from other groups has little or no effect on 
prejudice reduction, affection or positive attitudes 
(Lemmer and Wagner, 2015). 
The WBGU believes that digitalization has potential 
in the development of solidarity, particularly at the 
level where people with the same interests network 
directly and experience common ground at the civil-so-
ciety level. Examples of such networking potential 
include campaigns such as Standing Rock (standwith-
standingrock.net), where people show global solidarity 
with others for a certain purpose (in this case with the 
Sioux for nature and water protection) and take joint 
political action. Such political options are broadened by 
digitalization and range from direct participation to the 
dissemination of content via social networks, online or 
crowd-funding and petitions. The constant possibility 
of exchange, together with direct insights via video 
messages, probably strengthens the feeling of collec-
tively having an impact (strengthening collective 
self-efficacy: Bamberg et al., 2015) and enable ‘ pioneers 
of change’ (WBGU, 2011: 242ff.) to make their feelings 
and ideas digitally comprehensible for others more 
quickly and more directly. 
Should digitalization promote empathy?
In the following, the WBGU takes up the key concept of 
‘empathy expansion’ (Rifkin, 2009), which is associ-
ated primarily with positive effects in public discourse: 
it is imagined that empathy with other people’s joy and 
suffering drives one to behave altruistically and/or 
show solidarity (Batson and Shaw, 1991).
From the point of view of cognitive psychology, the 
discussion should include the fact that the promotion 
of empathy, e.g. via stronger networking via social 
media, also entails risks at the individual and societal 
level. Hence, ‘empathizing with other people’, the core 
of empathy, is often also associated with negative stress 
(empathic distress; Singer and Klimecki, 2014), espe-
cially when negative emotions are involved (e.g. pity 
for climate-change victims). For example, the emphasis, 
especially in social media, seems to be on exchanging 
negative emotions and thus negative feelings of stress. 
Initial studies show that texts on climate change shared 
on social media are often emotionally charged (Veltri 
and Atanasova, 2017). Here there is a risk of feelings of 
helplessness, for example when others share the nega-
tive emotions (fear, anger, grief, disgust) of a cli-
mate-change victim who is currently losing their home. 
This can result in people distancing themselves psycho-
logically in order to protect themselves (Hart, 2011). 
Solidarity, as defined by the WGBU (WBGU, 2016a), 
is more likely to be strengthened by a rational experi-
ence of ‘compassion’ rather than by such an emotional 
experience. Compassion describes a feeling that arises 
when other people’s suffering is witnessed, and this 
motivates the desire to help (Goetz et al., 2010; Lazarus, 
1991; Singer and Klimecki, 2014). First studies show a 
positive influence of compassion on actions to conserve 
the Earth system (Pfattheicher et al., 2016). 
The WBGU asks where and how digitalization can 
try to have an effect here. Compassion requires recog-
nizing one’s own feelings, separating them from those 
of others, while allowing positive feelings for others. 
These skills can be promoted e.g. by mindfulness med-
itation techniques (Singer and Klimecki, 2014), which 
could be learned with the support of appropriate digital 
applications. 
Box 5 .3 .1-1
Digitalization to enable virtual contact with 
nature – IPGarten: “your own garden just a 
mouse click away”
A practical example where virtual technology is used to ena-
ble a new way of experiencing nature is the Berlin-based IP-
Garten Project (ipgarten.de, 2019). IP gardeners gain digital 
knowledge about sustainable agriculture and implement it 
directly by cultivating their own piece of land from home, 
planting, watering and harvesting their garden ‘digitally’. The 
digital IPGarten owners’ instructions are implemented by ‘an-
alogue’ (i.e. real) gardeners ‘on the spot’. The harvest can be 
collected from a central location (and surpluses are donated to 
needy people via the Berliner Tafel charity). Plant growth can 
be observed live via cameras and drones, and a wide variety 
of data, e.g. on soil, water and air, are transmitted in real time. 
Anyone can purchase an IPGarten, although the project is ad-
vertised particularly intensely in the educational context, e.g. 
in schools. Applicants currently have to wait for a garden for 
up to four years. 
IP gardening uses a virtual world to pass on knowledge for 
solving environmental problems, such as the sustainable use 
of soils. Apart from acquiring knowledge, concrete options for 
action can be tried out: indirect, environment-friendly action 
is made possible by digital interaction. It is certainly conceiv-
able that the knowledge acquired in the IPGarten project (e.g. 
on soil protection) could also lead to IP gardeners becoming 
more politically committed to such goals (e.g. sustainable soil 
management). 
Practical examples such as the IPGarten need evaluations 
to assess whether forms of virtually experiencing nature of-
fers potential for environmental protection, e.g. whether 
 digitally acquired knowledge and action on environmental 
protection issues is transferred to actual political or environ-
ment-friendly action.
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5.3.1.3 
Digital participation and networking to make 
changes in consumption styles possible in 
 everyday life
Taking into account the often reported success of 
group-based intervention techniques (e.g. targeted dif-
fusion in social marketing measures; Abrahamse and 
Matthies, 2012), or interventions that encourage 
groups to commit themselves collectively or individu-
ally (e.g. Energy Neighbourhoods initiated by the EU: 
European Commission, 2019b), the WBGU identifies 
considerable potential in digitalization for promoting 
sustainable consumption and a solidarity-based quality 
of life. 
Digitalization can enable participation, dissemina-
tion and rapid social interaction in different ways. 
Social interaction via ICT can enable in particular sus-
tainable consumption based on shared use, reuse, 
repair, sharing and exchange (Sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 
5.2.5). In addition, digitalization can make a wide range 
of different measures possible: from interactive coun-
selling programmes adapted to one’s own life situation 
(tailoring of interventions: Abrahamse et al., 2007) and 
feedback systems on one’s own lifestyle (behaviour 
feedback: Klöckner, 2015) to applications that reveal 
CO2 emissions associated with consumer goods and 
identify sustainable alternatives (Section 5.2.3). 
5.3.1.4  
Conclusions 
In the WBGU’s view, the potential of the digitally 
enhanced acquisition of environmental knowledge lies 
above all in making political action possible, under-
standing the need to take measures, and accepting 
those measures. Digital applications that reliably point 
out resource-conserving action alternatives can sup-
port individual everyday actions. Overall, it can be seen 
that involved learning through digitalization is possible 
and, if well designed, can in particular promote political 
action and the acceptance of measures. It is important 
here to use digitalization’s potential to increase know-
ledge of problems and systems – e.g. fast interactivity, 
direct feedback possibilities, and virtually experiencing 
natural environments and living creatures worthy of 
protection, which creates positive emotions. Funding 
for involved education and research formats such as 
citizen science (e.g. Box 5.3.1-2) can improve system 
knowledge and lead to more civil participation (self- 
efficacy). 
Box 5 .3 .1-2
Digitalization for citizen sensing
‘Citizen sensing’ is an exciting trend at the interface between 
digitalization, the environment and citizen science. Above all, 
the availability of ever cheaper, smaller and more powerful 
sensors enables ever denser and better networked monitoring 
of air quality (Jiang, 2017; Gabrys et al., 2016). The associat-
ed empowerment of more and more actors to carry out air 
measurements themselves releases a potential for societal 
transformation that should not be underestimated. In addi-
tion to, or together with, ‘professionals’ such as environmen-
tal authorities, companies, environmental organizations or 
scientists, more and more private individuals are becoming 
‘measurement actors’ in citizen sensing. 
In the context of digitalization, measurements in mi-
crosensor networks and networking in the IoT are expected to 
contribute to better air quality and consequently sustainable 
urban development (Lambrechts and Sinha, 2016; 
 Sections 5.2.7, 5.2.8). A well-known German example of cit-
izen sensing is a project called luftdaten.info (2018) organ-
ized by the OK Lab Stuttgart. The project encourages people 
to build and operate their own particulatematter sensors and 
to share the measured values on an open internet map plat-
form, which now extends beyond Germany’s borders. It thus 
embodies many characteristics of the bottom-up digitaliza-
tion movement, from the collaborative production of open 
knowledge to 3D printing of casing parts (Fröschle, 
2017: 515f.;  Sections 3.3, 5.2.2, 5.3.10). 
As already mentioned, citizen sensing currently offers 
above all the potential for societal transformation. From a me-
trological point of view, the disruptive potential of cost-effec-
tive sensors can still be classified as rather low due to the 
fundamental conflict of objectives between quality and costs, 
but it could increase with rising quality (Jiang, 2017: 728ff., 
JRC, 2017: 1; for sensors from luftdaten.info: LUBW, 2017). 
However, low-cost sensor technology, especially in develop-
ing countries and emerging economies, could help to set up or 
expand (citizen) air-measurement networks and to monitor 
measurements made by the authorities (Lambrechts and 
Sinha, 2016: 11ff.). The required energy and resource con-
sumption should be taken into account here (e.g. electricity 
for sensors and WLANs, e-waste).
A combination with indoor air-quality measurements also 
offers the potential to measure people’s actual total exposure 
and to derive suitable options for action (Jiang, 2017: 727). 
Citizen sensing can also be used for environmental education 
in schools, e.g. smartphones as air sensors in the SusMobil 
project (SUSmobil, 2018).
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5 .3 .2 
Digitalization and public discourse: the end of 
rational argumentation or the chance of a global 
agora?
‘Digital structural change of the public sphere’ – what 
at first might sound academic and complex describes a 
transformation that is very evident for many people: 
digital technologies are changing the way we communi-
cate, how we perceive societal debates, and how we can 
take part in them (Fraser, 2010; Imhof, 2011; Ullrich, 
2017). Worldwide, but by no means globally, many 
people use social media such as Facebook, Twitter or 
Instagram to privately and professionally communicate, 
receive and transfer information and messages. One 
third of Germans, almost half of Americans and two 
thirds of Brazilians used social media as a source of 
news in 2018 (Newman et al., 2018). In many cases, 
information is also provided by end users themselves 
(Dolata and Schrape, 2017). The media landscape is 
changing: a small number of successful digital platforms 
are gaining importance as new intermediaries (media-
tors) via new media and sales formats, while print cir-
culations are declining and traditional business models 
are being eroded. Print media have increasingly come 
under economic pressure since the turn of the millen-
nium (Figure 5.3.2-1).
To put it bluntly, the reader’s letter as a format for 
Box 5 .3 .1-3
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Promotion of a collective global awareness’
 > Direct effects of digitalization (in the sense of networking, 
enabling a virtual online experience, etc.) can be expected 
in particular to promote an enhanced and enriched know-
ledge and understanding of problems. New forms of pro-
viding and experiencing information can therefore be 
expected to have positive effects on people’s motiva-
tion for political action and the acceptability of measures. 
The WBGU therefore recommends using digitalization to 
impart background knowledge and to reveal political action 
options. 
 > In the field of individual everyday actions, fewer direct 
effects can be expected from new forms of knowledge 
transfer; here, however, existing behaviour-changing tech-
niques (such as tailored intervention, implementation 
intentions, feedback) can be further developed and impro-
ved through digital implementation, and this should be 
promoted. 
 > In the 1990s, the possibility of determining one’s individual 
ecological footprint strongly motivated people to take indi-
vidual action. Digitalization makes the step from footprint 
to handprint possible: today, it is possible to focus on the 
positive effects of one’s own sustainable consumer behavi-
our and on joint effects, such as reductions in CO2 emissi-
ons if recommendations for action are implemented alone 
or jointly (e.g. handprinter.org). This should receive fun-
ding, and existing instruments should be further developed 
and disseminated on the basis of evidence.
 > Credible and reliable action knowledge and information in 
the sense of transformative education should be made 
widely available via the internet. This digitally available 
action knowledge should be used to develop applications 
that provide information on sustainable action alternatives 
tailored to a person’s individual life situation.
Box 5 .3 .1-4
Research recommendations for the arena 
‘Promotion of a collective global awareness’
 > There is a particular need for research on the impact that 
educational games, simulations of complex problem sol-
ving, and virtual experiences of nature have on environ-
ment-friendly everyday actions and political activity. Up 
to now it has been unclear (even in the health field) which 
digital technologies and elements (e.g. increasing immer-
sion and entertainment value, feedback) are particularly 
suitable for promoting knowledge of problems and for sup-
porting action. 
 > Research is especially needed into the extent to which the 
effectiveness of measures (such as recommendations for 
action and feedback) can be transferred when they are car-
ried out digitally. Studies have long since shown, for exa-
mple, that particularly a combination of knowledge and 
action promotes changes in behaviour (Hungerford and 
Volk, 1990): whether digitally acquired knowledge and 
digital action (e.g. IP gardens: Box 5.3.1-1) also promote 
changes in behaviour is yet to be researched. 
 > Especially in everyday life, the ability to directly expe-
rience and directly test new sustainable modes of behavi-
our are drivers of behavioural changes. Intensive research 
should therefore continue into new strategies for promo-
ting knowledge for action and environmentally relevant 
norms and values in ways that are not digital. 
 > One overarching research question on the topic of networ-
king concerns the possible promotion of empathy and/or 
compassion. According to the current state of knowledge, 
empathy can also lead to negative stress reactions – and 
thus to denial. Since compassion holds greater potential for 
positive reactions and commitment here, it is urgently 
necessary to clarify which are the best measures for digi-
tally promoting compassion and, building on this, 
 solidarity-based action.
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discourse is becoming a relic of bygone times, and Mr 
Smith now comments on the internet as purpledia-
mond72 – this change has communicative potential, 
but also risks. But what exactly is the digital public 
sphere of blogposts, comment columns, likes and 
retweets? Is all this a remake of what we are already 
familiar with in a new digital guise, or is it a fundamen-
tal upheaval – emancipation, regression, or both at the 
same time? The question as to what are the new ‘ leading 
media’ – especially in the sense of common, widely 
shared forums of authentic societal exchange – has 
remained unanswered up to now. Can the digital public 
sphere fulfil the important societal function of repre-
senting and aggregating the diversity of opinions in 
order to facilitate political decision-making and democ-
racy? Can societally relevant problems be revealed and 
substantive interests articulated there in such a way 
that areas where action needs to be taken can be iden-
tified and dealt with in the context of politics and 
 society?
In order to approach some of these fundamental 
changes, this arena is dedicated to public discourse in 
the Digital Age. What multiple structural changes is the 
‘digitalized agora’ undergoing (Section 5.3.2.1), e.g. 
through the blurring of boundaries and through frag-
mentation, while at the same time enormously increas-
ing the quantity of public communication? What does 
this structural change mean for people in terms of dig-
nity, Eigenart and inclusion, speakers’ freedom of infor-
mation, opinion and speech, and the need for an 
authentic interlocutor (Section 5.3.2.2)? What signifi-
cance does the transformation in the media landscape 
have (Section 5.3.2.3)? What decisions are necessary to 
realize the democratic potential of digital change and to 
ensure a shared and reliable, digitally enhanced societal 
space for discourse in the long term (Section 5.3.2.4)? 
5.3.2.1  
The digitalized agora – structural changes in public 
discourse in the digital space
The transformation of the public discourse space is 
often reflected in the changed intermediaries of this 
space. All media, from classic daily newspapers to 
online platforms, are intermediaries, i.e. service provid-
ers and places of provision, aggregation, selection and 
mediation of content. However, classic media – both 
offline and online – usually have long-established prac-
tices and stable procedures involving internal quality 
standards, voluntary self-regulation and a pronounced 
professional ethic imparted in the course of training 
and practice. Especially in its initial heyday, the internet 
and digital space were seen as an alternative to this 
structured form of public exchange. However, the early 
euphoria of the 1990s and 2000s about a great democ-
ratization and transnationalization of largely user-or-
ganized public opinion-forming and decision-making 
today faces a much more critical assessment (Lovink, 
2017; Jacob and Thiel, 2017). Sheer quantity is not to 
be equated with the quality of participation. A simple 
increase in the possibilities of digital communication 
could come to nothing unless they are connected – in a 
(media-)mediated and editorially structured way – to 
(e.g. parliamentary) fora of genuine political deci-
sion-making (Ullrich, 2017). In addition, differences in 
usage skills and access to the possibilities of the digital 
public sphere – together with the parcelling out of com-
munication into filter bubbles or echo chambers with 
like-minded people in the social media – have promoted 
a fragmentation and trivialization of public digital com-
munication (Pariser, 2011; Bedford-Strohm, 2017). 
Although the public sphere was already locally and 
thematically fragmented in the past, the monopoly of 
reach and the influence of mass and leading media on 
the media agenda have been broken by digitalization – 
in this way, “the idea of a uniform national public 
sphere has been revised once and for all” (Hillje, 
2019: 69). The assumption is that “the decreasing ori-
entation function of the mass media [meets] an increas-
ing disorientation ability of the social media”, i.e. that 
using the media today creates less instead of more 
 orientation and overview (Hillje, 2019: 69). The extent 
of this fragmentation, however, has only been partly 
clarified by empirical research up to now, and it can 
vary by international comparison (Schünemann, 2019). 
However, a tendency for people to be less politically 
informed and capable of discourse, while polarization is 
on the increase, “can be confirmed quite well on the 
basis of communication theories, empirical findings and 
plausible considerations” (Schweiger, 2017: 182). 
Accordingly, people “today must be equipped with 
much more sophisticated information skills to be able to 

























Figure 5 .3 .2-1
Inflation-adjusted advertising revenues of US newspapers 
since 1950 in US$ billions (print and online). 
Source: Wikimedia, 2018
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navigate the jungle of facts and fakes and not to con-
stantly run the risk of being manipulated instead of 
informed” (Hillje, 2019: 123).
Despite a huge amount of available information and 
knowledge that is unsurpassed in human history, there 
are therefore also risks for public discourse, for example 
when conspiracy theories can generate a similar amount 
of media attention as serious news. Although disinfor-
mation already existed in earlier forms of the public 
sphere, there has been a qualitative and quantitative 
change in view of new forms, infrastructures and incen-
tives for digital communication. This concerns both the 
supply side of the media and their reception by individ-
uals. On the supply side, the algorithmic pre-structur-
ing and channelling of content plays a particularly 
important role, whether in social networks or in the 
listing of search results (Figure 5.3.2-2). 
As a result, intermediaries such as Google, Facebook 
and Apple, which process and offer content using algo-
rithms, are now offering their platforms and services as 
a solution to the very media industry they challenged 
(Schmidt, 2018). They want to become “publishers of 
the publishers”, so to speak, without themselves assum-
ing responsibility for the content, which in the end “will 
undoubtedly increase the power gap between digital 
corporations and news media” (Fanta and Dachwitz, 
2019). This variant of the Silicon Valley “solutionism” 
(Morozov, 2013) – i.e. the motivation to counter every 
(societal) difficulty with a rapid technological solution 
without considering possible problematic consequences 
– is risky for a democratic pluralistic public sphere as a 
basis of an open society. It further strengthens the 
power position of these corporations, undermines 
efforts at transparency and the democratic potential of 
a common-good-oriented form of public-service ICT 
(Section 5.3.5), and is susceptible to abuses of power 
– even for totalitarian purposes.
An important and hotly contested basis for a largely 
non-discriminatory infrastructure of public delibera-
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Figure 5 .3 .2-2
Comparison of the processes of two types of media intermediaries. Left, classic editorially curated media with editorial process-
ing and indirect influence of user reactions. Right, algorithmically structured intermediaries with algorithmic sorting and a direct 
influence of user reactions. 
Source: Lischka and Stöcker, 2017
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equal terms. Compliance with this principle of net neu-
trality (Cheng et al., 2011; Pil Choi and Kim, 2010; Ver-
ständig, 2016) is therefore a prerequisite for freedom of 
information and public opinion forming. It could be 
ensured particularly well in a public-service-based ICT 
(Section 5.3.5). Close networking and an increasing 
number of communication channels available at all 
times have been the technical drivers of structural 
change in recent decades. However, other systemic 
technical innovations that fundamentally challenge the 
structure of the public sphere as we know it are becom-
ing increasingly important. For example, their already 
not unproblematic “economy of attention” (Franck, 
1998) has become a data-driven “attention bazaar” 
(Dueck, 2017). Ultimately, algorithm-based systems 
that predict the relevance of content and personalize 
new media offerings decide whether and which content 
is communicated with what kind of reach (Hillje, 
2019: 122). In addition, there is disinformation – the 
extent and effect of which has as yet been insuffi-
ciently clarified by empirical research – via programmed 
accounts in social networks (social bots; Klinger, 2019; 
Kind et al., 2017), as well as manipulation of existing 
image, video and sound material using neural networks 
(deep fakes; Box 3.3.3-2). 
The first approaches to solving new problems of the 
digitalized public sphere have recently been imple-
mented, but some of them are producing new chal-
lenges. The German Network Enforcement Act 
(Box 4.3.6-2), for example, seeks to have hate content 
removed by platform operators – to protect personal 
rights and the debate culture and to stop criminal con-
tent. However, this involves risks associated with pri-
vatized law enforcement, such as a lack of transpar-
ency, especially in the case of unjustly removed con-
tent, or ethical issues associated with automated con-
tent moderation. This can conflict with normative 
principles such as enabling individual inclusion or pro-
tecting human dignity (Chapter 2). For example, the 
documentary film ‘The Cleaners’ (bpb, 2018) clearly 
shows how clickworkers in the Philippines 
( Section 5.3.8) sort problematic social media content in 
precarious working conditions and under psychological 
stress according to rules that are not subject to any 
external scrutiny. Yet in Germany, too, the work of con-
tent moderators of individual Facebook service provid-
ers – at least according to the few available sources – is 
constantly monitored with a scoring system 
( Section 5.3.3), in which up to now speed seems to pre-
vail over quality (Reuter et al., 2019). Training data for 
AI procedures arising from such working practices cre-
ate foreseeable new problems, e.g. when they are used 
to create increasingly automated filters. Critics of 
upload filters for platform content see them as a “close-
meshed censorship infrastructure” (Dachwitz and 
Rudel, 2019) that potentially runs counter to freedom 
of expression and democracy.
5.3.2.2 
Empowerment of, and threats to, individual 
 inclusion in public communication
The core of the internet’s promise of democratization 
was the immediacy of communication participation at 
the individual level (Zipfel, 1998; Siedschlag et al., 
2002; Vowe, 2014): each participant can be a potential 
speaker in many different formats in digitally enabled 
public exchange. Weblogs, podcasts, social media and 
the general possibilities of participation discussed 
under the catchword Web 2.0 (Schmidt, 2007; 
 Constantinides and Fountain, 2008; MacDougall, 2011) 
mark the transition from mere access to information 
(perceived till then by the general population as the 
main benefit of the internet) to a fusion of the roles of 
recipient and speaker. Indeed, the internet offers not 
only immediacy in the public communication of organ-
izations, i.e. without mediation by media operators, but 
also in particular direct interaction. Individuals can 
therefore not only access large amounts of information 
more directly, they themselves can be speakers in the 
communication process. This has the potential to eman-
cipate societal debates from the gatekeeper function of 
traditional media and thus allow for more plurality 
(Neuberger and Quandt, 2010). 
Even individuals who lack the necessary attention 
resources such as prominence can, in principle, make 
their voices heard in the discourse with little technical 
effort. However, it has been shown that the potential 
for strengthening a societal discourse in the Haberma-
sian sense, in which everyone would strive to reach a 
consensus (Habermas, 1981) through the sincere 
exchange of arguments, remains largely untapped. 
Obstacles to the full development of this potential can 
be identified from the perspective of the speakers. On 
the one hand, the loss of the press’s intermediary func-
tion is both liberating and a challenge at the same time. 
In reception, there is no such curator to help select and 
classify content and without whom the recipient might 
be overtaxed both qualitatively and quantitatively 
(Neuberger and Quandt, 2010; Busch, 2017). Despite 
the generally lower technical requirements for partici-
pation, sections of the population who lack access to or 
an understanding of digital technology can also remain 
unheard in public debates if the latter shift primarily to 
the virtual sphere (hence the need for the right to evade 
digital spaces; Box 9.3.1-1).
On the other hand, the new opportunities for partic-
ipation do not necessarily overcome existing power 
structures. The large number of participating compa-
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nies and users on the internet do not in themselves 
guarantee that there will be no concentration of power 
(Sassen, 1999). Two developments are essential in this 
context. First, the reduction of technical barriers to 
access has by no means led to an unlimited pluralization 
of voices in digitalized public discourse. Established 
actors have taken over the discourse space opened up 
by the internet. The initial understanding of Web 2.0 as 
a public space that enables sincere discourse in the 
Habermasian sense has proved to be naive (Chadwick, 
2008). After an exploratory phase in which the freely 
accessible internet was mainly used by research institu-
tions and technophiles, contents have become commer-
cialized, partially concealing diversity in the discourse. 
YouTube is an example that illustrates the opportunities 
for emancipation and plurality as well as their coun-
ter-trends. The video platform made it easier to appear 
in digital communication not just passively as a recipi-
ent – like a television viewer – but also to be a ‘broad-
caster’ oneself (Burgess and Green, 2018). Following an 
initial, pioneering phase of broadcasting from home 
using simple technical means, many producers have 
now become more professional and commercialized 
their content; established media groups have joined as 
high-profile providers and signed up many of the sup-
posedly independent producers within the framework 
of multi-channel networks (Döring, 2014; Cunningham 
et al., 2016). As a result, a discussion about the essence 
of YouTube has flared up: is it “a social network site 
produced by communities of practice; a chaotic archive 
of weird, wonderful, and trashy vernacular videos; or a 
distribution platform for branded and big media enter-
tainment” (Burgess and Green, 2018: 91)? Platforms 
like YouTube can certainly generate attention for indi-
viduals and enable them to participate in public dis-
course. However, the example urges us to consider the 
limitations of this potential. In view of the tendencies 
towards commercialization, the hoped-for emancipa-
tory, authenticity and diversity effects may sometimes 
be drowned out, as is also the case in offline media.
Second, other participants in public communication 
cannot be unequivocally identified by individuals as 
authentic (human) speakers (Box 9.3.1-1). Automated 
computer programs now also act as speakers. Although 
such bots on platforms like Twitter can also serve benign 
purposes, such as pointing out genuine news from 
established agencies or (online) newspapers (Lokot and 
Diakopoulos, 2016), social bots are increasingly being 
used for political propaganda, imitating human speak-
ers (Ferrara et al., 2016; Kollanyi et al., 2016; Ehren-
berg-Silies and Thiele, 2016; Haller, 2017; Kaufhold et 
al., 2017; Graber and Lindemann, 2018). Although the 
extent to which social bots are currently used is as yet 
insufficiently empirically clarified (Klinger, 2019; Kind 
et al., 2017), nevertheless, individuals cannot be sure 
whether the virtual counterpart is a sincere person or a 
machine with a programmed agenda and less sincere 
people behind it. The contextual prerequisites for com-
municative action are not given in this case. Against 
this background, competence in dealing with digital 
media and an understanding of the underlying technol-
ogy are prerequisites for the consolidation of public 
debating culture (Graber and Lindemann, 2018).
5.3.2.3  
The digital agora between concentration of power 
and the public interest
Even before digitalization, mass media were character-
ized by a fundamental contradiction between societal 
and individual interestsTheir role as societal institu-
tions for a living democracy contrasts with their com-
mercial role: “On the one hand – as creatures of the 
Enlightenment – they are committed to values such as 
freedom, autonomy, reason and knowledge. On the 
other hand, the mass media and their actors are ori-
ented towards practical, pragmatic requirements and 
goals such as reach, competition, editorial deadlines, 
professionalism and careers. This situation leads to con-
flicts between expectations expressed towards the 
media and what the media and their journalists are 
capable of” (Weischenberg, 2018: 55).
While Weischenberg (2018: 55) regards media qual-
ity as threatened when it is “unilaterally dissolved in 
favour of profits and to the detriment of social respon-
sibility,” media corporations are now confronted with 
structural problems threatening their existence on both 
levels in the Digital Age. The circulation of print media 
sold in Germany has been declining continuously in 
recent years (IVW, 2018: 10), although the situation on 
the German press market has stabilized somewhat 
recently with slowing loss rates and double-digit growth 
rates in electronic editions of newspapers and maga-
zines (IVW, 2019). As a result of the longer-term trend, 
however, editorial resources have been continuously 
thinned out, which has also worsened the working con-
ditions for journalists in terms of working hours, pay 
and (for freelancers hardly accessible) permanent 
employment opportunities. Figure 5.3.2-2 has already 
shown how dangerous – in view of a further increase in 
the concentration of power – it can be for the demo-
cratic public sphere if this problem is ‘solved’ by digital 
corporations which are partly responsible for it. On the 
other hand, however, the first prototypical pioneers of 
a media change oriented towards individual autonomy 
and freedom of the press are emerging; the WBGU 
believes they should be strengthened, as should new 
potential for using digitalization to research the demo-
cratic public sphere. For some time now, high expecta-
People and society  5.3
215
tions have also been made of journalists under the 
heading of constructive journalism. Against a back-
ground of positive psychology, it is argued here that in 
addition to addressing problems, journalists also have 
the function of drawing attention to possible solutions 
and to actors working on solutions, in order to 
strengthen the collective self-efficacy of the recipients 
and to avoid a journalistic “negative bias” (Gyldensted, 
2018). Transparently operating research networks such 
as correctiv.org also make a cooperative form of inves-
tigative journalism possible offering a quality that is 
becoming increasingly difficult in times of cost pressure 
and thinly staffed editorial offices. In addition, the 
infrastructure basis can be designed by means of pub-
lic-service ICT (Section 5.3.5) in such a way that it pro-
motes both this kind of change in the media and the 
realization of corresponding potential in both private 
and public-service media companies.
5.3.2.4 
Conclusions: the impact of the digital  structural 
change in the public sphere on democratic 
 processes
The described structural change in the public sphere, 
including its individual and media-economic character-
istics, has significant effects on public communication 
in democratic processes. Transparency in political affairs 
is a prerequisite for discourse and diversity of opinion 
(Sarcinelli, 2011); it is thus essential for the functioning 
of a democratic political system. As explained in the 
course of this section, digitalization enables the multiple 
provision of information and more direct forms of polit-
ical inclusion, and promotes plurality and visibility of 
opinion through simpler, faster and more direct public 
communication. Emancipation from established media 
companies as conventional gatekeepers enables a more 
pluralistic, empathic and integrative discourse. Through 
global interconnectedness, this could even have an effect 
at the transnational level and thus create a post-national 
public sphere and deliberative structures beyond indi-
vidual nation states through the formation of cross-bor-
der communities and a global environmental awareness 
(Sections 4.2.7, 5.3.1).
However, as explained in the course of this arena, 
there are a number of limitations and counter develop-
ments. In general, the actual reach of an individual is 
only small (Section 4.2.3). Against the background of 
the sheer quantity of contributions, individuals still have 
little chance of visibly contributing their own opinion 
to the discourse without the corresponding institutional 
resources. Furthermore, as explained with the example 
of filter bubbles and echo chambers, there is a risk of 
the discourse becoming fragmented and polarized (Del 
Vicario et al., 2016; Boutyline and Willer, 2016). Due to 
the lack of editorial pre-sorting and classification (Neu-
berger and Quandt, 2010; Busch, 2017) – unlike auto-
mated selection – on many platforms, the rationalization 
and filtering function of plural societal or media organ-
izations is missing. These organizations have an impor-
tant mediating role in the democratic public sphere as 
rationalizing sluices and amplifiers (Habermas, 1992). 
Instead of editors, algorithms trimmed to click counts 
determine what is placed in a prominent position (New-
man et al., 2018). This can be a breeding ground for 
propaganda as well as for politically motivated misin-
formation and agitation – often discussed under the 
buzzword ‘fake news’ (Lazer et al., 2018), especially in 
connection with the presidential election in the United 
States in 2016 (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). In their 
selection criteria, editors too can focus more on sensation 
and the potential for attention – and thus sales – rather 
than on an orientation towards solutions and strength-
ening the self-efficacy of the recipients; however, auto-
mated and accelerated dissemination in social networks 
speeds up and intensifies the associated effects of neg-
ative bias and demoralization. In fake news, the charac-
teristics of public online communication that could 
 basically strengthen democracy are turned into chal-
lenges for democracy.
In addition, the extent to which the opportunities 
for participation on the internet are actually taken up is 
also particularly relevant for democratic processes. 
Although the number of users of social networks today 
is drastically higher (Chadwick, 2008; Busemann and 
Gscheidle, 2011), there are still large sections of the 
population who do not participate in the digitally ena-
bled public discourse. Even though it is an easy and 
quick way for journalists to get an impression of opin-
ions, a mood in social media cannot be understood as 
the will of the people. The privatization and oligopoli-
zation of the digital public space and thus also of the 
“infrastructure on which the democratic public sphere 
is constituted on the web” (Hillje, 2019: 15) is far 
advanced. For example, there is currently just one qua-
si-monopoly consisting of four search engine operators, 
all located outside the EU: Google and Bing from the 
USA, Yandex from Russia and Baidu from China (Tan-
gens and Ude, 2019). But whoever, as is the case with 
Google, “processes three-quarters of all search queries 
on the internet has the power to direct users to very 
specific paths on the network and to make other paths 
less accessible” (Hillje, 2019: 120). The extent to which 
the sometimes massive private concentration of power 
advances the democratic public sphere is questionable, 
not least because “first and foremost the platforms nat-
urally always pursue an economic interest – in case of 
doubt to the detriment of the common good” (Hillje, 
2019: 128). Against this background, the WBGU 
5 Arenas of Digital Change
216
 considers it important to counter any threat to the fun-
damental democratic functions of the public sphere 
decisively and in good time.
Box 5 .3 .2-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Digitalization and public discourse’
Due to the concentration of power among the intermediaries 
who currently provide key services for the digital public, and 
the observable deficits in their regulation (e.g. by the German 
Network Enforcement Act, NetzDG, Box 4.2.6-2) and this 
regulation’s enforcement (e.g. the European General Basic 
Data Protection Regulation, GDPR, Box 4.2.6-1), the WBGU 
sees the creation of adequate alternatives as an important 
lever for securing a functioning digital public sphere. In order 
to be able to implement the following recommendations as 
quickly and successfully as possible, there is also an urgent 
need for research across disciplinary boundaries in all areas.
 > Establish a European public-service platform infrastructure: 
The WBGU recommends the timely creation of a European 
platform infrastructure for digital media and communica-
tion. Realized via public-service ICT (Section 5.3.5), this 
should serve as a potentially powerful European alternative 
plan to counter the concentration of power by US Ameri-
can platforms, with an open, cross-border communication 
space guided by democratic values (Box 5.3.5-1) instead of 
being driven primarily by private-sector business models. 
In the WBGU’s view, private-sector interests and an orien-
tation towards the common good are not mutually exclu-
sive on principle; however, in a core societal area such as 
the public sphere, the former should be answerable to the 
latter, i.e. subordinate in case of doubt. An interoperable 
infrastructure of diverse platforms should in principle be 
open to both public-service and private media from diffe-
rent European countries and should enable a joint commu-
nication of content and its AI-supported translation. In a 
similar way to public-service broadcasting, the coordina-
tion of this project should be independent from the out-
set and democratically supported by societal groups. As 
a first step, the WBGU recommends networking existing 
initiatives (Box 5.3.5-1; Hillje, 2019: 130f.) and providing 
start-up funding for the first lighthouse project of a Euro-
pean public-service media platform. This can then be suc-
cessively extended in the sense of a later platform ecosy-
stem that should be as diverse as possible. The vision is that 
this diverse infrastructure will also promote a global digital 
democratic public sphere beyond Europe.
 > Build up a European search index: As an accompanying 
measure, and in order to use the central resource of a data-
base of all searchable websites and their contents for the 
public good, the WBGU also recommends the establish-
ment of a European search index as a “public library of 
the internet” (Huss et al., 2019) and a “basis for diversity” 
(Lewandowski, 2016: 15). Since this concentrated power 
plays a key role in the digital public sphere, public funds 
should be made available to prevent information flows that 
are distorted by business interests. A corresponding “open 
web index” (Huss et al., 2019: 7) would also help secure a 
critical infrastructure, restore Europe’s digital informatio-
nal sovereignty, and stimulate search engines and the Euro-
pean start-up and internet economies. It would be availa-
ble globally to all companies, public institutions and civil-
society actors as a further central part of a future Euro-
pean public-service ICT infrastructure. On that basis, a new 
pluralism in access to and the dissemination of digitalized 
information would be possible, as would data-protection-
friendly business models.
In addition, states should support actors who provide quali-
ty-checked information online and enable individuals to 
express their opinions on the web. 
 > Guarantee journalistic quality and freedom of the press: 
The WBGU recommends broad media-policy support and 
the expansion of quality journalistic initiatives. Investi-
gative, transparent and collaborative research networks 
and news portals (e.g. correctiv.org, uebermedien.de or 
netzpolitik.org) and constructive journalism that also looks 
for possible solutions should be strengthened. On a natio-
nal level, this could be achieved through increased coope-
ration with the public-service sector, for example by mutu-
ally supporting (counter-)research, and by supporting and 
expanding corresponding collaborative projects. Interna-
tionally, the establishment of a decentralized agency and 
information portal could contribute to greater pluralism 
and more transparent reporting. The WBGU also stron-
gly recommends that the protection of sources and whist-
leblowers be legally safeguarded in order to strengthen 
investigative journalism as an essential part of journalistic 
practice relevant for democracy.
 > Ensure anonymity in internet communication and protect 
fundamental rights: The WBGU advocates both the general 
necessity of anonymous online communication to ensure 
privacy and the possibility for citizens to consciously com-
municate in a non-anonymous way in designated secure 
digital spaces. A general and comprehensive obligation to 
use real names is not necessary. In view of a risk of advan-
ced censorship by the private sector in order to comply 
with the German Network Enforcement Act (Box 4.2.6-2) 
or copyright regulations through upload filters, the WBGU 
similarly shares the critical assessment of the UN Special 
Rapporteur’s opinion on freedom of expression, the right 
to privacy and the protection of fundamental rights in the 
fight against terrorism (Kaye et al., 2018). In the WBGU’s 
view, only independent institutions committed exclusively 
to the rule of law can guarantee the regulation of online 
communication in conformity with fundamental rights. 
 > Promote media and information literacy and embed it more 
firmly in the education system: In the WBGU’s view, the pro-
motion of individual autonomy is another important stra-
tegy against current crisis phenomena in the public sphere, 
particularly with regard to the dissemination of disinforma-
tion. Accordingly, it is important to embed media compe-
tence and confident information interpretation more firmly 
in the education system. Ideally, in a modern democracy, all 
citizens would have sufficient journalistic competence to 
reflect on and classify content, but also to compose content 
themselves and discuss it critically within the digital agora.
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5 .3 .3 
Challenges of the scoring society 
Scoring methods that describe human behaviour with a 
numerical value (Box 5.3.3-1) are being used as a basis 
for decision-making in more and more core areas of 
society. They represent an enormous abstraction and 
simplification of complex contexts. This is both the 
strength and weakness of these methods. Simplifica-
tion and standardization initially facilitate deci-
sion-making in specific areas. Scoring methods that use 
a mathematical-statistical approach of analysis are an 
example of algorithm-based decision-making systems. 
The informative value of a score, however, must always 
be viewed with great caution and seen in the context of 
the specific field of application, even if the selection of 
data, analytical methods and application areas is crite-
ria-based. 
In addition to the field of economic-risk assessment, 
where scoring has been common practice for many dec-
ades (primarily in the banking and insurance sectors), 
the use of scoring methods to assess ‘social risks’, e.g. 
calculating recidivism predictions in criminal prosecu-
tion, is currently spreading (Brayne, 2017). As a result, 
individuals are no longer only evaluated in their role as 
consumers, but also in other key areas of life. This social 
categorization and evaluation of individuals using scor-
ing methods is referred to as ‘social scoring’. With more 
and more behavioural data accruing in social media and 
in increasingly digitalized areas like health, education 
and mobility systems (Section 3.2), a new quality is 
emerging in the scope and complexity of scoring tech-
niques. The use of female consumer data for predicting 
pregnancies in order to place advertising (Dixon and 
Gellman, 2014) or social-media data in loan approvals 
(Hurley and Adebayo, 2016) illustrates the depth and 
intensity of intrusions into the privacy of individuals 
that is already possible in business today. Experiments 
with social credit systems by Chinese central and local 
governments in turn show how scores can be used as an 
instrument for wielding state power (Box 4.2.6-2). 
Global trends include the use of alternative data 
sources for the worldwide dissemination of credit 
scores, the use of a score outside its original area of 
application, and, increasingly, the use of scores to influ-
ence behaviour or as an instrument of state societal 
control. In view of the currently ongoing expansion of 
scoring methods in many areas of application where the 
underlying cause-and-effect relations are only insuffi-
ciently reflected and there is inadequate regulation to 
prevent violations of the rights to freedom and equal-
ity, the sustainability potential of scoring methods in 
defined areas of application is not addressed in this 
chapter. Instead, the focus is on a systemic and societal 
perspective.
Although the use of scoring methods aims to enable 
more objective decision-making in a specific area, the 
systemic effect of these applications can contribute – 
unnoticed by the individual – to an undermining both 
of self-determination and privacy, which are protected 
by fundamental rights, and of human decision-making 
sovereignty (Section 8.3.3). The social and legal embed-
Box 5 .3 .2-2
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘Digitalization and public discourse’
 > Develop new infrastructure to secure and enforce the law: 
Instead of the current practice of delegating the secu-
ring and enforcement of legal rights to private corpora-
tions, with the risk of content (pre-)censorship, the WBGU 
recommends increased interdisciplinary and international 
research into options for securing fundamental rights in 
order to moderate legally problematic online content. 
 > Promote research on media and information literacy: In 
media sciences, especially in media psychology, there are 
research approaches that empirically investigate initial 
measures for promoting internet literacy (e.g. the recogni-
tion of fake news; Roozenbeek and van der Linden, 2019a, 
b). In view of the great importance of media literacy, the 
WBGU recommends strengthening research activities on 
the effectiveness of measures to promote media and infor-
mation literacy.
 > Research and establish new mechanisms for the quality 
assurance of online media and content: The WBGU recom-
mends that the current practice of online platforms mode-
rating content (e.g. for the purpose of removing problema-
tic content such as depictions of violence, but also other 
content that contradicts the corporate guidelines) should 
not be maintained in this form. Psychologically burden-
some outsourcing is incompatible with human dignity, and 
at the same time there is a risk that unclear guidelines may 
significantly affect freedom of expression. The alternative 
is not laissez-faire, but research into and the establishment 
of quality assurance institutions compatible with funda-
mental rights in conjunction with the development of auto-
nomy-promoting information services and education (e.g. 
correctiv.org, reporterfabrik.de), individual media compe-
tence and ethical reflection.
 > Research and establish transparency-focused media ethics: 
In view of the fundamental upheavals described above, the 
WBGU recommends the development and implementation 
of ethical codes, particularly to balance journalistic and 
commercial interests, to maintain or promote expectations 
of self-efficacy, and for transparent ownership and data 
protection (Puppis et al., 2017; Heesen, 2016). These 
should be developed and implemented by the media indus-
try with interdisciplinary scientific support.
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ding of these procedures is key to avoiding such viola-
tions of fundamental rights; however, at present this is 
currently inadequate. Similarly, in some cases the 
potential for more objective decision-making in specific 
areas of application cannot currently be exploited due 
to a lack of transparency about areas of deployment, 
methods and data, and a lack of supervision (SVRV, 
2018). The WBGU therefore suggests holding debates 
on scoring focusing on key issues in order to prevent 
violations of the rights to freedom and equality 
(Box 5.3.3-3). A central research topic here should be 
how the increasing use of scoring methods is shifting 
societal norms and moral standards.
5.3.3.1 
Global trends in the application of scoring 
methods
On the one hand, scoring methods are being spread by 
private-sector actors whose business models are based 
on the analysis of new data sources. On the other hand, 
state actors, authorities and international organizations 
are also involved, some of whom collect their own data 
or enter into collaborations. 
Use of alternative data sources for the worldwide 
dissemination of credit scores 
Especially in the case of credit scoring (Box 5.3.3-1, 
Figure 5.3.3-1), one current focus of application is the 
scoring of people for whom there are no financial data, 
but for whom alternative data sources exist. Knowledge 
of payment-default risks is crucial for building stable 
credit markets. Scores consolidate this information and 
thus enable a standardized and rapid decision-making 
process on individual lending. From an economic 
 perspective, credit scores thus have the function of 
establishing trust between economic actors, which is a 
fundamental building block of functioning credit mar-
kets. Partly in cooperation with international organiza-
tions such as the ITU or the World Bank, private-sector 
and state actors are therefore planning to calculate 
Box 5 .3 .3-1
Definitions of scoring and distinctions between 
terms
The term ‘scoring’ is generally used to assign a numerical 
value to a natural person in his or her role as a consumer, 
citizen, employee, etc. Scoring can also refer to the aggrega-
tion of different characteristic values to form a single value 
– often using a statistical procedure. In profiling, by contrast, 
categories are formed to which certain measures are linked. 
The individuals are allocated to the categories; the allocation 
can also be based on a score. The term scoring is relatively 
rarely used in the evaluation of e.g. companies, organizations 
or states. Examples of scoring definitions include:
 > “awarding a number of points in a finely graded classifi-
cation that allows the person to be ranked according to 
values” (Mau, 2017: 104).
 > “assigning a numerical value (score) to a person for the pur-
pose of predicting or controlling behaviour. This numerical 
value is usually determined on the basis of a broad pool of 
data using an algorithmic process” (SVRV, 2018; 15).
 > the “use of a probability value relating to a particular future 
action by a natural person for the purpose of deciding on 
the creation, execution or termination of a contractual rela-
tionship with that person” (Section 31(1) of the Federal 
Data Protection Act of 30 July 2017: Federal Data Protec-
tion Act (BGBl.) I S. 2097). 
In credit scoring, the best-known and most widespread appli-
cation of scoring (Figure 5.3.3-1), several people’s payment 
or credit histories are combined with other personal data 
(name, gender, age, current and previous addresses, etc.) in a 
database. On the basis of the payment histories of all the peo-
ple in the database and other personal characteristics, weights 
for each variable available in the database are calculated using 
a statistical process, usually a logit regression, which serves to 
predict the individual probability of repayment. The indivi-
dual probability of repayment forms the credit score and ser-
ves as the basis for deciding whether to grant a loan or for 




Credit score Granting of loan
Payment history
Other personal data, 
in some cases features not
subject to change
Figure 5 .3 .3-1
Credit-score-based decision-making. 
Source: WBGU
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credit scores for the approximately 3 billion people 
worldwide without bank accounts or payment histories, 
most of whom live in developing countries and emerg-
ing economies. Alternative data sources such as psy-
chometric data (World Bank, 2017a; FICO blog, 2019) 
or data obtained from online tracking are to be used on 
a large scale for this purpose. Facebook, for example, 
had a process patented in 2015 that also takes into 
account an applicant’s social network when deciding on 
creditworthiness (SVRV, 2018). Other providers use 
information such as shopping habits or information 
about how quickly e-mails are answered – information 
that would not intuitively be associated with credit-
worthiness – to determine the score (Hurley and Ade-
bayo, 2016). Data brokers such as Acxiom or Oracle 
specialize in collecting and reselling these data 
(Box 5.3.3-2). 
Use of a score outside the original area of 
application 
Almost universally available scores are not limited to 
one area of life, but are also used as a basis for deci-
sion-making outside their specific area of application. 
For example, the scores generated by the German credit 
investigation company ‘Schufa’ (Schutzgemeinschaft 
für allgemeine Kreditsicherung), which are calculated 
for more than 66.3 million private individuals in Ger-
many, are requested not only in the financial sector but 
also for apartment rentals, the conclusion of mobile-
phone and internet contracts, and online purchases. 
Schufa generates annual sales of €123 million with this 
business model (Christl, 2014). Furthermore, US credit 
scores are taken into account in staff recruitment deci-
sions. A single indicator can thus be decisive for several 
key areas of life as well as for such individual basic 
needs as communication or housing and therefore have 
a fundamental influence on inclusion in societal life 
(Figure 5.3.3-2). 
The influence of scoring on behaviour 
Knowledge of individual preferences and behaviour 
patterns enable not only probability statements about 
individual behaviour and subsequently fast deci-
sion-making processes based on objective criteria, it 
can also exert targeted influence to bring about behav-
ioural changes in its own interests. These possibilities 
are particularly interesting for insurance and advertis-
ing companies. For example, individualized insurance 
offers and premiums (telematics-based tariffs) and the 
associated financial advantages and disadvantages can 
lead to changes in behaviour, such as a more prudent 
approach to one’s own health (Schumacher, 2016: 48) 
or more responsible driving. Targeting specific custom-
ers with advertising, as illustrated by the example of 
pregnancy scoring, can influence consumer behaviour 
(Korczak und Wilken, 2008). 
Scores as an instrument of state societal control
China’s original plan to introduce scoring methods to 
promote credit markets, which was similar to those in 
other developed economies, was expanded in 2012 to 
include the idea of establishing a ‘trust-based’ society 
(Kostka, 2018). Not only payment histories, but also 
social behaviour is to be evaluated (Box 4.2.6-2). The 
Box 5 .3 .3-2
Expansion of data availability and the data trade
Data are sometimes collected for a specific purpose, for exam-
ple by statistical offices, research institutes or market analysis 
institutes, to enable an analysis of an existing issue or state of 
affairs. However, when digital applications are used, behavi-
our-generated data such as social graphs, communication pat-
terns, purchase histories or streaming data are generated as a 
‘by-product’. In addition to the specific application, compa-
nies are interested in obtaining structured information from 
these basic data which can be used for their business purposes 
and offer immediate added or novelty value. Data brokers 
specialize in collecting and reselling these data. The US data 
trader Oracle links information from online and offline 
sources about payment histories, social-media activities, 
magazine subscriptions, and religious or political affiliations. 
According to its own information, this data trader owns an 
average of 30,000 characteristics of over 2 billion customers 
worldwide (Federal Trade Commission, 2014). This data gene-
ration and valorization process is currently taking place wit-
hout sufficient regulation to exclude violations of the rights 
to freedom and equality (Fezer, 2017); the structure and scale 
of data trading vary according to the requirements of national 
data protection law (Christl und Spiekermann, 2016). Having 
given their consent to data processing once in the context of 
a specific application, users are no longer involved in the fur-
ther data processing. As a result, companies have access to 
personal information that is denied to users as data subjects 
(Jentzsch, 2017). Although the GDPR contains regulations 
that restrict data trading, it remains to be seen whether these 
regulations can be enforced. The first lawsuits have been filed 
against the data brokers Acxiom and Oracle (Privacy Inter-
national, 2019). In the WBGU’s view, it is necessary to create 
transparency over what, where and how personal information 
is used. However, transparency alone is not enough. Each 
individual should have sovereignty over his or her data, inclu-
ding the behaviour-generated data created when using digital 
applications. This can be achieved, for example, using Perso-
nal Information Management Systems, i.e. systems that allow 
users to manage their personal data in secure, local or online 
storage systems and to distribute usage consent to different 
digital applications and withdraw it when necessary. In addi-
tion, individuals should be appropriately involved in the valo-
rization of their data.
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Chinese scoring process is designed as an instrument of 
governance operating on various levels. In addition to 
the economic advantages of scoring that are also 
emphasized in other countries, it is intended to remedy 
social grievances such as corruption, crime and a lack of 
trust in public institutions (Kostka, 2018). As from 
2020, the score, which thus functions as social credit, is 
to be calculated at the central state level for individuals, 
companies, social organizations and state authorities. 
This would basically make the (digital) surveillance of 
the entire Chinese population possible.
5.3.3.2  
Necessary debates
What are the implications of the development outlined 
above for society as a whole? What key questions in 
the application of scoring methods need to be solved so 
that they can be used for the common good without 
having to accept long-term violations of the rights to 
freedom and equality? Approaches that should be dis-
cussed in the context of scoring are outlined below. 
The mantra of more transparency: who attributes 
which values to whom using which data and 
procedures?
The current scoring practice exhibits numerous prob-
lems which, although widely known, have not yet been 
countered by appropriate regulatory measures. In con-
trast to self-chosen scoring services such as fitness 
trackers (Section 5.3.7), individuals can rarely evade 
scoring services used by third parties. Since in many 
countries it is ultimately unknown how many such 
scores are calculated, where they are applied, which 
calculation methods are used and what information is 
included in the calculation, it is currently difficult to 
assess to what extent individual rights such as equal 
treatment or informational self-determination are 
being violated (Dixon und Gellman, 2014; Korczak und 
Wilken, 2008). The latest report by the German Advi-
sory Council for Consumer Affairs (Sachverständigen-
rat für Verbraucherschutz) for the German judicial area 
contains detailed proposals on how grievances in the 
field of consumer scoring can be countered (SVRV, 
2018). The WBGU supports their swift implementation. 
The proposals include greater transparency regarding 
areas of application, the methods and underlying data 
used by scoring methods, improved consumer educa-
tion, and supervision by the state and civil society. 
Communitization or individualization of risks within 
society
The distribution of risks within a society is a normative 
issue. In the global banking and insurance industry, the 
contractual conditions are determined by the individual 
risk of default, so that each borrower usually pays for 
his or her own risk. This is considered fair by large sec-
tions of society, even though it may restrict financial 
inclusion for some individuals. In many countries, by 
contrast, the principle of solidarity is applied in the 
health sector; existing risks are redistributed according 
to defined distribution ratios that do not correspond to 
the individual risk. In its many different areas of appli-
cation, scoring brings a new quality to the individual-
ized calculation of risks on a large scale. The question as 
to which risks are individualized and which are commu-
nitized therefore needs to be reassessed in those areas 
where the principle of solidarity is applied. For exam-
ple, the introduction of telematics-based tariffs, which 
use scoring techniques to determine tariffs depending 












Other personal data, in some cases
features not subject to change
Figure 5 .3 .3-2
Schematic diagram showing the application of credit scores using information that would not intuitively be associated with 
creditworthiness.
Source: WBGU
People and society  5.3
221
being excluded from – or charged more for – health 
services due to certain characteristics such as lifestyle, 
alcohol consumption, participation in screening pro-
grammes, genetic disposition or illness (Weichert, 
2018). Particularly in the healthcare sector, therefore, 
the discussion on the normative question of risk distri-
bution must be reopened. 
Changes in norms and moral standards 
Scoring methods themselves can gradually shift norms 
and moral standards as the areas of application expand 
(Fourcade and Healy, 2016). However, to date there has 
been little research on the social consequences of the 
comprehensive use of scoring methods. In the Chinese 
context, some of the small number of available studies 
point to initial changes in behaviour and further effects 
such as the influence of the score on the choice of a 
partner (Kostka, 2018). Initial representative survey 
results show high approval rates of up to 80% for the 
scores commonly used there (Alpermann and Thünken, 
2018; Kostka, 2018). As scoring methods are used 
more broadly, therefore, there is a considerable need for 
research into the social effects of the increasing 
 quantification of decision-making processes and 
emerging shifts in values and norms.
Box 5 .3 .3-3
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Scoring society’
Scoring methods are currently being applied in more and 
more core areas of society without an appropriate legal 
framework to ensure that the aim of scoring – a more objec-
tive, transparent and efficient decision-making process – will 
be achieved and to avoid violations of the rights to freedom 
and equality. The systemic effects of these applications can 
impair an individual’s self-determination and privacy, which 
are protected by fundamental rights, as well as human sover-
eignty over decision making – without even being noticed by 
the individual concerned. The social and legal embedding of 
these procedures is therefore essential: 
 > The WBGU recommends the rapid implementation of the 
proposals for ‘consumer-friendly scoring’ that have been 
put forward for the German judicial area (SVRV, 2018). 
These proposals include greater transparency on the areas 
of application, the methods and underlying data used 
by scoring methods, improved consumer education, and 
supervision by the state and civil society. In addition, the 
WBGU recommends that a ‘right to reasonable inferences’ 
be established at European level (Wachter and Mittelstadt, 
2018a).
 > Although many democratic societies (still) vehemently 
reject state-applied holistic scoring systems– like the Chi-
nese social credit system – scoring approaches that also 
include social behaviour in their calculations are gradually 
creeping into society via the private sector as a result of the 
current lack of transparency and a legal framework. In this 
way, they develop considerable societal steering effects. At 
the international level, discourse spaces should therefore 
be opened up and guard rails and targets introduced on the 
use of scoring methods.
 > At the international level, processes should be set up to 
observe, discuss and regulate the cross-border effects of 
different scoring systems similar to those that are in part 
being implemented in China.
 > In the WBGU’s view, it is necessary to create transparency 
over what happens – where and how – to personal informa-
tion. However, transparency alone is not enough. At the 
international level, processes should be set up to regulate 
the global data trade. Each individual should have sove-
reignty over his or her data, including the behaviour-gene-
rated data created when using digital applications. Greater 
use should therefore be made of systems that enable usage 
consent to be distributed to different digital applications – 
and withdrawn when necessary.
Box 5 .3 .3-4
Research recommendations on the arena  
‘Scoring society’
Key research topics should include how the increasing use of 
scoring methods can be embedded in the law and the ways in 
which scoring methods shift societal norms and moral 
standards. 
 > There is a considerable need for research on the effects of 
scoring on the fields of privacy law, self-determination and 
private autonomy. Scoring can have discriminatory effects. 
A distinction must be made here between whether scoring 
is used in a private-law relationship or by the state. One 
of the key research questions is whether and how the cur-
rent legal system is in a position to counter the violation of 
rights by scoring adequately.
 > Similarly, there is a need for research on the social impact 
of increasing quantification of decision-making processes 
and emerging shifts in values and norms. Work should also 
be done on any objectification tendencies that may arise as 
a result of the evaluation of an individual by a third party, 
e.g. the ‘worthlessness’ of a consumer with small financial 
resources.
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State scoring approaches for the control and 
monitoring of societies
According to many experts, a centralized state scoring 
system aimed at controlling and monitoring society as a 
whole, like the social credit system planned in China, 
has the potential to reshape entire social systems 
( Ohlberg et al., 2017). If the social credit system is suc-
cessfully implemented, it cannot be ruled out that other 
countries will also follow China’s example. Parallels 
have already been drawn in the media between the 
Venezuelan ID card programme and the Chinese social 
credit system (there is evidence that the Venezuelan 
system uses Chinese technology; Berwick, 2019). In 
addition, an initial case study points to the cross-border 
effects of the Chinese social credit system. China’s civil 
aviation authority has accused international airlines of 
‘grave dishonesty in trade’ because they listed Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macau as travel destinations on their 
websites, which violates guidelines laid down in the 
social credit system (Hoffman, 2018). Although holistic 
scoring approaches like the Chinese social credit system 
are (still) vehemently rejected in many democratic soci-
eties, scoring approaches that also include the social 
behaviour of societal groups in their calculations are 
gradually creeping into society as a result of both 
intransparency and the lack of a legal framework. At 
the international level, discourse spaces should there-
fore be opened up and guard rails and targets intro-
duced on the use of scoring methods. 
Overarching legal framework for scoring methods 
based on statistical inference
When statistical methods are used to determine a score, 
that score is always a probability statement. The legal 
handling of probability statements is not explicitly reg-
ulated in many countries. For example, a court in Fin-
land recently ruled that credit decisions may not be 
based solely on models founded on probability calcula-
tions derived from statistics on the behaviour and char-
acteristics of others (National Non-Discrimination and 
Equality Tribunal of Finland, 2018). The individual 
payment histories should also have been considered 
separately in addition to the score. This argumentation 
has far-reaching consequences for current practice. For 
example, what should be done if there is no payment 
history? Should the use of psychometric data obtained 
from online tracking, as promoted by the World Bank 
and private providers, be considered illegal? This exam-
ple illustrates the fundamental problems of how the law 
should handle algorithmic decision-making systems, of 
which scoring methods are a subset. The collective 
dimension of statistical models (‘collective’ because an 
individual score cannot be calculated without the data 
of many other individuals) conflicts with individual 
rights, such as the right to equal treatment. In certain 
cases, unequal treatment does not constitute discrimi-
nation. This is the case, for example, where there is a 
legal basis, the objective pursued is justified, and 
unequal treatment is a proportionate way to achieve 
that objective. However, a review of this kind hardly 
ever takes place in practice. The question of whether 
and how the current legal system is able to deal with 
this situation, or whether existing ethical and legal cri-
teria need to be further developed, should be a key 
issue for research (Jaume-Palasí and Spielkamp, 2018).
5.3.3.3 
Conclusions
The use of scoring methods is already normal procedure 
today and has a fundamental influence on societal 
inclusion. This often happens without the knowledge of 
the affected individuals or without reflection on the 
underlying cause-and-effect context of the methods 
used. In addition to obvious regulatory steps, such as 
creating more transparency or giving the state and civil 
society supervisory responsibilities and capacities, 
debates of a fundamental nature should be initiated, for 
example on the distribution of risks in the banking and 
health systems and the overarching legal framework for 
algorithmic systems that support decision making. It 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to what 
extent scoring methods are a proportionate means of 
achieving an objective and to what extent they infringe 
on people’s rights to freedom and equality. Changes in 
norms and moral standards within society can already 
be seen where state scoring approaches of societal con-
trol are used, e.g. in the case of the social credit system 
implemented in China. However, they can also take 
place insidiously. There is still a lack of public awareness 
of this perspective. Here, educational and research 
work must be carried out to preserve societies capable 
of long-term action in the Digital Age and to prevent 
losses of freedom.
5 .3 .4 
From education for digitalization and sustainable 
development to future-proof education
This arena shows that the conceptual combination of 
digitalization and sustainability requires a wide variety 
of initiatives in the context of education. After a brief 
assessment of the current situation, some examples are 
given below of ideas on how education could be shaped 
in the sense of ‘transformation education’ or ‘future-
proof education’, and how risks connected with digital-
ization can be contained and positive potential leveraged. 
People and society  5.3
223
Topic box 5 .3-1
Digitalization: risk or opportunity for the 
enforcement of environmental law?
Although many states have established comprehensive 
regimes of criminal and regulatory law to protect environ-
mental goods, enforcement is nevertheless inadequate (World 
Bank, 2017c: 259). The main reasons for this shortcoming are 
insufficient financial and human resources coupled with a 
lack of professionally and technically trained staff in the 
responsible authorities, insufficient information, and little 
willingness to enforce the laws effectively (Ziekow et al., 
2018: 78ff.). In addition, there is a lack of scientific and tech-
nical expertise and local knowledge among government emp-
loyees (SRU, 2007: 176). The constantly growing number of 
laws often contain very detailed regulations that are someti-
mes inconsistent with other (environmental) laws, which are 
difficult to understand and problematic in their application 
(Bogumil et al., 2016: 10). The enforcement of environmental 
law is typically the responsibility of the state authorities that 
punish violations of environmental regulations. These state 
authorities for environmental law enforcement are listed 
under SDG 16 ‘Peace, justice and strong institutions’.
Digitalization to combat enforcement deficits
Just as digital technologies facilitate violations of environ-
mental law, they also provide new instruments to prevent 
violations of environmental regulations. To counteract the 
lack of human and financial resources for environmental law 
enforcement, digitalization can be useful to an environmental 
administration if it is successfully used to make work proces-
ses more efficient. For example, digitalized files (e-files) can 
be used to improve knowledge management by making exis-
ting findings and experience available and making it easier to 
access comparable procedures, thus reducing workloads 
(Adelhard, 2017). In order to improve the clarity and accessi-
bility of environmental law, regulations are already being 
compiled on digitally searchable platforms (e.g. ECOLEX by 
FAO, IUCN, UNEP and InforMEA by the UN). At the same 
time, digital methods require experts who are familiar with 
the technical infrastructures used, which creates a need for 
ICT competence among all participating government 
employees.
Digital technology can counteract information deficits in 
environmental management in various ways: digitally suppor-
ted opportunities for citizens to send reports to the adminis-
tration cut administrative employee costs and give authorities 
access to private knowledge regarding violations of environ-
mental law. They also enable citizens to take responsibility for 
the natural environment that directly affects them, and to 
improve their own quality of life. Citizens in Maputo (Mo-
zambique), for example, have become involved in official mo-
nitoring activities; they use text messaging, apps and web-
sites to report undisposed waste, illegal landfills and 
unauthorized waste incineration to the responsible environ-
mental authorities (UN DESA, 2016a: 52). Between 2014 and 
2016, 43 countries introduced mobile applications or text 
messaging services in the environmental field (UN DESA, 
2016a: 89). While simpler communication between citizens 
and public authorities can promote the enforcement of envi-
ronmental law, digital technologies also involve the risk of 
people being denounced as ‘polluters’ on social media, thus 
violating their personal rights. Environmental law enforce-
ment should therefore be understood and carried out as a 
state task.  Electronic microchips inserted into plants are in-
creasingly being used to protect plants such as cacti in US 
national parks from theft (Ziegler, 2008). Automatic scanning 
systems are then used to detect thefts when people leave a 
national park. The origin of the plants or animals can also be 
traced later from dealers and future owners. 
Linking and openly publishing environmental data is parti-
cularly effective. The collection and publishing of environ-
mental data on freely accessible, state-run digital platforms 
creates a common, quickly available database for different 
authorities. They can improve the pool of data on which ad-
ministrative decisions are based. This can reduce the trans-
action costs of communicating information on the state of the 
environment. Potential sources include manual entries and 
automated recordings by sensors, e.g. measuring the concen-
tration of pollutants in the air (World Bank, 2016: 322). Such 
information portals have an impact on an internal and also on 
an external level and can promote the cooperation between 
authorities required by environmental law. When open-data 
portals make private data from companies, the scientific com-
munity and environmental organizations available and usea-
ble, the information platforms are doing more than making 
work easier within the administration; information and data 
are also made available to the general public, business enter-
prises, the scientific community and environmental organiza-
tions, thus making the administration more transparent (UN 
DESA, 2018: 104, 107). This helps build up pressure on aut-
horities and decision-makers, increasing the will to enforce 
environmental regulations. 
Prerequisites for the successful use of digital tools for 
environmental law enforcement
However, the successful use of data platforms also faces chal-
lenges. The quality and topicality of the data provided must 
always be guaranteed. Although the quality of data in parti-
cular and the technical methods of collection and dissemina-
tion have improved considerably since the early 1990s (World 
Bank, 2016: 323), e.g. the ‘Open Data Barometer 2018’ shows 
that there is still room for improvement in the quality of open 
environmental-data provision. Only 20% of environmental 
data are openly accessible, and only 41% of these are upda-
ted (World Wide Web Foundation, 2018: 17, 23). Therefore, 
an important new role for the administration is to set stan-
dards for data collection, reporting and sharing to ensure data 
quality and topicality (World Bank, 2016: 324). Quality con-
trol of publicly supplied data in turn ties up human resources 
and requires technical knowledge, which can be a challenge 
for environmental administrations and cause new resource 
shortages. 
Incorporating digital technologies into communication and 
cooperation between public authorities, businesses and civil 
society for environmental law enforcement involves the need 
to make portals, services and apps user-friendly and attracti-
ve, for example by providing support in local languages (UN 
DESA, 2016a: 52). The high costs of setting up and maintai-
ning monitoring systems are significant barriers (World Bank, 
2016: 322; Section 5.2.11). 
Moreover, the accessibility of data alone is not sufficient 
to ensure that laws are enforced. It is also necessary to disse-
minate information to potentially interested parties and to 
enforce accountability (World Bank, 2017c: 248). As adminis-
trations become more transparent and public, and private 
participation increases (digitalization is an essential multiplier 
here), this must always involve the realization of effective 
legal protection. Only if decisions are judicially verifiable are 
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5.3.4.1 
Assessment – today’s education for digitalization
Up to now, a rapid digitalization has taken place in 
many areas of society without this technological devel-
opment being systematically integrated into formal 
education courses in schools, colleges, universities and 
educational institutions. In Germany, most digital-
ly-supported learning is informal, self-organized, and 
takes place online or at home (for example via Google 
and YouTube; WBGU, 2016a). Teaching staff do not 
seem to be well-enough trained to use digital teaching 
materials (e.g. open educational resources, digital jour-
nals) and platforms that are firmly established in every-
day learning (e.g. Wikipedia) for didactic purposes 
(Brinkmann and Müller, 2018; Schmid et al., 2017). 
Inadequate advanced training for teachers, a shortage 
of teachers, a lack of infrastructure, and material access 
restrictions are regarded as barriers to successful learn-
ing with digital media in both industrialized and devel-
oping countries. This means that there is often a lack of 
protected learning locations for trying out digital media, 
promoting potential and containing risks.
There is therefore national and international politi-
cal discussion on how to better embed and use digitali-
zation in the education system. Ideas include creating 
easier access to high-quality education (see SDG 4) and 
preparing for the use of digital infrastructures (e.g. 
Hochschulforum Digitalisierung, 2019; KMK, 2017; 
UNESCO, 2018; WSIS, 2018; OECD, 2018a,b,c). There 
is a consensus that educational goals such as the 
self-determined use of digital media (digital literacy) 
pose major challenges, especially for formal educational 
institutions like kindergartens and schools (e.g. OECD, 
2018b). In the WBGU’s view, the promotion of digital 
skills is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for 
‘transformation education’ or ‘future-proof education’. 
5.3.4.2 
Future-proof education as a driver of the Great 
Transformation 
According to the WBGU’s humanist understanding, 
education should enable people to be proactive players 
in shaping society (see also the OECD Learning Frame-
work 2030 and the UNESCO Global Action Programme 
for Education for Sustainable Development, Alliance 
for Future Education in Germany). Individuals face 
challenges in handling digital technology as citizens, 
users and consumers. These changes must be addressed 
by education (Chapter 4). Problem awareness, systemic 
thinking, responsible action, individual and collective 
creativity and innovation (WBGU, 2016a: 23, 425) are 
just as crucial in the networked and complex societies 
of the 21st century as personality development, coop-
eration skills and the courage to act (UNESCO, 2014; 
John et al., 2017; Brundiers and Wiek, 2017; Rasfeld 
and Breidenbach, 2014; Amsler and Facer, 2017; OECD, 
2018). 
In the sense of the Great Transformation, the WBGU 
distinguishes between transformation education and 
transformative education or transformative learning. 
Transformation education provides research findings 
on sustainability transformation and critically reflects 
on the basic knowledge and skills needed by the actors 
of sustainability. This includes a well-founded under-
standing of the pressure to act to create environmen-
tally friendly development paths, a global sense of 
responsibility, and a systemic understanding of the 
interrelated issues involved (WBGU, 2011; 2016a). 
Transformative education also plays an important role, 
especially in times of profound upheaval. It promotes 
an understanding of diverse options for action and 
solution approaches, of the dynamics of societal 
change, and of one’s own self-efficacy in shaping life 
contexts and societal changes. By using the term 
‘future-proof education’, the WBGU combines the 
requirements discussed in the field of sustainable 
development with digital literacy (Figure 5.3.4-1). It 
aims to make individuals and societies ‘fit for the 
future’, i.e. to enable the continuous shaping of chang-
ing circumstances in a meaningful, anticipatory and 
target-oriented way. Future-proof education in the Dig-
ital Age requires a new quality of technological under-
standing, since key relationships between people and 
their environment are increasingly mediated digitally 
(digital curtain).
In order for digitalization to be shaped in the sense 
of a sustainable society that is fit for future, individuals 
need both digital and sustainability skills (Engagement 
Global, 2018). Skills in technical design, privacy skills, 
equal opportunities, data protection and the use of 
open educational resources are important secondary 
objectives, as formulated in the DigitalPakt Schule 
(‘DigitalPact for Schools’) of the Federal Government 
and the Länder. In order to participate in the Great 
authorities and the political decision-makers and govern-
ments behind them forced to implement existing environ-
mental laws. Effective legal protection in the environmental 
field is promoted, for example, by the use of judicial control 
instruments, such as class actions by citizens and associati-
ons, to enforce environmental law. One treaty that establi-
shes the three pillars of access to information, public partici-
pation and legal protection is the Aarhus Convention, which 
all states should ratify. 
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Transformation, individuals also need skills in Education 
for Sustainable Development in order to be able to place 
their own activities into the context of global environ-
mental change, for example to think and plan systemi-
cally and develop environmentally relevant attitudes 
and behaviours (Roth, 1992; Scholz, 2002). Dealing 
with change and uncertainty also requires transforma-
tive literacy skills such as innovativeness and anticipa-
tion skills in order to develop a desirable vision of the 
future for oneself and others. 
The objectives of future-proof education and the 
skills proposed for it are described in more detail in the 
Recommendations for action (Section 9.1.4). The fol-
lowing are examples of the challenges that should be 
offset by education.
5.3.4.3 
Use education to offset negative effects in the 
Digital Age
Among other things, education should create sensitiv-
ity and compensation strategies for risks and require-
ments arising from the use of digital technology, rang-
ing from social media and digital applications (apps) to 
the Internet of Things (e.g. smart homes). These 
requirements include, for example, control over one’s 
personal data and self-presentations in social media, 
e.g. posting such information about oneself as hobbies, 
professional life, friends and interests. Identity con-
flicts (privacy vs. self-revelation), phenomena such as 
‘social scoring’ (Section 5.3.3) and the ‘chilling’ effect 
(self-censorship for fear of negative consequences of 
ESD
Digital education









(e.g. critical thinking, self-efficacy, 
creativity)
Sustainability literacy
(e.g. systemic thinking, understanding of
nature, multiperspectivity)
Anticipatory literacy
(e.g. reflexivity, visions of the future,
communication)
ICT skills
(e.g. technical knowledge, media
education, digital resilience)
• Create spaces for discourse
• Invest in common-good-oriented
 technology/infrastructure
Figure 5 .3 .4-1
From Education for Sustainable Development and Digitalization.
The skills required in each case overlap considerably. Taken together, they should enable individuals to actively participate in 
shaping the Great Transformation, including its digital components (Chapter 8). Transformative literacy means the ability to un-
derstand information on societal change processes and to contribute one’s own actions to these processes (WBGU, 2014a: 103); 
it is thus similar to formative skills (de Haan, 2008). Sustainability literacy combines systemic thinking, planning and self-com-
petence, but also in particular environmentally relevant knowledge, attitudes, standards, a sense of responsibility, taking action 
and being involved (Wiek et al., 2011; Roth, 1992). Anticipation skills include a critical-constructive discourse with human 
 ideas and notions and their effect on how society is shaped over time. ICT skills comprise media education and technical know-
ledge in order to use, understand and shape digital media critically, autonomously and responsibly, and to negotiate privacy 
(Trepte, 2016b; SFIA Foundation, 2019).
Source: WBGU
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publishing on the internet), and filter bubbles are new 
challenges facing the education system. The rapid and 
cooperative provision and dissemination of information 
via online media and social platforms involves both 
potential and uncertainties – such as whether informa-
tion is generated by people or avatars (e.g. social bots 
that simulate human identities). Furthermore, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish verified general knowledge from 
private beliefs or opinions. 
One particularly frequently discussed example is the 
distribution of incorrect information (‘fake news’) via 
online platforms, social media and online magazines, 
for example that man-made climate change is a lie. It is 
still unclear how such false information affects people’s 
attitudes and behaviour (e.g. electoral behaviour in the 
USA: Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Research has shown 
that people selectively prefer and trust information 
that resembles their attitudes and thought patterns 
(Leiserowitz,  2006) and those of family and friends 
(Metzger et al., 2010). Phenomena such as echo cham-
bers or filter bubbles are also discussed in this context. 
Strategies of source checking and balanced opinion 
formation, as well as quality-assured sources, should 
help expose false information, for example by provid-
ing trustworthy and vetted information options or lists 
on the internet, or clear rules and checks, as for exam-
ple in Wikipedia (Van der Linden et al., 2017; Chan et 
al., 2017a; Lewandowsky et al., 2017; SVRV, 2017). 
Much more comprehensive measures are needed to 
ensure that people develop the knowledge and skills to 
reflect on their own opinions and attitudes and those of 
their social environment in the long term (Lewand-
owsky et al., 2017). These measures include the promo-
tion of sustainability and environmental literacy and 
the creation of discourse spaces (Figure 5.3.4-1; 
 Section 9.1.4).
5.3.4.4 
Use digitalization to promote a solidarity-based 
quality of life, inclusion and Eigenart
Education should aim to enable people, both individu-
ally and collectively, to use and shape digital technolo-
gies in a way that helps them generate quality of life for 
themselves without restricting other people and future 
generations (WBGU, 2016a). Key prerequisites for this 
are sustaining natural life-support systems, inclusion, 
Eigenart and dignity (Normative Compass; Section 2.2). 
The WBGU uses examples to show how solidarity-based 
quality of life can be made possible by providing edu-
cational opportunities. 
Sustaining natural life-support systems: actively 
involve people in resource conservation
Digital educational opportunities can be used to raise 
awareness of global environmental contexts 
( Section 5.3.1) and actively involve people themselves 
in resource-saving measures (experiential learning). 
People can actively participate in knowledge build-
ing via citizen-science approaches (e.g. air measure-
ments in their city). At the same time, opportunities 
open up for transformative education, for example 
through knowledge provided by apps about a product’s 
CO2 footprint or by drawing attention to resource-sav-
ing product alternatives (Sections 5.2.3, 5.3.1). 
Online applications, platforms and games make it 
possible not only to communicate theoretical educa-
tional content, but also to test and develop sustainable 
options for action through educational games 
( experimental learning). Knowledge about the prob-
lems of the Earth system and climate change can thus 
be directly linked in simulations to knowledge about 
action. Digital educational opportunities can offer sup-
port where practical learning experience would other-
wise not (yet) be technically possible, or else be costly. 
One idea might be to make it possible to digitally expe-
rience climate protection by testing new mobility 
 concepts or eating habits (Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.8). 
Inclusion: reduce financial, temporal and spatial 
educational barriers 
Digitalization is cited by many actors as the key to 
inclusion in education (e.g. KMK, 2017: 8; UNESCO, 
2017b: 13). In particular, financial and spatial barriers 
to the use of educational opportunities can be over-
come with digital media. Examples include free soft-
ware and educational opportunities such as online 
courses and teaching materials that can be used in class, 
or independently outside educational institutions. Par-
ticularly in poorer countries, digitalization is seen as a 
great opportunity to boost education and as an essen-
tial prerequisite for successful sustainable development 
(World Bank, 2016). Here, online learning and web-
based training courses, virtual universities or class-
rooms, and distance learning are being promoted in an 
active and target-oriented way. 
Particularly in emerging economies and developing 
countries, teacher shortages and insufficient digital lit-
eracy among teachers and students jeopardize the suc-
cess of such measures (UNESCO, 2016). Language bar-
riers (van Dijk, 2006), poor ICT infrastructure, lack of 
electricity or financial resources (UN, 2018a;  Andersson 
et al., 2009) make access to digital technology more dif-
ficult. It is the case in all countries that active participa-
tion in shaping digital technology requires a range of 
abilities (e.g. programming skills) in which disadvan-
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taged groups (such as women) tend to be less profi-
cient. Restrictions on time (e.g. women do more unpaid 
work worldwide than men) and differences in predom-
inant participation behaviour are also examples of bar-
riers to participation with regard to common goods 
available online. For example, less than 10% of authors 
at Wikipedia are female (Dobusch, 2017a; Ford and 
Wajcman, 2017). Overall, digital-education measures 
should counteract existing forms of discrimination and 
barriers, i.e. enable equal access to high-quality educa-
tion and thus often also to societal inclusion. 
The WBGU therefore recommends the (further) 
development of new digital and non-digital educational 
opportunities involving all groups, especially those 
who are discriminated against; the opportunities should 
be geared to their needs. This includes, for example, 
offering educational opportunities in diverse local lan-
guages (OECD, 2018) and/or in a culturally sensitive 
way for each target region using local staff (Lotz-Sisitka 
et al., 2017). A potentially global dissemination of 
knowledge and educational content must not come at 
the expense of diversity and cultural heterogeneity 
(Amsler and Facer, 2017).
Box 5 .3 .4-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Future-proof education’ 
 > Develop integration mechanisms between processes, insti-
tutions and funding programmes for digital education and 
education for sustainable development (ESD): Both of these 
funding programmes call for significant extensions to the 
current canon of education, teaching formats and teacher 
training, although up to now their efforts have been lar-
gely implemented in parallel and without any coordination 
(Figure 5.3.4-1). On the one hand, there is much synergy 
potential; on the other, integration would prevent either 
technical knowledge (in the case of ESD) or environmen-
tal knowledge (in the case of digital education) from being 
neglected, despite considerable adjustment measures.
 > Align educational content and formats to active efforts to 
shape the future: The traditional understanding of educa-
tion is rather instrumental and reactive, the aim being to 
make people fit to fulfil certain tasks which are prescri-
bed to them. In times of profound upheaval like today, 
however, it is neither easy to foresee the jobs of the future, 
nor does a reactive understanding of one’s own role in soci-
ety enable people to shape transformation and innovation 
processes proactively and participatively. Topics such as 
human dignity, systemic knowledge, the ability to reflect, 
moral thinking, the ability to change one’s own behaviour 
and to be aware of one’s own self-efficacy should be fur-
ther quality features of education content. The OECD 2030 
Learning Compass plays an interesting role here due to the 
OECD’s standard-setting role.
 > Measures to contain (already existing) disadvantages (gen-
der, age, origin): Education should counteract the aggra-
vation of existing areas of discrimination, and new digi-
tal opportunities should enable and improve in particular 
participation in education for groups of people who facing 
major challenges (e.g. as a result of physical or mental cha-
racteristics, cultural differences, geographical distances). 
New digital and non-digital educational opportunities 
should be (further) developed in a targeted manner, involve 
discriminated groups and be geared to their needs. 
 > Conduct evaluations to document the implementation of new 
educational content, as well as the effects of digital teaching 
and its connection with analogue formats: Regular and rele-
vant evaluations are necessary for the further development 
and improvement of educational opportunities (Michelsen 
and Wells, 2017). They should be differentiated enough to 
reflect qualitative and quantitative aspects and local diffe-
rences such as Eigenart, and to avoid tendencies towards 
uniformity. 
 > Develop educational formats for the competent use of digi-
tal technology and media literacy: People should be enabled 
to critically question and assess digital information, know-
ledge and sources (e.g. knowledge about climate change, 
political news) and to take a responsible part in shaping 
them. The basis for this is also the communication of know-
ledge about rights in the digital space (e.g. data protection), 
as well as education about the risks of a public life and 
addictive potential (privacy skills and digital resilience).
 > Expand qualification measures for teaching staff in all educa-
tional institutions: Teaching staff worldwide should be given 
further training, and personnel and infrastructures should 
be significantly improved. The US$39 billion per year fun-
ding gap estimated by UNESCO (projection for 2019) for 
achieving just the educational goals that are stipulated in 
SDG 4 should trigger a special programme of international 
cooperation (UNESCO, 2015).
 > Create digitally available, trustworthy knowledge and super-
visory bodies for content on the Great Transformation: In the 
WBGU’s view, trustworthy knowledge sources and infor-
mation are a prerequisite for all measures designed to pro-
mote the dissemination of transformation-relevant know-
ledge and action. This includes a wide range of knowledge 
fields: information on environmental problems (e.g. climate 
change) and sustainable consumption alternatives, as well 
as on social justice and human rights (e.g. flight and migra-
tion). Similar recommendations have already been made in 
the field of digital health (e.g. the proposal made by the 
German Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (SVRV) for 
a ‘positive list of evidence-based and understandable [digi-
tal] sources’; SVRV, 2017). In this context, offering a cen-
tral platform for the provision of scientifically sound know-
ledge on intensely discussed political demands and content 
can counteract the dissemination of fake news (see e.g. the 
ideas of the Science Media Lab). It would be important in 
this context to also clarify the origins of different state-
ments by scientific studies: methodological and discipli-
nary data selection, variables and derivations, or even time 
periods etc. can be reasons here; understanding them 
restores confidence in the credibility of evidence.
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Eigenart: enable targeted advancement, cooperation 
and creativity
Since the 1980s (Benjamin, 1988), it has been argued 
that digital media can enable individualized and 
self-regulated knowledge acquisition and targeted 
advancement (Heinen and Kerres, 2015). It is said, for 
example, that, through individualized feedback and 
exchange, digital technology guarantees a self-regu-
lated learning process that is adapted to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the learners (e.g. digital learning 
portfolios, vocabulary training according to learning 
status). One hope is, for example, that digital technolo-
gies promote networking and that digitalization 
increases the importance of creative skills (BMBF, 2016; 
Heinen and Kerres, 2015; OECD, 2018: 40). Initial stud-
ies show that digital media encourage particularly prob-
lem-based and cooperative learning with a wide range 
of materials (Herzig,  2014). It is said that the use of 
digital media particularly promotes creative freedom 
and prevents personalized monitoring and the quanti-
tative recording of performance from leading to exces-
sive standardization and restrictions on imaginative-
ness (Williamson, 2018). 
An additional aspect relating to safeguarding 
 Eigenart concerns privacy skills, i.e. the ability to decide 
and negotiate (with individuals, companies and other 
institutions) which personal contents may be disclosed 
to whom and in which form (Masur et al., 2017). Digital 
resilience (UNESCO, 2018) is another term that encom-
passes not only the cautious use of online services in 
terms of time and scope, but also the socio-psycholog-
ical effects of extreme exposure and changes in forms 
of behaviour in social networks. Research is only begin-
ning here.
5.3.4.5 
Future-proof education: protect human dignity 
and master societal challenges collectively 
With its three Dynamics of the Digital Age (Chapter 7), 
the WBGU addresses the societal potential and risks 
that a new humanist vision of the 21st century must 
master. Compliance with planetary guard rails, safe-
guarding social inclusion and cohesion, and securing 
Eigenart are always prerequisites for a successful tech-
nological revolution that respects human dignity. The 
Digital Age is therefore about much more than the tech-
nical and digital literacy of individuals; it is equally 
about individual and societal skills in using new tech-
nologies as aids in shaping structural upheavals and 
transitions for desirable futures, and in containing neg-
ative and unintended consequences at an early stage. 
Education for the societal challenges of the coming 
decades should therefore include a paradigm shift that 
enables each individual to actively participate in shap-
ing his or her (digital) environment (WBGU, 2011: 351–
352). Future-proof education enables people to hold 
discussions and dialogues, to reflect on their own and 
other people’s behaviour, and to act in such a way that 
their own interests and motives are protected – without 
restricting those of others. Human rights and human 
dignity, the ability to reflect, moral thinking (i.e. adopt-
ing perspectives and orienting oneself towards ethical 
principles) and the ability to change one’s behaviour in 
a self-determined way are already key issues in trans-
formative education, peace-building and education for 
sustainable development (UNESCO; Orr 1991; Ibisch et. 
al., 2018); they are also discussed in psychology as per-
sonality development. 
So, instead of developing and promoting a separate 
strand of digital education and technological literacy, 
the aim should be to bring the leading educational con-
cepts of sustainability and media education together 
with the approaches of futures literacy and anticipa-
tion, and to formulate a ‘pact for future education’ for 
Box 5 .3 .4-2
Research recommendations on the arena  
‘Future-proof education’ 
 > Transformation knowledge and action: The WBGU recom-
mends creating a broader empirical knowledge base in 
order to specifically investigate how digital and non-digital 
educational measures can promote knowledge and action 
for the Great Transformation. 
 > Research on the systematic substantiation of the new edu-
cation pact and the evaluation programmes: Both the poo-
ling of competencies and their implementation in pionee-
ring institutions should be accompanied intensively. One 
 priority is new capabilities such as digital resilience or 
futures literacy. 
 > Research into which digital elements and techniques pro-
mote problem knowledge and action: For example, research 
should be conducted on what effect educational games, 
simulations of complex problem solving, and virtual expe-
rience of nature have on environmentally friendly every-
day actions and political activity. Research should also be 
conducted into which digital technologies and elements 
(e.g. increases in immersion and entertainment value, feed-
back) are particularly suitable for promoting knowledge of 
problems and for supporting action. Context dependencies 
should also be taken into account in this context.
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active participation in shaping the 21st century. This 
can be based on the processes mentioned above, and 
resources and competencies can be combined in such a 
way that educational offers are supplemented accord-
ingly in all contexts, especially in regions with high 
transformation dynamics. To this end, funding should 
be significantly topped up as a systematic ‘investment 
in the future’ (Section 9.1.4.3); internationally, too, 
measures to achieve SDG 4 on ‘Education’ should be 
expedited accordingly (Section 9.1.4.4). The UNESCO 
programme on ‘Education for Sustainable Development 
Beyond 2019’ is moving in the right direction and 
makes it clear that good education for all people is not 
only a goal pursued by the international community, 
but that educational content corresponding to the chal-
lenges of the future also lays the foundation for the 
implementation of the SDG agenda (UNESCO, 2019). In 
the WBGU’s view, this includes an explicitly reflective 
and anticipatory approach to knowledge and assump-
tions about possible, realistic and desirable futures 
(Section 9.1.4.5). 
5 .3 .5 
Public-service ICT as part of basic public services
For some years now, basic internet access has been the 
subject of public debate as a fundamental or human 
right, for example within the framework of the UN Res-
olution of 2016 (UN, 2016a: 3), the judgement of Ger-
many’s Federal Court of Justice in 2012 (BGH, 2013), 
the signing of the principles of the Contract for the Web 
(Webfoundation.org, 2019) by the German and French 
governments among others in 2018 (Bundesregierung, 
2018a), the Charter of Digital Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union initiated under the auspices of the 
Zeit-Stiftung (Zeit-Stiftung, 2018), and the Internet 
Rights Charter of the Association for Progressive Com-
munications (APC, 2006). For example, the Charter of 
Digital Fundamental Rights of the European Union pro-
vides for a fundamental right to information and com-
munication (Article 2), and in Estonia, citizens have had 
a constitutional right to internet access since 2000 
(Hartleb, 2017: 39). 
In Germany, the Federation has an obligation to pro-
vide a constitutionally guaranteed infrastructure of 
basic services, including appropriate and nationwide 
telecommunications services (Article 87f. of the Basic 
Law; Deutscher Bundestag, 2011: 7). However, this 
does not apply to information technology services, e.g. 
the internet or social platforms that make data and edu-
cational offerings available, which are of particular 
importance in the Digital Age. In the WBGU’s view, 
every state should have an obligation to guarantee such 
IT services as part of basic public services, as it is appar-
ent that the market has failed to create general and 
secure access to ICT infrastructures and services up to 
now. This can be seen, for example, in the inadequate 
provision of high-speed internet of at least 50 Mbit/s 
in rural areas, and in the market dominance of commer-
cial social platforms, which inadequately safeguard the 
data protection and privacy of their users. There is evi-
dently a lack of incentives for the private sector to ade-
quately embed an orientation towards the common 
good into services of infrastructural relevance – such as 
platforms – from the outset.
The WBGU therefore considers the realization of a 
form of public-service ICT that pursues the interests of 
the common good from the outset to be a sensible 
option for meeting these challenges (Section 4.3.2). 
Problems related to a digitalized public (Section 5.3.2), 
e.g. concentration of power, could also be solved by 
public-service ICT. Based on the definition of public IT 
by Fromm et al. (2013: 17), the WBGU defines 
 public-service ICT as information and communication 
 technologies that are of key importance to society as a 
whole and where the state has a special responsibility 
for their realization. In the WBGU’s view, public-service 
ICT infrastructures are made up of a public-service part 
of the internet, including social platforms, via which 
public data, information, knowledge and educational 
and citizens’ services are accessible and subject to key 
principles such as net neutrality (which is increasingly 
threatened), inclusivity and accessibility (Section 
5.3.5.4).
Information and communication are regarded as 
basic human needs (Sen, 2015: 2813); public-service 
ICT can ensure that they are met. Moreover, inclusion 
and Eigenart, as overarching sustainability goals 
( Chapter 2), can be achieved via public-service ICT. The 
provision of public-service digital services is an impor-
tant precondition of inclusion in societal and economic 
life in the Digital Age (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012: 4). 
Public-service ICT is also an important prerequisite for 
the provision of, and access to, digital public goods 
( Section 5.3.10) and a location factor for innovation, 
competition, employment and sustainable economic 
growth. The public sector is therefore responsible for 
ensuring affordable access (as part of basic services) for 
public institutions (schools, museums, etc.), public 
spaces (squares, traffic areas, etc.) and businesses. 
Although it is possible in principle to involve the pri-
vate sector in the provision of infrastructure, it is 
necessary for provision to be the state’s responsibility 
and thus under state supervision. If the infrastructure 
is not provided by private actors, the state has a duty to 
realize it in some other way. The concrete design of 
public-service ICT infrastructures is in the hands of the 
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responsible public administrations (in Germany, for 
example, the municipalities and other federal struc-
tures), in order to make it possible for public-service 
ICT to be tailored to local and regional needs. A pub-
lic-service ICT in cities and regions created on the basis 
of universally accessible international standards makes 
the necessary diversification of the required subsys-
tems and their components possible. This creates space 
for resilient and inclusive infrastructures. With regard 
to the UN’s sustainability goals, there are close links to 
SDG 9, ‘Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation’ 
(in particular targets 9.1 and 9.C), and SDG 11 ‘Make 
cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient 
and sustainable’ (in particular target 11.7;  Section 5.2.7). 
The focus here should be, inter alia, on creating and 
extending universal and affordable access to ICT serv-
ices worldwide. Against the background of the increas-
ing digital divide, the public sector’s obligation to guar-
antee further information-technology services, such as 
information and education services, as part of basic 
public services should also be addressed. 
5.3.5.1 
Public-service ICT to reduce the digital divide
In Germany, the concept of basic public services 
includes, among other things, state-organized water 
and energy supply, postal and telecommunications 
services, a basic school and education system, and 
guaranteeing external and internal security (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2006: 2f.). The WBGU calls for a broader 
understanding of the concept of basic public services, 
where the public sector is not only responsible for tra-
ditional basic services, but must also acknowledge the 
growing importance of ICT and be obliged to guarantee 
general access to further information-technology serv-
ices in line with the needs of the Digital Age (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2012: 5f.). 
The provision of information-technology infrastruc-
tures and services is central to reducing the digital 
divide worldwide. For example, there are major differ-
ences in the provision of, and access to, ICT infrastruc-
tures both within countries (e.g. according to geograph-
ical location) and between countries at different stages 
of development (World Bank, 2016: 7). Over four bil-
lion people worldwide have no access to the internet 
(World Bank, 2016: 4, 6). Whereas in 2014 only 31% of 
the population in developing countries were connected 
to the internet, in high-income countries the figure was 
80% (World Bank, 2016: 6). In developing countries, 
mobile phones are the most important form of internet 
access. But although more than 70% of the poorest 
fifth of the world’s population have a mobile phone, 
almost 60% of the world’s population have no access to 
the internet (World Bank, 2016: 6). Overall, there is a 
significant correlation between a country’s gross 
domestic product and ICT penetration (Nipo and 
Bujang, 2014). The reasons for the continuing digital 
divide between industrialized and developing countries 
are diverse and range from unfavourable market condi-
tions (e.g. lack of competition and the formation of 
monopolies, which impacts on the cost of hardware and 
internet access), low institutional efficiency levels (e.g. 
caused by political, economic and social instabilities 
that prevent investment), to a lack of education (e.g. in 
ICT management; Fong, 2009; Cruz-Jesus et al., 
2018: 14f.). 
In addition to the digital divide between industrial-
ized and developing countries, there is also a digital 
divide between individual social groups (e.g. between 
the sexes, young and old, etc.). Geographical factors 
also play an important role, as demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by the insufficient provision of broadband in rural 
areas. Digital divides within countries can be as large as 
the divide between countries (World Bank, 2016: 6). It 
is therefore necessary to ensure universal access to 
public-service ICT infrastructures as part of basic public 
services both between and within industrialized and 
developing countries and emerging economies.
5.3.5.2 
Options for the realization of public-service ICT
Broadband connections are regarded as key infrastruc-
tures for the internet. They thus represent a basis for 
digitalization (Eskelinen et al., 2008: 412). By interna-
tional comparison, however, Germany only holds a 
medium-ranking position in terms of broadband provi-
sion (Opiela et al., 2019: 10). In rural areas especially, 
services are inadequate (Beckert, 2017: 12), when it 
comes to high-speed internet access of 50 Mbit/s or 
more, especially as broadband meanwhile denotes 
speeds of 100 Mbit/s or more. In Germany, only 50.5% 
of households had access to fast internet at 50 Mbit/s 
or more by mid-2018 (BMVI, 2018a: 6). Compared to 
other EU countries, Germany was thus below the EU 
average in 2017 (EU-Commission, 2018a: 97). 
Not only in Germany have market failures led to 
insufficient broadband availability, especially in rural 
areas, and the dominance of a small number of technol-
ogy corporations that pay inadequate attention to pub-
lic welfare, data security, privacy and data protection. 
These dominant digital corporations include such tech 
giants as Apple, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, Amazon 
and Facebook (GAFAM, also known as the ‘Big Five’), 
which are among the five most valuable corporations in 
the world in terms of market value (Barwise and Wat-
kins, 2018: 21; Section 3.1). Their handling of user data 
repeatedly gives rise to negative headlines. 
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The creation of a public-service ICT makes sense – 
and not only in Germany – in three respects: first, in 
view of the lack of nationwide broadband internet cov-
erage; second, in view of the power of a small number 
of private digital corporations that pay little or no 
attention to their users’ privacy when realizing their 
business models; and third, because public digital serv-
ices are often lacking or only limited. 
Suitable state intervention could be meaningful to 
ensure that countries, regions or individual social 
groups are not digitally left behind and that, for lack of 
alternatives, individual users are dependent on social 
media platforms which do not properly meet require-
ments such as privacy protection or an orientation 
towards the common good. TThe WBGU proposes that 
key ICT services such as public-service communications 
access, information services, citizen accounts and serv-
ices, and digital commons (Section 5.3.10) should be 
implemented under state responsibility. Public commu-
nication and information services are of crucial impor-
tance for democratic decision-making in the Digital 
Age, which is why common-good-oriented platforms 
should be created for both public-service and pri-
vate-sector media formats ( Section 5.3.2). There are 
many initiatives of this kind (Box 5.3.5-1), and the 
WBGU believes they should be expanded. In this con-
text, it should be pointed out that the public-service 
media in Europe as a whole already have comparatively 
large budgets, and it does not seem rational that their 
cooperative and long-term-oriented activities in the 
digital sector should be restricted by regulation (e.g. by 
only being able to offer fragmented media libraries), 
Box 5 .3 .5-1
Public-service platforms – approaches for a 
European and global digital public sphere
A functioning democracy needs an enlightened public sphere 
and lively societal discourse based on trustworthy sources of 
information. On this basis, the ‘Public Open Space’ project 
aims to develop a digital platform oriented towards the com-
mon good. The intention is to facilitate intensive cooperation 
between the media, education, culture and society, to master 
the challenges of digital structural change in the public sphere 
(Section 5.3.2), and to unleash its potential. It is “an initiative 
that is transnational, European and open to development; it 
consists of representatives from science, the public-service 
and non-commercial media, as well as civil-society organiza-
tions from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The initiative 
currently sees itself as a project that synergetically, coopera-
tively and participatively develops a public-civic partnership 
that provides the foundation for such a #PublicOpenSpace” 
(POS, 2019). Beyond the current concentration of power and 
economization on the internet, digital technologies could thus 
open up “opportunities for more freedom of expression and 
diversity, independence, credibility and participation in the 
national, European and global context” and turn correspon-
ding visions into reality (POS, 2019): 
The ‘Public Open Space’ initiative urges the development 
of a new digital, non-commercial platform (#PublicOpenS-
pace), which makes content and services accessible while tak-
ing societal diversity into account, as well as offering a public 
discourse space for the entire population. In order to do jus-
tice to an increasingly fragmented society, particularly the 
media with a public mandate have the function of facilitating 
links between individual societal groups. Here, the traditional 
inclusion mandate of public-service media is given a new, ur-
gent topicality. This requires new collaborations and alliances 
between media with a public-service mandate and public in-
stitutions in the fields of science and education, civil society, 
art and culture. 
This initiative, which is characterized by a broad interdis-
ciplinary team of researchers and media professionals, began 
as a project called ‘European Public Open Spaces’, launched in 
2017, which initially existed primarily in the European con-
text (EPOS, 2018). In addition, a working paper entitled ‘Ide-
as for a contemporary public-service media platform’ was 
recently put forward under the term ‘internet directorship’ 
calling for a “new understanding of a public-service approach 
to interactive and/or audiovisual media” (Bieber et al., 2019): 
“In order to do justice to the digital potential for generating 
and distributing specific and general public-service content, 
we call for the endowment of a separate internet directorship 
using funds from the broadcasting licence fee. The five main 
tasks of the internet directorship comprise (1) the develop-
ment and operation of a public-service platform, (2) the allo-
cation of funds for the creation of specific public-service on-
line content, (3) curating and cooperating with third-party 
providers, also beyond classic content productions, (4) the 
promotion of innovation, and (5) the establishment of a su-
pervisory body, especially with regard to the protection of 
minors from harmful media”.
Irrespective of questions about concrete design – e.g. on 
the de-/centrality or plurality of an internet directorship, an 
ecosystem of networked platforms, or the possible integration 
of both poles – a global reach is essential. In view of the global 
nature of the internet and the global challenges of the digital-
ized public sphere, these ideas should be thought about and 
realized not only in European terms but also globally (POS, 
2019). The development of a ‘Platform Europe’ (Hillje, 2019) 
or a corresponding ecosystem for a European communication 
space in the Digital Age is, however, initially focusing on ur-
gent democratic challenges in Europe, because: “as yet there 
is no European public sphere; up to now there has been no 
success in creating one either by Europeanizing national pub-
lic spheres or via digital channels. The member states talk 
about the EU and about each other, but not with each other. 
Europe negotiates European topics in national filter bubbles, 
instead of in a European communication space” (Hillje, 
2019: 14) By contrast, the “decentralized, nationally-inde-
pendent structures of the internet could at last be used for 
European integration” and bring about “a democratization of 
the digital space in Europe, and thus create a digital public 
sphere based on European values that serves the common 
good and European democracy” (Hillje, 2019): 15).
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thus at least indirectly supporting the market power of 
commercial platforms. Going beyond the orientation of 
‘Public Open Space’ – and based on it – it would also be 
conceivable to open up such a platform providing pub-
lic-service resources to private media, thus guarantee-
ing pluralism of content and making it more attractive 
for users.
In Germany, as in other countries, ICT infrastructures 
such as broadband networks are often implemented via 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). Country studies 
have “shown that it is often municipal involvement that 
 triggers competition and drives technical innovation” 
(Beckert, 2017: 9). The involvement of third parties 
(e.g. with PPPs) has had a positive effect in many coun-
tries, e.g. with regard to broadband expansion in the 
interaction between state and private-sector actors. In 
Box 5 .3 .5-2
Broadband coverage by international comparison 
– examples
Sweden
Sweden was the first European country to implement an ac-
tive broadband policy and is seen as a pioneer in the availa-
bility of broadband connections (Eskelinen et al., 2008: 413). 
In 2017, the country achieved very good levels of broadband 
availability and was above the EU average, also in terms of 
rural broadband coverage (European Commission, 
2018a: 182). A key role in broadband provision with fi-
bre-optic networks in Sweden is played by local actors, such 
as city and municipal administrations, public utilities and lo-
cal network operators, who “early on regarded high-speed 
internet lines as part of basic public services” (Beckert, 
2017: 41) and laid their own cables, which are operated as 
open access networks. Municipal networks account for 
around 60% of Swedish fibre-optic cables. The remainder are 
run by telecommunications and cable-TV operators (Beckert, 
2017: 42). The largest telecommunications company TeliaSon-
era, which is more than 37% state-owned, has set up its own 
fibre-optic networks outside the coverage areas of the city 
networks, which it also makes available to other providers in 
an open-access model (Beckert, 2017: 43). State funding of 
around €400 million was made available between 2000 and 
2005 to promote the expansion of broadband infrastructure. 
In Sweden, this model works because “the city networks have 
been demonstrating for many years how a competition of 
services can work on a common technical platform, and the 
success of the city networks has led to expectations that make 
copper-based expansion strategies seem unsuitable” ( Beckert, 
2017: 43).
The Swedish government also set ambitious targets with 
its 2016 broadband strategy. The aim is to provide 95% of all 
households and businesses with broadband internet access at 
a minimum speed of 100 Mbit/s by 2020. Access to high-
speed broadband should be available throughout Sweden by 
2025 (European Commission, undated).
New York and San Francisco
Major US cities have launched a broadband initiative to en-
sure broadband coverage for the population at more than 100 
Mbit/s. New York City and San Francisco are considered pio-
neers (Morozov and Bria, 2017: 82). To close the digital divide 
in New York City, the strategy followed by mayor Bill de 
 Blasio, ‘One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City’, 
will provide access to affordable, reliable and fast broadband 
services by 2025 for the entire urban population, as well as 
for urban enterprises (Shorris, 2015; DoITT, 2019). San Fran-
cisco aims to bridge the digital divide, create more competi-
tion in internet-access services, and make access to high-
speed internet available at affordable prices across the board. 
The aim is to connect all households and businesses in the city 
to a fibre-optic network and to create fast and affordable in-
ternet access for both citizens and businesses (San Francisco 
Department of Technology, o. J.). To this end, a city-wide 
 fibre-optic network is to be put into operation that gives pri-
ority to network neutrality and the protection of privacy. In 
order to provide higher-quality internet services at more 
 affordable prices, the city has opted for a PPP model 
( Crawford, 2017).
Box 5 .3 .5-3
Further development of public-service ICT in the 
EU: Next Generation Internet programme
The Next Generation Internet (NGI) programme supports the 
creation of European internet platforms to counter the domi-
nant internet platforms operated by US companies with mo-
nopoly-like market positions (Morozov and Bria, 2017: 82). 
The NGI programme was launched by the European Commis-
sion in 2016 and aims to develop and promote new internet 
technologies, together with various stakeholders, and to ad-
vance research (Smart Data Forum, 2017). The aim is to create 
an internet that serves people and society, addresses current 
problems (e.g. monopolization and aspects of data security 
and privacy) and follows the ‘internet for the people’ princi-
ple in terms of development and design. The internet of the 
future is to be developed within the framework of an inclu-
sive and multidisciplinary approach (Fatelnig and Müssig-
mann, 2017). It focuses on values such as openness, 
cross-border cooperation, decentralization (e.g. through de-
centralized data systems), transparency, the protection of pri-
vacy, and the prevention of exclusion (BMWi, 2017a). The 
programme is still in its infancy, so it remains to be seen what 
impact it will have and whether the objectives associated with 
the programme will actually be achieved.
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view of the criticism of existing PPPs on infrastructure 
provision, for example on responsibility or the restric-
tion of democratic control and design (Mattert et al., 
2017), the WBGU calls for a precise allocation and 
review of responsibilities. The development and 
 operation of public-service ICT must focus on the 
 common good.
Despite known problems with PPPs, this form of 
cooperation between public authorities and private indi-
viduals continues in Germany (Mattert et al., 2017), and 
the state is increasingly withdrawing from responsibility 
for the infrastructure (Luch and Schulz, 2009). On the 
other hand, in countries regarded as leaders in broad-
band expansion, government intervention has increased 
to ensure nationwide fibre-optic coverage. In 2016, for 
example, the Icelandic government launched the ‘Ísland 
ljóstengt’ initiative, coordinated by the Telecommunica-
tions Fund, which aims to provide 99.9% of Icelandic 
Box 5 .3 .5-4
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Public-service ICT’ 
The WBGU recommends guaranteeing free and equal access 
to public-service information and communication services for 
all, made available as part of basic public services by, or on 
behalf of, the public authorities themselves. ICT should be 
enshrined as an integral part of national development strate-
gies and plans (Ericsson, 2016: 69ff.), thus closing the digital 
divide and ensuring access to the internet for all (OECD, 
2017b: 145). According to this list of requirements and in line 
with the aims of the EU’s Next Generation Internet pro-
gramme (Box 5.3.5-3), the WBGU recommends defining pub-
lic-service ICT as a core area of public tasks. On this basis, 
anything that is politically desirable but not (adequately) 
achieved by market forces could be implemented (Lenk, 
2018: 241).
In this context, the WBGU advocates, on the one hand, 
ensuring net neutrality in the public-service part of the inter-
net. On the other hand, the creation of plurality and compe-
tition is key, and this includes promoting and applying open 
international standards and designing modular and exchange-
able technical components, in order to avoid dependencies on 
individual manufacturers and infrastructure providers. Fur-
thermore, open source software should be used and devel-
oped, and principles such as interoperability, reusability, se-
curity and scalability should be fulfilled (Zeit-Stiftung, 2018; 
Schieferdecker et al., 2018). In addition, increased 
 private-sector investment in the digital infrastructure and 
services that takes the common good into account should be 
made possible by improving the framework conditions for its 
funding and for implementing new business models (OECD, 
2017b: 146).
The aim should be to (re-)establish public ICT infrastruc-
ture-planning structures that are oriented towards the com-
mon good and not towards commercial gain (Meerkamp et al., 
2008). The establishment, expansion and operation of ICT 
infrastructures and services should also be ecologically fo-
cused, using energy-, resource- and data-optimized technolo-
gies. The components of public-service ICT should be adapted 
to local circumstances and policy objectives (UNCTAD, 2018). 
To this end, open dialogue and cooperation between different 
stakeholders (local authorities, business, science, civil socie-
ty) to promote a rapid, user-centred introduction and im-
provement of ICT services are recommended (Ericsson, 
2016: 96ff.).
Digital competence should be promoted, especially in pub-
lic administration and politics, in order to fulfil the tasks re-
lated to public-service ICT. This can be done through targeted 
training and further-education modules to develop or update 
ICT skills in administrative careers. New policy areas that 
have emerged as a result of digitalization should be given 
greater consideration. The focus on ICT infrastructures and 
services in network policy should be complemented by con-
tent-related questions such as “whether and to what extent 
many societal problems can be solved with a constantly re-
fined database and its evaluation” (Lenk, 2018: 241).
Box 5 .3 .5-5
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘ Public-service ICT’
Accompanying research in the humanities and social sciences 
is essential in view of the societal relevance and urgency of 
this subject area (Section 10). Possible topics include trust in 
data or services (Rieder and Simon, 2018), the limits of a de-
velopment tending towards technocratic ‘governance by 
numbers’, the potential and limits of predictability, and the 
(partial) automation of the (social) world (Mainzer, 2018; 
Królikowski et al., 2017).
Public-service ICT itself should therefore become the sub-
ject of research. Possible research questions include: 
 > How should public-service ICT be designed? 
 > Which services are fundamental components of public-ser-
vice ICT, which are optional, and which belong outside? 
 > How can it be financed, regulated and operated? 
 > What technical solutions are needed to establish public-
service ICT on the one hand as a driving force for innova-
tion in business, public administration and science, and on 
the other as an anchor for open, democratic and multilate-
ral opinion-forming? 
 > How will the social fabric change with the availability and 
use of public-service ICT? 
 > How can the general pace of ICT innovation be matched 
with that of public-service ICT? 
 > How will inclusion be promoted in public-service ICT?
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households and businesses with wired high-speed inter-
net at ≥100 Mbit/s by the end of 2020 (Government of 
Iceland, 2018). This initiative has put Iceland at the 
forefront of general broadband access in the world (PTA, 
2017: 5 f.). However, other countries are also playing a 
pioneering role (Box 5.3.5-2).
5.3.5.3 
Approaches to the further development of 
 public-service ICT
The WBGU believes that the public sector has a respon-
sibility to create, protect and ensure the functioning of 
public-service ICT-supported spaces, thus achieving the 
corresponding sustainable development goals (in 
 particular SDGs 4, 5, 9, 10 and 11, also as a technical 
instrument for the other SDGs). The following require-
ments need to be met by public-service ICT (Fromm et 
al., 2013: 9f.; Fromm et al., 2014; Schieferdecker et al., 
2018: 209ff.): 
1. It needs to operate its own communication net-
works and services (effectiveness and efficiency) in 
the public sector, also to ensure technological and 
data sovereignty. 
2. Public-service ICT systems should be characterized 
by clear decision-making processes and traceable 
functions (transparency).
3. A holistic approach to security is also key. Data pro-
tection, data security, as well as IT and functional 
security should already be taken into account at the 
planning stage (security).
4. Because of the increasing networking of public ICT 
systems, which are often organized in a decentral-
ized way, it is important that they can cooperate 
across levels and domains (interoperability). 
5. To create inclusiveness and promote the use of pub-
lic-service ICT, involving users in the planning of 
the ICT and user-friendly operability are key ele-
ments. In addition, inclusive, non-discriminatory 
and barrier-free access must be guaranteed in order 
to open up new possibilities of societal, economic 
and political inclusion for everyone (inclusiveness 
and usability).
6. In order for public-service ICT to adequately fulfil 
its societal functions, an equitable balance of inter-
ests among all actors (civil society, business, sci-
ence, public administration) should also be estab-
lished (Fromm et al., 2014). The involvement (coop-
eration, coordination, information) of as many actor 
groups as possible is needed to ensure the function-
ing of public-service ICT infrastructures and serv-
ices (participation).
7. Technical components should be designed to be 
standards-based, modular and exchangeable, in 
order to avoid dependencies on individual manu-
facturers and infrastructure providers. In addition, 
open-source components should be used wherever 
possible and be financed with public money. The 
principle of net neutrality must also be guaranteed 
and strengthened using regulatory measures (com-
petition and plurality).
8. The protection and sustaining of the natural 
life-support systems should also be ensured when 
establishing, expanding and operating ICT infra-
structures and services.
5 .3 .6 
Digital technology as a gender bender?
Despite growing political attention, gender equality has 
still not been achieved in any country in the world 
(Köhler, 2017). The UN member states have agreed on 
an important conceptual framework for gender equality 
in the 2030 Agenda. SDG 5 formulates the goal for the 
global community of overcoming all gender inequalities 
by 2030. These include, for example, lower educational 
opportunities (SDG 4.5), legal and economic inequality, 
harmful socio-cultural practices (e.g. forced marriage, 
etc.) and (sexualized) violence and discrimination 
(SDG 5.1–5.6). Furthermore, SDG 5.b stipulates that 
enabling technology, in particular information and 
communications technology (ICT), should be used to 
promote the empowerment of women (UNGA, 2015). 
How exactly can this emancipatory potential be lever-
aged without reinforcing inequalities? Can digital tech-
nology be used as a ‘gender bender’ – as indicated in 
the title of this arena – to break down existing gender 
boundaries and clichés and contribute to more gender 
justice?
On the one hand, interactions in virtual space offer 
in principle the possibility of overcoming inequalities 
due to physical differences like gender characteristics 
and age, as well as racial discrimination. In addition, 
when precisely targeted, digital technology can also 
have an emancipatory effect. On the other hand, digital 
systems are not created in a technical vacuum. They are 
developed by human beings within a socio-cultural 
context, which is why their development and use run 
the risk of reproducing societal inequalities and dis-
crimination of all kinds (Box 5.3.6-1; Garcia et al., 
2018; Hargittai and Hsieh, 2013; Nakamura, 2014). 
Active political and societal shaping is therefore still 
indispensable in the Digital Age if progress is to be 
made on gender equality, also beyond a two-gender 
understanding (Box 5.3.6-2). This section addresses 
urgent needs for action: dismantling gender-specific 
access barriers, strengthening gender diversity and 
awareness-raising within the tech community, the 
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anti-discriminatory use of algorithms, and designing 
digital experimental spaces for equality and gender 
diversity.
5.3.6.1 
Exclusion from the digital sphere: gender-specific 
access barriers
Although access to information and communication 
systems has improved in general, the gender gap has 
remained unchanged globally. Between 2013 and 2017, 
the proportion of women among people using the inter-
net worldwide rose from 37% to 45% and the propor-
tion of men from 41% to 51% (data are not collected 
for other gender groups). While women and men are 
similarly well connected to the internet in industrialized 
countries (80% of women and 82% of men have 
access), the gender gap remains large in emerging econ-
omies and developing countries. In emerging econ-
omies, 38% of women and 45% of men, and in devel-
oping countries 14% of women and 21% of men have 
access to the internet (Sanou, 2013; ITU, 2017a). 
Disadvantageous cultural contexts and norms create 
access barriers, especially for women and gender minor-
ities (IGF, 2017 and 2018a). These can also limit partici-
pation in creative and decision-making processes 
within the internet and tech sector, or have a negative 
influence on user experience, perpetuating or even 
exacerbating existing inequalities. For example, the 
proportion of female authors in Wikipedia, the world’s 
largest online encyclopaedia, is below 10% (Ford and 
Wajcman, 2017). Not surprisingly, therefore, persistent 
gender stereotypes and inequalities have been identi-
fied on Wikipedia (Graells-Garrido et al., 2015; Wagner 
et al., 2015). The user experience of women and gender 
minorities is also marked by violence in the digital 
realm. Although digital violence is on the increase, par-
ticularly affecting people with transgender identities 
(Levitt and Ippolito, 2013), it is not yet recognized in 
many countries as a ‘real’ form of violence (Šimonovic, 
2018). 
Above all in emerging economies and developing 
countries, however, the unequal availability of financial 
resources is also relevant for the acquisition of end 
devices or network connections (A4AI, 2016; GSMA, 
2018). For example, low-income households in the 
Asia-Pacific region often have only one mobile phone, 
if any, between them; here, the male family members 
often feel entitled to use it exclusively themselves (IGF, 
2017, 2018a). The danger of a digital divide in society 
is especially great in developing countries and emerging 
economies. The reasons for gender-specific barriers to 
access, leading to discrimination or the exclusion of 
women and gender minorities from digital life, there-
fore lie primarily in existing patterns of discrimination.
5.3.6.2 
Still a male domain: gender aspects in the design 
of technical systems 
Much of the power to shape the digitalization process 
lies with people with technical expertise, e.g. program-
mers, IT experts or scientists (Section 4.2.4). How pre-
vailing gender attitudes shape technology development 
and use has been researched since the 1990s by femi-
nist cyber- and technoscience in the social-sciences 
Box 5 .3 .6-1
Digital divides and online discrimination
According to the UN Charter of Human Rights (1948), all per-
sons are entitled to equal protection against all forms of dis-
crimination. The WBGU underpins this general ban on dis-
crimination by explicitly naming the inviolability of human 
dignity as an orientation aid for shaping digitalization and as 
a foundation for the normative compass (Section 2.2). Inclu-
sion and Eigenart are particularly relevant dimensions of this 
compass in the gender context. Tim Berners-Lee designed the 
internet with the idea of creating a universally accessible and 
open network (Berners-Lee, 2010). As a great equalizer, it 
promised equal opportunities in terms of access to informa-
tion and services (Hargittai and Hsieh, 2013). However, dis-
crimination is widespread in both the analogue and digital 
realms. Disadvantages based on diverse identity characteris-
tics often interact (intersectionality) and sometimes lead to 
multiple discrimination, both online and offline (Hill Collins 
and Bilge, 2016). In order to do justice to this diversity of 
digital marginalization dynamics, and going beyond purely 
technical barriers to access, some people use the plural and 
speak of digital divides and inequalities (Hargittai and Hsieh, 
2013; Nakamura, 2014).
Digital divides exist both geographically, for example be-
tween the city and the country or between countries and be-
tween population groups (e.g. according to age and income) 
(Zillien and Haufs-Brusberg, 2014). For example, the World 
Bank estimates that the probability of having internet access 
in African countries is almost three times higher for the 60% 
that are better-off than for the poorer 40% (World Bank, 
2016). In addition to physical access to ICT, the decisive factor 
is in particular skill-based and use-related access: i.e. lan-
guage barriers must be overcome, teachers must be enabled to 
teach ICT-based knowledge, and enough teachers should be 
available in general in the education sector. At the same time, 
digitalization also offers enormous potential for reducing so-
cio-economic disparities. One obstacle is the relatively high 
cost of internet use in developing countries compared to rich-
er countries. While internet access in rich countries costs 
around 1.7% of annual net income, relative access costs can 
amount to as much as 40% of annual net income in develop-
ing countries (Weingarten, 2013).
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(Haraway, 1991; Hawthorne and Klein, 1999; Faulkner, 
2001; Wajcman, 1991, 2010). However, its suggestions 
for critically examining gender-related aspects of tech-
nology development have so far met with little response 
outside the field of gender studies and have not been 
systematically integrated into technical training. 
Since women and gender minorities remain under-rep-
resented among creative technical actors, gender-related 
aspects in the design of technical systems are primarily 
decided by men. This is a circumstance that becomes 
more relevant in society as digital solutions become more 
widespread, for example with the increasing use of vir-
tual assistants. Although a test has shown that language 
assistants were able to refer callers speaking of suicidal 
intentions or health emergencies (e.g. heart attacks) to 
suitable emergency numbers, when other callers men-
tioned domestic violence or rape, these situations were 
not recognized as emergencies (Miner et al., 2016). Fur-
thermore, when personalities or human-like attributes 
are assigned to robots and autonomous systems, there 
is also a danger that female stereotypes will be used and 
existing role understandings reinforced (Ferrando, 
2014). Virtual assistants have already been criticized for 
reacting very reticently to ambiguous questions, insults 
and sexual advances, thus propagating a passive image 
of women (Fessler, 2017). Technical systems are thus 
not neutral, as is often assumed, but reflect existing 
gender attitudes. The gender-specific effects of the 
design of digital technologies on individual users and 
society should be consistently studied and a sensitive 
approach to diversity within the tech community pro-
moted in order to make technology design inclusive.
It is still the case in almost every country in the world 
that, at present, fewer women than men complete 
courses of study in engineering and computer science. 
Exceptions are Oman (where 53% of engineering grad-
uates are female) and Malaysia (where there is parity in 
the IT sector). In Germany, the proportion of female 
graduates was 19.5% in computer science and 23.1% in 
engineering in 2017 (Kompetenzzentrum Technik-Di-
versity-Chancengleichheit, 2018). Similar ratios also 
apply in most countries in the natural sciences, although 
the proportion of female graduates is much higher. In 
Europe and North America it varies between 26% and 
55%. Some developing and emerging countries have 
higher female shares by comparison. Female graduates 
are in the majority in eleven of 18 Arab states, and in 
Guatemala the figure is as high as 75% (UN, 2015b). 
Since the societal significance of these subject groups 
will continue to increase (Grabka, 2016; OECD, 2017a; 
Sorgner et al., 2017; WEF, 2016b), the persisting differ-
ences should be seen as a wake-up call. This applies 
particularly to the not insignificant number of countries 
where the proportion of female graduates in tech-rele-
vant courses of study is falling, not rising (UN, 2015b). 
In addition, the disproportionately high share of men in 
technical occupations is accompanied by a low level of 
awareness of gender equality. In Germany, a supposedly 
progressive country in terms of gender attitudes, only 
17% of men have a role model that is consistent with 
gender equality (Wippermann, 2016). In order to reduce 
unevenly distributed creative power, therefore, diversity 
in  particular within the tech community should be pro-
moted. 
Box 5 .3 .6-2
Overcoming the binary understanding of 
biological and social gender as a global challenge
Overcoming the binary understanding of biological and social 
gender is a global challenge, despite the progress that has 
been made in recent decades. Some countries already have a 
third legal gender category, stating that the person is not clas-
sified according to the two-gender understanding (Shardlow, 
2017; UN, 2015a). Since December 2018, it has been possible 
for intersexual people to be registered as ‘diverse’ in the birth 
register in Germany. Some cultures also historically recognize 
more than two or dynamic gender categories (Nanda, 1999; 
Roscoe, 1991; Kulick, 1998). However, the two-gender un-
derstanding, in which the social gender (gender identity and 
gender roles) conforms to one of two biological sexes (male or 
female), continues to be the norm worldwide (Köhler, 2017). 
This marginalizes diverse gender minorities, such as intersex-
ual people, whose biological gender cannot be classified in 
binary form, and transgender persons, whose gender identity 
does not correspond to the gender assigned to them at birth. 
In addition, it restricts cis-gender men and women because of 
its rigid role attributions (Butler, 1991; OHCHR, 2013; 
 Wippermann, 2016). The global two-gender norm is also 
 reflected in the fact that SDG 5 implicitly has a two-gender 
perspective on reducing gender inequality (Dorey, 2016). 
 Action still needs to be taken, therefore, both nationally and 
internationally, to do justice to the diversity and dynamics of 
gender roles. 
Little attention is currently being paid to the question of 
whether digital technology can be consciously used to cross 
existing gender boundaries, or as an experimental space for 
gender diversity, i.e. as an emancipatory ‘gender bender’. Yet 
this debate is urgently needed: in Germany, for example, an 
initial survey shows that 3.3% of the population do not 
 recognize themselves in the binary male-female model (All-
mendinger, 2017) and only 17% of German men have a gen-
der role model that is consistent with gender equality (Wip-
permann, 2016). In Section 5.3.6.4, the WBGU presents some 
initial ideas on how greater equality and gender diversity can 
be achieved with the help of digital experimental spaces and 
how restrictive role allocations can be broken down.
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5.3.6.3 
Anti-discrimination work using algorithm-based 
systems?
When deployed with deliberately emancipatory inten-
tions, digital solutions can also help to raise awareness 
of existing inequalities and discrimination and to track 
the emergence of rigid role allocations. Social interac-
tions (e.g. written communication in chats, the sharing 
of image material), which until now have not always 
been traceable in detail, leave behind data in digital 
space that can be strategically evaluated. The analysis 
of unstructured data, i.e. data lacking a formalized 
Box 5 .3 .6-3
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘ Digital technology as a gender bender?’
Despite growing political attention, gender equality has still 
not been achieved anywhere in the world (Köhler, 2017). 
Equality policies such as legal harmonization, an equal distri-
bution of unpaid work, and dismantling discriminatory 
 socio-cultural practices are therefore still indispensable. How-
ever, new digital instruments or measures to reduce inequali-
ties in the digital realm should be seen as a complement to 
existing equality policies, not as a replacement for them. 
 > Take gender-specific access barriers into account when 
expanding the net: The global expansion of the net reached 
a milestone in 2018: more than 50% of the world’s popu-
lation now have access to the internet. However, women 
and gender minorities are disproportionately confronted 
with access barriers. As the net continues to expand, more 
attention should be paid to ensuring meaningful access for 
these groups and to identifying and removing context-spe-
cific access barriers. The UN Internet Governance Forum 
has identified barriers such as unaffordability, lack of 
infrastructure, language (lack of local languages), insuffi-
cient digital literacy, social stigma and cultural factors (IGF, 
2017).
 > Digitally advance disengagement from the binary gender 
model and rigid gender roles in all countries: Additional cat-
egories that take gender diversity into account should be 
introduced for digital identities that require gender assign-
ment. AI personalities and humanoid robots should also be 
designed in a gender-sensitive way to prevent the direct 
reproduction of existing stereotypes. In this context, 
the labelling obligation for interactions with machines in 
cyberspace should also be regulated, or else new machine 
categories or ‘machine genders’ should be developed that 
clearly identify machines as machines.
 > Digital experimental spaces to raise awareness of equality 
and gender diversity: Digital experimental spaces should 
be specifically created to enable individuals to experience 
their gender identity via games and to use changes of per-
spective to become more aware of other people’s positions. 
These should be used for educational purposes in schools 
as well as in adult education.
 > Promote diversity in the tech community and bring about 
cultural change: Programmes to empower women and gen-
der minorities in STEM occupations (science, technol-
ogy, engineering and mathematics – STEM) are becoming 
increasingly important as a result of rapid digitalization. 
Tech companies in particular should work towards an inclu-
sive learning and working culture, raising general aware-
ness of anti-discrimination issues and preventing structural 
discrimination. In view of these companies’ increasing soci-
etal impact and the spread of digital products, professional 
ethics should be developed for this branch of industry – 
particularly for product managers and developers – and 
integrated into training.
 > Recognize digital violence for what it is: In order to counter 
new forms of gender-specific discrimination and violence, 
technological and internet-based violence should be 
 recognized as such by all states and taken into account in 
legislation.
Box 5 .3 .6-4
Research recommendations on the arena  
‘Digital technology as a gender bender?’
 > Set up an interdisciplinary research programme to reveal 
gender inequalities and develop a digital anti-discrimination 
agenda: The European Commission and the BMBF should 
create a framework for an interdisciplinary research pro-
gramme that combines expertise in the fields of gender 
and machine learning. The aim of the programme should 
be the systematic investigation of existing gender bias in 
media content, social processes and products in the digi-
tal environment. New analytical methods and qualitative 
social-science approaches offer especially promising pros-
pects here. As a next step, an interdisciplinary task force 
should be set up to develop an anti-discrimination agenda 
for the Digital Age in the light of the research findings.
 > Set up a research agenda regarding the re-production of 
gender and gender inequality: The WBGU recommends set-
ting up a research agenda that specifically examines and 
analyses the gender concepts produced in virtual spaces 
and how they affect existing gender images.
 > Integrate critical gender perspectives into computer-science 
education: A sensitive approach involving diversity is key 
to inclusive technology design. In order to specifically 
minimize the reproduction of unequal notions of gender by 
technical systems, a critical gender perspective should be 
integrated into computer-science studies and related trai-
ning courses. The findings of gender studies conducted by 
feminist cyber- and technoscience in the social-sciences 
should be used in this context.
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structure (e.g. videos, images or text) (Eckert et al. 
2014: 7), can also be used today to improve our under-
standing of gender inequalities. Automated analysis of 
text corpora and film contents have already been used 
to identify discrimination patterns in language use 
( Caliskan et al., 2016) and to quantify the under-rep-
resentation of women in terms of speaking time and 
screen presence in films (GDI, 2017). 
The emergence of gender inequalities can also be 
tracked digitally, as shown, for example, by the analysis 
of comments in the chat room of an interactive com-
puter game: although players are observed only via 
their actions within the computer game, players identi-
fied as females are more likely to receive comments on 
body aspects, whereas players identified as males are 
more likely to receive comments on technical or strate-
gic aspects (Nakandala et al., 2016). On Github, a web-
based online service that enables collaborative software 
development, in a collective decision-making process 
developers accepted 71.8% of the program codes writ-
ten by women when their gender was unknown. When 
their gender was disclosed, the acceptance rate fell to 
62% without any change in the quality of the program 
code (Terrell et al., 2017). 
If algorithms are trained using such distorted data 
without reflection, they reproduce the discriminatory 
patterns. For example, software trained on distorted 
data concluded that ‘computer programmer’ relates to 
‘man’ in the same way as ‘housewife’ relates to ‘woman’ 
(Bolukbasi et al, 2016). This makes it all the more 
important to also recognize and exploit the anti-dis-
criminatory potential of new analytical methods. In this 
way, gender-based discrimination and decisions influ-
enced by (un)conscious bias can be made visible and 
suitable measures for gender equality derived from the 
data.
5.3.6.4  
Digital experimental spaces for gender equality 
and diversity
Flexible and diverse gender identities, which the WBGU 
reaffirms in the category of Eigenart, are lived out in 
virtual spaces (normative compass, Section 2.2;  Cannon 
et al., 2017; Cipolletta et al., 2017). Facebook, for 
example, offers its users up to 73 gender categories to 
choose from (Haimson and Hoffmann, 2016). In addi-
tion, some disadvantaged gender minorities, e.g. trans-
gender people, have an opportunity to develop a sense 
of belonging as well as welfare structures that are often 
denied them in dominant public discourse but repre-
sent central identity generators and necessary points of 
support in everyday life (Cavalcante, 2016). Digital 
spaces can also be used to put people in the ‘digital 
shoes’ of disadvantaged people by means of immersive 
virtual realities using avatars. This raises their aware-
ness e.g. about gender-based exclusion, and negative 
social stereotypes are reduced (Yee and Bailenson, 
2006). Experimentation in digital spaces can therefore 
contribute to softening rigid concepts of roles and to 
establishing new role models that do justice to the 
diversity and dynamics of gender roles.
5 .3 .7 
Digital self-tracking: between empowerment and 
loss of control
The digitalization of more and more areas of life also 
involves the spread of ICT in the healthcare sector. 
Examples include the implantation of digitized devices 
that support physical functions (Topic box 5.3-2) by 
means of virtual consultations with a doctor via video 
chat, or apps and devices for tracking one’s own body. 
Such devices are presented here as examples to illus-
trate the digitalization of the healthcare system and the 
possible implications of the comprehensive collection 
and availability of data. This topic seems particularly 
relevant since digital self-tracking can significantly 
influence three of the four dimensions of the WBGU’s 
normative compass (Section 2.2): inclusion, Eigenart 
and human dignity. It also influences health and 
well-being, which are both goals (SDG 3) and resources 
of a Transformation towards Sustainability (WBGU, 
2016a: 184). 
5.3.7.1 
Digital self-tracking and the data generated 
A survey conducted in 2016 in 16 countries worldwide 
showed that one in three internet users use digital tools 
to observe, evaluate and, when appropriate, monitor 
their own health or fitness. Self-tracking is a form of 
continuous data recording where the initiative for 
recording the data originates from the individual her/
himself. The methods of data collection vary. People 
can enter data (such as eating habits or medical exami-
nation results) in apps and other data carriers them-
selves. Furthermore, networked devices can transmit 
certain measured values (e.g. a person’s weight meas-
ured using networked scales) directly to personal 
devices or central servers. Increasingly, health data are 
collected ‘en passant’ by computers worn directly on 
the body (wearables), e.g. smart watches and fitness 
trackers (Jülicher and Delisle, 2018). In addition to fit-
ness and health data, metadata are also collected, i.e. 
data about the wearable itself, such as the duration and 
intensity of equipment use or connection data (Jülicher 
and Delisle, 2018). All the data collected, including the 
metadata, allow conclusions to be drawn on users’ hab-
People and society  5.3
239
its (Mau, 2017: 118) and are used for behavioural 
assessments and predictions by algorithm-based sys-
tems. The calculation methods are frequently consid-
ered by the manufacturers as trade secrets, so that it is 
incomprehensible for users how the results are obtained 
(Rey, 2018: 5–6). 
Most of the data collected by self-tracking applica-
tions are legally classified as health data (Kampert, 
2018). With regard to the European data-protection 
law, which offers a comparatively high level of protec-
tion (Box 4.2.6-3), health data are personal data relat-
ing to a natural person’s physical or mental health and 
revealing information about that person’s well-being 
(Article 4 no. 15 of the EU-GDPR). The data are classi-
fied as particularly sensitive because processing them 
poses considerable risks to a person’s right to life and 
health (EU-GDPR, Article 9, EU-GDPR, recital 51) and 
could facilitate discrimination (Weichert, 2017). In 
addition to health data (in the narrow sense), however, 
numerous other forms of personal data can also allow 
conclusions to be drawn about a person’s health (e.g. 
movement data or search behaviour on the internet; 
Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017), conclusions that can also be 
classified as relevant to health in related contexts. 
5.3.7.2 
Does digital self-tracking of health strengthen or 
weaken individual self-determination?
There is still a lack of comprehensive and representa-
tive empirical studies on the individual and societal 
effects of digital self-tracking. This section therefore 
examines selected implications of digital self-tracking 
that require further empirical review. 
As a positive effect of digital self-tracking, the liter-
ature emphasizes that users of self-tracking services 
could gain a better understanding of, and more control 
over, their own bodies and state of health even without 
medical expertise (Jülicher and Delisle, 2018: 84; Sha-
ron, 2017: 97). Users’ self-determination can poten-
tially be strengthened by encouraging them – in a 
low-threshold manner and without involving the health 
system – to use digital self-tracking to make health-pro-
moting lifestyle changes (e.g. by increasing their phys-
ical activity) in the sense of prevention, therapy and 
aftercare (Charismha, 2016: 21). Medical staff treating 
patients can also use the data collected – in aggregated 
and visualized form and independently of place and 
time – in diagnostics and the treatment of diseases 
(Charismha, 2016; Heyen, 2016). Furthermore, 
improved knowledge on the part of patients could also 
break down the asymmetry of information in the rela-
tionship between healthcare professionals and patients, 
and possibly lead to greater transparency in healthcare. 
Potentially, it will enable patients to assume more 
responsibility for their own health and, for example, to 
better exercise their patient rights (Charismha, 2016: 2; 
Sharon, 2017: 97). Digital self-tracking could strengthen 
the inclusion and Eigenart of patients (normative 
 compass; Section 2.2). 
In practice, however, it can be seen that self-tracking 
apps sometimes have considerable deficits when it 
comes to data quality, data-collection methods and data 
processing (Heyen, 2016: 7; Lucht et al., undated: 22f.; 
Charismha, 2016: 197f.). This can lead to users being 
misled and making wrong health-related decisions, e.g. 
if diabetics make health-endangering adjustments to 
their insulin dose based on their own digitally meas-
ured blood-sugar level. Poor data quality can also cause 
problems in the subsequent use of data in medical 
research. It is emphasized that a positive side effect of 
individual self-tracking could be the creation of a com-
prehensive database, which, in aggregated form, could 
contribute to medical research. However, in order to 
meaningfully use aggregated and individual health data 
(e.g. for therapies or in research), both the database 
and the data-processing methods must meet scientific 
standards. Furthermore, studies from Germany and 
Europe point out that there is uncertainty, or a lack of 
competence, in the use of fitness-tracking services 
(Budzinski and Schneider, 2017; Adam and Micklitz, 
2016), which could have a negative effect on patient 
sovereignty and thus on inclusion in the health system. 
However, a list of criteria and a web app called the 
APPKRI have been developed to address this problem 
and support users in evaluating and selecting health 
apps.
There is also a discussion that digital self-tracking 
technologies could lead to an (unnoticed) restriction of 
users’ personal freedom and self-determination and 
thus have a negative impact on their Eigenart and 
human dignity. For example, self-tracking technologies 
could be used to monitor and discipline both the sick 
and the healthy (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2015; Sharon, 
2017: 98). In some cases, employers use fitness trackers 
to promote the health of their workforce as part of 
occupational health and safety programmes, thus 
simultaneously gaining access to sensitive data that 
could be used as a basis for calculating a salary or grant-
ing promotions (Christl, 2014: 40; Röcke, 2015: 619). 
Health and life-insurance companies already use data 
from self-tracking services to offer individual insurance 
tariffs or premiums adapted to their policy-holder’s 
lifestyle as part of bonus programmes (Schumacher, 
2016: 48; AOK Plus, undated; Generali Vitality, 2019). 
The data could potentially be used to the detriment of 
users, for example by withdrawing benefits in the event 
of illness or not granting benefits at all if there are devi-
ations from measurement parameters that are regarded 
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Box 5 .3 .7-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Digital self-tracking’
Various measures for maintaining self-determination and 
protecting the privacy of users of self-tracking services are 
discussed in scientific literature. This section presents recom-
mendations considered worthy of support, complemented by 
the WBGU’s own recommendations:
 > Secure privacy, enable sovereignty: In order to ensure data 
protection and data security in self-tracking services and to 
protect their privacy, users must gain sovereignty and con-
trol over their own data and decide what may be done with 
them (Buck et al., 2015: 57; Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 268). 
To this end, incremental opt-in models are proposed that 
allow users to give their consent once, regularly or on a case-
by-case basis (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017a: 270). In addition, 
it is important that self-tracking devices and applications 
offer data-protection-compliant basic settings as standard, 
as stipulated in the European GDPR (privacy by design and/
or privacy by default; Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 270). Audi-
ted or certified software tools in the form of data agents 
can help users to manage the collected data as they wish 
(Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 268). Selling products that are 
flawed in terms of data protection and data security should 
be illegal and sanctioned to ensure that only high-quality 
products are put on the market. Here, authorities, consu-
mer-protection organizations and individuals can promote 
the further development of the law by filing corresponding 
lawsuits. The legal basis is not only rooted in data-protec-
tion law, but possibly also in medical-product law (which 
should be further developed), competition law, consumer-
protection regulations and general liability law (Deutscher 
Ethikrat, 2017: 97ff.). A further development of the liability 
basis, e.g. by applying ‘strict liability’ for processing health-
related big data analyses, might also be considered (Deut-
scher Ethikrat, 2017). The WBGU regards transparency and 
choice as key levers for more self-determination and data 
protection. Here, labelling requirements for data storage and 
a user-friendly administration of usage options (only pri-
vate, also for friends, also for science, or for all) could help. 
Labelling should provide, among other things, answers to 
the following questions: are the data only stored locally on 
the users’ own devices, or also (or even exclusively) cen-
trally? To what extent are they stored centrally?
 > Ensure protection against discrimination and stigmatization, 
safeguard the solidarity principle: The WBGU recommends 
encouraging a societal discourse on the relevance of the soli-
darity principle in healthcare in relation to the (self-)tra-
cking of individuals. The following issues should also be dis-
cussed in this context: How can certain groups of people (e.g. 
addicts) be protected from discrimination and stigmatization 
(e.g. via complaints offices and arbitration bodies) in view 
of the societal trend towards digital self-tracking (Deutscher 
Ethikrat, 2017: 273)? To what extent can individuals be held 
responsible for their health? Should sanctions be imposed on 
‘unhealthy’ behaviour, and from which point on can behavi-
our be classified as ‘unhealthy’ (Heyen, 2016: 12)? How can 
one ensure that appropriate measures are developed so that 
persons are not morally or contractually obliged to use self-
tracking applications or devices (Röcke, 2015: 619f.), e.g. 
by employers or health insurance companies? The WBGU 
regards discourse arenas ( Section 9.4.4) as a way of achie-
ving a societal debate on this topic.
 > Promote health-data skills: Another recommendation is 
that schools, other educational institutions and busi-
nesses should teach comprehensive knowledge on the 
importance of collecting personal data and on the value 
of this data (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 271f.; Charismha, 
2016: 23). This means creating the necessary prerequi-
sites, e.g. by means of teacher training (Deutscher Ethikrat, 
2017: 271f.). The literature also emphasizes the need for 
(further) training of medical staff in the potential of third-
party health data and how to handle the data responsibly 
(Rey, 2018: 16; Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 280). In order to 
empower users, the WGBU recommends information cam-
paigns on the consequences of disclosing one’s health and 
fitness data. In addition, there should be more extensive 
enforcement of the transparency obligations of the opera-
tors of tracking applications and devices, e.g. on their pur-
pose and methods of data collection and the creation of 
user profiles, or on changes to their general terms and con-
ditions (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 270f.; Rey, 2018). 
 > Assure data quality and data security: The prerequisites for 
the usability of health data collected by self-tracking for 
individual, medical and scientific purposes are high levels of 
data quality and data security. The WBGU therefore recom-
mends creating uniform data and documentation stan-
dards, as these enable cross-system data exchange (inte-
roperability) and traceability of the data back to their ori-
gin (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 265). In addition, thresholds 
and/or data ranges for health data should be laid down 
and understandably described. Furthermore, checks on 
the data quality and data security of self-tracking appli-
cations should be carried out and published by indepen-
dent bodies such as technical testing organizations, consu-
mer-protection organizations or patient-protection organi-
zations (Rey, 2018: 5, 16). In addition, internal data audits 
– analogous to invoice audits – can be introduced (Deut-
scher Ethikrat, 2017: 278). In particular, the WBGU reco-
gnizes a need for test seals or data-quality and data-secu-
rity certificates for health apps. Since many devices are 
sold via app stores, a corresponding (self)obligation should 
be introduced, perhaps an obligation for app stores to test 
products (Charismha, 2016: 29). The list of criteria develo-
ped by Fraunhofer FOKUS for evaluating health apps could 
provide a starting point for tests. 
 > Enable the use of self-tracking data for research purposes: 
Provided that users have been fully informed about the 
further use of their data (and/or the data of people for 
whom they are responsible) and about the possible impli-
cations (e.g. for the rights of affected family members when 
disclosing genetic defects), the WBGU recommends making 
it easier for willing users of self-tracking services to make 
their data available for further use in clinical and medical 
research without a strict purpose limitation (Deutscher 
Ethikrat, 2017: 198, 266f.). In addition, standards of beha-
viour – preferably internationally agreed – should be esta-
blished for researchers who wish to use highly sensitive 
health data (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 279). The WBGU 
also sees the possibility of ‘health accounts’ with govern-
ment-supervised intermediary institutions, similar to the 
citizen accounts planned under the Online Access Act 
(OZG), from which data from health apps could be released 
to doctors, hospitals or research institutions. Such a proce-
dure should be considered. The highest security standards 
would have to be applied, permanently updated and fur-
ther developed for such solutions. The concrete feasibility 
of the idea requires further examination. 
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as ideal (Rey, 2018: 8). This could have an impact on the 
overall organization of health systems, especially health 
insurance, if they are organized according to the princi-
ple of solidarity. Where the solidarity principle applies, 
the insured person’s insurance contribution is based on 
their economic capacity, but benefits are granted inde-
pendently according to need (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie 
Online, 2018). An integration of self-tracking applica-
tions into the health-insurance system favours those 
who are physically fit and can (and want to) document 
the fact (Rey, 2018: 15). Potentially, therefore, this 
could lead to restrictions on substantive and economic 
inclusion and to violations of human dignity for those 
less privileged in terms of health, or for all those who 
reject self-tracking of their fitness and health. The ero-
sion of a health system based on the solidarity principle 
could also create or increase overall societal pressure to 
optimize oneself (Schumacher, 2016: 48), thus threat-
ening Eigenart in the sense of diversity. At present, at 
least in Germany and Switzerland, individualized condi-
tions based on proven positive self-tracking data are 
only permitted in the case of supplementary insurance 
policies (Rey, 2018). 
In the context of a possible loss of self-determina-
tion due to digital self-tracking, the concept of reducing 
physical functions and characteristics to numbers is 
also viewed critically (Buck et al., 2015: 57). It is 
thought that users might increasingly determine their 
well-being on the basis of the measured data, thus 
reducing their ability to assess their own body or to 
notice signals (Buck et al., 2015: 57; Sharon, 2017: 107). 
Digital self-tracking carries the risk of undermining a 
person’s autonomous, self-determined interaction with 
his or her own body. The possibility is also considered 
whether a permanent preoccupation with one’s own 
fitness and health might contribute to increased pres-
sure to perform and cause fears of illness (‘cyberchon-
dria’), or increase anxious people’s proneness to hypo-
chondria (Rey, 2018: 8, 10f.). Some even see in the 
self-rationalization through the described tracking 
practices the risk that individuals might become objec-
tified, thus threatening the core of human existence – 
and consequently also human dignity (Selke, 2016: 967; 
Duttweiler and Passoth, 2016: 10). 
The key risk of digital self-tracking is the users’ loss 
of control over their own data (Sharon, 2017: 105; 
Röcke, 2015: 619). For, in the case of self-tracking 
services using wearables or apps, these data are often 
available not only to the users, but also to the tracking 
providers, who pass the data on to third parties. This is 
problematic because users of digital fitness and health 
trackers fitted with a memory function do not have a 
clear picture of how their data are transmitted to and 
used by third parties. A study by the German Federa-
tion of Consumer Organizations (Verbraucherzentrale 
Bundesverband), for example, has shown that provid-
ers of self-tracking apps and self-tracking platforms 
grant themselves comprehensive rights in the use of 
user-generated data in their general terms and condi-
tions and data-protection provisions (Koch, 2014). The 
data are forwarded to and merged with data from third-
party sources (Gigerenzer et al., 2016). Although 
data-protection laws like the GDPR stipulate that con-
sent given for the further use of personal data can be 
invalid, there is a lack of appropriate mechanisms to 
prevent such practices (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2017: 17). 
Box 5 .3 .7-2
Research recommendations on the arena  
‘Digital self-tracking’
 > Research the implications of tracking health data: On the 
one hand, there should be research into the societal poten-
tial (e.g. reducing health costs through self-tracking) 
and into the effectiveness of self-tracking for the indivi-
dual as advertised by providers (e.g. to promote health or 
improve quality of life and one’s own health competence; 
Rey, 2018: 5, 16). On the other hand, it is also necessary to 
empirically show the dangers of tracking, e.g. possible loss 
of control or the danger that excessive digital self-tracking 
can cause an exaggerated fear of illness (‘cyberchondria’) 
(Heyen, 2016: 13; Sharon, 2017: 116; Charismha, 2016: 22; 
Röcke, 2015: 620; Rey, 2018: 10). 
 > Investigate data protection and data security in the field 
of health data during processing by self-tracking services: 
There should be studies on whether and how data pro-
tection and data security can be ensured in self-tracking 
by digital tools, e.g. data agents. In particular, the effec-
tiveness of the evolving legal framework for the further 
use of user data must be examined (Deutscher Ethikrat, 
2017: 269). 
 > Research data quality in self-tracking services: There should 
also be research to determine how a high level of scienti-
fic data quality can be ensured in self-tracking services, 
and what the minimum requirements concerning research 
with data from self-tracking services in view of fluctuating 
data quality are. 
 > Research the importance of fitness and health tracking for 
universal healthcare: There is also a need for research into 
the extent to which the tracking of fitness and vital data 
already plays a role in healthcare today (Charismha, 
2016: 23). It would be interesting to study to what extent 
fitness and health data tracking already has an influence on 
healthcare in different countries. In order to conduct scien-
tifically based societal debates on the significance of the 
solidarity-based system in the health sector, the studies 
should focus on the relationship between the individualiza-
tion of the insurance system and the solidarity principle.
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Topic box 5 .3-2
The technologization of the human being 
In the course of industrialization, and since the 1950s at the 
latest, the influence of human beings on the environment has 
reached such an extent that we must be regarded as a  central, 
formative factor influencing the Earth system. Naming a new 
geological epoch the Anthropocene is an expression of this 
development (Crutzen, 2002; Rosol et al., 2018). In a similar 
way, we are now potentially at the beginning of an epoch in 
which humans will influence their bodies in just as funda-
mental a way as they are influencing the Earth  system today 
(Coeckelbergh, 2013a; Braidotti, 2014, 2016). 
Areas of application and ethical questions
Digitalization expands the horizon of possibilities for techni-
cally changing human characteristics and abilities. The areas 
of application range from implanted RFID chips as a kind of 
digital door key (Mair, 2015) to brain/computer interfaces 
(BCIs), e.g. by deep brain stimulation (Perlmutter and Mink, 
2006; Schermer, 2011; Birbaumer, 2017; Rezeika et al., 2018), 
and the analysis of DNA using artificial intelligence (Domin-
gos, 2015). For example, brain activity can be converted via 
BCIs into signals for technical systems, enabling people to 
give instructions to a computer without touching anything 
or speaking. In the opposite direction, brain activity can be 
influenced by small electrical currents to improve sleep qual-
ity or long-term memory (Birbaumer, 2017; Rezeika et al., 
2018). In the literature, the military application possibilities 
of this technology are currently being prominently discussed; 
for example, brain implants could increase the  vigilance of 
soldiers in stressful situations or if they lack sleep (Tracey 
and Flower, 2014; McCarty, 2014; Pugliese, 2015; Beard et 
al., 2016; Caron, 2018; Harrison Dinniss and Kleffner, 2018). 
But there are also numerous medical areas of application. Deep 
brain stimulation is used, for example, in the treatment of 
Parkinson’s disease or in controlling prostheses (Perlmutter 
and Mink, 2006; Schermer, 2011; Birbaumer, 2017). However, 
when technology is used on humans, questions arise regarding 
ethical guidelines and possible red lines. Such debates can 
potentially be confronted by situations in which today’s eth-
ical discussion becomes too far removed from actual future 
technical and societal developments (Ferrari et al., 2012). Nev-
ertheless, if we are a forward-thinking society, we must start 
asking the right questions today (Section 7.5). 
In the medical field specifically, the focus must be on tech-
nologization’s actual healing effect and patients’ autonomy. If, 
for example, an obsessive-compulsive disorder is treated by 
deep brain stimulation, the question arises as to the extent to 
which the technically induced state of mind actually represents 
an improvement: “Making people feel good is not the same as 
enhancing their well-being” (Schermer, 2011). Furthermore, 
such treatments mean a sensitive intervention into the in-
nermost part of the patient’s being. By linking BCIs with AI 
evaluation, mind reading – i.e. technically identifying thought 
statements – also becomes possible, at least it will be at some 
time in the future, although such attempts have been rudimen-
tary up to now (Mecacci and Haselager, 2017; Roelfsema et 
al., 2018). So far, there have been no legal limits or guidelines 
on appropriate safety measures to protect those affected, and 
many manufacturers and legislators lack the necessary sensi-
tivity (Birbaumer, 2017). Should technical extension become 
the norm in non-medical areas, it also threatens to become a 
category for social status and could thus lead to social pres-
sure for technical self-optimization (Fukuyama, 2002, 2004; 
Buchanan, 2009). 
Fundamental questions about being human
Beyond concrete areas of application and their ethical impli-
cations, fundamental questions arise as to which understand-
ing of being human the technologization of human beings is 
based on, and where the development is leading (Box 2.1.2-1). 
Transhumanist perspectives understand the technologization 
of human beings as overcoming their biological limitations. 
Human enhancement is intended to lift humans from Homo 
sapiens to Homo digitalis, i.e. onto a new evolutionary stage of 
development (Allhoff et al., 2010;  Domingos, 2015; Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016). It is argued that the technologization of human 
beings is nothing fundamentally new and that humans have 
always striven to extend their qualities and abilities (Daniels, 
2009; Coeckelbergh, 2013a). Some people go even further and 
consider any restriction of technologization as problematic, 
because it prevents humans from fully developing their own 
physical potential in the context of what is technically possible 
(Savulescu, 2009). Nevertheless, other authors point to an 
irrefutable core of what it means to be human. The fact that 
human beings might be relieved of their biological limitations 
by human enhancement would not make them less human. 
On the contrary, new vulnerabilities would take their place 
(e.g. susceptibility to problems with the technology); it is not 
biological characteristics, but precisely these vulnerabilities 
in relation to their environment that constitute being human 
(Coeckelbergh, 2011, 2013a). From this point of view, there-
fore, the decisive issue is not humans as supposedly unchange-
able biological beings (human nature), but the essence of being 
human (human being). Critical posthumanist perspectives re-
ject both transhumanism and a categorical understanding of 
the natural, biological human self; instead, they propagate an 
understanding of human intelligence that can also develop in 
interaction with machines (Hayles, 1999). The focus widens 
from the humanistic image of the human being as a rational 
being to detached, open-ended reflection on the essence of 
being human, which cannot be categorically defined by demar-
cation from animals or machines (Haraway, 1991; Braidotti, 
2016). Being human cannot be understood separately from 
possible machine components; rather, there is an indissoluble 
relationship between body and technology (Box 2.1.2-1). 
These different views show that the technologization of 
human beings touches on fundamental questions of being 
human. In view of the expansion of possibilities created by 
digitalization, it cannot be ruled out that hitherto hypothetical 
ethical and societal questions might become concrete in the 
future. This makes it all the more important to create a suitable 
societal framework. Although this is an issue for the future, it 
is imperative that changes in the relationship between humans 
and technology be responsibly anticipated. Just as planetary 
guard rails must be adhered to in the relationship between 
humans and the environment, guard rails for changes relating 
to the technologization of humans in the Digital Age must also 
be negotiated in a discourse and laid down with binding force. 
The need for this is illustrated by another analogy relating to 
climate change: geoengineering to mitigate or even reverse 
global warming through technical interventions has been 
discussed for some time (Marchetti, 1977), but increasingly 
so in recent years (Blackstock and Low, 2018), as a possible 
response to climate change. However, the risks of unleashing 
such an invasive, untested and costly influence on such a com-
plex system as the Earth’s  climate are immense. As in the case 
of the technologization of human beings, it will therefore be 
crucial to agree on global guidelines and regulations before in-
dividual actors create facts with an irreversible societal impact.
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The fact that general terms and conditions are fre-
quently changed without necessarily informing the 
users contributes to the lack of transparency for users 
and ultimately to the loss of their informational self- 
determination (Rey, 2018: 14). 
Overall, the ‘arena’ covered in this section illustrates 
that digital self-tracking potentially offers advantages 
and opportunities, but also involves disadvantages and 
risks with regard to a Transformation towards 
 Sustainability. In a first step, it is necessary to conduct 
empirical research to deepen our knowledge of the 
effects of self-tracking, and to implement quality-as-
surance measures relating to the devices, applications, 
data quality and data protection.
5 .3 .8 
International division of labour and digitaliza-
tion: consequences for developing countries and 
emerging economies
In recent decades, there has been a global ‘shift in 
wealth’ from industrialized countries to emerging econ-
omies and developing countries, and a ‘new global mid-
dle class’ has formed as a result (Kharas, 2010; 
 Milanovic, 2012, 2016). The increasing integration of 
these countries into the trading structures and global 
value chains that have been emerging since the 1980s 
has played a major role in this economic upswing. One 
widespread assessment is that digitalization will change 
these economic interdependencies and the interna-
tional division of labour. On the one hand, there is very 
high technical potential for digitally enhanced labour 
substitution and automation in some developing coun-
tries and emerging economies; on the other, there are 
new opportunities for economic integration and inclu-
sion through digital networking and digital work plat-
forms. The following discussion focuses on the conse-
quences of this for future development dynamics. 
However, a comprehensive, conclusive assessment is 
not yet possible on the basis of the current state of 
research (Lütkenhorst, 2018: 28f.; Schlogl and Sumner, 
2018: 34; Rodrik, 2018). 
5.3.8.1 
Starting position: advances in development during 
the second wave of globalization
The development advances of the past decades are 
closely linked to the second wave of globalization that 
began in the 1980s (‘second unbundling of globaliza-
tion’; Baldwin, 2013; Baldwin and Evenett, 2015; 
World Bank, 2016: 60; Timmer et al., 2014), which was 
initiated by technological progress in information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). By making the 
logistics and coordination of business activities consid-
erably easier, even over long distances, it became pos-
sible to split up production steps into outsourcing and 
offshoring processes and to distribute them interna-
tionally, exploiting local locational advantages. The 
result was a further deepening of international eco-
nomic interdependencies. Even from the 19th century 
onwards, the use of fossil fuels had made it possible to 
reduce the costs and duration of goods transport, mak-
ing it possible to geographically separate consumption 
and production and initiating the first wave of globali-
zation (‘first unbundling of globalization’).
In the course of the second wave of globalization, 
new development models emerged for developing 
countries and emerging economies. Their locational and 
competitive advantages, especially in the form of low-
cost labour and extensive natural resources, allowed 
them to integrate into production and value chains 
(Norton, 2017). Thus, especially in the 2000s, some of 
them achieved much more dynamic (economic) growth 
than industrialized or OECD countries and increased 
their share of global economic output (as a percentage 
of global GDP) and trade volume (OECD, 2016c: 54ff.). 
As a result, the number of absolute poor living on less 
than US$ 1.90 a day, as defined by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2019a), fell from 1.8 billion (1990) to 
770 million (2013). Their share of the world population 
was thus reduced from over 40% at the beginning of 
the 1980s to 10% by 2015 (World Bank, 2019b; status 
in January 2019). This was accompanied by further 
advances in development, such as a reduction in infant 
and maternal mortality, a decline in years lost to disease 
measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), and 
a global increase in life expectancy (Roser, 2019). There 
has also been a sharp decline in illiteracy (Roser and 
Ortiz-Ospina, 2019). However, the growth and devel-
opment dynamics described were primarily driven by 
China, India and some other Asian countries (Rodrik, 
2014; UN DSP, 2015; Milanovic, 2012; 2016). Around 
a quarter of the developing countries, especially in 
Africa, were only integrated into value chains and the 
international division of labour to a small extent (UNDP, 
2010).
Technological progress, especially in ICT, has there-
fore already had a significant impact on trade patterns 
and patterns of international division of labour in the 
past. It is precisely the importance of ICT for the second 
wave of globalization that supports the expectation 
that the patterns of the international division of labour 
and current international economic interdependencies 
will continue to develop and change in the course of 
digitalization (OECD, 2016c: 63f.). It cannot be ruled 
out that the locational advantages of many developing 
countries and emerging economies, which have been 
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decisive in the past, are becoming less important during 
this process, and this poses dangers for the develop-
ment progress that has been achieved and the economic 
inclusion of these countries in global prosperity. In 
view of the foreseeable structural changes in labour 
markets (Section 5.3.9), this is – as further explained 
below – even probable, not least because the industri-
alization processes have not led to an extensive transfer 
of technologies and knowledge to all countries as a 
result of the international division of labour. Not all 
countries have therefore been able to develop from a 
mere ‘workbench’ into more independent technology 
locations with correspondingly highly qualified 
employees (Baldwin, 2013: 198), as this requires, in 
particular, economic inclusion in the potential of digi-
talization. 
5.3.8.2 
Changing value chains through digitalization
Future prospects for economic development based on 
the international division of labour in industrial produc-
tion processes are regarded critically in the context of 
digitalization for two reasons in particular (UNCTAD, 
2016; Stiglitz, 2017a: 630; McKinsey Global Institute, 
2016). 
On the one hand, digitalization is creating new pro-
duction processes that can be expected to reorganize 
production structures. New additive manufacturing pro-
cesses such as 3D printing (Section 3.2) allow a simpler 
and more cost-effective design of products and eliminate 
(labour-intensive) intermediate stages of production. 
They are thus leading towards more decentralized pro-
duction structures and a shortening of global value 
chains (Gebler et al., 2014: 161; Rehnberg and Ponte, 
2017; WEF, 2018b). Previous cost advantages of geo-
graphically concentrated, large-scale production struc-
tures are declining accordingly (UNCTAD, 2017b: 15). 
On the other hand, the development of increasingly 
intelligent technical systems is increasing the possibilities 
of automation, and thus the substitution of human work 
in the production process. This development affects not 
only developing countries and emerging economies, but 
also industrialized countries ( Section 5.3.9). Due to the 
higher proportion of routine work tasks, however, the 
number of jobs at risk in developing countries is esti-
mated to be higher. Table 5.3.8-1, which summarizes 
recent estimates, illustrates this (World Bank, 2016: 122; 
Schlogl and Sumner, 2018; Section 5.3.9). 
However, as discussed in Section 5.3.9, assessments 
of the technical potential of labour substitution as a 
result of automation should not be equated with fore-
casts of actual job losses. It is not yet clear, for example, 
whether automation really will result in cost savings, 
given the frequently very low labour costs in develop-
ing countries and emerging economies. However, other 
factors, such as the growing importance of transport 
costs or customer proximity, can more than compensate 
for labour-cost advantages and contribute to the relo-
cation of production stages back to industrialized coun-
tries (or at least to countries geographically closer to 
home markets or relevant customer groups). 
The growing demand for individualized products, 
which can be better met through more decentralized 
and customer-oriented production structures, is one of 
the central trends in the manufacturing industry (WEF, 
2017b: 11, 2018). For the target countries, however, no 
major increases in employment are to be expected, 
since relocations and backshoring are associated with a 
switch to highly automated production processes. 
There has been a lack of more systematic studies of 
the relevance for re-, back- or near-shoring processes 
up to now. In individual cases, however, such processes 
can already be observed today with a direct reference 
to digitalization (De Backer et al., 2016). The battery 
manufacturer Varta, for example, closed its production 
in Singapore at the end of the 1990s, relocated it back 
to Ellwangen (Germany), and cut the number of 
employees in Singapore from 500 to 100 (Rückver-
lagerung.de 2006). However, even during the partial 
relocation back from Singapore, labour-intensive pro-
duction steps were still being outsourced to Indonesia 
and later also to Shanghai. Outsourcing and backshor-
ing processes therefore took place in parallel here. In 
2017 for the first time in years, Adidas opened a new 
factory in Germany, where sporting-goods manufacture 
is robot-controlled and uses 3D printing for some prod-
ucts (shoes). This was driven in particular by the desire 
to be able to respond as quickly as possible to dynami-
cally changing, specialized customer requirements in 
certain product segments. With this highly automated 
method of production, it should be possible in future to 
relocate production to where the demand is, using the 
‘copy and paste’ principle (Busse, 2017).
In the course of such restructuring, developing 
countries lose jobs and opportunities for economic 
inclusion in global profits on value-added. From a 
development-policy perspective, developing countries 
and emerging economies are threatened by early dein-
dustrialization: their economies are developing into 
service economies after a much shorter period of indus-
trialization and thus at a significantly lower level of 
income and productivity than was the case in many 
industrialized countries in the past (Rodrik, 2016; 
 Lütkehorst, 2018: 60). There are already signs of a 
trend towards ‘early deindustrialization’, particularly in 
Latin American countries (Rodrik, 2016; Schlogl and 
Sumner, 2018: 1). It is precisely for these countries and 
African countries, which so far have hardly benefited 
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from the export-driven industrialization processes of 
globalization, that new growth and development 
models seem necessary (Norton 2017: 26; Rodrik, 
2018; Stiglitz, 2018). The main challenge here is that a 
shift to service jobs seems unlikely to lead to a similar 
structural change promoting long-term employment 
and development potential as the migration of labour 
from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing indus-
try. This assessment is based on the observation that at 
least many traditional service sectors generally have 
only a labour productivity comparable to that of the 
agricultural sector and only little potential to increase 
it, not least because, for example, they offer no oppor-
tunities for economic development via trade and 
exports (Rodrik, 2018). However, digital change in par-
ticular can alter this starting position and open up new 
development potential in the field of services. Thus, in 
the course of digitalization, new jobs for the highly 
qualified are created in the service sector which are not 
necessarily subject to these restrictions and which, for 
example, permit further integration into international 
value chains (Miroudot and Cadestin, 2017; WEF, 
2018b). Examples are highly qualified activities in 
financial and business services or in IT, knowledge-in-
tensive business services. However, in order for these 
specific services to become a new development model, 
substantial investment and reforms of the education 
systems are needed in developing countries and emerg-
ing economies (Stiglitz, 2018; World Bank, 2019c). 
However, the lack of comprehensive educational and 
further-training systems and the corresponding lack of 
qualifications for handling new technologies will also 
mean that new technologies and production processes 
will not be deployed at all in developing countries and 
emerging economies in the field of industrial produc-
tion. In addition to pure cost issues, this creates an 
additional obstacle to locating or maintaining manufac-
turing processes in the countries concerned (Rodrik, 
2018). There are already signs of changing qualification 
requirements in developing countries: in these coun-
tries, too, the demand for labour has increasingly 
shifted towards non-routine activities, which are gen-
erally regarded as less easy to automate, but which 
require completely different skills from the routine 
activities typical of labour-intensive manufacturing 
processes (Reijnders and de Vries, 2018; Section 5.3.9). 
The lack of technological expertise and qualifica-
tions can also prevent independent local businesses 
from using new digital technologies in production and 
marketing. Even when they do succeed, the necessary 
technologies often have to be imported (for example to 
automate production and maintain international com-
petitiveness). In this case, there will be no direct, but an 
indirect, relocation of value creation back to the indus-
trialized countries (UNCTAD, 2017a: 24). The shift 
towards service economies and the structural changes 
Table 5 .3 .8-1
Estimates of the employment effects of automation in developing countries and emerging economies.
Source: Examples taken from: Schlogl and Sumner, 2018: 20-21.
Author(s): Country group/region Estimate
Chandy, 2017 Developing countries Automation is expected to replace jobs 
in developing countries even faster than 
in industrialized countries (p. 15).
Chang and Huynh, 2016 Southeast Asia In ASEAN countries, 56% of workplaces 
are exposed to a high automation risk.
Frey et al., 2016 Developing countries Developing countries are very 
 vulnerable to a growing degree of 
 automation (p. 18).
Frey and Rahbari, 2016 OECD plus Ethiopia, India and China China will lose 77% of jobs as a result of 
automation, India 69%, Ethiopia 85%; in 
the OECD an average of 57% of jobs will 
be lost.
World Bank, 2016 Developing countries Two thirds of all jobs are prone to 
 automation (1.8 billion jobs). 
Avent, 2017 Developing countries New technologies seem to make life 
 more difficult for upcoming countries in 
particular (p. 171).
WEF, 2017a Africa 41% of all jobs in South Africa are prone 
to automation, 44% in Ethiopia, 46% in 
Nigeria and 52% in Kenya.
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on the labour markets – the increasing demand for 
(highly) skilled labour compared to the falling demand 
for less-skilled labour – generally harbour the risk of 
rising inequality and growing social tensions, and this 
also applies within developing countries and emerging 
economies (UNCTAD, 2016; Stiglitz, 2018). In develop-
ing countries and emerging economies, however, these 
developments become even more explosive as a result 
of greater political instability, the often weaker (state) 
institutions, and the frequently lacking or considerably 
weaker social-security mechanisms and systems (World 
Bank, 2019c; Section 5.3.9). Automation can also lead 
to lower demand for migrant workers in industrialized 
countries. The consequence would be a collapse in 
return remittances, which in many developing coun-
tries and emerging economies account for a significant 
proportion of GDP (Norton, 2017). 
On the other hand, technological leapfrogging can 
offer positive development opportunities. In principle, 
this potential is also inherent in digitalization. Promi-
nent examples are mobile communications and the 
mobile internet, which enable communication over long 
distances and internet access even in remote regions 
without the capital-intensive development of cable 
infrastructures, opening up access to banking and 
financial services, for example (World Bank, 2016). 
However, it should also be noted in this context too that 
sufficient education and qualification in handling new 
technologies and media are essential prerequisites for 
all development opportunities based on leapfrogging. 
Against this background, the possibilities for leap-
frogging have so far been seen as being rather low 
( UNCTAD, 2017a; Niebel, 2018).
5.3.8.3 
The changing international division of labour: from 
the analogue to the digital workbench?
By reducing the costs of communication, information 
and searching (Goldfarb et al., 2019), digitalization also 
opens up opportunities for developing countries to 
develop their economies independently. Companies and 
employees can also gain easier access to international 
markets when barriers to market entry are falling 
(World Bank, 2016: 59f.). For instance, digital technol-
ogies can reduce the amount of capital needed to par-
ticipate in international (digital) markets. In principle 
for example, cloud computing also offers smaller com-
panies in developing countries access to the latest tech-
nologies without their having to fully bear the high 
investment costs and risks of server infrastructures 
(World Bank, 2016: 69). At the same time, with the help 
of digitalization (service) activities can be outsourced 
and traded internationally. Digital work platforms rep-
resent a new, global labour market for such jobs, to 
which developing countries and emerging economies 
also have direct access. Digital work platforms 
(Box 5.3.8-1) can thus lead to a new quality in the 
international division of labour. 
There are many examples of how such platforms can 
improve the income situation of people in developing 
countries and emerging economies and connect service 
providers in poor countries with the markets of wealthy 
countries (UNCTAD, 2017b: 47ff.). For example, a 
 former university lecturer in Manila can earn much 
more doing programming work for a US company with-
out having to undertake a time-consuming commute 
(for more examples, see: Graham et al., 2017b). 
Box 5 .3 .8-1
Digital labour platforms 
In ‘digital work’ a distinction can be made between ‘cloud 
work’ and ‘gig work’. A task that can be performed from any-
where over the internet is called ‘cloud work’. ‘Gig work’, on 
the other hand, refers to location-based work facilitated by 
digital platforms (UNCTAD, 2017a: 46). Companies or indi-
vidual clients post job offers on these digital labour platforms, 
for which contractors can then submit a bid. The further re-
duction of information and transaction costs on digital work 
platforms can also help ensure that production processes are 
no longer organized within a company. Instead, individual 
tasks can be distributed globally on a very small scale and 
completely outsourced from companies to quasi-independent 
contractors. These outsourcing processes with the help of 
agencies or the auctioning of work assignments on internet 
platforms, referred to as the new ‘global gig economy’ 
( Norton, 2017), can be interpreted as a digital continuation or 
transformation of the global analogue workbench to a digital 
workbench. As digitalization progresses, a global structural 
change is emerging in which developing countries and emerg-
ing economies are increasingly offering (high-quality) 
 services on the global market. English-language global digital 
labour platforms (e.g. for translating, programming, market-
ing, accounting, office assistance) are currently growing by 
approximately 25% per year (Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 2018). 
In 2016/17, 46% of the companies offering jobs on digital 
labour platforms came from the USA, followed by Europe, 
India, Australia, the UK and Canada (Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 
2018). Offers were also received from Brazil, South Africa and 
Egypt. When it comes to the origins of the contractors, how-
ever, developing countries are more strongly represented, 
above all India and the Philippines (UNCTAD, 2017a: 49). 
Despite these impressive growth figures, the relevance of 
the gig economy is still limited today. Estimates available to 
date of the proportion of the working population who are 
employed full-time via job platforms vary, albeit at a very low 
level of less than 3% (OECD, 2019a). The World Bank esti-
mates that less than 0.5% of the world’s working population 
is currently employed in the gig economy, and less than 0.3% 
in developing countries (World Bank, 2019c).
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With sufficient training and continuously improving 
access to the internet, it can be assumed that millions of 
people in developing countries can potentially benefit 
from the opportunities of generating income on digital 
work platforms (Graham et al., 2017b; Norton, 2017). 
The fact that digital work platforms can reduce the 
number of informal jobs, which are prevalent in many 
of these countries, can also have a positive impact on 
the development of developing countries and emerging 
economies. This can contribute to the state’s ability to 
act, for example by laying the foundations for function-
ing tax systems. However, a fall in informal employ-
ment also removes one of the key hurdles to improving 
people’s situations by providing corresponding 
social-security systems (OECD, 2019a; World Bank, 
2019c; Section 5.3.9).
Despite these advantages, however, the effects of 
the new opportunities for integration into newly 
emerging global labour markets and self-employment 
can be ambivalent, especially for developing countries 
and emerging economies (World Bank, 2019c). 
Although formal employment relationships are increas-
ing, many developing countries and emerging econ-
omies lack adequate social security systems. Where 
such systems exist at all, they are generally geared to 
regular employment relationships. Yet the intensified 
international competitive pressure is currently leading 
to a growing fragmentation of contracts into sub-pro-
jects for the self-employed and thus to a decrease in 
regular, i.e. socially insured, (full-time) employment. 
As a rule, contractors lack the negotiating power to 
enforce social standards and labour rights (van Doorn, 
2017b). The increasingly decentralized organization of 
work processes also plays a role here. This also makes it 
more difficult to monitor working conditions, although 
this is partly counteracted by increasing transparency 
in the course of global,  digital networking. 
Against this background, it is feared that this contin-
Box 5 .3 .8-2
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘International division of labour’
Even in the Digital Age – and especially in view of the chal-
lenges associated with automation – traditional fields of ac-
tion such as education, social security and institutional devel-
opment are still important ‘analogue’ prerequisites for 
creating and using development potential (World Bank, 
2016). 
 > Establishment and promotion of education and training sys-
tems: The spread of digital technologies involves specific 
challenges and new opportunities. In particular, investment 
in education is more necessary than ever, as education and 
training are becoming increasingly important as a basis for 
skilled work. In the Digital Age, education and training are 
key to the successful use of digital technologies in deve-
loping countries, especially in order to open up the pos-
sibilities of new development models based on ‘high-qua-
lity’ services. Questions such as what educational content 
should be taught and how abilities such as creativity, flexi-
bility and general analytical and cognitive skills can be pro-
moted in developing countries – also taking into account 
regional characteristics – cannot yet be answered conclu-
sively; the same applies in industrialized countries. Parti-
cularly in the context of developing countries, questions 
arise as to what influence regional and cultural characte-
ristics have on developing and redesigning suitable educa-
tion systems. However, digital technologies can generally 
be used to make it easier to multiply educational opportu-
nities and offer them universally. This is particularly true in 
the remote rural regions of developing countries, provided 
that the still-large digital divide between urban and rural 
regions can be quickly closed. 
 > Promotion of infrastructure development: The targeted pro-
motion of inclusive infrastructure development adapted to 
local conditions, for example within the framework of deve-
lopment cooperation, is a key approach to reducing regio-
nal disparities and ensuring future economic inclusion. This 
expansion of infrastructures must be accompanied by tech-
nology transfer in order to build up IT industries in deve-
loping countries and thus reduce their dependence on 
imports. One important concrete approach here lies in new 
regulations in the field of the protection or transferability 
of intellectual property rights (Baker et al., 2017) or open-
source solutions. Furthermore, there is a need to counteract 
the ‘brain drain’ from developing countries and emerging 
economies. There should be more incentives for highly skil-
led workers in the digitalization sector to return to their 
home countries from industrialized countries. 
 > Establishment and expansion of social security systems: 
There is still a great need for action to improve social secu-
rity in developing countries and emerging economies. 
Along with improved access to financial and banking ser-
vices, digital technologies should be used to register and 
document the population – also in rural areas. Develop-
ment cooperation could also support the establishment of 
functioning social security systems. In order to effectively 
counter the high international competitive pressure and the 
bargaining power that individual contractors usually lack, 
there should also be efforts to pursue the agreement of 
minimum labour standards in digital work within the fra-
mework of international agreements (e.g. with the ILO). 
Digital technologies and international networking can also 
be valuable tools in verifying compliance with labour stan-
dards and thus monitoring the implementation of interna-
tional agreements. 
 > Development of guidelines for new challenges in occupa-
tional health and safety: However, ICTs also make it increa-
singly possible to monitor employees – ethical guidelines 
already need to be drawn up at the development stage. 
Especially industrialized countries, where these technolo-
gies are largely developed, have a responsibility not to 
export technologies that might contravene labour law in 
their own country.
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uation of the analogue workbench in the digital world 
– parallel to positive employment effects – may lead to 
the emergence of a new type of service precariat, espe-
cially in developing countries and emerging economies 
(UNCTAD, 2017b: 51): “Employment in much of the 
informal sector has always lacked security and protection 
of rights. The ‘gig economy’ is nothing new in developed 
or developing societies. But digital work platforms seem 
likely to spread these characteristics more widely, to 
increase both access and competition, and introduce 
these ways of working to new sectors – probably quite 
rapidly” (Norton, 2017: 9). 
It must be critically questioned whether the hopes 
raised (for example by the World Bank and many gov-
ernments) on the development potential of digital online 
platforms are not being thwarted by existing inequalities 
and power relations (Graham et al., 2017b). In particu-
lar, access to international product markets and to a 
newly emerging labour market on digital platforms is 
highly dependent on the skills of the workforce. There 
is thus a danger that only highly qualified people will 
benefit from the development potential, while the major-
ity of the population will be affected by increasing com-
petitive pressure, inadequate social security and growing 
vulnerability: “There is a risk that the present system 
will create good and well-paying jobs only for a few, 
while for the majority, there will be little security and 
persistent concerns over job quality and level of 
 compensation” (UNCTAD, 2017a: 51). 
Box 5 .3 .8-3
Research recommendations on the arena 
‘International division of labour’
The existing considerable uncertainty about the impact of 
digitalization on work and employment also touches on the 
question of how digital change will alter the economic inte-
gration and inclusion of developing countries and emerging 
economies. At a very fundamental level, there is considerable 
scope for research to identify at an early stage the potential 
of digitalization for the further economic integration of devel-
oping countries, as well as the possible risks (Lütkenhorst, 
2018: 28f.; Schlogl and Sumner, 2018: 34). 
 > A more systematic understanding of the effects of digital 
progress: Whereas in the past, industrialization processes 
generally increased labour productivity and created emplo-
yment at the same time, this is no longer guaranteed in the 
course of digital change. The question of how automation 
and digitalization affect developing countries with their 
own specific production, employment and export struc-
tures has hardly been studied. More detailed research is 
also needed into the conditions under which productivity 
and income growth are likely to translate into employment 
growth in the future, and what relevance possible processes 
of re-, back- or near-shoring will have for the economy as 
a whole. Such a deeper and more systematic understanding 
of the consequences of digitalization on labour markets in 
developing countries and emerging economies would also 
be necessary to be able to assess at an earlier stage politi-
cal risks from possible deindustrialization processes and job 
losses, as well as from rising social tensions caused by any 
unequal development of capital and labour income. 
 > Identification of possible new development models Globali-
zation and the use of low-cost labour have allowed longer-
term development progress in developing countries and 
emerging economies by triggering structural change from 
agricultural economies to increasingly industrialized eco-
nomies. In the future, alternative development models will 
become necessary – models that open up new prospects 
for the young populations in developing countries, some 
of which are growing rapidly. How development can suc-
ceed under these conditions, however, is still largely an 
open question. In this context, the possibilities and prere-
quisites of technological leapfrogging should also be stu-
died in greater depth.
 > International division of labour, new development models 
and environmental protection: In the search for new deve-
lopment models, little attention is paid to the question of 
how the reorganization of the international division of 
labour and the possible shift from analogue to digital work-
benches is related to environmental and climate protection: 
does digitalization help reconcile development models with 
environmental sustainability goals or not? Under the above 
conditions, there is an urgent need to develop alternative 
economic-policy strategies for developing countries in line 
with planetary guardrails. Here, the necessary knowledge 
for orientation and action is lacking, making it difficult to 
point to alternative, future-proof possibilities for develop-
ment. 
 > Changes in working conditions and quality: Similarly, little 
research has been done into the question of how digital 
technologies are changing working conditions in develo-
ping countries and emerging economies, what opportuni-
ties digitalization offers for creating equal working condi-
tions worldwide, and what is necessary for the implemen-
tation of equal working conditions. There is also a consi-
derable need for research into the potential of sustainable 
work (UNDP, 2015), the influence of gainful employment 
on the socio-ecological shaping of lifestyles, and the que-
stion of what contribution digitalization can make by chan-
ging the division of labour. In addition, societal change will 
be needed in developing countries to establish the 
importance of lifelong learning more firmly in society. In 
order to address from the outset new forms of unsustaina-
ble working conditions caused by international competitive 
pressure and a lack of bargaining power, it would also be 
necessary to ask how industrialized countries can shape 
their national labour (market) policies and regulations to 
make a globally fair and sustainable international division 
of labour possible.




The ongoing process of digital structural change in the 
international division of labour has the potential to 
re-order global economic relations on many levels. It 
has been evident for many years that there will be a 
readjustment of the role of developing countries and 
emerging economies in the international division of 
labour. The possibility of unequivocal conclusions on 
the impact of digitalization on the international organ-
ization of value chains is currently limited. This also 
applies to the question of whether the progress made 
during the second wave of globalization could be again 
jeopardized in many developing countries and emerg-
ing economies. However, several studies estimate the 
technical potential of job losses due to automation in 
developing countries and emerging economies to be 
very high (Table 5.3.8-1). 
A change in the international division of labour is 
foreseeable. Robotics and 3D printing will reshape 
entire production processes and structures; digital work 
platforms will result in fewer analogue, but more digital 
‘extended workbenches’. Some people are already talk-
ing about a third wave of globalization (Baldwin, 2016), 
as individual tasks can be distributed and outsourced 
globally in ever smaller parts with the help of new, dig-
itally enhanced manufacturing technologies, as well as 
digital networking and platforms. It is conceivable that 
this new form of the digital division of labour will have 
positive consequences for sustaining the natural 
life-support systems if the resource-intensive transport 
of goods and labour can be significantly reduced. New 
additive manufacturing processes can also contribute to 
this, enabling production to be closer to the customer, 
even if products are designed at remote locations. In 
view of the challenges described here for the future 
development models of developing countries and 
emerging economies, however, it also becomes clear 
that such positive sustainability implications of new 
production structures and technologies at the level of 
resource and environmental protection can generate 
tension with societal goals of sustainable development. 
This also applies in particular to the further potential 
for saving resources through more efficient, more auto-
mated production processes (Section 5.2.1), whereby 
automation reduces resource consumption, but is also 
associated with a (net) loss of employment in develop-
ing countries and emerging economies in view of a low 
level of education and the correspondingly weaker 
global economic integration of these countries. These 
possible sustainability implications, which go beyond 
economic inclusion, are currently hardly being consid-
ered in connection with the further development of the 
international division of labour. They should become 
the subject of intensive research, as should possible 
new development models and the further development 
of existing economic interdependencies, in order to 
provide a more secure basis for policy-making 
( Chapter 10). 
5 .3 .9 
Sustainable working environments of the future
Work, i.e. gainful employment, fulfils broad societal 
functions: it produces goods and services that are rele-
vant to society, secures people’s livelihoods, guarantees 
societal inclusion, and is a source of self-esteem and 
personal respect. Taxation of earned income is also an 
important basis for financing state budgets and, in par-
ticular, social security systems. Not least against this 
background, the successful integration of people into 
the labour market is a largely undisputed, sensible eco-
nomic-policy objective that is also part of development 
and sustainability policy and reflected in the SDGs 
(SDGs 1, 8 and 10).
Labour markets and gainful employment in their 
current form are being profoundly transformed by dig-
italization and the Transformation towards Sustainabil-
ity. The structural change needed for a sustainable eco-
nomic system poses great challenges for people, regions 
and entire societies. To ensure the social compatibility 
of this change, future prospects must be developed for 
people who are currently employed in non-sustainable 
sectors, such as industries dependent on fossil fuels 
(WBGU, 2018b). At the same time, technical systems 
and machines are acquiring (cognitive) abilities through 
interconnectedness and a vast abundance of data with 
which they can compete with human work in an ever 
increasing number of areas. This development fuels 
fears of loss and uncertainty, as already illustrated by 
the discussion on technologically induced (mass) unem-
ployment and distributional conflicts that has been 
ongoing since the beginning of industrialization (Mokyr 
et al., 2015; Allen, 2017). Fears of social relegation and 
loss of acceptance on the part of those affected can also 
play into the hands of populist movements. 
Digitalization undoubtedly poses significant chal-
lenges to the societal functions of (paid) work today and 
the role of work and employment for sustainable devel-
opment. However, the initiated transformation also 
offers opportunities for a new social contract and the 
development of new models for decent work with a new 
quality of work that strengthens inclusion,  Eigenart, and 
more humane and sustainable working conditions. 




Tasks and jobs with clearly definable and repetitive 
processes are particularly suitable for automation. In 
contrast to these routine activities, non-routine activi-
ties require creativity, flexibility or adaptability, as well 
as analytical, cognitive or organizational skills, and 
social or communication skills (empathy; World Bank, 
2019c). How non-routine activities can be successfully 
mastered can often only be imperfectly explained via 
standardized approaches or solutions, so that it is diffi-
cult to codify the necessary processes (‘Polanyi’s Para-
dox’, Autor, 2015). Yet even some jobs with high qual-
ification requirements, e.g. in banks or insurance com-
panies, are categorized as routine activities; in some 
cases, they too have already been taken over by AI 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge, 2017: 126ff.). 
 Conversely, in addition to analytical or ‘abstract’ activ-
ities, some forms of manual work are also classified as 
non-routine activities, e.g. if they do not require high 
educational qualifications but high sensorimotor skills 
and a high degree of adaptability to individual tasks 
(Autor, 2015). 
Quantitative estimates of the technical potential for 
automating today’s occupations and jobs arrive at 
mixed results. If individual occupations are considered, 
almost half of the occupations present in developed 
economies today could be taken over by machines over 
the next 10–20 years (Frey and Osborne, 2013, 2017). 
However, the estimated automation potential is signifi-
cantly reduced when the fact is taken into account that 
occupations generally involve different activities that 
cannot all be performed by machines in the same way. 
In the USA, for example, it is reduced from 38% to 9% 
of jobs (Arntz et al., 2017). Similar orders of magnitude 
are found in other industrialized countries such as 
 Germany (Arnold et al., 2016; Dengler and Matthes, 
2015). For developing countries, however, this poten-
tial is regularly estimated to be higher (Section 5.3.8). 
Whether existing substitution potential is actually 
exploited, however, depends ultimately on societal, 
legal and economic framework conditions (Frey and 
Osborne, 2017; Südekum, 2018) and can therefore in 
principle be shaped by society and politics. Technolog-
ical progress can not only lead to job losses, it also 
induces counteracting effects: it can stimulate positive 
growth and can lead to the emergence of new occupa-
tions and jobs (Benzell et al., 2015; Mokyr et al., 2015; 
Autor, 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a). Up to 
now, it has been difficult to predict whether these 
effects will be as strong as in past technological revolu-
tions (Autor, 2015; Mokyr et al., 2015; Allen, 2017). 
However, new areas of employment have already 
emerged today. Examples include programmers and 
entrepreneurs who develop concrete applications for 
digital technologies (Benzell et al., 2015; Bresnahan 
and Yin, 2017), or agencies that improve the search-en-
gine friendliness of websites. Positive employment 
effects from digitalization may also arise from possible 
improvements in the functioning of (labour) markets, 
the reduction of search and information costs, and the 
reduction of labour-market friction (World Bank, 
2016). In particular, digital labour platforms such as 
Uber, Amazon Mechanical Turk or Etsy allow the place-
ment of work orders and the mediation of jobs in (at 
least ostensible) self-employment even for the smallest 
tasks (Goldfarb et al., 2019; Section 5.3.8). However, 
this does not always create additional employment; 
sometimes regular employment relationships are 
replaced (Eichhorst et al., 2016). 
Negative effects of digitalization and automation on 
the amount of work available can also be mitigated by 
adjusting working hours. Keynes already speculated at 
the beginning of the 20th century about the working 
week being reduced to 15 hours in his grandchildren’s 
generation (Keynes, 1930). Even if reality has lagged 
behind this forecast, working hours have fallen in the 
course of societal negotiation processes in many coun-
tries. As a result of rising labour productivity and 
increasing material prosperity, this has been possible 
without endangering employees’ material livelihoods 
(Mokyr et al., 2015; Boppart and Krusell, 2016; Ste-
venson, 2018). At the same time, leisure activities have 
become more accessible for broad sections of the popu-
lation (Mokyr, 2013; Irmen, 2018). Today, visions of 
future developments even include fully automated 
post-work societies (Aira, 2017) in which people 
receive an appropriate share of the economic wealth 
generated (Pfannebecker and Smith, 2013) and pursue 
activities no longer for gainful employment but 
 primarily with the aim of self-realization. In a pessimis-
tic vision, by contrast, society is split into a class of 
rulers and the ‘useless,’ who have no political or eco-
nomic significance (Harari, 2017).
5.3.9.2  
Distribution implications
Already today, the distribution of income and wealth is 
discussed as a central challenge for social cohesion and 
political stability (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; OECD, 
2015c; World Inequality Lab, 2017; Alvaredo et al., 
2018; Guriev, 2018). Not least against this background, 
the distributional implications of digitalization and the 
Transformation towards Sustainability, as well as the 
structural changes on the labour markets described 
above, are currently increasingly coming into focus. 
Compared to the question of (absolute) employment 
development, it is relatively undisputed that these 
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changes can pose major societal challenges and signifi-
cantly exacerbate existing social tensions (Korinek and 
Stiglitz, 2017; Berg et al., 2018a; Südekum, 2018). 
Moreover, not only the actual measurable consequences 
are of societal and political relevance. Rather, the 
spread of a feeling of insecurity and growing fears of 
social relegation, which can arise from dynamic digital 
development, are also relevant (Bussolo et al., 2018). 
From a sustainability perspective, such developments 
threaten not only societal and economic inclusion, but 
also the necessary political support for, and the shaping 
of, sustainable development. 
Implications for regional and spatial distribution
Since some industries particularly affected by digitali-
zation and the Transformation towards Sustainability are 
concentrated in certain areas, induced distribution 
effects will vary from region to region. Similar to the 
current debate about job losses in the coal industry, 
regional economic and social upheavals can arise as a 
result of incipient structural change, which must be 
accompanied and cushioned in good time by appropriate 
measures (WBGU, 2018b). Regional economic shifts due 
to technological progress have also frequently been 
observed in the past and addressed in numerous studies 
(Arntz et al., 2016). However, there is still a considera-
ble need for research in order to understand the concur-
rence and interaction of the effects on the labour market 
of digital change and the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability. Spatial and regional differences do not com-
pletely lose their significance even with advancing inter-
connectedness and virtualization through digitalization. 
At the international level, factors such as proximity to 
customers and the declining significance of labour costs 
can lead to new patterns of trade relations and the divi-
sion of labour with consequences for distribution and 
development policy ( Section 5.3.8). 
Distribution between jobs requiring different 
qualifications
There is a widening gap between existing and required 
skills and qualifications among people of working age 
as a result of structural change in the labour market 
(‘mismatch of skills’: Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a). 
This is exacerbated by highly dynamic digital techno-
logical progress, as expressed, for example, by the rela-
tively large increase in the potential for labour substi-
tution in Germany (Dengler and Matthes, 2018). In the 
course of digitalization, employment opportunities will 
be preserved or newly created, especially if they involve 
non-routine activities that are difficult to automate. As 
these activities include both highly paid, highly skilled 
‘abstract’ jobs and low-paid ‘manual’ jobs, it is expected 
that employment will shift to both ends of the wage 
distribution, while routine middle-income jobs will dis-
appear (Autor, 2015). This ‘polarization of employ-
ment’ to the opposite ends of wage distribution has 
been observed in many countries since the 1980s and 
is explained, inter alia, by technological progress in ICTs 
(Michaels et al., 2014; Bárány and Siegel, 2018). 
In addition, income inequality can be exacerbated 
between non-routine activities requiring high and low 
qualifications (Eden and Gaggl, 2018). Due to the lim-
ited labour supply, disproportionately large wage 
increases can already be observed today among 
employees with special skills in handling digital tech-
nologies (Gallipoli and Makridis, 2018; Falck et al., 
2016). On the other hand, wages for low-skilled, man-
ual non-routine jobs are likely to come under increasing 
pressure if more and more workers move into these jobs 
from employment that is based on routine tasks and 
thus highly susceptible to automation because of lower 
skill requirements (Autor, 2015). 
Development of growing inequality between capital 
income and earned income
Particularly in industrialized countries, earned income 
as a percentage of overall value added has fallen since 
the 1980s in favour of capital income and corporate 
profits, especially since the turn of the millennium 
(Piketty, 2014; Dao et al., 2017; OECD, 2017b). This 
development is attributed inter alia to automation and, 
more generally, to technological progress in ICT (Eden 
and Gaggl, 2018). The work-substituting effect of digi-
tal change plays an important role here; this ultimately 
reflects the classic distribution conflict between labour 
and the owners of capital and/or machines which has 
existed since industrialization. But the change of market 
structures into ‘winner-takes-all’ markets – which is seen 
to be induced by the parallel increase in the importance 
of immaterial (digital) assets – also plays a role: it pro-
motes market concentration and thus rising profits on 
the corporate side (Autor et al., 2017a, b; Guellec and 
Paunov, 2017; Section 4.2.2). If these developments 
were to continue or were reinforced in the course of 
further digital change, (paid) work would contribute less 
and less to ensuring economic inclusion in society as a 
whole (DeCanio, 2016; Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017). The 
complete substitution of human labour by ever-more-in-
telligent AI systems would ultimately be only the most 
extreme form of this development. 
Market-economy adjustment processes can limit 
losses in wages and thus also distributional implications 
in addition to reducing the number of jobs 
( Section 5.3.2.1). The emergence of new occupations 
again plays a key role here: new occupations counteract 
inequality developments if they evolve around activi-
ties which are not susceptible to automation or for 
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which technical progress has an effect that is comple-
mentary to labour. In this respect, it should also be 
noted that the direction of technological development 
may change over time. For example, other challenges, 
such as sustaining the natural life-support systems, can 
become more ‘pressing’ problems and the use of labour 
can become more attractive compared to other produc-
tion factors (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018b). 
These possible adjustment processes only partially 
reduce the societal challenges and formative tasks that 
result from labour-substituting technological progress. 
They do not prevent phases of transition in which peo-
ple are confronted by changes in occupational profiles 
and qualification requirements. The stabilization of 
employment and earned income can take long periods 
of time – as became clear in the course of the Industrial 
Revolution (Allen, 2009) – and raise intergenerational 
distribution questions accordingly. These are exacer-
bated by the fact that trade-offs can arise between 
income gains for future generations and a more even 
distribution of income in favour of earlier generations 
(Berg et al. 2018a). 
5.3.9.3 
Social security systems and income distribution 
mechanisms 
In view of the foreseeable impact on income distribu-
tion and labour markets, it is important to develop 
approaches that cushion structural changes in labour 
markets and preserve economic and societal inclusion. 
People need financial and temporal flexibility and sup-
port so that the transition from old to new occupations 
can be managed successfully and those who struggle to 
cope with the speed of technological progress are not 
left behind. Functioning social security systems are 
therefore more necessary than ever. However, should 
(paid) work lose so much economic importance that it 
no longer guarantees broad economic inclusion and an 
adequate income distribution, further mechanisms of 
income (re)distribution will be needed to maintain 
social cohesion.
In addition to the growing need for social security, 
digital change endangers the functioning of social 
security systems in their current form. In many coun-
tries, benefits and individual entitlements are directly 
linked to the time people have spent in, and the amounts 
they have earned under, regular employment contracts. 
Additional, more unconditional benefits mainly target 
particularly needy population groups as part of basic 
security benefits, or people not yet of working age. 
Already today, however, the work biographies of young 
people in particular show ever shorter regular employ-
ment relationships, multiple job changes and non-reg-
ular jobs found, for example, via digital labour plat-
forms (Section 5.3.8). Digital change is likely to rein-
force this trend. However, digital work platforms also 
have ambiguous implications in this respect. Especially 
in developing countries, the coverage of social security 
systems is often limited today, due to the traditionally 
large number of informal employment relationships 
there. Digital labour platforms can help overcome insti-
tutional deficits in the registration of work and employ-
ment, and thereby promote formal employment in 
these countries (World Bank, 2019c). 
An additional challenge arises from the impending 
erosion of the funding bases of social security systems 
(OECD, 2019a; World Bank, 2019c). On the one hand, 
the financing of these systems has so far been based 
primarily on income from regular employment, which is 
threatening to become less important. On the other 
hand, with digitalization it becomes less and less impor-
tant where people work, which can lead to work being 
moved to countries with lower social security contribu-
tions for companies (Section 5.3.8) and simultaneously 
reduces the bargaining power of employees (OECD, 
2018d). With earned income’s share of overall value 
added declining, the financing of social systems also 
risks becoming based on an ever smaller share of 
national income. This opens up another dimension of 
inequality and is a possible source of social tension.
To prevent ever larger sections of the population los-
ing access to social security, reform efforts are aimed at 
increasing the flexibility of social security systems with 
respect to frequent changes of occupation and employ-
ment, and at broadening their coverage of an increasing 
variety of employment forms, thus putting regular and 
non-regular employment on an equal footing (OECD, 
2018d, 2019a). This approach would simultaneously 
broaden the funding base and help curb the sometimes 
abusive cutting of labour costs by transforming regular 
into non-regular employment and creating qua-
si-self-employed jobs. Extending the social security 
obligation to self-employment and non-regular 
employment is also being discussed. This would counter 
the risk that, with the emergence of occupations not 
subject to compulsory insurance, more and more peo-
ple, trusting in social solidarity in emergencies, or in 
view of their own economic capacity, would opt out of 
social-security systems and thus undermine the sys-
tems’ principles of solidarity and risk spreading (Eich-
horst et al., 2016; OECD, 2019a).
Rising financing needs for social security and the 
distributional consequences of digital change make a 
further broadening of the funding bases appear sensi-
ble. Such an expansion could also relieve the burden on 
labour in relation to other production factors. This 
would dampen incentives for automation and thus also 
influence future technological development (Stiglitz, 
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2017a; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a, b; World Bank, 
2019c). Higher charges on capital income, wealth and 
corporate profits are under discussion in this context 
(Bussolo et al., 2018; Box 4.2.2-2). Proposals for the 
introduction of digital taxes or robot taxes also point in 
a similar direction (Guerreiro et al., 2017; Acemoglu 
and Restrepo, 2018a, b).
The more issues of a fundamental redistribution of 
income come to the fore and require social security sys-
tems to become more detached from concrete employ-
ment relationships and earned income, the more rele-
vant additional funding bases become (Bussolo et al., 
2018; World Bank, 2019c). At a very fundamental 
level, considering the longer term and possible develop-
ments of AI, it is necessary to think about how an 
appropriate distribution of value added and income can 
be ensured while preserving the other societal func-
tions of gainful employment (Korinek and Stiglitz, 
2017). There is much discussion on concepts of an 
unconditional basic income in this context (Hoynes and 
Rothstein, 2019; Banerjee et al., 2019). Whether, and 
in what form, a basic income can be a suitable response 
to future challenges of income distribution is contro-
versial. A number of economic and societal questions 
arise with regard to fiscal effects, distributional implica-
tions and consequences affecting individual incentives 
for societal and economic inclusion (World Bank, 
2019c). Alternative approaches to guaranteeing broad 
inclusion which are currently being discussed include 
concepts of broader holdings in companies, either 
directly in the form of a broader distribution of com-
pany shares (Eichhorst et al., 2016; Südekum, 2018) or 
indirectly via state-organized future funds (Corneo, 
2015; WBGU, 2018b). Finally, addressing rising market 
concentration, and with it strongly rising corporate 
profits on digital markets, also helps to alleviate con-
cerns about distributional implications and social 
 tensions (Sections 4.2.2, 9.2.3.3; Autor et al., 2017a).
5.3.9.4 
Guiding concepts for sustainable work in the 
future
Even if gainful employment remains a component of 
modern societies, forms and environments of work as 
well as the societal significance of some occupations 
and activities will change considerably. Changes in the 
societal status of work and in the societal concepts of 
‘decent’ work or top-quality work are also possible, and 
these also influence the general perception of technical 
progress itself, as became clear in past epochs (Shiller, 
2019). 
In view of the change in the significance of currently 
established jobs and the advance of ‘intelligent’ 
machines, a change in societal values can be a pre-
requisite for people to continue to experience self-effi-
cacy and a meaning in life. Up to now, however, there 
has been no public discussion about future concepts of 
work that might also be used as orientation for shaping 
digital change. The lack of orientation is currently 
increasing uncertainty and fuelling fears about the 
future. Dystopian and utopian scenarios of post-work 
societies (Chapter 6) can be helpful in initiating such 
discussions and developing ideas on how societal func-
tions linked to gainful employment today might be ful-
filled in the future. The further development of societal 
concepts of work should always take into account the 
goals and requirements of sustainable development. 
The following elements are essential for future models 
in an integrated view of digital change and the Trans-
formation towards Sustainability:
1. Gainful employment in a sustainable economic sys-
tem: The compatibility of newly emerging work 
and employment with environmental sustainability 
goals is key to successfully accomplishing the Trans-
formation towards Sustainability. However, this 
aspect is largely neglected in the current debate on 
the employment effects of digital technological pro-
gress. Equally little attention is paid to the future 
viability of digitally enhanced business models 
against the background of the sustainable develop-
ment goals. Accordingly, this question plays only a 
secondary role in the promotion of business start-
ups (Trautwein et al., 2018). For example, struc-
tures and qualifications representing new obstacles 
to adaptation on the way to more sustainable socie-
ties are threatening to spread (Section 4.3). Instead 
of this, the jobs and business models created in the 
course of digital change should also follow the guid-
ing principle that they support the creation of more 
sustainable economic systems (“There are no jobs 
on a dead planet”: ILO, 2018). In terms of concrete 
implementation, this means that clear frameworks 
are needed that reconcile private-sector inter-
ests and drivers of digital change with sustainable 
development (Section 8.4.1). Here, more stringent 
taxation of environmental damage can also help 
to align environmental sustainability objectives 
with issues of the labour-market effects of digital 
change: it can create room to reduce (fiscal) burdens 
on labour relative to other factors of production and 
value creation and thus help curb strong automa-
tion trends (Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017; Acemoglu 
and Restrepo, 2018a). 
2. Decent and sustainable working environments: 
Although some existing models of future work-
ing environments such as decent work, ‘green jobs’ 
(ILO,2018) or ‘sustainable work’ (UNDP, 2015) 
refer to environmental sustainability challenges, 
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many have been developed without explicit refer-
ence to digitalization. New forms and conditions of 
work through digital technologies represent essen-
tial topic areas relating to the quality and definition 
of decent work. They offer considerable opportuni-
ties to shape more sustainable work, as illustrated, 
for example, by the question of time sovereignty 
as an important feature of work quality and a pre-
requisite for reducing gender disparities (ILO, 2019). 
New forms and possibilities for more independent 
or less location-based work through digitalization 
can undoubtedly strengthen these opportunities, 
but they must not be at the expense of social secur-
ity, for example (Section 5.3.8; World Bank, 2016; 
Hodgson, 2016). However, digital technologies can 
also expand the possibilities for monitoring at the 
workplace. Some companies are already tracking 
computer work steps and implanting microchips 
into employees (Astor, 2017; Anthes, 2017). This 
raises new questions and challenges for the safety 
and health of employees in times of comprehensive 
monitoring possibilities and the possible ‘technolo-
gization of human beings’ (Topic box 5.3-2). 
3. Extended understandings of the meaning of work: 
Experiencing self-efficacy and meaning in life via 
work and jobs usually also depends on whether and 
Box 5 .3 .9-1
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Sustainable working environments of the future’
 > Reform of systems of taxes and levies: A comprehensive 
reform of systems of taxes and levies is a core component 
of the task of sustainably designing the necessary double 
structural change – consisting of labour-substituting, digi-
tal progress and the Transformation towards Sustainability. 
The financial scope for action by the state and social sys-
tems must be maintained and possibly even expanded, so 
that structural change can be accompanied by socio-politi-
cal measures and new tasks in public services can be fulfil-
led in the course of digitalization (Sections 5.3.5, 5.3.10). 
One aim of such a reform should also be to reduce the tax 
burden on earned income, thus reducing incentives for 
automation or labour substitution in view of labour’s far-
reaching societal functions. In addition to a reform of cor-
porate taxation (Box 4.2.2-2), stringently and comprehen-
sively using taxes and levies for the pricing of environmen-
tal damage creates financial leeway. It also helps integrate 
the protection of the natural life-support systems directly 
into private-sector decisions and research and development 
efforts.
 > Promote the societal establishment of an expanded under-
standing of work: Financial incentives can provide stimuli 
for expanding the societally recognized understanding of 
work over time. The reform of systems of taxes and levies 
can include a stronger promotion of voluntary and social 
activities by taking them more into account when asses-
sing taxes and levies. At least on a transitional basis, the 
state can also provide financial support for work that has 
hitherto been unpaid and thereby help ensure that areas 
of work that were previously unpaid, but important from 
a societal and sustainability point of view, are converted 
into paid employment. In addition to such financial stimuli, 
these activities can also promoted by lowering time cons-
traints on people, for example by supporting a reduction in 
working hours and/or encouraging companies to give their 
employees time off. The creation of favourable framework 
conditions, for example for collaborative forms of economic 
activity, can also contribute to a change in the understan-
ding of work (Section 5.2.2).
 > Secure and promote social standards in occupational health 
and safety: The WBGU recommends an international initia-
tive to develop and establish (minimum) standards of occu-
pational health and safety and social security that are as 
global as possible. The initiative should follow on from the 
global dialogue process entitled ‘The Future of Work We 
Want’ of the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2017) 
and address new topics such as the possibilities of work-
place surveillance, the safety and health of employees in 
times of the technologization of humans, and enhance an 
understanding of ‘decent work’ (ILO, 2018: 9) in the Digital 
Age. National approaches and regulations that oblige com-
panies to comply with national minimum standards when 
outsourcing or relocating work from employees to quasi-
self-employed people should be strengthened. A stron-
ger organization of employees engaged in such quasi-self-
employed jobs, for example in the sense of a trade union 
representation that strengthens their bargaining power, 
could be specifically supported for this purpose.
 > Enable participation: Structural changes through decarbo-
nization and, where foreseeable, digitalization should be 
disclosed as early as possible. Such openness can help to 
reduce uncertainty and resulting fears about the future 
and creates the necessary conditions for involving those 
affected, both positively and negatively, in the deve-
lopment of new economic and societal prospects for the 
future. In this way, alternative, sustainable development 
models can be negotiated and new regional identities crea-
ted, for example for regions particularly affected by decar-
bonization and digitalization (WBGU, 2018b).
 > Education: Awakening a lifelong interest in and openness 
to new ideas and independent motivation is an important 
prerequisite for ensuring that people are not overtaxed by 
processes of societal and technical change, that they use 
their freedom to shape their lives in a more self-determined 
way, and that they can experience a meaning to life today 
even without similarly far-reaching and fixed structures of 
gainful employment and labour markets. New educational 
content and formats must be developed for this purpose 
(Section 5.3.4; Harari, 2017; Trajtenberg, soon to be 
 published). The possibilities for continuing vocational trai-
ning should also be expanded and institutionally embedded 
more strongly (ILO, 2019). This applies not only in the 
shorter term with a view to the generations active in the 
labour market today, but also in the longer term in view of 
the very-likely rising dynamics of technical progress and 
societal change (Section 3.4.5).
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how society recognizes and values the contributions 
that all individuals make within their work efforts. 
Especially with intelligent machines taking over 
more and more tasks and jobs in currently highly 
respected areas of human work, societal discussion 
about future concepts of work should also include 
the underlying understanding of the meaning of 
work. Taking into account the goals of sustainable 
development, the main issue here is recognizing and 
raising the status of work activities that contrib-
ute to sustaining natural life-support systems or to 
social cohesion by promoting Eigenart and societal 
inclusion. Today too, these activities include volun-
tary activities, political or social work, and gener-
ally activities that are often not organized via regu-
lar labour markets and are therefore often less visi-
ble in society. With creative thinking and empathic 
action, many of these activities are characterized by 
abilities that make them difficult to automate (Sec-
tion 5.3.3.1). Financial support or more time sover-
eignty in gainful employment relationships can be 
first steps to raising the societal status of such activ-
ities. In the past, the understanding of the mean-
ing of work has been successfully broadened by, for 
example, making the typical features of female life 
contexts visible, so that jobs traditionally carried 
out by women (e.g. housework, raising children, 
Box 5 .3 .9-2
Recommendations for research on the arena 
‘Sustainable working environments of the future’
 > Jointly examine the impact of digital change and the Trans-
formation towards Sustainability on the labour markets 
Existing research projects on the Transformation towards 
Sustainability and related processes of structural change 
should add labour-substituting digital progress to their 
research agenda. Projects on the effects of digitalization 
on the labour market should also focus on the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability and the associated processes of 
structural change. In addition, regional forecast maps could 
be produced in developed economies to assess the changes 
in employment relationships as a result of these trans-
formation processes; this information could help deve-
lop (regional) structural programmes with a more precise 
‘fit’. In Germany, for example, the BMWi and BMAS could 
set up a corresponding project together with social- and 
labour-policy research institutes such as the Institute for 
Labour Market and Occupational Research of the Federal 
Employment Agency.
 > Develop and experimentally test new distribution mech-
anisms: New concepts of redistribution and participation 
should be developed at an early stage and examined in fea-
sibility studies. Initial insights on the societal consequences 
of forms of participation such as corporate holdings, an 
unconditional basic income, or payouts from future funds 
could be gained in experiments with a limited number of 
participants and time horizon. The following questions in 
particular should also be addressed: (1) whether, and under 
what conditions, different redistribution mechanisms allow 
people to experience self-esteem and a meaning in life, 
(2) whether, how and over what time periods a widely 
accepted societal change could be implemented, and (3) 
whether there are consequences for the stability and func-
tioning of democratic societies (Cowen, 2019). Finally, in 
addition to experiments, systemic, comprehensive analyses 
of concepts for financing such distribution mechanisms are 
required which also take into account the need for a reform 
of tax systems as a whole and the consequences for the 
financing of the state and social security systems.
 > Develop new models for sustainable work in the future: In 
the WBGU’s view, different scientific disciplines should be 
involved in researching the guiding principles for societies 
that guarantee sustainable work in the future. The digitally 
enhanced transformation to a sustainable economic system 
is a key starting point for a corresponding guiding prin-
ciple. Newly emerging jobs and activities, as well as new 
business models and corporate forms, should be compati-
ble with environmental objectives so as not to create new 
adaptation barriers and path dependencies. Furthermore, 
existing models such as decent work, ‘green jobs’ or sustai-
nable work should be further developed to meet new chal-
lenges arising from digital technologies, e.g. by increasing 
monitoring possibilities at the workplace and by safegu-
arding new forms of self-employment. A third key ele-
ment in developing future concepts of sustainable working 
environments is the societal understanding of what work 
is. From today’s point of view, an extension of the cur-
rent understanding of work seems sensible and necessary. 
On the one hand, it can serve societal goals of sustainable 
development. On the other, however, it is also a prerequi-
site that special, essentially human activities and abilities 
that can scarcely be automated are given the societal reco-
gnition and status that is necessary for a feeling of self-
efficacy. How such a societal (value) change can be initia-
ted and actively promoted, however, still appears to be lar-
gely an open question, so that the need for research is cor-
respondingly high. 
 > Expand our understanding of the implications of digital tech-
nological progress for work and income distribution: There is 
still a considerable need for both theoretical and empirical 
research in order to systemically and profoundly under-
stand the effects of digital technological progress on work 
and income distribution. Especially in the long term, when 
thinking about the implications of AI, very far-reaching 
research questions arise: Which factors (e.g. land, energy, 
capital) are still economically relevant in extreme scenarios 
of highly automated production and highly developed AI? 
According to which rules should ownership of these factors 
be distributed? Is there rivalry and competition for the use 
of factors between humans and intelligent technical sys-
tems, and if so, how can human access be ensured and the 
(natural) life-support systems thus sustained?
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caring for those in need of help) were recognized 
and received a higher societal status than before. 
5.3.9.5 
Conclusions
Without doubt, labour markets are being profoundly 
transformed by digitalization and the Transformation 
towards Sustainability. The broad impact and speed of 
digital technological progress and the new quality of 
automation represent a special feature in any historical 
comparison. However, in the foreseeable future the 
WBGU does not expect digitalization to herald the end 
of work and employment, as some have imagined as 
either a utopia or a dystopia. People will continue to 
work in the future, but it remains to be seen how these 
work efforts can be embedded into society and organ-
ized in such a way that the functions of gainful employ-
ment as we know them today – securing a livelihood, 
societal inclusion, the basis of self-esteem – can be 
guaranteed in the future. To this end, structural change 
in labour markets should be accompanied by measures 
of social and educational policy. New distribution 
mechanisms that ensure adequate economic inclusion, 
preserve incentives for individual participation, and are 
accepted by society should be developed and experi-
mentally tested. Digital change and the Transformation 
towards Sustainability offer opportunities to develop 
and establish new models for more sustainable working 
environments.
5 .3 .10 
Digital commons 
In the Digital Age, an enormous increase is taking place 
both in digitized data (Section 3.3.2) and in informa-
tion and knowledge goods based on them. These can be 
used in whole or in part for the common good to 
strengthen social cohesion and boost societal and eco-
nomic innovation. The WBGU describes such goods as 
digital commons. They can be produced or maintained 
either directly or as by-products (like the online 
 encyclopaedia Wikipedia, Open Street Map, Open Sea 
Map or the data and applications related to WheelMap), 
but they can also come from other sources, such as the 
public sector. Clear concepts and fundamental organi-
zational, regulatory and financial decisions must be 
taken for their realization and preservation – to ensure 
that these valuable goods are accessible for 
 common-good-oriented uses and to protect them from 
misuse. 
5.3.10.1 
Digital commons as a key instrument for the 
 digital common good
The traditional term ‘commons’ is not a technical term 
in the narrower sense of the word; it is more general 
and refers to a multitude of non-private goods that are 
used by a group (whose size can vary considerably from 
local to global) and are susceptible to different social 
dilemmas such as overuse, supply shortages, contain-
ment or exclusion. The term is often used and the sub-
ject of very lively discussion in academic, political and 
civil-society discourses, although in very different 
manifestations (Dorsch and Flachsland, 2019). 
In the WBGU’s understanding, unlike classic natural 
commons, digital commons share the characteristics of 
‘social commons’ (Heller, 2012) such as knowledge, 
language or the internet, which in principle are non- 
rival, i .e. they are not reduced or consumed by use. 
However, social dilemmas frequently arise in everyday 
life, for example through exclusion, privatization or 
underuse. The WBGU therefore defines digital com-
mons in a normative way as all digitized data, informa-
tion and knowledge goods which are non-rival resources 
for the common good and should be made accessible to 
the public as widely as possible and be provided tech-
nically via public-sector ICT (Section 5.3.5). Examples 
of digital commons include free education in the sense 
of open education and Open Educational Resources 
(OERs; Section 5.3.10.2), freely accessible knowledge 
via open access (Section 5.3.10.3), freely accessible 
data and facts via open data (Section 5.3.10.4), and the 
digitized cultural and natural heritage (Section 5.3.10.5). 
Digital spaces open up new possibilities for these com-
mon goods in terms of broader, non-rival availability.
Each of these types of digital commons are digital 
instruments for understanding our natural life-support 
systems and societal conditions, and for an informed 
and mature society. They are sources of education, 
open discourse and participation and make an original 
contribution to strengthening participation and dignity 
as well as an implicit contribution to sustaining the nat-
ural life-support systems. Based on them, the digital 
divide can be reduced, diverse skills can be strength-
ened, and offers oriented towards specific needs can be 
created, e.g. for open innovation and civil science 
( Section 10.2.4.1) or for needy social groups. In this 
way, digital commons can strengthen Eigenart. Creative 
Commons licenses (CCDE, 2019) have for some time 
offered a broad and frequently used portfolio of options 
for the regulated provision of digital commons through 
a flexible licensing model for open and free offers. The 
Equitable Licensing Model (Box 5.3.10-1) is also wide-
spread in the USA and the UK – describing a socially 
acceptable form of patent exploitation, which is used 
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The aim of open education is to “make education and 
educational materials freely available. In the narrower 
sense it is often related to knowledge transfer via the 
internet, which is based on the one hand on free learn-
ing materials, and on the other hand on generally acces-
sible learning platforms” ([do:index], undated). 
Open materials for learning and education, also 
known as Open Educational Resources (OERs), have 
many definitions with different emphases regarding 
the breadth of the target group, the formats (digitized 
or other materials), and conditions of use with regard to 
the payment of usage costs (Dobusch et al., undated:  5f.). 
Following UNESCO’s definition, the term OERs is used 
here to refer to educational materials that can be avail-
able in the form of different media (e.g. books, courses) 
and are made available in the public domain or under an 
open licence. This means that they are accessible and 
usable free of charge with no, or only minor, restric-
tions and can be modified and distributed by the users 
(Neumann and Muuss-Merholz, 2017:  11). OERs are 
not in competition with educational institutions, but 
should rather be seen as a supplement to conventional 
educational offers made by schools and other educa-
tional institutions (Section 5.3.4).
OERs are seen as having the potential to increase 
educational equity by improving knowledge sharing, 
capacity building and access to quality education (Neu-
mann and Muuss-Merholz, 2017:  11). For example, the 
exchange of materials among teachers across institu-
tional and national borders and the preparation of school 
lessons, seminars, etc. could be facilitated in this way 
(Arbeitsgruppe zu Open Educational Resources, 2015:  4). 
In addition, OERs offer the possibility of accessing teach-
ing materials independent of time and place and hold 
potential for informal learning outside educational insti-
tutions such as schools and universities (Arbeitsgruppe 
zu Open Educational Resources, 2015:  4). Furthermore, 
OERs allow the promotion of individualized teaching 
and learning processes because teaching content can be 
more easily adapted to specific learning needs and con-
texts (Arbeitsgruppe zu Open Educational Resources, 
2015:  2; Metze-Mangold, 2017:  9). They are also seen 
as having the potential to improve the cost efficiency 
and quality of teaching and learning outcomes (UNESCO, 
2012b), because free teaching and learning materials 
could reduce costs for educational institutions, students 
and especially for disadvantaged groups (European 
 Commission, 2014). Overall, therefore, free education 
can have a  positive impact on achieving SDG 4, which 
aims to ensure inclusive, equitable and quality education 
by 2030 and to promote lifelong learning opportunities 
for all (Orr et al., 2018:  12). 
On the other hand, there is the risk that the materials 
provided might be of poor quality (Falconer et al., 
2013:  39), even though there is in principle a chance 
that these will be continuously further developed by 
users and their quality improved (Metze-Mangold, 
2017:  9). Where the creation and further-processing 
processes are non-transparent, there is a risk that OERs 
may contain content errors or tendentious statements. 
It is therefore necessary to sensitize teachers and learn-
ers to a critical approach to these educational materials 
(Arbeitsgruppe zu Open Educational Resources, 
2015:  4). In addition, implementation involves the risk 
of potential copyright infringements (Neumann and 
Muuss-Merholz, 2017:  17). Another problem is that 
OERs are unlikely to break the dominance of large 
 publishers. With regard to Germany, it is assumed that 
the use of OERs at least in Germany will not contribute 
to reducing the costs of teaching and learning materials 
(Arbeitsgruppe zu Open Educational Resources, 2015). 
In Germany small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
or spin-offs would seem most likely to create and dis-
seminate OERs, but large publishing companies could 
also take on this task (Arbeitsgruppe zu Open Educa-
tional Resources, 2015). New business models that are 
adapted by large companies as part of their strategy are 
problematic here – this has already happened, for 
example, in the context of open-source software and 
open access (Section 10.2.4.1). The same is also 
 conceivable in the case of OERs with regard to quality 
generation and assurance by established publishers in 
the school and further-education sector (Arbeitsgruppe 
zu Open Educational Resources, 2015:  7). In implemen-
tation, it is important to ensure that OERs maintain or 
increase the diversity of teaching and counteract the 
dominance of individual actors and institutions. In 
order to be able to use the advantages of OERs, the 
users need media skills as well as skills of independent 
learning, which must be trained accordingly 
( Section 5.3.2). 
5.3.10.3 
Free knowledge
Although open access is already firmly embedded in 
scientific practice, both its definition and its concrete 
implementation remain the subject of intensive debates 
on the openness of science (Open Science;  Section 10.3.1). 
In the first implementations, open access refers to 
 scientific publications and generally remains distinct 
from open access to data in the general research context 
in the sense of open data (Sitek and Bertelmann, 2014). 
One exception is the still rarely used  supplement Open 
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Access to Data (Klump, 2012) for the underlying research 
data. At the same time, however, there is also a broader 
understanding: while UNESCO (undated) emphasizes 
free access to scientific information and the unrestricted 
use of electronic data for all, knowledge is ‘open’ accord-
ing to the the ‘Open Definition 2.1’ of the Open Knowl-
edge Foundation (undated) when it is freely accessible, 
usable, modifiable and shareable. In this case, open 
access to knowledge explicitly aims at the possibility of 
downloading complete works free of charge, stating the 
necessary information about the licence and the author. 
Such a broad definition therefore includes not only 
research results, but also raw and metadata, other source 
materials and digital representations in the form of 
images, graphics or multimedia material, and thus poten-
tially also affects other components of the discourse on 
open science, such as open methodology to ensure the 
traceability of data analyses carried out (Section 10.3.1). 
The main potential lies in a greater visibility of 
research results, better knowledge transfer, increased 
research efficiency and promotion of good scientific 
practice, as well as potential opportunities for coopera-
tion and new ways of working and financing; more effi-
ciency, faster scientific progress, and a strengthening of 
citizen science are also frequently mentioned (Fecher 
and Friesike, 2014). In addition to better and faster dis-
semination of scientific information (Max Planck 
 Society, 2003), open access also emerged against the 
background of rising costs in scientific publishing 
(Swissuniversities, undated ) and the dominance of 
profit-oriented publishers. With the help of open 
access, the dissemination of knowledge should no 
longer be restricted by high costs or copyright. Whether 
this has been achieved or whether publishing 
 monopolies have even been strengthened by open 
access ( Hagner, 2018) is disputed, but the criticism is 
not directed at the concept as such, but at its implemen-
tation in the scientific field to date. In the WBGU’s 
view, publicly financed research results should gener-
ally be understood (in the sense of open access) as 
 commons that are accessible to all and usable without 
restriction. The extent to which the further implemen-
tation of open access will do justice to this ideal is cur-
rently still open and can therefore be shaped politically. 
 Ultimately, even in a global context, what remains deci-
sive at the end of the day is what knowledge is available 
to whom via what path. An example of a particularly 
successful international free knowledge infrastructure 
that has digitally democratized knowledge and made it 
available is the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. This 
has also helped to overcome linguistic barriers, although 
there is still room for improvement in the multilingual 
aspect. Beyond questions of linguistic boundaries and 
opportunities, such as automated translation proposals 
via AI, challenges for free access to knowledge include 
both over- and under-use as well as the quality man-
agement of content in corresponding repositories. 
5.3.10.4 
Open data
Not only open science and its potential for interaction 
with society depend on open access to knowledge. 
Open data, a term that is similarly not clearly defined, 
at its core stands for freely accessible data via the 
Box 5 .3 .10-1
Licensing models
The Creative Commons licence 
Creative Commons (CC) is a non-profit organization founded 
in 2001 that has developed standards-based licence agree-
ments enabling creators to make their works available for use 
by others to varying degrees. CC has developed a total of six 
standard licensing agreements that enable authors to deter-
mine what may or may not be done with their works (CCDE, 
2019):
 > Attribution 4.0 International,
 > Attribution – ShareAlike 4.0 International (distribution on 
the same terms),
 > Attribution – NoDerivs 4.0 International, 
 > Attribution – NonCommercial 4.0 International,
 > Attribution – NonCommercial – Share Alike 4.0 Internatio-
nal (distribution on the same terms), 
 > Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivs 4.0  International.
CC licences allow content to become “part of the growing and 
living commons” through the ability to share content (CCDE, 
2019).
The model of equitable licences
Equitable licensing refers to a socially acceptable licensing 
model in which the results of publicly funded research are not 
patented, so that poorer countries in particular have easier 
access to research results (Ferretti et al., 2016). The model has 
its origins in the USA, where it was developed in 2001 in the 
course of the debate about access of poor sections of the 
population in Africa to medicines for treating HIV (Godt et al., 
2019). In the meantime, there are various forms of these 
 equitable licences, “which either impose direct supply obliga-
tions on the licensee or, by waiving patent enforcement in 
certain countries, indirectly make a domestic, inexpensive 
production of drugs possible” (Godt et al., 2019: 1). While the 
model is already increasingly being used in the Anglo-Amer-
ican region, it is not yet widely used in Germany (Ferretti et 
al., 2016). The Universities Allied for Essential Medicines net-
work, founded in response to the debate on access to HIV 
drugs, advocates the use of this licensing model in publicly 
funded research worldwide. Equitable licensing makes the 
societal responsibility of publicly funded research clear 
( Ferretti et al., 2016) and is regarded as “a pragmatic example 
of the implementation of public demands on research as 
 commons” (Godt et al., 2019: 3).
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 internet and their unrestricted use. Open data thus 
offer broad opportunities for specific applications in 
the sense of the common good. Examples include plat-
forms providing open data – e.g. on the voting behav-
iour of politicians, statistics, transport, environmental 
and geodata, scientific publications or radio and televi-
sion programmes. This not only makes better infra-
structure management possible, but also facilitates 
exchange between citizens and authorities, as well as 
data deliveries within the framework of citizen science 
– up to jointly created, freely available digital 
 cartography (Hagendorff, 2016b:  127ff.).
Knowledge that is particularly relevant for the general 
public, e.g. that is made available by public administra-
tion (e.g. open government data) or private companies, 
requires practicable solutions and incentive structures. 
As in science, open data without methodological docu-
mentation on collection, cleansing, maintenance and 
analysis cannot be used meaningfully. Therefore, the 
current state of research on reproducibility of results by 
open data and methodology (Hampson, 2017) should 
also be taken into account by repositories for open 
( government) data. 
Also in the sense of inclusion, the efficient dissemi-
nation of knowledge and data in the exchange between 
society and science ultimately depends on the extent to 
which new collaborative approaches to open science are 
applied not only there, but also in society. From an 
 economic perspective, the German Federal Network 
Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, 2018:  7) has pointed out 
not only the great importance of data as a competition 
and  value-creation factor in network sectors and for the 
 digital network economy, but also the multifacetedness 
and complexity of data-related issues. The main chal-
lenge for an appropriate balance of interests between 
different market players is the development of clear, 
innovation-friendly and data-protection-compliant 
 regulations. With regard to conflicting objectives, e.g. 
between exploitation interests and consumer protection, 
according to the Federal Network Agency comprehen-
sive, continuous and proactive market observation and 
also reporting obligations for companies are crucial for 
a well-founded situation assessment (Bundes-
netzagentur, 2018:  7).
5.3.10.5 
Digitized cultural and natural heritage 
According to UNESCO, cultural heritage includes mon-
uments, groups of buildings and sites of exceptional 
universal value (UNESCO, 1972). Digitized cultural her-
itage is created by the digitization of these physical cul-
tural assets (artefacts, objects) and the information 
about them (e.g. data on cultural assets, digital texts, 
image sources or reconstructions of buildings and their 
history). A large part of the research carried out in the 
field of digital humanities is already contributing to 
digital heritage. Examples include digital editions of the 
writings of classical authors or 3D scans of ancient 
works of art (Kornwachs, 2016; Sahle, 2013).
According to UNESCO, natural heritage includes 
“natural features consisting of physical and biological 
formations or groups of such formations”, geological 
and physiographic formations that are habitats for 
endangered plant and animal species, as well as natural 
sites (UNESCO, 1972: Art. 2). For aesthetic or scientific 
reasons, or for reasons of nature conservation, all are 
considered to have exceptional universal value 
( UNESCO, 1972). Digitized natural heritage is the digi-
tally recorded physical natural heritage, e.g. data sets 
on plants, animals, minerals, nature reserves or fossil 
sites. 
Since cultural and natural heritage belongs to the 
foundation of our lives and our quality of life, it is 
important to preserve it for future generations (DBU, 
undated). This is becoming increasingly important, for 
example, in the face of rising sea levels (e.g. the immi-
nent demise of island states such as Kiribati, including 
its world cultural heritage), the progressive destruction 
of nature (e.g. logging in rainforests) or in the wake of 
armed conflicts and terrorism (e.g. cultural vandalism). 
The digitization of the cultural and natural heritage 
serves to secure and provide broad access to natural 
and cultural content for people across countries and 
generations over the long term (Section 5.2.11), but 
should not be a substitute for committed measures to 
protect the physical cultural and natural heritage. In 
this way, cultural and natural heritage, as well as previ-
ously protected knowledge (reserved for experts only) 
from galleries, libraries, archives and museums, can be 
Box 5 .3 .10-2
The digitized cultural heritage Europeana
The Europeana Collections by its own account grants users 
access to more than 50 million objects (books, music, works 
of art, etc.) in digitized form (Europeana, 2019b). The aim is 
to make it easier for people to access European cultural assets 
for different purposes. Through its work, Europeana wants to 
contribute to an “open, informed and creative society” 
( Europeana, 2019b). The Europeana prototype was launched 
in 2008 (and has been in regular operation since 2010); it 
made 4.5 million digital objects accessible at that time. In ad-
dition to libraries, museums, archives and galleries are in-
volved in Europeana and have created a common access point 
to European cultural heritage (Europeana, 2019a).
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made accessible to an almost unlimited number of 
interested people (Królikowski, 2014). Consequently, 
access to digitized cultural and natural heritage offers 
opportunities for the creation and exchange of know-
ledge worldwide (UNESCO, 2003). For example, the 
possibility of learning independently of place and time 
can improve the achievement of the UN’s educational 
goals, e.g. using apps such as ‘App – in the wild forest’. 
This app is a joint project of four German federal states, 
“a modern and effective medium in nature conservation 
communication intended to communicate the impor-
tant topic of biological diversity in the natural old beech 
forests of Germany” (Kohlhammer, undated). 
There is also the possibility of (remotely) exploring 
natural and cultural assets (Pieraccini et al., 2001:  64). 
For example, virtual walks can be taken through 
national parks, such as the Ordesa National Park in 
Spain (Aragón virtual, 2015); or historical sites can be 
experienced via virtual reality, e.g. using the KotinosVR 
application, which allows interested parties to discover 
the treasures of the Archaeological Museum of Ancient 
Olympia (Kotinos, 2016). Digitally experiencing the 
natural heritage can contribute to the creation or 
strengthening of a world environmental awareness 
(Section 5.3.1), which in turn could promote actions to 
preserve the Earth system and enable the development 
of a lifestyle based on solidarity (Section 5.3.1). 
 Monitoring (Sections 3.3.5.1, 5.2.11) can also be used 
Box 5 .3 .10-3
Recommendations for action on the arena 
‘Digital commons’
A wide range of organizational, regulatory and financial deci-
sions are necessary in order to further expand the valuable 
digital commons, make them accessible to all, and protect 
their availability:
 > The importance of digital commons in a digitalized sustain-
ability society and the need to provide and secure them 
should be placed on the political agenda both nationally 
and internationally. They must be secured both organiza-
tionally and legally. 
 > Inclusive and equitable access to digital common goods 
should be ensured. This includes making them available 
in open, accessible formats, and developing or improving 
tools and environments that help make digital commons 
easier to find and access, e.g. by adopting international 
metadata standards.
 > Measures should be taken to ensure the quality of digital 
commons, e.g. the introduction of seals of quality and the 
systematic involvement of users (‘collaborative processes’) 
in further developing and maintaining digital commons, 
such as free educational resources (Arbeitsgruppe zu Open 
Educational Resources, 2015:  5; UNESCO, 2017a:  4, 8f.).
 > It is also important to train and motivate interested peo-
ple to participate in the production and dissemination of 
high-quality digital common goods, taking into account 
local needs and the diversity of potential addressees, 
for example with regard to knowledge and educational 
resources. Broad participation in the creation and develop-
ment of digital commons should be encouraged. For exam-
ple, the public sector could hold competitions or promote 
flagship projects. 
 > In addition, it is key to work towards improving legal 
 certainty in licensing with regard to the creation,  storage, 
distribution, duplication and alteration of digital commons. 
Furthermore, review procedures should be developed 
to ensure that availability and changes are allowed with 
respect to copyright and personality rights (Arbeitsgruppe 
zu Open Educational Resources, 2015:  6).
 > In addition, politicians, society and computer scientists 
should be made aware of the ‘transience’ of knowledge and 
the digitized cultural and natural heritage in order to initi-
ate measures to conserve it (Królikowski, 2014:  2).
 > The development of digital infrastructures and public- 
sector ICTs (Section 5.3.5) should already be accompanied 
by efforts to promote digital commons and the technical 
 possibilities for their use.
Box 5 .3 .10-4
Recommendations for research on the arena 
‘Digital commons’
On the one hand, research should focus on digital commons 
as an object of research to expand the methodological and 
technological foundation and, on the other hand, to examine 
the effects of digital commons on society, the economy and 
within the framework of the Great Transformation towards 
Sustainability in order to strengthen their positive impact:
 > Digital commons should be taken into account in research 
on commons, especially with regard to the similarities to 
and differences from traditional commons and their impli-
cations.
 > Existing standards for the publication of data and know-
ledge assets should be further developed with a view to 
the particularities of digital commons. In new, hitherto less 
digitized fields (e.g. areas of the natural and cultural heri-
tage), it is also important to develop them and establish 
international standards in order to strengthen the inter-
operability of digital commons and their further use.
 > In the UNESCO World Action Programme ‘Education for 
Sustainable Development’, digital commons should be 




to record the condition of and changes in the natural 
and cultural heritage (e.g. monitoring cultural assets for 
damage due to atmospheric influences or cultural van-
dalism, or the digitalized monitoring of breeding birds). 
This data and information can be used to formulate 
strategies for protecting and conserving the cultural 
and natural heritage (Pieraccini et al., 2001:  64) or 
reconstruct the destroyed cultural heritage. 
However, along with the many opportunities offered 
by a digitized natural and cultural heritage, there are 
also a number of challenges. First, experiencing  physical 
artefacts is very different from seeing digital, virtually 
accessible artefacts, so it is important to ensure a com-
bined offer of physical and digital libraries (Królikowski, 
2014:  1f.). A core problem of purely digital cultural 
objects lies in their dependence on digital data carriers 
and formats and the resulting low levels of durability 
and accessibility (Królikowski, 2014:  1f.). Furthermore, 
the effort required for long-term archiving is consider-
able and this is associated with specific problems: from 
preservation, accessibility and minimizing information 
loss, to the modelling and standardization of software 
and archiving processes, to complex copyright issues 
(Królikowski, 2014:  3f.) or even a change in cultural 
heritage through content censorship. Another discus-
sion involves the reliability of records and a lack of 
awareness of the importance of preserving and access-
ing digitized natural and cultural heritage. Digitized 
natural and cultural heritage can serve as an alternative 
to experiencing the physical natural and cultural herit-
age (Section 5.3.1). However, this does not mean that 
measures to protect and conserve the physical natural 




All the ‘arenas of digital change’ were chosen because 
they have a direct reference to digitalization while at 
the same time being significant for the Great Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability. They provide a multifac-
eted impression of the way in which digitalization can 
be shaped in the service of the Transformation towards 
Sustainability. The analysis covers both central topics at 
the direct interface between digitalization and sustain-
ability (e.g. monitoring of biological diversity, e-waste, 
circular economy) and areas in which simultaneous 
potential for digitalization and sustainability will 
become relevant in the near future (e.g. workplaces of 
the future, urban mobility). In addition, issues for the 
future are also presented which will only become rele-
vant in the longer term, but will have repercussions for 
the environment and the Earth system, so that the soci-
etal discourse should begin now (e.g. technologization 
of human beings).
An important finding across several arenas is that 
the destruction of ecosystems and resource consump-
tion as a result of growth and rebound effects have 
steadily increased (e.g. online commerce, e-waste), 
with digitalization appearing to be an accelerating and 
reinforcing factor. A trend reversal towards sustainabil-
ity is urgently needed. For example, there is an acute 
need for action to move towards a digitally supported 
circular economy. The example of e-waste shows that 
not only the longevity and ease of repair of electrical 
appliances, but also problems in the extraction and use 
of raw materials, and the recycling and disposal of 
e-waste should be taken into account. Another example 
is precision agriculture, which offers opportunities for 
environment protection and sustainable land use, but 
has so far mainly benefited large-scale farming and 
monocultures. 
Indeed, it often becomes clear that technological 
innovations do not generate sustainability ‘by them-
selves’, but that the positive potential of digitalization 
for the Transformation towards Sustainability can only 
be achieved in conjunction with institutional, norma-
tive and regulatory frameworks. For example, there are 
technological innovations in the health sector that are 
used for the benefit of humankind; on the other hand, 
developments have also become possible that can be 
used for human self-optimization with the help of tech-
nologies, making a normative and regulatory frame-
work necessary. In online commerce, technological 
innovations have created many opportunities to 
increase efficiency, but a regulatory framework is 
needed to avoid negative social and environmental 
externalities or rebound effects. Scoring procedures are 
another example of how digital assistance can be used 
to provide incentives for more sustainable consumer 
behaviour; yet this can come at the expense of personal 
freedom and decision-making sovereignty. Alternatives 
to this are feedback systems, e.g. relating to one’s own 
resource consumption by showing the ecological foot-
print. Here, too, it is clear that there is a growing need 
for research on societal norms and moral standards as 
well as normative frameworks. 
Structural shifts are to be expected on the interna-
tional labour markets, and these can be accompanied by 
a reorganization of value chains, the relocation of pro-
duction processes back to industrialized countries, and 
consequently to a shift in power between industrialized 
and developing countries. However, the flexibility of 
the labour markets is also being increased by online 
platforms and sharing economies – an aspect broached 
in the arenas on the new approaches to sustainable 
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business and public discourse. Even with these new 
concepts and lifestyles, it remains to be seen how the 
implications for sustainability and the circular economy 
will be assessed. It is quite possible that we can cur-
rently only see the tip of the iceberg of a major process 
of change and structural shifts. Digitalization could 
even act as a catalyst for growth patterns that are 
already driving the overuse of natural resources and 
increasing social inequality in many countries, although 
the impact cannot yet be accurately assessed or grasped 
in its full dimensions (Second Dynamic; Section 7.3). 
Data protection and data security are recurrent top-
ics of key importance in the arenas. Significant 
 deficiencies in this field have the potential to under-
mine fundamental and human rights. Protecting these 
rights is therefore one of the great cross-cutting chal-
lenges of the Digital Age. This aspect is of importance 
not only with regard to the digitalization of the health-
care system, which is the subject of the arena on the 
quantified self, but also, for example, in scoring or in 
precision agriculture. The privacy, personal freedom 
and self- determination of users can be either impaired 
by digitalization or strengthened, if regulated and nor-
matively embedded in institutional frameworks. This is 
particularly evident in the context of the smart city, 
where many digital applications are concentrated and 
people find it difficult to escape digitalization, e.g. in 
the use of digitally assisted mobility.
There is also a need to consider a cross-section of 
issues that have received little attention up to now in 
the context of digitalization, such as education for sus-
tainability, for which completely new funding opportu-
nities are opening up in connection with digitalization, 
as well as the issues of gender and digital commons. All 
three topics are very closely linked to inequalities in 
access to digital services and to the future-proofing of 
a society. It becomes clear that existing gender inequal-
ities are often manifested in technical systems, includ-
ing the internet. In education, too, the promotion of 
digital and sustainability skills and the necessary infra-
structures and services do not appear to be adequate. 
For example, the education sector also requires new 
initiatives in the conceptual combination of digitaliza-
tion and sustainability. Furthermore, digital services 
must be developed that are oriented towards the 
 common good and accessible to the general public.
On the one hand, the ‘thematic deep drilling’ of the 
arenas results in concrete material for the synthesis in 
Chapter 7, which represents the connection between 
digital change and the Transformation towards Sustain-
ability in the form of three ‘Dynamics of the Digital 
Age’. On the other hand, the arenas provide valuable 
material not only in terms of concrete recommenda-
tions for action and research, but also of overarching 
knowledge requirements and policy challenges, which 
are addressed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
All in all, the arenas clearly show that the agendas of 
sustainability and digitalization, both in research and in 
politics, should be linked and further developed 
together. In this context, digitalization must be placed 
at the service of sustainability. This is the core message 



















Blueprints of the Future and Visions 
on Digitalization and Sustainability
The future of society in the Digital Age has been predicted in many ways. 
The WBGU combines elements from scientific and popular-scientific sources 
with utopian and dystopian narratives that extrapolate and illustrate trends, 
thus making them tangible. Utopian and dystopian aspects are not always 
clear-cut, and their classification is subjective. However, the dystopian visions 
illustrate where there is a risk of certain borders being crossed; these should 
be contained at an early stage to avoid endangering sustainability goals.
When reflecting on future-proof forms of interaction 
between digitalization and sustainability, one should 
not overlook the visionary creativity with which tech-
nology forecasting, science vision and even science fic-
tion have for years been attempting to anticipate the 
Digital Age. Taking the example of blurring borderlines 
between humans and machines, the Office for Technol-
ogy Assessment at the German Bundestag, for instance, 
has found that the corresponding discourses can be 
very powerful and can shape real technology expecta-
tions (Kehl and Coenen, 2016). Such blueprints of the 
future take up diverse facets of digitalization and com-
bine them with speculations that also relate to different 
areas of sustainability. Although the visionary sketches 
are often aimed at entertainment rather than the polit-
ical shaping of a sustainable future, they also contain 
surprisingly ground-breaking messages. A study pub-
lished by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, 
Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) on 
whether, and in which areas, works of science fiction 
can guide action in real-life urban-development pro-
cesses (BBSR, 2015) has shown that science-fiction lit-
erature can indeed come up with likely predictions for 
the future.
A systematic evaluation of science vision and fore-
casting literature cannot be carried out within the scope 
of this report. However, this chapter looks at some 
visionary, hypothetical and speculative drafts and 
assessments made by various scientists, journalists, 
entrepreneurs and people in public life on the societal 
effects of predicted technology development in the 
field of digitalization. The aim is to inspire and supple-
ment thoughts on the best ways to shape a sustainable 
future.
Thus, this chapter does not outline the WBGU's own 
vision of the future, but brings together selected ele-
ments from different sources of science vision, ( popular) 
scientific futurology and statements by individuals to 
form narratives that illustrate incipient, potentially 
medium- to longer-term change trends. Since these are 
not WBGU statements, they are presented in a different 
font. First, the WBGU presents a positively connotated 
narrative, i.e. utopian drafts on interaction between 
digitalization and sustainability (Section 6.1), then it 
looks at destructive and dystopian visions (Section 6.2). 
The quotations are interspersed as examples. It should 
be emphasized that the sources given do not always 
outline utopian or dystopian drafts of the future; some 
also take up current developments which either have 
dystopian potential or can be a source from which such 
potential can be derived. It should also be borne in 
mind that, when it comes to details, utopian and dysto-
pian aspects are not always clearly distinguishable and 
classification is a matter of subjective assessment and 
cultural preferences. 
Because of the disruptive, complex dynamics of dig-
italization, any consideration of its interaction with 
sustainability over several decades is dependent on 
such visionary drafts of the future. The WBGU uses 
them above all to flesh out the Second and Third 
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Dynamics of the Digital Age (Sections 7.3, 7.4). By con-
trast, the 'arenas' explored in detail in Chapter 5 on the 
basis of scientific studies and data primarily address the 
First and Second Dynamics (Sections 7.2, 7.3). Finally, 
after a tabular compilation of identifiable opportunities 
and risks (Section 6.3), conclusions are draw for the 
report's further line of argumentation and for the kind 
of formative action that needs to be taken (Section 6.4).
6 .1
Utopian vision of a digitalized sustainability 
 society
In this section, selected utopian ideas and aspects are 
presented and assembled into a multi-faceted picture of 
a fictitious future of the interaction between digitaliza-
tion and sustainability. The interspersed quotations are 
examples of sources that mention the respective 
aspects, albeit possibly with differing assessments.
Digital utopia
In the digitalized sustainability soci-
ety, sustaining the natural life-sup-
port systems is fully ensured and 
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases are reduced to the technically 
feasible minimum. 100% of energy is 
generated from renewable sources 
(Jacobson et al., 2017), smart grids 
and storage systems provide a relia-
ble and affordable power supply for 
all. Motorized traffic and heating sys-
tems in buildings are electrified and 
emissions-free, the use of fossil fuels 
has been completely discontinued (Helm, 
2017). In such a future, electricity 
could be 'too cheap to measure' once 
capacity is installed, and flat rates 
like those charged for the use of tele-
phones or the internet could be made 
available.
The extensive use of precision-farming 
technologies – which use sensors, geo-
graphic information systems and robots 
to monitor and optimally tend plants 
and animals, utilize fertilizers and 
water precisely, and replace pesti-
cides with automated mechanical pro-
cessing – saves resources, protects 
the environment and cuts costs (Eberl, 
2016). 
The digitally optimized combination 
of intelligent product design, repa-
rability and automated deconstruction 
at the end of a product's life signifi-
cantly reduces the demand for new raw 
materials. It allows a circular econ-
omy according to global standards and 
on a global scale (EMF, 2016). Distrib-
uted-ledger technologies (blockchain) 
provide proof of origin, improve prod-
uct traceability and contribute to 
consumer confidence. 
As people have become comprehen-
sively interconnected via the inter-
net and communication platforms – i.e. 
with unlimited possibilities for their 
communication and collective initia-
tive and no restrictions of time and 
space – a global awareness of each 
person's responsibility for overarch-
ing sustainability issues has devel-
oped among the individuals of the dig-
ital society (e.g. an awareness of the 
effects of individual consumption on 
“Almost all of these new electricity generation technologies do 
not have an energy cost once they are built and installed. The 
energy they generate is free. […] A zero-carbon world is close 
to a ‘zero marginal cost  electricity generation’ one.” (Helm, 
2017: 7)
Dieter Robin Helm is an economist at the University of Oxford 
and the author of ‘Burn Out: The Endgame for Fossil Fuels’.
“More and more robots will be working independently in the 
fields of the future – controlled by digital maps, satellites and 
weather forecasts, as well as by sensors with which they can 
detect weeds and measure temperature and humidity. They 
will fertilize the soil, sow seeds and apply pesticides precisely 
within a centimetre of where they are needed, and gather the 
harvest. Autonomous drones will then circle above them to 
check the condition of the fields, detect fungal infestation or 
damage caused by game, and prevent crop failures.” (Eberl, 
2016: 181).
Ulrich Eberl is a science and technology journalist and the author 
of ‘Smart Machines. How artificial intelligence is changing our 
lives’.
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nature and the environment; Weng et 
al., 2018). Global commons, which are 
indispensable for sustaining the nat-
ural life-support systems and for the 
continued existence of humanity in 
peaceful coexistence, are placed under 
protection by united efforts.
The Internet of Things makes it pos-
sible to bring the marginal costs of 
production close to zero, creating a 
world of global commons in which peo-
ple in open democratic societies work 
together voluntarily and not for profit 
(Rifkin, 2014). The digital society is 
inclusive across all social classes 
and living environments; everyone has 
access to essential goods, poverty 
has been largely overcome, and inclu-
sive development has become a real-
ity. Basic human needs are secured, 
the communitization of property and 
 profits through digitalization enables 
a guaranteed minimum income (‘social 
wage’) for all people, as well as uni-
versal access to adequate housing, 
education and healthcare (Merchant, 
2015). A general, reliable supply of 
high-quality and sustainably produced 
food has been achieved (Wahlen et al., 
2012). Billions of people have access 
to individual healthcare based on the 
use of digital technologies ( ’eHealth’, 
GeSi, 2016).
 
Work and income have become largely 
decoupled in the digitalized sustain-
ability society. Robots and other 
intelligent machines perform much of 
the physically demanding, dangerous 
or boring work. The inclusion of every-
one in global prosperity is made pos-
sible through communitization (Mer-
chant, 2015); extreme inequalities can 
be reduced. In general, digitalization 
fundamentally changes many economic 
practices by making market-related 
information widely and equally acces-
sible to all actors in the spirit of 
pluralization. Because the relation-
ship between (paid) work and leisure 
time is changing, the development of 
a 'post-work' society creates much 
greater scope for individual self-re-
alization and activities for the com-
mon good. Work forms and business 
models are also experiencing a form of 
pluralization, with commons-based 
peer production and platform coopera-
tives on a digital basis helping to 
meet sustainable and individualized 
needs independent of income.
“Soon all the people on our planet will be connected. If 
 another five billion people populate the virtual world in the 
near future, in the physical world this boom will mean, among 
other things, increases in production, health, education, 
 quality of life for everyone, from elite users to people at the 
bottom end of the economic scale.” (Schmidt and Cohen, 
2013: 27)
Eric Schmidt is a technical consultant at Google. He was CEO of 
Google from 2001 to 2011 and CEO of Alphabet, Google's 
parent company, until 2018. Jared Cohen is founder and director 
of Jigsaw, a technology incubator at Alphabet.
“I am also guardedly hopeful that a near zero  marginal cost 
society can take the human race from an economy of scarcity 
to an economy of sustainable abundance over the course of 
the first half of the twenty-first century.” (Rifkin, 2014: 644)
Jeremy Rifkin is the author of ‘The Zero Marginal Cost Society: 
The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the 
Eclipse of Capitalism’
“AI will also lower the cost of many goods and  services, 
 effectively making everyone better off. Longer term, AI may be 
thought of as a radically different mechanism for wealth 
 creation in which everyone should be entitled to a portion of 
the world’s AI-produced treasures.” (Stone et al., 2016)
Initiated in 2014, the ‘One Hundred Year Study on Artificial 
Intelligence’ is a long-term study on the field of AI and its effects 
on humans, their communities and society. The first report 
 quoted from here appeared in 2016.
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New high-quality companies,  professions 
and jobs are being created for the 
development, mediation and operation 
of digitalized infrastructures and 
terminal devices in the sustainable 
digital society. Skills requirements 
and skills offered in combination with 
the necessary training and education 
opportunities can be tracked and taken 
up digitally and thus coordinated in 
a timely manner. Cooperative telework-
ing in cyberspace becomes an essen-
tial part of work, so locational ties 
are no longer a selection criterion for 
choosing a job, which considerably 
reduces commuting and occupational 
traffic. A cooperative division of 
labour applies between humans and 
machines (or collaborative robots, 
so-called cobots), in which each per-
son takes on the job they do best 
(Schmidt and Cohen, 2013). In a smart 
society, however, no one is forced to 
do paid work.
Knowledge and educational resources 
are commons and openly and freely 
(except for marginal costs) accessi-
ble to all in digital (and analogue) 
formats. Digital platforms, access 
points, services and applications pro-
vide suitable information for every-
one, anywhere, at any time and accord-
ing to any preference, both in  private 
and professional environments. 
In a universal digitalized library, 
every book in the world is available 
to every human being in every language 
(Kelly, 2016: 97). In a society that is 
both smart and media-literate, educa-
tion is communicated digitally and can 
be made accessible in an individual-
ized and tailor-made way for every per-
son. AI revolutionizes research and 
leads to new scientific breakthroughs 
(Alkhateeb, 2017).
The relationship between data manage-
ment and individual data protection is 
balanced, and digital self-determina-
tion is guaranteed. People keep con-
trol of the data they release for fur-
ther processing, and 'digital oblivion' 
is possible. An international digi-
tal charter, drawn up in a participa-
tory manner by the entire global com-
munity, regulates the principles gov-
erning the handling of personal data, 
their economic exploitation and indi-
vidual personal rights, perhaps as a 
further development of the Charter of 
Fundamental Digital Rights of the EU 
that has been proposed by a group of 
citizens (Zeit- Stiftung, 2018). 
The digitalized sustainability soci-
ety has reliable and resilient infra-
structures (Francis and Bekera, 2014). 
“People of the free internet, we now have the opportunity to 
create a world where we choose to work a 4 hour work week 
at our whim, collaborating globally with whom we like, freely 
choosing compensation in currency or equity, frolicking in our 
hyper-creative and artistic, fractally self-organized fluid work 
groups, protected from catastrophic risk by a basic income 
provided by our egalitarian peer to peer protocols. In this 
vision the tragedy of the commons is stamped out like polio by 
a collaborative network of trust and enforced by a con sensus-
based cryptographic protocol that ensures our aligned 
incentivization towards the expression of our personal and 
 collective purposes.” (Thorp, quoted from Swartz, 2017: 88)
Noah Thorp is co-founder of the blockchain startup Citizen Code.
“It is really possible with the technology of today, not 
 tomorrow. We can provide all the works of humankind to all 
the people of the world. It will be an achievement remembered 
for all time, like putting a man on the moon.” (Kahle, quoted 
from Kelly, 2016: 97)
Brewster Kahle is a computer scientist, entrepreneur and activist.
“If you can use AI to read 400,000 research papers 
 automatically, organize the knowledge and then combine your 
intuition with machine learning, you can sharpen the research 
field – instead of fanning out for a solution, you fan in. This is 
what I believe is going to be really game changing for research 
in the future.” (Bekas, undated)
Costas Bekas is a cognitive solutions research manager at IBM.
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All functional areas of society, such 
as administration, mobility, energy, 
food and water supply, urban and rural 
infrastructures, transport and pro-
duction facilities, healthcare and 
education, are digitally networked, 
coordinated, quality-controlled and 
protected against failure and attack. 
This applies not only to the urban 
agglomerations developed as 'smart 
cities', but also to a considerable 
extent to optimally equipped rural 
areas, the smart countryside. 
All individual transport based on 
fossil fuels has been successfully 
eliminated without in any way restrict-
ing the right of all citizens to mobil-
ity (Nikitas et al., 2017). Mobility as 
a Service (MaaS), which can be opti-
mally adapted to individual demand 
using digitalization, has contributed 
to this and ensured that the popula-
tion of both urban and rural areas can 
access all important basic existen-
tial functions in good time. 
Any economic or political concentra-
tion of power through data monopolies 
is resolutely prevented (West, 2017). 
Rather, digital pluralism is emerging. 
The digital flexibilization of the use 
of goods that are in limited supply 
also strengthens common-use scenar-
ios in the sense of a sharing economy 
(Hamari et al., 2016). 
The digitalized sustainability soci-
ety follows the principle of open gov-
ernment. Democratic participation is 
fully guaranteed; all social groups 
can participate equally in decisions 
affecting the common good (Macintosh, 
2004). Access to information and the 
possibility of political participation 
are facilitated and made ubiquitously 
available through the use of modern 
ICT (Mossberger et al., 2007).
In the digitalized sustainability soci-
ety, people are digitally empowered. 
Digital technologies, especially appli-
cations of AI and machine learning 
combined with genetic testing, promise 
great advances in personalized diag-
nostics and therapy (Stone et al., 2016; 
Fierz, 2004).
“As cars will become better drivers than people, city-dwellers 
will own fewer cars, live further from work, and spend time 
differently, leading to an entirely new urban organization.” 
(Stone et al., 2016)
See above: ‘One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence’.
“A near perfect version of transport futures, based on such an 
integrated approach, therefore would be revolved around 
 shared used CAVs [Connected Autonomous Vehicles] fuelled 
by electricity, produced solely from renewable energy sources, 
that will operate under MaaS principles, meaning that they 
should be accessible only as part of packages primarily 
 offering electrified public transport from initiatives like BRT 
[Bus Rapid Transit] and Hyperloop.” (Nikitas et al., 2017: 17)
Alexandros Nikitas and his co-authors conduct research on the 
topic of mobility.
“If we want to renew democracy in the coming decades, we 
need a sense of indignation, a sense of the loss of what is being 
taken from us. [...] What is at stake here is people's  expectation 
to be masters of their own lives and originators of their own 
experience. What is at stake here is the inner experience from 
which we form the will to want, and the public spaces in 
which we can act on it. What is at stake is the ruling principle 
of social order in an information civilization and our right as 
individuals and societies to find answers to the old questions: 
Who knows? Who decides? Who decides who decides? [...] The 
digital future cannot be stopped, but people and their 
 humanity should come first.” (Zuboff, 2018:  595f.)
Shoshana Zuboff is an economist and author of ‘The Age of 
 Surveillance Capitalism’.
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The digitalized sustainability soci-
ety is peaceful. In a world where 
broadly available knowledge is the 
central source of prosperity, wars 
disappear (Harari, 2015). A life free 
from physical and psychological suf-
fering and the possibility of digni-
fied ageing are achieved by replacing 
or optimizing bodily functions 
(cyborg; Kurzweil, 2005). Humankind 
reaches a completely new stage of evo-
lution (Harari, 2015) – Humanity 2.0 
comes into being. 'Natural' evolution 
will be replaced in the future by a 
technological further development of 
human beings. The gradual substitu-
tion of the human body by technical 
systems becomes possible (Kurzweil, 
2005) – even the transfer of the human 
mind to technological systems in the 
sense of the emulation of the brain. 
Such an 'upload' can theoretically 
live indefinitely and would have 
almost unlimited access to all digi-
tally available or stored cognitive 
resources (Moravec, 1988).
6 .2
Dystopian vision on the risks of digitalization for 
sustainability
The utopian vision of the future is now contrasted with 
a highly dystopian vision, characterized by misguided 
and negative developments, one that could emerge in 
the distant future. Again, we include selected state-
ments and quotations from the public debate and 
sources of science vision in an overall narrative, which 
this time emphasizes many different risks. 
Digital dystopia
Contrary to hopes, increasing digi-
talization has not led to the devel-
opment of a sustainable society or to 
dematerialization, but to the emer-
gence of a hyperconsumer society in 
which people uninhibitedly pursue 
their desires for consumption at the 
expense of the natural environment 
(Wahnbaeck and Rolof, 2017: 3).
Not only does the sale of digital 
devices rise sharply with signifi-
cant negative effects in the area of 
resource exploitation; the wide range 
of options for targeting individual 
people with customized advertising 
in all areas of consumption result-
ing from big data also considerably 
accelerates growth in demand. The 
explosion in online commerce has led 
to a further increase in transport 
“If machine learning can help reveal relationships between 
genes, diseases and treatment responses, it could revolutionize 
personalized medicine, make farm animals healthier and 
 enable more resilient crops. Moreover, robots have the 
 potential to become more accurate and reliable surgeons than 
humans, even without advanced AI.” (Tegmark, 2017: 101).
Max Tegmark is Professor of Physics at MIT and President of the 
Future of Life Institute.
„Although these ideas may sound like science fiction, they cer-
tainly don’t violate any known laws of physics, so the most 
interesting question is not whether they can happen, but 
whether they will happen, and, if so, when. […] I think of an 
upload as the extreme end of the cyborg spectrum, where the 
only remaining part of the human is the software.“ (Tegmark, 
2017: 154)
“Clearly, the ICT has a potential to decouple economic growth 
from environmental degradation. However, without conside-
ring potential rebound effects of increased ICT consumption, 
the environmental implications can quickly become detri-
mental. The environmental impacts of ICT largely depend on 
how the ICT applications perform when human behaviour 
becomes a very important factor. The society should not be too 
optimistic about the positive role of ICT in economy without 
accounting ICT’s environmental impacts.” (Plepys, 2002: 521) 
Andrius Plepys is a researcher at the International Institute for 
Industrial Environmental Economics (IIIEE) at Lund University in 
Sweden. His research addresses strategies for sustainable con-
sumption and sustainable lifestyles.
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costs and traffic congestion. In addi-
tion to increasing the level of con-
sumption, the construction and oper-
ation of virtual and physical infra-
structures require massive inputs of 
raw materials and energy (Lange and 
 Santarius, 2018: 48). Resource consump-
tion is also increasing as a result 
of rebound effects, as the potential 
of new digital technologies to reduce 
resource use is outweighed by their 
increased use. The deliberate short-
ening of the service lives of digital 
devices and the acceleration of inno-
vation and product life cycles also 
contribute to the destruction of the 
natural life-support systems (Santar-
ius, 2017).
In the hyperconsumer society, peo-
ple are entirely disinterested in the 
natural living environment and its 
ongoing destruction. By extensively 
using virtual spaces, they live in 
illusory worlds and mentally distance 
themselves from their natural envi-
ronment. Thus the planetary guard-
rails are flouted, resulting in the 
destruction of the natural life-sup-
port systems. Because the 2°C guard-
rail aimed at limiting climate change 
is exceeded, and CO2 emissions from 
fossil sources are further increased, 
the global surface temperature and 
the acidification of the oceans are 
increasing drastically, resulting in 
the loss of biodiversity and ecosys-
tem services in the oceans and on 
land. In addition, digitally enhanced 
agriculture intensifies land and soil 
overuse and degradation as well as 
the loss of phosphorus, regardless of 
the disastrous effects on food secur-
ity and biomass production. In addi-
tion to CO2 emissions, there are also 
sharp increases in emissions of other 
long-lasting pollutants (e.g. mer-
cury and persistent organic pollut-
ants). This has catastrophic effects 
on the natural life-support systems 
and endangers the health of large 
sections of humanity (WBGU, 2014b: 21). 
The planet is getting out of equi-
librium, and collapse is imminent 
( Diamond, 2005).
As the natural life-support systems 
are destroyed, the material division 
of society grows, further exacerbated 
by the digital divide. Signs of pov-
erty spread and intensify worldwide. 
There are famines and increasing 
migration of people who have lost 
their homes as a result of climate 
change and the destruction of the nat-
ural environment.
The division in society is also deep-
ened by the robotization of the labour 
market (Kling, 2017: 142). Progressive 
digitalization threatens to end gain-
ful employment with no compensation 
for lost incomes. As a result of this 
digitally enhanced divide, almost 
every job is threatened by rationali-
zation and automation via digital 
technologies, even in occupations 
requiring a high level of skills 
(Andersen and Zinner Henriksen, 2018).
Mass unemployment and economic 
in equality are growing in both indus-
trialized and developing countries 
and in emerging economies, as fewer 
and fewer people benefit from the 
wealth created by new technologies 
“The economy is having to face ever-greater disruptions in the 
work force because of A.I. And in the long run, no element of 
the job market will be 100 percent safe from A.I. and 
 automation. People will need to continually reinvent 
 themselves. This may take 50 years, but ultimately nothing is 
safe.” (Harari, 2018, cited in Kaufmann, 2018)
Yuval Noah Harari is Professor of History at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem and author of the international bestsellers 
‘Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind’ and ‘Homo Deus: A Brief 
History of Tomorrow’.
„Low-wage jobs are especially at risk: in its 2016 report to the 
president, the U.S. Council of  Economic Advisers estimated 
that 83 percent of jobs paying less than $20 per hour could be 
automated.“ (McAfee und Brynjolfsson, 2016: 140)
Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson are senior scientists  
of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy and authors of  
the  bestseller ‘The Second Machine Age’.
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(Collins, 2014: 51, quoted from Dörre, 
2016: 4; Nourbakhsh, 2015: 27). There is 
a gap between a limited number of 
highly qualified people and the major-
ity of the population, who, for exam-
ple, carry out routine activities, but 
also between industrialized and devel-
oping countries and emerging econ-
omies (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). 
The super-rich on the one hand, and 
mass unemployment and misery on the 
other, create the potential for mas-
sive unrest, violence or revolution.
The developing countries lose their 
comparative advantage in the avail-
ability of cheap labour because 
 products are now produced fully auto-
matically by digitally controlled pro-
duction lines, and production is being 
relocated back to industrialized coun-
tries (Al-Ani, 2017; Deutscher Bundes-
tag, 2017a: 6f.). This is especially 
problematic for developing countries 
because they hardly have any social 
security systems; it is therefore 
unclear how social transfer payments 
could be structured and financed 
(Al-Ani, 2017).
In the industrialized countries, by 
contrast, social security systems 
threaten to collapse under the burden 
of the large numbers of unemployed. 
The now growing inequality far eclipses 
the previously known socio-economic 
disparities (Nourbakhsh, 2015: 27). The 
majority of people worldwide live at 
the subsistence level. Only a small 
elite – e.g. the owners and managers 
of leading technology companies – 
benefit from the effects of digitali-
zation on the world of work (Barwise 
and Watkins, 2018: 44ff.; Hilbig, 2017). 
Monopolies or oligopolies are formed 
by a handful of globally active IT 
corporations or IT-based corporations, 
leading to a concentration of capital 
“The privileged, we’ll see time and again, are processed more 
by people, the masses by machines.” (O’Neil, 2017)
Cathy O’Neil is a mathematician and the author of ‘Weapons of 
Math Destruction’.
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2017a: 6f.; Bar-
wise and Watkins, 2018). These power-
ful digital corporations abuse digi-
tal possibilities in their own destruc-
tive interests. A form of digital 
imperialism emerges. The deep social 
division of society leads to dramatic 
conflicts, as well as national and 
regional unrest, and destabilizes 
entire regions (Hilbig, 2017).
As a result of the lack of work for the 
majority of the population due to mass 
unemployment, an ignorant, self- focused 
and bored society emerges. However, 
digital technologies not only take away 
all people's work, they are also used 
for population monitoring on a massive 
scale. In this digitalized surveil-
lance state, every individual is spied 
on using digital technologies by organ-
izations of all kinds – from state 
intelligence agencies to global pri-
vate companies (Wolf, 2012; Lyon, 2003). 
Established freedoms and rights, such 
as the right to informational self-de-
termination or the right to privacy, 
are a thing of the past in this post-pri-
vacy age (Bauman et al., 2014; Lynch, 
2015).
“[W]ork’s value both for individuals and for  communities goes 
well beyond its financial role. As Voltaire put it, ‘Work saves us 
from three great evils: boredom, vice, and need. But isn’t work 
itself becoming passé, thanks to automation?’ ” (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson, 2016: 145)
“A child born today will grow up with no conception of privacy 
at all. They’ll never know what it means to have a private 
moment to themselves, an unrecorded, unanalyzed thought. 
And that’s a problem because privacy matters, privacy is what 
allows us to determine who we are and who we want to be.” 
(Snowden, 2013)
Edward Snowden is a former CIA employee who became known 
in 2013 through his revelations about the practices of the US 
intelligence services.
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This is made possible by the advanced 
development and dissemination of dig-
itally upgraded surveillance tech-
nology. The use of technologies (e.g. 
drones) to capture movement pro-
files, recognize faces or other fea-
tures makes it possible to identify 
each individual person in a public 
space. The omnipresent surveillance 
takes place not only in public, but 
also in the supposedly private sphere: 
the recording and evaluation of peo-
ple's online surfing behaviour allows 
conclusions to be drawn about the 
thoughts of every user of an IT device 
(Helbing, 2018).
They are continuously monitored via 
smartphones and voice assistants. 
Smart televisions and game consoles 
monitor leisure-time behaviour, and 
fitness and health-data trackers col-
lect every individual's most sensitive 
health data (Helbing, 2018).
Digital surveillance technologies are 
also used at the workplace, for exam-
ple for monitoring and predicting the 
behaviour of all employees (Solon, 
“No, the ‚targets‘ here are me and you: everyone, all of the 
time. In the name of ‚national security‘, the capacity is being 
built to identify, track and document any citizen constantly 
and continuously.” (Wolf, 2012)
Naomi Wolf ist Schriftstellerin und  politische Aktivistin.
“George Orwell’s dystopian novel ‘1984’, written in 1948 [...] 
was intended as a warning. But apparently it was used as an 
instruction manual: Google knows what we think, Amazon’s 
Kindle Reader what we read; YouTube and the game console 
know what we look at; Siri and Alexa listen to our conver-
sations; Apple and IBM measure our health; [...] Apps, cookies 
and browser extensions evaluate our internet activities. And 
our car is a data leech.” (Helbing, 2018).
Dirk Helbing is Professor of Computational Social Science at the 
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences and a 
member of the Department of Computer Science at the ETH 
Zurich.
2017a; Ball, 2010). Compared to earlier 
practices, surveillance by the state 
and companies now takes on a new 
dimension because it takes place 
everywhere, incessantly, permanently 
collecting, linking and evaluating 
all recordable patterns – be they 
movement data, data on behaviour or 
ways of thinking – in both public and 
private spaces.
In this totalitarian state, the know-
ledge acquired by mass surveillance 
is deliberately used to monitor, con-
trol and oppress the population. With 
the help of a social credit system, a 
data-based credit-rating system based 
on the Chinese model, citizens are 
assessed on the basis of their behav-
iour (e.g. in a work context), reli-
gion, ethnicity, diseases, DNA or the 
products they buy (Lee, 2018). Moni-
toring and assessment target a wide 
variety of activities such as payment 
behaviour, criminal records, shopping 
habits, lifestyles, moral conduct, 
social behaviour and political con-
victions. Depending on the conformity 
of personal behaviour with the values 
of the ruling regime, individuals are 
rewarded – or punished for non-com-
pliant behaviour – for example when 
looking for accommodation, enrolling 
in schools, applying for social serv-
ices, in work promotions, when ask-
ing for loans, taking out insurance or 
seeking employment (Kühnreich, 2017, 
quoted from Gruber, 2017; Helbing et 
al., 2015; Kling, 2017: 38f.). The aim 
of the keeping records is (external) 
control of all individual behaviour.
“Democracy and the internet are less and less compatible. 
Content censorship and mass surveillance of users are 
 spreading in both totalitarian and democratic states; dis-
information and propaganda are increasingly becoming 
effective anti democratic instruments.” (Gaycken, 2016)
Sandro Gaycken is the founder and director of the Institute for 
Digital Society at the ESMT Berlin.
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The all-encompassing use of digital 
technologies also increases the vul-
nerability of vital infrastructures, 
which are increasingly being targeted 
by hackers in the new age of cyber 
wars.
An arms race has long-since begun 
with governments, secret services and 
the military instructing hackers to 
carry out cyber-attacks (Reissmann, 
2012). Now there are armed conflicts 
all over the world, a cyber world war 
breaks out using digital technologies 
to immediately interrupt or control 
enemy resources, especially critical 
infrastructures. In addition to seri-
ous attacks on infrastructures and 
terminal devices, there is also dis-
information and election influence 
(Kurz and Rieger, 2018a: 8) and other 
destabilizing cyber-actions. The mil-
itant aggressions emanate from states 
that declare war on each other, but 
also from non-state forces; it is often 
“Throughout the entire history of humankind, throughout the 
entire analogue age, remembering was the exception and for-
getting the rule. So we remembered the important things and 
forgot almost everything else. Today, remembering, storing 
has become the rule, and forgetting, deleting, has become the 
exception.” (Mayer-Schönberger, 2014: 2)
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger is Professor of Internet Governance 
and Regulation at the Oxford Internet Institute.
“As technology continues to reshape the world, it’s clear that 
conflicts between nations are no longer confined to the land, 
sea and air. A cyber arms race is underway with nations 
 developing and unleashing a new generation of weapons 
aimed at governments and civilians alike, putting at risk the 
critical data and digital-powered infrastructure that we all 
depend on for our daily lives. […] If we do not do more to 
address the risk of nation-state cyberattacks, the world will 
become a more  dangerous place.” (Smith, 2017)
Brad Smith is President and Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft.
 
Based on extensive knowledge of every 
person's individual preferences and 
behaviour patterns, the state and the 
companies collecting the data predict 
people's behaviour and exert deliber-
ate influence on them in order to 
bring about behavioural changes in 
their own interest. In the private 
sector, the focus is on influencing 
purchasing behaviour, but also 
increasingly on exercising control 
over the population in competition 
with the totalitarian state. As a 
result, social scoring leads to enor-
mous pressure on citizens to conform 
– controversial opinions are no longer 
voiced and divergent behaviour is 
avoided (Christl, 2014: 72). Diversity 
and freedom are lost.
All a person's activities, be they 
entries in the criminal record, tax 
returns or activities in social net-
works, are digitally recorded and 
stored even after their death. Thus, 
every activity can be tracked forever. 
Forgetting is impossible, because the 
recordings are also stored decen-
trally on any computer, but cannot 
be changed by the person concerned. 
As a result, humans become digitally 
immortal.
“If you draw the timelines, realistically by 2050 we would 
expect to be able to download your mind into a machine […].” 
(Pearson, 2005)
Ian Pearson is futurologist.
“[T]he net stores everything. Nothing is ever lost, no piece of 
information however tiny, no e-mail, no online photo however 
embarrassing, no Twitter or Facebook entry, no booking 
request with a travel agency. Digital memories have deprived 
society of its ability to forget and given it a comprehensive 
memory instead: a memory that takes away our freedom, 
because each of our steps, every recorded thought becomes 
controllable.” (Polke-Majewski, 2011)
Karsten Polke-Majewski is a journalist at ZEIT Online and head 
of the Investigative/Data team.
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no longer possible to say clearly who 
started the aggression (Baur-Ahrens, 
2016: 262; Reissmann, 2012; Kurz and 
Rieger, 2018a: 7f.). The cyber-attacks 
take place in different ways using 
different levels of violence. Auto-
mated weapons such as drones are also 
used. 
In addition to the use of malware 
for espionage, sabotage, crippling or 
destroying the critical infrastruc-
tures of the opposing forces, cyber-at-
tacks are also carried out in the form 
of spreading false reports (fake news). 
Disinformation is disseminated in 
social media, and new conflicts are 
stirred up to destabilize political 
systems (Baron, 2017: 37).
In large parts of the world, critical 
infrastructures, such as the finan-
cial system, energy and water supply 
or transport, fail temporarily or per-
manently, and the economy and public 
life collapse (Hutter, 2002: 37f.). Dig-
ital blackouts occur again and again, 
paralysing infrastructures and infor-
mation systems on a large scale. The 
result is the loss of civilizational 
knowledge, which is now only availa-
ble in digital form. In contrast to 
'analogue' warfare, cyber war is also 
characterized by cyber espionage, 
disinformation campaigns and strate-
gic activities to achieve advantageous 
positions (Kurz and Rieger, 2018a: 7).
The use of unconventional weapon 
systems is not necessary because the 
war is waged with everyday compo-
nents like computers, and anyone with 
a minimum of IT skills can become 
an attacker (Baur-Ahrens, 2016: 263). 
Since every person potentially poses 
a danger, there is widespread mistrust 
“The new, highly granular, centralized possibilities of targeted 
and completely invisible, uncontrolled manipulation are [...] a 
diabolical contortion of democratic opinion-forming. 
 Democracy and its institutions must fight it. [...] Otherwise we 
will lose core elements of democracy to the invisible evil of this 
machine.” (Gaycken, 2016)
in society. Once put into operation, 
the weapons used can neither be deac-
tivated nor their effects or functions 
controlled. Not only the military, but 
also the civilian population become 
victims (Baur-Ahrens, 2016: 264). The 
cyber attacks, for example on nuclear 
facilities, are on such a scale that, 
in addition to objects, people are 
also injured or even killed (e.g. by 
exposure to radiation; Baur-Ahrens, 
2016: 263f.).
The cyber world war immerses soci-
ety in digital chaos, where it is con-
trolled not for the common good, but 
to serve the egoistic interests of 
various actors. In particular, multi-
national digital corporations and pow-
erful nation states try with all their 
might to advance their own interests. 
The former multilateralism practised 
in international institutions such as 
the EU and the UN comes to an abrupt 
end.
A transhuman era begins with 
ground-breaking technological devel-
opments. Digitally controlled human 
enhancement technologies allow 
socially privileged groups to optimize 
their bodily functions according to 
individual preferences or health needs 
(Miah, 2016; Nourbakhsh, 2015: 26). 
Only a limited number of people have 
the necessary financial resources and 
access to technologies to halt the 
ageing process, alleviate their phys-
ical ailments and enhance their men-
tal and emotional capacities (Faber, 
2012; Allhoff et al., 2010: 16ff.).
“The fundamental experience is that technical progress opens 
up possibilities for action which interfere with the natural 
life-support systems of our existence and sometimes entail the 
risk of attacking the essence of these very foundations, thus 
turning against the basis of technical progress itself.” (Krieger, 
2011)
Gerhard Krieger was Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of 
Theology in Trier and president of the Medievalists’ Society.
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Human enhancement not only leads to a 
new dimension of inequality, but also 
entails fundamental risks to human 
existence.
The self-optimization of humans con-
tinues to the extent that all bodily 
functions are replaced. Machines are 
created with abilities such as empa-
thy, emotionality and the feeling of 
social connectedness, which were once 
purely human abilities. With the devel-
opment of an AI with emotional aware-
ness, the last 'competitive advantage' 
of the human being is lost.
Technological advances, especially in 
the field of AI, gradually lead to the 
creation of a destructive robotic civ-
ilization and finally to the abolition 
of humans.
“The concentration of power in the global pharmaceutical 
industry has already reached staggering proportions. The 
implications of a new market-driven eugenics are enormous 
and far reaching. Indeed, commercial eugenics could become 
the defining social dynamic of the new century.” (Rifkin, 
2005)
Jeremy Rifkin is an economic and social theorist, writer, speaker, 
political consultant and activist.
“[I]t’s my conclusion that it is possible to make a conscious 
computer with superhuman levels of intelligence before 2020 
[…]. It would definitely have emotions – that’s one of the 
 primary reasons for doing it.” (Pearson, 2005)
“I fear that AI may replace humans altogether […]. If people 
design computer viruses, someone will design AI that improves 
and replicates itself. This will be a new form of life that outper-
forms humans. […] A super intelligent AI will be extremely 
good at accomplishing its goals, and if those goals aren’t 
 aligned with ours, we’re in trouble.” (Hawking, 2017)
Stephen W. Hawking was a theoretical physicist and professor of 
mathematics at the University of Cambridge.
Social, highly intelligent machines are 
created that replicate themselves and 
constantly improve themselves until 
they are superior to humans in all 
areas and can no longer be controlled 
by them (Bostrom, 2014; Hawking, 2017; 
Nourbakhsh, 2015: 27f.). Humans become 
the puppets of these autonomous, 
super-intelligent creatures, which 
develop their own urge to survive and 
ultimately threaten the existence of 
human life (Nourbakhsh, 2015: 27f.; 
 Barrat and Bostrom, 2014; Hawking, 
2017). In their fight for survival, 
these almost almighty robots not only 
attack human targets, but also fight 
each other. The result is a war of the 
'killer robots' in which the human spe-
cies is finally exterminated (Schäfer, 
2018).
6 .3
Synopsis: Comparison of visionary future hopes 
and risks
The preceding sections have revealed selected utopian 
and dystopian developments of digital change from the 
perspective of sustainability. However, since there are 
in fact many more development options, the synoptic 
Table 6.3-1 gives a brief overview of utopian and dys-
topian development possibilities and relates them to 
the key issues for a digital, sustainable society that 
were published by the WBGU in 2018 (WBGU, 2018a).
6 .4
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from the above-out-
lined visions of the future that might boost present-day 
efforts to (a) support digitalization's constructive role 
in the global Transformation towards Sustainability that 
will take place in future decades, and (b) to avoid 
“[T]he development of superintelligence will be associated with 
significant challenges, likely including novel security concerns, 
labor market dislocations, and inequality. It may even involve, 
in the form of accident or misuse, significant existential risk.” 
(Bostrom et al., 2016: 2)
Nick Bostrom is a philosopher at the University of Oxford and 
director of the Future of Humanity Institute.
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 foreseeable undesirable developments? This section 
examines (1) the relationship between optimistic and 
pessimistic expectations, (2) essential fundamental 
driving forces behind the longer-term development 
dynamics of digital change, and (3) insights into indis-
pensable requirements for shaping a sustainable soci-
ety as the Digital Age advances. It reveals the need for 
long-term thinking and systemic foresight, a return to 
the basic consensus of human rights (with human dig-
nity as its basis), and a general willingness to innovate 
and question technological developments.
Dystopian drafts of the future regarding the inter-
play of technical progress, natural life-support systems 
and socio-political developments are much more prom-
inent than utopian visions. This is not surprising, since 
dystopian narratives, like negative scenarios in general, 
are easier to describe. As is generally the case for dys-
topian movies and novels, as well as the narratives of 
computer games, dystopian narratives are particularly 
successful and appealing when their main themes 
address people’s ‘primal or basic fears’. In psychology, 
fear is in principle considered to be an unpleasantly 
experienced inner state of terrible expectations that 
cannot be precisely predicted at the present time, i.e. 
are connected with the impression that future threats 
can be neither anticipated nor controlled (Butcher et 
al., 2009). Basic fears can be derived from basic needs, 
such as the motivation to socialize or the pursuit of rec-
ognition (e.g. Maslow, 1943; McClelland, 1991). 
Dystopian narratives address such losses of control 
or identity, for instance relating to societies where indi-
vidual control is no longer possible and unequal power 
relations undermine identities. Therefore, in discourses 
on possible dangers of digitalization, it should always 
be borne in mind that visions of the future are often 
determined more by culturally pre-formed basic dysto-
pian themes than truly derived from the new technical 
possibilities (Kehl and Coenen, 2016). The WBGU, with 
its commitment to enlightenment and emancipation 
from immaturity, consciously adopts a distanced, criti-
cal attitude towards dystopian narratives and sees a 
need for research here, both in the sense of technically 
unemotional feasibility studies and impact assessment 
and with a view to addressing culturally heightened 
fears.
It is an open question whether the utopian or dysto-
pian futures are more likely to manifest themselves. 
This is precisely where the political and societal man-
date for proactive governance lies. When designing 
ecologically and societally sustainable pathways for 
technology development, it is important to keep an eye 
not only on potential but also on risks. This applies all 
the more since, already in the present, attention gaps, 
a failure to act, or a lack of foresight can set in motion 
later-irreversible, cumulatively intensifying processes 
involving destructive forces which no one will be able 
to stop in just a few decades time. On the other hand, 
the outlined utopian blueprints of the future show that 
particularly the task of shaping desirable positive inter-
actions between digitalization and sustainability still 
requires a lot more incentives in order to promote the 
necessary inventiveness and creativity and to 
strengthen implementation options.
It is precisely the more extreme visions of the future 
that reveal the driving forces the underlie development 
dynamics in the technology field of digitalization and 
shape sustainability effects. There is a lot of evidence of 
highly self-serving actions by different actors who, 
when developing and using digitalization, are guided 
primarily by motives like convenience, consumer 
enthusiasm and the pleasures of life, economic 
 competitive advantages and profit expectations, the 
exercise of power and the pursuit of control. There is 
little evidence of any motivation among actors from 
business, society or politics to explicitly pursue sustain-
ability goals (such as the SDGs) and thus to prioritize 
gearing digitalization to serving these goals. This omis-
sion may lie, so to speak, in the ‘weakness’ of human 
nature, so that it seem advisable to focus primarily on 
incentives, controls and regulations benefiting sustain-
ability goals keep a check on such weaknesses. Or else 
the actors are unaware of the harmful consequences of 
their actions and/or do not notice the opportunities 
offered. It is therefore important to vehemently propa-
gate and promote on a broad front the great, as-yet-un-
developed potential offered by digitalization for the 
future safeguarding of natural life-support systems, 
societal inclusion and the preservation of Eigenart.
As far as findings on indispensable requirements for 
shaping a sustainable society and humankind in the 
Digital Age are concerned, the quoted visions clearly 
reveal certain ‘guardrails’ which the digital society must 
not breach under any circumstances. There are techno-
logical advances and lines of development that – against 
the background of the WBGU's understanding of sus-
tainability – must not be tolerated and are to be avoided 
at all costs. This applies above all to the risks of the 
autocratic, kleptocratic total surveillance of all individ-
uals by digitally upgraded state institutions (in the sense 
of ‘Orwell 2084’), the complete assumption of power 
over consumer needs by a small number of corporations, 
and the replacement of human beings by digitally con-
structed and operating technical creatures. In many 
ways, it is to be hoped that the drafted dystopia will 
never become reality. Yet this is precisely why the dys-
topian narrative must be told now in order to prevent 
its realization in good time, and to make it  possible to 
use digitalization constructively for a  sustainable future.
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 > Comprehensive use of 
 renewable energy
 > Use of digital technologies for 
monitoring sustainable land 
and ocean use and the sustai-
nable use of all natural 
resources
 > Comprehensive conservation of 
biodiversity and ecosystems
 > As complete a circular economy 
as possible 





 > Disinterest in the natural living 
environment
 > Ecocide: progressive destruc-
tion (climate impacts, loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem 
 services, soil degradation)
Table 6 .3-1
Synoptic comparison of utopian and dystopian visions of the future. The visions are assigned to key issues that were published 
by WBGU in its discussion paper (WBGU, 2018a). Source: WBGU
Key topic Utopian vision of the future Dystopian vision of the future
Poverty reduction and 
inclusive development 
  
Equal access for all people to all 
basic existential functions
 > Personalized medicine
 > Worldwide access to education 
through digital and digitalized 
educational resources
 > Improved food supply through 
the use of digital precision-far-
ming technologies
 > Dematerialization
Material division, extreme 
widening of disparities
 > Perpetuation of poverty with 
consequences such as (environ-
mental) migration and hunger 
crises 
Future of work and 
reduction of inequality 
  
Inclusive digital society
 > Self-determined work and 
social security for all
 > Robots and machines take over 
hard, dangerous and monoton-
ous forms of work
Digitally exacerbated division
 > Increasing inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth and 
income
 > Wage slavery; environmentally 
hazardous and exploitative 





Open, free access to informati-
on in an open society
 > Free access for all to digital 
commons
 > Development of creative 
potential by digital means 
( digital creatives)
Dark age 
 > Organized stultification of the 
masses by outsourcing all 
forms of (thinking) work to 
machines
 > Absolute boredom
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Big data and privacy 
  
Self-determination 
 > Informed (personal) 
 responsibility
 > Digital sovereignty and data 
sovereignty
Post-privacy age
 > The digitalized surveillance 
state ('Orwell 2084')
 > Everyone is digitally immortal: 
no digital oblivion
 > External control
Fragility and autonomy 
of technical systems 
  
Resilient digital society 
 > Digital skills
 > Resilient infrastructures
 > Responsibility and liability in a 
networked society
 > Redundancies and quality  
levels according to security 
risks
Digital pluralism 
 > Digital commons and 
 public-service ICT
 > Sharing economy




 > Digitally supported multilatera-
lism
 > Creation of transparency rela-
ting to governmental and admi-
nistrative action, strengthening 
of democratic participation and 
collaboration with government 
and administration through  
the use of digital technologies 
(in the sense of open govern-
ment)
Digital blackout
 > Inadequate cybersecurity
 > Keeping security gaps open
Digital imperialism
 > Winner takes all: monopolies 
instead of diversity resulting in 
a deepening of unequal distri-
bution
 > Digitally enforced conformity
 > Misuse of digital possibilities to 
meet destructive vested 
 interests
Digitalized chaos
 > Vested interests of digital 
 multinational corporations or 
nation states leads to the end 
of multilateralism / the UN and 
the EU
Economic and political 
power shifts 
  
Acceleration and limits 
of governance
  
Key topic Utopian vision of the future Dystopian vision of the future
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Key topic Utopian vision of the future Dystopian vision of the future
Further development of 
humans 
  
Future of civilization 
  
The digitally enhanced human 
being
 > Individualized health; cures for 
physical and mental sufferin
 > Human beings enhanced 
by digitalization
Humanity 2 .0
 > Peaceful world
 > A life free of physical and 
 psychological suffering
 > Dignified old age
 > Optimum assistance  
through AI
Human enhancement 
 > Digitally exacerbated division
 > Cyborg competition: enhance-
ment of one’s own body and 
mind only for privileged elites
End of humankind /  
abolition of human beings
 > War of (autonomous) weapon 
robots
 > Superintelligence / singularity










‘Digitalization for  
sustainability’ 
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The WBGU presents three ‘Dynamics of the Digital Age’ to illustrate diffe-
rent areas where action is urgently needed. First, they concern the sustaina-
bility challenges that are already described in the 2030 Agenda. Second, they 
are about dealing with fundamental societal upheavals that go beyond these 
challenges and are triggered by digital change. Third, the future viability and 
identity of Homo sapiens itself is discussed.
7 .1
Three Dynamics of the Digital Age
In times when many societal structures and solutions 
are being questioned and look fragile, the likelihood of 
transformative or radical change increases. Such times 
are characterized by uncertainty, and questions about 
shaping the future come to the fore. Tipping points are 
reached when a return to previous development paths 
no longer seems possible. Societies will be in a state of 
radical openness to the future during the coming dec-
ades – at the latest after the simultaneous transforma-
tions caused by sustainability challenges and the wave 
of digitalization. Tipping points have been reached in 
both cases. In order to achieve the sustainability goals, 
a strategic transformation of deeply embedded path 
dependencies in economic and societal processes is 
necessary to comply with planetary guard rails. If this 
transformation fails, societies will be forced into 
upheaval by major changes in the natural life-support 
systems and available resources. The outcome of this 
upheaval, however, is even less predictable, but it is 
likely to drastically reduce many people’s quality of life 
and welfare. 
Similarly, it seems unlikely that the networking of 
processes and actors, or of the development and use of 
AI and virtual spaces, will be rolled back. In particular, 
the transfer of human decisions to technical systems is 
currently being promoted, turning these systems into 
new ‘actors’ with formative power and displacing typi-
cal human qualities from decision-making processes. In 
business, this has already been taking place for some 
time in the form of algorithmically controlled, high-fre-
quency trading in the financial sector; state social insti-
tutions in several countries use algorithms to allocate 
their funds; and doctors and lawyers also use AI for 
diagnoses and judgements. This gives rise to new nor-
mative questions which our societies must face up to. 
This chapter aims to develop the relation between 
digitalization and sustainability, with its fundamental 
questions and long-term dynamics. Three ‘Dynamics of 
the Digital Age’ are presented, which are intended as 
heuristics to illustrate three different, but acute needs 
for action. They should not be understood as a strict 
chronological sequence; the developments of all Three 
Dynamics are already taking place in parallel today. The 
Dynamics differ in their thematic focus, as well as in 
their time-staggered impact and societal discourse 
intensity (Figure 7.1-1). The Three Dynamics are inter-
woven and interdependent, so that clear-cut distinc-
tions are not possible. Instead, the WBGU’s purpose 
here is to bundle together relevant issues at the inter-
face between digitalization and sustainability in this 
century in order to identify action-relevant perspec-
tives on key challenges and areas of potential.
At this point, we would like to recall the WBGU’s 
central guide: the normative compass (Chapter 2). Sus-
taining the natural life-support systems, the compre-
hensive facilitation of inclusion, and the promotion of 
Eigenart remain guiding principles in the age of digital-
ization. For the special tasks facing humankind in the 
Digitalization and Sustainability – 
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The future of Homo sapiens
 Digitally support 
  sustainability
 - Comply with planetary guard rails 
(climate, nature, soils, oceans)
 - Secure social cohesion (against 
hunger, poverty, inequality; for 
access to water, health, education, 
energy)
 New humanism
 - Networked world society as a further 
advancement of Enlightenment and 
humanism
 - Development of global 
(environmental) awareness
 - Culture of cooperation, empathy, 
global solidarity
  Strengthen Homo sapiens‘ self-
confidence
 - Preservation of the biological human 
in its natural environment 
 - Ethically reflected advancement of 
humanity 
 - Design human-machine collaboration
 Ecological and societal 
 disruption
 - More emissions and resource use
 - More inequality
 - Greater concentration of power
 - Erosion of civil rights and privacy
 - Erosion of the state’s governance
  Digitally empowered 
totalitarianism
 - Hollowed-out democracies and 
digitally empowered autocracies
 - Massive inequality, domination by 
elites, total surveillance and loss of 
freedom
 - Environmental destruction and loss 
of social cohesion
  Blurring of borderlines between 
humans and machines
 - Abuse of human-machine 
relationship
 - Superintelligence
 - Artificial human evolution
Figure 7 .1-1a
Three Dynamics of the Digital Age. 
The chart shows the positive case of the Dynamics being successfully contained by setting goals and through governance. All 
three Dynamics are already emerging in parallel today, albeit at different levels of intensity, so there is no strict chronological 
sequence involved. Each Dynamic consists of different subpaths pointing in different directions. The name given to each Dy-
namic reflects the priorities for action required in each case. The texts below the illustration give keywords to the potential out-
comes (: upper row) and the risks (: lower row) of the three Dynamics. 
Source: WBGU; diagram: Wernerwerke, Berlin
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short, medium and long term as a result of digitaliza-
tion, it is also important for the WBGU to draw atten-
tion to the fundamental category of human dignity as a 
normative guiding principle (Section 2.3). Since simply 
being human could itself be challenged by digitalization 
in such different and radical ways, this perspective is 
relevant for all subsequent dynamics. 
The WBGU recommends conducting the urgently 
needed discourse on digitalization and sustainability 
along the following three central Dynamics of the Dig-
ital Age (Figure 7.1-1): 
 > First Dynamic: ‘Digitalization for sustainability’ – use 
digitalization to protect the Earth system and ensure 
social cohesion: The First Dynamic focuses on the 
2030 Agenda with the SDGs (Section 7.2). The ques-
tions are: How can digitalization be used both to 
protect the Earth system and to achieve social cohe-
sion – e.g. to mitigate climate change, biodiversity 
loss and soil degradation, and to eliminate hunger, 
poverty, extreme inequality and exclusion? How can 
digitalization help to effectively implement the 
ambitious programme for complying with planetary 
guard rails, protecting the environment and expand-
ing inclusive development, which has been succes-
sively developed over decades? But there is also the 
other side: digitalization can accelerate environmen-
tally harmful developments (e.g. the use of fossil 
fuels or valuable mineral resources) and thus aggra-
vate the risk of breaching the planetary guard rails. 
It also has the potential to weaken the social cohe-
sion of societies. Digitalization will be judged accord-
ing to whether it can reinforce the trend towards 
ecological and societal sustainability. In other words, 
we are at a crossroads. An internationally agreed tar-
get system for sustainability already exists with the 
2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement and other multi-
lateral treaties in the field of the environment and 
development. Despite these international agree-
ments, significant contrary trends can be observed 
(Section 7.2). With regard to the ecological situation, 
there is a risk of breaching planetary guard rails and 
degrading local ecosystems. With regard to social 
cohesion, the following trends can be observed in 
many countries: (1) rising inequality, (2) an increas-
Figure 7 .1-1b
Three Dynamics of the Digital Age. 
The chart shows the negative case of unsuccessful attempts to deal with the challenges. The failure of the First Dynamic has a 
negative overall effect on the Second Dynamic's prospects of success; a failed Second Dynamic has a corresponding negative 
 effect on the Third Dynamic (yellow flashes). 
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ing concentration of political and economic power, 
(3) a rising threat to civil rights and privacy, (4) an 
erosion of governance capacity among states. An 
uncontrolled form of digitalization that is not geared 
towards sustainability could reinforce or even multi-
ply these negative ecological and societal trends and 
lead to severe societal distortions. If efforts to con-
tain these risks fail, this will reduce the chances of 
using digitalization in the Second Dynamic to realize 
a positive vision of the future in national societies 
and throughout the world.
 > Second Dynamic: ‘Sustainable Digital Societies’ – 
realize a new humanism and prevent digital totalitar-
ianism: Parallel to this, the processes of the Second 
Dynamic are already underway. They are concerned 
with how to deal with the fundamental societal 
reconfigurations made necessary by digitalization, 
i.e. ultimately with reshaping the world in the Digital 
Age (Section 7.3). The digital societies of the Second 
(and Third) Dynamic will be as fundamentally differ-
ent from today’s societies as industrialized societies 
were from agricultural societies. In this context, the 
Second Dynamic seems to be like a Janus head with 
positive and negative potential, each involving 
corresponding challenges for shaping society. In the 
positive case, this offers hope that digitalization will 
open up new perspectives for development in order 
to develop and advance a humanist vision for a con-
nected global society of the Digital Age that reflex-
ively ties in with the legacy of the Enlightenment 
(‘New Humanism’, Box 7.3-2). But digitalization also 
involves the risk that undermined democracies and 
digitally empowered autocracies might destroy pre-
vious achievements in sustainability, and that socie-
ties will increasingly exhibit massive inequalities, 
power monopolies and elite rule, total surveillance, a 
loss of freedom and environmental destruction. 
Such developments are already visible today and are 
beginning to have an impact; active work can and 
must therefore begin now on the various fundamen-
tal choices. 
 > Third Dynamic: ‘The future of Homo sapiens’ – dis-
courses: The Third Dynamic is also already beginning 
to take shape today. It deals with the most funda-
mental of all sustainability issues: the future viabil-
ity and identity of humans themselves, embedded 
both in society and in the environment transformed 
by it (Section 7.4). Seemingly futuristic but already 
highly relevant core questions are being asked: What 
relationship will future humankind develop with an 
environment that has been fundamentally trans-
formed in the Anthropocene (Natura futuris)? How 
will humans in the Digital Age change through inter-
action with AI or the fusion of the physical and the 
virtual world? What will a Homo digitalis look like 
and how will he develop? What will a new human-
ism mean for Homo digitalis? How will it be possible 
to distinguish artificially intelligent, cognitively 
powerful machines (Machina sapiens) from humans? 
What characteristics and decision-making powers do 
we want to assign to a Machina sapiens? How can 
people, organizations, societies, international organ-
izations and networks prepare to keep these funda-
mental changes in the history of Homo sapiens under 
control?
Moving from the First to the Third Dynamic, there is 
increasing uncertainty and insecurity, less sharpness of 
detail, fewer reliable research findings, and ever fewer 
concrete recommendations. Instead, there are more 
fundamental questions which our societies should 
tackle in order to develop a sense of direction and the 
ability to shape and plan. With the debates on sustain-
ability, the environment, development and the 2030 
Agenda in the First Dynamic, the WBGU is still within 
its area of ‘core competence’. The issue is how the 
potential of digitalization for sustainability can be 
mobilized to limit the risks of drastic global environ-
mental changes and threats to the social cohesion and 
stability of many societies, and to reopen positive 
options for shaping and planning them. Beyond this 
short-term perspective, however, digitalization is 
changing societal realities so comprehensively (e.g. 
through AI and machine learning) that concepts of sus-
tainability must be further developed and ideas formu-
lated on the future of the human species. A new para-
digm of sustainability for ‘environment’ and ‘human 
beings’ (or ‘human societies’) must be developed in the 
Digital Age, not least so that the future human environ-
ment does not degenerate into a virtual illusion. In this 
context, the WBGU would like to make contributions to 
formulating a paradigm on sustainability and human 
development and a new humanism in the Digital Age. 
To this end, it is first of all necessary to stimulate or 
intensify a public discourse focusing on the impact of 
the potentially fundamental effects of digitalization. In 
addition, the relevant trends that are emerging should 
be shaped by society in good time. In view of digitali-
zation’s potential, steps should be taken towards a 
jointly developed positive vision, and a way should be 
devised to ensure forecasting of possible future sys-
temic risks. In addition to the WBGU’s repeated calls for 
compliance with planetary guard rails (e.g. WBGU, 
2014b), the First Dynamic (Section 7.2) explains cur-
rent risks of societal development already mentioned 
above that might gain momentum with digitalization: 
an increase in inequality, problematic concentrations of 
power, the loss of civil rights and privacy, and the failure 
of governance. If no action is taken to counteract the 
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developments that are already visible, there is a risk of 
aggravating societal systemic risks. Some of these risks 
relate more to relatively slow erosion processes. How-
ever, other systemic risks could lead to tipping points 
being exceeded beyond which radical systemic changes 
must be feared. Finally, there are risks associated with 
major uncertainties for which there is little forecasting 
capacity (‘black doors’). 
In the following three Sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, the 
Three Dynamics are described in more detail and guid-
ing principles for action added. 
7 .2
First Dynamic: use digitalization for 
 sustainability 
In the First Dynamic, the aim is to relate digitalization 
directly to the Transformation towards Sustainability, 
which the WBGU has described in its flagship report 
‘World in Transition – A Social Contract for Sustainabil-
ity’ and other publications (WBGU, 2011, 2014a, b). 
The planetary guard rails must be complied with, the 
corresponding tipping points of the Earth system must 
not be exceeded (WBGU, 2014b; Lenton et al., 2008), 
and social cohesion must be ensured by combating pov-
erty, among other things.
In recent decades, the two megatrends ‘sustainabil-
ity’ and ‘digitalization’ have developed in parallel and 
largely independently of each other; there has been 
little systematic coordination between them. This is 
illustrated for example by the fact that digitalization is 
not mentioned as an essential factor in the 2030 Agenda 
and the SDGs (Chapter 8). Conversely, digitalization 
strategies seldom have a sustainability dimension, 
regardless of whether they are the strategies of large 
digital corporations, governments, NGOs or academia 
(Section 4.2, Chapter 8). Digital technologies are used 
in all sectors to improve effectiveness and efficiency; 
for example, renewable energy systems have long-since 
been unthinkable without digitalization (Section 5.2.6). 
However, at best there are only initial signs of digitali-
zation being geared towards and targeting the Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability (Section 8.2). 
An evaluation of ten examples of reports by interna-
tional organizations on the topic of digitalization and 
sustainability shows that the issue of digitalization has 
arrived in the strategy departments of international 
organizations (Section 3.6), although the way this topic 
is dealt with can often still be described as a search pro-
cess. 
The arenas of digital change that are studied (see 
Chapter 5) illustrate the fact that linking digitalization 
and sustainability can open up considerable opportuni-
ties. Digitalization and sustainability must be systemat-
ically considered together, and digitalization must be 
actively shaped and systematically used for the Trans-
formation towards Sustainability. 
With reference to sustainability, preliminary ideas 
relating to this First Dynamic have already been devel-
oped in recent decades. The relevant scientific evidence 
is already available in many areas of the sustainability 
agenda, and there is a worldwide political consensus for 
the global sustainability agenda with its approach of 
preserving the environment, complying with the plan-
etary guard rails, combating poverty worldwide, and 
enabling development for the ‘bottom billion’ (Collier, 
2017). The multilateral target system for the Transfor-
mation towards Sustainability exists in the form of the 
2030 Agenda and its SDGs, the Paris Agreement and 
other multilateral treaties (Chapter 8). They clearly out-
line in principle which routes along this path need to be 
followed and which must be avoided. These goals still 
neglect the full breadth and consequences of digitaliza-
tion; their relevance to digitalization is therefore yet to 
be determined. But the first step has to be their imple-
mentation, and digitalization can play a decisive role 
here.
Digitalization as a way of enabling sustainability
As in many areas of society, digitalization also makes 
valuable and in some cases indispensable contributions 
in the field of sustainability to finding better and faster 
solutions to global environmental and development 
problems. The arenas of digital change in Chapter 5 
show that there is potential in many fields relevant to 
sustainability. Some of these can accelerate incremental 
developments, while others can trigger disruptive 
changes. 
However, this technological potential for solving 
sustainability problems is not ‘automatically’ used. It is 
therefore a matter of active policy: the societal objec-
tives must be operationalized in such a way that digital-
ization does not reinforce trends towards existing neg-
ative developments, but can have a positive, transform-
ative effect for a sustainable society. 
Digitalization is a prerequisite for the decarboniza-
tion of the electricity sector, for example (Section 
5.2.6). In particular, it facilitates the integration of fluc-
tuating and decentralized renewable-energy sources 
into the electricity grids, and plays an important role in 
the electrification of other sectors (e.g. transport, heat-
ing and refrigeration). 
Digitalization’s potential for dematerialization, 
resource conservation and the circular economy is as 
yet far from exhausted (Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.5). New 
regulatory approaches, business models, monitoring 
options, services and cultural practices are necessary, 
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especially in the field of electronic waste (Section 5.2.5). 
Yet this must not only be about improved recycling. 
Setting the course for a circular economy that is as com-
plete as possible includes a prudent digitalization 
offensive to leverage the positive potential of digitali-
zation along the entire life-cycle of products, as well as 
the creation of suitable economic and regulatory frame-
work conditions that make the corresponding technolo-
gies and business models competitive.
Digitalization also fosters the diffusion of sustain-
able consumption patterns by means of a greater diver-
sity of information and offers, and via new services, 
such as a resource-saving sharing economy based on 
smartphone technology (Sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3).
Sustainable land use is indispensable in order to sup-
ply humankind with agricultural and forestry products, 
and to preserve ecosystems, their biological diversity 
and ecosystem services in the long term. Even though 
many approaches to solving this problem lie outside the 
realm of digitalization and mechanization (e.g. plant 
breeding, soil restoration, climate adaptation), and in 
some cases even outside the realm of agriculture itself 
(e.g. food loss after harvesting, nutrition styles), preci-
sion agriculture is an interesting instrument for globally 
sustainable land use, and its potential should be 
exploited (Section 5.2.9). In developing countries, dig-
ital access to agricultural information and advice is an 
important starting point (Section 5.2.10). 
Digitalization also offers valuable new opportunities 
for monitoring ecosystems and biological diversity to 
improve knowledge and, for example, to counter over-
use or illegal activities (Section 5.2.11). 
Digital technologies could enable a new quality of 
monitoring and revolutionize our understanding of the 
interdependent social, ecological, economic and tech-
nological dynamics of the Anthropocene 
( Sections 3.3.5.1, 5.2.11). They could fill the gaps 
between observation, experimentation, modelling and 
theory formation and open up a route to a collective 
global awareness for sustainable development 
( Section 5.3.1). However, they also open up valuable 
opportunities for promoting social cohesion, e.g. by 
facilitating access to education (Section 5.3.4) and dig-
ital commons (Section 5.3.10) or by improving public 
discourse (Section 5.3.2). 
Digitalization as a risk to sustainability
However, digitalization can also massively exacerbate 
existing sustainability problems. Without suitable 
framework conditions there is a risk of societies even 
drifting faster towards the planetary guard rails and 
moving ever further away from the goal of sustainable 
development. Digitalization currently acts as an ampli-
fier and accelerator of economic processes that are still 
predominantly based on fossil fuels and resource 
extraction. Take the production and operation of elec-
tronic devices which are replaced in a rapid cycle; this 
in itself is a major driver of energy and resource use. 
Without a change of course in the direction of sustain-
ability, unbridled digitalization could jeopardize the 
success of the sustainability transformation. 
In concrete terms, digitalization threatens to increase 
resource consumption (e.g. strategic metals, rare 
earths), because more and more digital devices with 
brief lifespans keep coming onto the market (Köhler et 
al., 2018). Digitalization accelerates the linear economy 
(Section 5.2.5). Furthermore, if billions of new devices 
are networked over the coming years, the demand for 
energy from data centres and network services will also 
increase. This could be limited by increasing energy 
efficiency (IEA, 2017a). However, despite high effi-
ciency gains, there are currently no signs of a trend 
reversal in the ICT sector; direct demand for energy 
continues to rise rapidly (Köhler et al., 2018). A contin-
uation of these two trends increases ecological risks 
and the threat of breaching planetary guard rails. As a 
result, the challenges for an energy transformation 
(decarbonization) and a resource transformation (circu-
lar economy) are increasing considerably. An example 
of the indirect effects of digitalization on consumption 
is the resulting increase in energy and resource con-
sumption and the negative social and societal conse-
quences of online commerce (Section 5.2.4). 
Even using the positive potential of digitalization for 
the Transformation towards Sustainability involves fur-
ther societal dangers; this is because it means collecting 
and handling (in some cases large) amounts of data, 
which are processed by software and converted into 
concrete actions by partially or fully automated deci-
sions or via actuators. Leveraging sustainability poten-
tial is therefore inherently linked to questions: Who can 
use these data and how? Who designs, manufactures, 
operates and controls the algorithms for evaluation? 
Which data are regarded as personal? Who benefits 
from the new, associated business models? Who 
becomes dependent? How fragile are the new technical 
infrastructures? Which decisions are still made by 
human beings? What should the interplay of human 
intelligence and AI look like in order to strengthen peo-
ple and societies instead of weakening them (Rosol et 
al., 2018)? For these reasons alone, questions concern-
ing data handling, privacy, rights of use, decision-mak-
ing power and monopolization are already relevant in 
the First Dynamic and should be addressed in order to 
contain the risks involved. The arenas of agriculture, 
the circular economy, decarbonized energy systems, 
and smart cities provide clear examples of this connec-
tion (Section 5.2). 
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Furthermore, it must be feared that inclusion in the 
digitalized society is more difficult for poverty groups 
and minorities, and that they face an increased threat 
of discrimination, e.g. for lack of access to ICT or as a 
result of inadequate education (Sections 2.1.2, 5.3.5, 
5.3.4). 
In addition to the urgency of complying with plane-
tary guard rails, the WBGU also believes that the fol-
lowing four trends are a challenge for our societies. 
Their effects could be mitigated by the targeted use of 
digital solutions, but if they are not properly shaped, 
there is a great danger that they may become more 
severe. Ultimately, all these risks of societal develop-
ment also threaten human dignity (Section 2.3). 
The first risk arises from the increase in inequality 
within societies and, despite some partial successes, 
also between societies. Today, inequality is already a 
worldwide threat to social cohesion. Although the 
effects of digitalization could counteract this, they 
could also increase inequality and thus, in extreme 
cases, become a global multiplier of inequality. Prevent-
ing this effect through formative action is an urgent 
project of any form of digitalization geared towards 
sustainability.
The second risk is the growing trend towards new, 
potentially problematic concentrations of power at 
many levels. The five most valuable companies today 
are already digital corporations. The economic market 
power they have as a result is not necessarily a problem 
in itself, albeit only unless it is augmented by poorly 
regulated, powerful access to the data of billions of 
users. Politically, the figure of the ‘strong autocrat’ is 
once again in the ascendancy. Even within the Euro-
pean Union and in the USA the hitherto clear commit-
ment to the separation of powers and the rule of law 
has been shaken. Even if digitalization effects are not 
the unequivocal cause of this, the risk of the misuse of 
digital technologies is evident.
Thirdly, the increasing erosion of civil rights and pri-
vacy can already be seen today. Driven by economic or 
state interests and made possible by technical infra-
structure and lax handling of data by individuals, we 
are experiencing an unprecedented relativization of 
privacy and a growing threat to civil rights. In view of 
the above-outlined possibilities of a technological 
development towards societal totalization and individ-
ual transparency, measures must be taken to prevent a 
post-privacy society. 
Fourthly and finally, the rapid pace of developments 
threatens to overtax the ability of governments and the 
multilateral system. The risk of an erosion of the state’s 
ability to govern is increasing – recognizable as a loss of 
the conventional ability to act, shape and plan. Even 
now, governments are completely unprepared for the 
formative challenges of digital upheavals. There is a 
lack of knowledge and experts in the governments, 
administrations and networks to exploit the potential 
of digital change and prevent the gradual creation of a 
self-learning technosphere that might slip out of human 
control, manipulate human behaviour, and be misused 
by powerful actors. If the sustainability transformation 
is already dependent on multifaceted cooperation and a 
wisely designed polycentric architecture of responsibil-
ity, this requirement is reinforced by the consequences 
of digitalization (Section 4.1). The digitalization-driven 
acceleration of economic and socio-political develop-
ments must not lead to a further loss of political, 
national or multilateral ability to govern. However, 
democracies in particular can potentially deal well with 
complexity and diversity – if they are prepared to do so 
on a institutional and discursive level. As in the area of 
climate change, individual and national contributions to 
the governance of digitalization must be globally 
embedded and coordinated. 
The societal challenge will be to contain these four 
risks of societal development. Implementing the 2030 
Agenda and achieving the SDGs are important pre-
requisites for this. If time is wasted and the sustainabil-
ity goals are not achieved, there is a threat of intolera-
ble effects on the Earth system (breaching of planetary 
guard rails) and severe societal upheavals in global 
 society (loss of social cohesion, e.g. due to poverty, 
hunger, failed states). The four risks are already having 
an effect in the First Dynamic. If they cannot be con-
tained, their impact will be maximized in the Second 
Dynamic, where a fundamental restructuring of social 
systems is about to begin. This would in turn signifi-
cantly reduce the chances of using digitalization to 
make real progress towards realizing a ‘new humanism’ 
(Box 7.3-2). 
Guiding principles for action 
Figure 7.2-1 illustrates the challenge in a simple way. If 
the two central axes of sustainability (environment and 
Earth system; development and social cohesion) are 
plotted against each other, and both a positive and a 
negative area are assumed for each axis, then the chal-
lenge in the case of the First Dynamic is to set the right 
levers in motion so that global society can find its way 
into the double-positive ‘green’ quadrant. The other 
quadrants or scenarios, and particularly the dark red 
area, represent failure to contain the risks of societal 
development and thus also the failure of the hope in 
the Second Dynamic of being able to achieve a ‘new 
humanism’ with the help of digitalization.
In order to reach the ‘green quadrant’ of a digitalized 
sustainability society, the WBGU expressly recom-
mends that digitalization be put at the service of global 
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sustainability WBGU, 2018a; Chapter 9). The motto of 
this First Dynamic should be: society must act now to 
achieve the transformation to a digitalized sustainabil-
ity society! Digitalization provides powerful tools which 
are already in wide use in society, but need to be 
deployed more intensively to implement the 2030 
Agenda. In order to exploit the new possibilities of dig-
italization for the Transformation towards Sustainabil-
ity and to avoid the risks, actors at all levels, from local 
to intergovernmental, must be addressed (Chapter 4).
However, by no means all sustainability problems 
can be solved with digitalization. In the WBGU’s opin-
ion, it is primarily a question of society’s willingness to 
make a decision in favour of the Transformation towards 
Sustainability and to commit itself to this goal (Chapter 
9). In Germany, for example, the obstacles to phasing 
out coal are not rooted in the insufficient application of 
digitalization. 
Several urgent guiding principles for action in the 
First Dynamic emerge from the WBGU’s analysis. 
 > Understand digitalization and sustainability: The 
information and knowledge base about the ecologi-
cal effects of digitalization is insufficient. The gaps 
in knowledge that have been identified should be 
closed through targeted research (e.g. energy and 
resource requirements, Section 10.3.1). 
 > Integrate engagement with digitalization and sustain-
ability: Digitalization and sustainability are not sec-
tors that can be treated separately. They are 
cross-cutting issues that need to be included ubiqui-
tously in analyses. In this context, sustainability is 
above all a system of objectives; digitalization is 
above all a means to this end involving many posi-
tive and negative side effects. The 2030 Agenda 
should therefore be examined to determine its links 
to digitalization; corresponding potential should be 
leveraged (Sections 8.2.1, 10.3).
 > Shape digitalization for sustainability: The current 
pace of technological development will not be redi-
rected towards sustainability of its own accord. For 
example, urgent action must be taken to counteract 
the threat of a multiplication of the demand for 
energy and resources caused by the increasing num-
ber of digital devices and applications and rapidly 
growing infrastructures. Efforts should be made 
nationally and multilaterally to reduce the digital 
divide and make digital services accessible to all. 
Digitalization needs to be shaped for sustainability 
by society so that digitalization can have a produc-
tive impact on the Transformation towards Sustaina-
bility. To this end, policy-makers should consistently 
further develop or create the legal framework for 
sustainability policy. The foundations should be laid 
early on for the advancement of the 2030 Agenda in 
a way that includes the megatrend of digitalization 
(Section 9.3). 
Figure 7 .2-1
Compliance with planetary 
guard rails and securing 
 social cohesion; both must 
be achieved. The core que-
stion of the First Dynamic is 
which digitalization strate-
gies are suitable for moving 
societies in the direction of 
a digitalized sustainability 
society (green quadrant, top 
right). Only if this is achie-
ved is there a good chance 
of avoiding systemic risks in 
the Second Dynamic and 
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 > Engage responsibly with data: In order to leverage 
the positive potential of sustainability, it is essential 
to clarify beforehand the way in which the data, 
algorithms and knowledge from digitalization appli-
cations are handled and used. This involves both 
guaranteeing privacy, self-determination, data pro-
tection and data security, and the resilience, robust-
ness and fault tolerance of the emerging systems 
(Section 9.2). The designers and operators of digital 
solutions should be enabled through education and 
further training to understand and implement these 
characteristics together with sustainability aspects. 
 > Move towards resource-conserving consumption: 
Some of the societal challenges outlined above can-
not be met without changes in behaviour. Regula-
tion (e.g. pricing) of negative environmental impacts 
can make an essential contribution to steering con-
sumption towards resource conservation. Education 
for sustainable development (Section 9.1.4) should 
also raise awareness of the need for a critical attitude 
towards consumption (Section 5.2.3). Education in 
line with the normative compass (Chapter 2) can 
help promote values related to the well-being of 
people and the environment. A corresponding long-
term strategy for future-proof education is a pre-
requisite for shaping digitalization in the sense of 
the Great Transformation towards Sustainability 
(Section 5.3.4; Box 7.5-1). 
7 .3
Second Dynamic: Sustainable digitalized  societies 
– anticipate and shape fundamental changes
While the First Dynamic is primarily concerned with 
using digitalization as a means of solving existing sus-
tainability problems and of maximizing its benefits for 
the 2030 Agenda canon of objectives, the Second 
Dynamic points to more fundamental changes. Digital-
ization can be a radical and potentially system-chang-
ing driver of societal change. Our relationship with the 
environment and the Earth system, our ways of doing 
business, our societal practices and political institu-
tions, the use of technologies – even on and in people 
– all this will change fundamentally. ‘Digitalization’ 
should neither be mystified nor glorified in this con-
text. Yet, just as in the early days of the Industrial Rev-
olution it was impossible to foresee what enormous 
influence mechanization and the use of steam engines, 
coal and iron would have, it is not clear today what 
consequences digitalization will have for our present 
societies, or what will be the effects of the increasing 
networking, the cognitive abilities and autonomy of 
technical systems, or virtuality and the knowledge 
explosion (core characteristics of the Digital Age: 
 Section 3.4). 
The transformative power of the Industrial Revolu-
tion made great prosperity and progress possible, but it 
also produced or enabled environmental degradation, 
climate change and enormous social upheaval, impov-
erishment and exploitation. In many societies, it was 
only after long social struggles that the most blatant 
social consequences were later contained with com-
pletely new forms of social and economic policy. Even 
today the social question is not adequately addressed in 
many countries, not to mention the key unresolved 
issues of worldwide decarbonization, effective climate 
policy, and decoupling wealth creation from the con-
sumption of natural resources. This ‘retarding moment’ 
in the history of innovation should be pre-empted in 
the case of the digital revolution, precisely because its 
penetration, range and speed are likely to eclipse previ-
ous phases of technological progress. In view of the 
core characteristics of the Digital Age (Section 3.4), the 
course should already be set today, proactively, in all 
key spheres of life (Section 3.5). These characteristics 
and their current impact must be understood, critically 
and anticipatively thought through, and shaped to 
sound out their future realms of possibility. 
The fundamental openness of the future is both an 
incentive and a mandate to exert a influence to shape 
changes. Societies can already prepare themselves 
today for this important and challenging task. The dem-
ocratic nation-state has many possibilities for technical 
and institutional further development, and also for pro-
moting awareness and competence among other soci-
etal actors. Scientific advice for policy-makers, technol-
ogy-impact assessment, and strategic early detection 
(‘horizon scanning’ and ‘visioning’) – as well as the 
broad-based integration of expertise on digitalization 
and its societal consequences in the executive and leg-
islative core areas of government – are important 
options for maintaining a future-sensitive ability to 
shape and plan. Today, tomorrow and in the future, par-
liaments and governments should develop the neces-
sary expertise to make the diverse effects of digitaliza-
tion transparent and tangible; and society as a whole 
should publicly discuss them and critically reflect on 
them. On this basis, far-reaching societal changes for 
the sake of sustainability can also be mastered.
A canon of objectives for a sustainable digitalized 
global society is still lacking at the global level. The 
Agenda 2030 does not provide this: first, it only mar-
ginally addresses the effects of digitalization; second, 
its impact extends far beyond the 2030 Agenda ( Section 
8.3). Here, too, in the WBGU’s view, the normative 
model and guideline for such a canon of objectives 
should be its compass dimensions – sustaining the 
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 natural life-support systems, inclusion and Eigenart – as 
well as the protection of dignity (Chapter 2). If it is pos-
sible to make use of digitalization for sustainability in a 
timely manner (First Dynamic), then it may be possible 
to sustainably shape the more extensive digitalization 
effects of the Second Dynamic. This begins with a 
 critical (self-)reflection of the current situation, because 
our world is already profoundly influenced by the 
rationality and incentive structures of digitalized busi-
ness models. Where do our societies stand today, and 
what fundamental steps must now be taken to make 
positive use of digitalization for digitalized sustainable 
societies? The manifold, concrete decisions facing 
humankind can lead us into radically different worlds 
(Section 7.5). An overarching key question of this 
Dynamic should therefore be: will global society 
 succeed in realizing the old dream of humanism in a 
new and global way in the Digital Age (Box 7.3-2)? Or 
will it slip into digitally empowered totalitarianism with 
radically intensified power asymmetries, environmen-
tal destruction, massive threats to democracy and soci-
etal deliberation, the loss of social cohesion, and multi-
ple global inequality dynamics – for instance between a 
small elite and those who are left behind? 
Understand digitalization and shape it proactively in 
all key spheres of life today
In order to achieve a Great Transformation towards Sus-
tainability (WBGU, 2011), many old paths and estab-
lished patterns must be abandoned and new roads 
adopted. If properly shaped, digitalization, with its dis-
ruptive potential, can open up many of these new ave-
nues and make them viable (Section 7.2). However, 
another important finding of this report is that both the 
many small innovations and the potentially far-reach-
ing system changes are already being actively driven by 
certain actors and individual interests today (Chapter 4) 
– and that this by no means automatically leads to more 
sustainability. In many areas – employment and agri-
culture, mobility and urban development, democracy 
and inequality – it is not yet certain which direction 
developments will take in the medium and long term 
(Chapter 5). In these arenas it has become clear that 
although the respective systemic framework conditions 
often have a greater effect than individual technologi-
cal innovations, these technological innovations can 
nevertheless have a system-changing impact. 
To master this task of shaping an entire society, it is 
necessary for society as a whole to be vigilant in order, 
first, to anticipate systemic risks and, second, to iden-
tify paths towards the realization of a ‘new humanism’ 
in the Digital Age and in many cases to actively follow 
those paths in the spirit of a ‘polycentric responsibility 
architecture’ (Chapter 4). Such at-times radical open-
ness to the future should not lead to impotence or 
speechlessness, for transformative change can also be 
shaped by anticipatory governance (Section 4.1). The 
normative compass can help provide orientation as to 
which directions should be taken, which paths will lead 
us astray, and which landmarks should be followed and 
fundamental decisions taken to initiate timely partici-
patory societal discourses and research. The analysis of 
changes in key areas of life in the Digital Age 
( Section 3.5) provides numerous pointers for these cre-
ative and formative tasks. 
This means that standards and rules should also 
apply to the global, increasingly digitalized economy. 
Risks such as an accelerated opening of the gap between 
rich and poor within and between societies, or too one-
sided value creation by a few global corporations must 
be prevented. To this end, the ‘digital’ potential of both 
new and old economic forms for sustainable production 
and consumption should be promoted, and ways of 
steering the economy (such as competition control) 
newly or further developed. Concrete innovation pro-
jects, such as the creation of public-service infrastruc-
tures or the expansion of effective data protection as a 
locational advantage for the EU, could bring about rel-
evant changes and support long-term cornerstone 
choices (Sections 5.3.5, 5.3.10). Societal debates and 
scientific research on the form and function of work, 
working hours, employment and inclusion in the Digital 
Age (Section 5.2.9) should be initiated and carried out 
as promptly as those on a collaborative economy, the 
challenges and opportunities of platform and circular 
economies, and the importance of secure data use 
( Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.5).
The conscious and rights-based handling of data is 
also one of the core issues in defending the principles 
of liberal and social democracy. Adhering to individual 
privacy protection and joint arenas of public exchange 
is an important prerequisite for a functioning democratic 
public sphere (Section 5.3.2). It is not easy to contain 
the currently growing tendency to digitally ‘publish’ 
privacy, while arenas of the digital public sphere are 
simultaneously being privatized and parcelled out on 
manipulation-prone platforms. However, effective 
data-protection laws, well thought-out media policies, 
and educational initiatives promoting digital literacy are 
three relevant building blocks in this direction. The state 
as a whole should play a structuring and, where appro-
priate, orchestrating role in concert with the many other 
relevant actors in proactively shaping digitalization for 
sustainability. The WBGU recommends a ‘polycentric 
responsibility architecture’ as a guiding principle (Chap-
ter 4). The diversity of policy levels and actor profiles 
to be included can be recognized from this perspective, 
making a concrete allocation of responsibility possible. 
Second Dynamic: Sustainable digitalized  societies – anticipate and shape fundamental changes  7.3
293
For individual people, individual autonomy and 
self-determination become the focus of attention. In 
view of the self-tracking and external scoring in the 
growing data economy – including the beginnings of 
dystopian standardization and control by state actors 
– it is difficult, if not impossible, for people not to inter-
act with the digital or digitally recorded environment 
(Sections 5.3.3, 5.3.7). This makes it all the more impor-
tant to promote individual maturity and education and 
to create structural conditions that contain encroach-
ment by technical systems and activate the potential 
for expanding human empathy and developing global 
mutual perception (Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.4; Box 7.5-1). 
Actively maintain foresight and the ability to act: 
develop positive guiding principles and avoid 
systemic crises
A critical and reflective perception of the already exist-
ing imperatives of increasingly digitalized societies and 
economies is therefore important in order to set the 
course today for a sustainable global society in the 
 Digital Age. In view of the potentially disruptive power 
of digital innovation, it is all the more important to 
reflect in good time on the long-term visions and pro-
spective goals. Disruptions are useful when they help to 
breach path dependencies of unsustainable develop-
ment, be it in the transition to renewable energy sys-
tems and new sustainable mobility or in overcoming 
scarcity in key areas of our economic system. However, 
disruption triggered by digitalization can also lead to 
systemic crises in all spheres of life. The WBGU believes 
it is important to discuss and illustrate both perspec-
tives in society to enable people to gain a better under-
standing of the possibility of radically different futures. 
To achieve this, societies need both long-term visions 
for realizing key potential benefits of digitalization, and 
an informed ability to anticipate dystopias in order to 
contain system risks (Box 7.3-1). 
The WBGU proposes a global and digitally enabled 
‘new humanism’ for a possible positive development 
perspective that helps to overcome the prevailing ‘dic-
tatorship of the present’ (Figure 7.1-1a; Box 7.3-2). In 
this way, digitalization offers hope for a new phase in 
which human curiosity, diversity and physicality can be 
liberated from material restrictions and structural con-
straints, and conditions can be created for all people to 
largely overcome deprivation and conflict. The WBGU’s 
vision here is that of human beings becoming more pro-
foundly human with the help of technical systems. This 
humanistic vision is not just a vague utopia: digital 
technologies are already making transnational commu-
nication, networking and the growth of information 
and knowledge possible in unprecedented ways. Look-
ing ahead to the future, this can encourage the human 
capacity for a more profound culture of cooperation, 
mutual empathy and global solidarity. 
For the WBGU, the dystopian antithesis to this is 
digitally reinforced authoritarianism or even ‘digitally 
Box 7 .3-1
Avoiding systemic risks in the Digital Age 
In order to be able to exploit the potential of digitalization, we 
must be aware of the possible systemic risks in the Digital 
Age. Digital systemic risks include conceivable, large-scale 
changes in our societies, each of which could in itself trigger 
destabilization in those societies. Knock-on and cumulative 
amplifying effects would multiply accordingly and have a 
broad-based impact. 
While some of these threats are undisputed (e.g. la-
bour-market disruptions), the magnitude of the changes is 
uncertain. The probability of other systemic risks occurring is 
significant (e.g. breaching planetary guard rails, digital au-
thoritarianism, further power gains by major digital corpora-
tions), while the likelihood of other risks occurring is relative-
ly low from today’s perspective (e.g. acceptance of human 
enhancement to create an optimized Homo sapiens). Howev-
er, even the latter systemic risks must not be neglected be-
cause, in a worst-case scenario, they would have a major im-
pact on the future of civilization. The WBGU identifies the 
following systemic risks in the Digital Age:
 > the breaching of planetary guard rails as a result of digitally 
driven, resource- and emissions-intensive growth patterns,
 > the disempowerment of the individual, threats to pri-
vacy and an undermining of the digitalized public sphere 
through digitally empowered authoritarianism and totali-
tarianism,
 > an undermining of democracy and deliberation by norma-
tively and institutionally non-embedded, automated deci-
sion-making or decision-making support,
 > dominance by companies that can elude government con-
trol, driven by further data-based power concentration,
 > disruption of labour markets by the comprehensive auto-
mation of data-driven activities and the danger that human 
labour will become increasingly irrelevant to the economy,
 > a deeper division of global society as a result of limited 
access to, and use of, digital potential, mainly by wealthy 
minorities in the global society, 
 > abuse of the mechanization of humanity on the basis of 
human-enhancement philosophies and methods.
It is also important to bear in mind that the digital upheavals 
are being experienced by societies that are already unsettled 
by globalization, the rise of new powers, refugee flows and 
forms of authoritarian populism. The bow-waves of digitaliza-
tion are colliding with the current crisis in Europe and the 
West, as well as with frontal attacks on a multilateral world 
order based on cooperation and rules. The systemic risks of 
the Digital Age could overlap with and reinforce the centrifu-
gal forces that already exist in many societies.
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Box 7 .3-2
Strengthen humaneness as a humanistic digital 
project 
Many seemingly self-evident tenets are re-scrutinized at 
times of societal upheaval. Historically, this has always related 
to humans’ role on Earth and the prevailing human self-im-
age. After Classical Antiquity, the Renaissance and the En-
lightenment, the transition to the Digital Age has given rise 
for the fourth time to the humanist hope that new technolog-
ical and societal breakthroughs could serve the full unfolding 
of civilizational and human potential. Improving the precon-
ditions of human life, human self-determination and human 
dignity are important building blocks of humanist schools of 
thought (Wolf, 2007). 
Discussions about digital change are often conducted from 
a highly technical and economic point of view and are similar 
to the strands of the sustainability debate, which focus pri-
marily on resource efficiency potential and technological 
solutions to sustainability challenges. The sustainability of 
societies depends not only on efficiently designed technolo-
gies and institutions, but above all on the goals, motivations 
and justifications with which people create and use these 
technologies and institutions. Specifically at times when hith-
erto self-evident tenets and certainties are being challenged, 
these goals, motivations and justifications are also questioned 
and renegotiated. For example, people also changed their ‘in-
tellectual map of the world’ (Goldin and Kutarna, 2016) in 
previous major innovation surges such as the Renaissance by 
adapting to new knowledge, new technical possibilities and 
new societal challenges. Conversely, the objectives, motiva-
tions and justifications that prevail have a strong impact on 
which new technical possibilities, societal institutions, cer-
tainties and self-evident tenets will prevail. 
New humanism in the 21st century
In the Digital Age, for the first time in history, technical pro-
gress opens up an area of possibility for a potentially funda-
mental change in the human condition. Particularly in con-
nection with AI – in the sense of the rule-guided 
machine-generated evaluation of large data sets and its pos-
sible applications (Section 3.3.3) – four central questions of a 
humanist project are therefore discussed (Floridi et al., 2018): 
(1) Who or what can we become (autonomous self-realiza-
tion)? (2) What can we do (human activity)? (3) What can we 
achieve (individual and social skills)? (4) How can we interact 
with each other and with the world/environment (social co-
herence and people as part of the natural environment)? In all 
these points, digital technologies can be used in such a way 
that they strengthen, underuse or limit potential by being 
overused or misused, thus leading to considerable risks (Flori-
di et al., 2018). 
In the WBGU’s view, interaction between people and tech-
nologies should always be considered in the context of the 
natural life-support systems and whether they can be sus-
tained. This applies particularly if this new humanist project 
is to encompass humanity as a whole and not be limited to the 
maximum possible technological support of privileged per-
sons (Harari, 2018). 
Furthermore, a humanist reading of digital change re-
quires that current societal discourses be turned upside down. 
Up to now, discourses on digital change, with their structural 
determinism, have resembled the economic narrative of the 
20th century, according to which people have to toughen and 
improve themselves for a changed environment and society. 
A humanist vision, by contrast, looks for ways in which peo-
ple can once again increasingly become actors and subjects in 
shaping their technologically supported societies and devel-
opments. This appeal to creative power is thus a central com-
ponent of an expanded sustainability paradigm and the basis 
for leveraging humanistic potential in the 21st century. Such 
a vision thus offers an alternative narrative to technological 
fantasies that declare that the Eigenart (i.e. individuality, 
uniqueness; Section 2.2.4) of human existence in particular 
will soon be a thing of the past. These technological fantasies 
appear in variations of the following two directions:
 > ‘The technologization of the human being’, a fundamental 
extension of human beings (human enhancement) through 
digital technologies with the aim of overcoming their bio-
logical limitations (Topic box 5.3-2),
 > ‘The humanization of the machine’, the creation of a 
human-like, sentient and independent artificial species 
(Section 7.4).
Navigating between these two extremes through and beyond 
the 2030 Agenda, a broad space opens up for the develop-
ment of human Eigenart. Describing and defining future de-
velopment paths – and also the human self-image – is there-
fore an integral part of many ethical discussions. These 
decisions cannot be made by political, scientific or financially 
strong elites. The emancipatory hope of a ‘new humanism’ 
can only be legitimized and realized as a broad-based societal 
process of searching and shaping.
The role of a new Enlightenment in the 21st century
The connection between humanism as a societal vision and 
the historical-philosophical project of the Enlightenment in 
the 17th and 18th centuries is well summarized in Immanuel 
Kant’s ‘emergence of man from his self-imposed immaturity’ 
(1784). The search for new intellectual maps begun in the 
Renaissance manifested itself in this epoch. Absolutism, God’s 
grace, the system of the ‘estates of the realm’, and the domi-
nance of the Catholic Church were replaced by human reason 
as the universal, progressive authority for judgement. The 
Enlightenment included currents of rationalism (Descartes), 
empiricism (Hume, Locke), encyclopaedism (Diderot, 
d’Alembert), and universalism (Kant), and created important 
foundations for general human rights, evidence-based 
 sciences, and the principles of popular sovereignty and the 
rule of law. Four main characteristics of the human self-image 
often referred to (or disqualified) as Western can be traced 
back to the Enlightenment. Humans are understood to be (1) 
capable of rationality (Kant), (2) communicative (Habermas) 
and (3) autonomous (Descartes, Locke) subjects with (4) nat-
ural rights (Kant, Rousseau).
These key achievements must be defended in view of the 
rapid changes brought about by digitalization, because socie-
ties are sustainable precisely if they maintain the principles of 
the ability to discuss, act, innovate and shape (Section 7.5), 
even in the face of greatly changed framework conditions. To 
defend the central elements of the Enlightenment, the follow-
ing questions should be put to society: 
1. How can human maturity and democratic voting proces-
ses be preserved in the context of increasingly automa-
ted decision-making?
2. How can deliberative processes be protected and orien-
tation secured in view of the massive increase in know-
ledge and opinions?
3. How can key rights such as freedom, equality, privacy and 
property be protected for all people in the digital space?
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empowered totalitarianism’. In view of the challenges 
that already exist today because of extensive data col-
lection and economic incentive structures in liberal 
democracies, and scoring approaches in authoritarian 
systems such as China, the danger of total individual 
and collective surveillance and the end of genuine pri-
vacy is by no means distant doom-mongering. Here 
looms the danger of an insidious destruction of the 
model of the free individual as a person with dignity 
and rights. The ongoing shifting of decisions to digital 
systems, if it goes beyond meaningful automation (e.g. 
security-relevant backup functions, more effective 
process control), will also be crossing a threshold if it 
threatens to erode democracy and public deliberation 
4. How can the sovereignty of the people and the rule of 
law – as opposed to arbitrariness (Locke) and divine grace 
(Rousseau) – be defended against digital surveillance?
An anticipatory and extended humanism for the 21st century 
will also further develop the (universalistic) image of human-
kind, since it is sharply criticized not only in intercultural di-
alogue and in the reappraisal of colonialism, but also by 21st 
century science. The basic features of a further development 
of the central ideas and scientific findings of the 17th and 
18th centuries can be summarized in four points (Braidotti, 
2014; Whatmore, 2002; Hayles, 1999; Haraway, 1991; Ben-
nett, 2010; Box 2.1.2-1):
1. Reducing people to their thinking neglects the import-
ance of physicality and emotions. 
2. Individualism as a culture and scientific methodology 
neglects the importance of society and social networking 
for human development.
3. Looking at human life decoupled from nature neglects 
systemic interconnections of the biosphere, to which 
humans also belong and on whose dynamics human exis-
tence depends.
4. Universalism that ignores differences when describing 
people and societies neglects the role of culture, instituti-
ons, and even technologies in the shaping of individuals. 
So historically we are again in a phase in which not only the 
societal narratives and structures are being challenged in 
terms of their effect on human freedom and potential devel-
opment – as the sustainability agenda has done since the pub-
lication of the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987). The onset of 
both the Anthropocene and the Digital Age is so comprehen-
sive in character that, as in previous great transformations, 
they affect societal relations as a whole. Enlightenment in the 
21st century therefore again encompasses the human self-im-
age itself, as formulated at the very beginning of the Brundt-
land Report: “In the middle of the 20th century, we saw our 
planet from space for the first time. Historians may eventually 
find that this vision had a greater impact on thought than did 
the Copernican revolution of the 16th century, which upset 
the human self-image by revealing that the Earth is not the 
centre of the universe. From space, we see a small and fragile 
ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a 
pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils. Humanity’s in-
ability to fit its activities into that pattern is changing plane-
tary systems, fundamentally. Many such changes are accom-
panied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from 
which there is no escape, must be recognized – and managed” 
(WCED, 1987; no italics in the original).
In view of the comprehensive penetration of societies by 
new technologies, this enlightenment project should also in-
clude technology-impact assessment in particular. Visions, 
narratives, scenarios and simulations are integrated there as 
“content in the form of ideas about future developments,” but 
are based “exclusively on current ‘input data’ such as know-
ledge, interests, assumptions and values” (Grunwald, 
2012: 26). Without this emancipatory scrutiny, new technolo-
gies are conceived and used with precisely the human self-im-
age and world view on which many of the sustainability prob-
lems are already based. This would be more likely to lead an 
acceleration than to a correction of these negative trends. The 
practice of questioning the assumptions, knowledge, interests 
and values of current input data forms the basis of reflexive 
science, in which terms like ‘futures literacy’ and ‘anticipa-
tion’ are established as new fields of research and practice 
(Chapter 2). The emergence of socio-technical systems of ma-
chine intelligence and decision-making, as well as technical 
possibilities for manipulating human beings, raise questions 
relating to human life and dignity, as well as to self-determi-
nation and the foundations of life. 
Use digitalization as potential for humanity
An approach in the spirit of the Enlightenment is a prerequis-
ite for new technological possibilities to help advance the vi-
sion of a ‘new humanism’ and the development of human 
potential:
1. Can human abilities such as empathy, personality 
development, physical sensitivity and self-regulation be 
strengthened by digitally transmitted data, information 
or educational games? Or, on the contrary, are restricti-
ons in the use of digitally mediated experiences required?
2. Can new forms of communication, interaction or infras-
tructure make it easier to experience systemic connec-
tions and social feedback loops in societies and thus also 
to embed individual actions within them? Or is digitally 
mediated communication weaker here than analogue 
communication?
3. Does digitalization enable us to overcome the lack of 
mediation and speechlessness between local communi-
ties and global ecosystems? How could augmented rea-
lity, simulations, gaming or even citizen science help 
here? What role does directly experiencing nature play? 
4. Which cultural influences and digitally mediated practi-
ces find an echo and are disseminated in an increasingly 
global space of discourse and interaction? Which ideas 
of human self-determination and solidarity, dignity and 
way of life are dominant; which are hardly represented? 
What effect does this have on the human self-image in 
the 21st century?
Research, science and education often have a constitutive ef-
fect, especially in times of profound upheaval, which they 
should courageously and responsibly accept. People can be-
come co-creative and successful actors in shaping the future 
if they are enabled to meet the current challenges: observa-
tion, reflection, imagination and creativity drive alternatives, 
experiments and innovations. In times of crisis they are im-
portant components of resilience (UNESCO, 2012a: 15). 
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as the central mechanisms of societal decision-making. 
The economic system could develop further by means 
of monopolization tendencies in the direction of 
increasing concentrations of power and consumption of 
natural resources that would further underpin the 
above-mentioned totalization dystopia. Disruptions of 
the work-oriented society could cause the global col-
lapse of forms of work and participation that are estab-
lished today. The consequence of these and other 
potential systemic risks would be increasing inequality 
and exclusion (Box 7.3-1). Small digital elites, equipped 
with considerable economic and political power, would 
have exclusive access to human enhancement, global 
databases and the vestiges of intact nature; everyone 
else would increasingly be left behind and form a global 
precariat without dignity or purpose, sedated by multi-
media and frozen in the apparent imperfection of their 
biological existence.
Under no circumstances should these systemic risks, 
which describe negative extremes of possible futures, 
obscure our view of the challenges and shortcomings of 
the present. The joint development of positive guiding 
concepts is just as necessary for actively shaping digi-
talization and sustainability as clear and early analyses 
of the future dangers and risks of digitally empowered 
totalitarianism. 
Guiding principles for action
It is thus evident that the disruptive force of possible 
developments makes ‘profound’ digital change a key 
sustainability issue. Like recognizing and overcoming 
path dependencies, projections in the face of great 
uncertainty are a known problem in sustainability sci-
ence and policy. In environmental policy, there are 
established and proven principles (precautionary prin-
ciple, cooperation principle, polluter-pays principle and 
integration principle) that can be used for shaping dig-
italization (Section 8.4.2). In the context of this experi-
ence, further guiding principles for this Second Dynamic 
therefore include the systematic strengthening of soci-
etal far-sightedness and constant reflexivity, the ability 
to act, and long-term resilience. 
In order to set the course for sustainability today, 
societies should hold discussions today, strengthen 
their creative power and develop long-term visions. 
Scientific advice for policy-makers, methods for strate-
gic foresight, technology-impact assessment, research 
and education initiatives, as well as societal and trans-
national discourses with all stakeholders are ways to 
fight together anticipatively to realize a ‘new human-
ism’ (Box 7.3-2) – and at the same time prevent a grad-
ual collapse into a convenient ‘more-of-the-same’ atti-
tude, or even ‘digitally empowered totalitarianism’. 
This requires multilateral cooperation and a global 
framework (Chapter 8). Technologies and increasing 
innovation and knowledge often know no national bor-
ders, whether positive or negative. The EU in particular 
has a responsibility to develop its own citizen-oriented, 
constitutional and democratic model for the digital 21st 
century (Section 8.5). The development of strong guid-
ing principles that go beyond the 2030 Agenda can 
form the starting point for this.
 > Societal ‘update’ for broad and institutional digitali-
zation competence: Sustainably shaping digital 
(global) societies requires a systematic strengthen-
ing of societal reflexivity and the ability to act. This 
competence-building process, which must be 
embedded technically and institutionally, should 
encompass the political and institutional core areas, 
i.e. the government, ministries, authorities and par-
liaments. In addition, business, civil society, the edu-
cation system and academia, too, require self-reflec-
tion, technical expertise and, perhaps, embedding in 
institutions to enable them to anticipate and influ-
ence digitalization effects in their respective spheres 
of life and fields of activity. New and old forms of 
scientific advice to decision-makers in politics and 
society, technology-impact assessment, methods of 
strategic foresight, and diverse societal arenas for 
discourse (e.g. stakeholder formats, science, the 
media, but also art and cultural institutions) remain 
key in this context. 
 > Develop visions and shape pathways proactively: A 
critical and reflexive debate about visions and 
models for society as a whole is important to be able 
to use creative power proactively. The dominant, 
economic- and technology-policy-oriented dis-
course on ‘innovation leadership’, on ‘being driven’ 
and ‘not being left behind’ does not lead to a mean-
ingful model for a digital, sustainable society. This 
narrative constricts arguments and fuels fears. With 
its outline of a ‘new humanism’ (Box 7.3-2), the 
WBGU offers a possible positive vision of how digi-
talization could sustainably enrich our world society. 
Such a target perspective can also be a guiding factor 
for institutional processing, for example by minis-
tries and authorities, e.g. to answer the key question 
of ‘Why digitalization?’ The EU as a pioneer of a dig-
nity- and rights-based, sustainable digitalization 
strategy is a similarly powerful vision – particularly 
as a global alternative to the liberalistic paths of 
 Silicon Valley and Chinese state authoritarianism.
 > Clearly identify and avoid dystopic systemic risks in 
the present and the future: Both as a precaution and 
to structure digitalization in the best possible way, it 
is important to anticipate possible dangers and traps. 
With a tentative list of ‘systemic risks’ (Box 7.3-1), 
the WBGU suggests conducting the discourse on 
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negative consequences throughout society, paying 
attention to the varying character of such systemic 
risks in order to promote resilience in societies. Some 
of these systemic risks relate to gradual processes, 
others to abrupt turnarounds. Still others are today 
hardly tangible and will need further research and 
precautionary action (‘black doors’). 
7 .4
Third Dynamic: The future of Homo sapiens – 
 discourses 
Digitalization opens up completely new realms of pos-
sibility for the future of Homo sapiens that go beyond 
biological and cultural evolution. This future has long 
been part of societal discourse, not least in science fic-
tion, which explores utopian and dystopian possibilities 
(Chapter 6). Digitalization can furthermore have funda-
mental effects on the relationship between human 
beings and the environment. For example, virtual com-
ponents might increasingly be added to the future 
human environment. Completely new questions are 
arising: Could there be a Natura futuris that from today’s 
point of view is impoverished, but in which a future, 
adapted human being can still live? Should digitaliza-
tion focus primarily on improving the world/environ-
ment or human beings? In the end, can a technological, 
posthumanist human being, freed of everything bio-
logical, manage completely without nature or the planet 
(Box 2.1.2-1)? The preservation of humankind on this 
planet can be seen as the ‘ultimate sustainability prob-
lem’: The question is about the future viability and 
identity of humankind itself and human societies as 
such. 
In the WBGU’s view, this should not be a matter of 
redefining human health or environmental health by 
enabling people to live by means of digitalization in an 
otherwise ruined environment. Rather, the WBGU 
 recommends the aim of preserving biological human 
beings and their societies embedded in their natural 
environment (Section 2.2).
Human beings in the Digital Age, referred to by the 
WBGU here as Homo digitalis, to use a term coined by 
Capurro (2017), are not only in constant interaction 
and closely interwoven with digital tools and media; 
they are already increasingly in the process of repair-
ing, changing or even improving their bodies using dig-
ital methods (Box 2.1.2-1; Section 5.3.7). The technol-
ogization of human beings has already begun and is 
progressing turbulently (Topic box 5.3-2; Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016; Birbaumer, 2017). As the WBGU (2018a) 
writes, “assistance systems, implants, sensors and other 
forms of interaction between people and technical sys-
tems can compensate for physical limitations (e.g. with 
prostheses), or even shift the parameters of human 
capabilities, e.g. improve our cognitive potential.” This 
development is very much driven by technological and 
economic interests and science; the focus often is on 
individual benefit (e.g. in the form of scientific find-
ings, commercial usability or individual quality of life), 
while the societal or ethical consequences of the poten-
tial benefits or risks often receive too little attention. 
There is already an urgent need today to examine 
the framework conditions of these technologies (Kehl 
and Coenen, 2016: 150) and a need for regulation to 
limit and monitor some of the already visible negative 
consequences (Yuste and Goering, 2017; Birbaumer, 
2017; Section 9.4). Even if the term Homo digitalis does 
not mean a new species in the transhumanist sense 
(Box 2.1.2-1), this Third Dynamic is about the incipi-
ent, gradual transformation towards, in the future, 
increasingly digitalized people within digitalized socie-
ties. In the digital Anthropocene, therefore, the future 
of what it means to be human is itself becoming a topic 
of sustainable development
Furthermore, there is an intensive and controversial 
discourse on Machina sapiens, i.e. on cognitively pow-
erful machines (Section 3.3.3). Are we threatened by a 
humanization of machines (Box 7.3-2; Section 
10.3.3.1)? To what extent can and should machines be 
human-like at all? Technical systems can already imi-
tate intelligence and make autonomous decisions today 
– albeit hitherto only to a limited extent. In public dis-
course, however, they are often even humanized, i.e. 
they are attributed genuinely human qualities or 
behaviours (Rehak, 2016). The problem here is “not so 
much that technology is increasingly approaching or 
visually resembling human beings – rather, it is a matter 
of the subtle blurring of the fundamental characteris-
tics that make up a person or a machine” (Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016: 147). In any case, AI and automated 
decision-making systems will fundamentally change 
and challenge people and our societies, confront them 
with previously unknown problems while at the same 
time opening up new options for action: “Machines are 
now good or excellent at arithmetic, chess, proving 
mathematical theorems, stock picking, image caption-
ing, driving, arcade game playing, Go, speech synthesis, 
speech transcription, translation and cancer diagnosis” 
(Tegmark, 2017: 80). AI is already superior to human 
analytical capabilities in an increasing number of 
sub-areas, while human intelligence is (still) unique in 
its ability to assess multiple contexts. It is uncertain 
when or whether technical systems will ever be gener-
ally equal or superior to human cognition. However, 
long before such a point might be reached, the connec-
tions between technical systems and human beings, 
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people’s self-image and our world views will change 
fundamentally in more and more areas of business, 
society, politics and science. 
At the same time, there are distinguishing features 
that not only make people unique in relation to 
machines, but also emphasize this uniqueness. The 
human ability for empathy, emotionality and social 
community distinguishes us fundamentally from 
machines. Only humans have their own reasons for 
their actions – motives, feelings, moral sensitivity. The 
mutual recognition of these motives – and thus recog-
nition as human actors – can only be the basis of inter-
action between humans, because machines do not have 
intrinsic reasons for their actions (Nida-Rümelin and 
Weidenfeld, 2018). 
A key unique feature of human intelligence in rela-
tion to machines is thus based on the emotional and 
social components of human action. Although machines 
in their interaction with humans can increasingly inter-
pret human emotions and also depict emotions them-
selves (Yonck, 2017), it is never anything more than a 
simulation of feelings (Nida-Rümelin and Weidenfeld, 
2018). As the director of MIT Media Lab, Joichi Ito, 
noted in this context: “More computation does not 
makes us more ‘intelligent’, only more computationally 
powerful” (Ito, 2018). The computing power of 
machines, which may appear superior to ours, therefore 
does not per se eclipse human intelligence (Sections 
3.2; 3.3.3). Rather, the inability of machines to gener-
ate their own genuine emotion can help people to bet-
ter recognize and strengthen the unique features of 
their thinking; after all, these characteristics are indis-
pensable for human coexistence. “We trust other peo-
ple not because they are incredibly smart – like AI – but 
because they have emotional connections, specifically 
with us” (Gray, 2017: 21). The unique characteristics of 
human intelligence cannot on principle be ascribed to 
any machine, no matter how advanced it may be.
However, as already mentioned, there is speculation 
that autonomous and intelligent machines – beyond the 
present-day achievements of AI, which are already 
impressive in some areas, e.g. pattern recognition – 
could in the future significantly surpass humans in 
terms of cognitive performance (‘singularity’; Vinge, 
1993; Kurzweil, 2005; Bostrom, 2014). Under more 
advanced technological conditions than today’s, it is 
even speculated that powerful AI could one day achieve 
some kind of ‘superintelligence’, with the associated 
risk that machines could gain power over humans 
(Bostrom, 2014). In extreme cases, transhumanists and 
technological posthumanists even speak of overcoming 
the shortcomings of the biological body, particularly 
death, by ‘uploading’ human identity into a digital 
machine (Box 2.1.2-1; Kurzweil, 2005; mind uploading: 
Loh, 2018: 80ff., 122ff.). Under these extreme scenar-
ios, even human beings’ natural environment could 
become superfluous if they were to digitally distance 
themselves so far from their biological origins that their 
relationship to the Earth system became obsolete (Teg-
mark, 2017).
In view of these visions, the borderline between 
humans and machines, and thus between humans and 
the environment, threatens to become increasingly 
blurred (Kurzweil, 1999; Kehl and Coenen, 2016). At 
present, these discourses appear speculative, but they 
are already powerful in culture (science fiction), society 
and science and are associated with both hopes and 
fears (Chapter 6). 
Other authors are sceptical about these speculations 
and see no dangers from superintelligent machines 
(Floridi, 2014: 129ff.; Domingos, 2015: 283f.; Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016: 16f.; Misselhorn, 2018: 205ff.), or deny 
that software-based systems of any kind, including AI 
systems, can have any kind of mental characteristics 
such as perceptions, emotions or decision-making abil-
ities; they merely see a “more or less successful simula-
tion of cognitive and emotive processes” (Nida-Rüme-
lin and Weidenfeld, 2018: 205). Irrespective of where 
one might like to draw the line between humans and 
machines, society faces the challenge of understanding 
and negotiating the further dissolution of borderlines 
between humans and machines to the benefit of 
humankind, or of designing the interaction between 
humans and machines in a positive way. In the course 
of technical progress and in the context of societal chal-
lenges, the relationship between human beings and 
technology will have to be constantly redefined (Kehl 
and Coenen, 2016). 
Further fundamental questions arise in view of a 
potential ‘artificial evolution of humankind’. It is 
already possible today to select in-vitro fertilized eggs 
according to desired criteria before they are implanted 
into the uterus. Even more profound would be the 
application of new methods of genetic engineering (e.g. 
CRISPR/Cas9; Jinek et al., 2012); modern digital tech-
nology is indispensable for the development and use of 
these methods. An artificial modification of the human 
genome in the germ line could be used to cure heredi-
tary diseases resulting from genetic defects (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2018). Corresponding research 
has been carried out on human embryos for several 
years now (e.g. Liang et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2016). 
The alleged editing of the genome of twins by the Chi-
nese scientist He Jiankui using CRSIPR/Cas9 in Novem-
ber 2018 has encountered massive criticism worldwide 
(Cyranoski and Ledford, 2018) and led to an ongoing 
societal discourse on responsible human germline edit-
ing (Deutscher Ethikrat, 2019).
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But the new genetic engineering methods also open 
up the transhumanist-eugenic prospect that Homo 
sapiens ‘takes evolution into his own hands’ and pur-
posefully steers it towards a new ‘posthuman species’ 
(Annas et al., 2002; Fukuyama, 2002). In this way, 
human adaptations and traits could be cultivated, such 
as tolerance to adverse environmental conditions 
caused by global environmental changes, or extremely 
enhanced sensory abilities (Nuffield Council on Bioeth-
ics, 2018: 47). These approaches thus have the poten-
tial to fundamentally change the biological constitution 
of the future Homo sapiens. Because of the ethical 
problems associated with this, researchers warn against 
genetic manipulation of the human germ line (Lanphier 
et al., 2015; Baltimore et al., 2015); it is banned in 
many countries. 
With regard to the above-mentioned necessary dis-
courses, and to the potentially far-reaching effects on 
societies and the environment, fundamental questions 
on ethics and human dignity arise – some of which are 
quite speculative. Therefore, the WBGU’s Third Dynamic 
cannot only be about concrete recommendations for 
action or research in the sense of classic advice for pol-
icy-makers. Rather, it is above all a matter of looking at 
these issues and problems early enough and drawing 
societal attention to them, because the changes out-
lined will fundamentally challenge and change existing 
concepts of ‘human development’ and ‘sustainability’. 
The WBGU’s main aim here is to ask the right questions 
and not to present ready-made answers. In a second 
step, ways and methods should then be found for soci-
eties and cultures to prepare for the possible paths of 
society in relation to Natura futuris, Homo digitalis and 
Machina sapiens, and how they can democratically and 
transparently shape the discourse on criteria, rules and 
demarcations. 
In order to stimulate this discourse on the future 
range of possibilities, the WBGU briefly presents here 
three speculative, optimistic mind games. The WBGU 
recommends using John Rawls’s method to reflect on 
possible futures. In his Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1972), 
Rawls advised his readers, citizens and decision-makers 
to think about ‘fair conditions’ from a position in which 
the thinkers do not know what status they themselves 
have in the imagined society. This ‘veil of ignorance’ 
allows ideas and principles to be generated of justice 
that are not shaped by the immediate self-interests of 
the thinkers, but geared towards imagining a fair soci-
ety that does justice to ‘every man and woman’. Such a 
‘veil of ignorance’ could also be helpful when thinking 
about future human images in the Digital Age against 
the background of the WBGU’s three mind games: 
1. Humankind finds itself: AI already surpasses 
human cognitive performance in some areas today 
( Section 3.3.3). All the more reason for us to focus 
our attention and appreciation on the unique fea-
tures of humankind described above, which specif-
ically do not directly relate to cognitive capacities: 
emotional and social abilities. AI could take on more 
tasks in measurement, calculation and documenta-
tion, and in this way enable us to turn our attention 
more to such capabilities as empathy, care and soli-
darity. In contrast to the ‘hard’ clichés of the super-
human with a computer brain, or omniscient com-
puter systems with increasingly human character-
istics, this would outline a ‘soft’ vision of societal 
progress.
2. Humans create companions: The further the 
advances that AI makes in ever more applica-
tion areas, the more diverse and intimate can the 
points of contact and interfaces become between 
technology and people. This can even lead to sym-
biotic connections, which, however, are likely to 
turn out differently than imagined in the popu-
lar ‘cyborg’ dreams. It is also possible that AI-ena-
bled entities will emerge that will become well-in-
tegrated, loyal companions of humans in socie-
ties that are more liveable than those of today. 
For example, digital assistants could increasingly 
take over our  monotonous activities (e.g. logisti-
cal tasks), support us in learning and understanding 
(e.g. by synthesizing and interpreting overwhelm-
ing amounts of information), and, not least, help 
us to value ourselves and our environment more 
highly (e.g. through diagnostics and mirroring). If 
people themselves had control over all the data they 
generate, they could be empowered to understand 
and develop themselves and their behaviour bet-
ter. Such a prospect encounters less scepticism in 
the East Asian cultural sphere than in Western soci-
eties, for example, and promotes a world view that 
does not categorically isolate humans from nature 
and technology. 
3. Humans invent their masters: As described earlier in 
this chapter, speculation about the future progress 
of AI – and thus ultimately also about the future of 
Homo sapiens – diverge widely (Section 3.3.3; Box 
2.1.2-1). Nevertheless, against the background of 
the already impressive cognitive achievements of AI 
today, it is both disturbing and highly controversial 
to ask whether not only conscious but also animate 
artificial entities with independent decision-making 
and reproductive capabilities might be formed in a 
later phase of the digital revolution. In this context, 
protecting human dignity would remain a quintes-
sential challenge. Nevertheless, the following ques-
tion could be posed in the discourse: could the 
combination of humankind’s social and emotional 
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intelligence with the superior cognitive abilities of 
machines make a form of co-evolution  possible, 
whose creatures possess even more humanity than 
we ourselves do?
The WBGU has discussed these thought experiments 
and recommends that our societies should proactively 
and rapidly concern themselves in the Digital Age with 
the future of human development, understanding 
human dignity and concepts of sustainable develop-
ment, i.e. the interaction between societies and the 
Earth system. This is the only way to develop the ability 
to shape and plan. The intuitively ‘reasonable’ option 
would be a general moratorium that would fundamen-
tally prohibit R&D efforts to create conscious and 
therefore sentient systems. But is such a complete and, 
above all, global moratorium even feasible? And if the 
development of civilization since the Neolithic Age has 
evidently been self-organized and directed towards 
substituting and transcending human (physiological, 
manual, cognitive) capabilities, can the creation of a 
new being by humans be excluded per se? Against this 
background, WBGU has resolved to recommend dis-
courses on desirable futures. 
Guiding principles for action
These three thought experiments might seem extremely 
speculative. Nevertheless, the Third Dynamic has 
already begun. The WBGU therefore recommends 
anticipating the future of humanity in the Digital Age 
now in a way that is democratic and oriented towards 
the common good, and using regulatory means to con-
tain the current challenges of digitalization. “It is still 
largely an open question how ‘anticipatory govern-
ance’, which should involve not only science and tech-
nology but also politics, business and potential users, 
might be organized” (Kehl and Coenen, 2016: 17). The 
new challenges, e.g. with regard to individual auton-
omy, self-determination and sovereignty over personal 
data, are already pressing, but they could be consider-
ably intensified by the future digital possibilities. 
In view of such momentous questions, a broad and 
transparent societal discourse and state policy on frame-
work conditions should take priority over simply leaving 
things to the momentum of commercial interests. The 
necessary societal decisions must be made in a demo-
cratic process. In order to prepare these formative tasks 
at an early stage, we need a worldwide, differentiated, 
joint and dynamic debate on values and standards. Fun-
damental philosophical and ethical questions must be 
discussed in a societal discourse; the normative dimen-
sion gains decisive importance. Here, too, the WBGU 
would like to place the concept of  dignity at the centre 
of the deliberations (Section 2.3). Discourses on the fol-
lowing action-guiding points are particularly important:
 > Discourse I: Homo digitalis: Beyond the welcome 
compensation of physical limitations, e.g. with 
mechanical or sensory prostheses, the rapidly grow-
ing technical possibilities pose the following ques-
tions: How can the identity of humans or what it 
means to be human be preserved in view of the 
‘technologization of human beings’ (Topic 
box 5.3-2)? Where should boundaries be drawn to 
limit the technologization of human beings? Which 
“genuine characteristic of human beings and their 
culture” do we want to preserve and protect from 
interference or mechanical replacement (Kehl and 
Coenen, 2016: 18)? To what extent do we want to 
control the future evolution of the Homo sapiens 
species itself? What does a new humanism mean for 
Homo digitalis (Box 7.3-2)? 
 > Discourse II: Machina sapiens: Humans will always 
have the responsibility for machines, data, algo-
rithms and software. To this extent, the WBGU urges 
the positive approach of seeking self-assurance of 
which characteristics and what kind of well-being 
the natural Homo sapiens should strive for in their 
relationship with machines and automatisms. The 
aim should be to strengthen humanity’s self-confi-
dence and to actively shape human/machine collab-
oration in accordance with human responsibility. In 
view of questions such as whether and where people 
need to be protected from machines, and whether 
and where human well-being can be endangered by 
machines, the WBGU also advocates a moratorium 
on the development and application of fully auto-
mated autonomous weapon systems, as can be found 
in the draft of the ‘Charter for a Sustainable Digital 
Age’ (Section 8.6). There are a number of other rel-
evant questions that the WBGU would like to raise in 
the discourse: Should there be a limit on the ability 
of machines to feel empathy, or on the humanization 
of machines? Or would this even have advantages if 
it were carried out with the necessary ‘containment 
measures’? Is the ‘superintelligence’ of machines 
nothing more than a dystopian science fiction vision, 
or is it a scenario or risk that needs to be discussed? 
At some time in the future, will we perhaps even 
face the challenge of drawing a borderline beyond 
which even the dignity of artificially intelligent 
machines would have to be discussed? Or should this 
be excluded from the outset by fundamentally out-
lawing and excluding research on machine con-
sciousness for ethical reasons (Metzinger, 2001)? 
 > Discourse III: Natura futuris: In the age of the digital 
Anthropocene, the question arises as to where to 
draw the borderlines of human intervention in 
nature and the environment. Are the existing politi-
cal objectives enough? How is the relationship 
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between humans, nature and technology changing 
in the Digital Age? If biological humans are to be 
preserved in their natural environment, what pre-
requisites are needed for nature and the Earth 
 system? Should further objectives that go beyond 
this be pursued? 
The overall question arises as to how can we shape a 
positive co-evolution between human civilization, the 
technosphere and the environment? The WBGU sees 
these guiding principles here: 
 > Create discourse arenas and engage in a societal dis-
course: In view of these possible and, in some cases, 
necessary issues, an important task that already 
exists today is to organize an ongoing societal dis-
course with broad participation and to create suita-
ble arenas for discourse (Section 9.4.4). At the heart 
of these discourses lies the question of how – on the 
basis of common values and norms, perhaps based 
on the normative compass – the interaction and 
co-evolution of human civilization and intelligent 
technical systems could be shaped in such a way that 
human well-being takes centre stage (Chapter 2). 
These discourses should therefore discuss not only 
the current state of affairs, but also different posi-
tions, conflicts of interest and power constellations. 
Not least, they should examine whether the existing 
institutional regimes need to be adapted. 
 > Think ahead about the new digital society: Digital 
technologies make completely new ways of shaping 
the future possible. The fundamental strategic deci-
sions and cultural upheavals of the Digital Age 
should already be thought through today. The 
above-mentioned profound philosophical questions 
must be asked and discussed now in new discourse 
spaces yet to be created (Section 9.4.3). Philosophy 
should therefore become one of the leading sciences 
of the Third Dynamic. Research and education must 
create a foundation for future decisions 
( Section 10.3.3). In this context, technology-impact 
assessments of possible future scenarios and applied 
ethics offer constructive approaches for developing 
early-warning functions and proactively shaping 
technological change (Section 10.3.3.3). 
7 .5
Conclusions: Place digitalization at the service of 
global sustainability
The WBGU’s overarching message is that digitalization 
should be put at the service of global sustainability. 
Digitalization is not a ‘force of nature’, but a peo-
ple-driven development which, given its potential and 
risks, must be shaped for sustainability. The decisive 
starting points for the Transformation towards Sustain-
ability (depending on the dynamics and problems) lie in 
the political framework (politics, law), the societal prac-
tices (business, consumers), and in the further develop-
ment of sustainability models and ideas of ‘human 
development’ that do justice to the dynamics of the 
Digital Age. In this context, digitalization is both a sub-
ject of observation and a possible instrument of specific 
solution strategies. 
Current developments clearly do not yet point in 
this direction. The possibilities of the Digital Age are 
currently not being sufficiently placed at the service of 
global sustainability. Current framework conditions and 
societal realities mean that the digital revolution is rein-
forcing and accelerating existing unsustainable trends 
rather than helping to overcome unsustainable path 
dependencies. The many concrete changes described 
and analysed in this report do indeed hold great poten-
tial. However, they will not per se lead to a trend rever-
sal. From a transformational perspective, this can be 
termed ‘incremental radicalism’: the sum of a multitude 
of concrete practices reproduces and accelerates sus-
tainability crises without these negative consequences 
being intended or completely foreseeable in individual 
cases. 
By comparison, the putative utopias of those who 
deliberately want to use the means of the digital revo-
lution in a disruptive way are relatively clear. Here, a 
society that takes surveillance to extremes and where 
personal data becomes an important raw material meets 
with the totalitarian control-state that tries to prevent 
any deviation using digital means. From a transforma-
tional perspective, a kind of ‘radical radicalism’ emerges. 
On the one hand, digital strategies radically geared 
towards resource efficiency, climate-change mitigation 
and Earth-system protection would be conceivable that 
use the technical possibilities of monitoring production 
and consumption for ecological progress. On the other 
hand, systemic disruptions are then fuelled as an end in 
themselves, without paying attention to important sys-
tem functions that are absolutely worth preserving – 
such as the preservation of freedom and human dignity. 
Putting digitalization at the service of sustainability 
therefore means using the many concrete possibilities 
of digital applications systematically in such a way that 
successive, unsustainable path dependencies can be 
overcome. The Transformation towards Sustainability is 
a comprehensive project of society made of many 
ingredients that significantly changes the shape and 
driving forces of our economy and coexistence. In such 
a fundamental sense, the intention of this transforma-
tion is a kind of ‘radical incrementalism’: many impor-
tant changes are made step by step in a reflexive and 
anticipatory way, so that the essential core functions, 
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i.e. our ecological, social and species-specific life-sup-
port systems, are sustained in the long term. 
The following elements for this comprehensive, 
formative task emerge from all the dynamics analysed. 
Societies must be able to quickly and effectively tackle 
the urgent problems for sustainability with the help of 
digitalization (acting societies). This applies with par-
ticular urgency to sustaining the natural life-support 
systems (Section 9.1.1) and to securing social cohesion 
(Section 9.1.3). This concrete need for action must be 
taken seriously and addressed by means of active gov-
ernance by a ‘proactive state’ (WBGU, 2011: 203ff.; 
Section 4.1), by companies and civil society, and not 
least by educational actors (Box 7.5-1; Section 5.3.4). 
At the same time, there should be a focus on ensuring 
the future ability to act (societies capable of action). 
Strategies need to be developed in good time to deal 
with the profound changes in societies brought about 
by digitalization and its impact on sustainability. People 
must be empowered through education to understand 
the upheavals outlined in order to learn to shape them 
(Box 7.5-1). Finally, discourses should already be made 
possible today in which the fundamental questions of 
the digital future are reflected on and negotiated (for-
ward-thinking society). A responsible society with the 
ability to act can develop in the interaction of these 
elements.
Against this background, the WBGU sees the EU as 
an economic and values community, as an important 
actor in progressing towards the integration of sustain-
ability and digitalization. This opens up the possibility 
for the EU to realize a sustainable, free and equal civil 
society through digitalization, especially in contrast to 
the American laissez-faire attitude towards digital com-
panies and the Chinese model of exploiting digitaliza-
tion for the exercise of state power. Europe should 
therefore develop its own powerful vision of the use 
and regulation of digitalization for sustainability and 
the protection of human and fundamental rights. Up to 
now, the decisive drivers of digitalization have been the 
potential for economic profit and government surveil-
lance. Instead, efforts should focus on strengthening 
and promoting the sustainability of natural life-support 
systems, inclusion, Eigenart and human dignity 
( Chapter 2) through digitalization, and on responsibly 
containing risks. The outline of the core elements of a 
‘new humanism’ suggests the possible direction of such 
a development (Box 7.3-2). In such a process, Europe is 
Box 7 .5-1
Education for future-proof societies
How people perceive and understand reality affects how they 
experience and evaluate it – and thus also which ideas and 
entrepreneurial or political measures they regard as meaning-
ful, feasible and legitimate. The way in which people feel em-
powered to advocate these measures that they feel to be 
meaningful, feasible and legitimate, and to pursue them in 
cooperation with others, determines a society’s ability to in-
novate, discuss, shape and act. A sustainable society in the 
sense of a new humanism (Box 7.3-2) systematically pro-
motes its decision-makers’ – i.e. also its voting citizens’ – 
 capacity for reflection and self-efficacy.
Future-proofing is thus the result of what the WBGU 
(2011: 352ff.) has described as ‘transformative education’ 
and is being developed under the concept of transformative 
learning in educational theory: an understanding of options 
for action and approaches to solutions as well as one’s own 
efficacy in shaping future developments. This understanding 
includes a critical-constructive questioning of basic scientific 
assumptions and cultural patterns that have guided and legit-
imized the previous shaping of society with its conventions, 
roles and institutions. The World Social Science Report 2013 
(ISSC and UNESCO, 2013) described this reflexive capacity as 
‘futures literacy’ and as being central to transformative pro-
cesses in the sense of social learning (Section 2.1.2). Educat-
ing for the societal challenges of the coming decades should 
rediscover its humanist roots and help citizens to see them-
selves as designers of the future in their diverse societal roles 
(Section 5.3.4). Digitally simplified participation in the gener-
ation and dissemination of knowledge for the orientation and 
legitimization of transformation processes ( Section 5.3.1.1) 
supports this capability. Corresponding media and technology 
literacy and resilience transcends the currently often instru-
mentally defined digital literacy, which is limited to success-
fully operating technical devices (European Commission, 
2019a). Technologies are integral elements of social and insti-
tutional systems as regards their invention and dissemination, 
and this, too, should be integrated into the new understand-
ing of education. In sustainable societies, ethics, the ability to 
reflect, personality development and cooperative skills also 
belong to the educational canon. This can enable people to 
participate actively and anticipatively in shaping and trans-
forming social structures such as decarbonization or 
digitalization. 
The central role of values, attitudes, self-control and per-
sonality development in dealing with the rapidly increasing 
complexity and speed of societal developments due to digital-
ization and networking processes is also being discussed in 
the companies. The same applies to risk and resilience re-
search, which focuses on dealing with ignorance and nonlin-
earity in these systems. In times of great uncertainty and 
rapid and profound changes in societies, increased abilities of 
empathy, cooperation and self-regulation offer good prereq-
uisites for the preservation of cooperative and com-
mon-good-oriented values and democratic abilities. Further-
more, the selection and quality of reliable information and 
knowledge is of particular importance when it is a matter in 
legitimizing decisions or anticipating possible consequences. 
Broad access to data and public authorities with high quali-
ty-assurance standards are key to a societal understanding of 
plausible, possible and desirable futures and their entrepre-
neurial and political design (Section 5.3.2).
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not separating itself from the world community, but 
making the most of opportunities to give new momen-
tum to global digital development.
Four overarching, action-guiding principles are pre-
sented in the following that can be applied to all three 
Dynamics. 
 > Promote global society’s ability to shape and plan: 
Many different dimensions of a reduced ability to 
shape and intervene can be identified in the field of 
digitalization and sustainability; here are some 
examples: (1) it is very difficult for political actors to 
muster the creative power to prevent the planetary 
guard rails from being breached; (2) states are at risk 
of losing the sovereignty to actively shape the 
behaviour of multinational digital corporations; (3) 
people are losing their formative sovereignty over 
the way their personal data is used by companies or 
states and the way in which decisions are influenced 
by this. Because of their commercial interests, pri-
vate actors develop many different options and 
products that can have both positive and negative 
effects from a normative point of view. Containing 
these effects for the common good is an important 
formative task. States and, not least, global govern-
ance also have an especially important role to play in 
view of the global reach of digitalization and the 
global impact of a failure to shape sustainability. 
Guiding concepts should be developed and goals 
defined at multilateral level for a sustainability pol-
icy that takes into account the potential and risks of 
digitalization (Chapter 9). On this basis, the state 
should be able to lay down in a democratic process 
the framework conditions for private actors and 
companies in such a way that development does jus-
tice to the interests of society. 
 > Promote global society’s innovative capacity: The 
potential of digitalization should be used for sustain-
ability and human well-being. It is therefore a matter 
of ‘responsible innovation’, in which both goals and 
possible risks to sustainability are taken into account 
from the outset. The recommendations of this prin-
ciple are primarily directed towards academia and 
education, but also towards technology-impact 
assessment and technological change (Section 10.1). 
 > Promote global society’s ability to understand: For 
societies to remain able to shape their future, the 
processes and effects of the digital revolution must 
be understood by societal actors, and there should 
be transparency about who or what causes and 
drives them. This applies, for example, if the sys-
temic risks of the Digital Age (Box 7.3-1) identified 
by WBGU are to be avoided. This is about education 
and the communication of science, thus ultimately 
also about digital literacy (Section 9.1.4). The 
 recommendations of this principle are primarily 
related to education and discourse, and not least at 
scientific advice for policy-makers. 
 > Promote global society’s ability to engage in discourse: 
We already need arenas in which to discuss, for 
example, how an exemplary ‘new humanism’ 
(Box 7.3-2) can be developed in the 21st century. 
How can digitalization be linked to societal goals, 
and what roles should public and private, local and 
global actors play? The recommendations of this 
principle are primarily aimed at education and the 




The WBGU makes initial proposals on how the international community might 
agree on common guiding concepts, principles, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks, and ethically-based borderlines. The EU should develop its own 
model of a sustainable, digitally enhanced future and work towards a shared 
understanding at the international level in a multilateral network. To provi-
de impetus for global processes, the WBGU presents a draft charter for ‘Our 
Common Digital Future’.
Shaping the Digital Age with the aim of sustainability is 
a global task that requires a framework of principles, 
rules, laws and institutions: global governance is there-
fore a decisive lever for the Transformation towards 
Sustainability in the Digital Age. Digitalization is both 
an object and an instrument of global sustainability 
policy. In the course of digital change, some path 
dependencies of unsustainable developments are 
breaking open, creating windows and spaces of oppor-
tunity for new actor constellations that can be mobi-
lized for a Transformation towards Sustainability in the 
sense of the 2030 Agenda. At the same time, however, 
significant new actors of the Digital Age, such as devel-
opers, tech communities and digital corporations, can 
continue and intensify old, unsustainable development 
patterns and themselves create completely new sus-
tainability challenges and unsustainable path depend-
encies (Chapter 4). Some digital corporations are 
amassing ever more market power and already provid-
ing societally relevant services and technologies today 
without any assurance or even indications that ecolog-
ical or other societal goals of sustainable development 
are being taken into account. States are taking little 
responsibility for the development of digital and digi-
talized infrastructures and technologies; decisions are 
made by cross-border alliances dominated by the pri-
vate sector; the rights of individuals can be eroded in 
the Digital Age (Section 4.2). So how is the global 
understanding of sustainability changing, and how can 
it be linked to digitalization? 
Over the last five decades, international sustainabil-
ity goals have developed as a vision of global, long-term 
well-being, reflected in particular by the 2030 Agenda 
with the SDGs, the Paris Climate Agreement and the 
Aichi biodiversity goals. By comparison, efforts to reach 
international agreement on a regulatory framework and 
cooperation in the field of digitalization, e.g. on soci-
etally controversial uses of digital solutions, are still in 
their infancy, and the need for regulation is increasingly 
becoming the focus of public attention (Section 8.1). 
There is a particular need for international cooperation 
and regulation gearing digital change towards achieving 
the SDGs. The WBGU shows how digital change currently 
can and does affect the chances of achieving global sus-
tainability goals (Sections 3.6, 8.2). Just as the Brundt-
land report on ‘Our Common Future’ (WCED, 1987) 
launched a global understanding of sustainable devel-
opment by integrating environmental and development 
issues, a similar new stimulus is needed today for a global 
understanding of ‘Our Common Digital Future’. The 
existing sustainability goals and their underlying under-
standing of sustainability largely ignore key challenges 
posed by the use of digital technologies in core societal 
areas. In the WBGU’s view, sustainable development in 
the Digital Age requires not only ecologically oriented 
digitalization, but also a common understanding of the 
problem of how to handle privacy and, closely linked to 
this, maintaining human decision-making sovereignty, 
guaranteeing digital inclusion, and shaping the relation-
ship between people and machines (Section 8.3). Based 
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on analyses and assessments of existing international 
governance and the identification of new needs for 
action and cooperation (Sections 8.1, 8.3), Section 8.4 
extrapolates the first overarching approaches and gov-
ernance instruments for integrating sustainability and 
digitalization at the global level. As a potential pioneer, 
the EU can play a prominent role in the global develop-
ment of digitalized sustainability societies. This requires 
a sustainability-oriented digital policy and a sustain-
ability policy that places digitalization at the service of 
sustainability (Sections 8.1.6, 8.5). With its draft charter 
for ‘Our Common Digital Future’ (Section 8.5), the 
WBGU presents for discussion an integrated understand-
ing of digitalization and sustainability which aims to 
provide orientation for shaping the Digital Age in the 
spirit of sustainability.
8 .1
Approaches to the governance of digitalization at 
the global level
In recent years, numerous reports at the global level have 
addressed the influence of the Digital Age on the 
 economy, societal development and achieving global 
development goals (Section 3.6). At the same time, 
examples like the convening of the World Summit of the 
Information Society (2003 and 2005) and its follow-up 
 processes, the report of the High-level Panel on Digital 
Cooperation to the UN Secretary-General entitled ‘The 
Age of Digital Interdependence’ (UN High-Level Panel 
on Digital Cooperation, 2019), and the appointment of 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy (2015) 
show that the issue of digitalization is increasingly 
receiving international attention. The UN General 
Assembly’s resolution ‘The Impact of Rapid  Technological 
Change on the Achievement of the Sustainable 
 Development Goals and Targets’ (UNGA, 2018a) contains 
particularly clear references to sustainability issues. This 
increasing importance of digitalization and its conse-
quences for fundamental and human rights at the inter-
national level is also reflected in initial governance 
approaches and institutional responses at the global level 
(Sections 8.1.1 to 8.1.3).
In contrast to discourses in the 1990s, when state 
action was still seen as an encroachment on the freedom 
of the internet, the call for more global cooperation and 
greater responsibility on the part of the international 
community is also growing louder in the tech  communities 
(Section 4.2.4). For example, in 2018, a large number of 
tech actors addressed an open letter to the governments 
of the G20 states calling on them to work together on 
key digital fields of action at the global level (Joint Call 
to G20 Leaders, 2019). 
8 .1 .1 
Private-sector development as a starting point 
for global digital policy
Today, the development of digital technologies, the 
expansion of digital and digitalized infrastructures and 
the dissemination of digital applications and services 
are essentially driven, financed and shaped by globally 
active companies and private organizations. The basic 
functionality of the internet is guaranteed, for example, 
by ICANN, a private (non-profit) organization 
(Box 4.2.7-1), and the necessary standardization pro-
cesses for digital goods are often informal and unregu-
lated (Hofmann, 2017). In many countries, digital serv-
ices such as search engines, map services or social net-
works have become a basic component of everyday 
private and business life. Measured in terms of their 
societal significance and function, some of them already 
bear the hallmarks of goods that meet basic human 
needs; at the same time, however, a large proportion of 
them are provided purely privately. Not least because 
of the effects of networking and economies of scale, the 
multinational digital corporations Google/Alphabet, 
Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft, now known 
as the ‘Big Five’, are playing a particularly prominent 
role in shaping the future (Chapter 4).
On the one hand, this global, proactive role of digital 
companies and private organizations in the digital sec-
tor has sparked a high level of dynamics technical 
development and dissemination of digital applications. 
On the other hand, the societal challenges of this hith-
erto mainly one-sided private influence on digitaliza-
tion are also becoming increasingly clear; they are also 
reflected, for example, in the systemic risks identified 
by the WBGU (Section 7). The lack of influence in the 
administration and organization of basic infrastructures 
and services exerted by states or the international com-
munity leads to problems in the enforcement of stand-
ards (Hofmann, 2017). 
With search engines, digital communication services 
and social networks, private companies have also cre-
ated new sources of information and spaces for the 
exchange of information and interaction, and their use 
is having increasing societal and political implications 
(Section 5.3.2). In contrast to traditional media such as 
radio and television, however, this scope has hitherto 
not been adequately reflected in corresponding regula-
tions and rules, for example to exclude the misuse of 
these services and platforms or to sufficiently guaran-
tee the transparency of information flows such as elec-
tion advertising. A higher level of protection for per-
sonal data is now enshrined in the GDPR, which applies 
in the EU (Box 4.2.6-1). Furthermore, states occasion-
ally enact laws to combat the manipulation of online 
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communication and hate content on the internet 
(Box 4.2.6-2). However, there are still flaws in the 
design and, particularly, in the enforcement of this leg-
islation (Boxes 4.2.6-1, 4.2.6-2). Another factor in 
these challenges is the fact that digital networking and 
internationalization, which has been significantly 
driven by companies and private organizations, has cre-
ated structures and reached dimensions that often 
severely restrict the intervention options of individual 
states, which are frequently overburdened in their 
attempts to represent societal interests (Section 4.2.6). 
The topic of sustainable development has so far been 
hardly embedded at all in tech communities that make 
decisions about the development of technologies and 
standards for devices and system solutions 
( Section 4.2.4). Only a few topics are being addressed: 
in the meantime the tech communities are increasingly 
discussing privacy issues (Hofmann, 2017), and com-
panies are becoming involved in network expansion in 
developing countries and the provision of internet con-
nections. With the Free Basics programme, part of its 
internet.org project, Facebook, for example, gives peo-
ple in developing countries free, restricted access to 
selected internet services. However, this provision of 
access also raises new questions about the power of 
major corporations in the provision of infrastructure 
and related problems such as safeguarding the privacy 
of users or net neutrality (Solon, 2017b). 
8 .1 .2 
UN conferences and processes
The first major international conference on digitaliza-
tion was the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) hosted by the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU, a UN special organization) in 2003 and 
2005, which prominently addressed the Digital Age as 
an international policy issue. The WSIS conferences 
passed the ‘Geneva Declaration of Principles’ entitled 
‘Building the information society: a global challenge in 
the new millennium’), the ‘Geneva Plan of Action’ 
(WSIS, 2003a, 2003b), the final declarations ‘Tunis 
Commitment’ and the ‘Tunis Agenda for the Informa-
tion Society’ (which called, inter alia, for the establish-
ment of the ‘Internet Governance Forum’: WSIS, 2005a, 
b). ICTs are enshrined as instruments for environmental 
and resource protection in the WSIS Forum’s ‘Geneva 
Plan of Action’. One of the most controversial issues at 
the WSIS was the question of who would organize the 
internet in the future. One unsuccessful proposal was 
for the administration of domain names and IP addresses 
to be organized by the private ICANN under the aegis 
of the ITU, which, as a UN organization, is under the 
control of the international community (Kleinwächter, 
2005; Box 4.2.7-1). Instead, the conference decided to 
set up the UN’s Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The 
IGF has met every year since 2006 and offers stake-
holders from all countries an opportunity to participate 
in the debate on internet governance. The IGF is not 
intended to replace or supervise existing forums or 
organizations, but to provide an additional transparent, 
multilateral exchange platform between all stakehold-
ers (private, state and civil society). Among other 
issues, the IGF 2018 focused on the future of work, the 
internet, the SDGs, internet access in public spaces and 
its funding, and multi-stakeholder participation to 
develop global transnational governance (IGF, 2018a). 
Topics of ecological sustainability, particularly Green IT, 
were underrepresented here. 
In addition to the IGF, the annual WSIS Forum was 
set up as a continuous follow-up process to the WSIS. 
The Forum is jointly organized by the ITU, UNESCO, 
UNDP and UNCTAD in cooperation with other UN 
organizations. The WSIS Forum, which can draw on the 
budget and the well-established secretariat of the ITU, 
is a strong competitor of the IGF (Kleinwächter, 2016). 
The WSIS Forum is the world’s largest meeting of UN 
institutions on the theme of ‘ICT for development’. The 
Forum’s task is to coordinate the implementation of the 
measures agreed at the WSIS (UNGA, 2016a) with the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda. It provides an 
opportunity to exchange information and create know-
ledge, while identifying new trends and promoting 
partnerships, taking into account the developing infor-
mation and knowledge societies (WSIS Forum, 2018). 
The UN General Assembly evaluated the implemen-
tation of the WSIS’s decisions in 2015 (UNGA, 2016a). 
The resolution adopted at that time included a commit-
ment by the states to harness the potential of ICT for 
the 2030 Agenda. It states: “[We] call for close align-
ment between the World Summit on the Information 
Society process and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, highlighting the crosscutting contribu-
tion of information and communications technology to 
the Sustainable Development Goals and poverty 
 eradication” (UNGA, 2016a). No concrete measures 
were agreed. Up to now, the international community 
has hardly been a relevant actor in the further develop-
ment of ICT or in setting standards. It has recently 
begun taking global sustainability goals into account, 
but has not identified any concrete issues or areas of 
application.
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8 .1 .3  
UN agencies, UN programmes, UN special 
 rapporteurs and high-level advisory groups
More and more organizations and subunits in the United 
Nations system are dealing with digital change. This is 
demonstrated, for example, by the increasing number 
of reports from UN organizations (Section 3.6). Recent 
annual reports – such as UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report 2017 entitled ‘Investment and the Digital Econ-
omy’ or the World Bank’s World Development Report 
2016 on ‘Digital Dividends’ – illustrate this trend. 
 Furthermore, publication series have also emerged, such 
as the UN’s E-Government Survey, which has been pub-
lished regularly since 2001, UNCTAD’s Information 
Economy Report since 2005, the UNESCO Series on 
Internet Freedom since 2009, and the ITU’s ‘Measuring 
the Information Society Report’. 
Particularly important for the Digital Age is the work 
of the ITU, which deals with the technical aspects of 
global telecommunications. In addition to the ITU, 
UNCTAD is represented in the UN system with numer-
ous publications on ICT topics such as the digital econ-
omy, e-commerce and the information economy. As a 
body of the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD has the 
task of promoting trade between countries at different 
levels of development and offers advice to developing 
countries on their own ICT strategies. 
Issues of privacy, the ethical dimension of digitaliza-
tion, access to knowledge and education via the inter-
net, and freedom of the media are addressed by UNE-
SCO, also a UN specialized agency. It has published 
reports on digital literacy, digital citizenship and digital 
inclusion, for example. 
Only a few references to digitalization can be found 
to date in the UN Environment and UNDP programmes, 
whose subject matter is particularly close to global sus-
tainability policy. The UN Habitat programme addresses 
the issue of smart cities. However, digitalization has 
hardly been mentioned in the New Urban Agenda or in 
the 2030 Agenda up to now. 
The appointment of UN Special Rapporteurs is 
another element that can be used to address pressing 
issues or new problems in the UN system. The UN Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the right to privacy, who is attached 
to the UN Human Rights Council and was first appointed 
in 2015, has a tenure of three years (Section 8.3.1) and 
has the task of reporting annually to the UN General 
Assembly and the Human Rights Council (HRC, 2018). 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and pro-
tection of the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion, first appointed in 1993, pointed out in his current 
report to the UN General Assembly (2018) that 
 algorithmic decision-making systems can violate human 
rights (UN, 2018a). 
Since 2006, the United Nations Group on the Infor-
mation Society (UNGIS), which was set up by the Chief 
Executive Board for Coordination chaired by the UN 
Secretary-General as a new cross-organizational mech-
anism, has been responsible for intensifying the inte-
gration of digitalization into the UN system. The aim of 
UNGIS is to generally raise the profile of ICT-related 
issues in the UN, embed them in all relevant UN insti-
tutions, and thus contribute to achieving the WSIS 
goals set out in the four outcome documents 
( Section 8.1.2).
The appointment of the High-level Panel on Digital 
Cooperation by UN Secretary-General Guterres in 2018 
was a reaction to the realization that current interna-
tional cooperation is not an adequate response to the 
reach and speed of digitalization, especially if it is to be 
used to implement the SDGs. The advisory group’s task 
was to draw up proposals for improving international 
cooperation between, among others, the private sector, 
civil society, international organizations, academia and 
technology developers. The advisory group also aimed 
to raise public awareness of the extent and challenges 
of digital change and its impact on the economy and 
society. A report entitled The Age of Digital Interde-
pendence was published in 2019 (UN High-Level Panel 
on Digital Cooperation, 2019). It makes recommenda-
tions on building an inclusive digital economy and soci-
ety, developing human and institutional skills, protect-
ing human rights and human actions, promoting trust, 
security and stability in the digital world, and promot-
ing global digital cooperation. However, it hardly men-
tions the conservation of natural resources or issues of 
global sustainability. 
8 .1 .4  
Initiatives in the World Bank, G20, WTO and 
OECD
Digitalization is a clearly visible and well integrated 
topic at the World Bank. ‘Digital Development’ is a sep-
arate thematic block in its own right among a total of 30 
topics covering digital infrastructure, digital financial 
services and digital identity cards (e-identity), digital 
innovation and entrepreneurship, digital platforms (e.g. 
e-commerce) and digital skills (e-literacy). In the World 
Development Report 2016, the World Bank also 
addressed governance challenges, including the need to 
strengthen global internet governance (World Bank, 
2016: 303). References to ecological sustainability are 
only weakly represented, as can be seen from the focus 
of the blogs and reports on digitalization. 
The topic of digitalization has also arrived at the 
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G20, although it has only been dealt with marginally so 
far. In 2017, the ministers responsible for digitalization 
in the respective governments adopted a Roadmap for 
Digitalization, in which digitalization was mentioned 
for the first time as an instrument for sustainability 
(Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 
2017). The G20’s objectives include securing worldwide 
access to ICT, building up infrastructures for this pur-
pose, developing a common digitalization policy and 
standards, and using digital technologies to implement 
the 2030 Agenda. 
Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which regulates economic cooperation among 
its 164 member states and the mediation of disputes 
between them, the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA) was concluded back in 1996. It came into force in 
1997 and has been signed by more than 82 states 
(WTO, 2019). The WTO is characterized by an effective 
dispute-mediation mechanism and the ability to impose 
trade sanctions in the event of any breach of the agree-
ment. The ITA’s jurisdiction was extended to more than 
200 additional products in 2015. The aim of the agree-
ment is to reduce all taxes and duties on the IT products 
listed in the agreement to zero. The WTO has also been 
running a work programme on e-commerce since 1998. 
These issues are also discussed in the Council for Trade 
in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, the Council 
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, and the Committee on Trade and Development. 
The WTO bodies have been mandated to examine the 
connections between existing WTO agreements and 
electronic commerce. Since then, a moratorium on lev-
ying customs duties on electronic communications 
(‘e-commerce moratorium’) has been agreed and 
extended at each subsequent WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence to date (WTO, 2018). In 2019, plurilateral negoti-
ations are to begin under the auspices of the WTO in a 
WTO sub-group on electronic commerce, in which only 
some of the WTO members negotiate. Plurilateral 
agreements allow negotiations between an interested 
group, so that non-interested countries cannot block 
decisions. In 2015, such a plurilateral set of rules was 
already concluded with the ITA. Currently, the negoti-
ating group on electronic commerce, which was agreed 
at the 2017 WTO meeting in Buenos Aires, comprises 
76 states (including the EU, Japan, the US and China). 
The objectives of the negotiations include unhindered 
data exchange and cybersecurity. Data protection and 
the protection of privacy are major contentious issues, 
as individual countries have very different regulations 
on these or none at all (Section 8.3.3). However, it is 
not yet clear what the rules for unhindered data 
exchange might look like. It is also unclear what conse-
quences this would have for developing countries; for 
example, there is a danger that such a plurilateral agree-
ment might further deepen the digital divide. Recently, 
there have been discussions on the extent to which the 
different data policies of the EU, the USA and China 
might make cross-border data-traffic regulation more 
difficult and create “another digital divide” (Aaronson 
and Leblond, 2018). Overall, it has not been possible 
since 2001 to conclude the WTO round of negotiations 
(‘Doha Round’) or to include current issues (Schmieg, 
2019). Many regional or bilateral trade agreements 
have therefore been concluded since then. Also in view 
of the currently growing protectionism and populism, 
as well as China’s role in world trade, which has changed 
considerably over the last two decades, the G20 formu-
lated the need for a reform of the international trading 
system in 2018. The range of problems has grown con-
siderably since the Doha Round. In addition to unre-
solved issues such as rules for agricultural and fisheries 
subsidies, new topics have arisen, such as electronic 
commerce, the link between trade and climate protec-
tion, and the integration of the SDGs (including human-
rights issues such as labour standards) in trade agree-
ments (Schmieg, 2019). 
Digitalization is also a prominent issue in the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), an association of 34 countries with high 
per-capita incomes. For example, the OECD’s Going 
Digital project aims to achieve stronger and more inclu-
sive growth through the ‘digital revolution’. The OECD 
Ministerial Declaration on the Digital Economy, adopted 
in 2016, formulates the goal of maintaining an open 
internet, closing the digital divide, promoting digital 
skills, and generally doing more to exploit the potential 
of the digital economy (OECD, 2016a). Sustainability 
and the 2030 Agenda are only mentioned in the pream-
ble of this declaration. At the OECD level, the BEPS 
(Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) project will also 
address the challenges to taxing digital companies and 
other internationally active companies – challenges 
resulting from the intensification of the problems of 
international tax competition in the course of digitali-
zation. However, no agreement on concrete solutions 
has yet been reached (Box 4.2.2-2). 
8 .1 .5 
Initiatives in public-private partnership
One component of the fragmented discourse and deci-
sion-making spaces both at the UN and in the private 
sector consists of numerous initiatives, often promoted 
in public-private partnerships (PPPs), dealing with the 
digital future or specific technology-based develop-
ments such as the internet. Examples range from 
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 conferences (e.g. NETmundial, but also the IGF 
described above) to efforts to reach global agreements 
(e.g. Contract for the Web, Webfoundation.org, 2019) 
and forming commissions to develop scientifically 
based recommendations on the regulation of digitaliza-
tion (e.g. Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber-
space), or to promote the use of data for sustainable 
development (e.g. discoverdatascience.com). 
 > At the NETmundial event in 2014, Brazil, along with 
partners including representatives of governments, 
academia and research, civil society, the United 
Nations and the private sector, brought together 
some 1,500 people to jointly adopt principles on the 
use and development of the internet. The initiative 
was discontinued after important stakeholders such 
as ICANN (Box 4.2.7-1) withdrew. The principles put 
forward by NETmundial in a consensus-based mul-
ti-stakeholder process have found wide recognition. 
They are not binding, but have acquired a certain 
importance because of the broad participation. They 
state that all users should have the rights of freedom 
of opinion and association, privacy, accessibility, 
freedom of information and freedom of access to 
information and development – also on the internet. 
Intermediaries such as platform operators should be 
protected and cultural and linguistic diversity pro-
moted, the security, stability and resilience of the 
internet and an open and distributed architecture 
should be maintained to create an environment for 
sustainable innovation and creativity (NetMundial, 
2014).
 > The contract negotiations for a transnational 
‘ Contract for the Web’ were launched under the 
leadership of Germany’s Federal Government, the 
French government, the civil-society organizations 
CIPESA, Web Foundation, The NewNow and change.
org, and the companies AnchorFree and Google 
( Web foundation.org, 2019). The current negotia-
tions are based on a number of principles designed 
to protect the ’open web as a public good and a fun-
damental right for everyone’. Governments commit 
to enabling people to connect to the internet, keep-
ing the entire internet available at all times, and 
respecting people’s fundamental right to privacy; 
businesses commit to making the internet affordable 
and accessible, respecting consumers’ privacy and 
personal data, and developing technologies for the 
common good. Citizens should be creators and form 
a strong community that promotes public discourse 
and is committed to human dignity on the internet 
(Webfoundation.org, 2019). 
 > The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber-
space was founded on the initiative of two inde-
pendent think tanks. It has identified functions of 
the internet worth protecting for the digital public 
sphere (such as the public core of the internet) and 
developed proposals for standards to ensure the 
internet’s stability (GCSC, 2017, 2018a, b, c). These 
are intended to support the establishment of a legal 
framework for the internet. The Commission is 
funded by the governments or foreign ministries of 
the Netherlands, Singapore, France, Estonia, as well 
as the companies Microsoft, the Internet Society, 
Afilias and GLOBSEC.
 > A number of international initiatives on the use of 
data for sustainable development have emerged in 
recent years. UN Global Pulse is committed to the 
safe and responsible use of big data and its classifi-
cation as a public good (UN Global Pulse, 2019b). 
The Data-Pop Alliance (“for a people-centred 4th 
industrial revolution”) is a global coalition on big 
data and development to promote a people-centred 
big-data revolution through joint research, capacity 
building and societal engagement (Data-Pop Alli-
ance, 2019). The Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development Data is an international initiative ded-
icated to building data services to meet SDG commit-
ments (Global Partnership for Sustainable Develop-
ment Data, 2016). The focus is on improving data 
collection, data quality, access to data and data use. 
The Principles for Digital Development – developed 
by ICT experts together with practitioners of devel-
opment cooperation (DC) and humanitarian aid – 
also provide guidelines for DC projects (Principles 
for Digital Development, 2019). 
 > Data availability, data security and privacy in inter-
national cooperation are addressed by the Responsi-
ble Data Forum (UN Global Pulse, 2019c), the Inter-
national Data Responsibility Group (data-responsi-
bility.org) and the Data Privacy Advisory Group (UN 
Global Pulse, 2019a), among others. The Open Data 
Charter targets transparency through open data and 
the right of access to data (opendatacharter.net). 
Civil-society research and development institutes 
also document trends in the practical implementa-
tion of digital development cooperation, e.g. the 
Betterplace Lab with the trendradar_2030 (Better-
place Lab, 2017).
8 .1 .6 
EU’s strategies for sustainability and 
 digitalization
The EU has become a global symbol of peace and inter-
national understanding, a distinction that was under-
lined by the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. The 
EU is also of global importance because of its economic 
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strength. European integration is an example of a trans-
formation process driven not only by economic inter-
ests, such as the establishment of a common internal 
market, but also by a common vision of a peaceful and 
politically stable Europe (WBGU, 2011: 104f.). Beyond 
its importance as a community of law for the member 
states, the EU is a key partner in international processes 
and agreements. 
In its strategy for the period 2010 to 2020, entitled 
‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’, the European Commission mentions 
digital (‘smart’) and sustainable growth in the same 
sentence. Sustainability focuses here on resource effi-
ciency, ‘green growth’ and economic competitiveness; 
European Commission, 2010b). However, the two top-
ics are not systematically linked. The EU has had a 
‘ Digital Agenda’ since 2010 (European Commission, 
2010a). Its action areas include the digital internal mar-
ket, interoperability and standards, trust and security, 
fast and ultra-fast internet access, research and innova-
tion, improving digital literacy, skills and integration, 
and exploiting ICT-based benefits for EU society. As 
early as 2010, the EU recognized the value of digitali-
zation for achieving overall societal goals such as com-
bating climate change and ageing with dignity. How-
ever, only one of 13 concrete indicators relating to the 
Digital Agenda goals is an environmental goal. The dig-
ital single market is of particular importance in the 
European Commission’s work. At the heart of EU digital 
policy is the ‘Strategy for a Digital Single Market for 
Europe’ (European Commission, 2015b). The strategy is 
based on three pillars: (1) improving online access to 
goods and services across Europe for consumers and 
companies, (2) setting the right conditions for thriving 
digital networks and services, and (3) maximizing the 
growth potential of the European digital economy. The 
digital single market is also one of the ten Commission 
priorities for the 2014–2019 legislative period. Sus-
tainability is to be embedded in the framework of the 
digital single market (RNE, 2018). 
The European Commission’s strategic vision on AI 
(JRC, 2018) shows a similar focus. It is primarily geared 
to international competitive strength. Sustainability, by 
contrast, is addressed both with regard to the SDGs and 
on the basis of concrete topic areas such as energy con-
sumption. However, an overarching framework is lack-
ing, as are guidelines and principles. Different features 
are emphasized, for example, by the French AI strategy 
(Villani, 2018), which explicitly takes a European per-
spective and was developed as a parliamentary ‘mis-
sion’ of the Prime Minister from September 2017 to 
March 2018. A separate chapter is devoted to the use 
of AI for ecological purposes and embedded in a broad 
economic paradigm shift towards sustainability. 
However, it is an open question whether value-based 
AI development will or can be consistently imple-
mented within the EU. The consistently ethical use of 
AI – actually intended to distinguish it from the way it 
is handled in the USA and China – is criticized by some 
politicians and businesspeople as a possible constraint 
on international competitiveness. Here, the EU is not 
yet pursuing a stringent path between the international 
race following the standards of US or Chinese digitali-
zation models and a model of its own. A consistent, 
value-based approach to AI based on ethical principles 
and human rights could be crucial for the responsible 
and technology-open development of AI (Dignum, 
2019). Approaches to ethical AI development, for 
example under the title ‘AI4People’ (Floridi et al., 
2018), as well as ethical guidelines, are already being 
developed and discussed (Box 3.2.5-1).
The EU’s sustainability policy is currently also in 
motion. The implementation strategy for the 2030 
Agenda and a new environmental action programme is 
to be presented in 2019, and in 2020 the EU will submit 
a long-term strategy for its contribution to climate 
change under the Paris Agreement to the UN Climate 
Secretariat. Following the publication of a long-term 
vision for the decarbonization of the European econ-
omy (in preparation for the European contribution to 
the Paris Agreement) entitled ‘A clean planet for all’ 
(European Commission, 2018c), in January 2019 the 
Commission published a reflection paper called ‘Towards 
a sustainable Europe by 2030’ (European Commission, 
2019f) in preparation for the implementation strategy 
of the 2030 Agenda. The documents also point out that 
digitalization is a trend that is changing lifestyles (e.g. 
less business travel as a result of video telephony) and 
provides new tools. Further automation and intelligent 
control are seen as ways of improving competitiveness 
through efficiency gains, while at the same time reduc-
ing greenhouse-gas emissions in industry (European 
Commission, 2018c: 15). In its reflection paper, the 
European Commission recognizes digitalization as a 
horizontal factor of sustainability change alongside 
education, science, technology, research and innova-
tion (European Commission, 2019f.). This paper already 
states that the EU should take on a global leadership 
role in formulating the new ethical principles for AI and 
use the benefits of digital change to achieve the SDGs. 
Its focus is to be placed on sustainable, innovative agri-
culture and food systems, clean technology, human and 
animal health, ecosystem services, resource-efficient 
products and production methods. The forthcoming 
and pending adoption of an EU sustainability strategy 
implementing the 2030 Agenda will require strong 
links with and integration of digitalization in the sense 
that digitalization should be put at the service of sus-
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tainability. Furthermore, the Digital Agenda 2010 
should be dovetailed by a newly developed EU Digital 
Agenda that integrates sustainability and makes it one 
of the goals of a digital agenda. 
8 .1 .7 
Conclusions
Digital change and its implications for sustainable 
development is a topic that is commanding an increas-
ing amount of attention in international cooperation. 
This is demonstrated by the numerous digitalization 
initiatives and processes that have emerged in recent 
years, particularly at the ITU, UNCTAD, World Bank, 
WTO, OECD and even in its early stages at the G20. 
Digitalization is predominantly classified as an econom-
ic-policy issue that promises economic growth. This 
approach can also be observed in the EU’s digital policy. 
UNESCO, on the other hand, is particularly committed 
to knowledge and education through the internet and 
freedom of the media. With topics such as digital liter-
acy, digital citizenship or digital inclusion, it covers 
important areas of sustainable development. So far, 
there has been a lack of overarching concepts, guiding 
concepts and concrete principles and initiatives for 
linking digitalization and sustainability. It makes sense 
for the SDGs to be taken up by the UN institutions 
already dealing with digitalization (WSIS Forum, ITU, 
IGF). Environmental issues addressed by SDGs 13, 14 
and 15, for example, are not yet having an impact. Con-
versely, the UN Environment and UNDP programmes, 
which are particularly responsible for sustainability 
issues, have so far only addressed the issue of digitali-
zation to a limited extent. However, a number of initia-
tives on data and sustainable development, data secur-
ity and privacy in international cooperation have 
emerged in recent years. 
Although there are efforts to focus more on the dual 
topic of digitalization and sustainability in the UN sys-
tem and to embed it coherently throughout the system, 
there is no robust and clearly visible placement, for 
example within the framework of a mechanism for dig-
italization and sustainability. There is also no systematic 
processing in the UN system of the state of scientific 
knowledge on this topic, which involves many uncer-
tainties. Finally, there is a lack of an overarching orien-
tation or action framework for sustainable digitaliza-
tion in the form of a joint declaration by the interna-
tional community, an agenda or a common codex. The 
direct and effective embedding of the goals and guard 
rails of sustainable development in the societal and 
political framework conditions of economic activity 
was and is therefore a fundamental field of global gov-
ernance for the sustainable shaping of the Digital Age.
On the other hand, there is an increasing number of 
global companies that are decisively driving and shap-
ing digital development and concrete applications of 
digital technologies in society and business. These 
actors wield global influence and usually pay only mar-
ginal attention to the goals of sustainable development. 
In particular, there is currently a certain disproportion 
between the influence of companies and the possibili-
ties and structures available to regulate them. The EU 
has tentatively begun to link digitalization and sustain-
ability through various policy processes and strategies. 
The extent to which these declarations of intent will be 
reflected in programmes and strategies (environmental 
action programme, sustainability strategy) and con-
crete implementation measures in individual policy 
areas (e.g. mobility) remains to be seen. 
8 .2
Potential benefits and risks of digitalization for 
global sustainability goals 
Digital solutions can play an important role in achieving 
globally agreed sustainability goals, but they offer both 
new opportunities and new risks. The SDGs agreed in 
2015 (Box 2.1-1) and the objectives of the Paris Agree-
ment on Climate Change and the Convention on Biolog-
ical Diversity are considered below as examples. 
8 .2 .1 
Digitalization and the Sustainable Development 
Goals
In 2015, the SDGs replaced the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals as a global target system. They provide a 
universal framework and orientation for international 
and national policies over the next decade (UNGA, 
2015; Box 2.1-1). The target year for achieving the 
SDGs is 2030. Many SDGs aim to provide access to basic 
services and supplies for all people worldwide, e.g. ‘No 
poverty’ (SDG 1), ‘Zero hunger’ (SDG 2), ‘Good health 
and well-being’ (SDG 3), ‘Quality education’ (SDG 4), 
‘Clean water and sanitation’ (SDG 6) or ‘Affordable and 
clean energy’ (SDG 7). Other SDGs relate to the conser-
vation of natural resources, such as ‘Climate action’ 
(SDG 13) and the protection and sustainable use of 
‘Life below water’ (SDG 14) and ‘Life on land’ (SDG 15). 
While progress has been made in recent decades 
through development cooperation and national devel-
opment policies, existing positive development trends 
need to be accelerated and scaled up to make basic 
services available to all by 2030 (UN, 2018b). In addi-
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tion, little progress has been made on environmental 
SDGs, which has repercussions on the development 
progress that has been made. For example, after many 
years of improvement, the number of malnourished 
people rose from 777 million in 2015 to 815 million in 
2016; among other things, conflicts, droughts and cli-
mate-change-related disasters are seen as causes of this 
trend reversal (UN, 2018b). 
There is currently no comprehensive and reliable 
analysis of the extent to which digitalization can con-
tribute to the timely achievement of the SDGs. The 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI), representing 
ICT-related companies and organizations, has presented 
an initial study linking access to ICT with progress 
towards SDG achievement across countries, based on 
observed correlations (GeSi, 2018). This study found a 
positive correlation for 11 of the 17 SDGs. No correla-
tion was found for environment-related SDGs 13, 14 
and 15, or for SDGs 10 (‘Reduced inequalities’) and 17 
(‘Partnerships for the goals’); SDG 12 (‘Responsible 
consumption and production’) correlates negatively 
with access to ICT. To what extent the respective (posi-
tive and negative) correlations are also associated with 
causal relationships, or whether other important exter-
nal variables (e.g. GDP, quality of governance) are 
responsible for the correlations found remains open in 
this analysis. 
A further analysis has been carried out under the 
auspices of the WSIS Forum and looks at the question 
of how the WSIS’s objectives (‘action lines’) can be used 
to promote the achievement of the SDGs (WSIS, 2015). 
The study lists numerous starting points, projects and 
success stories illustrating the positive potential of ICT 
for achieving individual SDGs. However, in view of the 
global differences in development, it also points out 
that giving all people and countries the opportunity to 
benefit from the potential of ICT is a major challenge.
A meta-study has shown that there are numerous 
individual studies on the connection between ICT and 
SDGs, but that they focus predominantly on technical 
aspects and do not have a holistic view of overall soci-
etal contexts and the common good (Wu et al., 2018).
In the WBGU’s view, it is necessary to adopt such a 
holistic view: connecting the use of digital technologies 
with SDGs must not be limited to technological poten-
tial, but must also address overarching potential bene-
fits and risks (Section 9.1). This requires an inter- and 
transdisciplinary analysis, which should be supported 
by appropriate research programmes (Chapter 10). 
Against the background of its analyses, particularly of 
the arenas (Chapter 5) and literature analyses, in 
Table 8.2.1-1 the WBGU gives a tentative assessment 
of selected potential benefits and risks of digitalization 
for achieving the SDGs, as well as a qualitative assess-
ment of the current status: are digital solutions being 
used more in the spirit of sustainability, or does the 
trend seem to be towards unsustainable development? 
The compilation is designed as a preliminary assess-
ment and intended to provide an overview by way of 
examples. In this respect, it makes no claim to com-
pleteness and does not go into detail. However, it 
clearly illustrates both the opportunities and the ambiv-
alence of the influence of digital change on SDGs and 
thus reveals the great need to actively shape digital 
change. It also makes it clear that, although digital tech-
nologies offer direct potential for individual goals, the 
main levers for achieving these goals lie in the institu-
tional framework for systemic concepts and in creating 
incentives. This often requires structural changes. In 
addition, digital change gives reason to expect funda-
mental societal restructuring in the medium term 
(Chapter 7); however, it is unclear which of these 
changes will have a major impact in the course of the 
SDG period. For the period after 2030, the question 
remains whether and how the SDGs, if they are to be 
continued, should be meaningfully extended to take 
new developments into account (Section 9.3.1.1; 
Table 8.2.1-1).
8 .2 .2 
Climate policy in the Digital Age
The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 was celebrated as 
a milestone in climate policy. It pursues three binding 
objectives. First, it is about climate-change mitigation: 
climate-change mitigation aims to keep anthropogenic 
warming well below a 2°C increase compared to pre-in-
dustrial levels, and efforts are to be made to limit it to 
1.5°C. Second, it is about adaptation: steps are to be 
taken to improve the ability to adapt to the harmful 
effects of climate change, to boost resilience and cli-
mate-friendly development, and to prevent any threat 
to food production. Third, the financial flows are to be 
brought into line with the objectives of climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation. The time horizon of the Paris 
Agreement goes far beyond that of the 2030 Agenda. 
For example, it was explicitly agreed that a balance 
must be achieved between greenhouse-gas sources and 
sinks by the second half of this century (UNFCCC, 
2015). 
It is currently an open question what contribution 
digitalization will make to climate-change mitigation, or 
whether it will undermine it. Digital technologies can 
be used either to technically implement the global 
transformation of energy systems towards sustainabil-
ity (IEA, 2017a) – or to advance the exploration of fos-
sil fuels (Mittal et al., 2017). They can enable efficient 
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Table 8 .2 .1-1
The WBGU’s assessment of selected potential benefits and risks of digitalization in achieving the UN’s sustainable develop-
ment goals (SDGs), as well as a qualitative assessment of the current status: are digital solutions being used more in the spirit 
of sustainability, or does the trend seem to be moving towards unsustainable development? The table is designed as an initial 
expert assessment and, using examples, aims to provide an overview of starting points. It already clearly illustrates the ambi-
valence of digital change's influence on the sustainability goals, and thus demonstrates the great need for formative action. 
The figures in brackets refer to the sub-targets of the SDGs as set out in the 2030 Agenda (UNGA, 2015).
Source: WBGU
Selected potential benefits Selected risks Qualitative assessment
 
SDG 1  
No poverty 
 > Integration of the poorest into the world eco-
nomy (globally, regardless of location, via the 
internet if access is available).
 > Creation of institutional framework conditions 
(microfinance services; identity verification via 
blockchain; spare parts by 3D printing).
 > Monitoring, data evaluation and access to infor-
mation (in agriculture, medical care, humanita-
rian aid, etc.) make new forms of planning and 
coordination possible.
 > Virtual realities visualize areas of crisis and 
poverty and thus increase the willingness of the 
global community to donate and to act.
 > Lack of access to infrastructure and institutions 
(internet, electricity, education) worsens the 
digital divide between and within societies, fur-
ther marginalizing certain groups (e.g. the poor; 
1.1, 1.2).
 > Provision of this access could create problema-
tic infrastructural dependencies, especially if it 
is provided for purely profit-driven motives by 
private companies (1.4).
 > The substitution of work by automation and the 
backsourcing of companies limits employment 
opportunities and thus the potential for poverty 
reduction (1.1, 1.2).
 > Digital technologies are increasingly attracting 
attention in poverty reduction and development 
cooperation.
 > The focus is currently still on pilot projects. 
Mainstreaming digital technology in poverty 
reduction and development cooperation is still 
in its infancy.
 > The extent to which the potential for poverty 
reduction will be exploited is as yet unclear.
 
SDG 2  
Zero hunger 
 > Precision agriculture can increase the quantity 
and quality of the products (2.1, 2.3, 2.4).
 > Sharing services via smartphone apps (e.g. 
AgriShare) enables smallholders to also use 
machines and services (2.3).
 > Drones for monitoring the soil, fertilizer use and 
plant protection, also for use in plant protection 
(2.4).
 > Children's height and weight can be monitored 
by 3D scanning to detect malnutrition (e.g. 
Child Growth Monitor 2.2 app). 
 > The use of smartphones opens up new 
 marketing and income-generating opportunities 
for women (2.3).
 > Potential benefits can only be realized where 
there is access to infrastructure and instituti-
ons.
 > Smallholders, especially in developing count-
ries, could be marginalized.
 > New dependencies on the multinational compa-
nies that provide digital technologies or impro-
ved input.
 > The fight against hunger and for food security 
can be promoted by means of sustainable agri-
culture.
 > Precision agriculture is more likely to be imple-
mented by large-scale agriculture, not by small-
holders.
 > Application prototypes (e.g. Child Growth 
Monitor app and AgriShare app) are in the pilot 
phase.
 > Open-source solutions are occasionally made 
available.
 > Further concentrations of power by agricultural 
corporations endanger farmers' control over 
agricultural data.
 
SDG 3  
Good health and well-being 
 > eHealth (including mobile health, telemedicine, 
health information systems) enables or facilita-
tes diagnosis, therapy, the exchange of expe-
rience, staff training, illness reporting, cost 
savings for transport and health facilities, as 
well as supplementary, decentralized advisory 
services (3.8).
 > Big data analyses, e.g. on medical contexts, 
 global disease trends, prediction of epidemics 
(3.3).
 > Blockchain technologies for drug traceability 
and prevention of drug counterfeiting (3.8). 
 > Protection against pollutants (3.9), e.g. with 
digital air or water sensors (3.3).
 > New possibilities through medical 3D printing 
(prostheses, orthoses, organs), also in develo-
ping countries.
 > Prevention (e.g. HIV education via the internet 
and apps).
 > Costs for ICT, training and advisory services, as 
well as the necessary electricity supply can be 
problematic in developing countries.
 > Implementation of blockchain technology is dif-
ficult due to inadequate infrastructure, high 
complexity, high energy requirements and a lack 
of 'infostructure' (= roles, guidelines and proce-
dures for information transfer). 
 > Risk of loss of data control, data misuse and 
hacker attacks.
 > Internet and computer games can lead to 
'gaming disorder', a disease recognized by the 
WHO (3.5). 
 > According to the WHO, accident risk is three- to 
four-times higher if mobile phones are used 
(even hands-free) while driving (3.6). 
 > Radiation-related health consequences of long-
term (>15 years) mobile-phone use have not yet 
been clarified, according to the WHO. 
 > Problematic emotional and social consequences 
possible because of lack of opportunities to 
controll digital technology.
 > Demand for telemedicine has tended to remain 
constant; it has increased little.
 > First eHealth pilot projects launched, but no 
widespread application yet. 
 > Trend towards self-tracking shows people's inte-
rest in their own health, but potential for addic-
tion is suspected. 
 > The internet is the main source of information 
on health, but there is a lack of control over the 
quality of information.
 > Access to telemedicine creates job opportuni-
ties for women doctors (e.g. the digital platform 
DoctHERs in Pakistan connects qualified 
women doctors with patients who cannot afford 
access to the health sector; changemakers.com).
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Selected potential benefits Selected risks Qualitative assessment
 
SDG 4  
Quality education
 > Participation in education through financial and 
spatial independence of use, e.g. continuing digital 
education and training for teachers and learners 
(4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6).
 > Active inclusion in and co-determination of educa-
tion and participation. Inclusive development of 
new technology and creation of effective, safe, 
gender-sensitive, non-violent (digital) learning 
environments, especially for disadvantaged groups 
(e.g. refugees or migrant women; 4.5, 4.6, 4.A).
 > Future-proof education, future literacy: interlink-
age of transformation education or ESD with edu-
cation for digitalization (4.7). (Focus on coopera-
tion, innovation and creativity, identity, cultural 
diversity, peace).
Education must offset risks to inclusion and 
 Eigenart such as:
 > Intensification of existing inequalities (digital 
divide) and discrimination caused by the digita-
lization of educational opportunities (4.5, 4.6, 
4.A, also 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6; 5).
 > Dealing with uncertainties (individual and 
civil-societal), such as the truth content of digi-
tal information or technological developments 
and their future impact (e.g. on the world of 
work, 4.7). 
 > New demands on the legal protection of privacy 
(against ok privacy violation), users' lack of 
competence when handling digital technology.
 > Many actors support the goal of enabling bet-
ter inclusion in education through digital 
technology and (further) developing educa-
tional opportunities (4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.6). 
 > Major inequalities exist up to now; e.g. most 
adults in emerging economies and developing 
countries lack basic digital literacy; major 
gender inequalities have been identified in 
developed countries.
 > The potential of interlinking education for 
digitalization with education for sustainabi-
lity – e.g. for future viability or cooperation – 
has not been exploited to date (4.7).
 
SDG 5  
Gender equality
 > Emancipatory potential of digital technologies, 
e.g. via better access to information and educa-
tion, as well as networking opportunities (5.B, C).
 > Improved measurability and visibility of gender 
inequalities and discrimination (e.g. in collective, 
digitally supported decision-making processes; 
5.1).
 > Raising awareness of equality and gender diversity 
via digital experimentation spaces and flexible and 
diverse digital identities (10.2).
 > The use of smartphones opens up new marketing 
and income-generating opportunities for women.
 > Discrimination against women and gender 
minorities because of ongoing gender-specific 
barriers preventing access to digital solutions, 
especially in developing countries.
 > Reproduction of existing gender inequalities 
and gender stereotypes in the development and 
use of digital solutions (5.1).
 > Limited participation of women and gender 
minorities in creative and decision-making pro-
cesses within the tech sector (5.5).
 > New forms of gender-specific discrimination 
and violence, such as digital violence, which are 
not recognized or acknowledged as such (5.2).
 > Despite growing political attention, gender 
equality has not been achieved in any country 
of the world. Technological solutions can do 
little to solve this fundamentally structural 
problem. 
 > Existing gender inequalities and stereotypes 
are reproduced in socio-technical systems 
such as the internet, and this can lead to new 
discrimination. 
 > The potential for using digital technology in 
the interests of equality is currently insuffi-
ciently exploited, particularly with regard to 
improved analytical options, the emancipa-
tory use of digital solutions, and awaren-
ess-raising in digital experimentation spaces. 
 
SDG 6  
Clean water and sanitation
 > Improved and, where appropriate, more cost-ef-
fective and efficient management of water-supply 
and disposal systems.
 > Improved customer service and thus easier access 
to water-supply and disposal services for all popu-
lation groups.
 > Improved irrigation systems.
 > Better seasonal water management through early 
detection of droughts or the risk of torrential rain.
 > Improved rainwater harvesting.
 > Better quality management of drinking water.
 > Digitalization cannot have an effect without 
good analogue and common-good-oriented 
management.
 > Fragility and maintenance deficits of pipeline 
systems.
 > Vulnerability to cyber attacks of digitally con-
trolled water systems.
 > Concentrating the use of digital water-supply 
and disposal technologies on privileged urban 
dwellers, neglecting informal urban neighbour-
hoods.
 > The water sector is a key funding area of 
development cooperation.
 > Digital technologies increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of projects in the water 
sector (e.g. monitoring and management sys-
tems; reduction of water loss).
 
SDG 7  
Affordable and clean energy 
 > Digital technologies can be used to enable access 
to stable electricity in off-grid regions (e.g. with 
mini grids based on renewable energies; 7.1).
 > They allow a high proportion of fluctuating rene-
wable energies in the power grid. In addition, digi-
tal technology can be used to electrify other sec-
tors and thus also to switch to renewables (7.2).
 > Efficiency potential can be tapped by monitoring, 
optimization and control (7.3).
 > Digitalization can contribute to breakthroughs in 
key technologies such as battery storage, e.g. 
using materials research or battery management.
 > Ubiquitous digital applications could potentially 
lead to an increase in energy demand in all 
 sectors, which would also overcompensate for 
possible efficiency gains ('rebound').
 > Digital infrastructures themselves lead to an 
increase in the direct demand for energy.
 > The digital networking of energy systems and 
other sectors leads to an increased risk of 
attacks on critical energy infrastructures and of 
user data being misused.
 > New geopolitical dependencies on regions with 
critical resources for the development and 
maintenance of digital infrastructures may 
emerge. 
 > Digital technologies have long been used in 
the energy sector and facilitate the use of 
renewable energies, yet their share of the 
global energy system is increasing only very 
moderately.
 > New business models give poverty groups 
access to electricity in developing countries, 
e.g. the use of mobile payment systems for 
solar, off-grid electricity systems. 
 > Up to now, digitalization has not yet been 
able to make a difference for the almost 1 
 billion people who do not yet have access to 
electricity.
 > The demand for energy in the ICT sector 
 continues to grow.
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Selected potential benefits Selected risks Qualitative assessment
 
SDG 8  
Decent work and economic growth  
 > New manufacturing technologies, virtualization, 
monitoring and the provision of information 
open up potential for improved efficiency in 
using natural resources; they thus contribute 
towards decoupling resource consumption on 
the one hand from production and consumption 
on the other.
 > Digital technologies can trigger further (produc-
tivity) growth (8.1, 8.2). Higher productivity and 
automation can help disseminate decent work 
environments and create space for new models 
of sustainable work (8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.5, 8.7).
 > New forms of access to (labour) markets and to 
goods and services (banking, education) can 
develop. For example, opportunities for econo-
mic inclusion expand, especially in developing 
countries and emerging economies (8.1, 8.3, 
8.6, 8.10).
 > More precise monitoring of labour markets and, 
in particular, compliance with minimum social 
standards becomes possible (8.8).
 > Rapid labour-substituting technical progress threa-
tens to decouple economic growth from employ-
ment growth, thus jeopardizing social cohesion 
and political stability (8.3, 8.5, 8.6).
 > In addition to job losses, there is a particular threat 
of rising inequality and/or a widening digital divide 
(1) between developing countries and emerging 
economies on the one hand and industrialized 
countries on the other, (2) between regions, (3) 
between people with different qualifications, and 
(4) between earned income and other forms of 
income (8.5).
 > Work platforms and new (quasi-self-employed) 
forms of work can circumvent occupational safety 
standards and create new risks of exploitation and 
monitoring of workers.
 > The resource requirements of digital technologies 
and rebound effects threaten to increase resource 
consumption and to lead to only a relative decou-
pling of growth and resource consumption (8.4).
 > The newly emerging forms of access and 
employment possibilities, especially in 
 developing countries and emerging econo-
mies, today often still lag behind the societal 
challenges posed by automation and new 
forms of work. 
 > There is a lack of consistent societal 
 objectives and guiding principles for the 
 possible future world of work and a sustain-
able economy, as well as of strategies for 
 shaping societal change in a socially 
 acceptable way. 
 > An absolute decoupling of growth and 
resource consumption is not to be expected 
under the current (political) framework 
 conditions.
 
SDG 9  
Industry, innovation and infrastructure 
Industry 
 > Creation of new jobs, including new fields of 
activity (9.2).
 > Increased economic inclusion for individuals – 
through improved access to financial services – 
and for developing countries as a whole through 
better market access (9.3).
 > Dematerialization and resource efficiency by 
means of Industry 4.0 (9.4).
Innovation
 > Digital innovation for societal and ecological 
challenges (9.5).
 > Rising employment figures in the ICT-related 
R&D field (9.5).
Infrastructure
 > Improved resilience to climate change through 
wider access to information via ICT (9.1).
 > Resource-conserving IT infrastructures  
(Green IT; 9.4).
 > Intelligent digital technologies (e.g. IoT) as 
 drivers of sustainable smart cities (9.4).
Industry 
 > Loss of employment and purchasing power due to 
automation (9.2).
 > Backshoring of industrial production to industrial-
ized countries with negative economic effects for 
developing countries (9.2, 9.3).
 > Rebound effects resulting from efficiency improve-
ments by industry 4.0 (9.2).
Innovation
 > Lack of broadband and information services 
 jeopardizes growth and innovation (9.C).
Infrastructure
 > Privatization of infrastructures against the 
 interests of users (9.1).
 > Increased consumption of resources and electricity 
by digital technologies (9.4).
Industry
 > Great potential for increasing the producti-
vity of developing countries, although this 
has not yet evolved due to other develop-
ment policy problems.
Innovation
 > Digitalization promotes the emergence of 
innovations that are increasingly digitally 
based. ICTs contribute to the dismantling of 
innovation barriers, facilitate the emergence 
of new business models, and make the rapid 
transfer of technology and ideas possible.
 > However, technology-based leapfrogging in 
developing countries has so far been hampe-
red by existing development policy problems 
(e.g. political instability, lack of infrastruc-
ture, lack of education).
 > Positive picture with regard to R&D in terms 
of increasing R&D expenditure and employ-
ment figures in the ICT sector.
Infrastructure
 > Great potential for the establishment of 
 sustainable infrastructures through smart 
cities. However, the development of smart 
cities is still in its infancy. Furthermore, 
smart-city concepts in developing countries 
and emerging economies are today in some 
cases at odds with the goals of sustainable 
development.
 
SDG 10  
Reducing inequalities 
 > Leapfrogging: catching up on development 
backlogs by making technological leaps (10.1).
 > New forms of employment (e.g. via platforms) 
and increasing spatial and temporal flexibility 
through mobile internet and mobile end devices 
(10.2).
 > Facilitating access to information on employ-
ment with new websites and a faster exchange 
of information (10.2).
 > Access for all to digital infrastructure streng-
thens education and health (10.3).
 > Revealing existing inequalities by means of 
increased transparency (10.3).
 > Widened digital divide.
 > Existing gender inequality is intensifying and ham-
pering development.
 > Automation endangers jobs requiring a low to 
medium level of qualification.
 > Backshoring: shifting employment from developing 
countries back to industrialized countries exacer-
bates inequality in developing countries.
 > The pressure to perform and meet deadlines inten-
sifies in a digitalized working environment.
 > Open-access data are increasingly being offe-
red, especially for small or marginalized 
groups and groups with special needs.
 > Actors within value chains make informed 
decisions.
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SDG 11  
Sustainable cities and communities 
 > Saving energy and resources, reducing green-
house-gas emissions and air pollution (11.6).
 > More efficient energy generation and supply of 
electricity and drinking water.
 > Easier access to basic services for informal 
settle ments and poor urban neighbourhoods, 
e.g. mobility as a service (11.2).
 > Improved municipal administration, including 
participatory urban planning and management 
(11.3).
 > Easier self-organization of city dwellers via 
municipal platforms and means of communica-
tion (11.3).
 > The use of technology ignores the needs of large 
sections of the population.
 > The possibility of inclusion and use is often limited 
to the urban digital elite.
 > Dependence of municipalities on proprietary 
 software or individual technology providers.
 > Total surveillance and loss of privacy versus 
 security in public spaces (11.7).
 > Vulnerability of urban infrastructures (e.g. water-
works, electricity supply) to cyber attacks.
 > Online shopping creates challenges for the 
 redesign of city centres.
 > Net impact on housing costs is unclear (11.1).
 > There is criticism of smart city implementa-
tion, especially insufficient inclusion and 
common-good orientation, particularly in 
developing countries and emerging econo-
mies.
 > Hardly any holistic smart city approaches, 
mostly (isolated) pilot projects in individual 
fields of action (e.g. energy, mobility, waste 
management, e-government).
 > Masterplanned smart cities can be sustaina-
ble if inclusion, resource protection and 
Eigenart are the foundation of their design.
 
SDG 12  
Sustainable consumption and production 
 > Increased global environmental awareness 
through more information about the sustainabi-
lity of products, as well as production and con-
sumption methods (12.8, 12.A).
 > Comprehensive monitoring of environmental 
impacts using 'intelligent' products, sensors and 
big data, implementation in economic incen-
tives for sustainable corporate action and com-
petitive advantages (12.6 and 12.7).
 > More efficient use of resources via more com-
plete information systems, platform-based busi-
ness models and (virtual) corporate networks; 
dematerialization via virtualization or the addi-
tion of services to production (servitization), 
e.g. sharing (12.2, 12.6).
 > Improved production and supply-chain manage-
ment reduces e.g. food losses (12.3).
 > Closing cycles by means of a digitally supported 
circular economy – not only in waste manage-
ment (12.5).
 > Potential of 3D printing for producing spare 
parts.
 > Public procurement as a pioneer in the field of 
green IT (12.7).
 > Increased demand for critical raw materials (12.4), 
electricity and natural resources (12.2).
 > Increase in the amount of electronic waste and 
related pollution (12.4).
 > Fewer possibilities of 'eco-sufficient' behaviour 
because of greater technical dependency and 
shorter product life cycles of technical devices, dis-
placement of low-tech solutions (12.5).
 > Increasing complexity of products reduces repara-
bility (12.5).
 > Short-lived software and increasing computing 
capacities increase product obsolescence (12.5).
 > Possible increase in consumption as a result of 
more comprehensive marketing and greater availa-
bility of goods, e.g. through online shopping (12).
 > 'Smart' labelling that equates digital products with 
sustainable products dilutes target orientation 
(greenwashing).
 > A digitally supported change towards 'using 
instead of owning' is not yet sufficiently 
backed up by measures to limit rebound 
effects (e.g. intensification of use).
 > The digitalization of many product groups 
leads to a higher demand for resources and 
energy. 
 > Additional ICT functions are currently not 
being developed or reviewed with the aim of 
resource and energy reduction. 
 > The lack of orientation of digitalization initia-
tives (e.g. Industry 4.0) towards net resource 
and energy savings means that the potential 
for sustainability is not being fully exploited.
 
SDG 13  
Climate action
 > Digital applications have the potential to contri-
bute to emission reductions in many sectors 
(e.g. energy, agriculture, industry, buildings, 
transport), but also have the potential to 
increase emissions.
 > Networked early-warning systems can increase 
resilience to natural disasters and improve cli-
mate-risk management and weather forecasting 
(13.1).
 > Digital applications play a key role in deriving 
and providing information on future climate 
changes and their impacts as a basis for decisi-
ons on climate-change mitigation and adapta-
tion (climate services; 13.3).
 > Digital technologies can make it easier to extract 
and use fossil fuels.
 > New general-purpose technologies can lead to an 
increase in economic activity, which has a negative 
impact on emissions and climate-change 
mitigation. 
 > The increasing dependence on ICT can reduce the 
resilience of infrastructures to climate-related 
disasters and extreme events (13.1).
 > Digital solutions cannot make up for a lack of 
political ambition, a lack of regulation and a 
lack of institutions. In order to achieve 
SDG13, it is therefore essential to close these 
gaps, so that digitalization can make a 
 positive contribution to climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation (13.2).
 > ICT is currently a driver of energy-related 
CO2 emissions.
 > Earth observation and modelling already 
 provide valuable information for adaptation, 
 early-warning systems and disaster 
 preparedness and form the basis of our 
 detailed understanding of the climate 
 system.
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SDG 14  
Life below water 
 > Digital technologies offer long-term prospects for 
the circular economy and for combating marine 
garbage (14.1).
 > Digital technologies can help to improve the 
monitoring, surveillance and enforcement of eco-
system protection and to combat overfishing, as 
well as illegal and destructive fishing (14.2, 14.4).
 > Science, research and technological development, 
as well as the dissemination of their results, 
benefit from digital opportunities and networ-
king (14.A).
 > Improved access to digital information systems 
could help improve market access for small-scale 
fisheries (14.B).
 > The use of digitally supported technology 
means that very few shoals of fish now escape 
detection (14.4).
 > Digitalization is currently accelerating economic 
processes based on fossil energy (including off-
shore oil and gas production) and resource 
extraction. This drives marine pollution (e.g. 
plastics) and acidification (14.1, 14.3). 
 > Digital technology increases the demand for 
rare metals and with it incentives for deep-sea 
mining.
 > The risks of economic development driven by 
digitalization and the resulting overburdened 
production and sink functions of the oceans 
currently outweigh their positive potential. 
 
SDG 15  
Life on land 
 > Precision agriculture (apps, sensors, etc.) can 
improve environmental protection, resource effi-
ciency and productivity (15.1).
 > Digitally enhanced monitoring of ecosystems and 
soil conditions (including forests and wildlife) 
strengthen the protection of terrestrial ecosys-
tems and biodiversity (15.1, 15.2).
 > By using mobile phones, smallholders can benefit 
from advice on improvements in production plan-
ning and the management of weather-related 
risks. Other agricultural risks, e.g. pests, plant 
diseases or soil erosion, can also be identified 
using mobile phones and digital photographs; 
advice can be provided and risks thus mitigated 
or prevented (15.4).
 > Securing the land rights of smallholders, e.g. via 
blockchain technologies as a way of preventing 
large-scale land grabbing.
 > Limited access to digital technologies and infor-
mation in developing countries. 
 > New dependencies on the multinational compa-
nies that provide digital technologies or impro-
ved input.
 > Marginalization of poor smallholders by 'land 
grabbing', among other things.
 > Mobile-phone advisory services on new agri-
cultural practices and better management.
 > Environmental protection, resource efficiency 
and productivity are increased in industriali-
zed countries through precision farming; in 
developing countries, only individual elements 
(e.g. apps, SMS) are used.
 > Precision farming is not yet available to small-
holders.
 > Drones and satellites are already being used to 
monitor forest areas and ecosystems (to pre-
vent deforestation, biodiversity loss and poa-
ching).
 > The development and diffusion of blockchain 
technologies is still in its infancy.
 
SDG 16  
Peace, justice and strong institutions 
Peace
 > Better monitoring and data analysis improve the 
detection of illicit financial flows and illicit arms 
trafficking (16.4, 16.5).
 > Global networking and possibly virtual reality 
provide opportunities for more empathy world-
wide (16.1). 
Fight against crime/Justice
 > Crimes can be detected by monitoring or  
tracking (16.4).
Strong institutions (16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.10)
 > Open-government data can promote the 
 transparency and verifiability of official  
decisions for  citizens and civil society. 
 > Digital data collection and processing can 
 contribute to greater policy coherence and  
good governance. 
 > Digital monitoring of target achievement can 
lead to increased accountability on the part of 
institutions.
 > Digital technology also creates new options for 
citizen participation and civil-society control. 
 > Increases in efficiency lead to cost reductions for 
public services.
Peace
 > Robotics and AI are deployed in the develop-
ment of autonomous weapon systems.
 > Cyber attacks (sabotage or espionage by 
 attacking important digital systems) could be 
used militarily (cyber war) – particularly 
 problematic with regard to critical 
 infrastructures (see below).
Fight against crime/Justice
 > Surveillance state based on monitoring or 
 tracking (16.4).
Strong institutions (16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.10)
 > States use digital technology specifically for  
the total surveillance of private and public 
 institutions (infringement of human rights, 
independence of state institutions) and for  
the state and private control of behaviour by 
private and public institutions (e.g. social  
credit scores in China). 
 > The authorities are threatened by the depen-
dence of public institutions on digital tools and 
infrastructures, thus increasing their suscepti-
bility to crises (especially cybersecurity). 
 > Possibilities for manipulating or influencing 
democratic legitimation procedures (e.g. 
 elections) are increasing. This could result in a 
crisis of confidence among citizens in state 
institutions, even in countries whose instituti-
ons are now considered stable.
Peace
 > Armed, remote-controlled military robots 
(drones) are already in use, automated to 
 varying degrees.
 > Cyber warfare in the narrower sense of the 
hostile use of ICT has not yet been observed 
as the aspect of direct violence is lacking 
(16.1).
Fight against crime/Justice
 > The fight against crime is moving in both 
 positive and negative directions.
Strong institutions
 > States use e-government both for better 
governance and for comprehensive govern-
ment surveillance and control. 
 > Lack of access to ICT hampers the potential 
for civic participation and citizens' services.
 > Information and communication alone do not 
bring about change as long as power asymme-
tries persist.
 > The complexity of providing reliable, secure, 
inclusive and transparent public services is 
increasing. 
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SDG 17  
Partnerships for the goals
 > Transfer of knowledge and technology suppor-
ting the implementation of the SDGs (17.6–8, 
17.16), e.g. broadband and information access, 
global exchange and access with minimal margi-
nal costs through ICT and digitized manuscripts; 
in this context, technology transfer increasingly 
includes software, the transfer of which is sub-
ject to hardly any physical restrictions.
 > Capacity building for data evaluation and moni-
toring (17.16, 17.18-19) and for the concrete 
preparation of national implementation plans 
(17.9).
 > Use of digital solutions for development finance 
(17.1-3), debt reduction (17.4) and open, 
rules-based world trade (17.10-12).
 > Possible disruptive impact of individual or 
cumulative digitalization consequences on 
world trade (17.10-12), macroeconomic stabi-
lity (17.13) and – deduced from this – systemic 
issues in general (17.13-19).
 > Cooperation on technology transfer, the collec-
tion of data sets and statistics, or the dissemi-
nation of ICT use can lead to (new) dependen-
cies and privacy conflicts. Nor is it a matter of 
purely 'technological fixes'; e.g. technology 
transfer is dependent on coherent framework 
conditions and the development of know-how 
on the meaningful use of technologies.
The political will to cooperate, the provision of 
 financial resources and the establishment of insti-
tutional framework conditions for the implemen-
tation of the SDGs is essentially a task with no di-
rect connection to digitalization.
Currently, positive trends in the use of digitali-
zation for SDG 17 are visible in some areas, but 
overall they are marginal. Although the use of ICT, 
data evaluation and monitoring is increasing in 
general – as in many areas of life – in detail the 
UN progress reports (2018) show a sober picture 
in detail, e.g.:
 > In 2016, only 6% had fixed broadband access in 
DCs, compared to 24% in ICs. 
 > Moreover, in 2015 only 0.3% of all ODA was 
devoted to building statistical capacity to imple-
ment and monitor development agendas. 
 > In 2017, 102 countries implemented national 
statistical plans, with 31 sub-Saharan countries 
forming the largest group.
In addition, the risks described are still being in-
sufficiently anticipated, both nationally and 
globally.
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climate-change mitigation through smart applications 
in buildings and industry, transport and agriculture, but 
they can equally cause further increases in emissions 
by boosting economic activity (de Coninck et al., 
2018: 369). While, in the Paris Agreement, the interna-
tional community agreed objectives that could prevent 
the most serious effects of climate change (IPCC, 2018), 
this commitment has not yet been followed up by ade-
quate pledges on climate change by states (UNEP, 
2018). Moreover, many G20 states have not yet intro-
duced the policies that would enable them to achieve 
their – already weak – goals signalled for 2030 (UNEP, 
2018). 
The great potential of the new digital technologies is 
thus confronted by a political, regulatory and institu-
tional environment that to date has been unable to 
direct their use productively and purposefully. It is 
therefore of the utmost urgency to create the appropri-
ate framework conditions worldwide in order to put 
digitalization at the service of climate-change mitiga-
tion. The question also arises of how a global innova-
tion policy should be designed to accelerate the devel-
opment and introduction of technological solutions to 
the hitherto unsolved challenges of decarbonization. 
This applies, for example, to aviation, (long-distance) 
transport and shipping (Davis et al., 2018).
Digitalization opens up new possibilities for adapt-
ing to climate change and dealing with losses and dam-
age. In the same way that human-induced changes and 
destruction can be better documented and understood 
through monitoring and modelling, the ability to make 
predictions about the precise effects also increases to 
the same extent. This improves the possibilities to take 
adjustment measures, reduce climate risks and record 
damage caused by disasters more quickly (de Coninck 
et al., 2018). The international community worldwide 
plays an important role in the use and provision of this 
information and growth in knowledge, also within the 
framework of bodies established – or yet to be estab-
lished – by the UN.
A wide range of digital support options are conceiv-
able with regard to the directions of financial flows. As 
with the other issues, however, it will depend on how 
much control and transparency the states allow.
The implementation rules for the Paris Agreement 
agreed in Katowice in 2018 relate, among other things, 
to the transparency of the states’ measures on cli-
mate-change mitigation and to uniform reporting obli-
gations. Digital technologies and solutions will often be 
a prerequisite for meeting the numerous complex gov-
ernment reporting and transparency requirements. 
They can also facilitate civil-society efforts to increase 
transparency. However, it is also to be expected that a 
number of states will not show any interest in too much 
transparency about their own actions and will take a 
sceptical to negative position on any compulsory use of 
new possibilities via big data, AI or the IoT. There are 
better chances for the cross-cutting use of digital solu-
tions to create more transparency in areas where gov-
ernments or other actors expect financial support for 
their measures, e.g. in the context of the international 
‘market mechanisms’ yet to be negotiated. 
Here, numerous actors are already in the starting 
blocks, emphasizing, for example, the potential of smart 
contracts for transactions and accounting systems. One 
example would be the financing of  climate-change miti-
gation projects with automated compliance supervision 
using monitoring systems (CLI, 2018). Here too, how-
ever, the effectiveness of such systems depends to a 
large extent on what framework conditions are agreed. 
In the past (e.g. in the Kyoto  Protocol), the accounting 
modalities and market mechanisms agreed at the inter-
national level were often designed in such a way that 
they could conceal the lack of ambition on the part of 
individual states (WBGU, 2009a: 18). If this continues 
to be the case, a digitalized implementation can only 
make the situation more visible and possibly thus give 
some impetus for change. Lack of political will cannot 
be substituted by  technologies.
8 .2 .3 
Global biodiversity policy in the Digital Age
The world community is currently experiencing a global 
biodiversity crisis (IPBES, 2019). Natural habitats and 
ecosystems are being destroyed and spatially frag-
mented. There is extensive overexploitation of bio-
logical resources by, for example, agriculture, fishing or 
poaching. Climate change, ocean acidification and 
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 pollution of the environment are further drivers of bio-
diversity loss (IPBES, 2019; WBGU, 2014b). World 
trade is contributing to the spread of invasive species 
(Bacon et al., 2012). These trends are leading to a dra-
matic and accelerating decline in biological diversity 
(Section 5.2.11.1). The consequences for human socie-
ties are increasingly being felt and could take on con-
siderable proportions; they are described in global 
overview studies (IPBES, 2019; UN Environment, 
2019; CBD, 2014). The biodiversity crisis is thus also an 
essential part of the sustainability crisis.
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD 
UN, 1992) aims, among other things, at the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity. There is a broad 
political consensus in international biodiversity policy 
that the human-induced loss of biological diversity must 
be slowed down as soon as possible and ultimately 
stopped. The CBD’s current strategic plan reinforces this 
vision (CBD, 2010) and has set clear and quantified 
political ‘Aichi biodiversity goals’. The 2030 Agenda also 
takes up these goals in SDGs 14 and 15 (UNGA, 2015; 
Box 2.1-1; Table 8.2.1-1), even though these targets are 
currently hardly being met. The targets of the CBD’s first 
strategic plan (CBD, 2002) have not been achieved either, 
and the interim assessment of the Aichi objectives shows 
that progress will, in most cases, not be sufficient to 
achieve them (CBD, 2014). The main problem here is 
that the above-mentioned drivers of biodiversity loss 
continue to have an impact (IPBES, 2019). 
Digitalization is indirectly linked to these drivers. A 
crucial background factor is the significant increase in 
demand for biological resources, which is related not 
only to population growth but also to the significant 
growth of economic development and consumption 
observed since about the middle of the last century 
(IPBES, 2019). Insofar as digitalization further acceler-
ates resource- and energy-intensive economic activi-
ties, and the demand for ICT-based services continues 
to rise, it can indirectly fuel demand for fossil, mineral 
and biological resources until the energy turnaround 
and a circular economy have been achieved. Increased 
resource extraction goes hand in hand with increased 
environmental damage (UN Environment, 2019). 
Furthermore, there is a danger that rising global liv-
ing standards, combined with the technical possibilities 
of digitalization, will lead to a further intensification of 
agriculture including the large-scale use of agrochemi-
cals and a corresponding decline in insect and bird pop-
ulations (Section 5.2.9.3). Agriculture is held responsi-
ble for 70% of the expected loss of biodiversity on land 
(CBD, 2014: 10). Increased extraction of fossil resources 
not only leaves an ecological footprint as a result of 
more oil- and gas-drilling rigs and coal mines, but also 
through accelerated climate change and ocean acidifica-
tion. The extraction of mineral resources manifests 
itself in more mines, opencast mines and, in the future, 
deep-sea mining, with corresponding losses of bio-
logical diversity. In its entirety and simultaneity, digi-
talization can thus act indirectly as an accelerator of the 
biodiversity crisis. 
On the other hand, there is hope that digitalization 
can also promote the decoupling of wealth develop-
ment from ecosystem degradation. New digital solu-
tions can also contribute to the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological diversity (Section 5.2.11). In 
particular, monitoring can make valuable contributions 
to supplying improved knowledge. This includes eco-
logical knowledge about the interactions between spe-
cies and environmental factors (Pereira et al., 2013), 
knowledge about the effects of the biodiversity crisis 
on ecosystem services and human welfare (Dirzo et al., 
2014), and knowledge about the limits of the sustain-
able use of biological resources. Furthermore, there is 
new potential for the enforcement and monitoring of 
management rules and bans designed to prevent over-
exploitation. Finally, comprehensive knowledge about 
nature motivates many people and creates an incentive 
for political engagement or participation in citizen-sci-
ence projects (Section 5.3.1.1). This may increase the 
pressure on policy makers to put the biodiversity crisis 
higher up on the political agenda. Box 8.2.3-1 deals 
with another current challenge of digitalization for 
international biodiversity policy, the handling of digital 
sequence information. 
Ultimately, new technologies alone cannot save 
either threatened species or ecosystems (Pimm et al., 
2015). The political will to combat the drivers of biodi-
versity loss and to implement the agreed objectives 
remains a prerequisite for the success of the CBD and 
the 2030 Agenda. 
8 .3
New global areas for cooperation beyond the 
2030 Agenda 
The agreement on the 2030 Agenda as a common target 
system for sustainable development was adopted 
largely without considering digital change and its 
Earth-systemic, individual, economic, societal and 
socio-technical implications. The need to critically 
anticipate digital change – and its broad impact on all 
areas of sustainable development and on all SDGs – in 
order to contain the dangers and realize its multiple 
potential benefits has become clear in many sections in 
this report. Consistent ‘digital updating’ of existing sus-
tainability policy and sustainability research is a neces-
sary prerequisite for developing common objectives for 
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a common digital future in an informed manner through 
global cooperation.
In order to further develop the existing 2030 
 Sustainability Agenda, it is also important to identify 
new urgent global fields of action and cooperation result-
ing from the dynamics of digitalization. The existing 
2030 Agenda is itself a further development of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, which were primarily aimed 
at poverty reduction. Integrating development goals with 
environmental goals was a consistent further develop-
ment of the international target system. The WBGU is 
convinced that digitalization requires a further develop-
ment of the sustainability goals of the 2030 Agenda in 
at least four concrete thematic areas. These four areas 
are already of global importance today, but have not, or 
have hardly, been addressed up to now by the UN or 
state alliances. The new areas requiring global action and 
cooperation relate in particular to the need to: 
 > protect of the privacy of each individual, 
 > preserve and expand inclusion for all people in the 
Digital Age, 
 > ensure human decision-making sovereignty, and 
 > create a human-machine relationship based on 
human abilities and needs. 
The respective state of discussion and understanding of 
the problem is different in each of these four fields of 
action and cooperation – as is the nature and scope of 
the existing governance architectures. The four fields 
are all of key importance for future ideas of 
‘ people-centred development’ and require action to 
shape the interplay between societal and technical 
 systems. 
8 .3 .1 
Protection of individual privacy 
In the Digital Age, ensuring privacy by protecting peo-
ple’s private spheres is becoming a turning point for 
coexistence in societies – both in terms of individual 
freedom and self-determination, and in terms of equal-
ity and political participation. Regular scandals over 
massive data abuse by corporations (e.g. Facebook and 
Cambridge Analytica) or government surveillance (e.g. 
Edward Snowden’s revelations: Lucas, 2014; Lyon, 
2014) are only the visible tip of the iceberg in the con-
stant struggle for guaranteed privacy and its important 
function for the individual, society and politics.
The WBGU stresses that, from a normative perspec-
tive (Chapter 2), it is necessary to define and shape pri-
vacy as a sustainability issue (Section 9.2.1). In order to 
realize their Eigenart, people need the free space made 
possible by privacy, a space in which their own prefer-
ences and creativity can be tested so that variety devel-
ops in which people and groups of people can develop 
in a self-determined way. Privacy also protects us against 
unequal treatment and manipulation (Nationale Akad-
emie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina, 2018) because it 
‘pulls a veil over societal inequalities’ ( Baumann, 2015).
Box 8 .2 .3-1
Current challenge of biodiversity policy: digital 
sequence information
The discussion on digital sequence information (DSI) can be 
referred to as a current example of the complex relationships 
between biodiversity policy and digitalization. In addition to 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
the third objective of the CBD is the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources (Ar-
ticle 1 of the CBD). Article 15 of the CBD gives states sover-
eign rights over their natural resources and the power to de-
termine who has access to genetic resources. The legally 
binding Nagoya Protocol to the CBD, agreed in 2010, clarified 
these provisions and laid down the rules on cross-border ac-
cess to genetic resources and on equitable access and benefit 
sharing (ABS; SCBD, 2011). If, for example, a product (e.g. a 
drug) results from the use of a genetic resource in a develop-
ing country, the country of origin of the resource must have 
given its prior consent and must share in the benefits arising 
from its use. When the Nagoya Protocol was adopted, it was 
assumed that genetic resources were contained in biological 
material (e.g. plant components, seeds) that had to be 
 physically exported across borders from their countries of or-
igin in order for the genetic resources contained therein to be 
used. 
In the meantime, however, genetic resources can also be 
available in digital form and transferred across national bor-
ders. DSI consists of digital images of genetic resources (DNA) 
that can be stored in databases, sent and thus exported. They 
can be transformed back into the original physical DNA in 
laboratories outside the borders of the country of origin. 
There is now controversy over whether DSI or only physical 
genetic material should fall under the Nagoya Protocol. Indus-
trialized countries (and their business actors) are opposed to 
this and wish to maintain open access to genetic information. 
There are also significant concerns from the scientific commu-
nity about the inclusion of DSI in the Nagoya Protocol (e.g. 
Prathapan et al., 2018; dos S Ribeiro et al., 2018). Developing 
countries see DSI as a loophole depriving them of rights and 
financial resources. 
Three years ago, the discussion on DSI was still a debate 
for a few specialists, but today it is one of the most important 
unresolved and contentious issues in the CBD’s political dis-
course; it should be clarified at future conferences of the sig-
natory states to avoid legal uncertainty and a resulting lack of 
acceptance of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol.
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8.3.1.1  
Status quo of the global protection of individual 
privacy
Numerous states or communities of states, such as the 
EU, have enacted data-protection laws. In autumn 
2018, almost 120 data-protection laws or laws on pri-
vacy existed worldwide. Similar laws are currently 
being developed or discussed in almost 40 other coun-
tries (Banisar, 2018; Figure 8.3.1-1).
A special position is taken by the European General 
Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR), which is a ref-
erence point for international data-protection laws and 
is having a considerable impact (Box 4.2.6-1). The Ger-
man National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina 
(2018: 54) recently pointed out the need for regulation 
of big data and privacy: “Use of these possibilities is a 
challenge that can also – but not only – be met nation-
ally or in the EU, but preferably worldwide; it requires 
trans- and international cooperation”.
Human rights relating to the protection of privacy 
provide a normative starting point for a worldwide dia-
logue on the protection of privacy. The relevant provi-
sions of international law (Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the IPbpR, 
Article 8 of the ECHR) target the protection of privacy 
in the classic sense of the ‘analogue world’, i.e. the pro-
tection of private life, family, home and correspond-
ence. The right to data protection is not explicitly 
standardized under international law, but is regarded as 
a specific part of the right to privacy (Kettemann, 
2015: 33). As a first step, Germany’s former Federal 
Commissioner for Data Protection, Peter Schaar, has 
proposed adding an additional protocol to Article 17 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which covers protection against arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with a person’s privacy (Leinen und Bum-
mel, 2018: 221ff.). As early as 2009, 58 non-govern-
mental organizations signed a declaration calling for an 
international agreement on the protection of privacy 
and informational self-determination of citizens (The 
Madrid Privacy Declaration: The Public Voice, 2009). In 
2013, following Edward Snowden’s revelations and the 
subsequent NSA scandal, Germany and Brazil initiated 
a working process within the United Nations on the 
‘Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’. Since 2013, the UN 
General Assembly has repeatedly confirmed that the 
rights to which people are entitled in the analogue 
world must also be guaranteed online, that states must 
safeguard these rights and urge companies and other 
private actors to comply with them (UNGA, 2013, 
2014, 2016b, 2018b). Currently, the resolutions are not 
aiming at a formal agreement, but appeal to both states 
and private-sector actors to secure and strengthen data 
and privacy protection. The human right to privacy is in 
permanent conflict with the national governments’ 
fight against crime and terrorism, i.e. with the internal 
security of states and the desire to use data comprehen-






















































Figure 8 .3 .1-1
Overview of data-protection laws worldwide. Blue: comprehensive data protection law enacted. Red: pending bill of initiative to 
enact law. Beige: no initiatives or no information. 
Source: Banisar, 2018
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From a global perspective, in addition to the creation 
of convincing data-protection laws in countries where 
there are currently none, the following urgent chal-
lenges for the protection of privacy in the Digital Age 
exist (Sections 4.2.1, 3.1.1): 
1. an international agreement on common standards 
for the protection of privacy (Section 8.3.1.1), 
2. the enforcement of privacy protection in countries 
that already have existing data-protection laws 
(Section 8.3.1.2). 
8.3.1.2 
Ensuring the enforcement of privacy protection
Currently, what is primarily lacking globally is not a 
basis in human rights, but the concrete implementation 
and enforcement of privacy protection in the digital 
domain (Section 9.2.1). While data are transmitted and 
processed across borders (Box 5.3.3-2), national and 
regional laws relate to specific territories. Binding, 
international minimum standards of privacy protection 
are therefore required: individuals leave digital traces 
on the internet, which can be accessed from anywhere 
in the world if there is no data security or data protec-
tion. Furthermore, the release of private information 
about individuals also has an indirect effect on the 
regulation of the privacy of other individuals from a 
similar environment or from comparable groups – also 
in other countries (spill-over effect; Fairfield und Engel, 
2015).
The EU is responding to this challenge by introduc-
ing the principle according to which the user’s place of 
residence is decisive, not the company’s registered 
office, thus defining the legal framework for all data 
processing on people living in the EU (Box 4.2.6-1). 
This is also having a strong impact outside the EU 
(Kuner et al., 2017). However, this alone does not guar-
antee that the same standard will be enforced vis-à-vis 
companies that are based in other countries. Assuming 
that several states follow this example, a complicated 
web of data-protection laws will emerge. Under certain 
circumstances, this can result in trade and communica-
tion barriers. Intergovernmental cooperation is further-
more necessary to counter the market dominance of 
large digital companies. Through their extensive use of 
data, some corporations have built up a position of eco-
nomic power against which individual states are virtu-
ally powerless. The current instrument for the enforce-
ment of privacy protection at the global level is the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, a position 
that was established in 2015 by the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (HRC, 2015). As an ombudsper-
son, s/he pools information, monitors and evaluates 
developments and raises a voice for the right to privacy 
in the Digital Age. The Special Rapporteur contributes 
to improving transparency and raising awareness of 
privacy violations by taking a position on data-protec-
tion laws worldwide and can address criticism and sug-
gestions for improvement to the relevant countries. 
S/he cannot, however, achieve binding enforcement 
against companies or states.
The protection of privacy can only be comprehen-
sively guaranteed globally and particularly in the inter-
play of national and international policies. Increased 
regional and national levels of protection provide 
important initial stimuli in this regard and thus contrib-
ute to improving the global level of protection. These 
must be further developed and, in particular, decisively 
enforced (Section 9.2.1.2). 
8.3.1.3  
Cooperation to ensure privacy: a United Nations 
Privacy Convention
At the global level, the WBGU sees the need for the 
enactment of binding international law in the form of a 
‘United Nations Privacy Convention’. This would define 
a common global understanding of privacy protection, 
as well as common minimum standards and procedural 
rules for the enforcement of data protection and data 
security to protect privacy in the digital space 
( Section 9.2.1.2). Such an agreement should address 
the legal design and enforcement of privacy protection 
in the signatory states and transnationally. The integra-
tion principle (Section 8.4.2.4) can serve as a guiding 
principle: privacy protection is a cross-cutting issue 
that must be taken into account in all areas, especially 
in digitalized ones. Data protection and data security 
should therefore be integrated into all technical and 
organizational processes and into various policy areas. 
In addition to highly promising instruments such as 
data-protection officers as ombudspersons, there 
should be agreements on data protection by design and 
by default and on data-protection impact assessments, 
technology and experience transfer. Probably the most 
important point is cooperation in the cross-border 
enforcement of the protection of personal data. Civil 
society’s involvement as a guardian of individual pri-
vacy is recommended and can be enshrined in the Con-
vention, for example through complaint and action 
mechanisms for NGOs committed to data and privacy 
protection.
8 .3 .2 
Preserving and extending inclusion in the  Digital 
Age 
Key issues of sustainable development in the Digital 
Age are decided via access to and possible uses of data 
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and other intangible, digital and digitalized goods and 
services. On the one hand, there are risks such as grow-
ing inequality, a widening digital divide and an intensi-
fying concentration of power (e.g. of the digital econ-
omy; Chapter 4); on the other, there is potential for 
strengthening societal and economic inclusion in the 
sense of sustainable development. Examples include an 
easier (including international) exchange or transfer of 
information and knowledge and easier access to 
 markets. 
The particular consequences, but also the particular 
challenges involved in shaping opportunities for access 
and use are essentially a result of the basic characteris-
tics of data and digital goods and services. Digital goods 
and data are non-rival resources in consumption. They 
can be simultaneously and multiply used and repro-
duced, (largely) without this restricting their usefulness 
for other users. Against this background, it is in the 
interests of society and the economy as a whole to use 
digital goods, or at least make them available, as widely 
as possible once they have been created. From the point 
of view of sustainable development, non-rivalry in 
consumption combined with the ongoing digitalization 
of society and the overall economy offers new oppor-
tunities to expand the inclusion of people who have 
hitherto been denied access to education, information 
and culture. Non-rivalry distinguishes digital goods 
substantively from many physical goods and factors, as 
well as from private goods in general. As with the latter, 
and unlike public goods, digital goods also allow the 
exclusion of third parties from access and use. 
Harmonizing opportunities for access and use in the 
digital domain as broadly as possible with the goals of 
sustainable development is therefore a key field of gov-
ernance in the Digital Age. Opportunities for access and 
use should ultimately be effectively organized primar-
ily by means of international agreement. Digital spaces 
and services are often cross-border by nature, and 
national borders do not usually play a role in data flows 
either. This inherently affects international policy 
fields, as well as trade policy in particular (OECD, 
2018g). Against this background, individual states – 
with the possible exception of the USA and China – do 
not usually carry enough weight to be able to decisively 
shape digital inclusion for the purpose of global devel-
opment. Obliging nation states to provide more open 
access to data that are key to future innovations and 
competitive advantages (Section 4.2.2), for example, 
would do little to change the dominant position of 
global internet groups. 
Questions relating to opportunities to access and use 
digital and digitalized goods and services also concern 
(international) patent rights, copyrights or licences – 
and thus international agreements to protect intellec-
tual or intangible property. However, the existing regu-
lations seem to be becoming increasingly out of touch 
with the increasing (economic and societal) importance 
of intangible, digital and digitalized goods, ever stronger 
digital networking, and the development potential 
associated with these developments. Known problems 
of today’s regimes for protecting intangible assets such 
as intellectual property are threatening to intensify and 
thus generate digital inequalities (digital divides), espe-
cially in view of the opportunities for the societal and 
economic inclusion of developing countries in the 
course of digitalization and the shift in importance 
towards digital goods and spaces (Baker et al., 2017). 
This can also be illustrated by the example of digital 
sequence information based on genetic resources 
(Box 8.2.3-1). Alternative forms of patents, licences 
and copyrights – such as equitable licensing 
( Section 5.3.10) and the applicability of environmental 
agreements to new kinds of digital goods – should 
therefore be further discussed and pursued. In view of 
increasing global networking, there is also a need for 
greater international harmonization and coordination 
of patent protection and copyright, which would also 
allow smaller companies, especially from developing 
countries, to operate in foreign markets at lower cost. 
The same applies to rules and standards for data 
exchange and protection (World Bank, 2016: 301ff.). 
Many issues of data access and use are still largely 
unregulated, even though, for example, there are basic 
OECD guidelines for dealing with cross-border data flows 
(OECD, 2018g). The GDPR on the handling of personal 
data represents an important step towards closing these 
gaps, at least in Europe (Box 4.2.6-3). The handling of, 
and access to, non-personal data in Europe, on the other 
hand, has hitherto been de facto controlled by those who 
collect the data, and they can exclude third parties from 
using it, for example by means of encryption or local 
storage. From a legal point of view, no full ownership or 
intellectual property rights exist for data in European 
jurisdictions (Schweitzer and Peitz, 2017: 61). Data trad-
ing and data exchange – and thus data access in the field 
of private data that cannot be related to individuals – are 
essentially based on bilateral agreements negotiated by 
the private sector. At least for public-sector data, the 
‘PSI Directive’ on the re-use of public-sector information 
already regulates access for the general public, and this 
access is to be made even more comprehensive in the 
future ( European Parliament, 2019).
Shaping opportunities for accessing and using intan-
gible, digital and digitalized goods, as well as the delib-
erate breaking up of hitherto de facto control possibili-
ties almost inevitably generate tension between eco-
nomic, societal and individual reasons in favour of and 
against openness: on the one hand there are the soci-
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etal advantages of the broad use of non-rival goods, on 
the other the risk that increasing openness might lead 
to the loss of economic incentives to provide these 
goods. There is a risk of societal supply shortages. In 
addition to these well-known economic and societal 
ambivalences, in the digital space, there is often the 
additional need to consider the protection of privacy – 
and the potential for conflict here (Section 8.3.1). 
It will not be possible to completely resolve this ten-
sion. Nor does it seem possible or sensible to have an 
across-the-board regulation that applies across differ-
ent areas of life and the economy: too diverse are the 
many areas of life and the economy in which questions 
of access to and the use of data and digital and digital-
ized goods are relevant (Drexl, 2017). Differentiating 
opportunities for access and use must also be generally 
distinguished from the definition and enforcement of 
complete ownership rights to digital and digitalized 
goods and in particular to (non-personal) data. The lat-
ter rights are under discussion, but hardly do justice to 
the special role of data in the economy and society or 
to the real challenges involved in shaping how data 
should be handled (Varian, 2018): apart from issues of 
implementation (the appropriate allocation of property 
rights is often unclear, particularly in the case of 
non-personal data: Drexl, 2017), the definition of 
property rights would primarily address the fact that 
third parties can already be excluded from the use of 
data, as well as possible economic incentive problems 
with regard to investment in data collection, which are 
generally regarded as quite small (Duch-Brown et al., 
2017). In this respect, ownership rights to data would 
not help to ease (Schweitzer and Peitz, 2017; Jones and 
Tonetti, 2018) excessive restrictions on access to 
(non-personal) data from a societal or macroeconomic 
point of view.
In the case of data, the added value of broad usage 
possibilities lies, for example, in the synergy effects of 
combining data (‘economies of scope’; Duch-Brown et 
al., 2017; Dewenter and Lüth, 2018) or in the value 
that access to data sets has for the further innovation 
process. This is illustrated, for example, by the develop-
ment of systems for autonomous driving, in which the 
combination of the ‘training data’ of various manufac-
turers and developers would basically be more promis-
ing than individual developers creating corresponding 
data sets separately (Varian, 2018; Jones and Tonetti, 
2018). Nevertheless, the de facto scope for restricting 
data access is frequently used today to defend or even 
expand once gained competitive advantages for as long 
as possible, in view of the importance of data for new 
(data-driven) business models and innovations. More 
open, regulated access to data, especially data that are 
collected cost-effectively as the by-product of a ser-
vice, can accordingly serve to break up structural driv-
ers of increasing market concentration, thus creating 
space to develop competing offers and fair competition, 
and ultimately strengthening Eigenart and inclusion 
(Section 4.2.2). 
Networking, collaborative cooperation and non-ri-
valry in consumption in the digital space also offer con-
siderable potential for significantly improving inclusion 
in essential goods. Goods such as education, knowledge 
and culture in their digitalized form can be defined as 
new (global) commons, and their provision can be 
organized and supported accordingly (Section 5.3.10). 
In the development-policy context in particular, this 
may include, for example, the more targeted and timely 
structuring of development cooperation or the estab-
lishment of early-warning systems for environmental 
disasters or outbreaks of diseases (World Bank, 2016). 
In particular, information from monitoring the environ-
ment and ecosystems can be made publicly available as 
a global (public) digital common good in order to 
increase environmental awareness.
In principle, the question of access to and use of dig-
ital or digitalized goods also relates to the ecological 
dimension of sustainability via the associated con-
sumption of energy and resources. These environmen-
tal impacts should, however, be addressed more gener-
ally and thus independently of the issue of access to 
specific data and digital and digitalized content. Other-
wise, there is a danger that, for example, environmental 
regulation will distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
data and thus violate the principles of net neutrality on 
the internet. 
8 .3 .3 
Preserving human decision-making sovereignty 
Algorithmic decision support and decision making is 
also increasingly spreading in core areas of society such 
as the judiciary, police work and social systems (Sec-
tions 5.3.3 and 3.2.3) due to advances in data process-
ing and evaluation methods and the growing availabil-
ity of large amounts of data (big data; Section 3.3.2). 
This development can have potentially far-reaching 
implications for decision-making sovereignty at both 
the individual and societal level, especially if such tech-
nologies are used without reflection and in a non-trans-
parent way. This makes questions of the application and 
appropriate regulation of these technologies an impor-
tant field of cooperation for sustainable digitalization 
governance (Box 4.3-2; Section 5.3.3). However, the 
creation of political and legal framework conditions 
that take into account the societal implications of 
 algorithmic decision-making is still in its infancy. It is 
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true that strategies for dealing with AI have now been 
adopted at a national level in several countries. How-
ever, there is no common international understanding 
or awareness of the problems involved. 
In the WBGU’s view, guaranteeing and protecting 
human decision-making sovereignty should be recog-
nized as a general principle of societal and political 
decision-making at the global level (Section 9.4). Such 
a principle would be indispensable for respecting the 
demarcation between technical automation and societal 
discussion of political, social and legal issues (Box 4.3-2). 
The WBGU thus regards safeguarding human deci-
sion-making sovereignty as the overriding goal for 
maintaining societies’ ability to take action in the long 
term (Chapter 7) and thus as part of the global sustain-
ability agenda. 
Moreover, algorithmic decision-making becomes a 
global area of cooperation in that it is applied to policy 
fields that by their very nature are already embedded 
at the intergovernmental and global levels. For exam-
ple, the use of algorithmic decision-making systems is 
already significantly reshaping the rules of some global 
policy areas, such as cybersecurity (encryption tech-
nologies, etc.) or the financial sector (automated trad-
ing; Contratto, 2014). At the international level, there-
fore, agreement is needed on how to develop appropri-
ate sets of rules to ensure the stability of the relevant 
international systems using algorithmic decision-mak-
ing. The specifics of the societal sector in which 
machine-supported decision-making is applied are 
decisive in this context, i.e. separate agreements on 
how to deal with the new procedures will probably 
have to be reached in each global policy field. Armed, 
remote-controlled military robots (mostly drones, 
Box 3.3.5-2), for example, are already being deployed 
today and have varying degrees of decision-making 
autonomy (Asaro, 2012; Krishnan, 2016). At the eco-
nomic level, questions of possible concentration pro-
cesses on individual companies, and with them on indi-
vidual decision-making systems, are also relevant 
( Section 4.2.2). In this context, there is a threat not 
only of potentially far-reaching influences on individ-
ual, societal and political decisions, e.g. by influencing 
and monitoring information flows, but also of the insta-
bility of entire markets, e.g. in the financial system 
(Contratto, 2014). There is a risk of over-dependence 
on individual decision-making systems in the absence 
of competing, independent assessments of the data.
A global agreement on possible exclusion from cer-
tain areas of application is also necessary. Particularly 
when automated decisions are routinely made in insti-
tutions in core areas of society, there is a danger that 
societal debates on mediation between different inter-
ests and values, which ultimately underlie such deci-
sions, will no longer take place to the necessary extent. 
“[I]t is critical to ensure that in key areas where auto-
mation is not appropriate from a human rights perspec-
tive, it does not take place” (Council of Europe, 
2018: 44). Where the use of systems involves high risks 
to human sovereignty over the design of social systems, 
then moratoria or other instruments that exclude use 
should be established at the international level. 
Ensuring human decision-making sovereignty 
requires both normative guidelines and a concrete insti-
tutional framework in which these guidelines are man-
ifested. In addition to the general principles of good 
practice in the use of AI and algorithmic decision- 
making (Box 4.3–2), guidelines are needed in societally 
relevant areas to preserve human decision-making sov-
ereignty, which can, for example, be embedded in a 
Charter for a Sustainable Digital Age (Section 8.6, 
Box 9.4-1) or the UN Declaration on Human Rights. 
Institutionally, these guidelines could then be trans-
lated into concrete regulations at the EU level 
( Section 8.5). Depending on the area, it can also make 
sense to expand existing dialogue forums, agreements 
and organizations in order to embed decision-making 
sovereignty, e.g. the Geneva Conventions on autono-
mous weapons.
8 .3 .4 
Protection of unique human characteristics in the 
human-machine relationship 
Similarly to the way humans are having a formative 
influence on the Earth system in the Anthropocene 
(Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002; Rosol et 
al., 2018), at present humanity is potentially on the 
threshold of an age in which humans can technically 
change their own bodies in an equally fundamental and 
formative way (Section 7.4). This long-term prospect 
makes the human-machine relationship a global sus-
tainability issue. In view of the new possibilities offered 
by technical medical interventions – implants, augmen-
tation of (sensory) organs, brain-computer interfaces 
(Topic box 5.3-2) – and increasing human interaction 
with AI, fundamental questions are arising about the 
relationship between humans and machines. The 
human capacity for empathy, emotionality and social 
association are characteristics that clearly distinguish 
humans from machines (Section 7.4). Only humans 
have their own reasons for their actions – motives, feel-
ings, moral sensitivity (Nida-Rümelin and Weidenfeld, 
2018). Mutual recognition of these motives – and thus 
recognition as human actors – can only be the basis of 
interaction between human beings, because machines 
do not have intrinsic reasons for their actions 
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(Nida-Rümelin and Weidenfeld, 2018). The mere simu-
lation of these characteristics by AI would also only be 
just that, a simulation, and therefore not the same as 
possessing these characteristics (Nida-Rümelin and 
Weidenfeld, 2018). 
Although a future issue, the responsible anticipation 
of changes in the human-machine relationship is a deci-
sive field for global cooperation in the Digital Age (Sec-
tion 9.4). Just as planetary guard rails must be adhered 
to with regard to the relationship between humans and 
the environment, guard rails for the shifts in the rela-
tionship between humans and machines in the Digital 
Age must also be negotiated in a discourse and agreed 
upon as mandatory – both with regard to the mechani-
zation of humans and to the humanization of machines 
(Topic box 5.3-2; Section 7.4). Here, too, an analogy to 
climate change is appropriate: the mitigation or even 
reversal of global warming through geoengineering has 
been discussed for a long time (Marchetti, 1977), and 
the discussion has been markedly stepped up in recent 
years (Blackstock and Low, 2018) as a possible response 
to climate change. However, the risks of unleashing 
such an invasive, large-scale, untested and costly influ-
ence on such a complex system as the Earth’s climate 
could be immense. It will therefore be crucial to agree 
on global guidelines and regulations and, where appro-
priate, bans by multilateral agreements before individ-
ual actors create facts that may be irreversible. The 
same applies to the relationship between humans and 
machines. This requires a global normative framework, 
such as a charter (Box 9.4-1). In view of the global, 
polycentric actor structure (Chapter 4), the creation of 
a common normative framework can only succeed 
effectively if this process of anticipatory governance is 
initiated at the global, multilateral level. Human influ-
ence on the Earth’s climate – i.e. an effect of the inter-
action between technology and the Earth system – has 
already established itself as a subject of international 
politics in the global governance system (Hamilton, 
2017). Interaction between technology and humans is 
not yet embedded at this level. The observations in this 
report have shown, however, that the human-machine 
relationship, as a future topic, already requires forward 
planning and shaping today. In a similar way to climate 
science (at the IPCC), internationally networked 
research is crucial. On the one hand, this research must 
take technical developments and their implications into 
account, but on the other hand it must also establish an 
understanding of technology and the future in the sci-
entific community with the necessary breadth and 
depth required by a holistic understanding of digitali-
zation.
8 .4
Elements for the sustainable shaping of the 
 Digital Age at the global level
The 1987 Brundtland Report entitled ‘Our Common 
Future’, in which the basic understanding of sustainable 
development still valid today was formulated, is regarded 
as a milestone and impetus in the worldwide discourse 
on sustainable development: “Sustainable development 
is development that satisfies the needs of the present 
without compromising future generations’ ability to 
meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, para. 49). The 
Brundtland report became an important precursor of the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The 1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED, also called 
the Rio Conference) is still an important reference point 
for international environmental and development policy. 
With the Rio Declaration (including the then innovative 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility), 
the Agenda 21, and the agreement of binding interna-
tional treaties on climate, biodiversity and desertification 
(the Rio Conventions UNFCCC, CBD, UNCCD), the inter-
national community recognized for the first time the 
urgency of joint action to protect humankind’s natural 
life-support systems. 
Urgent action is still needed to achieve the objectives 
of these agreements. While digital technologies offer 
new potential in this context, they can at the same time 
jeopardize the achievement of objectives. To date there 
are very few assessments of whether the potential of 
digital technologies will be used for sustainable devel-
opment or whether they are more likely to strengthen 
unsustainable developments (Section 8.2). On the basis 
of the analyses in Sections 8.1 to 8.3, there is also a 
concrete need for a reinterpretation of sustainability and 
the further development of global governance architec-
tures. The following sections identify elements of a nor-
mative, organizational and institutional framework for 
global sustainability policy under the conditions of dig-
ital change. At the same time, these elements indicate a 
way of addressing the challenges relating to international 
digital companies with great market power (Section 
4.2.2, Box 8.4-1). Shaping a concrete regulatory frame-
work for the international digital economy requires fur-
ther, scientifically based debates, proposals and an 
examination of suitable approaches for regulation and 
control.
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8 .4 .1 
Economic paradigm as a strong lever
Since the dynamics of digitalization are largely shaped 
by business actors, an adaptation of the economic par-
adigm to the challenges associated with digitalization is 
a fundamental prerequisite for the transition to a sus-
tainable Digital Age and the development of appropri-
ate governance structures (Section 9.2.3). Disruptive 
technological developments, combined with an expo-
nential increase in the world population, have already 
led to challenges for society and the economic system 
in the past, making demands on and changes to the eco-
nomic paradigm that prevailed at the respective time. 
The development of the social market economy as a 
model for European economies can be seen not least as 
a long-term consequence of the Industrial Revolution, 
a growing population and the consequences of two 
devastating world wars. The development of socialist 
economic systems in the last century was also a result 
of the economic and societal challenges of an increas-
ingly mechanized world. The spread of digital technolo-
Box 8 .4-1
The digital economy as a subject of global 
governance
Powerful companies in the digital economy are already active 
and are shaping digital technologies and their applications at 
a global level. These companies are thus themselves part of 
the governance structures that exist today in the field of dig-
italization (Section 8.1). However, their global scope of action 
and the now prominent societal significance of their products 
and services necessarily make these companies themselves 
the subject of global governance for a sustainable shaping of 
digitalization. Global governance faces the following chal-
lenges, which are discussed at various points in the report:
 > As a result of economies of scale and network effects, com-
panies in the digital economy, especially the Big Five, have 
today achieved very powerful international market posi-
tions and considerable financial strength. This position 
allows them to collect unprecedented amounts of data and 
information from both private and public areas. Their lar-
gely exclusive access to this data not only gives companies 
competitive advantages at present, it can also prevent the 
development of competitive, alternative offers in the lon-
ger term (Sections 4.2.2, 8.3.2). Up to now, competition-
law procedures have often been ineffective in dealing with 
these concentration tendencies. There is already intense 
discussion on further developing these procedures in order 
to better do justice to data-driven business models (ser-
vices in exchange for data), the often unclear definition of 
market segments, possible substitution relationships, and 
the impact of network effects in the future. In view of the 
importance of data for business models and innovations, 
however, individual procedures under competition law may 
fall short even with greater international harmonization. 
The development of obligations requiring greater interope-
rability and more open, regulated data access should the-
refore be further examined and pursued (Section 9.2.3). 
The great development-policy potential that lies in shaping 
new regimes for access to and use of digital and digitalized 
goods/services and data must also be taken into account 
(Section 8.3.2).
 > The powerful market position of companies also poses a 
challenge with regard to the protection of privacy and the 
decision-making sovereignty of individuals and groups. By 
combining data and information from different areas of 
an individual’s life, very extensive profiles can be  created 
which can be used for personalized advertising, the calcu-
lation of individualized prices (price differentiation) or the 
personalized design of decision-supporting systems (Sec-
tions 4.2.2, 8.3.1). The processes of linking and using data 
are generally non-transparent, so that the criteria and 
values on which the details of a digital service are based 
are hardly comprehensible to the individual (Section 3.2.5). 
Moreover, by linking data with big data and machine lear-
ning, conclusions can be drawn on what are actually pro-
tected areas of privacy; yet these are not covered by cur-
rent data-protection provisions such as the GDPR (Section 
5.3.3).
 > Digitalization entails considerable challenges in the taxation 
of corporate profits, which also, but not only, affect compa-
nies in the digital economy. The digitally supported inter-
nationalization and virtualization of entrepreneurial acti-
vities raise questions of geographical allocation and eva-
luation. At the same time, opportunities for tax avoidance 
in international tax competition are growing. Box 4.2.2-2 
discusses these challenges and possible reform approaches 
for company taxation in detail. International cooperation is 
key in this context. However, the already ongoing interna-
tional negotiation processes have not yet led to an agree-
ment on concrete steps for reform (Section 8.1.3).
 > The special, prominent role of companies like Google/
Alphabet, Facebook or Amazon is also reflected in the fact 
that these companies’ products and services have become 
an integral part of everyday life in many countries, both in 
the private and in the public and economic spheres (Section 
8.1.1). This enables companies to collect very large amounts 
of data with the consequences and challenges discussed 
earlier. It should also be noted, however, that companies 
use search engines or social networks to offer services and 
virtual spaces that have, in the meantime, become socie-
tally relevant, e.g. as key sources of information or forums 
for societal (political) decision-making. As initially purely 
private-sector services, the services and their use by third 
parties are not usually subject to regulation and supervi-
sion by socially/democratically legitimized authorities, or 
if they are, this control is inadequate in view of their signi-
ficance. Thus, the extent to which societal values, such as 
freedom from discrimination, are taken into account when 
developing these products and services remains largely 
non-transparent. The same applies to the use of the newly 
created, digital and thus inherently international spaces by 
third parties, e.g. for political purposes in election cam-
paigns (Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.5).
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gies and the business models based on them are also 
currently breaking up economic structures and path 
dependencies. Incumbent companies and markets are 
being challenged and are facing strong, sometimes 
far-reaching change dynamics (Chapter 4). Spaces for a 
change in the economic paradigm that developed in the 
course of industrialization in western market economies 
are once again emerging. Which direction this dynamic 
of transformation will take in concrete terms is cur-
rently not foreseeable. However, it is clearer than ever 
that, without an appropriate framework, purely 
 private-sector dynamics are unlikely to fully meet the 
goals of sustainable development and the transforma-
tion processes required to implement them.
In the past, neither decentralized nor centrally con-
trolled economic systems have succeeded in adequately 
addressing the overuse of natural resources and the 
threat of planetary guard rails being breached. Despite 
– or perhaps precisely because of – advancing economic 
globalization, the necessary long-term perspective and 
global approaches are still insufficiently integrated into 
political processes. This is also reflected in the tradi-
tional performance indicators of societal and economic 
systems. Indicators such as gross national product and 
economic growth date back to a time when rising mate-
rial prosperity was often equated with rising welfare. 
Threats to the common good due to the overexploita-
tion of natural resources, conflicts over distribution and 
other environmental or social externalities of pri-
vate-enterprise activities do not play a role in these 
performance indicators. 
8.4.1.1 
Guiding principles and performance indicators of 
an ‘empty’ and a ‘full’ world
Historically, the performance indicators currently used 
stem from an ‘empty world’ (von Weizsäcker and Wijk-
man, 2018) with far fewer people and seemingly abun-
dant resources. In this world, progress has basically 
been measured in monetary terms by a better supply of 
goods (rising incomes) or a more ‘productive’ use of 
factors (such as labour). For example, the productivity 
of the use of labour and land relates to the value cre-
ated per hour worked or per hectare of land. Since for a 
long time the natural life-support systems were not 
perceived as systemically scarce, traditional perfor-
mance indicators either do not cover the repercussions 
of economic activities on ecosystems and the environ-
ment at all, or, if so, only inadequately.
However, the situation in the 21st century has fun-
damentally changed compared to this starting position: 
today, humankind lives in a comparatively ‘full world’ 
with over 7 billion people and an average gross national 
product of approx. US$10,000 per capita (World Bank, 
2019c). In the past, rising prosperity was possible with-
out decoupling resource and environmental consump-
tion; today, this development is reaching the limits of 
natural resources and ecosystems – or has already been 
exceeding them for decades. Rising material prosperity, 
as measured by traditional performance indicators, no 
longer reflects rising welfare to the same extent. In 
order to adequately map the challenges of a ‘full world’, 
new, or at least enhanced, performance indicators are 
needed that combine the classic understanding of 
development with a socio-ecological one. 
Inclusive (social-ecological) prosperity
(global common good)
















Figure 8 .4 .1-1
Extended guiding principles for digitalization that is geared towards the global common good.
Source: WBGU
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8.4.1.2 
Towards a new (economic) guiding principle of 
digitalization
Digitalization offers great potential for overcoming the 
challenges of a ‘full world’ (Section 8.4.1.1), but often 
lacks appropriate incentives to use this potential. This 
lack of incentives reflects not least the orientation of 
the economy according to traditional guiding principles. 
Alternative guiding principles of (digital) progress that 
are more oriented to societal welfare must be developed 
and implemented for a future-oriented form of digital-
ization. Inclusive performance indicators can provide 
important support for this and for assessing develop-
ment potential.
While the classic economic understanding of devel-
opment assesses the opportunities of new technologies 
primarily by their contribution to developing material 
prosperity, the socio-ecological understanding of devel-
opment assesses the ecological and social potential of 
innovations. In order to leverage the potential of digi-
talization in both dimensions, it is necessary to develop 
orientations that are based on an inclusive understand-
ing of development which combines both perspectives 
and also adequately takes the benefits and costs of dig-
italization into account (Figure 8.4.1-1). An increasing 
demand for such integrative development concepts and 
models can already be seen today among many actors 
in society, politics and business. 
Up to now, alternatives to conventional indicators 
have emerged in particular from the endeavour to 
reflect ecological and social development aspects more 
adequately. Examples range from the concept of 
“ genuine savings” (Hamilton, 2000), the ecological 
footprint (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996), to the human 
development index (UNDP, 2019) and the index for 
ecological sustainability (Esty et al., 2005). However, 
the challenge remains to give these indicators the 
necessary weight and to pay more attention to them in 
policy processes. Initial approaches to using suitable 
indicators to measure the macroeconomic effects of 
digitalization are also emerging (Brynjolfsson et al., 
2019a, b). However, so far no metric has been devel-
oped that comprehensively takes economic develop-
ment, sustainability and digitalization into account. 
8.4.1.3 
New hybrid forms of economic activity
Simply developing new, extended indicators to measure 
economic and societal progress does not, however, 
meet the challenges of a ‘full world’ (Section 8.4.1.1). 
These indicators must ultimately be brought to the 
attention of the private-sector actors by creating a con-
crete framework. Regulatory measures, e.g. environ-
mental and resource policy, can achieve a stronger wel-
fare orientation of traditional prosperity indicators, but 
they do not make comprehensive, alternative measures 
of welfare superfluous. It is clear that an increasing 
departure from the laissez-faire principles of an ‘empty 
world’ is inevitable. 
Private-sector actors have considerable potential to 
promote sustainable development within the frame-
work of digitalization, for example through more 
resource-efficient production processes, monitoring 
and closing material cycles (circular economy), the 
dematerialization of consumption, or through business 
models based on the shared use of economic goods. 
However, this potential is generally only exploited if 
there is a corresponding return on investment 
( Section 4.2.2). Setting regulatory frameworks plays a 
decisive role in determining which technologies are 
Figure 8 .4 .1-2
Moving towards hybrid 
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associated with these expected returns. A synchroniza-
tion of private-sector interests and an orientation 
towards the common good seems at least partially pos-
sible. 
In this context, it is also important to determine the 
potential of alternative forms of private enterprise that 
are not primarily profit-oriented (e.g. cooperative 
approaches). However, this, too, presupposes creating 
uniform conditions for economic activity which take 
due account of the positive and negative societal con-
sequences of economic activity. Suitable financing 
instruments must also be created for the provision of 
goods and services for which there is no market poten-
tial even under these conditions, despite their societal 
desirability (Section 5.2.2). Already today, there is a 
continuously rising interest in alternative forms of eco-
nomic activity, such as platform cooperatives and citi-
zen-supported sharing services, which would encour-
age a common-good-oriented form of digitalization 
(Section 5.2.2).
The extent to which it should at least partially be the 
state’s responsibility to realize the potential of digitali-
zation must be examined, particularly in the context of 
digital public goods and public-service ICT 
( Sections 5.3.5, 5.3.10). In the case of autonomous 
mobility systems, sharing services, the provision of dig-
ital educational resources – to name just a few exam-
ples – the state’s role in relation to private-sector pro-
vision (whether for profit or common-good-oriented) 
needs to be discussed. Hybrid forms of economic activ-
ity (Figure 8.4.1-2) which combine the advantages of 
different ownership structures and understandings of 
development can offer considerable opportunities for 
leveraging inclusive development potential (not only, 
but also in the context of digitalization). 
8 .4 .2 
Principles and instruments of environmental law 
in the context of digitalization 
The containment of negative impacts of digitalization 
on sustainability objectives requires a clear allocation 
and assumption of responsibility by state, economic 
and societal forces, as has already been largely devised 
in the environmental field. Shared guiding and lead 
principles are helpful for success in achieving the sus-
tainability goals in a polycentric actor structure. Over 
the last 30 years, principles such as the precautionary 
principle, the polluter pays principle, the cooperation 
principle and the integration principle have been devel-
oped and applied in international environmental law as 
the basis for agreements, institutions, procedures and 
instruments to protect the environment. In the context 
of the challenges of digitalization already outlined, 




The precautionary principle was developed for cases 
where there is scientific uncertainty in the develop-
ment and application of (international) environmental 
law (Sands et al., 2018: 230). It has been included in 
several soft and hard law agreements, such as Article 15 
of the 1992 Rio Declaration and Article 3 (3) of the 
UNFCCC. According to this principle, “where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environ-
ment, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation” (UNCED, 1992). 
The precautionary approach is contained in German 
law, e.g. Article 20a of the Basic Law (GG) and section 
5 (1) no. 2 of the Federal Immission Control Act 
( BImSchG), and in European law in Article 191 (2) sen-
tence 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU; Calliess, 2013). The precautionary 
principle is not yet recognized as universally applicable 
customary international law because of its slightly 
ambiguous content (SRU, 2011; Sands et al., 2018: 234). 
The precautionary principle may include risk- and 
resource-related precautions (Messerschmidt, 
2011: 286): a risk-related precaution is the manage-
ment of risk situations defined by uncertainty and 
insecurity; a resource-related precaution means pre-
serving the present resources with a view to the needs 
of future generations (Calliess, 2013). The precaution-
ary principle obliges the states to exercise preventive 
and planned governance (Kloepfer, 2016), use all 
accessible sources of knowledge, conduct a risk com-
parison and justify risk decisions (Schlacke, 2019). Pre-
caution can also lead to procedural safeguards, such as 
participation rights for societal groups and the trans-
parency of official decisions, or making it possible to 
trace the potential cause of danger in order to prepare 
for subsequent state action (Calliess, 2013). 
A central element of risk precaution is the scientific 
determination of risk (Calliess, 2013). Social- science-
oriented risk assessment is of particular relevance in 
the digitalization context, since not only physical and 
technical risks, but also societal coexistence in particu-
lar, are changing as a result of digital change. In a world 
with plural risks, impact assessments are also playing 
an increasingly key role, whether with a view to data 
protection, environmental impacts or other risks. Insti-
tutions that contribute to scientific risk identification 
and assessment at the global level include intergovern-
mental institutions, such as the Intergovernmental 
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Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the World Biodiver-
sity Council (IPBES), which compile overviews of scien-
tific research for political decision-makers.
8.4.2.2 
The polluter pays principle
According to the polluter pays principle, the party that 
causes a negative environmental impact is to be made 
responsible for the prevention, elimination, mitigation 
of, or compensation for any environmental damage 
(Sands et al., 2018: 240). The polluter pays principle 
does not apply between states; rather, it is a guideline 
for the domestic level (Sands et al., 2018: 241). Between 
states, customary international law does not apply the 
polluter pays principle but prohibits any intentional or 
negligent cross-border environmental damage (USA vs. 
Canada, 1941). 
The polluter pays principle is laid down, inter alia, in 
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration (UNCED, 1992). 
This idea includes private responsibility for the primary 
obligation to avoid adverse effects (e.g. product respon-
sibility of manufacturers), but also for the costs and 
compensation payments for losses, i.e. liability for 
environmental damage (Schlacke, 2019). This is based 
on the assumption that polluters can combat damage 
and losses most effectively and least expensively them-
selves (Kloepfer, 2016). Moreover, the environment as 
a freely available good should not be damaged without 
sanctions being imposed (Schlacke, 2019). Further-
more, applying the polluter pays principle aims to con-
tribute to burden sharing and to distributive justice 
(Kloepfer, 2016). In addition to cost-reimbursement 
obligations and the internalization of external costs, 
measures and instruments that implement the polluter 
pays principle include bans and restrictions, as well as 
civil-law injunctions and product and procedural stand-
ards (Kloepfer, 2016: 193), such as regulations on prod-
uct responsibility.
A clear allocation of responsibility is necessary in 
the context of digitalization, for example in the provi-
sion of critical infrastructures and in the context of 
automated decision making. Societal value decisions 
(e.g. privacy by design) must already be implemented 
during the development of technology.
8.4.2.3 
The cooperation principle
The cooperation principle states that environmental 
protection is a common task of all societal forces, not 
just a purely state task. Principle 5 of the Rio Declara-
tion also lays down a global principle of cooperation to 
combat poverty and inequality (UNCED, 1992). The 
state has a leading function here, since it is bound to 
the common good and charged with its realization. 
Cooperation serves on the one hand to integrate exper-
tise for public concerns, and on the other to promote 
information and acceptance by involving the people 
affected and relieving the burden on the state (Schlacke, 
2019). However, orientation towards the cooperation 
principle should not disregard the fact that it may be 
necessary in cooperation situations to reach a compro-
mise on the object of cooperation (e.g. the environ-
ment). This can result in costs for the general public. 
Cooperation can also be used by negotiating partners 
for economic reasons to prevent enforcement (Schlacke, 
2019).
In the Digital Age, cooperation between the differ-
ent societal forces is of particular importance, as form-
ative and market power is increasingly shifting to pri-
vate companies. Public-private cooperation is needed 
to contain this power. The form of this public-private 
cooperation, which sees the shaping of the Digital Age 
as a public task, is becoming increasingly important. 
What is crucial is that the state not only retains the 
ability to play a leading role in shaping public-private 
cooperation, but also accepts and performs this func-
tion as a key task of the state. In addition, all relevant 
actors should be enabled to cooperate. Furthermore, 
the state should monitor and check whether certain 
forces are losing their ability to cooperate and whether 
they need to be strengthened.
Concrete instruments that can be derived from the 
cooperation principle and further developed in the dig-
ital context include, for example, the involvement of 
private individuals in legislation and enforcement, and 
the involvement of civil society in decision-making 
processes and their mobilization for law enforcement. 
8.4.2.4 
The integration principle
There are goals, such as environmental protection and 
climate-change mitigation, which cannot be achieved 
sector-by-sector but must be promoted as cross-cutting 
issues in all areas. The integration principle under envi-
ronmental law aims precisely at that and states that 
environmental concerns must be integrated into all 
areas of society, particularly into economic develop-
ment, and taken into account in all formative action by 
the state. In international environmental law it is 
understood as a component of the sustainability princi-
ple (Sands et al., 2018: 227) and is embedded at a high 
level in EU law with the cross-sectional clause in Article 
11 of the TFEU. It means that environmental protection 
must be taken into account when implementing all 
aspects of political and societal action (including eco-
nomic and development policy) and that the protection 
of the environment must be taken into account within 
the individual sectors (Kloepfer, 2016: 205). At the 
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international level, it is laid down in Principle 3 of the 
Rio Declaration (UNCED, 1992). Instruments for imple-
menting the integration principle include, for example, 
collecting and disseminating environmental informa-
tion, carrying out environmental impact assessments 
(Sands et al., 2018), and appointing ombudspersons to 
advocate the principle. In the Digital Age, the integra-
tion principle must be applied in particular to topics 
such as privacy protection (including data protection 
and data security) and cybersecurity. At the same time, 
environmental protection needs to be integrated into 
the negotiation areas on digitalization.
8 .4 .3 
Readjustment of sustainability governance 30 
years after the Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro
The rapid global spread of digital technologies requires 
urgent adjustments to global sustainability policy in 
order to set the course in good time for a digitalized 
sustainability society. Today, 30 years after the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (UNCED), a readjust-
ment of global sustainability governance is needed 
(Section  9.3.1). The summit’s achievements, e.g. the 
establishment of the three Rio Conventions UNFCCC, 
CBD and UNCCD, were marked by the political opti-
mism following the end of the Cold War and a for-
ward-looking response to growing challenges – such as 
sustaining the natural life-support systems and over-
coming key development problems such as poverty and 
malnutrition. But the conditions for a new start are 
much more difficult than in 1992 in view of the cur-
rently growing obstacles to multilateral cooperation. 
However, the crisis of multilateralism that has only 
emerged in recent years could be overcome again in a 
few years’ time. Chancellor Angela Merkel also empha-
sized this in her speech at the 2019 Munich Security 
Conference (Merkel, 2019), which attracted a lot of 
international attention. In order to set the right course, 
the WBGU proposes that Germany and the EU should 
advocate a UN summit on the topic of digitalization and 
sustainability (UN Conference for a Sustainable Digital 
Age; Section 9.3.1.1) in 2022 – 30 years after UNCED. 
The central theme of the conference with a global per-
spective should be to agree on the big strategic deci-
sions that need to be taken to achieve sustainable 
development and avoid unsustainable consequences of 
digital change. Suitable thematic priorities include 
using digital technologies to support the implementa-
tion of the SDGs and new challenges to global sustain-
ability policy after 2030. The global summit should take 
into account the recommendations of the UN High-
level Panel on Digital Cooperation and the results of the 
world summits on sustainable development held since 
1992 (UNCED, 1992; Millennium Summit, 2000; 
WSSD, 2002; UN Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment, 2012, and the world summits on the information 
society in 2003 and 2005). A key outcome of the UN 
summit could be a charter of the international commu-
nity on ‘Our Common Digital Future’. The WBGU has 
submitted a draft for such a charter (Section 8.6; Box 
9.4-1). Such a declaration should list the fundamental 
issues for sustainably shaping the Digital Age, identify 
key political starting points, stipulate key levers, and 
present flagship initiatives for policy-making. 
To prepare for the proposed UN Summit, the WBGU 
recommends immediately setting up a ‘World Commis-
sion for Sustainability in the Digital Age’ modelled on 
the ‘Brundtland Commission’ (Section  9.3.1.1). At the 
time, the latter aimed to develop long-term strategies, 
point out possibilities for improving international coop-
eration, propose effective measures and procedures, 
and provide ambitious common goals for the world 
community (UNGA, 1983). The new World Commis-
sion’s task should be to develop the goals, long-term 
strategies, and a vision for a common digital future. In 
particular, it should identify the risks posed by digital 
technologies for the Transformation towards Sustaina-
bility and describe ways of containing them. At the 
same time, the World Commission should stipulate the 
conditions that will enable the potential of digital tech-
nologies for sustainable development to unfold. The 
results should in any case be incorporated into the fur-
ther development of the SDG agenda after 2030.
8 .4 .4 
Governance gap: adequate institutional 
 capacities for new challenges
New global challenges not only make it necessary to 
strengthen civil society and local capabilities 
( Sections 4.2, 9.3.3), they also require changes in global 
governance. A sustainable digital policy requires people 
championing sustainability in all private, intergovern-
mental and transnational forums and organizational 
units. In the WBGU’s view, however, firmly embedding 
the topic of digitalization in the institutions of the UN 
system is key. The WBGU sees various opportunities for 
achieving this. First, all UN institutions working on 
development issues (e.g. UN Environment, UNDP, 
UN-Habitat, IOM, as well as the World Bank and 
regional development banks) should systematically 
incorporate the issue of the digital transformation into 
their work and strategy-building processes. In addition, 
‘digitalization’ should be embedded more firmly as a 
cross-cutting issue and in the interaction between UN 
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organizations. The topic of digitalization therefore 
needs to be more firmly embedded in the institutions of 
the UN system beyond the existing United Nations 
Group on the Information Society (UNGIS; 
 Section 8.1.3). To this end, a mechanism should be set 
up to ensure cooperation between agencies and sys-
tem-wide coordination (‘UN Digitalization’ analogous 
to the existing UN Energy; Section 9.3.1.2). In particu-
lar, however, as representatives of their citizens and of 
general welfare in accordance with the understanding 
of the ‘proactive state’ with increased opportunities for 
participation (WBGU, 2011), states too should cham-
pion the interests of the common good, in particular 
environmental and privacy protection, digital inclusion 
and human decision-making sovereignty. This corre-
sponds to their obligation to protect and take precau-
tions against any dangers to society, individual citizens 
and the environment that are associated with digitali-
zation. By virtue of their constitutions, states in this 
sense have the task and the duty to influence interna-
tional processes (Hoffmann-Riem, 2016). This means 
that environmental protection and other aspects of 
sustainability, such as privacy protection, should be 
embedded as a cross-sectional task in all digital devel-
opment agendas and practices. The Global Commission 
on the Stability of Cyberspace should also deal with 
material and energy consumption by cyberspace – and 
participating states should work towards this aim. Insti-
tutions that can demand and exercise societal control 
over states and companies include, for example, ombud-
spersons who promote under-represented topics such 
as environmental and climate protection in tech organ-
izations and companies and put them on the agenda. 
Equally important are opportunities enabling civil soci-
ety to participate. To this end, conducive framework 
conditions should be created and resources made avail-
able.
8 .4 .5 
A binding framework under international law: the 
optimum solution
Important international agreements such as the CBD, 
UNFCCC and UNCCD have been among the driving 
forces behind the further development of international 
environmental law and global sustainability govern-
ance. Such framework conventions offer states an 
opportunity to stay engaged with issues on an ongoing 
basis, create further institutional capacity and take 
action. These conventions are arguably the most visible 
examples of an institutional embedding of global gov-
ernance; however, they also involve the longest and 
most complicated negotiation processes and are politi-
cally the most difficult to achieve, given the current 
international situation. In the WBGU’s view, the nego-
tiation of a ‘UN Framework Convention on Digital Sus-
tainability and Sustainable Digitalization’ would be 
necessary in order to integrate sustainability goals and 
digitalization (Section  9.3.1.3). This is the only way to 
create the necessary new negotiating spaces under 
international law for a form of digitalization that is ori-
ented towards global sustainability. In particular, the 
following new topics should be placed on the interna-
tional community’s agenda: global cooperation for the 
preservation and expansion of inclusion in the Digital 
Age; human decision-making sovereignty in the 
deployment of algorithm-based decision making; AI 
and automation; and discourses on changes in the 
human-machine relationship. In any case, the enforce-
ment of digital privacy protection should be the subject 
of a binding agreement under international law, either 
as a protocol to a framework convention on digital sus-
tainability and sustainable digitalization or as a sepa-
rate agreement (Section 8.3.1.3). 
8 .4 .6 
Role of science
Although future developments cannot be predicted, 
scientific expertise can help decision-makers to prepare 
better for possible futures, especially if disruptive 
developments seem possible. Science and research can 
also contribute significantly to raising awareness of the 
key challenges of digital change and thus promote soci-
etal acceptance. The example of the IPCC has shown 
that pooling scientific expertise is an important pre-
requisite for fact-based policy-making for political 
decision-makers. It would therefore be a good idea to 
set up an intergovernmental or international scientific 
body that would prepare regular progress reports on 
the state of scientific knowledge on all socio-technical 
and ecological aspects of the digital transformation that 
are relevant to sustainability (Section 9.3.1.4). Building 
on the experience gained to date, such a body could be 
structured in a similar way to the IPCC or IPBES.
8 .5
The EU as a pioneer in the integration of 
 sustainability and digitalization
In order for a global integration of digital change and 
sustainability transformation to succeed, states and 
alliances are needed that pursue this goal ambitiously 
and integrate it into global processes. As an economic 
region and an area of shared values and norms, the EU 
8 Global Governance for the Transformation towards Sustainability in the Digital Age
336
should, in the interest of its citizens and global sustain-
ability, offer an alternative to strategies for regulating 
digitalization that are inadequate from a European per-
spective: e.g. strategies based on a laissez-faire mental-
ity (like in the USA) or on the use of digital instruments 
to exercise authoritarian state power (like in China; 
 Section 7.3). A visionary attitude on the part of the EU 
that consistently sets itself apart from these strategies 
(Sections 7.3, 9.3.2) can have a global impact, despite 
challenges to political implementation. The aim is not 
“to win a race” but “to ensure the well-being of human-
kind and the environment” (Dignum, 2019).
8 .5 .1 
Appeal and political feasibility of a European 
model
The proposal of a European model for sustainability 
and digitalization (Section  9.3.2.1) faces the challenge 
of having to make a global impact and be politically 
enforceable, particularly in view of the current world 
political situation and intra-European problems. The 
EU’s economic weight and soft power (Nye, 2004) play 
a role in the question of the global appeal and political 
feasibility of a European model for sustainability and 
digitalization. 
The EU can bring its economic weight to bear in this 
way. Legal regulation in large economies can have a pos-
itive spill-over effect if companies adhere globally to the 
standards applicable there (Section 4.2.6). In the past, 
there has indeed been a Brussels effect in which legal 
regulation in the EU has de facto been adopted outside 
the single market (Bradford, 2012). In order to use and 
strengthen this effect in the sense of sustainable digi-
talization, and to thus codify the legal framework for 
sustainable digitalization more strongly, it would be 
conceivable to incorporate corresponding regulations 
into the EU’s trade agreements, thus forming a coalition 
for common high standards. In the past, the EU has 
already used trade contract negotiations with partner 
countries to embed basic labour rights or economic 
development strategies (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006). 
In the dispute over the trade in meat from hor-
mone-treated cattle, for example, the EU has not shied 
away from a dispute with the USA in the World Trade 
Organization, although the protection of European farm-
ers might have played a role (Josling and Roberts, 2001; 
Kerr and Hobbs, 2002). With the REACH chemicals 
regulation, it has also set standards across European 
borders and thus directly influenced international trade 
(Motaal, 2009). The EU has been a pioneer in climate 
protection, although it has lost this aspiration to some 
extent in the meantime (Fischer und Geden, 2015).
International reactions to the GDPR show that inter-
nal EU regulation on digital issues is also noted at the 
global level and that it carries weight (Box 4.2.6-1). The 
EU’s pioneering role could spread to other countries and 
regions in this way. A European model for sustainability 
and digitalization could help establish the link between 
the two aspects in international politics and thus, in the 
medium and long term, initiate dialogues at the global 
level that ultimately lead to appropriate legal and insti-
tutional frameworks beyond the EU.
A European model for sustainability and digitaliza-
tion is currently facing serious problems relating to the 
internal cohesion of the Member States, the rule of law 
in individual Member States, and the common under-
standing of fundamental freedoms. These existing 
problems complicate the political implementation of an 
ambitious integration of digitalization and sustainabil-
ity as called for in this chapter. This is not only a Euro-
pean problem. Counter-movements against the liberal 
world order and its institutions are forming in the entire 
western world, including the USA (Hale and Held, 
2017; Ikenberry, 2018). 
In order to politically implement a European model 
for sustainability and digitalization, the social concerns 
of all affected population groups must be taken into 
account. A common vision of a sustainable digital 
future that places people at the centre of attention 
could be a new common project for Member States on 
the one hand, and actively address concrete fears of 
individual population groups on the other. This makes 
it possible to monitor the socio-economic structural 
change brought about by both the transformation to 
sustainability and digitalization. As with climate change 
(WBGU, 2018; Feist and Messner, 2019), ensuring 
social cohesion is essential for both normative and stra-
tegic reasons: on the one hand, for example, those 
affected by the upheavals in the working world as a 
result of digitalization (Section 5.3.9) need support; on 
the other hand, the successful setting of the framework 
conditions for sustainable digitalization is linked to 
broad public acceptance. To ensure an inclusive process, 
the EU should not act alone. Instead, it should join 
forces with the governments of the Member States and 
non-state actors who also have an interest in an active, 
sustainability-oriented shaping of digitalization, and 
develop deliberatively ambitious solutions that offer 
alternatives to the existing models. Such a stakehold-
er-oriented approach would contribute to the policy 
feasibility of a European model for sustainability and 
digitalization.
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8 .5 .2 
Setting the course for EU’s political priorities, 
strategies and programmes 
A new legislative period for the EU began in 2019 with 
the election of a new European Parliament and appoint-
ment of a new European Commission. As existing over-
arching EU strategies expire in 2020, there is currently 
a window of opportunity for the integration of sustain-
ability and digitalization agendas and policies. Given 
their importance, both issues should be visible in the 
EU’s overarching strategies and priorities, integrated 
into them on a permanent basis, and their interactions 
taken into account (Section 9.3.2.1). In the case of 
environmental protection, integration has already been 
achieved with the cross-sectional clause of Article 11 of 
the TFEU: environmental concerns must be “integrated 
into the definition and implementation of Union poli-
cies and activities, in particular with a view to promot-
ing sustainable development.” The same applies to 
other economic and social sustainability issues, such as 
protection against discrimination (Article 10 of the 
TFEU), consumer protection (Article 12 of the TFEU), 
and the protection of personal data of individuals 
( Article 16 (1) of the TFEU). Accordingly, there is 
already an obligation to ensure that EU digital policy is 
sustainable. However, also the use of digital technolo-
gies as instruments and tools for digitalizing other pol-
icy areas always needs to be aligned with the funda-
mental values and environmental and sustainability 
principles of the Union enshrined in the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union, especially 
when it comes to adopting legislative acts, setting up 
institutions and establishing procedures. 
In the future, the overall, overarching EU strategy 
and priorities should be explicitly aligned with the 
2030 Agenda. In this way, the EU can send a signal to 
the world that strengthens the sustainability goals as a 
political guiding principle. With regard to ecological 
issues, high political priority should be given in particu-
lar to a digitalized energy and climate-protection union 
and to the application of digital technologies to a circu-
lar economy. It would also be possible to place the inte-
gration of digitalization and sustainability policy onto 
the political agenda as a general priority. 
In order to leverage the potential of digitalization for 
overall societal goals alongside economic targets, 
greater weight must be given to sustainability goals in 
EU digitalization policy. The 2030 Agenda has differen-
tiated the goals. The EU Digital Agenda should be 
revised and merged with the sustainability objectives in 
order to align Europe’s digital innovation capacity with 
the target system. The principles of environmental law 
(Section 8.4.2), which already apply in EU environ-
mental law, can be used to benefit the shaping of digi-
talization. In line with the precautionary principle 
relating to resources (Article 191 (1) of the TFEU; Sec-
tion 8.4.2.1), the increasing demand for resources for 
digital products and infrastructures must be met by 
rapid progress in the switch to renewable energies and 
the establishment of a far-reaching circular economy. 
The precautionary principle relating to risk (Article 191 
(2) of the TFEU; 8.4.2.1) requires that both the societal 
consequences of sustainability transformation and the 
societal effects of digitalization be taken into account. 
It also requires that the ability of society as a whole to 
cope with structural change and to build resilience 
should be promoted. In order not to lose the broad sup-
port of society, people must be informed about both 
sustainable development and digital competence via 
future-proof education. In addition, it is important to 
make use of the dynamics and broad impact that can 
result from the involvement of private-sector actors. 
What is needed, however, is a binding framework for 
meeting sustainability targets and correspondingly 
enhanced economic performance indicators in the EU in 
order to reconcile private and societal interests. Digital 
tools should be used to achieve overall societal objec-
tives such as climate and environmental protection, 
climate adaptation, and for monitoring the way in 
which the goals are pursued and whether this is suc-
cessful. This should be given greater priority in policy 
strategies, also in order to identify and promote  possible 
technological game changers. 
New, globally relevant areas of cooperation – such as 
the protection of privacy, inclusion in digital and digi-
talized goods, guaranteeing human decision-making 
sovereignty, and human-machine relationships that are 
in line with human needs – should also be the subject 
of a new EU Digital Agenda (Section 8.3). As a general 
rule, ethics, privacy, IT security, sustainability and fair 
production conditions in technology design, implemen-
tation and operation (ethics by, in and for design, pri-
vacy by design, security by design, sustainability and 
fairness by design) should be central principles guiding 
future European digitalization models (Section 9.3.2). 
Key projects for implementation can be the develop-
ment of sustainable, public-service European ICT infra-
structures (Section 5.3.5) and participation in digital 
commons (Section 5.3.10).
The EU has an opportunity to define ambitious steps 
and concrete measures to implement and enforce the 
goals for sustainable development in the field of sus-
tainability and environmental policy in the ongoing 
process of relaunching an EU sustainability strategy as 
the ‘Implementation Strategy for the 2030 Agenda’, 
the new ‘Environmental Action Programme’ and the 
‘Decarbonization Strategy as a Contribution to the Paris 
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Convention’. The EU should now resolutely enshrine 
the existing approaches (Section 8.1.6) in the strategies 
and programmes to be formulated and in particular 
define and pursue ambitious steps and concrete meas-
ures for the implementation of the SDGs. In particular, 
the potential of monitoring in implementation should 
be exploited to the full. With an ‘EU Strategy for Sus-
tainability in the Digital Age’, the EU could furthermore 
play a pioneering role in reinforcing and further devel-
oping the worldwide sustainability agenda after 2030. 
The strategy should jointly address existing sustain-
ability goals and new cooperation requirements 
( Section 8.3), and thus look beyond 2030. 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that digital 
technologies cannot replace political will in order to 
solve urgent sustainability problems. Guiding principles 
and performance indicators for measuring economic 
success which reflect the resilience and sustainability of 
the economy can encourage companies to rethink in the 
direction of sustainability (Section 8.4.1). 
8 .6
On the need for a charter for a sustainable  Digital 
Age
Global governance for the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability in the Digital Age needs a fixed normative 
reference point. On the basis of the analyses in this 
report, the WBGU has therefore developed a draft 
Charter for a Sustainable Digital Age (Box 9.4-1). The 
Charter is intended as a system of principles, objectives 
and standards for the international community – com-
plementary to the 2030 Agenda and beyond, and with 
a specific global sustainability perspective 
( Section 3.6.3). It contains condensed guiding princi-
ples for sustainable action in the Digital Age, covers the 
challenges of the three dynamics of digitalization, and 
is institutionally geared to the multilateral level in order 
to be able to offer a target system with the necessary 
global perspective complementary to the 2030 Agenda.
Based on the normative compass developed by the 
WBGU (Section 2), the draft first formulates objectives 
and principles for the protection of human dignity, the 
natural life-support systems, inclusion in and access to 
digitalized infrastructure and the underlying technolo-
gies, as well as individual and collective freedom of 
development in the Digital Age. On this basis, the Char-
ter sets out concrete guidelines for action on how the 
global community should position itself to meet the 
challenges of the Digital Age. For this purpose, the 
Charter contains three core elements. First, digitaliza-
tion should be designed in line with the 2030 Agenda, 
and digital technology should be used to achieve the 
SDGs. Second, beyond the 2030 Agenda, systemic risks 
(Chapter 7) should be avoided, e.g. by protecting rights, 
promoting the common good, and guaranteeing deci-
sion-making sovereignty. Third, societies must prepare 
themselves procedurally for future challenges by agree-
ing on ethical guidelines and ensuring future-oriented 
research and education.
Germany and the EU should work towards initiating 
a process at the global level to establish such a Charter 
for a Sustainable Digital Age and, as pioneers them-
selves, should shape policy in line with the stated prin-
ciples. The WBGU’s proposal (Box 9.4-1) should be 
understood in this context as a stimulus for a broad 
societal debate in the course of which the Charter 
should continue to take shape (wbgu.de/charter). The 
draft Charter is to be further developed in the course of 
a public consultation  process.
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The urgent challenge for politics and society is to steer digital change towards 
sustainability. In this regard, the WBGU makes a number of recommendations 
for action, which are primarily addressed to the German Federal Government, 
but also offer starting points for other actors. All states, organizations, busin-
esses and individuals are called upon not only to participate in the discussions 
about our common digital future, but also to play an active role in shaping it.
The WBGU recommends that digitalization should be 
explicitly placed at the service of sustainability. Unless 
it is actively shaped, global digital change involves the 
risk of further accelerating the threat to humankind’s 
natural life-support systems. Without regulation and 
democratic control, it can also endanger cohesion in our 
societies, violate fundamental and human rights, and 
weaken our democracies. The use of digital technolo-
gies needs to be embedded in a sustainable develop-
ment strategy for it to make a positive contribution to 
our common digital future. This requires looking beyond 
2030, the target year of the UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs). Unlike most of the studies on this 
subject conducted by international organizations, the 
WBGU therefore takes a longer-term perspective. From 
this perspective, adaptive policy-making and a culture 
of future-oriented thinking based on systemic long-
term analyses and scenarios are required. 
Digital change is happening at a time when decisions 
on the strategic course of action need to be taken and 
undesirable path dependencies overcome in order for 
the Transformation towards Sustainability to succeed. 
Experience shows that the probability of fundamental 
changes (system changes) increases during such phases. 
The challenge for policy-makers and societies lies in 
ensuring that digital change can be steered towards 
sustainability.
In order to grasp the opportunities for change that 
lie ahead, the WBGU distinguishes between three 
‘Dynamics of the Digital Age’ and analyses their inter-
actions together with sustainable development 
( Figure 9-1; Chapter 7). These Dynamics involve very 
different challenges at different times, but all require 
immediate action. The First Dynamic focuses on the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the question 
of which course to set in order to harness digitalization 
for achieving the SDGs. The focus here is on concrete, 
political implementation measures, for which the 
WBGU offers a package of recommendations, e.g. on 
urban and rural development (Section 9.1). The Second 
Dynamic concerns the profound structural changes to 
society, the economy and the individual brought about 
by digitalization, such as new challenges in handling 
privacy and extensive changes in market dynamics. 
Digitalization opens up new opportunities, but it can 
also generate enormous risks: digital change is cur-
rently moving in a non-sustainable direction. This 
dynamic is therefore about preventive policy-making 
and ensuring that societies prepare themselves better 
for profound, in some cases disruptive changes. Key 
elements here are technology-impact assessment, risk 
analysis, the interlinking of digitalization and sustain-
ability research and their integration into politics (Sec-
tion 9.2). In the Third Dynamic, questions are raised 
about the future viability and identity of human beings 
and human societies in relation to the developing natu-
ral and technical environment. This raises new norma-
tive questions concerning the relationship between 
human beings and machines. In order to meet these 
challenges, societal dialogue processes are central to 
staking out desirable futures. To this end, the WBGU 
recommends, among other things, establishing dis-
course arenas on fundamental issues of what it means 
to be human in the Digital Age (Section 9.4). 
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For all the Dynamics, the challenge is to reconcile the 
impact of digitalization with the objectives of sustain-
able development. In view of the rapidly changing 
framework conditions, however, a common under-
standing of global sustainability also needs to be fur-
ther developed. The overall discussion therefore covers 
proposals for a global governance architecture and a 
possible role for the European Union (EU) that can do 
justice to all three Dynamics. It becomes clear that pol-
icy-making must change its mode from a strong orien-
tation towards the present – critics would call it ‘man-
aging the status quo’ – to a greater emphasis on shaping 
the future, which can only succeed if policy-makers, 
society and business work together. 
In its thematic analyses of the link between digitali-
zation and sustainability, the WBGU looks at certain 
examples which are reflected in ‘arenas of digital 
change’ (Box 9-1). These provide a multifaceted impres-
Figure 9-1
Three Dynamics of the Digital Age.
The chart shows the positive case of the Dynamics being successfully contained through goals and governance. All three 
 Dynamics are already emerging in parallel today, albeit with different levels of intensity, so there is no strict chronological 
 sequence involved. Each Dynamic consists of different subpaths following different trajectories. The name given to each 
 Dynamic reflects the priorities for action required in each case.
The texts beneath the figure give keywords on the potential (: upper row) and risks (: lower row) of the three Dynamics.























The future of Homo sapiens
 Digitally support 
  sustainability
 - Comply with planetary guard rails 
(climate, nature, soils, oceans)
 - Secure social cohesion (against 
hunger, poverty, inequality; for 
access to water, health, education, 
energy)
 New humanism
 - Networked world society as a further 
advancement of Enlightenment and 
humanism
 - Development of global 
(environmental) awareness
 - Culture of cooperation, empathy, 
global solidarity
  Strengthen Homo sapiens‘ self-
confidence
 - Preservation of the biological human 
in its natural environment 
 - Ethically reflected advancement of 
humanity 
 - Design human-machine collaboration
 Ecological and societal 
 disruption
 - More emissions and resource use
 - More inequality
 - Greater concentration of power
 - Erosion of civil rights and privacy
 - Erosion of the state’s governance
  Digitally empowered 
totalitarianism
 - Hollowed-out democracies and 
digitally empowered autocracies
 - Massive inequality, domination by 
elites, total surveillance and loss of 
freedom
 - Environmental destruction and loss 
of social cohesion
  Blurring of borderlines between 
humans and machines
 - Abuse of human-machine 
relationship
 - Superintelligence
 - Artificial human evolution
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sion of how digitalization can be shaped to serve the 
Great Transformation towards Sustainability. A detailed 
description of the arenas, including specific recommen-
dations for action and research, can be found in 
 Chapter 5.
In its 2018 discussion paper ‘Digitalization: what we 
need to talk about’, the WBGU formulated key ques-
tions on ten topic areas (WBGU, 2018a). The structure 
of the recommendations for action is essentially based 
on these sets of questions, without claiming to provide 
answers to all the questions asked in the paper. In many 
cases, concrete proposals on shaping digital change can 
already be made today. In other cases, in view of exist-
ing uncertainties, the first step is to create spaces for 
societal discourse in order to improve our understand-
ing of the scale of the possible changes, and to develop 
normative principles for the design task that results 
from these changes. After all, digitalization is not a 
force of nature; rather, the road to our common digital 
future is a process that must be actively shaped.
Setting the course for a European road to a 
digitalized sustainability society
The EU should play a pioneering role in integrating sus-
tainability and digitalization. By strengthening techno-
logical innovations and systematically linking them to 
sustainability-oriented social, cultural and institutional 
innovations, the EU could add something special to the 
global technology race and be a pioneer in the search 
for pathways to the digitalized sustainability society. In 
some areas of digitalization, the EU is already playing a 
pioneering role by setting legal frameworks. The EU 
Basic Data Protection Regulation (EU, 2016) is unique 
in the world when it comes to data protection and pri-
vacy. It gives concrete form to fundamental rights by 
protecting individuals from the unauthorized use of 
personal data by commercial or government entities. 
Furthermore, the EU is working on a European data 
space aimed at providing citizens and businesses with a 
highly developed, well-functioning, transparent system 
of public data, information, services and standards. This 
system would also help combine competitiveness with 
data protection in order, in the best-case scenario, to 
create competitive advantages for EU companies, e.g. in 
competition with China and the USA. 
The EU is also at the forefront of sustainability pol-
icy: for example, environmental protection is enshrined 
as an EU goal in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the EU Treaty. Furthermore, the EU is currently work-
ing on a new Environmental Action Programme and a 
decarbonization strategy as a contribution to the Paris 
Agreement. However, the EU is not (yet) a pioneer 
when it comes to the urgently needed, implementa-
tion-oriented dovetailing of sustainability and digitali-
zation. Thoughts on how digital change can be used to 
implement SDGs, or which ethical principles should be 
developed to govern the use of artificial intelligence 
(AI, Section 3.3.3), are still in their early stages. 
The WBGU proposes fundamental decisions to be 
taken on five different stages for a European road to 
digitalized sustainability societies, in order to master the 
profound and radical changes towards sustainability in 
the Digital Age. Taking this road can only succeed if the 
fundamental decisions made on the five stages are 
intermeshed.
1. New humanism for the Digital Age – renew the nor-
mative foundations of our societies: The WBGU 
develops essential features of a new humanism 
for the Digital Age with the aim of defending the 
fundamental, albeit endangered achievements of 
humanism and enlightenment over the past two 
centuries and, at the same time, creating attractive 
future prospects for a digitalized sustainability soci-
ety. Our hope is that Europe will be in a position to 
make such a concerted civilizational effort
2. Charter for the transition to a digitalized sustainabil-
ity society: Societal discourses for a new humanism 
need a starting point. On the basis of its analyses 
and discussions, the WBGU has condensed some 
key principles and guidelines for the digitalized 
sustainability society into a Charter, which the EU 
could embrace as its own. These guiding principles 
include the protection of the planet and the preser-
vation of human integrity, above all by protecting 
human dignity. This Charter also encompasses sup-
port for local and global fairness, justice and soli-
darity under the conditions of a digital revolution. 
Finally, it involves strengthening global (environ-
mental) awareness and the cultures and systems of 
global cooperation by making use of digital oppor-
tunities, and by also developing a form of AI that 
furthers human development possibilities, soci ety’s 
ability to learn and social cohesion. The Charter 
can become a starting point for the renewal of sus-
tainability paradigms and place our common  digital 
future at the centre of efforts at the national, Euro-
pean and global level. The Charter builds on the 
Agenda 2030 and, at the same time, goes beyond it 
to highlight the normative foundations of our soci-
eties in the Digital Age.
3. Building blocks of a responsible society capable of 
taking action: Science and education are funda-
mental for freedom, inclusion and the Eigenart of 
the individual in the sense of future-oriented and 
creative, inclusive societies. The demands placed 
on our societies cannot be ‘solved’ solely by indi-
vidual instruments (such as a CO2 tax, resource 
 pricing or reforms of the existing global competi-
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Box 9-1
Arenas of digital change
The ‘arenas of digital change’ are intended as examples to give 
a multifaceted impression of how digitalization can be placed 
at the service of the Transformation towards Sustainability. 
The report briefly presents and analyses concrete topics and 
extrapolates recommendations for action and research.
Industrial metabolism
Digitalization changes the energy- and material-exchange re-
lationships (metabolism) within companies and value chains. 
In the case of digital devices, the main issue is currently envi-
ronmental risks (e.g. electronic waste). In production, digital-
ized manufacturing processes that are coordinated in the 
sense of Industry 4.0 offer potential for higher resource effi-
ciency. Digital platforms could enable a close linkage of mate-
rial flows between companies. The global sustainability impli-
cations and the contribution to the circular economy are 
ambivalent and require in-depth analyses (Section 5.2.1).
New forms of digital economy
Digital technologies enable new, collectively organized eco-
nomic systems that are oriented towards the common good. 
These include new business models (sustainable digital entre-
preneurship, green digital start-ups) and corporate forms 
(platform cooperatives), alternative forms of production (pro-
sumer, commons-based peer production), and participatory 
value creation (sharing economy). Unlocking the related po-
tential requires a suitable legal framework, a corresponding 
promotion of economic development, and the development 
of infrastructure (Section 5.2.2).
Sustainable consumer behaviour
Digital technologies can be used to help people to consume in 
a sustainable manner (e.g. by buying only what they need, 
and through resource-sparing use, reuse, repairing and shar-
ing). The focus is on consumer decisions about the type, 
quantity and use of products. It presents sustainability-rele-
vant forms of ‘digitalized consumption’ and identifies the 
challenges and potential of digitalized consumption for sus-
taining natural life-support systems (Section 5.2.3). 
Online commerce
Online commerce is growing rapidly. This involves both 
 negative environmental effects – from delivery services, pack-
aging waste and returned goods – and positive effects from 
fewer private journeys and optimized logistics. Most of the 
turnover in online commerce is currently concentrated on a 
small number of companies that are displacing bricks-and-
mortar retailing outlets. Opportunities for monitoring 
 compliance with environmental and social standards at the 
place of origin are diminishing. Municipalities and cities should 
 develop strategies to react to the displacement of the local 
retail trade (Section 5.2.4). 
Electronic waste and the circular economy 
Digitalization is a driver of resource extraction and rapidly 
growing amounts of electronic and toxic waste. In order to 
reverse this trend, aims of the circular economy – e.g.  resource 
conservation, durability, ease of repair, recycling – must al-
ready be integrated into business models and product designs. 
Clear regulations and incentives, societal embedding and a 
research offensive are levers for unlocking the potential of 
digital technology along the entire product life cycle 
( Section 5.2.5).
Digitalization for climate-change mitigation and the 
energy transformation
Digital solutions support the integration of fluctuating renew-
able energies into energy systems and can promote access to 
modern energy in off-grid regions. Increases in energy de-
mand triggered directly and indirectly by digitalization can be 
problematic. Long-term targets must be clear and reliable to 
ensure that investment and innovation are used for cli-
mate-change mitigation. The reliability and security of the 
increasingly complex energy systems and data protection 
should be taken into account from the outset 
(Section 5.2.6). 
‘Smart City’ and sustainable urban development 
Sustainable urban development using digital technologies 
presupposes that municipalities and urban societies retain 
their governance sovereignty vis-à-vis the digital economy 
and develop their own technological sovereignty. A growing 
number of cities are actively investing in decentralized digital 
urban platforms, open architecture and an orientation to-
wards the common good. If this trend prevails, there is justi-
fied hope that the digital transformation can be used for in-
clusive, sustainable urban development (Section 5.2.7). 
Sustainable urban mobility 
Digitally supported innovations in the transport sector are 
currently being tested in many cities and give us an idea of 
future disruptive changes. In many cases, it is not clear how 
data and liability issues will be handled. However, solutions to 
key problems of urban transport systems (e.g. high CO2 and 
air-pollutant emissions, land consumption, noise pollution, 
increasing travel and transport times and accident risks) are 
not a purely technological matter; rather, they will be decided 
by how digital solutions are embedded into comprehensive 
concepts of sustainable urban mobility (Section 5.2.8). 
Precision farming
Land use is a key sustainability issue for food security and 
nature conservation. Digitalization must not reinforce the 
trends towards industrial agriculture. It should be used to re-
duce environmental damage caused by the use of fertilizers 
and pesticides and to promote the diversity of cultivation 
methods and landscapes. Trustworthy data systems, a focus 
on data sovereignty, Open Data and Open Source can all help 
prevent farmers from increasingly losing control and becom-
ing dependent on agricultural corporations (Section 5.2.9).
Agriculture in developing countries 
Most of the world’s agricultural land is farmed by smallhold-
ers. Precision agriculture is highly capital-intensive and 
therefore less suitable for smallholder agriculture in develop-
ing countries. Even so, digitalization can increase the efficien-
cy, productivity and sustainability of small farms by improv-
ing access to information, advice and education. Mobile 
connectivity and organizing small farms in cooperatives play 
a key role here (Section 5.2.10). 
Monitoring ecosystems and biodiversity 
Digitalization is changing nature conservation in fundamental 
and transformative ways. Digitally enhanced ecosystem mon-
itoring cannot directly influence the drivers of the biodiversi-
ty crisis, but it is a source of valuable knowledge and opens 
345
Recommendations for action 9
up new opportunities for monitoring compliance with 
 management rules and bans that are aimed at preventing the 
overexploitation of biological resources. The vision of a global 
system for monitoring biodiversity with semi-automated in-
ventories of species and ecosystem services is becoming more 
realistic (Section 5.2.11). 
Collective global awareness 
Individuals can be motivated to act in a way that preserves 
the Earth system by creating a corresponding awareness of 
the problem and specific knowledge of how best to act. New 
digital possibilities, such as interactivity, gaming, virtual 
 experiences of nature and citizen-science projects offer new 
opportunities for promoting environmental awareness. In the 
longer term, this will lead to a new willingness for global 
 cooperation and a strong sense of global citizenship 
(Section 5.3.1).
Public discourse 
Digital technologies are changing how we communicate, how 
we perceive societal debates, and how we can take part in 
them. New forms of participation, algorithmic pre-structuring 
of media content, the use of social media, and new forms of 
content editing are restructuring public discourse. New skills 
and suitable legal and institutional framework conditions are 
required to ensure that the foundations of democratic opin-
ion-forming and journalistic quality are preserved in the long 
term (Section 5.3.2).
Scoring society
Scoring procedures map human behaviour using numbers. 
They are being used in more and more core areas of society 
(e.g. health care, law enforcement) as a basis for deci-
sion-making, often without the knowledge of those affected. 
The potential for more objective decision-making is being 
undermined by a lack of transparency concerning areas of 
application, methods and data, as well as a lack of supervi-
sion. Individuals should be given a right to have decisions 
justified by rational reasons. The way in which scoring influ-
ences societal norms and moral standards should be a central 
research topic (Section 5.3.3).
Future-proof education 
Up to now, digitalization has not been systematically incorpo-
rated into educational programmes. The planned promotion 
of digital skills and infrastructure (e.g. in the German ‘Digital-
Pact for Schools’) seems necessary, but it is not enough. The 
conceptual combination of digitalization and sustainability 
requires a variety of initiatives in the education context. The 
WBGU shows how education could be ‘future-proofed’, 
which risks (e.g. ‘fake news’) should be countered, and where 
there is potential for more solidarity-based quality of life 
(Section 5.3.4).
Public-service ICT 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) have be-
come a lot more important in society and are increasingly 
influencing citizens’ lives. The public sector has a responsibil-
ity for the operation and content of public-service ICT. This is 
an important prerequisite for equal inclusion in societal life, 
for the provision of, and access to, digital commons, and as a 
locational factor for innovation, competition, employment 
and sustainable economic growth (Section 5.3.5). 
Digital technology as a gender bender? 
Despite growing political attention, gender equality has not 
been achieved in any country in the world. Existing gender 
inequalities and stereotypes are reproduced in socio-techni-
cal systems such as the internet, and this can lead to new 
discrimination. Equal-opportunity measures are still neces-
sary, and not only in the context of a two-gender understand-
ing of the issue. Digital technology offers emancipatory po-
tential by providing access to information and networking, 
exposing discrimination, and raising awareness in digital are-
nas for experimentation (Section 5.3.6).
Digital self-tracking
Digital self-tracking apps supply people with information 
about their own bodies and offer comparisons with others. 
The WBGU uses this example to reveal the implications of 
healthcare-system digitalization and universal data collection 
and availability. The potentially better information base for 
users is partly offset by major quality deficits in data protec-
tion, data quality, collection and processing. In addition, us-
ers’ privacy, personal freedom and self-determination could 
be restricted (Section 5.3.7).
International division of labour
The ongoing digital structural transformation in the interna-
tional division of labour will lead to a readjustment of the role 
of developing countries and emerging economies. Unequivo-
cal conclusions on the impact of digitalization on the interna-
tional organization of value chains are currently limited. On 
the one hand, there are large potential job losses due to digi-
tally supported automation and production relocation pro-
cesses; on the other, new markets are accessible, primarily via 
digital platforms (Section 5.3.8).
Working environments of the future
Digitalization and sustainability transformation are radically 
transforming labour markets. People will continue to work in 
the future, but it remains to be seen how this can be embed-
ded into society and organized in such a way that the func-
tions of gainful employment as we know them today – secur-
ing livelihoods, social participation, the basis of self-esteem 
– can be guaranteed in the future. However, digital change 
and sustainability transformation offer opportunities to de-
velop and establish new models for more sustainable working 
environments (Section 5.3.9).
Digital commons 
Based on common goods in general, digital commons are data, 
pieces of information, educational and knowledge artefacts in 
the public interest that are available to the public barrier-free. 
They must be protected from exclusionary use for profit max-
imization and from abuse. To this purpose, fundamental or-
ganizational, regulatory and financial decisions, e.g. obliga-
tions to provide information, are necessary to develop a 
public-welfare orientation using digital common goods 
( Section 5.3.10).
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tion order). Rather, responsible societies capable of 
taking action must be developed and strengthened, 
so that the upheavals outlined can be mastered and 
managed. The WBGU proposes the following build-
ing blocks of a responsible society capable of tak-
ing action, which – in their entirety and if they are 
cleverly combined – will result in the architecture of 
these societies and should be promoted by the EU:
 > People must be enabled to understand and par-
ticipate in shaping the coming upheavals. Com-
prehensive education for sustainable develop-
ment in the Digital Age is the key to this.
 > Science should generate knowledge about the 
future in order to shape digitalized sustainability 
and sustainable digitalization. Four decades ago, 
the Herculean task was accomplished of bringing 
together climate and Earth-system research with 
social science and economic disciplines to form 
the sustainability sciences that are established 
today. Similarly, it is now necessary to quickly 
and closely interlink them with digitalization 
research. 
 > States must be able to assume a formative role 
themselves: states and public institutions should 
invest in their own capabilities in order to estab-
lish and consolidate digital skills for the transition 
to a sustainable society.
 > The creation of arenas for experimentation and 
discourse in Germany and Europe would make it 
possible to prepare and accelerate innovations, to 
think ahead and to develop examples for shaping 
the future.
 > The new power constellations must be contained 
in order to secure democratic inclusion. Impor-
tant examples in view of high global mobility in 
the digital economy are an international harmo-
nization of competition law and corporate taxa-
tion, as well as non-discriminatory, clearly regu-
lated cross-border exchange processes in virtual 
spaces that are standardized to ensure interoper-
ability.
 > The digital changes have a fundamentally world-
wide effect, so that global, rule- and fair-
ness-based regulatory models are needed that 
make it possible to combine digital change with 
the Transformation towards Sustainability as pro-
posed in the WBGU Charter. Only if the EU devel-
ops a common policy in this direction will Euro-
pean societies be able to influence the global 
restructuring of the future. 
 > Digitalization will fundamentally change the 
development opportunities available to societies 
in developing countries and emerging economies 
– for better and for worse. International 
 cooperation for sustainable development, and 
 Germany’s and the EU’s collaborations with the 
United Nations and other multilateral actors, 
should therefore be urgently expanded in this 
direction.
4. Technological game changers can accelerate sus-
tainability transformations: Digitalization offers an 
enormous toolbox of instruments and methods that 
must be used effectively and efficiently to achieve 
the sustainability goals. Here are some examples of 
technological game-changers that the EU should 
rapidly promote in order to trigger change processes 
in European societies and in the world economy, in 
cooperation and competition with other states and 
the United Nations:
 > The extended possibilities of digitalized remote- 
and near-Earth observation, and the sensors, 
equipment and infrastructure required for this 
purpose, should be developed worldwide and 
upgraded for the comprehensive and real-time 
monitoring of the natural Earth systems, their 
condition and development. The resulting inter-
national digital commons (Section 5.3.10) should 
be used as a starting point for the establishment 
and realization of services and applications for 
global (environmental) awareness ( Section 5.3.1). 
 > Building on this, the nation states should, in the 
context of the UN, establish a globally coordi-
nated and interoperable system of digital SDG 
indicators to improve the topicality, transparency, 
comparability and verifiability of digitalized 
national and international SDG reports. 
 > In parallel, the sustainability and environmental 
data collected for SDG indicators and Earth obser-
vation should be made available as digital com-
mons.
 > ICT infrastructures should not least be made 
available on a non-discriminatory basis as part of 
basic public services (Section 5.3.5), thus foster-
ing inclusion and the emergence of ‘quality 
media’ also in the digital sphere.
 > Digital technologies should be used to establish 
global processes and infrastructures that make it 
possible to map the emission and resource foot-
prints of both traditional industries and the digi-
tal economy across the entire value chain.
 > The multifaceted potential of AI should be har-
nessed for sustainability issues, for example to 
improve our understanding of material cycles, 
production processes, supply chains, usage con-
texts and consumption patterns, to determine 
key triggers and patterns, and to identify and 
implement optimization potential. 
 > Using digitalization to determine ecological 
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parameters and correlations (e.g. achieving SDGs, 
footprints, material cycles) creates the informa-
tion base needed for an efficient regulation of 
environmental resource consumption. Especially 
for the central goal of decarbonization, digitaliza-
tion can make the difference, as it not only plays 
a key role in the realization of renewable energy 
supplies, but also makes specific production- and 
consumption-oriented regulation possible. In 
combination with economic policies for decar-
bonization, these can have a real impact.
 > However, none of these digitalization-related 
levers will become effective unless there are com-
prehensive safeguards protecting not only the 
resilience, cyber-security and trustworthiness of 
digitalized infrastructures, their longevity and 
robustness, but also human decision-making 
sovereignty in the case of societally relevant 
automatic systems involving AI.
5. Strengthen the sustainability and resilience of the 
economy: Digitalization processes open up opportu-
nities not only to advance a green economy, but also 
to strengthen the diversity and resilience of eco-
nomic structures by adding new business models to 
the private sector. Digitalization is also used by coop-
erative, public and common-good-oriented enter-
prises to create new business models. This emerging 
diversity again ties in with the old strengths of post-
war European economies: a strong private sector, a 
diversity of enterprise types, and markets embed-
ded in institutions and normative systems. In order 
to exploit the potential of digitalization, it is impor-
tant to find a new balance between entrepreneurial 
competition, regulatory and legal frameworks, soci-
etal responsibility and an orientation towards the 
common good. The guard rails and values set out by 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the 2030 
Agenda and the WBGU’s Charter for a Digitalized 
Sustainability Society could thus become guidelines 
for the renewal of Europe.
Immanuel Kant analysed the essence of the Enlighten-
ment as a ‘change in the way people think’. Having 
arrived at a new level of civilization in the Digital Age, 
we face a similar challenge in the struggle for sustain-
able, globally and virtually networked digitalized soci-
eties and in the search for a new humanism: the further 
development of our civilization on a finite planet in the 
digital Anthropocene.
9 .1
Use digitalization for the 2030 Agenda and the 
Transformation towards Sustainability
In many cases, using digital solutions can help achieve 
the goals of the 2030 Agenda. However, it is also neces-
sary to contain risks to achieving the SDGs that are 
caused by digitalization. The WBGU’s analysis makes it 
clear that there are no simple technological solutions 
for achieving the SDGs – they must always be embed-
ded into society as a whole (Section 8.2.1). Digital solu-
tions are no substitute for a lack of political ambition, a 
lack of regulation, a lack of institutions or a lack of con-
trol instruments. The focus should be on creating the 
appropriate framework conditions to steer the momen-
tum of digitalization in the right direction. In addition, 
the WBGU believes that the urgency of the 2030 
Agenda will increase as a result of digital change, since 
achieving the goals can often also be seen as a pre-
requisite for making societies fit for the extensive 
upheavals that digitalization will bring. Initial 
approaches to making digitalization sustainable already 
exist in specialist literature and recent reports 
(Box 9.1-1).
The WBGU takes a profound, holistic look at various 
areas of the existing sustainability agenda with in-depth 
examples, and makes selected recommendations. This 
reveals the close connection between the SDGs (Sec-
tion 8.2). Since many of the issues involved will still be 
topical after 2030, some of the recommendations go 
beyond this date and refer to the Transformation 
towards Sustainability in general.
9 .1 .1 
Digitalization and sustaining the natural life- 
support systems
Sustaining the natural life- 
support systems is one of the 
three dimensions of the nor-
mative compass developed by 
the WBGU (Section 2.2.1). It 
involves, on the one hand, 
respecting planetary guard 
rails (e.g. on climate protection 
and the preservation of biodiversity) and, on the other, 
avoiding local environmental problems. These topics 
are addressed in several SDGs. At present, many trends 
are moving in the direction of an increasing risk of 
breaching guard rails, rising emissions and a growing 
use of resources. Digitalization can contribute to rein-
forcing these trends. This makes it all the more  important 
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Box 9 .1-1
Recommendations on digitalization and 
 sustainability in specialist literature 
Preparations for writing this report’s two chapters of recom-
mendations included reviewing already existing recommen-
dations for action; corresponding text passages from 90 
source documents that implicitly or explicitly position digital-
ization in the context of sustainability were condensed into 
compact statements in a qualitative-interpretive discourse 
analysis. The entire analysis, covering recommendations both 
for action and for research, is available as a separate PDF doc-
ument for download at www.wbgu.de. Some of these recom-
mendations are repeated by different sources. This analysis 
reveals that, both internationally and nationally, there is cur-
rently a strong emphasis on recommendations formulated 
from a perspective that is oriented more towards technical 
solutions. A broader perception of digitalization as a so-
cio-technical system is comparatively rare. The topics were 
structured in line with the categories used in the discussion 
paper on Digitalization and Sustainability that preceded this 
report (WBGU, 2018a). 
With regard to sustaining the natural life-support systems 
(Section 9.1.1), several texts propose solving global environ-
mental problems with the help of artificial intelligence (AI), 
reducing the ecological footprint of ICT during life cycles, im-
plementing energy labels at the national to global level, and 
using technology that is as energy-efficient as possible in 
public institutions in order to lead by example. Furthermore, 
the spectrum of topics ranges from technological optimization 
(e.g. indicators, evaluation) and concrete regulatory options 
such as standards to a fundamental transformation of the 
economic system (e.g. the sharing economy).
Also in the context of poverty reduction and inclusive de-
velopment (Section 9.1.2), one of the two most frequent pro-
posals aims to solve problems by means of AI. However, sev-
eral texts call for disadvantaged groups (e.g. children) to be 
protected from the negative impacts of digitalization and for 
it to be used instead to promote their inclusion. The wider 
spectrum includes both general and topic-focused anti-dis-
crimination proposals, technical solutions relating to SDGs 
and general problems of global and local social inequality (e.g. 
raw materials, digital inclusion), as well as recommendations 
for action that are specifically designed to solve concrete 
problems.
In the area of work in the future and reducing inequality 
(Section 9.1.3), the most common proposal is to use the re-
turn on investment in automation to deal with its conse-
quences, for example to finance an unconditional basic in-
come. Closely related are more specific proposals for a socially 
equitable distribution of the productivity gains achieved 
through AI or for a tax on data. However, it is also stressed 
that work will continue to be an important basis for people’s 
livelihoods and for self-determination in the future. The re-
maining proposals cover topics ranging from education and 
training to a digital revolution in the financial system.
AI is also the most frequently discussed topic in the area 
of knowledge, education and digital literacy (Section 9.1.4), 
albeit with regard to the discourse on this topic, which should 
be promoted in a dialogue with and in society. Another sub-
ject addressed is ‘digital enlightenment’ in the sense of pro-
moting individual and, ultimately, collective literacy. In this 
context, recommendations include an informed public debate 
on digitalization, a right to education for a self-determined 
digital life, and a right to free digital expression without cen-
sorship. Along with other references to digital literacy, the 
remaining proposals are more specific (e.g. consumer-centred 
data portals, training a new generation of applied AI 
ethicists).
By far the biggest share of recommendations in the texts 
analysed relates to big data and privacy (Section 9.2.1). The 
most common demand relates to data protection and calls for 
the principles of privacy by design and by default to be en-
forced. Other sources address the right to data protection and 
privacy, the right to self-determination regarding personal 
data, and the principle of data economy; they oppose data 
retention and the idea that informed consent can be given via 
general terms and conditions. On the technical side, there is a 
call for anonymization and transparency in big data process-
ing, and for data portability and data exchange to be ensured 
and promoted. With regard to algorithmic decision-making 
(ADM; Section 9.2.2), demands include transparent and 
traceable processes, as well as independent human superviso-
ry bodies, especially with regard to bias. Some sources argue 
in favour of subjecting algorithms to regular testing (similar to 
roadworthiness tests for vehicles); others support stricter 
statutory regulation in general, human monitoring (especially 
of objectives), or want the creators of ADM processes to be 
unequivocally responsible for the latter’s results. The remain-
ing recommendations address other aspects, such as giving 
more power to data protection officers, strengthening corpo-
rate data governance or preserving personal data 
sovereignty.
Alongside more general recommendations, when it comes 
to the fragility and autonomy of technical systems (Sec-
tion 9.2.2) some studies specifically address IT/data security, 
while others focus on how to ensure that machine learning 
complies with human rights. The responsibility of (legal) per-
sons for AI actions is most frequently emphasized. Recom-
mendations in the field of IT/data security include promoting 
open standards, maximizing data security, and ensuring the 
intactness, confidentiality and integrity of ICT. They fre-
quently concentrate on preserving human autonomy and 
control over technology, demanding, for example, that there 
be no ‘black-box’ use of AI in core areas of society. Further 
recommendations address in particular the development of a 
European and global AI charter (Metzinger, 2018; Sec-
tion 3.6.3), as well as further ethical elements (e.g. gradual 
technology-based ethics in robotics, ethical and legal stand-
ards for autonomous driving). 
The most frequent demands on the topic of economic and 
political power shifts (Section 9.2.3) relate to ensuring net 
neutrality and a greater decentralization of platforms. The re-
maining recommendations cover a wide range of aspects, 
from empowering citizens to take part in legal processes, to a 
right to non-digital voting, making ICT companies transparent 
for the public, the promotion of societal and economic diver-
sity, and data as a democratically regulated common good. 
Further recommendations address various issues ranging 
from the digital public sphere to software development in line 
with public interest, and effective corporate liability. Beyond 
this, suggestions include modernizing international contracts 
on data security and embedding a collaborative AI ecosystem 
into the corporate strategies of original equipment 
manufacturers.
As regards global governance for the sustainable shaping of 
the Digital Age, which was already touched upon at the end 
of the previous Section (Section 9.3.1), the focus is on the 
further development of international legal frameworks, on 
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to create the political, economic and regulatory frame-
work to reverse these trends and use the potential of 
digitalization to preserve the natural life-support sys-
tems in the long term. Examples of  recommendations 
for selected topics are given in the following.
9.1.1.1 
Promote decarbonization and climate protection 
in the energy sector, avoid rebound effects
For a successful implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment, global energy systems must be largely decarbon-
ized by the middle of the century. Depending on how 
quickly greenhouse-gas emissions decrease, it will be 
necessary in addition to remove CO2 from the atmos-
phere in the medium term to achieve the Agreement’s 
objectives. Another aim is to ensure access to sustain-
able and modern energy for all by 2030 (SDG 7). 
The WBGU recommends working towards an accel-
erated expansion of renewable energies worldwide 
(WBGU, 2016b). In this field, digital technologies are 
increasingly assuming important system-integration 
functions and can make it possible for off-grid regions 
to access electricity. Furthermore, they allow the elec-
trification of sectors that have so far been characterized 
by the use of fossil fuels. However, if the Transforma-
tion towards Sustainability is to succeed, global demand 
for energy must not rise too sharply (WBGU, 2011). In 
order to systematically quantify the potential benefits 
and risks of digital change for the mitigation of climate 
change and to derive starting points for political action, 
the WBGU recommends considering the establishment 
of a Digitalization Commission for Decarbonization. 
Without clear framework conditions, digitalization 
can act as a fire accelerant, driving increasing demand 
for energy and resources as well as greenhouse-gas 
emissions (Section 8.2.2). If billions of new devices are 
integrated in networks over the coming years, the 
demand for energy from data centres and network ser-
vices will increase. The basic prerequisite for exploiting 
the potential of digitalization for energy-system trans-
formation and climate-change mitigation is therefore 
an effective framework of climate and energy policies, 
as already outlined by the WBGU in previous reports 
(WBGU, 2011, 2016b). This involves well-known (but 
insufficiently used) climate-policy instruments such as 
CO2 pricing (Section 9.2.3.2) and the abolition of subsi-
dies for fossil fuels, but also suitable technology pro-
motion. Long-term targets must be set clearly and reli-
ably in order to steer investment in the right direction. 
Timely infrastructure investments are also necessary to 
make smart grids for renewable energies a reality on a 
large scale.
The WBGU also recommends establishing efficiency 
standards for digital solutions and digitalized infra-
structures, as well as, for example, certifying efficient 
data centres in order to counteract rising energy con-
sumption. Energy and resource efficiency should be set 
as dedicated innovation targets for digital technologies 
and applications. In order to give all people access to 
modern energy services in off-grid regions, the WBGU 
also recommends exploiting the potential of ‘virtual 
power plants’ and mini-grids based on renewable ener-
gies. Digital applications can eliminate the need for the 
diesel generators currently still frequently integrated 
into such systems. Mini-grids reach far higher service 
levels than solar home systems, for example, and can 
thus also make productive energy use possible in off-
grid regions. Specific recommendations on the decar-
bonization of energy systems are also to be found in 
Section 5.2.1. 
safeguarding principles of stakeholder diversity by region, 
language, gender and interests, enabling stakeholders to par-
ticipate and interact on an equal footing, as well as on proce-
dural aspects and, above all, internet governance. Other as-
pects range from a data-driven EU economic policy to the 
responsibility of the private sector and the demand that it 
respects human rights.
New normative questions about the future of Homo sapiens 
(Section 9.4) are brought up comparatively rarely, although 
they address heterogeneous issues that differ in terms of top-
icality and scientific basis. Based on the inviolability of hu-
man dignity – also in the Digital Age – discussions cover an 
international convention on ‘neurorights’, the privacy of neu-
ral data and strict regulation of their (re-)sale, physical integ-
rity, and preventing machine decisions on matters of life and 
death. In this context, there are also calls to halt research on 
autonomous weapon systems, not to deploy fully automated 
weapon systems, and for international condemnation of 
drone-based killing. Others also say that the military AI arms 
race should be prevented, as should the creation of a post-bi-
otic consciousness or an artificial subject – or corresponding 
research. However, another source argues that super-intelli-
gence should only be developed in an ethically planned and 
controlled manner.
The list shows that some approaches to shaping sustain-
able digitalization are already being addressed in the special-
ist literature. In this chapter, the WBGU takes up these ideas 
in a way that is thematically broader and more concrete as 
regards content. It should be noted, however, that the previ-
ously analysed material is selective and cannot be represent-
ative, since further publications are appearing all the time. 
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9.1.1.2 
Use the circular economy to improve resource 
 efficiency and avoid electronic waste
A key component of the Transformation towards Sus-
tainability is converting an economy that is now pre-
dominantly geared towards linear value chains into a 
circular economy oriented towards the principles of 
sustainable resource use and based on largely closed 
material cycles (Section 5.2.5). The orientation towards 
the 3Rs (‘reduce, reuse, recycle’) strategy involves a 
system of priorities in which waste avoidance (e.g. 
through eco-design, sufficiency, sharing) takes prece-
dence over reuse (e.g. treatment, repair, re-manufac-
turing) and, finally, recycling as the final option. 
On the one hand, due to the rapidly growing produc-
tion of electronic devices, digitalization is making a sig-
nificant contribution to exacerbating the problems of 
the linear economy by increasing demand for strategic 
metals and adding to the amount of toxic electronic 
waste. On the other hand, digitalization can help to 
make loops visible and close coordination gaps. The 
WBGU therefore recommends a transformative strat-
egy towards a circular economy that looks at the entire 
life-cycle of products at a global level and makes sys-
tematic use of digital technologies. Further essential 
components of this strategy include monitoring mate-
rial flows, establishing regulation in the form of tax and 
contribution systems (Section 9.2.3.2), new business 
models, social innovations, and changes in the cultural 
practices of consumers. 
Digital approaches should help monitor, analyse and, 
where possible, prolong the useful life of equipment, 
replace toxic and environmentally hazardous sub-
stances, prevent exports of electronic waste, and make 
products easier to reuse, repair and recycle. In order to 
start moving in the right direction, a global framework 
for action needs to be based on SDG 12, which defines 
3R obligations. But, first and foremost, national regula-
tions are needed which extend producer responsibility, 
integrate the circular economy into procurement and 
tendering systems, and provide incentives for social 
innovations. 
For example, the collection, reuse and recycling rates 
of electronic waste and other equipment and the recov-
ery of strategic metals can be significantly increased by 
developing a digitally supported, global monitoring 
system for electronic waste, and by tracking and avoid-
ing raw materials from regions of conflict.
The worldwide introduction of a digital ‘passport’ 
for product waste or e-waste using concepts from the 
Internet of Things (IoT; Section 3.3.1) should be exam-
ined. In addition, (digital) options that encourage busi-
nesses and consumers to assume more responsibility 
should be used more and expanded. Ideas for social 
innovations in the population should promote a repair 
culture and raise 3Rs awareness in general, for example 
by supporting repair cafés and platforms for informa-
tion, spare parts and second-hand products, and mak-
ing it simpler to return appliances. Corporate approaches 
should be geared towards durable, repair- and recy-
cling-friendly product designs (e.g. right to repair) and 
towards use-oriented business models (sharing econ-
omy, product-service systems). The use of digital sensor 
technology, robotics and AI in sorting plants for recy-
clable materials can significantly increase their effi-
ciency. Further concrete recommendations are given in 
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.5.
9.1.1.3 
Ensure sustainable land use and ecosystem 
 protection
Sustainable land use is one of the most important issues 
for the future. Protecting soils and land from overuse 
and degradation is decisive in ensuring the supply of 
food and biomass to the growing global population. The 
goal of halting land degradation agreed in the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 
should be vigorously pursued. At the same time, the 
agreement to stop the loss of biological diversity and 
ecosystem services enshrined in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) must be implemented. Digi-
tal technologies and applications can make a contribu-
tion here, as long as the political will is there and the 
corresponding framework conditions are created (Sec-
tion 8.2.3). This is often not the case at present, so that 
it will not be possible to achieve most of the CBD biodi-
versity goals (Aichi goals) unless considerable addi-
tional efforts are made. According to the Global Biodi-
versity Outlook (CBD, 2014), no progress is being made 
in key areas of biodiversity loss – fragmentation, over-
exploitation and loss of natural ecosystems, the spread 
of invasive alien species, and, not least, climate change. 
In fact in some cases the situation is deteriorating. Dig-
ital technologies (e.g. drones or sensors) should increas-
ingly be used to assist in the implementation of goals 
and policies aimed at promoting the protection and sus-
tainable use of biodiversity. For example, digital meth-
ods (e.g. drones or satellites to track herds and animals) 
can be used to counter acute poaching problems in 
Africa. Further recommendations on how ecosystem 
monitoring can be used to conserve biodiversity are 
made in Section 5.2.11. 
At present, most farmers rely on monocultures and 
use large amounts of pesticides and nutrients; this puts 
pressure on ecosystems, their ecosystem services and 
their biodiversity. The aim should be to promote more 
small-scale, ecologically compatible farming methods 
and to use agrochemicals as sparingly as possible. In 
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this respect, precision agriculture offers a wide range of 
possibilities. In developing countries, the opportunities 
offered by digitalized precision agriculture lie primarily 
in a combination of labour-intensive, manual activities 
to cultivate small areas (e.g. manual micro-fertilization 
and irrigation), access to the latest information and 
advisory services, and access to microfinance. Digital 
methods (e.g. digitalized land registers based on block-
chain technologies; Section 3.3.5) can help secure the 
land rights of the local smallholder population. Recom-
mendations on the arenas of precision agriculture and 
the digitalization of agriculture in developing countries 
can be found in Sections 5.2.9 and 5.2.10.
9.1.1.4 
Promote global environmental awareness and 
sustainable consumption through digitalization
Digitalization can support sustainable consumer behav-
iour in a number of ways, and thus make a growing 
global environmental awareness more visible and more 
effective. To this purpose, credible and reliable know-
ledge, data and information in the sense of transforma-
tive education should be made widely available via the 
internet or public-service ICT (Section 9.2.3.1), for 
example on the ecological effects of the manufacture, 
transport, use and disposal or reusability of products. 
Reliable sources of information and supply can support 
consumers’ decision-making and encourage products 
that are more sustainable, more resource-saving or 
more energy-efficient. The WBGU recommends making 
it obligatory for manufacturers and retailers to provide 
information in a digital format on the sustainability of 
products, e.g. the CO2 emissions generated during the 
manufacture and transport of the product, the resources 
used and the product’s social impact (e.g. child labour, 
occupational health and safety). This could be done, for 
example, by means of digital platforms, links to sales 
platforms, or codes on the products. Pre-set sustain-
ability filters in online shops are also conceivable (‘sus-
tainability by default’).
Whether information on sustainability really influ-
ences consumers’ purchasing decisions depends not 
least on whether this information is trusted and whether 
shortcomings in the quality of the information can be 
sanctioned. Here, for example, an extension of manu-
facturers’ or retailers’ warranty obligations (Schlacke et 
al., 2016) could support sustainable purchase and usage 
decisions. A right to repair – including far-reaching 
obligations to disclose the information required for 
repairs conducted by third parties (Kurz and Rieger, 
2018b) – also extends the possibilities for consumers to 
use a product sustainably. 
Digital applications for networking and exploring 
resource-saving lifestyles can have positive effects on 
the environment in the sense of resource conservation. 
The WBGU recommends promoting the development 
and dissemination of digital tools such as platforms for 
resource-saving shared use, ideas like reusing, repair-
ing, sharing and exchanging products, and suitable net-
working possibilities (Sections 5.2.2; 5.2.11). This 
addresses consumption practices and social innovations 
for implementing the circular economy and the 3Rs 
strategy of ‘reduce, reuse, recycle’. Potential user 
groups should also be involved in product development 
as early as possible, for example when drawing up 
usage scenarios or designing software for platform 
cooperatives (Section 5.3.6). Platforms for sharing can 
also be created as part of a public-service ICT strategy 
(Section 5.3.5; Section 9.2.3.1; Peuckert and Pentzien, 
2018: 56). 
Consumer-protection organizations should be 
strengthened both financially and institutionally in 
order to enforce consumer and environmental protec-
tion in an integrative manner via digital solutions, e.g. 
in online commerce. These associations have a control 
function which they can exercise via their right to issue 
warnings and to file collective action lawsuits. How-
ever, they can only also perform this function for new 
forms of digitalized consumption if they have enough 
personnel and institutional capacity.
The above recommendations can help in further 
developing the lighthouse initiative entitled ‘Ways and 
building blocks of a digital agenda for sustainable con-
sumption’ of the German Federal Ministry for the Envi-
ronment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) and the German Federal Environmental Agency 
(UBA). Further examples of recommendations can be 
found in the arenas on online commerce ( Section 5.3.2.4), 
on global environmental awareness (Section 5.3.1), on 
consumer behaviour (Section 5.2.3), on electronic 
waste and the circular economy (Section 5.2.11) and on 
alternative economics (Section 5.2.2). 
9.1.1.5 
Involve companies in designing a digitalized, 
sustainable future economy
Companies exert a decisive influence on the sustain-
ability of goods production through their raw-material 
and energy requirements, production methods, distri-
bution logistics, and their handling of by-products and 
residual materials. As users of digital technologies, e.g. 
for optimizing material input and process organization, 
they also have particular potential for constructively 
combining digitalization and sustainability. They should 
therefore be more actively integrated than hitherto into 
shaping a sustainable, digital future economy 
( Section 4.2.2) that uses and leverages the value of 
innovative technologies for resource-saving, low- 
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emission production methods. As ‘agents of change’, 
specialized service companies have long been offering 
companies technical and organizational environmental 
advice and helping them to make their production more 
energy- and resource-efficient (Schulz, 2005). If the 
development and use of efficiency-enhancing digital 
tools is specifically promoted by important actors like 
sustainability consultants (e.g. public authorities or 
industry associations providing such tools and 
best-practice recommendations free of charge), they 
will be able to support sustainable industrial and com-
mercial production in large parts of the economy even 
more effectively in the future. The international expan-
sion of initiatives that are already coordinating and sys-
tematically supporting collaborations between compa-
nies and environmental consultants with the help of 
digital platforms (e.g. the Austrian government’s Öko-
BusinessPlan in Vienna) can also help boost demand for 
corporate consulting on sustainability. 
The WBGU also recommends extending incentive 
schemes (e.g. certificates) to producers themselves in 
addition to tax regulations (Section 9.2.3.2). Unlike the 
latter requirements, certificates can have a positive, 
motivating effect on corporate sustainability behaviour 
and potentially involve large sections of the workforce 
in initiatives to achieve certification. The aim here is to 
stimulate the global spread of an enhanced sense of 
responsibility on the part of the private sector for digi-
tally supported sustainable production. Especially if 
companies can combine their environmental targets 
with marketing and competitive advantages, this moti-
vates the use of digitalization for sustainable produc-
tion. Incentives can be generated by new, special prod-
uct labels for products of the digital economy (e.g. as in 
the case of the Blue Angel and bluesign), which become 
more attractive and credible with the help of digital 
documentation (e.g. using blockchains) or by integrat-
ing digitally optimized testing methods. The same 
applies to international seals of quality or audit-based 
certifications of sustainable action by companies when 
they introduce digital technologies (further develop-
ment of approaches to corporate socio-environmental 
or digital responsibility; Loew and Rohde, 2013; Visser 
and Tolhurst, 2017). Companies, their products and 
services that have been certified in this way should be 
given preference in public tender procedures, e.g. in ICT 
infrastructure procurement. Also relevant in this con-
text is the call for more eco-certified product ranges to 
support sustainable consumption (Section 5.2.3). The 
design and effectiveness of such seals of quality for 
sustainability could be monitored by an independent 
testing organization.
As far as the regulatory framework is concerned, in 
the EU Committee of Experts and in the standardization 
committees Germany should champion internationally 
valid EMAS and ISO standards to make comprehensive 
and systematic use of the potential of digitalization for 
saving resources in production processes. The stan-
dards for environmental management systems like 
EMAS and ISO 14000 can be made even more demand-
ing and checked more effectively if digitalized monitor-
ing and control procedures are applied and consistently 
integrated. The results of the conferences of the World 
Circular Economy Forum (2017 and 2018) offer start-
ing points for establishing internationally valid stan-
dards on a digitally optimized certification strategy for 
corporate environmental management (Section 5.2.1).
Further starting points for Germany, integrated in 
the EU, can be found in the promotion of innovation 
and the economy. For example, BMBF or EU calls for 
tenders for international corporate cooperation proj-
ects, e.g. in product development or for joint R&D 
activities by companies and research institutions, can 
be directed specifically towards using digitalization on 
a broad front to make goods production more sustain-
able (e.g. enshrined in the Horizon Europe programme). 
The same applies to funding initiatives for spin-off 
companies that apply innovative ideas from research 
institutions, universities, colleges or established com-
panies and implement them in an entrepreneurial way. 
Regional funding formats should also set priorities here 
(e.g. BMBF-supported cluster funding, incentives for 
innovation-oriented regional development, the Smart 
Specialization approach of EU regional funding; Foray, 
2014; Morgan, 2017). New alliances and innovative 
companies can be formed that can establish the mutu-
ally beneficial interplay of digitalization and sustain-
ability at the global level as a model for modern indus-
trial development, raising it to a new, contemporary 
standard: ‘Industry 5.0’ (examples of recommendations 
on the field of global goods production are listed in 
 Section 5.2.3). 
9 .1 .2 
Poverty reduction and inclusive development
Assessments of the potential of 
digital technologies for devel-
opment cooperation (DC) range 
from highly ‘techno-optimistic’ 
notions that ‘everything will be 
solved digitally’ to those who 
consider digital change to be of 
little significance in solving the core problems of human 
development. The WBGU shows that digitalization 
dynamics influence the implementation of all 17 SDGs. 
This means that digital drivers of change must be sys-
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tematically taken into account across sectors in cooper-
ation with developing countries and emerging econ-
omies. Digitalization should become a cross-cutting 
task of DC. Digital expertise should therefore be signifi-
cantly expanded in development ministries and organ-
izations, but also in the public institutions of the part-
ner countries. Special attention should be paid to the 
fact that, through automation, digital processes gener-
ate structural change in the international division of 
labour that will change the patterns of integration of 
developing countries into the world economy. At the 
same time, digital platforms are creating new employ-
ment opportunities in developing countries. Coopera-
tion in economic, employment and innovation policy 
must systematically take these digital instruments of 
change into account. The digital possibilities for improv-
ing resource and climate efficiency and simultaneously 
reducing rebound effects, e.g. through price incentives, 
should also be mobilized. Cooperation with emerging 
economies will focus more on dialogue, scientific col-
laborations and cooperation to jointly shape global dig-
ital change: since developing countries and emerging 
economies are important partners in global governance, 
cross-border challenges of digitalization should be dis-
cussed and addressed. Against this background, the 
WBGU sets out below some examples of priorities in 
the areas of infrastructure and education, improved 
data applications in DC, urban development and mobil-
ity (Sections 5.2.7, 5.2.8).
9.1.2.1 
Strengthen the analogue basis
The use of digital technologies to reduce poverty (SDG 
1) can only succeed if the necessary analogue basis is in 
place (World Development Report, ‘Digital Dividends’; 
World Bank, 2016). First of all, infrastructures need to 
be developed, affordable access to ICT created and dig-
ital skills promoted. A strategy to make use of digital 
technology’s potential for rural development must, 
above all, close these analogue gaps to prevent the dig-
ital divide between the poor and rich parts of the world 
population from widening even further. An important 
measure for successfully exploiting the potential of dig-
italization for poverty reduction is therefore ensuring 
that DC has the corresponding resources and know-
ledge. 
If these conditions are met, digitalization offers many 
opportunities for poverty reduction, especially in rural 
areas of developing countries and emerging economies, 
where the infrastructure is often underdeveloped. It 
facilitates, for example, improved access to educational 
programmes (Section 5.6.2), health services (online con-
sultations), financial services (loans, payment systems 
by mobile phone), markets, weather information and 
agricultural advice (Section 5.3.2), government services 
(e.g. digital identities) and employment opportunities 
made available via digital platforms (Section 5.3.4). 
Blockchain-based solutions can simultaneously make the 
population less dependent on financial services that are 
hard to find in many places. However, if they are to be 
widely used, digital solutions must be adapted to local 
languages and  cultural conditions.
9.1.2.2 
Improve development cooperation and planning 
with digital technologies
DC instruments can potentially be improved using dig-
ital technologies. It is important here to combine data-
driven approaches with local and context-specific 
understanding. Areas of application include humanitar-
ian aid (e.g. combating epidemics or natural disasters), 
supervising bycatch and fishing quotas in the fishing 
industry, and replenishing stocks (e.g. vaccines). The 
use of digital technologies also offers great potential for 
monitoring – from environmental observation (Sec-
tion 5.2.11) to measuring progress in development.
Data applications can also be used in development 
planning. For example, real-time data generated by dig-
ital technologies make timely decision-making and 
project management possible: ongoing development 
activities can be steered and adapted and any problems 
that crop up immediately solved. However, there are 
many barriers, such as a lack of trust in data quality, 
inadequate knowledge of the available data, data that 
cannot be suitably translated into information, and 
information that is not tailored to the actors’ needs 
(Pawelke et al., 2017). Countering this requires the cor-
responding expertise, as well as institutional capacity 
and responsibility, e.g. data officers or data-protection 
officers. The use of data for development ultimately 
poses the same challenges to data protection and pri-
vacy as the use of data in general (Section 9.2.6). 
9.1.2.3 
Gear the digitalization of cities to sustainability 
and inclusiveness
Enshrine technological sovereignty in urban 
development
Cities and the worldwide power of urbanization are 
 crucial for the Transformation towards Sustainability. 
At the same time, cities are key arenas of digital change 
(WBGU, 2016a; Section 4.2.5). In this context, urban 
digitalization must not only be seen as a technocratic 
optimization task; rather, any use of technology should 
be explicitly embedded in an ecologically sustainable 
and socially inclusive form of urban development. This 
means systematically combining the implementation of 
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the New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat, 2016b) and the 
SDGs (particularly SDG 11: ‘Sustainable cities and set-
tlements’) with urban digitalization policy. If the use of 
digital technologies in urban development in the inter-
ests of the common good is to succeed, municipalities 
and urban societies must retain formative sovereignty, 
build up technological sovereignty, and develop into 
platform providers. To this end, digital (technological) 
sovereignty should be robustly anchored in urban 
development processes. The ‘right to the city’, extended 
by a digital dimension, should be recognized, and 
corresponding civil-society and science-driven initia-
tives should be promoted. In addition, more personnel 
and institutional attention needs to be devoted to the 
digitalization issue. While many cities and municipali-
ties have already taken this step, cities in developing 
countries and emerging economies in particular have a 
lot of catching up to do. Local authorities should make 
it a priority to create positions for data officers, 
data-protection officers and digital innovation officers, 
as well as competence centres for digitalization in 
municipal administrations (Sections 5.2.7).
Many ongoing projects on digital urban develop-
ment are only partially related to sustainability issues 
and tend to be on too small a scale; or else their com-
mitment to sustainability requirements are predomi-
nantly only rhetorical, without any consequences for 
project design. For example, the current lighthouse 
projects under the EU Smart Cities and Communities 
Initiative only address the topics of energy and mobil-
ity, without taking up other aspects of sustainable dig-
ital urban development. Although the innovation plat-
form on the City of the Future (BMBF, 2018c) has the 
necessary objectives, the projects still seem relatively 
small-scale. In the WBGU’s opinion, therefore, there is 
a need for regional, substantial support for real-world 
laboratories that can provide the necessary impetus for 
sustainable, digitally supported urban development. 
This should be accompanied by the development of 
sustainability indicators for cities that can, among other 
things, map the SDGs and how they are affected by dig-
italization.
Create urban data spaces 
An urban data space denotes “the space in which urban 
data are generated and processed” (Schieferdecker et 
al., 2018: 219). This refers to all the data that are rele-
vant to urban development, including data generated 
and collected in cities. Urban data spaces are thus the 
foundation of a participatory, scalable and future-ori-
ented digitalization of the public space. A prerequisite 
for the development of an urban data space is an inven-
tory of the municipal data pool and the local ICT infra-
structure. Building on this, a strategy should be devel-
oped for the use of the urban data space based on the 
identification of the strategic fields of action that are 
central to urban development. From a global perspec-
tive, such an approach is also recommended for urban 
development policy, as well as for the implementation 
of the New Urban Agenda and the SDGs (Section 5.2.7). 
If municipalities rely on individual manufacturers or 
operators to design their ICT infrastructures (Sec-
tion 3.5.5), a cost-intensive dependency can arise. As a 
general rule, openness in the sense of standards-based 
interfaces, formats and services that are accessible not 
only to manufacturers or operators but also to a wide 
range of actors should be demanded when purchasing 
systems and products or when outsourcing, in order to 
avoid vendor lock-ins (Schieferdecker et al., 2018). Pri-
vate providers that collect data in the public domain 
should be required to report to local authorities and 
submit aggregations of the data. 
In order to involve all actors in urban development 
via urban digital platforms (Sections 3.6, 4.1), open 
interfaces and formats, as well as a conformity of stan-
dards for interoperable value-added services, should be 
mandatory requirements in the realization of urban 
digital platforms. Furthermore, every software compo-
nent commissioned by the public sector should be made 
available as open-source software for use or further 
development by third parties. This is the only way to 
create a dynamic ecosystem of different products with-
out creating a producer dependency that excludes 
potentially relevant actors from the urban digital plat-
form (DIN SPEC OUP; DIN, 2016).
9.1.2.4 
Embed the use of digital technologies into 
 sustainable and inclusive mobility strategies
Sustainable mobility is an important aspect of the 2030 
Agenda. In the following, the WBGU concentrates on 
one aspect: personal urban mobility. Solving key prob-
lems of urban transport systems (e.g. high CO2 and 
air-pollutant emissions, land consumption, noise pollu-
tion, rising travel and transport times, and accident 
risks) is likewise not a purely technical matter; rather, 
the decisive issue will be how digital solutions are 
embedded into comprehensive concepts of sustainable 
urban mobility. However, digitalization plays an impor-
tant role in the discourse on the future of mobility, 
since sustainability potential is attributed to a combina-
tion of intelligent transport technology, shared mobility 
(e.g. car sharing, bike sharing, ride-sharing services) or 
mobility as a service, electromobility and autonomous 
driving. Mobility systems should be developed at an 
early stage based on the guiding principle of sustain-
able mobility. Development should be guided by demo-
cratically legitimized institutions, not by vehicle manu-
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facturers or digital companies; the well-being of people 
must be at the centre of attention. The WBGU therefore 
recommends (further) developing guiding principles 
and implementation plans for digitally supported, sus-
tainable urban mobility at the level of the cities in 
cooperation with the national level. Such urban, spatial 
and transport planning should focus on health and 
quality of life.
Digitalization can make an important contribution to 
the promotion of sustainable mobility by making soci-
etal transport-sector costs transparent. The new digital 
technologies are making instruments available that can 
record and price external effects such as emissions, land 
consumption, loss of time, etc., in near real-time; they 
include intelligent traffic-control systems using time- 
and congestion-dependent toll systems or the corre-
sponding pricing of mobility as a service. At the same 
time, unjustified subsidies must be reduced. However, 
these measures must be embedded into sustainable and 
inclusive mobility strategies, also because of their dis-
tributional impacts.
In order to preserve the formative sovereignty of 
public decision-makers in the field of sustainable 
mobility, measures should be taken to prevent individ-
ual private-sector actors from obtaining a monopolistic 
concentration of data and from gaining market-domi-
nating positions (e.g. sharing providers, mobility-ser-
vice providers), since access to data is increasingly a 
prerequisite for planning and controlling digitalized 
mobility. In addition, public actors must be enabled to 
collect and use digital data for specific purposes them-
selves. Particular attention must also be paid to data 
protection and to protecting people from surveillance. 
Position and mobility data are particularly sensitive – 
e.g. because even after anonymization they can, in cer-
tain circumstances, be used to identify the bearer and 
thus to assign further independent data sets to this per-
son. Accordingly, privacy issues should already be rou-
tinely taken into account when planning such projects, 
and the protection of the individual from surveillance 
should be embedded in the digital solutions. 
In developing countries and emerging economies, 
ensuring that poorer population groups have access to 
mobility services should also be a priority (SDG 11). In 
addition to access to public transport services, priority 
should be given to safety and to providing space for 
walking and cycling (walkability and bikeability). 
Among other things, this requires political attentive-
ness and investment in infrastructures for non-motor-
ized transport, which should not be pushed into the 
background by a focus on superficially more visible, 
large-scale projects.
9 .1 .3 
Work in the future and reducing inequality
The world of work and the 
labour markets face profound 
structural changes in the fore-
seeable future. Digital techno-
logical progress is fundamen-
tally changing job require-
ments and job profiles in labour 
markets. What is especially 
different by historical comparison is the breadth of the 
skills and jobs affected and the speed with which the 
changes are taking place. This new scale of labour sub-
stitution coincides with an equally far-reaching struc-
tural change in some regions, caused by the phasing out 
of fossil energies made necessary by climate policy and 
the abandonment of technologies associated with the 
process. The WBGU believes that the main societal and 
political challenges that are already predictable today 
will lie in dealing with the impact of the structur-
al-change processes on income distribution caused by 
digitalization and decarbonization. These are unfolding 
in very different dimensions: between human work and 
other, in some cases new factors of value creation, 
between work involving different qualifications, 
between generations, and between different regions 
and countries. Ultimately, the key challenge will be to 
avoid societal disruptions and simultaneously organiz-
ing societal change in such a way that the employment 
opportunities that will also exist in the future can fulfil 
the societal functions that gainful employment has 
today. However, the WBGU also sees this process as an 
opportunity to design more sustainable working envi-
ronments. More detailed recommendations in these 
areas can be found in the arenas on ‘Sustainable work-
places of the future’ (Section 5.3.9) and the ‘Interna-
tional division of labour’ (Section 5.3.8).
9.1.3.1 
Discuss work in the future as a sustainability task
The WBGU sees a need for action in the design and 
socio-political monitoring of the foreseeable structural 
change in qualifications and job profiles, so that those 
who are negatively affected are not left behind, and, 
overall, social cohesion is not endangered by the threat 
of inequality. This also includes maintaining the finan-
cial room for manoeuvre of the state and social security 
systems against the background of labour’s increasing 
mobility, the possibility of falling employment levels, 
and other changes in the economic structure. A reform 
of the financing systems of the state and public institu-
tions also appears advisable in order to reduce the tax 
incentives to replace human labour. In many countries, 
9 Recommendations for Action
356
these result from the high level of taxation on earned 
income that still exists today, raising the general wage 
level and making labour more expensive relative to 
other factors. A revenue-neutral reduction in the tax 
burden on earned income could, for example, be 
achieved in the context of a comprehensive social-eco-
logical tax reform involving appropriate pricing of envi-
ronmental impacts and resource consumption (Sec-
tion 9.2.3.2).
In addition, the WBGU recommends a continuous 
and fundamental examination of the societal functions 
of work. Even if people continue to work, the question 
is how employment will be embedded and organized in 
society in the future so that the societal functions 
attributed to gainful employment today may perhaps 
be guaranteed even more broadly and comprehensively 
than they are now. To this end, new, extended guiding 
principles of work must be developed and established 
in society. If today’s forms of gainful employment 
become less important, a societal consensus will also be 
needed on new approaches and mechanisms for ensur-
ing everyone’s economic and societal inclusion (Sec-
tion 9.1.3.3). However, new educational contents and 
formats are also needed to enable more people to expe-
rience self-efficacy and a meaning in life, without these 
being linked to work and gainful employment to the 
same extent as hitherto.
In addition to shaping and systematically reviewing 
such new blueprints for society, the WBGU believes 
that much attention should also be paid to the question 
of how the transition and the phase of necessary soci-
etal change can succeed without growing inequality 
and fears about the future jeopardizing social cohesion 
and, ultimately, political stability. On the one hand, an 
early debate serves to help society prepare and to safe-
guard it against the challenges posed by the double 
structural change brought about by digitalization and 
sustainability transformation. On the other hand, in the 
WBGU’s view, it promises an opportunity to actively 
develop and establish new and broader possibilities for 
leading a self-determined life and for individual devel-
opment within planetary guard rails.
9.1.3.2 
Secure and promote social standards in occupatio-
nal health and safety
In view of the increasing international mobility of 
labour, for example through the spread of digital work 
platforms, the WBGU regards securing and promoting 
occupational health-and-safety standards and social 
security for employees as a key element in shaping 
structural change in labour markets. In order to prevent 
the exploitation of workers and the bypassing of 
national regulations on occupational health and safety, 
the WBGU recommends an international initiative to 
develop and establish (minimum) standards of occupa-
tional health and safety and social security that are as 
global as possible and include the digital domain. On 
the probably long road to such an international agree-
ment, national approaches and regulations must also be 
discussed and strengthened to oblige companies to 
comply with national minimum standards when out-
sourcing and relocating work, thus turning employees 
into quasi-self-employed workers. The targeted promo-
tion of alternative, e.g. cooperative corporate forms can 
also potentially contribute to improving safeguards for 
social standards. Promoting a stronger organization of 
employees with the newly emerging status of 
 quasi-self-employment is also conceivable in order to 
increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis companies. 
In addition, the WBGU believes that in the discus-
sion on occupational health and safety and on what 
constitutes ‘decent work’, new aspects that are becom-
ing particularly controversial in the course of digitaliza-
tion should be given greater consideration and included 
e.g. in the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
definition of ‘decent work’ (ILO, 2018: 9). Examples 
include possibilities such as workplace surveillance (e.g. 
recording work steps on the computer, etc.) and the 
safety and health of workers in times of new digitalized 
tools (technologies for improving human performance, 
e.g. exoskeletons).
9.1.3.3 
Monitor and improve the functioning of labour 
markets
Apart from the financial ability to act of public institu-
tions (Section 9.4), continuous monitoring of labour 
markets is necessary for an informed debate on the 
future of work and to shape structural change, for 
example through programmes of further education. 
Against this background, the WBGU recommends using 
the extended possibilities for collecting and processing 
information via digitalization specifically for these pur-
poses, especially in developing countries. Furthermore, 
technical decision-assisting systems can be used to sim-
plify search processes on labour markets and to reduce 
friction. For example, labour recruitment could be 
improved by introducing new search and matching 
algorithms that bring job seekers and potential employ-
ers together through an intelligent registration of occu-
pations, qualifications and activities, despite increas-
ingly differentiated occupational profiles. However, 
such approaches should only be pursued if it can be 
ensured that the decision-making assistance systems 
are non-discriminatory. 
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9.1.3.4 
Develop and comprehensively test new 
 distribution mechanisms
The WBGU sees the danger that, in the course of digital 
change, the remuneration of gainful employment will 
contribute less and less to ensuring economic inclusion 
and a balanced distribution of income, even if extreme 
scenarios of complete automation do not become reality. 
There is a threat of increasing inequality between and 
within societies and countries both from a growing dis-
parity between the salaries of workers with different 
qualifications and from the declining importance of 
labour compared to other assets and factors, and corre-
spondingly of earned income compared to profit income.
The establishment or further development of social 
security systems is necessary to be able to counter the 
threat of growing inequality, especially in the near 
future, and to be able to help people who cannot keep 
up with the pace of technological progress. New forms 
of social security such as time banks (Section 5.2.2.1) 
can provide support here. In the WBGU’s view, the meth-
ods and scope of continuing vocational training should 
also be expanded and institutionally anchored more 
firmly; in view of the speed of technological and socie-
tal change, this is of great importance for securing eco-
nomic inclusion (Sections 5.3.4, 9.1.4).
A combination of traditional social security and struc-
tural policy in the narrower sense of the word could fall 
a long way short of the mark, especially in the longer 
term, if the aim is to ensure broad participation by the 
population in value creation and avoid more extreme 
inequality. New concepts of redistribution and partici-
pation must therefore already be developed at an early 
stage and examined in feasibility studies. Such distribu-
tion mechanisms and their societal acceptance are key 
elements of new, expanded definitions of work and the 
drafts of society based on them. Possible approaches 
that need to be examined more thoroughly and system-
atically than hitherto are forms of an (unconditional) 
basic income or opportunities for broader participation 
in enterprises and their economic gains from  digitalization, 
for example by establishing and promoting cooperative 
corporate forms (Section 5.2.2). Finally, the state can 
also contribute to the upgrading of societally important, 
but currently hardly paid or unpaid work by, for exam-
ple, transforming such work into formal employment 
relationships or financially supporting them through tax 
relief. Just like the use of social security systems to cush-
ion the effects of structural change in the shorter term, 
however, this presupposes a stabilization and strength-
ening of the state’s financial room for manoeuvre, which 
must be achieved by reforming and adapting tax and 
contribution systems to the challenges of digitalization 
and exploiting its potential ( Section 9.3.2.2). 
9.1.3.5 
International division of labour: prepare for 
 structural change
The changes in qualification requirements and the new, 
more extensive possibilities of automation as a result of 
digital technological progress also affect the economic 
integration of developing countries and emerging econ-
omies into global value chains. From the sustainability 
point of view, there is therefore a fundamental dimen-
sion of distributional effects between industrialized 
countries on the one hand, and developing countries 
and emerging economies on the other. 
In the future, it will be possible for many of the activ-
ities outsourced to developing countries and emerging 
economies to be taken over by technical systems and 
relocated closer to domestic markets and end consumers 
Past development models in which locational advantages 
were exploited by the international division of labour 
will thus be called into question. At the same time, new 
access routes are being created by digital platforms and 
by the possibility of offering services worldwide, regard-
less of location. In the WBGU’s view, more attention 
should be paid to this global dimension of structural 
change in the future. It should be examined more closely 
whether, and under what conditions, new, sustainable 
development models are generated by digital change and 
by newly emerging forms of work and employment rela-
tionships on digital platforms. A key factor will be to 
build up ICT infrastructures in developing countries and 
emerging economies to counter the danger of a new dig-
ital divide. This should be accompanied by the develop-
ment of skills in handling and developing digital tech-
nologies, as well as corresponding investment in educa-
tion and training. 
In order to strengthen the opportunities for sustain-
able development, the WBGU furthermore believes 
that internationally applicable minimum standards of 
occupational health and safety should also be agreed on 
for digital platforms. Digitalization offers the potential 
here to globally check and enforce compliance with 
such obligations and standards.
9 .1 .4 
Knowledge, education and digital literacy 
People are socialized beings 
searching for meaning. Their 
education accompanies the 
development of personality, 
orientation in social and natu-
ral environments, and how 
they create and deal with 
change. “Since wars begin in 
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the minds of men and women, it is in the minds of men 
and women that the defences of peace must be con-
structed,” according to the constitution of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) of 1945. Therefore, in order to shape 
the future in a peaceful and sustainable way, people 
need educational content and formats that can meet 
the respective challenges. The requirements of educa-
tion for sustainable development and global citizenship 
have been systematically recorded in the meantime, yet 
they have only rarely been consistently implemented. 
Today, demands for digital competence are growing 
louder. The WBGU proposes bringing the respective 
approaches together in a concept of future education; 
the corresponding resources must be earmarked and 
obligations enforced to ensure that this concept is sys-
tematically disseminated on a broad base. 
9.1.4.1 
Plan education for the digitalized sustainability 
society at an early stage
There is still a quite a lot of uncertainty about the effects 
of rapid, digitally induced socio-technical and societal 
change. As a result, the question of the most suitable 
educational ideal and suitable instruments and formats 
continues to gain in significance. Important, relevant 
skills are known from concepts of Education for Sustain-
able Development (ESD); these include multi-perspec-
tivity and critical reflection, creativity, innovation capa-
bility, the ability to engage in dialogue, dealing with 
uncertainties, and self-control. They correspond in many 
respects to the outlined educational needs for dealing 
with digital change and increasingly complex work con-
texts. Media education is becoming more important here 
and should be enriched and extended by basic know-
ledge about digital technologies and their history, tech-
nology-impact assessment, and the qualities of digital 
information spaces. In this way, people can maintain 
their literacy (vis-à-vis socio-technical systems, their 
manufacturers and operators, as well as the latter’s inter-
ests) and, at the same time, react flexibly and openly to 
new technical possibilities and developments. Personal-
ity formation, self-management skills and compassion 
not only help in dealing constructively with uncertainty, 
global solidarity and transformative developments, they 
are also discussed as unique features of humans com-
pared to digital and digitalized technology, including AI. 
With this in mind, a future-oriented Education and Train-
ing Pact for the 21st century should be concluded at the 
national and international level. The prerequisite for this 
is that access to education within and between countries 
is guaranteed for all. The WBGU has developed more 
detailed recommendations here for the arena of educa-
tion (Section 5.3.4). 
9.1.4.2 
Negotiate a Future Education Pact
In the context of the renewal of the World Action Pro-
gramme on Education for Sustainable Development, 
Germany’s Federal Government can use the coordina-
tion structures created between the federal and the 
state level to advance the integration of current skills 
requirements from different angles:
 > Transformation skills: These are fundamental for a 
context of profound and rapid changes in what is 
familiar and for a resultant increase in the role of 
ethical-normative questions as orientation in shap-
ing the new (e.g. philosophy, cognitive flexibility 
and complexity, critical, innovative thinking, and 
dealing with uncertainty and loss). 
 > Sustainability skills: These are oriented towards the 
aim that newly emerging technological, social, insti-
tutional and economic solutions should make human 
well-being possible within planetary guard rails, 
while respecting dignity and diversity. Examples 
include systemic thinking, the integration of scien-
tific, social-scientific and technical knowledge, and 
dealing with multi-perspectivity and normative 
weightings.
 > Anticipation skills: These are specifically geared 
towards reflection on how theories, concepts and 
assumptions about reality affect visions of the 
future and how these visions of the future in turn 
impact on actions and decisions in the present. 
Examples include the targeted search for divergent 
points of view, sensitivity to the structural power of 
established knowledge and practices, as well as 
empirical knowledge and learning through experi-
ence or simulation. 
 > Digital skills: These are important specifically for the 
new technical, organizational, social and (self-)regu-
latory challenges posed by digitalization. Examples 
include understanding digital technologies, methods 
and option spaces, handling digital media and 
sources of knowledge, digital business models, and 
the socio-technical and psychological effects of dig-
itally mediated communication or control.
9.1.4.3 
Take education seriously as an investment in the 
future 
In addition to an Education Pact, in which the main 
content priorities are defined, a plan for its consistent 
implementation is also needed. Joint financing of the 
DigitalPact for Schools can only be a first step here, and 
its time period is too brief. With regard to the successful 
implementation of the decisions on ESD, there are pro-
posals that include, for example, a roadmap of ten years 
and €14 billion in investment (Alliance for Future Edu-
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cation). A correspondingly larger undertaking is 
required for additional content and equipment. In the 
context of continuing vocational training, it is particu-
larly important to strengthen future-oriented offerings 
in sectors and regions that are affected by intensive 
change processes. Germany continues to rank in the 
lower quarter among OECD countries in terms of its 
expenditure on education; the infrastructure quality 
and staffing levels are inadequate in many schools and 
day-care centres, and large fluctuations in equipment 
and quality have long been documented. For these rea-
sons, the WBGU recommends a major investment initi-
ative in future education that also systematically tack-
les inequalities in the field of inclusion in education. 
Effective evaluation procedures should be drawn up 
through close cooperation with pioneers from educa-
tional practice (kindergartens, schools, colleges, univer-
sities, further-education institutions, municipalities, 
civil society) and ensure a high level of ambition. 
9.1.4.4 
Provide prominent support for the Global 
Action Programme on Education for Sustainable 
 Development
According to the review of SDG 4 – “Ensure inclusive 
and equitable quality education and promote lifelong 
learning opportunities for all” – at the 2019 United 
Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable 
Development (UN, 2019), the focus in international 
cooperation should also shift from monitoring to imple-
mentation barriers and to seeking more institutional 
and financial support for achieving the educational 
goals. 
9.1.4.5 
Understand and organize knowledge as an integral 
part of shaping the future 
Especially in times of societal upheaval with a high level 
of uncertainty about what changes are to be expected, 
the selection and quality of knowledge is of particular 
importance for the legitimacy of decisions and the 
anticipation of possible consequences. Public authori-
ties are very important for the task of creating a soci-
etal, facts-oriented understanding of plausible, possible 
and desirable futures and their political and technolog-
ical design. Results, especially on controversial topics, 
should be readily accessible to the public and presented 
in a way that is easy to understand. Institutions like the 
Science Media Centre are good as a first step, but no 
longer sufficient in times of more and more communi-
cation via social media unmediated by journalists. Fur-
thermore, futures literacy and anticipation – disciplines 
that reflect on prevailing assumptions of reality as fac-
tors that will shape ideas and assessments of the future 
– should be incorporated, specifically promoted as a 
new research field and educational topic, and system-
atically integrated into the further development of 
futurology, forecasting and technology-impact assess-
ment. 
9 .2
Digital revolution brings new sustainability chal-
lenges
The worldwide spread of digital technologies has given 
rise to specific risks, challenges and opportunities; 
although implicitly outlined in the 2030 Agenda’s sus-
tainability model, in many cases the scope of these fac-
tors has not been explicitly formulated (Section  8.3). 
The following recommendations on the topics of pri-
vacy, fragility and autonomy of technical systems, and 
economic and political power shifts show, by way of 
example, possible ways of meeting these challenges. 
9 .2 .1 
Big data and privacy
There is still no common under-
standing on how to handle data 
– either globally or within soci-
eties (Sections 8.3.1, 8.3.2). 
Data collection, data fusion, 
data trading and data use are 
largely not transparent. In 
many cases, decisions made on 
the basis of data evaluations cannot currently be 
tracked, and there is a lack of individual control over 
one’s own data, their exploitation or resale. In return 
for seemingly cost-free services provided by (digital) 
companies, communication and behavioural data are 
collected and used whose value is unknown to the indi-
vidual. Control over large quantities of personality pro-
files can furthermore open up possibilities for influenc-
ing societal and democratic decision-making that 
threaten the foundations of democratic processes. This 
not only poses a fundamental challenge to the market 
and to democracy, but ultimately also to people’s dig-
nity through a possible erosion of their autonomy 
(Christl and Spiekermann, 2016: 118ff.). The WBGU 
rejects not only private but also (and especially) state 
mass surveillance, since it is in fact fundamentally con-
trary to its professed aim of protecting democracy and 
destroys its foundations.
In view of big data’s contribution to the impression 
that the technical conditions for a totalitarian dictator-
ship have never been “as favourable as they are today” 
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(Grunwald, 2018: 54), the development is showing its 
darker side: “Modern man has made his environment 
and his coexistence largely machine-readable, i.e. pre-
dictable” (Ullrich, 2017: 188). It is therefore important 
to defend and preserve human and fundamental rights 
to privacy and freedom of opinion as the basis of free, 
democratic, peaceful and sovereign societies in the long 
term. For this it is essential to promote not only data 
protection, data security, informational self-determina-
tion and freedom from manipulation, but also data 
quality at national, European and global levels (Sec-
tions 9.2.1.1, 9.2.1.2), and to preserve and protect the 
digital public sphere and digital discourse spaces (Sec-
tion 9.2.1.3). The protection of privacy and the demo-
cratic public sphere in the Digital Age should therefore 
be systematically taken into account in the implemen-
tation of the SDGs, and strengthened with the goal of 
enshrining the topic in a post-2030 process. Recom-
mendations in this area can also be found in Sec-
tion 5.3.2; for recommendations on self-care apps and 
handling digital health data, see Section 5.3.7. 
9.2.1.1 
Strengthen public- and private-sector responsibi-
lity for privacy protection
The WBGU endorses the recommendations on the pro-
tection of privacy and the strengthening of individual 
sovereignty submitted by the National Academy of 
Sciences Leopoldina (2018) and the Advisory Council 
for Consumer Affairs (SVRV, 2017). In particular, due to 
the complexity of the topic, states should recruit more 
appropriate personnel with broad interdisciplinary 
competence to data(-protection) authorities in order to 
optimally safeguard users’ data-protection rights vis-à-
vis private and public actors. To improve the protection 
of citizens from the excessive use of data by state intel-
ligence services, parliaments must be given more effec-
tive rights to monitor secret-service data collection. 
The EU should perceive and develop data security 
and data protection as a future locational advantage; it 
should operationalize the level of protection offered by 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 
a practicable way and, where necessary, further develop 
it (Section 9.3.2.2). Civil society is an important voice 
for the enforcement of individual privacy protection. 
The WBGU therefore recommends supporting NGOs 
active in this field both through communicative 
exchanges with data-protection authorities and through 
scientific research (Section 10.2.4.3). NGOs should be 
empowered to contribute preventively by participating 
in preliminary procedures such as privacy and data-pro-
tection impact assessments or through complaint and 
redress mechanisms. While the responsibility must not 
be shifted onto individuals, each person should be able 
to contribute to their own privacy protection. First of 
all, this requires competence in dealing with ICT (Sec-
tion 9.1.4). The WBGU sees a further opportunity for 
more user sovereignty in user-friendly, accessible tech-
nical tools for data sovereignty that enable people to 
monitor their own data. Examples include projects like 
mydata.org and decode, which develop technical tools 
for data management. Sufficient resources and capacity 
should be made available in technology development 
for the implementation of the principles of privacy and 
security by design, which are mandatory at least within 
the EU. Accordingly, the protection of privacy should 
already be consistently taken into account when plan-
ning ‘smart’ projects, e.g. by means of privacy and 
data-protection impact assessments. The individual’s 
freedom from surveillance must already be embedded 
in the technologies used (Kurz and Rieger, 2018a). 
For a broad public discourse, especially on these top-
ics, the informational literacy (Ullrich, 2014) of individ-
uals and society as a whole should also be encouraged 
within the framework of a digital public sphere (Sec-
tion 9.1.4). As part of a responsible innovation policy, 
digitalized communication should be designed for an 
international public sphere to serve the common good 
(Dabrock, 2018): 41) and realized via public-service ICT 
(Section 5.3.5). 
To ensure the consistent protection of privacy and 
the public sphere, “the German business community 
[...] should also commit itself to handling data in a 
responsible way” (Lukas, 2018: 14). However, in the 
WBGU’s view, it should not do this alone – rather, even 
stronger EU-wide data protection legislation and appli-
cation should “define what constitutes responsible data 
trading” (Lukas, 2018: 14) – particularly in connection 
with its own European model (Section 9.3.2). A neces-
sary prerequisite for this is a structural change from the 
big data concept to a concept of ‘smart data’ 
( Section 3.3.2), which is already laid down in legal 
requirements such as the EU-GDPR by principles such 
as earmarking and data economy and should be con-
cretized in the sense of ‘data quality’ instead of ‘data 
quantity’. 
9.2.1.2 
Create international protection of privacy law at 
the UN level 
In the WBGU’s opinion, a United Nations Privacy Con-
vention should be adopted (Section 8.3.1) covering the 
global human right to privacy (Article 12 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). It 
should address detailed legal structures for handling 
data and protecting privacy both within and between 
countries. Privacy should also be understood as an inte-
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gral part of sustainable development and placed on the 
agenda for the future development of global sustain-
ability policy (Section 9.3.1). The initiatives established 
at UN level towards a global right to privacy (UN, 2017) 
should be further developed and supported. It should 
be noted in this context that, due to cultural diversity, 
notions of privacy vary greatly on a global scale, as do 
attitudes about what data should be collected, used or 
protected – and what methods should be used. This 
requires a discourse at the international level; local ini-
tiatives and the actors that promote the discourse in the 
respective countries should be supported to create 
broad multi-stakeholder governance.
9.2.1.3 
Shape the digital structural transformation of 
the public sphere in a way that is innovative and 
 oriented towards the common good
While on the one hand privacy is increasingly being 
‘made public’, the public sphere in the Digital Age (e.g. 
in social media) is characterized by increasing privatiza-
tion. Apart from greater risks of manipulation, the 
power of platform operators is already having a global 
impact on the right to freedom of expression (Cannataci 
et al., 2016), for example with regard to upload filters. 
From the perspective of global sustainability, however, 
digital structural change in the public sphere leads to a 
rather ambivalent picture – and not only in view of the 
partially unclear scientific data basis and related find-
ings (e.g. in connection with filter bubbles or echo 
chambers; Fraser, 2010; Imhof, 2011). First of all, this 
is a fundamental transformation of the conditions gov-
erning the public sphere (Section 5.3.2). Although the 
digital structural change of the public sphere is not the 
only reason, it is accelerating its current crisis. The gen-
eral functioning of media attention economies (Franck, 
1998; Weischenberg, 2018) is at least as crucial. Two 
decades ago, this term was already being used to 
describe not only the increasing abundance of informa-
tion as an individually “unmanageable flood” and an 
“ever-growing surge of stimuli”, which were “especially 
designed to monopolize our attention” (Franck, 
1998: 49). The digital structural change of the public 
sphere has certainly not mitigated but has aggravated 
this situation, and the scarce resource of individual 
attention appears to be more contested than ever in the 
Digital Age. However, the focus is not on information, 
but on the novelty value, so that the pressure to be 
up-to-date is rising, as is the pressure of competition 
and the tendency towards personalized, conflict-laden 
and emotionally charged reporting (Weischenberg, 
2018: 30 ff.). The WBGU therefore recommends that 
journalistic quality standards should not be subordi-
nated to speed and reach, and that more support should 
be given to the cause of press freedom, which in some 
cases is massively threatened internationally. In addi-
tion to media competence and literacy, which are more 
likely to be located in the field of education policy, the 
WBGU recommends promoting corresponding emanci-
patory projects that seize the opportunities of digitali-
zation to provide informed public discourse spaces and 
arenas (Section 9.4.4) in innovative ways (Puppis et al., 
2017).
9 .2 .2 
Fragility and autonomy of technical systems
The security and reliability of 
increasingly networked techni-
cal systems and processes are 
key prerequisites for a digital-
ized sustainability society. Ini-
tially, this applies in general to 
all ICT infrastructures (Sec-
tion 9.2.2.1), and in particular 
to algorithm-based processes for decision-making or 
decision-making support (Section 9.2.2.2).
9.2.2.1 
Security of digitalization as a prerequisite for the 
Transformation towards Sustainability
Enshrine security by design as a standard across the 
board
The WBGU strongly recommends insisting on security 
by design in the security-critical ICT field. This requires 
the further development of the corresponding exper-
tise and an inter- and transdisciplinary exchange, as 
well as the (further) training of operators of digital 
infrastructures and ICT. Cyber-security should be incor-
porated and taught from the beginning of training. 
Both the state and the private sector must avoid a situ-
ation where gaps in cyber-security are not closed – 
supposedly in the interests of public security – in order 
to exploit them for active intervention. The fundamen-
tal right to guaranteed confidentiality and integrity of 
information technology systems is violated when gaps 
are intentionally kept open. Contrary to previous secu-
rity-policy practices ranging from surveillance to future 
‘hack-backs’, the state should do everything in its 
power to apply cyber-security methods and techniques 
across the board and to avoid anything that weakens 
them. Furthermore, the WBGU recommends a paradigm 
shift from globally increasing digital offensive strate-
gies to a defensive cyber strategy. In the military and 
intelligence sectors, efforts should be made to interna-
tionally outlaw operations that “directly impair the 
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sovereignty of a state, attack its ability to govern, and 
target critical civilian infrastructure such as power 
grids, production facilities, health and food supplies, 
and communications networks” (Kurz and Rieger, 
2018a: 252 ff.). The WBGU would welcome a morato-
rium restricting a further cyber-arms race as a first step 
that sends an important signal. Subsequently, existing 
international agreements in the sense of a global digital 
peace policy should be extended, or new ones initiated.
Further develop BSI-KritisV and IT security law
The Ordinance on the Determination of Critical Infra-
structures under the BSI Act (BSI-KritisV) covers criti-
cal infrastructures in the fields of energy, water, food, 
information technology and telecommunications, 
transport and traffic, health, finance and insurance. The 
WBGU advocates the further development of the BSI 
KritisV to include public-service ICT (Section 5.3.5) as 
a critical infrastructure. In addition, the IT Security Act, 
which was passed against the background of possible 
significant IT security incidents based on cyber attacks, 
should be further developed in such a way that mal-
functions of different kinds must also be reported if the 
cyber-security and functional security of critical infra-
structures is under threat. At present, for example, 
ordinary malfunctions do not need to be reported, pro-
vided they can be prevented by measures taken in 
accordance with state-of-the-art technology and can 
be overcome without major problems or increased 
resource expenditure, e.g. as with invasions of ordinary 
malware or hardware failures (BSI, 2019). Failures 
caused by errors of quality, configuration or operation 
are thus also excluded in this way. The current specifi-
cations should be adjusted in such a way that IT disrup-
tions and IT failures are also reported in addition to 
significant IT security incidents. Furthermore, suppli-
ers, manufacturers and operators of critical infrastruc-
tures, as well as public authorities, must be obliged to 
publish gaps in cyber-security and errors in ICT critical 
infrastructures in a way that is accessible to experts and 
manufacturers. 
Develop a European register of technical systems, 
their failures and cases of damage
In order to improve the quality and security of ICT for 
the critical infrastructure available on the market, a 
parallel central European register should be set up in 
which they would be recorded in a differentiated man-
ner on the basis of ISO standards. One advantage of 
such a register would be greater transparency and 
security, and that it would enable manufacturers and 
operators to continuously improve quality. It could 
simultaneously work as an early warning system to 
identify risks and avoid repeated damage. To maximize 
its neutrality, it should be operated and administered 
by a network of public bodies, and an authorization 
system should be used to assign access authorizations 
according to roles. Where appropriate and possible, the 
register should also be accessible to the wider tech com-
munity. In addition, a European failure and damage reg-
ister should be established covering ICT failures and ICT 
damage to facilities, installations and parts of critical 
infrastructure, including public-sector ICT. It would also 
be worth considering the inclusion of reports of major 
IT malfunctions and failures in public administrations 
and digital service providers. The register should also be 
run and administered by a network of neutral public 
bodies, and full access should be reserved for an author-
ized circle of experts. However, extracts from the regis-
ter should be accessible to the wider tech community or 
the public. Authorization systems should be used for 
this purpose.
9.2.2.2 
Use of automated decisions
Digital technologies are taking on increasingly complex 
monitoring and control tasks, and societies and individ-
uals depend on their reliability. Decisions in core areas 
of society should only be transferred to automated sys-
tems in ways that are methodically and democratically 
safeguarded and understandable for the people affected 
(Section 8.3.3).
Big data and algorithmic decision-making processes 
– create legally enforceable rights
There is a need for more transparency on procedures, 
participation by civil society, better information for the 
people affected, and state supervision of algorithmic 
decision-making. In principle, this is a political, not a 
purely technical process that is determined by ideas, 
norms and interests, especially in core areas of society. 
Accordingly, there should be a broader discussion on 
obligations relating to information and labelling for 
those responsible for decision-making, on the preven-
tive monitoring of technical systems in critical areas of 
application under which the supervisory authority 
reserves the right to grant authorization, and liability 
rules. These should then be established. This also 
applies if a decision is only partially automated. First 
approaches would be the right to counterfactual expla-
nations (Wachter et al., 2017) and to rational algorith-
mic decision making and decision-making support 
(Wachter and Mittelstadt, 2018b). 
In the case of algorithm-based decision making and 
decision-making support or similar automated pro-
cesses, only audited processes or certified procedures 
should be used, especially in core areas of society. State 
regulation and, if necessary, explicit licensing of digital 
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solutions in socially critical areas of application should 
ensure that there is no threat of (fundamental) rights 
violations or other societal dangers. Furthermore, the 
individuals or legal entities affected must be given a 
legally enforceable right to a rational justification for 
decisions. The WBGU recommends that in automated 
decision making and decision-making support and the 
use of AI in core areas of society (Campolo et al., 2017; 
Villani, 2018), the ultimate decision-making sover-
eignty (and responsibility) should be left with human 
beings, especially in order to avoid discrimination. Fur-
ther recommendations on scoring in particular can be 
found in Section 5.5.5.
Strengthen liability, information and labelling 
obligations
In the context of democratic processes and multi-stake-
holder participation, the WBGU recommends develop-
ing criteria, standards and limits for the transfer of 
automated decision making and decision-making sup-
port to technical systems in such core areas of society 
as justice, health, welfare, finance and education – and 
for demands on traceability and suability when auto-
mated decisions are vetted – that go further than purely 
technical explanations.
Instead of simply subjecting algorithms to regular 
testing and certification (Djeffal, 2018; SVRV, 2017) – 
in a similar procedure to today’s auditing companies – 
the existing ICT-related certification authorities might 
be authorized to develop quality criteria for systems 
involving algorithm-based decision-making processes 
and to establish appropriate auditing and certification 
procedures. In this context, regulations on (and poten-
tially a tightening of) the responsibility and liability of 
private actors should be implemented as an additional 
incentive to develop resilient and secure systems 
(Scherer, 2016). There should also be clear quality and 
security labelling of software-based products and ser-
vices (Kurz and Rieger, 2018a: 256ff.; Table 4.2-2). Sus-
ceptibility to crises and the risk of systemic failure 
increase as the number of decentralized, independent 
components for algorithm-based decision-making sup-
port or decision-making systems decreases, as would 
result from increasing monopolization or market con-
centration. In the context of resilience, therefore, 
accompanying measures to maintain and strengthen 
competition and increase diversity are similarly import-
ant, also for security-critical components (based on 
standards, open interfaces and interoperability; 
 Section 9.2.3). Against this background, the problem of 
systemic importance (too big to fail), familiar from the 
financial sector, must also be addressed with regard to 
the required regulation and strengthening of pri-
vate-sector liability, since it may otherwise prove to be 
infeasible for very large, systemically important 
 companies. 
9 .2 .3 
Economic and political power shifts
Digital technologies are shift-
ing power and influence 
between states, companies and 
citizens (Section 8.4.1). As a 
result of strong network effects 
and economies of scale, digital-
ization today is largely being 
shaped by a small number of mostly private-sector 
stakeholders. Individual countries, too, are already 
making intensive use of digital technology to boost 
their state power. Digitalization will exacerbate existing 
social inequalities unless all people are given equal 
opportunities to share in its potential. 
9.2.3.1 
Create public-service ICT infrastructures and 
 digital commons
A central aspect in achieving the Transformation 
towards Sustainability is substantive inclusion for all 
people (‘normative compass’; Chapter 2). The WBGU 
argues that, in the Digital Age, access to digital infra-
structures is a key prerequisite for a decent life and for 
participation in societal development, in addition to 
classic basic public services such as education, health 
care and security. The state therefore has a responsibil-
ity to ensure general access to public information and 
communication services for all – particularly for disad-
vantaged population groups – as part of the provision 
of basic public services (Section 5.3.5). This includes 
part of the internet, as well as social platforms that can 
offer data, information, knowledge and educational 
services, provide citizens’ services (Hanafizadeh et al., 
2009: 388 ff.), perform public functions, and are pub-
licly or privately run. The respective characteristics – 
content, quality and security – of public-service ICT 
must be differentiated according to sectors.
In order to make the added value of a society perme-
ated by ICT usable for different purposes and for as 
many people worldwide as possible, the WBGU first 
advocates the establishment and expansion of neutral 
ICT network infrastructures with open international 
standards and interoperable interfaces and formats. In 
addition, the conception of modular and replaceable 
technical components should be promoted to avoid 
dependencies on individual manufacturers and infra-
structure providers and thus guarantee both reparabil-
ity and digital (technology) sovereignty (Schieferdecker 
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et al., 2018). Public procurement can play a key role 
here. The components of public-service ICT must also 
be adapted to local circumstances and political objec-
tives (UNCTAD, 2018); the WBGU recommends an 
open dialogue and cooperation between different 
stakeholders (local authorities, business, academia, civil 
society) to promote a rapid, user-centred introduction 
and improvement of public-service ICT offerings (The 
Earth Institute and Ericsson, 2016: 96 ff.). In addition, 
open source software should be developed in line with 
such principles as interoperability, reusability, security 
and scalability, and used and promoted in public pro-
curement in public-sector ICT infrastructure projects 
wherever appropriate and possible (Schieferdecker et 
al., 2018). As a general rule, the WBGU recommends, 
when setting up and developing public-service digital 
infrastructures, focusing on their public-welfare orien-
tation, so that public funds are used above all to create 
public goods. Societal controllability, discrimina-
tion-free access and sustaining the natural life-support 
systems should be guaranteed and become guiding 
principles for public procurement in addition to effi-
ciency, security (incl. trustworthiness) and resilience. 
The German Federal Government should also work both 
nationally and internationally to secure and strengthen 
net neutrality and promote equal access to the network 
in rural and structurally weak regions. At the same 
time, in the spirit of green IT, the ecological footprint 
(e.g. resource and energy efficiency, recyclability) 
should already be minimized at the development stage, 
i.e. the natural life-support systems must be respected 
and sustained during the development, expansion and 
operation of public-service ICT infrastructures and ser-
vices. In addition, the importance of digital commons 
(Section 5.6.2) – such as free education in the sense of 
open education and open educational resources, gener-
ally accessible knowledge via open access and open 
(government) data, and the digitalized cultural and nat-
ural heritage in a digital sustainability society – and the 
need to make them available and secure must be placed 
on the political agenda both nationally and internation-
ally. Digital commons must be organizationally, techni-
cally and legally secured, e.g. with a view to legal cer-
tainty in licensing or the long-term preservation of 
knowledge. The central aim is to ensure inclusive and 
equitable access to digital commons by means of open, 
barrier-free formats and improved findability and 
retrievability (e.g. by means of international metadata 
standards) and to promote broad participation in the 
creation and further development of digital commons, 
e.g. via flagship projects. Furthermore, quality assur-
ance and qualification measures must be taken to 
ensure the provision and use of high-quality digital 
commons. More detailed recommendations for action 
on public-service ICT and digital commons can be found 
in Section 5.3.5 (arena on public-service ICT) and Sec-
tion 5.3.10 (arena on digital commons). 
9.2.3.2 
Reform tax and contribution systems
The WBGU believes that governments and public insti-
tutions have an important formative role – also, indeed 
especially, in the Digital Age – be it in the provision of 
digital commons or public-service digital infrastruc-
tures, in shaping broad structural change in the social 
and educational policy field, or to ensure economic 
inclusion and to contain any risks of developments 
towards inequality. Doing justice to this role requires 
stable longer-term financial leeway for states and pub-
lic institutions. 
However, in the WBGU’s view, the structural changes 
in the labour markets, combined with the increasing 
economic importance of intangible assets like data and 
digital services, give rise to considerable doubts as to 
whether today’s tax and contribution systems will be 
able to provide such a financial base in the longer term 
(Section 5.3.3). In the WBGU’s opinion, the financing 
of the state and public institutions should be linked as 
far as possible to the design of the framework condi-
tions that are needed for sustainable development and 
for the form of digitalization needed to achieve this 
goal. Up to now, however, this link has not been made 
in the discussion about the challenges posed by digita-
lization and possible reform steps. There is no doubt 
that new regulations must be found to tax internation-
ally operating companies appropriately. The risk of ero-
sion of the financial base of countries in the course of 
digitalization and possibilities for a further harmoniza-
tion of international rules on taxation should be, and 
are already being, intensively discussed and explored 
today (e.g. BEPS project at the level of the OECD and 
G20; OECD, 2015d). However, taxes and contributions 
also have a strong steering effect, which the WBGU 
believes should be used specifically to promote sustain-
able development and to shape a sustainable Digital 
Age. The guiding principle for the future design of tax 
and contribution systems should therefore be to burden 
production methods and consumption patterns that run 
counter to these goals and, conversely, to correct cur-
rent tax burdens that are not in line with the goals of 
sustainable development. Generally speaking, the 
WBGU sees three overarching starting points for 
reforms. 
Tax natural resources and external effects that are 
not appropriately priced
The WBGU believes that the very far-reaching possibil-
ities for monitoring and analysing environmental 
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changes should be used to consistently gear tax and 
contribution systems towards the goals of sustainable 
development and, in particular, to protecting natural 
life-support systems: environmental influences and 
damage, and the general societal consequences of pri-
vate actions, should be comprehensively priced if these 
factors are not, or not adequately, covered by market 
prices. With such a (re)orientation of taxes and contri-
butions, individual actors, be they companies or private 
actors, can be given prompt (price) signals on the soci-
etal consequences of their actions in line with the pol-
luter-pays principle. This steers the actors’ attention 
directly to the protection of the natural life-support 
systems and, in addition to adjustments in production 
methods and consumer behaviour, brings further tech-
nological development much more into line with the 
objectives of sustainable development than it has been 
up to now. Although this reorientation of taxes and 
contributions affects all actors in principle, it also 
addresses in particular energy and resource consump-
tion by digital applications and devices and thus a cen-
tral challenge of digitalization for sustainable develop-
ment and protecting the natural life-support systems. 
At the same time, sources of finance are tapped that are 
not directly tied to gainful employment, thus avoiding 
an erosion of the state’s financing base or at least an 
increasingly unequal distribution of the financial bur-
dens of the state and social systems.
Ease the tax burden on labour
Such alternative sources of finance create scope for the 
second central reform approach: the WBGU believes 
that the current high tax burden on (gainful) employ-
ment in many countries should be reviewed and, where 
appropriate, corrected. This tax burden not only raises 
(distributional-policy) questions about the future 
financing of public systems and institutions, it also cre-
ates strong and one-sided incentives for companies and 
employers to exploit and expand technical automation 
possibilities. Further automation should not be rejected 
on principle; indeed it can be societally desirable, for 
example in the case of extremely dangerous work. Par-
ticularly in the short term, however, a very one-sided 
focus on the broad substitution of (gainful) employ-
ment instead of, for example, the protection of natural 
resources, is not in society’s interest. It threatens social 
cohesion and offers too little room for the societal 
change needed to ensure that the societal functions of 
gainful employment will also be guaranteed in the 
future – or perhaps even more comprehensively than 
they are today.
Reform corporate taxation
Without doubt, the appropriate taxation of corporate 
profits is key to maintaining the financial capacity of 
states to act. Problems for nation-state financing caused 
by international tax competition and the aggressive tax 
planning of international corporations already existed 
before digitalization. However, digitalization aggra-
vates these problems by generally promoting the inter-
nationalization and mobility of entrepreneurial activi-
ties and making the geographical allocation and deter-
mination of taxable assets more difficult since value is 
shifted to intangible assets such as data.
Despite concerns about a growing imbalance 
between the possibilities that a country has to levy 
taxes on the one hand, and the scale of business activ-
ities and earnings of non-resident, internationally 
operating companies – especially those of the digital 
economy – on the other, the WBGU does not believe 
that special regulations should be pursued for compa-
nies in the ‘digital economy’. Such distinctions between 
representatives of the digital and non-digital economy 
not only often contradict the internal logic of existing 
corporate taxation systems, they appear, above all, 
arbitrary and increasingly unclear over time in view of 
the widespread impact of digitalization.
Instead, reforms within the existing system of cor-
porate taxation are conceivable in principle, as is a fun-
damental departure from the current source-country 
principle of corporate taxation towards the destina-
tion-country principle. Within the existing system, 
which ties the right to tax to the place of value creation, 
new regulations must be found for the international 
allocation of company profits and value contributions. 
One starting point is the further elaboration of the con-
cept of digital production sites. In addition, criteria, 
which cannot yet be anticipated in full, must be devel-
oped for determining the proportion of value added 
generated locally in a particular country. If minimum 
tax rates could be agreed at the international level (e.g. 
G20), international tax competition could be curbed. 
A more far-reaching step towards reform would be 
to move the taxation of corporate income more towards 
turnover taxation. Including the non-monetary 
exchange of data for services in a company’s assess-
ment for turnover tax would represent a first step in 
this direction. This could also be introduced while main-
taining the current principles of company taxation, 
although its practical implementation raises complex 
issues regarding the full assessment and valuation of 
these barter transactions. On the other hand, a very 
fundamental reform of company taxation that is being 
discussed is the introduction of a destination-based 
cash-flow tax. This would generally link taxation to the 
sales generated and to the location of the end con-
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sumer, and thus no longer to the place of value creation 
or to the increasingly mobile place of profit generation. 
Such a step would clearly go much further than the 
reform steps currently being discussed at EU and OECD 
level. However, since it would significantly reduce and 
curb incentives for transferring profits, and with it 
international tax competition, the WBGU believes that 
this concept and its legal and economic implications 
should definitely be examined further. 
9.2.3.3 
Forestall monopolization tendencies and 
strengthen competition on digitalized markets
The advance of digital technologies in the economy and 
society has a fundamentally ambivalent impact on eco-
nomic concentration and competition. However, big 
economies of scale and network effects and the grow-
ing importance of data for successful products and 
services, as well as more radical innovations, lead to 
expectations that there will be ever stronger concentra-
tion on a few dominant actors; this is already becoming 
apparent today since many digitalization processes are 
still unregulated. The WBGU believes that strong eco-
nomic concentration should be avoided for a number of 
reasons. It has distributional effects that exacerbate the 
dangers of greater inequality between countries, but 
also within societies. From a systemic perspective, it 
impedes the innovation-promoting and system-stabi-
lizing forces of competition between decisions by dif-
ferent, independent actors and information-processing 
systems. Finally, at the political level, there is the dan-
ger that societal decision-making processes and the 
formative role of the state will be undermined if indi-
vidual private-sector actors become too dominant, 
especially since the formative power of these actors can 
be significantly increased by digital technologies. In 
order to curb such concentration processes, the WBGU 
believes that competition or cartel law should be fur-
ther developed and, if possible, international harmoni-
zation should be sought. However, this evolution of 
ex-post control is not sufficient. In addition, efforts are 
needed to effectively address the structural drivers of 
economic concentration – which are based on the inter-
action of economies of scale and network effects on the 
one hand and the importance of intangible assets such 
as data on the other. 
Develop effective approaches to competition 
control and coordinate them internationally
It is widely recognized that competition law needs to be 
further developed to achieve more effective control and 
sanctioning of market power and its abuse in an increas-
ingly digitalized, data-driven economy. First steps have 
been taken and further adjustments are already the 
subject of intense discussion. The WBGU believes that 
this discussion should definitely be continued in greater 
depth. Against the background of international compa-
nies and platforms, there should also be efforts to inter-
nationally harmonize competition-law procedures and 
requirements. 
In the WBGU’s opinion, priority should be given to 
further developing competition-law regulations and 
procedures for determining market power and its abuse. 
In particular, they should focus on how companies use 
the data they collect and link to create and defend dom-
inant market positions, quite apart from the question of 
pricing products and services. The WBGU also supports 
the idea that scientists and antitrust authorities should 
soon start examining the possibilities of (implicitly) col-
lusive behaviour using algorithm-based, autonomous 
decision-making systems. The WBGU regards a stron-
ger interlinkage between competition law and data pro-
tection/privacy protection as a significant extension of 
the scope of control possibilities under competition law. 
This should be further explored to make efforts to sanc-
tion the misuse of market power to circumvent 
data-protection provisions more effective. The WBGU 
takes a critical view – not only from the point of view 
of competition law but also from the sustainability per-
spective – of individual companies combining different 
business segments under one roof if the data linked in 
this way are used to restrict access to relevant basic 
goods, to threaten areas of privacy that deserve partic-
ular protection, or, for example, to undermine princi-
ples of solidarity and risk-spreading in the insurance 
sector. In the context of the regulation of well-known 
industries with strong network effects, such as the 
energy industry, the WBGU recommends at the very 
least considering whether the combination of certain 
business segments or operations under the umbrella of 
a single company should not be prohibited under anti-
trust law, or, if this is not possible, whether the possi-
bilities for such an antitrust divestiture should be cre-
ated. This could protect abuse-free access to relevant 
services, e.g. access to credit, which can be jeopardized 
by linking comprehensive personality profiles from 
social networks or major e-commerce platforms with 
offers of financial services. Here, too, international cri-
teria and regulations should be sought wherever 
 possible.
Address the role of data in the concentration of 
power
In addition to the need for an effective control of pos-
sible abuses of market- dominating positions, the 
WBGU sees the combination of economies of scale and 
network effects on the one hand and the feedback 
effects from the accumulation of data on the other as 
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fundamental structural drivers of concentration on 
data-rich, data-driven markets that require further reg-
ulatory intervention. Here, competition legislation that 
acts as an ex-post control instrument focused on spe-
cific, individual cases where existing market-dominat-
ing positions are abused, does not go far enough. 
Rather, the WBGU agrees with the view that regulated 
access to data should be developed and enforced to 
break up self-reinforcing positions of power and to dis-
mantle barriers to competition achieved by restricting 
data availability. Such forms of regulation necessarily 
face conflicting priorities: on the one hand the advan-
tages of openness and broad data availability and, on 
the other, the need to protect privacy and possible (pri-
vate) economic incentives for data collection. Further-
more, because the areas and contexts from which data 
are collected are so heterogeneous, there is no chance 
of a blanket regulation of data access. Free or at least 
clearly regulated, non-discriminatory and (in terms of 
interoperability) standardized access should, however, 
be enforced in the case of data that are relevant to com-
petition in the further development of products and 
services, do not relate to any individual person, and 
tend to be collected as a by-product of other economic 
activities. Before comprehensive, governmental frame-
works can be created regarding data access in digital 
market economies, approaches must first be developed 
that allow a more precise definition and delimitation of 
the (societal) value of data and their relevance for com-
petition and innovation. In the WBGU’s view, however, 
individual areas can already be identified today in 
which society’s interest in a broad, regulated availabil-
ity of data is particularly high. This applies, for exam-
ple, to data from public spaces (smart cities) or to the 
digital commons that are yet to be created. 
9 .3
World order of the Digital Age
Efforts are needed in politics 
and society in order to place 
digitalization at the service of 
sustainable development and 
to counter risks, meet chal-
lenges, and seize opportuni-
ties. The enormous speed of 
digitalization processes 
requires adaptive governance; the various levels of 
 governance will require an increase in capacity to meet 
this challenge. First, there is a need to strengthen inter-
national governance capacities to deal with the issue of 
sustainable digitalization and digitalization for sustain-
ability (Chapter 8). The following recommendations 
provide some initial ideas for reaching an understand-
ing on a common digital future. Second, the EU is called 
upon to develop its values, develop its path towards the 
digital future, and play an active role in shaping it 
( Section 8.5).
9 .3 .1 
Global governance for sustainably shaping the 
Digital Age
Internationally, an understanding of sustainability has 
evolved over the last decades as a vision of global, long-
term well-being; this is expressed by the 2030 Agenda, 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and other mul-
tilateral pacts and agreements in the field of environ-
ment and development. By comparison, efforts to reach 
an international understanding on a regulatory frame-
work and on cooperation in the field of digitalization 
and the application of digital technologies are still in 
their infancy (Section 8.1). The key challenge for the 
international community today is to develop a common 
vision for a sustainable, digitally supported future, and 
to reach an understanding on common guiding con-
cepts, principles and regulatory frameworks. Just as the 
Brundtland report on ‘Our Common Future’ launched a 
global understanding of sustainable development by 
integrating environmental and development issues, a 
new stimulus is needed today for a global understand-
ing of our common digital future. This requires stronger 
global governance capacities (Section 8.4).
9.3.1.1 
Call a UN summit on ‘Sustainability in the Digital 
Age’
Germany and the EU should champion a UN summit on 
‘Digitalization and Sustainability’ (UN Conference for a 
Sustainable Digital Age, Section 8.4.3) in 2022 (30 years 
after UNCED in Rio). The central theme of the conference 
with a global perspective would be agreeing on the 
necessary fundamental steps to be taken to achieve dig-
itally supported sustainable development and avoid 
unsustainable consequences of digital change. Suitable 
thematic priorities include the use of digital technologies 
to support the implementation of the SDGs and new 
challenges to global sustainability policy after 2030. The 
global summit should take into account the recommen-
dations of the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation 
and the results of the world summits on sustainable 
development held since 1992 (UNCED 1992, Millennium 
Summit, 2000, WSSD, 2002, UN Conference on Sustain-
able Development 2012, and the World Summits on the 
Information Society in 2003 and 2005). A key outcome 
of the UN summit could be the adoption of a charter for 
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Box 9 .3 .1-1
‘Our Common Digital Future’ – A Draft Charter 
for a Sustainable Digital Age
Preamble
Conscious of the responsibility of all societies for our common 
digital future,
conscious of the urgent need for decisive action to limit 
anthropogenic climate change and sustain the natural 
life-support systems, and conscious of the responsibility of 
humankind in the new geological epoch of the 
Anthropocene,
endeavouring to work towards a humanistic vision for a 
networked global society of the Digital Age in which civiliza-
tional and human potential can fully unfold,
recognizing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the report of the World Commission on Environment and De-
velopment, the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development, the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, the United Nations-sponsored World Summit on the 
Information Society, the United Nations 2030 Agenda with its 
Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement and 
similar processes launched by informal initiatives,
the undersigned acknowledge and commit to the imple-
mentation of the following goals, principles, freedoms, rights 
and obligations. 
Goals and principles
1. Human dignity shall also be inviolable in digital space. 
Everyone shall have the right to digital identity, soverei-
gnty, data protection and privacy. This shall also include 
the right to evade digitalization in the private sphere and 
the right to be informed if an interaction partner is not a 
human being but a technical system. 
2. The development of digital technologies and digitalized 
infrastructures shall always be geared towards sustaining 
the natural life-support systems. The planetary guard rails 
must be observed, global and local environmental pro-
blems must be avoided. The polluter-pays, cooperation, 
integration and precautionary principles must be obser-
ved as guiding principles.
3. The development of digitalized infrastructures shall 
always be oriented in such a way that it is accessible to 
all and offers equal opportunities for societal participa-
tion and realization. For the underlying technologies such 
as microelectronics, tele- and data-communication net-
works, data processing and artificial intelligence, infor-
mation on the basic functions should be accessible to all 
worldwide. 
4. The rights of the individual to the protection of individual 
freedom of development in the digital space shall be gua-
ranteed. These rights shall include informational self-de-
termination, the protection of freedom of expression and 
digital identity, the protection of minorities and protec-
tion against discrimination. All people shall have the fun-
damental right to inspect and correct data stored about 
them, to determine their use and to have them deleted. 
These rights shall be legally enforceable.
Digitalization at the service of sustainability goals
5. The potential of digitalization should be used worldwide 
to achieve the goals of sustainable development (2030 
Agenda and beyond). Solutions based on digital techno-
logy should be considered in societal decisions involving 
the goals of sustainable development.
6. The development of digital technologies and digitali-
zed infrastructures shall always take the environmental 
and social impacts into account. The planetary guard rails 
must be observed.
7. Digitalization shall be used specifically to monitor the 
UN's sustainability goals and thus to safeguard social and 
ecological standards.
8. All countries shall contribute to the development of digi-
tal commons, to the cultural and natural heritage and to 
the global state of knowledge, and shall ensure their pro-
tection and universal accessibility across generations. 
Avoid systemic risks
9. All states and companies shall actively work to mini-
mize risks to critical infrastructures. They shall be obli-
ged to inform each other about errors and vulnerabilities 
and to ensure that these are remedied. Responsibility for 
damage shall always be clearly defined.
10. The use of digital technology involves obligations. Its use 
should at the same time serve the common good. Digital 
solutions may not be used to oppress people, to monitor 
them without cause, or to exercise social control.
11. All states shall have a duty to provide appropriate sup-
port for people affected to adapt to the changes in the 
world of work caused by digitalization according to the 
principles defined above.
12. Human decision-making sovereignty in the use of artifi-
cial intelligence and algorithm-based automatic systems 
in societal decision-making processes shall be guaranteed. 
Human beings shall retain the right to make the final deci-
sion. Automated decision-making and decision-making 
support must always be traceable, and shall take place only 
within a clearly defined framework and with the option of 
making corrections. The responsibility for automated deci-
sion-making and decision-making support shall always be 
clearly defined.
13. All states shall have a duty to preserve the right of the 
individual to Eigenart and imperfection. Societal pressure 
to optimize the human body through technology shall 
be countered. All states shall agree on binding rules and 
ethical guidelines at the multilateral level.
14. Cyberattacks shall be subject to the Geneva Conventi-
ons on Armed Conflict and their additional protocols, 
which must be supplemented to include attacks on cri-
tical infrastructures. The use of fully automated autono-
mous weapon systems shall be prohibited. The protection 
of the civilian population shall have the highest priority. 
Prepare for procedural challenges
15. All states and companies shall develop ethical guidelines 
on the conception, development and application of digi-
tal technologies and solutions with regard to human dig-
nity and sustainability goals and shall create the neces-
sary legal and organizational frameworks for their imple-
mentation. 
16. All states shall create institutions that give advice on the 
use of digital technologies when they impinge directly 
on human dignity, the natural life-support systems, the 
inclusion of all human beings, or the individual's  Eigenart. 
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the international community (Box 9.3.1-1). Such a dec-
laration should set out the fundamental goals and prin-
ciples for the sustainable design of the Digital Age, call 
for a form of digitalization that is in line with the sustain-
ability goals, point out systemic risks to be avoided, and 
identify key political starting points for policy-making 
(Box 9.3.1-2).
To prepare for the proposed UN Summit, the WBGU 
recommends immediately setting up a ‘World Commis-
sion for a Sustainable Digital Age’ modelled on the 
Brundtland Commission. The World Commission’s task 
should be to develop the goals, long-term strategies, 
and a vision for the future of digitalized sustainability 
societies. In particular, it should identify the risks posed 
by digital technologies for the Transformation towards 
Sustainability and describe ways of containing them. At 
the same time, the World Commission should stipulate 
the conditions that will allow the potential of digital 
technologies for sustainable development to unfold. 
9.3.1.2 
Ensure that the issue of digitalization is well 
anchored in the UN system
The WBGU sees various possibilities for a stronger 
institutional anchoring of the topic of digitalization and 
sustainability in the UN system (Section 8.4.4). First, 
all UN organizations and institutions working on sus-
tainability issues (e.g. UNDP, UN Environment, 
UN-Habitat, IOM, UNCTAD, as well as the World Bank 
and regional development banks) should systematically 
incorporate the issue of digital change into their work 
and strategy-building processes. In addition, digitaliza-
tion should be firmly established as a cross-sectional 
issue. An appropriate way of doing this would be to set 
up a mechanism to ensure cooperation between agen-
cies and system-wide coordination (‘UN Digitalization’, 
analogous to the existing UN Energy).
9.3.1.3 
International legal framework as an indispensable 
element
International law is an important component of global 
governance – also in the Digital Age (Section 8.4.5). In 
addition to negotiating a United Nations Privacy Con-
vention (Sections 8.3.1.3, 9.2.1.2), Germany’s Federal 
Government should champion opening a global dis-
course space for new sustainability issues connected 
with digitalization; this would also include the negotia-
tion of a ‘UN Framework Convention on Digital Sus-
tainability and Sustainable Digitalization’. The latter 
would be the most visible measure, but certainly also 
the most complex task in terms of negotiation. In par-
ticular, new topics should be placed on the international 
community’s agenda, including digitalized infrastruc-
tures and internet governance, participation in digital 
assets such as data, the protection of human deci-
sion-making sovereignty in dealing with algo-
rithm-based decision-making, AI and automation, and 
the future of human beings in the relationship between 
humans and machines.
Starting points for international agreements on 
cooperation in these and other new fields of global gov-
ernance could be principles known from environmental 
law, such as the precautionary principle, the pollut-
er-pays principle, the cooperation principle and the 
integration principle. For example, technology-impact 
assessment should be enshrined as a fixed component 
and preventive controls by the authorities should be 
ensured in research, development and the application 
of autonomous and self-learning systems (precaution-
ary principle). According to the cooperation principle, 
companies should be turned into promoters of a digi-
tally supported Transformation towards Sustainability, 
e.g. through corporate eco-digital responsibility, incen-
tives (privileging), and a public discourse on the trans-
fer of state or private decisions to technical systems 
(cooperation principle). Liability gaps should be closed 
and responsibilities (product responsibility) assigned 
(polluter-pays principle). Old and new sustainability 
issues (ecology, privacy) should be integrated as 
cross-sectional issues into all areas of digital change 
(integration principle). The integration principle can 
also be applied to digitalization itself, which should be 
considered in all processes as a new cross-sectional 
topic and in the function of a tool and as a source of 
new challenges.
All states shall create the conditions for civil society to 
participate in these processes at an early stage.
17. Through technology-oriented future-proof education, all 
states shall enable their citizens to participate in the use 
of digital technology, to develop an awareness of global 
responsibility and a holistic understanding of their opti-
ons for action in the Digital Age, and to actively partici-
pate in shaping future developments of digital technolo-
gies and digital infrastructures. This shall include in parti-
cular education for sustainable development.
18. All states shall cooperate at a multilateral level in accor-
dance with the objectives and obligations agreed in this 
Charter. 
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9.3.1.4 
Appoint a scientific panel on digitalization and 
sustainability
Scientific advice for policy-makers, technology-impact 
assessment and the broad-based integration of fore-
sighted expertise on long-term developments and feed-
back between ecological and digitalized socio-technical 
systems should be institutionally strengthened in order 
to establish ‘anticipatory governance’. The example of 
the IPCC has shown that pooling scientific expertise is 
an important prerequisite for fact-based policy-making 
for political decision-makers. The WBGU proposes set-
ting up an intergovernmental or international scientific 
body to prepare regular assessment reports on the state 
of scientific knowledge on all socio-technical and eco-
logical aspects of digital change that are relevant to sus-
tainability. Building on experience gained to date, such 
a body could be structured similarly to the IPCC or 
IPBES (Section 8.4.6). 
9 .3 .2 
The EU as a pioneer of a digitalized sustainability 
society
As the world’s largest single market, having its own 
model of a digitalized sustainability society would give 
the EU an opportunity to make an international name 
for itself as a “sustainable environment in which to live 
and work” (RNE, 2018a; Section 8.5). Against this 
background, the German Federal Government should, 
within the framework of its EU Council Presidency in 
2020, commit itself to developing a common European 
vision and strategy for a digitally supported sustain-
ability society and to firmly establishing sustainable 
development itself as a guiding principle for European 
digitalization policies. The point of departure for a 
European path towards digitalized sustainability socie-
ties is the assurance of common values. The WBGU 
regards a new humanism for the Digital Age as a guiding 
principle for European development (Chapter 7). 
Essential elements of such a value system are also set 
out in the Charter (Box 9.3-1). 
9.3.2.1 
Setting the course for the digitalized  sustainability 
society
An important step for the European model is to inte-
grate the interaction of sustainability and digitalization 
into EU policies (Section 8.5.2). The overarching EU 
strategy should express this objective, with a clear 
focus on the 2030 Agenda and a strong prioritization of 
known and new sustainability issues involved in the 
digital revolution. A European vision of a sustainable 
digital future would, in addition to the goal of creating 
a digital internal market, focus in particular on sustain-
ing natural life-support systems and protecting other 
interests of the common good. The WBGU sees energy 
policy, the mitigation of climate change, and the circu-
lar economy as priority areas. In addition, the social 
Box 9 .3-1
Avoiding systemic risks in the Digital Age 
In order to be able to exploit the potential of digitalization, we 
must be aware of the possible systemic risks in the Digital 
Age. Digital systemic risks include conceivable, large-scale 
changes in our societies, each of which could in itself trigger 
destabilization in those societies. Knock-on and cumulative 
amplifying effects would multiply accordingly and have a 
broad-based impact. 
While some of these threats are undisputed (e.g. la-
bour-market disruptions), the magnitude of the changes is 
uncertain. The probability of other systemic risks occurring is 
significant (e.g. breaching planetary guard rails, digital au-
thoritarianism, further power gains by major digital corpora-
tions), while the likelihood of other risks occurring is relative-
ly low from today’s perspective (e.g. acceptance of human 
enhancement to create an optimized Homo sapiens). Howev-
er, even the latter systemic risks must not be neglected be-
cause, in a worst-case scenario, they would have a major im-
pact on the future of civilization. The WBGU identifies the 
following systemic risks in the Digital Age:
 > the breaching of planetary guard rails as a result of digitally 
driven, resource- and emissions-intensive growth patterns,
 > the disempowerment of the individual, threats to pri-
vacy and an undermining of the digitalized public sphere 
through digitally empowered authoritarianism and totali-
tarianism,
 > an undermining of democracy and deliberation by norma-
tively and institutionally non-embedded, automated deci-
sion-making or decision-making support,
 > dominance by companies that can elude government con-
trol, driven by further data-based power concentration,
 > disruption of labour markets by the comprehensive auto-
mation of data-driven activities and the danger that human 
labour will become increasingly irrelevant to the economy,
 > a deeper division of global society as a result of limited 
access to, and use of, digital potential, mainly by wealthy 
minorities in the global society, 
 > abuse of the mechanization of humanity on the basis of 
human-enhancement philosophies and methods.
It is also important to bear in mind that the digital upheavals 
are being experienced by societies that are already unsettled 
by globalization, the rise of new powers, refugee flows and 
forms of authoritarian populism. The bow-waves of digitaliza-
tion are colliding with the current crisis in Europe and the 
West, as well as with frontal attacks on a multilateral world 
order based on cooperation and rules. The systemic risks of 
the Digital Age could overlap with and reinforce the centrifu-
gal forces that already exist in many societies.
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dimension of both transformation processes is an 
important element of successful integration (Box 8.5-1). 
The principles of environmental law (precautionary 
principle, polluter-pays principle, cooperation principle 
and integration principle; Sections 8.4.2 and 9.3.1.3) 
can be used to further develop the digital agenda. They 
can also provide guidelines for a sustainable framework 
for digitalization processes. Up to now, the decisive 
drivers of digital change have been economic interests 
and state surveillance and control. Sustainable digitali-
zation policy should above all pursue interests of the 
common good.
Digital change, its opportunities and risks should be 
systematically included in the current preparations for 
the EU Environment Action Programme and the EU 
Decarbonization Strategy for the Paris Agreement. The 
development of an ‘EU Strategy for Sustainability in 
the Digital Age’ also opens up the possibility of placing 
new sustainability issues – such as privacy protection, 
digital inclusion, the sovereignty of human deci-
sion-making and the unique features of human beings 
in the human-machine relationship – onto the sustain-
ability agenda (Section 8.3). With an ‘EU Strategy for 
Sustainability in the Digital Age’, the EU could further-
more play a pioneering role in the further development 
of the 2030 Agenda. Europe can thus give new impetus 
to global digital development (Section 8.4; Box 8.5-1). 
To make this vision a reality, investment and innova-
tion should be steered in this direction, for example by 
building up a sustainable European ICT infrastructure 
and testing digital technologies in cities, municipalities 
and regions (Box 10.3.2-1). Looking into new indica-
tors and guiding concepts for measuring and evaluating 
economic success offers potential for promoting change 
towards the common good (Section 8.4.1). Important 
example projects include the provision of public-ser-
vice ICT and participation in digital commons (Sec-
tion 9.2.3.1). Education and research are key prerequi-
sites for the development of concrete elements for the 
success of this model (Section 9.1.4, Chapter 10). 
9.3.2.2 
Enhance data protection and ethics in technology 
design as a competitive and locational advantage
Instead of conforming to a kind of global competition 
that contradicts its own values, the EU, as a powerful 
actor, can go on the offensive and introduce its own 
rules in order to change global competition itself in the 
longer term. The protection for privacy created by the 
EU-GDPR should be seen as a locational advantage and 
consistently expanded (Section 9.3.2.2). Participating 
in international competition with China and the USA on 
training-data-intensive machine learning at the expense 
of privacy would be a mistake; it would undermine the 
European system of basic values. Instead, sustainabil-
ity, fair production conditions, privacy and cyber-secu-
rity in technology design and at work (ethics by, in and 
for design, privacy by design, security by design, sus-
tainability and fairness by design) should become cen-
tral action-guiding elements of a future European digi-
talization model. The most important reference here is 
the EU-GDPR and the development of sustainable data 
handling. The responsible handling of data and privacy 
would put the EU in a unique position if consistently 
enforced and not watered down in global competition. 
The EU should therefore create a competitive advan-
tage and, at the same time, perceive sovereign data pro-
tection and ethically reflected technology design as 
locational advantages. 
As a first interpretation proposal for handling per-
sonal data, the EU-GDPR is the strictest standard 
worldwide. It needs to be decisively implemented, 
enforced and constantly further developed. It aims to 
protect natural persons when their personal data are 
processed and transferred, thereby protecting the fun-
damental rights and freedoms of natural persons. In the 
WBGU’s view, the question of whether these protection 
objectives are achieved will depend to a large extent on 
the consistency of their enforcement, concrete applica-
tion and further development, e.g. by data-protection 
authorities and the courts. In addition to strengthening 
law-enforcement authorities in the Member States, the 
EU-GDPR should recognize and support civil-society 
actors in their important role as cooperation partners in 
its enforcement. A debate on privacy should be initi-
ated and supported throughout society. The WBGU rec-
ommends vigorously countering excessive surveilling 
and profiling. This requires, among other things, a pow-
erful ePrivacy Regulation (ePR). The German Federal 
Government should therefore work at the EU level to 
lift the blockade on the ePR and implement it in the 
interests of its citizens. The negotiation process on the 
ePrivacy Regulation, which is currently largely blocked, 
should be accelerated in the public interest. This and 
the further development of the EU-GDPR would also 
send an international signal to third countries, espe-
cially to developing countries (Kuner et al., 2017). 
Effective data-protection instruments should be suc-
cessively established as international standards via 
multilateral processes. In the Digital Age, data process-
ing is not only the cause of violations of privacy, but 
also of concentrations of power and undesirable eco-
nomic developments. The EU should therefore put data 
protection, together with data obligations, on the 
agenda – also in relation to non-personal data. 
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9 .3 .3 
Actor constellations for digitalized sustainability 
societies
In order to steer digitalization towards sustainability, 
alliances of actors are needed that promote normative 
guidance, regulatory frameworks and fair market struc-
tures in society. Combining digitalization with sustain-
ability objectives is a political process, not a technolog-
ical one. The WBGU has examined the actor groups, viz. 
individuals, business and enterprises, civil society, tech 
communities, cities and municipalities, states, trans-
national actors, and the international community of 
states (Chapter 4). Trends can be deduced as to which 
groups of actors will gain influence and room for 
manoeuvre through digitalization and which will lose it. 
From the target perspective of a Great Transformation 
towards Sustainability, it is necessary to involve actors 
with the power to shape transformation and to open up 
room for manoeuvre for pioneers of change. Specific 
recommendations have already been made on some 
actor constellations in Sections 9.1 to 9.3. 
The WBGU adheres to the concept of polycentric 
governance, which focuses on the interdependence of 
actor groups. The following recommendations aim to 
enable a wide range of actors to assume responsibility 
for the Transformation towards Sustainability in the 
Digital Age (polycentric responsibility architecture; 
WBGU, 2016b). Within a polycentric responsibility 
architecture, strong actors such as states or interna-
tional organizations can generate impetus and actively 
strengthen other actors, e.g. in order to form coalitions 
or counterweights to powerful players. Some of these 
potentially strong actors have yet to develop the ability 
to shape digital processes. To this end, digital compe-
tencies should be developed and linked to the require-
ments of sustainability transformation. 
9.3.3.1 
Develop civil-society networks for individual and 
public-interest concerns 
Since individuals in the digitalized world are exposed to 
numerous prestructurings and complexities, they need 
custodians of their collective interests who represent 
non-commercial interests (e.g. consumer-protection 
organizations). Existing organizations only provide 
individuals with limited protection from possible viola-
tions of individual rights by digital applications. For 
example, the interests of data-generating users vis-à-
vis commercial companies that exploit their data have 
so far not been safeguarded by custodians such as trade 
unions. This requires the development of new forms 
and representation rights. Civil-society organization 
and civic involvement are particularly crucial in the 
Digital Age as a link between the individual and society, 
but also as a counterbalance and supervisory entity 
that monitors state and economic power. Strong net-
works of civil-society actors can become a critical sen-
sorium, both nationally and globally, for ecological, 
societal and human-rights grievances, and in this sense 
be promoted and institutionalized all over the world. 
9.3.3.2 
Win over tech-communities as allies for the 
 Transformation towards Sustainability
Due to the ever-increasing influence of the tech com-
munities (Section 4.2.4), discourses relevant to sustain-
ability should be systematically and institutionally pro-
moted among this actor group. The discussions within 
the tech community on values by design, corporate 
social responsibility, the responsible use of technology, 
and the development of a professional ethic offer good 
starting points for leveraging potential for the ability to 
act, shape and plan when moving towards sustainabil-
ity transformation. These contents should also become 
an established part of education and further training. 
Alongside a strengthened form of corporate social 
responsibility, technological social responsibility should 
also be established so that tech communities increas-
ingly become pioneers of the Transformation towards 
Sustainability. The Corporate Digital Responsibility Ini-
tiative launched by the Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection (BMJV) has taken a first step 
towards defining possible principles of digital responsi-
bility in Germany. This can be further developed. 
A ‘Weizenbaum oath’ (Section 4.2.4) could serve as 
a professional ethic for the sustainable design and use 
of digital technologies. It could commit the tech com-
munities to general principles that guide the develop-
ment and application of digital technologies. These 
principles, too, should be an established part of the 
education and further training of experts.
9.3.3.3 
Mainstream technical knowledge and modernize 
state institutions 
The digital and sustainability competencies of public 
actors need to be strengthened in a targeted way for the 
Transformation towards Sustainability. In order to fully 
tap into the sustainability potential of digitalized state 
action, an understanding and technical knowledge of 
the opportunities and risks of digitalization should be 
enshrined in all government institutions from the local 
to the national level and across all relevant subject 
areas (mainstreaming). Moreover, states should increas-
ingly act together and cooperate multilaterally in order 
to (re-)gain their ability to act. They should ensure that 
civil rights are not restricted and that privacy is not 
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 violated. In the Digital Age, states have a special obliga-
tion to offer protection from threats to human dignity 
and must prepare themselves to be able to meet this 
obligation. 
9.3.3.4 
Use the resources of transnational and internatio-
nal organizations for sustainability
In the best-case scenario, digital interconnectedness, 
virtuality, and knowledge growth can be positive driv-
ers for the formation and diversification of trans-
national structures that have already been set in motion 
and which, in the long term, will cumulate into a kind 
of critical global society or global environmental aware-
ness. This requires the mainstreaming of sustainability 
topics in transnational networks and organizational 
structures dealing with digital and digitalized infra-
structures (e.g. ICANN). This perspective could be 
actively introduced by state or civil-society actors. 
International sustainability-governance organizations, 
which represent a key global knowledge resource with 
their fact-based reporting, should in the future take on 
a new role in the sense of informational quality assur-
ance. In addition, international organizations, resources 
and networks should form a bridge between transna-
tionally organized units and states. A compatible model 
example of this is the work of the UN Climate Secretar-
iat (Section 4.2.7). 
9 .4
New normative questions – the future of  
Homo sapiens
New ground is repeatedly being broken as the capabil-
ities and proficiencies of technical systems are continu-
ously further developed, human abilities extended by 
technical systems, and attempts made to confer human-
like abilities on technical systems. This raises funda-
mental ethical questions that must be discussed by 
society as a whole. Currently, images of utopian or dys-
topian science fiction abound in the discourses on 
cooperation and collaboration between humans and 
machines, and on the physical (and social) mechaniza-
tion of humans through digitalization (Chapter 6). Yet 
the emotionally charged atmosphere and the focus on a 
distant future distract from the fact that borderlines are 
probably already being crossed today that require 
immediate regulation (Section 9.4.1). The WBGU’s nor-
mative compass, which has been extended to include 
human dignity, can provide orientation on topics that 
currently still seem futuristic. Today, there are already 
concrete challenges to the protection of individuals 
from objectification (Section 2.3.2), to enabling 
self-determination and the free development of per-
sonality, and to diversity as the basis of creativity and 
an opportunity for necessary transformations in soci-
ety. Developments that are already emerging inevitably 
lead to questions as to which technical developments 
we want to – and which we do not want to – realize in 
the future, taking their possible consequences into con-
sideration. This requires the creation of discourse 
spaces and early warning systems (Sections 9.4.2, 
9.4.3).
9 .4 .1 
Brain-computer interfaces: incorporate data 
 protection and shut-down options
Although assessing the development of brain-computer 
interfaces (BCIs) and neuroprosthetics is often specula-
tive, in the meantime these technologies are considered 
significant by major investors. Correspondingly large 
research budgets and activities in the private sector are 
not without implications for research ethics and society, 
however, because the “meaningful, marketable and 
clinically usable development of brain-computer inter-
faces and brain-stimulation devices is only possible 
with equal and intensive cooperation between physio-
logical, engineering and clinical disciplines” (Birbaumer, 
2017: 8). In this context, the fact that the development 
departments of corporate groups often employ medical 
engineers without any clinical training or experience 
and without access to clinical groups is regarded as 
problematic in view of the lack of interdisciplinarity 
(Chapter 10); the same applies to decisions to make and 
design developments based on profit expectations and 
the availability of new technological options without 
reflecting on the ethics. Digitally controllable prosthe-
ses and implants are already being used for curative 
purposes today, in some cases without mandatory 
encryption or switch-off functions (Clausen et al., 
2017). There is an urgent need for action here.
Although technologies for reading thoughts are still 
rudimentary, and emotions cannot yet be read at all 
(e.g. by using scientifically questionable commercial 
EEG devices), such developments are theoretically pos-
sible in the foreseeable future (Topic box 5.3-2; Birbau-
mer, 2017). The WBGU therefore believes that the 
foundations must now be laid for regulating the use of 
such developments, which may possibly be pushed in 
ethically problematic directions for commercial rea-
sons. Since the rapid development of new sensors and 
machine intelligence could make ‘mind-reading’ possi-
ble within a few decades, at least in a limited form, it is 
important to already oblige manufacturers today to 
install an emergency shut-down switch. The maximum 
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safety and resilience of such systems must also be guar-
anteed (Birbaumer, 2017: 32). In this context, cyber-
security (Section 3.3.4) would be a new, additional 
guarantor of mental integrity. 
In view of the foreseeable quantitative increase in 
neuro data, the WBGU continues to recommend creat-
ing an individual right to privacy in the ‘default-opt-
out’ mode, strictly regulating the commercial use and 
passing on of data, and extending existing international 
obligations (e.g. UN Declaration of Human Rights) by 
adding corresponding ‘neuro-rights’ (Yuste and Goer-
ing, 2017: 161ff.). The rapid and, in some cases, already 
very advanced research and development in this area 
shows that spaces and institutions urgently need to be 
created for early discussions on setting possible border-
lines and imposing moratoria (Section 9.4.3).
9 .4 .2 
Licensing standards and ‘early warning systems’ 
in the field of human-machine interaction 
Not only does the physical technologization of human 
beings by machines raise fundamental questions; the 
intensification and redesigning of human-machine 
interaction also requires foresight and the containment 
of possible dangers relating to social policy, individual 
freedom of knowledge and decision-making autonomy 
(Box 4.3.3-1; Topic box 5.3-2; Birbaumer, 2017: 25ff.). 
Today, Alexa and Siri are already becoming part of more 
and more people’s everyday lives in industrialized 
countries. In view of people’s tendency to anthropo-
morphize autonomous systems, urgent societal ques-
tions arise here. In some cases, we interact with auton-
omous systems without knowing it (avatars, bots, ser-
vice robots), which is why the WBGU strongly recom-
mends a labelling requirement for communication with 
a machine ‘counterpart’. Furthermore, (partially) auto-
nomous robots are already being used today in vulner-
able areas, e.g. in nursing care, with patients suffering 
from dementia (Paro therapeutic robot) or in children’s 
rooms (e.g. networked toys with audio-visual tracking 
functions). Due to the potentially far-reaching conse-
quences for mental integrity, the WBGU recommends 
laying down appropriate general licensing standards for 
all socio-technical innovations, i.e. products and serv-
ices related to human-machine interaction. In order to 
keep pace with rapid developments driven by strong 
commercial interests, new and more anticipatory forms 
of technology-impact assessment need to be devel-
oped, as well as early warning systems for particularly 
vulnerable target groups (children, adolescents, etc.).
9 .4 .3 
Continuously adapt our understanding of the 
relationship between humans, machines and the 
environment 
Man-made digital technologies not only make it possi-
ble to irreversibly change the planet, they also influ-
ence and change human beings and the prevailing ideas 
of what it means to be human (Chapter 7, Section 8.3.4). 
The relationship between humans, machines and the 
environment is dynamic because all three components 
can be changed by technology and society. Neverthe-
less, technology is and will remain the work of human 
beings even in the long term. A critical and responsible 
anticipation of the future potential and risks of techno-
logical developments therefore requires a different, 
broader understanding of the future instead of a one-
sided technology-oriented one. In addition to an educa-
tion pact (Section 9.1.4.2), the WBGU recommends 
backing this up scientifically by further developing the 
necessary principles of futurology, forecasting and 
technological change (Chapter 10). Due to their societal 
significance, we see here a strong obligation to make 
the research results accessible to societal discourse, for 
example through new formats of knowledge transfer 
such as opportunities to experiment, road shows or 
testing in real-world laboratories.
9 .4 .4 
Create effective and inclusive discourse arenas
A further building block is the creation of arenas of 
discourse by Germany’s Federal Government – offering 
spaces for discussion in which civil society, scientists, 
businesspeople and policy-makers can exchange views 
on values, goals, and the limits of digital change (Sec-
tion 7.4). The aim of this instrument is to organize soci-
etal discourse in such a way as to raise awareness of the 
new ethical questions emerging in the context of digital 
change – and to develop answers for society. These are-
nas should be organized in several interconnected and 
complementary formats. Their results should be incor-
porated into parliamentary procedures, for example 
through statements (oral or written) to relevant Bunde-
stag committees (e.g. on the Digital Agenda). In addi-
tion, an interministerial or state-secretary committee 




The WBGU sees technological progress not as an end in itself, but as a means 
of achieving societal goals. Against this background, it proposes combining 
sustainability and digitalization research in order to close knowledge gaps. 
It also presents concrete proposals for the further development of existing 
research structures and makes research recommendations on various aspects 
at the interface between digitalization and sustainability.
The WBGU is oriented towards the questions of a global 
societal future within planetary guard rails. Research 
and innovation are of great importance in shaping a 
constructive role of digitalization for sustainable devel-
opment. The WBGU sees technological progress not as 
an end in itself, but as a means of achieving societal 
goals, in particular a decent life for all. In line with its 
normative compass (Chapter 2), the WBGU therefore 
expressly welcomes the corresponding basic convic-
tions of the BMBF’s digital strategy (2019) and their 
forthcoming implementation.
In this report, the Transformation towards Sustain-
ability is considered together with the power of digita-
lization and how it can be shaped. For sustainable 
development in the Digital Age, sustainability issues 
should be embedded in innovation and research policy 
on a broad societal level and should have international 
appeal on the sustainable design of the entire innova-
tion system at both the national and European level. 
Transformation research aimed at better understanding 
the importance of digitalization for fundamental socie-
tal change processes plays an important role here, as 
does transformative research, which, with its research 
findings, initiates and catalyses transformation pro-
cesses towards sustainable development (WBGU, 
2011: 22ff., 322). The contribution of science lies not 
only in stimulating relevant discourses but also in pro-
viding sound technical foundations for them in order to 
develop new technologies for digitalized sustainability 
and prepare them for application.
Although it is already understood that radical socie-
tal changes are to be expected on the way to the Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability and to digital 
change, current research in the context of digitalization 
continues to focus on technological development, e.g. 
big data, artificial intelligence (AI) or autonomous sys-
tems – as shown by a mapping of the discourse land-
scape carried out by the WBGU (Box 10.3-1). The con-
tent and direction of this research are primarily deter-
mined by economic potential, not least in the context of 
international competitiveness. Ecological and social 
research issues, the latter with the exception of the the-
matic blocks of knowledge, education and digital liter-
acy, are addressed to a much lesser extent. This also 
applies to the major questions of the future for the fur-
ther development of society and people in the context 
of digital change (Chapter 7). 
Compared to the speed and breadth of digital change, 
there is therefore still not enough reliable knowledge 
about the impact of digital technologies on the Earth 
system, societies and people. As a result, socio-political 
discourses on the effects of digitalization – for example 
with regard to work in the future or energy and resource 
consumption – are characterized by contradictory 
assessments and a lot of uncertainty. Equally, research 
has only just begun on the potential and risks of digita-
lization for achieving the internationally agreed sus-
tainability goals (UN Sustainable Development Goals – 
SDGs; UNGA, 2015) and the question of how digitally 
supported educational measures can promote knowl-
edge and action for the Great Transformation towards 
Sustainability (UN, 2018c).
This status quo suggests both a reorientation of the 




ability and the further development of sustainability 
research related to digitalization. In line with the Three 
Dynamics of the Digital Age (Chapter 7), the WBGU 
proposes the following overarching lines of research to 
fill existing gaps in knowledge and to gain more insight 
into the potential and risks of digitalization for a trans-
formation to a sustainable economic and societal 
 structure:
 > Research on digitalization for sustainability (First 
Dynamic): How can digital technologies, digital and 
digitalized infrastructures, as well as digitalized sys-
tems and end devices themselves be made sustain-
able, especially with regard to their energy and 
resource consumption and the establishment of a 
circular economy? How can digitalization be used as 
an instrument to implement the SDGs and to miti-
gate climate change?
 > Research on sustainable digitalized societies (Second 
Dynamic): How can societies be preserved that are 
able to assess the system-changing impact of digital-
ization on the Earth system, society, business, human 
beings and technical systems, and capable of taking 
action, proactively and sustainably shaping that 
impact, and countering any unintended conse-
quences? Important tasks for research include stud-
ying systemic risks and potential, developing new 
forms of inclusion in the context of work in the 
future, shaping human-machine interactions, and 
empowering the individual in digitalized sustainabil-
ity societies. Research funding on the impact of AI 
on the digitalized sustainability society should be 
significantly increased.
 > Research on the future of Homo sapiens (Third 
Dynamic): In the Digital Age, being human is in itself 
also becoming a topic of sustainable development. 
To what extent should old and new ideas of what it 
means to be human be questioned in the light of a 
possible intertwining of humans and technology and 
the increasing cooperation between humans and 
machines? How can the preservation of human dig-
nity be ensured?
Last but not least, the science system itself must face up 
to digital change and develop accordingly. A focus on 
sustainability goals in almost all disciplines places new 
demands on their structural design. There is a greater 
need for discourse and spaces for reflexion within the 
scientific system in order to make possible differenti-
ated, joint and timely discussion of ethical and sustain-
ability issues at various levels of society, and to develop 
proposals for suitable framework conditions.
First,  Section 10.1 explains the overarching objec-
tive with regard to the Great Transformation towards 
Sustainability (WBGU, 2011). On this basis,  Section 10.2 
makes concrete proposals for the further development 
of existing research structures. In the design of current 
programmes, it is often difficult to position projects at 
the interface of sustainability and digitalization. Insti-
tutes and programmes are presented which have taken 
the first steps towards exploring the interface between 
sustainability and digitalization, or which would lend 
themselves to bringing about a closer inter section of 
the two areas. Furthermore, proposals are made for 
existing programmes and institutions at the interface of 
digitalization and sustainability as well as for actors in 
the science system that take into account the increased 
necessity for interdisciplinary exchange and the inte-
gration of science-related actors. Finally,  Section 10.3 
explains the research recommendations in terms of 




At present, scientific and public uncertainty about the 
impact of digitalization on the Earth system, societies 
and people is out of line with the current dynamics, 
breadth and intervention depth of digital develop-
ments. The research recommendations in this report are 
therefore also concerned with maintaining and promot-
ing global society’s ability to understand, innovate, and 
engage in discourse, in order ultimately to preserve – 
or, where necessary, regain – its ability to shape and act 
( Section 7.5). Science and research have a key role to 
play here. Critical analyses, reflection and opening 
realms of possibility and discourse on digital change are 
therefore indispensable components for shaping a sus-
tainable Digital Age; they should be understood as pro-
moters of – and not obstacles to – innovation and com-
petitiveness.
In the WBGU’s view, perhaps the greatest challenge 
for research funding lies in creating conditions at 
diverse, interacting levels for a differentiated, joint and 
timely discussion of ethical issues, and in conceiving 
societal framework conditions for sustainable digitali-
zation and safeguarding it in the future. In this context, 
it is important to further increase reflective potential 
not only in science itself, but also in the many different 
public arenas of the digitalization discourse. To this end, 
new formats for science communication could be set up 
beyond existing ones, e.g. in the field of art, to increas-
ingly activate scientific expertise for public discourses. 
Accordingly, in order for a Great Transformation to be 
successful (WBGU, 2011), it is important to promote 
both transformation research for a better understand-
ing of how to shape digitalization, and transformative 
research using the instruments of digitalization. Digita-
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lization should be established as a new cross-cutting 
topic in all existing sustainability-research initiatives, 
and the sustainability target system should be embed-
ded in all digitalization research.
Transformation research ‘specifically addresses the 
future challenge of transformation realisation. This dis-
cipline explores transitory processes in order to come to 
conclusions on the factors and causal relations of trans-
formation processes. Examples from history could pro-
vide the basis for analysing observed transformative 
moments’ (WBGU, 2011: 22). In the context of digitali-
zation, such research helps us to comprehend what the 
relevant drivers are for understanding the ‘key ques-
tions for a digital, sustainable society’ (WBGU, 2018a). 
Against the background of the Three Dynamics, meth-
ods of technology-impact assessment and futurology 
are important building blocks of transformation 
research.
At the same time, digitalization offers instruments 
for raising empirical and long-term research to a new 
level of quality. For example, monitoring in Earth obser-
vation, social platforms in behavioural research, and 
Industry 4.0 for the circular economy – they all make it 
possible to comprehensively recognize dependencies, 
complex relationships and implications. Data analyses, 
time-series analyses, pattern recognition, modelling, 
simulations and forecasts are orders of magnitude bet-
ter than ever before – in terms of coverage, precision, 
repeatability and traceability – thanks to the accuracy 
of observation possibilities, as well as the topicality, 
scope and duration of the observations. Such instru-
ments make even such extensive tasks of observation 
and analysis as the further development of the SDG 
indicators feasible in countries and worldwide. A first 
SDG indicator framework was already presented with 
the SDGs. However, this has not yet been fully imple-
mented due to content-related and operational difficul-
ties. Developing it further with a view to implementa-
tion should therefore be a subject of research. In com-
bination with the communitization of research data and 
findings as digital commons, the SDG-oriented knowl-
edge base can thus also be established, expanded and 
made universally accessible. 
In the context of digitalization, transformative 
research develops on the one hand direct, digital-based 
methods and solution modules for sustainability-re-
lated challenges (e.g. innovations for decentralized 
energy-supply systems, automated driving in the con-
text of sustainable mobility, precision agriculture, cir-
cular economy); on the other hand, it initiates societal 
debates on the sustainability potential and risks of dig-
italization by creating a suitable framework and sensi-
tizing people to the interrelation of different issues. 
Furthermore, both can develop further with digitalized 
methods and instruments.
The intertwining of sustainability and digitalization 
research, in which transformative research cannot get 
by without the SDG target system and ICT innovation 
dynamics, should be accompanied by educational 
research for the digitalized sustainability society. Not 
only the manifestation and strengthening of digital and 
sustainability competencies should be examined here, 
but also, in particular, the transfer of transformation 
competencies to deal with the upcoming tasks and 
options of the Transformation. A canon for the educa-
tion and further training of digital, sustainability and 
transformation skills should be prepared and scientifi-
cally accompanied by transformative educational 
research as a foundation in the digitalized sustainability 
society.
10 .2
Research structures – transformation research 
and transformative research in the Digital Age
The German science system should be further devel-
oped in terms of both structures and programmes in 
order to process and provide the knowledge required 
for digital development, and to strengthen the role of 
science as a space for discourse and reflection. The SDG 
target canon should be mainstreamed in every relevant 
discipline, but especially in digitalization research 
because of the dynamics of ICT innovation. Table 10.2-1 
provides an overview of the ideas the WBGU is sug-
gesting for basic research on transformation processes 
in the Digital Age and transdisciplinary, application-ori-
ented research for digital change. Proposals are made 
both for existing research programmes ( Section 10.2.1) 
and for established actors in the science system 
( Section 10.2.2). Institutional capacity in Germany 
should also be further expanded (10.2.3), also in view 
of the fact that the German Federal Government, 
together with the Länder and industry, is still missing its 
target of allocating 3.5 % of GDP to research and devel-
opment – it is 0.5 % short (BMBF, 2018a). Further 
research recommendations can be found under the 
respective arenas (Chapter 5). Box 10.3-2 gives an 
overview of the topics.
10 .2 .1 
Extend research programmes and strategies 
at the interface between digitalization and 
 sustainability
In view of existing environmental and sustainability 
problems and the dynamics of digitalization, there is an 
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urgent need to generate knowledge to guide action. 
However, there are currently only a few existing 
research programmes and strategies that explicitly 
place digitalization and sustainability at the core of 
their activities. Existing transformative research pro-
grammes to accompany digitalization should be 
re-launched or further developed at the European and 
national level.
10.2.1.1 
Horizon Europe: centrally enshrine digitalized 
sustainability in Europe
The EU bundles its research-funding programmes in 
time-limited Research Framework Programmes admin-
istered by the European Commission. In 2021, the cur-
rent framework programme EU Horizon 2020 – with a 
funding volume of €77 billion the largest research and 
innovation programme in the world (BMBF, 2018a: 39) 
– will be superseded by its successor programme Hori-
zon Europe (2021–2027). As stated in the High-Tech 
Strategy, the German Federal Government should work 
to ensure that the SDGs and the Paris Agreement are 
enshrined in the new EU Research Framework Pro-
gramme. This programme is based on three pillars which 
can are a good match with this report: (1) open science, 
(2) global challenges and international  competitiveness, 
and (3) open innovation (Figure 10.2.1-1). 
However, in view of the interdependence of digitali-
zation and sustainability, the WBGU recommends that 
these three pillars of a ‘European Research Area’ should 
be conceptually combined more closely and that the 
Federal Government should take a corresponding posi-
tion on the further implementation of the ‘Responsible 
Research and Innovation’ paradigm (RRI; Lindner et al., 
2016). This would also have to be embedded in general 
incentive structures and not only, as with ‘Horizon 
2020’, in the comparatively low-budget sub-pro-
gramme ‘Science with and for Society’. This could be a 
way of directly strengthening the responsibility of 
European and German science in view of the challenges 
of digitalization relating to global sustainable develop-
ment. Just as securing industrial competitiveness in the 
second pillar can only be meaningfully considered in 
conjunction with global sustainability challenges, open 
science and innovation cannot be implemented sepa-
rately from responsible technology design. In the Fed-
eral Government’s position paper on ‘Horizon Europe’ 
(2018b: 5), the envisaged ‘broad concept of innovation’ 
explicitly refers not only to technological but also to 
social innovations and, in addition to increased value 
creation, also emphasizes the need to overcome societal 
challenges in line with the precautionary principle.
In line with the demand stated there that SDGs “are 
also included in the clusters as a guideline for topic 
selection and tenders,” the WBGU recommends devel-
oping and introducing an overarching ‘mission’ specifi-
cally oriented towards sustainable and sustainabili-
ty-enabling digitalization. In the report ‘Mission-Ori-
ented Research & Innovation in the European Union’ 
(Mazzucato, 2018), on which the European Commis-
sion’s current proposal is based, not only is there a clear 
reference to digitalization in many places, but the SDGs 
also play a key role. A corresponding, mission-oriented 
systemic policy uses ‘frontier knowledge to attain 
 specific goals’ or ‘big science deployed to meet big 
problems’ (Mazzucato, 2018: 4).
Table 10 .2-1








Transdisciplinary and application-oriented research 
for digital change
Set up research institutes on the basic issues of 
 digitalized sustainability
Ideas for the further development of basic research:
 > set up a DFG Senate Commission on ‘Sustainability in 
Digitalization Research’ 
 > guidelines for universities and R&D
Relate research programmes on sustainability and/or 
 digitalization reciprocally and develop them in a transdi-
sciplinary way:
 > Horizon Europe
 > Future Earth
 > High-Tech Strategy 2025
 > BMBF-FONA
 > Energy research programme
Stimuli for sustainable digitalization in industrial 
research:
 > Sustainability lines for R&D
 > Sustainability-oriented target indicators
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Given the complexity and specialization of today’s 
science, openness and collaboration are becoming criti-
cal success factors. This applies both within the diver-
sity of Europe and in global competition, especially 
with economically strong states such as China or the 
USA. In line with the WBGU’s transformative perspec-
tive (2011), the WBGU therefore recommends that 
mission-oriented research on fundamental global chal-
lenges (Grand Challenges) be implemented structurally 
in the next Research Framework Programme. The aim is 
to gear scientific investment towards making such 
research possible in an interdisciplinary, focused and 
problem-oriented manner in conjunction with basic 
and applied research (Mazzucato, 2018: 5ff.).
On this basis, the WBGU furthermore proposes the 
creation of a ‘Digital Sustainability Knowledge and 
Innovation Community’ (KIC) at the European Institute 
of Innovation and Technology (EIT; European Commis-
sion, 2018d) as a cooperative community for knowl-
edge and innovation together with industry, in order to 
implement major changes, e.g. towards a circular econ-
omy.
The WBGU further recommends that the German 
Federal Government should focus the negotiations on 
the next Framework Programme (FP9, beginning on 
1 January 2021) more strongly on the sustainability of 
digitalization and digital sustainability, in order to make 
important contributions to the sustainable develop-
ment of the EU, as laid down in the current position 
paper (Bundesregierung, 2018c: 2).
10.2.1.2 
Future Earth: extend sustainability research in the 
direction of digitalization
In view of the interdependencies between digitalization 
and sustainability identified in this report, the WBGU 
recommends integrating digitalization as an important 
building block into the international Future Earth 
research programme, which is geared towards the 
transformation to global sustainability. In this context, 
a global project on ‘eSustainability’ should be initiated. 
A new inter- and transdisciplinary type of science (in 
line with the WBGU’s ideas presented in  Section 10.2) 
is already a central element of the vision for 2025 
(Future Earth, 2014). ‘eSustainability’ can contribute 
significantly to achieving the SDGs, and not only 
through increased output on the central topics of 
Future Earth; it can also promote the realization of a 
corresponding new collaborative scientific culture that 
transcends current limitations and creates the neces-
sary prerequisites for it. The WBGU further recom-
mends the creation of a knowledge action network on 
‘Digitalization’ in order to firmly establish this and 
other projects at the interface of sustainability and dig-
italization as pillars of research strategy and to contin-
uously expand them.
10.2.1.3 
High-Tech Strategy 2025: bring digitalization and 
sustainability together
Since 2006, the High-Tech Strategy (BMBF, 2018b) has 
concentrated the German Federal Government’s 
research and innovation policy across all ministries. The 
further developments introduced in 2010, 2014 and 
2018 successively shifted the Strategy’s focus – which 
was originally purely technical and economic – more 
towards societal challenges. Since 2014, there have 
been occasional references to social innovations, as well 
as to research in sustainability, social sciences and the 
humanities. The 2018 revision further strengthened 
these aspects, a fact that the WBGU welcomes. Digital-
ization is treated as a central cross-cutting issue in the 
High-Tech Strategy and is to be promoted in all six 
fields of action. Sustainability, however, is kept themat-
ically more sectoral in the context of climate-change 
mitigation and energy. Although the High-Tech Strat-
egy states that the Federal Government is committed to 
anchoring the SDGs and the Paris Agreement in the 
new EU Research Framework Programme, they are not 
mentioned in the High-Tech Strategy itself. The High-
Figure 10 .2 .1-1
Three pillars of Horizon Europe. 
Source: European Commission, 2018d (own translation)
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Tech Strategy 2025 sees itself as a learning process that 
takes up ideas on the implementation and further 
development of the strategy. To this purpose, the WBGU 
recommends giving sustainability aspects even greater 
consideration in the High-Tech Strategy, and consist-
ently combining them with the power of digitalization. 
The following concrete measures are recommended:
1. Sustainability – like digitalization – should be posi-
tioned in the High-Tech Strategy as a cross-cutting 
topic that is promoted equally in all fields of action. 
Furthermore, digitalization for sustainability, in the 
sense of developing digitally supported solutions 
oriented towards the SDGs, should be added as a 
concrete mission in the High-Tech Strategy.
2. Growth targets should not take precedence over 
welfare and sustainability. With regard to interna-
tional competitiveness, the aim must be to com-
bine political thinking on competitiveness and sus-
tainability. Instead of focusing on the concept of 
growth and international competitiveness, the 
High-Tech Strategy should therefore focus on the 
concept of welfare and the sustainability goals as a 
new global development paradigm. Social and eco-
logical dimensions of innovations as strategic ele-
ments for achieving welfare goals should be further 
strengthened.
3. Sustainable digitalization – i.e. secure, resource-sav-
ing and energy-efficient digitalization – should be 
added to the High-Tech Strategy as a concrete mis-
sion. Solutions for a sustainable consumption of 
required resources and energy should already be 
taken into consideration in the development and 
operation of digital and digitalized infrastructures 
and applications. 
10.2.1.4 
FONA4: create link with digitalization
The BMBF Framework Programme on ‘Research for 
Sustainable Development’ (FONA) develops decision 
criteria for future-oriented action and innovative solu-
tions for a sustainable society. The Fourth framework 
programme (FONA4) should be used to introduce the 
topic of digitalization into the sustainability research 
programme. It should take into account in particular the 
possible role of digitalization as an instrument for 
effectively implementing the sustainability goals, e.g. 
through improved monitoring or the simplified 
exchange of environmental data.
This strategic reorientation places new demands on 
the preventative research already set out in FONA3 
(BMBF, 2015), since new digital preventative topics 
such as data security, protection of privacy and stability 
of infrastructures are thus also gaining relevance in sus-
tainability research. Accordingly, preventative research 
should be further developed within FONA4. The same 
applies to the socio-ecological research conducted 
within FONA, which takes up topics involving societal 
negotiation processes and value discussions in order to 
find possible solutions for the transition to a sustain-
able society. Linking FONA with digitalization topics 
will lead to more discussions on values.
10.2.1.5 
German Federal Government’s Energy Research 
Programme: strengthen sustainability impacts and 
the international perspective
The Energy Research Programme describes the content 
and instruments of the Federal Government’s research 
funding in the energy sector. It has only recently been 
fundamentally revised, and the current seventh edition 
has been adapted to changed framework conditions and 
new challenges in the implementation of energy- and 
climate-policy objectives in Germany. The Energy 
Research Programme takes up many technologies and 
approaches to protecting natural resources that are also 
important to the WBGU, such as technologies for cap-
turing CO2, and processes and materials for closing 
material cycles. In the WBGU’s view, it is important to 
emphasize that the revision significantly strengthened 
the programme’s orientation towards systemic research 
questions and cross-system research topics. These 
include interdisciplinary research on the necessary 
socio-economic prerequisites for the successful applica-
tion and dissemination of new technologies, and on the 
practical testing of technologies and regulatory meas-
ures in real-world laboratories.
In addition to this enhanced focus on interaction 
between society and technology for the successful 
application of new technologies, the WBGU welcomes 
the fact that the revision has explicitly integrated digi-
talization and its consequences for the energy sector as 
one of the cross-system research topics – as well as in 
many other areas, for example in connection with new 
mobility concepts, intelligent buildings and particularly 
in connection with sector coupling. This has remedied a 
major flaw in the previous Energy Research Programme. 
The current programme lists a wide range of technical 
and non-technical developments in the course of digi-
talization and a multitude of possible application areas 
and potential for digital technologies. Critical questions 
– such as the consequences of increasing networking 
for the security and resilience of the energy system and 
data protection – are not ignored either.
However, the societal and ecological implications of 
digitalization for sustainable development ensuing from 
the energy sector are hardly covered by the Energy 
Research Programme. In line with the guiding principle 
of this report, technologies and digitalization should be 
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placed at the service of sustainability. When developing 
technologies, therefore, the WBGU recommends consid-
ering not only market potential, but also societal and 
environmental sustainability impacts within the frame-
work of projects. For example, it could be made obliga-
tory to discuss these aspects when filing applications for 
new project proposals. Such a regulation would lay down 
the integration of sustainability aspects as a standard, 
deviations from which would have to be justified. More-
over, the WBGU takes a critical view of the very one-
sided focus on Germany and industrialized countries. 
This orientation neglects the special societal and struc-
tural prerequisites in developing countries and emerging 
economies for the design of sustainable energy systems. 
Societal and structural prerequisites in developing coun-
tries and emerging economies for designing sustainable 
energy systems should be given greater consideration in 
research funding, both in the development of new 
energy technologies and in studies on the necessary 
framework conditions for a successful and rapid imple-
mentation of technologies. 
10 .2 .2 
Recommendations to existing actors in the 
 science system
Since both digitalization and sustainability are 
cross-sectional topics, and are furthermore highly 
interdependent, both should be put on the agenda and 
disseminated by the key actors in the science system. 
By means of an inter- and transdisciplinary main-
streaming of these topics, it is possible to establish and 
gradually expand a broad understanding of sustainabil-
ity in the sense of the SDGs and to show how research 
linked to digitalization within science itself and in 
exchange with business and society can be made sus-
tainable. 
10.2.2.1 
DFG: set up a permanent Senate Commission on 
Sustainability in Digitalization Research
The intertwined fields of sustainability and digitaliza-
tion are a rapidly developing scientific topic that is con-
troversially discussed in politics and society where a 
recurring need for legal regulation with clear relevance 
for research is to be expected (DFG, 2018). The WBGU 
recommends that the DFG set up a standing Senate 
Commission on Sustainability in Digitalization Research 
to clearly define and pool the relevant competencies 
within the DFG. The Senate Commission would have 
the task of drawing attention to digital developments 
that raise scientific, ethical, legal and social questions, 
or conflict with the aim of sustaining natural life-sup-
port systems. It should observe digital change carefully 
and proactively in order to initiate new public debates 
in good time and indicate areas that require research. 
The Senate Commission on Sustainability in Digitaliza-
tion Research should also point out gaps in public and 
research-policy discourses. 
10.2.2.2 
Universities and colleges: formulate and develop 
guidelines
Universities and colleges can send important stimuli to 
society not only as places where research and teaching 
are bundled, but also as actors within society. Some 
universities and colleges have already drawn up official 
sustainability guidelines specifying, for example, the 
assumption of ecological and social responsibility in 
their research, teaching and administration. Universi-
ties and colleges should create, enhance and implement 
guidelines for their own practice on the sustainable use 
of digital methods and tools in university and college 
activities. To this purpose, they should seek ways to 
share and exchange know-how with faculties engaged 
in research on digitalization. The topic of digitalization 
should form an additional part of the BMBF’s Sustaina-
bility at Universities (HOCHN) project.
10.2.2.3 
Academies of science: intensify references to 
sustainability
Another central pillar of the German science system, the 
Union of the German Academies of Sciences and 
 Humanities, is an important player with a leverage effect 
in the shaping of national science practice. The topic of 
digitalization is already very present there with working 
groups on Digital Humanities, the creation of a National 
Research Data Infrastructure (NFDI) and digitalization 
centres. In the WBGU’s opinion, it would be desirable to 
further intensify references to sustainability and to 
simultaneously promote the realization of positive 
visions of open and inclusive science beyond the pillar 
of Open Access ( Section 10.2.4.1). The WBGU welcomes 
the initiatives on this that have already been launched, 
such as those at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities, and recommends their 
 expansion.
In the field of engineering sciences, the WBGU wel-
comes the ‘Germany decoupling’ initiative of the German 
Academy of Engineering Sciences (acatech) and suggests 
the systematic integration of the circular economy into 
all resource-related research fields (acatech, 2017). This 
applies in particular to the increasing volume of elec-
tronic waste (Section 5.2.5), but also to other material 
flows. Studies should be conducted on the causes of the 
growing demand for material and on strategies to avoid 
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it, on the possibilities of sustainable product design, on 
substituting materials with biodegradable ones, and on 
making products easier to repair. Such topics should 
become more widespread in engineering research and 
teaching. The practicability and potential of specific 
material and component cycles should also be looked at, 
as should cycle-oriented consumer practices and busi-
ness models.
10.2.2.4 
Business: integrate ethics and sustainability 
aspects into in-house corporate R&D
Two thirds of annual research and development expend-
iture in Germany is financed by the private sector with 
the primary aim of going straight into application and 
achieving commercially exploitable results. It 
 concentrates primarily on the high-value technology 
sectors (BMBF, 2018). In order to encourage responsible 
innovation, the WBGU recommends systematically 
incorporating ethics and sustainability in the sense of 
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI, Lindner et 
al. 2016) into private-sector high-tech development. To 
this end, companies should on the one hand develop 
guidelines that consistently integrate ethics and 
 sustainability into their in-house research activities; on 
the other hand, they should offer appropriate training 
and further-education programmes to empower devel-
opers to critically engage with conscious (e.g. privacy 
by design) and unconscious (e.g. gender stereotypes) 
assignments of values in technologies, for example in 
the development of AI and algorithms. Furthermore, 
support should be given to research linking design eth-
ics with professional ethics (such as the IEEE initiative 
on ‘Ethically Aligned Design’).
Research funding should provide companies with 
corresponding incentives. In future funding lines, the 
BMBF and the EU should make the integration of ethics 
and sustainability into corporate research a prerequisite. 
This would make it possible to link research funding in 
relevant areas to the collection of corporate data on 
resource flows and energy consumption, and to the 
development of systems that monitor, warn about, and 
forecast breaches of existing environmental regulations; 
the aim is to integrate sustainability requirements more 
firmly into production processes. In the case of funding 
approaches for R&D collaborations at the federal and EU 
level, incentives should be offered when consortia are 
created to bring specialists in digitalization together with 
experts in sustainable production approaches within a 
project framework. In addition, the EU should support 
the further development of regional innovation systems 
that focus on the systemic-synergetic interlinking of 
digitalization skills and sustainability transition 
 management.
10 .2 .3 
Establish research institute(s) on the 
 fundamental issues of digitalized sustainability
The institutional capacity of German environmental 
and sustainability research has been successively 
expanded over the past decades, and the level of 
research expenditure by the Federal Government (more 
than  €1.4 billion) is very high by international stand-
ards (BMBF, 2018a: 287). Research activities on digital-
ization have also been further expanded, especially in 
recent years. The Weizenbaum Institute for the Net-
worked Society (2017) or Cyber Valley between Stutt-
gart and Tübingen, with its International Max Planck 
Research School for Intelligent Systems (2017) are just 
two examples of start-ups and boosts to capacity in 
recent years. However, there has been no systematic 
interlinkage of programmes between the two thematic 
blocks of digitalization and sustainability. 
As a first step in this direction, an institute was 
founded in 2017 with the world’s most comprehensive 
funding for basic research at the interface between the 
internet and society: the Weizenbaum Institute for the 
Networked Society researches the ethical, legal, eco-
nomic, sociological and technical aspects of digital 
change from a social-science perspective. In addition, a 
cross-sectional department on digitalization and sus-
tainability incorporating different research groups was 
set up, which could provide initial stimuli for a further 
research institute. 
10.2.3.1 
New research institutes at non-university research 
institutions 
The WBGU sees a further need for financially inde-
pendent research centres which, although they have a 
technological knowledge base, do not themselves 
develop technology, but rather look into the implica-
tions of developments for present and future genera-
tions. The WBGU therefore encourages the establish-
ment of research institutes, e.g. at the Leibniz Associa-
tion, Helmholtz Association, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft 
or Max Planck Society, or as federal or state govern-
ment institutes. From a sustainability perspective, 
these should close current and future research gaps 
( Section 10.3) as quickly as possible and set new stand-
ards not only in terms of the quality but also the speed 
of research. On the assumption that technology should 
never be designed, developed or implemented without 
considering the implications for society, the WBGU rec-
ommends that potential and impact research, especially 
with regard to global environmental impacts, be estab-
lished and promoted at the institutes. 
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10.2.3.2 
Implement initiative for a new Max Planck Insti-
tute for ‘Geo-anthropology’
An article sponsored by the Max Planck Society in the 
journal Nature (Rosol et al., 2018) encourages the cre-
ation of a new branch of interdisciplinary research on 
‘geo-anthropology’. The aim is to systematically ana-
lyse global change in the Anthropocene and to bring 
together expertise from the natural sciences, humani-
ties and engineering in an interdisciplinary way in order 
to develop prospects for sustaining the natural life-sup-
port systems. Transformation processes in the Digital 
Age can be better understood with the help of such 
basic transformation research (WBGU, 2011). The 
WBGU therefore supports the initiative for a new Max 
Planck Institute in the field of ‘geo-anthropology’ 
(Rosol et al., 2018). 
10 .2 .4 
Further develop the science system and establish 
new forms of cooperation between science and 
society
In view of the question raised from the perspective of 
transformative research ( Section 10.1) as to whether 
“the institutions, the internal structures of universities 
and scientific institutions, the reputation systems, the 
quality assurance systems, the financing structures or 
the career biographies in today’s science system are still 
appropriate for suitably relating knowledge generated 
within the science system to society and its challenges” 
(Schneidewind, 2015: 89), the WBGU believes there is 
a need both for the consistent further development and 
implementation of open science and for new forms of 
cooperation between science and society.
10.2.4.1 
Open scientific structures for the joint production 
of knowledge
The WBGU shares the European Commission’s pro-
grammatic orientation towards open science as a collab-
orative approach with new possibilities for generating, 
teaching and communicating knowledge based on digi-
tal infrastructures and collaborative tools. This approach 
aims for a systemic switch in all areas of scientific work 
– e.g. from standard practices in the academic 
 publication of research findings to the use of all the 
available knowledge generated in shared exchange 
from the beginning of the research process (European 
Commission, 2016: 33). On this basis, the WBGU 
 recommends:
 > Make science as open and inclusive as possible: The 
WBGU recommends working towards a further 
opening of research practice beyond the current 
incentives, involving not only data, methods and 
results, but also the entire process of scientific work. 
At the same time, inclusion should be promoted 
both within science and in areas close to science, e.g. 
through citizen science. In this way, applied scien-
tific work can be accelerated, established more 
firmly in society, and geared more towards the com-
mon good. Increases in efficiency on the one hand, 
and the democratization of scientific knowledge 
from its creation to its dissemination on the other, 
are not mutually exclusive but can be mutually ben-
eficial. At the same time, societal needs in the sense 
of the common good can be addressed more directly 
by research in this way (Arza and Fressoli, 2017: 468).
 > Bring together sustainability, digitalization and open 
science: In this context, the digitalization of research 
practice must be consistently enhanced with sus-
tainability goals, and sustainability-oriented 
research must be supported digitally. To this end, the 
great potential of open and inclusive science can be 
exploited within the framework of current develop-
ments such as the European Open Science Cloud 
(EOSC) and national research data infrastructures 
(RfII, 2018a, b), but also beyond this. The WBGU 
believes that the principles of the GO FAIR initiative 
for research data – Findable, Accessible, Interopera-
ble and thus Reusable (FAIR) – which up to now has 
only been established in Germany, the Netherlands 
and France, should not only become the standard for 
the EOSC (Nature, 2017: 451) and internationally, 
but also take sustainability into account in its infra-
structure design. In addition, every publicly funded 
R&D project proposal should explicitly answer not 
only questions on data protection and ethics, but 
also standardized questions on sustainability. The 
research worthiness of a project should take into 
account its contribution and relevance to the 
 sustainability goals.
 > Expand science studies into open science: Concepts 
associated with open science – such as open access, 
open data, open source, review, education and citi-
zen science – will inevitably remain the subject of 
intense debate (Bartling and Friesike, 2014). In 
detail, many research questions on concrete imple-
mentation are still open, which is why the WBGU 
believes that targeted research funding of open sci-
ence and its associated concepts is necessary. Spe-
cific programmes in science research would need to 
be launched in order for science to be actively 





Digitally supported science in and with the public 
– from local to global
The inclusive nature of future open science also affects 
the public discourse on science (knowledge communi-
cation), including feedback channels relevant to democ-
racy and literacy, e.g. data journalism based on open 
data, transdisciplinary formats and citizen science. This 
inclusion of others can only succeed if mediated via 
appropriately networked technical infrastructures for 
science (e.g. research information systems or research 
data infrastructures), which to date have been domi-
nated by a small number of mainly private providers. 
By contrast, digitalized infrastructures in the public 
sector ( Section 5.3.5) could be linked to corresponding 
scientific repositories for organizing society’s know-
ledge archive ( Section 5.3.10) and transdisciplinary 
discourse. For this purpose, the national initiatives on 
research data infrastructures must be networked at the 
European and international levels and go beyond 
research data. Inclusiveness in this sense also means 
that the scientists themselves are involved in building 
and operating the digital research-data infrastructures, 
which gives them greater freedom but also means addi-
tional work. At this point, it is therefore crucial to cre-
ate corresponding incentives – which have been lacking 
up to now (Borgman, 2010; Klump, 2012) – for exam-
ple in the form of corresponding career paths without 
detrimental effects on scientific careers, or explicit 
research funds for the conception, implementation and 
application of sustainability research software. Fur-
thermore, the potential of international research col-
laborations facilitated by digital and digitalized infra-
structures could be exploited with the greater involve-
ment of developing countries and emerging economies 
in the sense of worldwide knowledge development and 
communication. With regard to global social and digital 
inequality, this could further counteract the systematic 
distortion of scientific work and scientific communica-
tion that happens to the detriment of researchers in 
those countries (Asamoah-Hassan et al., 2017). In this 
context, barriers between different scientific language 
areas (both cultural and discipline-related) could simi-
larly be further reduced through the use of natural 
(including artificial) language processing (an AI appli-
cation).
10.2.4.3 
Digitally supported transdisciplinarity and inter-
disciplinarity for solving societal challenges
The success of modern science is largely based on the 
specialization of research fields and the differentiation 
of disciplines. A newly emerging digital spectrum of 
methods and new digital instruments open up possibil-
ities for the further differentiation of the scientific dis-
ciplines and for new disciplines at the intersections. 
However, cross-disciplinary exchange is of particular 
relevance for sustainable digital development. Although 
the STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics) are essential to gain expertise on 
how technologies can be shaped and on socio-technical 
systems, a technical focus alone is not enough to be 
able to act with foresight. The knowledge that consti-
tutes a mature society (culture, ideas and values, etc.) 
is developed in particular by the humanities and social 
sciences. For example, important questions about the 
future, such as how to handle data or the increase in 
networking, can only be answered in an interdiscipli-
nary way and in a dialogue with society (Mainzer, 
2016: 225). In addition, innovative discourses on recip-
rocal links between digitalization and sustainability are 
increasingly being conducted outside of science, for 
example among NGOs, think tanks and private compa-
nies. Transdisciplinary research that wishes to build a 
new relationship between science, society and nature 
(Krohn et al., 2018) is therefore, in the WBGU’s view, 
an important building block of scientific culture in the 
Digital Age. Digital instruments and cooperation for-
mats ( Section 10.2.4.1) should be developed and used 
for the new forms of collaboration. This makes it possi-
ble, for example , for participants in political discourses 
to be better informed. Such formats can provide evi-
dence-based information about the potential effects of 
digitalization and the limits of the current state of 
knowledge (Section 5.3.2). Furthermore, a large num-
ber of perspectives are brought together in a targeted 
manner in order to gear the development of knowledge 
more closely to the common good and promote a sus-
tainable Digital Age in a dialogue with society. The abil-
ity of people to imagine their futures (futures literacy) 
is a core competence in this context (Section 5.3.4). 
10 .2 .4 .4 
Organize a relevant proportion of research in an 
inter- and transdisciplinary way and integrate 
 epistemology more closely into scientific training
The WBGU recommends a significant increase in the 
proportion of research funds used for inter- and trans-
disciplinary research. Amounts of up to 20% of public 
research funding are recommended in the discourse on 
transdisciplinary research. Transdisciplinary processes 
offer in particular potential in co-designing and in the 
joint production of knowledge by scientists and societal 
stakeholders with a view to developing problem defini-
tions and dealing with unintended side-effects for sus-
tainable digitalization. For example, a comprehensive 
European Expert Round Table process (Scholz et al., 
2017) identified a total of 42 unintended, possible 
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 negative effects of digitalization in ten overarching 
topic areas.
In order to support exchange across different scien-
tific disciplines, it is advantageous to have insights into 
the epistemological prerequisites and limits, and into 
how knowledge and other forms of conviction come 
about. The WBGU recommends that epistemological 
and scientific theory be enshrined more firmly in aca-
demic education, for example by integrating such 
courses more closely into existing post-graduate pro-
grammes. In view of their reflective core competence 
and interdisciplinary capacity for discourse, aspects 
from the perspective of the humanities and social sci-
ences, particularly philosophy and the history of sci-
ence, should also be reinforced.
In addition, the WBGU recommends that any aca-
demic training in digitalization-oriented or digitaliza-
tion-related occupations be extended to include explicit 
components of digital ethics and the methods, pro-
cesses and tools of their implementation (ACM Code of 
Ethics, IEEE CS/ACM Code of Ethics and Professional 
Practice, etc.). 
10 .2 .4 .5 
To influence public discourse more strongly, 
 provide third-party funding and expand the free-
dom of researchers 
Especially in the field of ‘digitalization and sustainabil-
ity’, scientists and scientific institutions are called upon 
as ‘public intellectuals’ to raise awareness of sustain-
ability potential, as well as the opportunities, risks and 
challenges of digitalization. Commitment to the synthe-
sis of scientific findings, their transfer and scientific 
communication should play a greater role within the 
research structures in assessing academic performance 
and appointing professors. The WBGU therefore rec-
ommends the provision of additional third-party fund-
ing for which both scientists and civil-society actors 
can apply, in order to have a greater impact on public 
discourse beyond scientific incentives. An additional 
incentive could be provided by extended freedoms, 
such as a reduction in teaching obligations and admin-
istrative tasks, which could be made more efficient 
through digitalization. 
10 .3
Research recommendations on content
In preparation for the following overview of a possible 
design for an inter- and transdisciplinary research 
agenda at the inter section of digitalization and sustain-
ability, the WBGU has evaluated the research recom-
mendations contained in recent reports and scientific 
publications (Box 10.3-1). 
The recommendations on socio-technical research 
listed here focus on the societal embedding of innova-
tion dynamics for sustainable development. Further 
research recommendations can be found in the respec-
tive topic arenas (Box 10.3-2). Using examples, the 
WBGU thus believes it is possible to outline the initial 
contours of future research agendas. This approach 
embodies a new, integrative perspective that does not 
claim to provide complete, detailed coverage of the 
respective subject areas. Even in the relevant discourses 
on recommendations for action (Chapter 9), the topics 
of digitalization and sustainability have so far only 
been interlinked to a limited extent. For example, sus-
tainability and environmental aspects have hitherto 
been under-represented in the German Federal Govern-
ment’s current key issues paper on AI (Federal Govern-
ment, 2018b). By way of contrast, the current Federal 
Research Report (BMBF, 2018a) often addresses these 
aspects, but as a rule does not relate them to the inno-
vation concept proposed there. The WBGU advocates a 
research and innovation agenda geared to the major 
issues of the future, in which SDG-related sustainabil-
ity issues become an integral part. Based on the ‘Three 
Dynamics of the Digital Age’ (Chapter 7), the following 
 section is divided into recommendations for the use of 
digitalization for sustainability ( Section 10.3.1), for 
sustainable digitalized societies ( Section 10.3.2) and 
for the future of Homo sapiens ( Section 10.3.3). 
10 .3 .1 
Research on digitalization for sustainability
The line of research entitled ‘Research on sustainable 
digitalization’ deals with the question of how digital 
technologies and the development of digital and digi-
talized infrastructures can be shaped in a sustainable 
way, especially with regard to their consumption of 
energy and other resources and the establishment of a 
circular economy. Another question is how digitaliza-
tion can be used as an instrument for implementing 
SDGs and for climate protection. Both lines of research 
are part of this section.
10.3.1.1 
Research on the ecological footprint of  digital 
solutions and the recycling of products, 
 components and raw materials 
In view of the expansion of the infrastructure and the 
increasing number of devices and their short lifespan, 
the demand for material resources and energy con-
sumption are expected to increase further as a result of 




WBGU analysis of research and recommen-
dations on artificial intelligence
Preparations for writing this report’s two chapters of recom-
mendations included reviewing already existing research rec-
ommendations. Corresponding text passages from 45 source 
documents that implicitly or explicitly position digitalization 
in the context of sustainability were condensed into compact 
statements in a qualitative-interpretive discourse analysis. 
The entire analysis, covering both action and research recom-
mendations, is available for download on the WBGU website. 
In some cases, these recommendations are repeated several 
times in different sources. The results show that, internation-
ally and nationally, there is currently a strong emphasis on 
research recommendations formulated from a technical per-
spective, and that direct references to sustainability are rarely 
explicit. The topics were structured in line with the categories 
of the stirring paper on digitalization and sustainability, which 
preceded this report (WBGU, 2018a). With the exception of 
the thematic block on knowledge, education and digital liter-
acy, it is relatively rare for social and ecological research ques-
tions to be addressed; the same applies to important issues 
about the future such as the further development of human-
ity and associated risks. Some such approaches are formulat-
ed for AI research, which is addressed in the publications 
examined as follows:
 > researching the opportunities and risks of AI more closely;
 > ethical reflection as a prerequisite for research funding on 
AI;
 > more ethical and legal research on AI;
 > gearing AI research to the common good;
 > interdisciplinary research on AI standards;
 > establishing the precautionary principle for AI and robotics 
using technology-impact assessment;
 > proactively anticipating the dual use of AI and robotics, 
developing best practices;
 > using AI for a more ecological economy using green AI/
open ecological data;
 > more research on the use of AI in the world of work;
 > research on strategies against AI bias;
 > developing the international coordination of AI research;
 > evidence-based AI research;
 > no militarily motivated AI arms race in research.
The list shows that this text corpus, which is specifically tai-
lored to the topic of the report, already addresses some ap-
proaches to sustainable digitalization research involving AI. 
In this chapter, the WBGU takes up these approaches in a 
thematically broader and more concrete form. It should be 
noted, however, that the previously analysed material can 
only be selective and is not representative, as further publi-
cations are constantly appearing. AI was chosen as an exam-
ple topic at this point because it is a research area with a 
disproportionately fast rising number of publications 
( Figure 10.3-1). In the last ten years, the number of AI pub-
lications has increased nine-fold, while the number of publi-
cations in computer science has risen six-fold and the number 
in all disciplines has almost tripled, as the Scopus database 
shows (scopus.com). Although this database, despite its size, 
does not reflect the global research landscape in a represent-
ative way (corpus bias), statements on general trends can be 
made without any bibliometric or scientometric concerns.
AI publications mainly appear in computer science jour-
nals (Figure 10.3-2). This suggests that a technology- and 
application-oriented perspective dominates in which digitali-
zation and sustainability are still (too) seldom linked. In view 
of the increasing use of AI technologies in core areas of soci-
ety, the WBGU believes it would be desirable if the expected 
future growth of AI publications were to contain a higher 
proportion of AI publications produced outside computer sci-
ence in a broader context and with an explicit consideration 
of sustainability. With regard to interdisciplinarity, Figure 
10.3-2 shows a clear imbalance between AI-related publica-













































Growth in the number of publications on AI compared to computer science and publications as a whole.
Source: WBGU, own diagram based on the Scopus database (scopus.com)
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of electronic waste (e-waste), achieving closed material 
cycles is still a long way off for critical raw materials 
(e.g. strategic metals, rare earths;  Section 5.2.5). More-
over, the information available on the ecological effects 
of digitalization is far from sufficient. A qualified 
assessment of the development of the global demand 
for energy and digital resources is hampered by insuf-
ficient data (Köhler et al., 2018). Corresponding 
research projects should be carried out to improve our 
understanding of the ecological footprint of digital 
technologies and their use. The WBGU therefore rec-
ommends a broad-based, transformative research 
offensive consisting of the following components:
1. The collection of data on the physical composition 
of the ICT hardware and an assessment of future 
resource needs for the development of techni-
cal infrastructures (servers, data centres, etc.) and 
devices, as well as the development of a global 
roadmap for phasing out toxic substances.
2. Research into improved approaches to avoiding or 
reducing e-waste by resource-saving device devel-
opment, the optimization of product architecture, 
improved target orientation and accessibility of 
information about re-use (e.g. second-hand mar-
ket, sharing and services) and reparability, and even 
material substitution and the development of bio-
degradable electronics ( Section 5.2.5).
3. Development of innovative processes for the digi-
tally supported, safe and lucrative further process-
ing of e-waste (remanufacturing), technical solu-
tions for recycling reusable materials from e-waste, 
such as strategic metals or rare earths, and the 
development and promotion of corresponding digi-
tal platforms in order to significantly increase levels 
of reuse and recycling. 
4. Social science research should contribute to sound-
ing out the theoretical and practical limits of the cir-
cular economy and assessing the need for further 
measures such as efficiency and sufficiency strat-
egies. In addition, scientific studies – incorporat-
ing nationally or regionally specific impact and suc-
cess factors – on economic incentives to reduce the 
demand for products at the beginning of the design 
phase and to prolong product lifecycles are recom-
mended.
5. Research to determine and minimize the resource 
requirements and energy consumption of individ-
ual technologies, e.g. blockchain or deep learning; 
development of tools to analyse lifecycles taking 
these factors into account.
6. Early integration of behavioural sciences, e.g. envi-
ronmental psychology, into the research and devel-
opment process of new technologies, since new solu-
tions (e.g. smart homes or smart grids) do not auto-
matically lead to more efficient use and resource 
conservation unless the motivation for behavioural 
changes is triggered (Schultz et al., 2015).
More specific recommendations on the relationship 
between digitalization and electronic waste can be 
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Digitalization as a key factor in decarbonization 
The goals for climate-change mitigation agreed in the 
Paris Agreement require not only the decarbonization 
of the global economy, but also, in the long term, the 
actual removal of CO2 from the atmosphere (IPCC, 
2018). Research on digitalization’s contribution to the 
global energy-system transformation should therefore 
be organized in a systemic way, i.e. going beyond the 
sectors of energy, mobility and heating. The WBGU rec-
ommends resolutely pursuing the vision of an energy 
system that is based 100% on renewable energies and 
enshrining it as a central research mission. A further 
focus should be research into cost-effective and robust 
solutions for a reliable power supply in off-grid regions 
in emerging economies and developing countries. A 
wide variety of digital technology applications are of 
importance here, e.g. for mini grids based on renewable 
energies (IRENA, 2016). Finally, greater emphasis 
should be placed on the reliability and stability of the 
energy supply, as well as on privacy and data protec-
tion, in the course of digitalization. Furthermore, smart 
grids, smart meters and other intelligent applications 
lead to new complexities of energy supply and use, the 
implications of which are a further research topic. Spe-
cific recommendations on the impact of digitalization 
on climate-change mitigation and energy-system trans-
formation can be found in  Section 5.2.6.
10.3.1.3 
Sustainable Industry 4.0 and resource-conserving 
industrial metabolism
The consumption of materials and energy should be 
digitally optimized, economically used, and based con-
sistently on the circular economy and recycling. In 
addition to this, industrial metabolism – i.e. the mate-
rial and energy flows connected with goods production 
– should be designed in such a way that the natural 
life-support systems are sustained, e.g. that significant 
contributions can be made to reducing greenhouse-gas 
emissions. Within existing research initiatives on Indus-
try 4.0, application-oriented proposals should be sys-
tematically developed for an improved coordination of 
material flows through the digital networking, control 
and monitoring of manufacturing processes. Above all, 
projects should sound out the potential of additive 
manufacturing processes (3D printing) for forms of 
goods production that conserve resources and offer 
improved recycling potential in logistics and material 
use. Beyond the research objectives of the sustainabil-
ity-oriented, further developed digital coordination of 
industrial value chains, ideas should be generated on 
how completely new, regenerative ‘technical ecosys-
tems’ of digitalized goods production can be established 
(Moreno and Charnley, 2016). Research should also be 
carried out into ways of using ICT (e.g. IoT) to improve 
links between production-, product- and use-related 
data within cross-company value-added systems, and 
to evaluate them using AI in order to identify new 
Box 10 .3-2
Arenas of digital change 
Further research recommendations are made on various top-
ics in the arenas of digital change (Chapter 5). Here is an over-
view of the topics with the corresponding references to make 
them easier to find.
 > Sustainable Industry 4.0 and the circular economy – how 
digitalization is changig industrial metabolism (Section 
5.2.1)
 > New forms of digital economy: approaches to sustainable 
economic activity in the Digital Age (Section 5.2.2)
 > Digitalization of consumption and sustainable consu-
mer behaviour: promotion of solidarity-based lifestyles 
( Section 5.2.3)
 > Sustainability in online commerce: status quo and  prospects 
(Section 5.2.4)
 > Digitalization: from the electronic waste problem to a 
 solution for the circular economy? (Section 5.2.5)
 > Digitalization for climate-change mitigation and the energy 
transformation (Section 5.2.6)
 > ‘Smart city’: sustainable urban development with digitali-
zation? (Section 5.2.7).
 > Sustainable urban mobility in the Digital Age (Section 
5.2.8)
 > Precision agriculture: the next step towards industrialized 
agriculture? (Section 5.2.9).
 > Digitalization in agriculture in developing countries 
( Section 5.2.10)
 > Digitally enhanced monitoring of ecosystems and biodiver-
sity (Section 5.2.11)
 > Digitalization as an opportunity to promote a collective glo-
bal awareness of sustainable development (Section 5.3.1)
 > Digitalization and public discourse: the end of rational argu-
mentation or the chance of a global agora? (Section 5.3.2).
 > Challenges of the scoring society (Section 5.3.3)
 > From education for digitalization and sustainable develop-
ment to future-proof education (Section 5.3.4)
 > Public-service ICT as part of basic public services (Section 
5.3.5)
 > Digital technology as a gender bender? (Section 5.3.6).
 > Digital self-tracking: between empowerment and loss of 
control (Section 5.3.7)
 > International division of labour and digitalization: conse-
quences for developing countries and emerging economies 
(Section 5.3.8)
 > Sustainable working environments of the future (Section 
5.3.9)
 > Digital commons (Section 5.3.10)
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potential in a circular economy for a comprehensive 
tracking and monitoring system of resource flows – and 
to market these via digital platforms. More specific rec-
ommendations on the influence of digitalization on 
industrial metabolism can be found in  Section 5.2.1. 
10.3.1.4 
Research on digitalization for global food security 
and nature conservation 
Research and development on the digitalization of agri-
culture should be oriented towards the goal of globally 
sustainable land use. Germany’s Federal Government 
should launch a research programme on sustainability, 
resource conservation and diversity in agriculture (e.g. 
crop rotations, biodiversity) using digital solutions. In 
particular, the focus should be on the potential benefits 
and risks of a digitalized industrial agriculture, a decid-
edly sustainable precision agriculture, and the frame-
work conditions and incentives that this requires 
( Section 5.2.9). 
In the context of developing countries and emerging 
economies, the potential for efficiency gains in small-
holder agriculture should be explored through improved 
access to information and knowledge and the removal 
of barriers to the adoption of digital innovations at the 
level of smallholder and medium-sized farms 
( Section 5.2.10). 
Given the rapid pace of technological development, 
the medium- to long-term potential benefits and risks 
of digitally supported nature conservation have not yet 
been sufficiently researched ( Section 5.2.11). The 
focus should be on contributions to global and compre-
hensive biodiversity monitoring (e.g. remote sensing, 
tracking, image recognition and analysis, data manage-
ment) and on digital support for practical nature con-
servation (e.g. inventories of endangered ecosystems 
and species, combating poaching). 
10.3.1.5 
Use digitalization for sustainable urban 
 development 
In its last flagship report (WBGU, 2016a: 423ff.), the 
WBGU presented comprehensive research proposals on 
sustainable urbanization and referred to technological 
transformation processes (WBGU, 2016a: 48ff., 368, 
373). Urban areas have become the central organiza-
tional form for almost all human societies, and each is 
seeking ‘its own way’ towards a sustainable future. In 
order to integrate digital solutions and use digital mod-
elling, simulation and prognosis for urban sustainabil-
ity, funding should be provided for empirical (case) 
studies and real-world laboratories that look critically 
and constructively at the economic, social and ecologi-
cal implications of digital smart-city and smart-commu-
nity approaches and study them empirically and in 
detail on location. In the same way, international com-
parative studies on significant differences in motiva-
tion, measure portfolios, actor structures and imple-
mentation dynamics of smart-city approaches in differ-
ent countries or regions should be conducted to advance 
international learning processes on sustainability issues 
in urban strategy and project development. There 
should be a special focus on the contribution of differ-
ent ICT applications (e.g. for mobility, housing, work, 
security, environmental monitoring) to achieving envi-
ronmental objectives and on their acceptance, the aim 
being to assess their potential for use and dissemination 
across different population strata. For only if the new 
digital possibilities are used widely can significant dig-
italization-related environmental effects be achieved 
(e.g. savings in energy and water requirements, more 
efficient use of many other material resources, emis-
sions reductions). The development of technology is 
currently taking place mainly in industrialized coun-
tries; however, just under 90% of urban population 
growth up to 2050 is expected to take place in Asia and 
Africa (UN DESA, 2015). Therefore, digital technolo-
gies for urban development should be studied against 
the background of different contextual situations and 
cultural areas. In this way, best practices can be identi-
fied and sustainable solutions implemented. More spe-
cific recommendations for action on sustainable urban 
development through digitalization can be found in 
 Section 5.2.7.
10.3.1.6 
New development models for developing 
 countries and emerging economies
There is a need for research into the question of which 
new development models might arise for developing 
countries and emerging economies in the course of dig-
italization. Digital technologies can, for example, help 
overcome institutional problems in developing coun-
tries and emerging economies or open up access to mar-
kets and necessary services (e.g. financing). In this con-
text, research needs to be done to determine which 
instruments of innovation and economic promotion can 
be used to establish or secure the inclusion of these 
countries in the digital economy. Initially, the condi-
tions should be studied under which developing coun-
tries and emerging economies can exploit this new 
development potential for themselves. It would also be 
necessary to analyse what development cooperation 
can achieve in terms of possible new development 
models and opportunities. Similarly, the effects of digi-
talization on trade structures and the division of labour, 
and thus, in a broader sense, on a fundamental devel-
opment model of recent years, are not clearly foresee-
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able to date. Studies have hitherto been limited to the 
presentation of individual cases. There is therefore 
already a considerable need for research on the funda-
mental question of the future and future design of 
global value chains and the international division of 
labour. Moreover, further recommendations for action, 
also for future development cooperation, would also 
require a deeper understanding of the factors that 
determine whether and when work steps are automated 
and, for example, relocated back to industrialized coun-
tries ( Section 5.3.8). At the same time, digitalization 
enables a more intensive exchange of research results 
and processed experience (Pawelke et al., 2017: 11), 
which, in the WBGU’s view, should be promoted par-
ticularly to make digitalization sustainable in develop-
ing countries and emerging economies and to encour-
age specific innovation in local contexts.
10 .3 .2 
Research for digitalized sustainability societies 
The overarching line of research entitled ‘Digitalized 
Sustainability Societies’ should deal with the question 
of how societies can interpret the system-changing 
impact of digitalization on the Earth system, society, 
economy, human beings and technology, make it sus-
tainable and counter any emergences that occur.
10.3.2.1 
Work in the future: develop new forms of inclusion 
At present, it is mainly gainful employment that 
ensures broad societal and economic inclusion: at the 
same time, it is of key importance to many people’s 
self-esteem. The partial substitution of manual and 
intellectual gainful employment by intelligent machines 
thus touches on very profound aspects of societal cohe-
sion and personal life. It raises questions about further 
developed forms of work, for example a shift in empha-
sis to social work, but also about possible alternative 
life goals, styles and designs. Up to now, not enough 
ideas have been developed on alternative and simulta-
neously incentive-compatible mechanisms of distribut-
ing work, income and prosperity that offer suitable 
incentives for participation in society and the economy 
as well as for (further) education, research and devel-
opment; the broader societal implications of such 
mechanisms have not been examined either. Further-
more, there is the question of the political consequences 
of a societal change caused by a further developed 
understanding of work; e.g. what might be the conse-
quences of ensuring economic inclusion via broad 
redistribution mechanisms for the stability and func-
tioning of democratic political systems? The specific 
challenges in developing countries and emerging econ-
omies, and changes in the international division of 
labour, should be described in more detail and taken 
into account when studying these questions. More spe-
cific recommendations on the field of digitalization and 
work can be found in Sections 5.3.8 and 5.3.9.
10.3.2.2 
Develop financing concepts for the state and social 
systems
Today, the financing of state systems is still predomi-
nantly based on the taxation of the (hitherto primarily 
immobile) factor labour. The social security systems in 
many countries are also institutionally coupled to gain-
ful employment. Existing tax and contribution systems 
must be fundamentally reviewed, both with a view to 
the future efficiency and financial room for manoeuvre 
of the state and social security systems, and with a view 
to possible distortions of the price of labour compared 
to production factors such as (financial) capital or data. 
At the same time, there is a considerable need for 
research into how alternative systems of taxation can 
be designed that preserve the state’s financial leeway 
for action if, in the course of digitalization, value crea-
tion shifts further to intangible assets such as data, 
human labour becomes more easily substitutable and 
even more mobile, or if, in the extreme scenario, human 
labour is completely performed by machines 
( Section 5.3.9).
10.3.2.3 
Research on the design of human-machine 
 interactions 
The WBGU recommends early and comprehensive 
research into the possible effects of interaction with 
(partially) autonomous technical systems. Possible 
research questions are as follows: How must such sys-
tems be designed to support desirable interaction and 
what possible negative implications need to be consid-
ered? Living together with autonomous systems raises 
diverse questions about the effect of interaction with 
such systems: what forms of interaction are desirable? 
How must systems be designed to promote appropriate 
and safe interactions and prevent dysfunctional inter-
actions? Which groups need to be differentiated (e.g. 
children or mentally handicapped persons)? Social 
sciences, especially psychological research, must be 
integrated into socio-technical developments at an 
early stage.
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10.3.2.4 
Technical and experimental impact assessment for 
dealing with major uncertainties
Due to the dynamics of digital transformation pro-
cesses, dealing with uncertainties, for example unex-
pected or unintended side effects (or ‘unseens’), poses 
a particular challenge. The WBGU recommends testing 
innovations and (new) regulatory instruments in real-
world laboratories in a temporary, spatially delimited, 
legally adapted (experimental clauses, special permits, 
etc.) and well-secured field with open-ended results 
(Box 10.3.2-1). 
In addition to real-world laboratories, further exper-
imental spaces should be strengthened (e.g. governance 
barcamps), which are explicitly focused on considering 
possible consequences. The development of capacities 
for IT-oriented governance research and IT-supported 
governance formats is of great importance here. 
10.3.2.5 
Research on sustainable handling of data
The effects of the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (EU-GDPR) in practice should be empiri-
cally tested and proposals for further development 
elaborated. For example, there should be research on 
how data-access regimes or a data-sharing obligation 
might be designed in detail. The technical, procedural 
and regulatory requirements for protecting personal 
data must be taken into account here, also with a view 
to the risk of the future ‘de-anonymization’ of cur-
rently non-personal data. What form should monitor-
ing by corresponding supervisory authorities for digital 
products and services take, e.g. with regard to the 
enforcement of data obligations, data protection, 
data-security standards or possible discrimination 
against users? There should be studies on how to iden-
tify, measure and trace the added value of data availa-
bility and the availability of certain digital products and 
services for society and the public. Research should 
also be conducted into how public, data-based goods 
( Section 5.3.10) can be made available in sufficient 
quality and quantity.
10.3.2.6 
Research on social platforms
New developments in social platforms should be con-
tinuously accompanied by research, e.g. with a view to 
how group dynamics, self-representation or the sharing 
of personal information (e.g. fitness and exercise data 
on fitness platforms, opinions or similar private infor-
Box 10 .3 .2-1
Real-world laboratories
There are no universally valid blueprints for making global 
digital transformation sustainable in the diverse areas of life. 
In view of the many unpredictable and rapid technological 
developments, this creative process remains a search and 
learning process involving many uncertainties. The special 
challenges of digital change are, on the one hand, that it af-
fects societies in a complex way, so that foreseeable effects 
take place beyond established forecasting areas. On the other 
hand, it is necessary to shape and regulate before all the ef-
fects are foreseeable. In these real-world conditions, it is im-
portant that Europe’s digital innovative capacity is geared 
towards the SDGs. In view of these challenges, the WBGU 
recommends that the EU set up ‘European labs for a sustain-
able and digital future’. In real-world labs, scientists and ac-
tors can experiment and try things out to jointly generate 
knowledge and work out problem solutions on how best to 
make the digital transformation sustainable. Real-world labs 
make it possible to experiment with innovations within a pro-
tected framework and, at the same time, gain more compre-
hensive knowledge faster. 
Real-world labs (also known as ‘living labs’ or ‘citizen sci-
ence projects’) are currently being carried out in several Eu-
ropean countries; some of them are transnational (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2018). Real-world labs have not yet become es-
tablished at the EU level, although they offer significant op-
portunities for further developing a European vision, 
strengthening European innovation, and improving quality of 
life for European citizens. In the research context, European 
real-world labs could be linked to the activities of the Euro-
pean Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) within the 
framework of Innovation Communities (such as ‘EIT Cli-
mate-KIC’). In addition to further developing the EIT’s exist-
ing transdisciplinary innovation and research approaches into 
holistic European real-world labs, the WBGU also recom-
mends setting up such laboratories on new topics, such as the 
sustainable future of work.
Real-world lab on the ‘Sustainable Future of Work’
Labour markets are an important guarantor of social inclu-
sion. Especially younger population groups and migrants are 
increasingly affected by new employment and work realities, 
such as new work, platform-based employment contracts, 
and the blurring of working hours and work location in gain-
ful employment. This opens up both opportunities and risks 
for a person’s quality of life, for social cohesion, and for the 
orientation towards a future-proof concept of sustainable 
work ( Section 5.3.9). A European real-world lab on the ‘Sus-
tainable Future of Work’ could experiment with new forms of 
social security (e.g. ecological transformation income; Swa-
ton, 2018) and organization under labour law that also take 
into account the special challenges of transnational working 
and living environments in the EU. The real-world lab would 
thus also play a pioneering role in the ongoing expansion of 
the EU’s social pillar. At this interface of sustainability and 
digitalization challenges, it is necessary to pool the energies 
of science, business, university and college education, and 
civil society in order to test new future models.
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mation) can affect people’s well-being, quality of life 
and social interactions ( Section 5.3.7). In addition, 
there should be research on which quality criteria are to 
be applied to social platforms, their services and appli-
cations, and how these are to be communicated, 
checked and improved. Both here and in general, tar-
geted education (Sections 5.3.4, 9.1.4) and corres-
ponding educational research are needed to enable 
people to deal competently and responsibly with new 
technologies and the high dynamics of (technical) pro-
gress. The possible impacts of social platforms on sus-
tainable and environmentally conscious behaviour 
should also be explored in greater depth ( Section 5.2.3).
10.3.2.7 
Educational research on empowering the 
 individual in a digitalized sustainability society
In order to teach transformation knowledge and action, 
the WBGU recommends investigating how (digitalized) 
educational measures can promote knowledge and 
action for the Great Transformation (WBGU, 2011), 
ideally through an institute for educational research on 
and in the sustainable Digital Age. This would focus in 
particular on research to promote creativity, coopera-
tion and innovation as well as environmental aware-
ness and futures literacy. Transformative education 
needs to be strengthened to constantly expand the 
ability to reflect. Parallel to this, further spaces for 
reflection could be created within the framework of 
collaborations with existing institutions, for example in 
the fields of science fiction, art, culture and the integra-
tion of forms of knowledge. Furthermore, research is 
needed to enable the inclusion of disadvantaged groups 
with the aim of investigating and evaluating which 
 digitalized educational opportunities also make it pos-
sible to include disadvantaged groups (particularly with 
regard to gender, age, origin) and how knowledge 
acquisition can be digitally promoted. Support should 
also be given to studies that address the impact of dig-
itally mediated content on learners’ skills. This is very 
likely to require a shift in the focus of education policy. 
Abilities must be strengthened that empower people to 
lead a self-determined, meaningful life without today’s 
labour-market structures. These skills include social-in-
teraction skills, empathy, creativity, keen perception 
and an ability to adapt quickly (in the sense of a 
well-developed ability to react to unexpected events, 
etc.), but not so much the ability to teach detailed 
knowledge. More specific recommendations on educa-
tion in the Digital Age can be found in  Section 5.3.4.
10 .3 .3 
Research on the future of Homo sapiens 
A superordinate line of research entitled ‘Research on 
the future of humankind and the preservation of 
human dignity’ should deal with the question of where 
the limits of old and new ideas on what it means to be 
human lie, in view of the interdependence of humans 
and technology and the design of machines with (ini-
tially supposed) human characteristics. As a general 
rule, individuals or groups who wish to evade digital 
developments should also be taken into account in all 
future developments; this also applies explicitly with 
regard to research ethics.
10.3.3.1 
Digital anthropology: how is the idea of what it 
means to be human changing?
In the Digital Age, being human is itself becoming a 
topic of sustainable development. The physical and 
social fusion of humans with digital technology on the 
one hand, and the humanization of technology on the 
other, raise the question of the conditio humana in a 
new and controversial way. In philosophical thinking 
beyond anthropocentric humanism with the human 
being at the centre, it therefore needs to be continu-
ously analysed in the future how the concept of what it 
means to be human develops dynamically in relation to 
the environment and increasing technical possibilities 
(Coeckelbergh, 2013b, 2017), in order to be embedded 
into the real world or into its ‘natural’ body. The WBGU 
strongly recommends that human dignity (Chapter 2) 
be placed at the centre of corresponding anthropologi-
cal and ethical debates and enshrined in responsible 
research and development. 
10.3.3.2 
Research the effects of digitalization on cognition, 
emotion and social life
Since digitalization, and in particular the many forms of 
interaction between humans and machines, will con-
tinue to influence key aspects of life such as cognition, 
emotion and social life in the future, it is necessary to 
conduct and provide targeted funding for interdiscipli-
nary research into these aspects (SVRV, 2017: 17ff.). 
Behavioural changes at the psychological and social 
levels must be systematically investigated in this con-
text. In the WBGU’s view, this should also be explicitly 
done in a positive sense for sustainable purposes, such 
as promoting a ‘global awareness for sustainable devel-
opment’ ( Section 5.3.1). Other relevant issues include 
the effects of multitasking (especially in children) on 
cognition (i.e. processes of attention, remembering, 
thinking, problem solving and creativity), the influence 
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of digital media use (e.g. social networks) on the sense 
of social belonging and emotion management, and the 
effects of workplace surveillance and health and safety 
in times of the technologization of human beings.
10.3.3.3 
Exploring the future of human civilization 
In the course of increasing international networking, 
the WBGU recommends using an interdisciplinary 
approach in order to research emerging risks to human 
civilization. In general, in view of the dual-use charac-
ter of technologies such as AI and robotics, responsible 
innovation, research on ethics, technology-impact 
assessment and proactive technological change must be 
expanded internationally in line with the precautionary 
principle. To this end, new international cooperation 
formats should be researched, also taking into account 
limits of development that will become necessary in the 
future. 
Timely implementation of the recommendations for 
action and research will make it possible to exploit the 
potential of digital change for the Great Transformation 
towards Sustainability and to contain its risks. This 
WBGU report is intended as an stimulus for long-
awaited discussions and initiatives on all levels and 
with all actor groups.
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Additive manufacturing / 3D printing
refers to various processes in which the desired compo-
nent is successively constructed on the basis of a digi-
tal 3D model by the targeted layer-by-layer application 
of the raw material (Caviezel et al., 2017:  9). The term 
‘3D printing’ is also commonly used since the manufac-
turing process has some similarities with 2D printing 
(Bourell, 2016:  2). → Section 3.3.5.4
Anthropocene
means the ‘age of man’ and is partly derived from the 
concept of geological ages like the Palaeocene or the 
Holocene. The term was coined in 2000 by Nobel Prize 
laureate Paul Crutzen together with Eugene Stoermer 
and refers to a geological era in which the effects of 
human activities on the environment have reached a 
global dimension. This leads to – in some cases consi-
derable – changes in ecosystems, even to the extent of 
their destruction. Further important changes caused by 
humans include climate change and ozone-layer deple-
tion in the Antarctic. → Chapter 2
Actuators
are electrotechnical assembly units that convert IT sig-
nals into changes in physical quantities, e.g. by means 
of mechanical movements. In this way, they acti-
vely influence their surroundings and control objects 
( Hoepner et al., 2016:  10). 
Algorithm
In general a sequence of instructions for solving a given 
problem (or, to be more precise, class of problems). 
Algorithms are always explicitly and well defined, alt-
hough the respective manifestation of the sequence 
of instructions in a specific application along concrete 
data and calculations cannot always be traced. Mat-
hematically, an algorithm corresponds to a calculable 
function; in terms of information technology, an algo-
rithm is a deterministic set of instructions for a compu-
tation. → Section 3.2.3
Artificial intelligence (AI)
refers to “a discipline within computer science that 
deals with the development of software systems which 
provide functions whose execution requires what is 
typically referred to as intelligence” (Burgard, 2018). 
As in the case of ‘intelligence’, there is still no uniform 
definition of artificial intelligence (AI); it is understood 
in many different ways. Basically, intelligent systems 
are characterized by the ability to solve problems (to 
some extent) autonomously and efficiently (Mainzer, 
2016:  2). → Section 3.3.3 
Autonomy
describes a → core characteristic of the → Digital Age, 
according to which technical systems independently 
make decisions and control and optimize complex pro-
cesses. They can help make better-informed economic, 
political and social decisions, but also lead to a loss of 
societal control or an abuse of power – or undermine 
privacy and freedom. → Section 3.4.3
Big data
is a generic term for developments of methods, tech-
nologies and solutions for collecting, preparing, storing 
and analysing large quantities of structured or unstruc-
tured data. In this way, large-volume, heterogeneous, 
volatile, even not clearly defined quantities of data can 
be processed in an ever shorter period of time. As a 
complex socio-technical phenomenon, big data forms 
the basis for using exponentially increasing volumes of 
data along the digitalization process to generate added 
value. →  Section 3.3.2
Big Five
refers to the five dominant digital corporations Goo-
gle/Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Micro-
soft (also known as GAFAM), which are among the 
five most valuable corporations in the world in terms of 
market value (Barwise and Watkins, 2018:  21). 
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Blockchain / Distributed-ledger technology
These terms refer to methods in which an expanda-
ble list of data sets (the ‘blocks’) are concatenated (the 
‘chain’) using cryptographic methods. The more gene-
ral distributed-ledger technologies (‘distributed regis-
ters’) are regarded as an innovation with far-reaching 
societal and technological changes (Schlatt et al., 2016) 
for cryptocurrencies, cadastres, health data, elections. 
→ Section 3.3.5.5 
Core characteristics of the Digital Age
identify the five essential characteristics of → digita-
lization in the civilizational context and make it possi-
ble to understand development trends and the direc-
tion of digital change. They comprise (1) → intercon-
nectedness, (2) → cognition, (3) → autonomy, (4) 
→ virtuality and (5) the → knowledge explosion. The 
WBGU has furthermore analysed the technologization 
of human beings (→ Figure 3.4-1), but has not (yet) 
named it as a core characteristic in terms of its effect 
and breadth. → Chapter 3.4
Cognition
refers to a → core characteristic of the → Digital Age 
according to which technical systems can perceive, 
learn, analyse, evaluate and act → autonomously using 
the methods of the → Internet of Things, → big data 
and → artificial intelligence. Such systems will funda-
mentally change our human self-image, the economy, 
labour markets, learning processes, our knowledge, 
our interaction with technology, society and nature. 
→ Section 3.4.2
Circular economy
refers to an alternative to the dominant ‘linear’ 
value-added chain in which raw materials are extracted 
by mining, processed into products and, at the end of 
their useful lives, either incinerated or dumped in land-
fills as waste (EMF, 2014). The ‘3Rs strategy’ (reduce, 
reuse, recycle) called for by the UN, among others, is 
regarded as one of the guiding principles of the circular 
economy. → Section 5.2.5 
Cybersecurity
Also known as information security, cybersecurity 
refers to the entire field of security in information and 
communication technology and describes the aim of 
reducing the risks from the use of ICT caused by thre-
ats and vulnerabilities to an acceptable level by taking 
appropriate security measures (BSI, 2019a). By contrast 
to safety (functional security), cybersecurity refers to 
the protection of the internal values of a system, i.e. 
internal protection, which can also cause immaterial 
damage externally in the event of misuse, for example 
when a → person’s privacy is violated. → Section 3.3.4
Data protection 
refers to measures to protect natural persons from vio-
lations of their rights of personality and comprises 
measures to protect against abusive data processing 
and handling, to protect people’s right to informatio-
nal self-determination, to protect their privacy in data 
processing and handling, or to ensure self-determina-
tion over personal data. → Section 3.3.4 
Data security
Part of → cybersecurity relating to measures to pro-
tect technical systems, particularly to protect data from 
loss, destruction or manipulation by unauthorized per-
sons; in the case of personal data it thus also relates to 
→ data protection. Data security is challenged by vul-
nerabilities in software and by malware, identity theft 
and targeted complex sociotechnical attacks (Rescorla, 
2005). → Section 3.3.4 
Decarbonization
describes the transition process from high-carbon 
energy sources (coal) to less carbon-intensive (oil and 
natural gas) and increasingly to CO2-emissions-free 
energy sources (solar, wind and hydroelectric power). 
→ Section 5.2.6
Digital commons
are all digitized data assets, information assets and 
knowledge assets which, as non-rival resources, should 
be made as broadly, i.e. publicly, accessible as possible 
in the common interest, → following the idea of com-
mons in general. → Section 5.3.10
Digital divide
refers to the spatial and social-group-specific differen-
ces in access to digital services and the (broadband) 
internet, as well as corresponding differences in skills 
for dealing with ICT. → Section 5.3.5
Digitalization
The WBGU has a broad understanding of digitaliza-
tion as the development and application of digital and 
digitalized technologies that dovetail with and aug-
ment all other civilizational technologies and methods. 
→ Chapter 3.1
Digitization





is a term used to describe the new social order that, 
since the introduction of electronic data processing in 
the 1950s, has emerged with new groups of actors and 
a more flexible and globalized → polycentric architec-
ture of responsibility. → Chapter 4
Distributed-ledger technology
→ Blockchain
Dynamics of the Digital Age
clarify the option spaces and areas where action is nee-
ded in the context of → digitalization and the → Great 
Transformation towards Sustainability: (1) ‘digitaliza-
tion for sustainability’, in which sustainability can be 
digitally supported, and/or ecological and societal dis-
ruptions can arise, (2) ‘sustainable digitalized socie-
ties’, which require a new humanism and are intended 
to prevent digitally empowered totalitarianism, (3) ‘the 
future of Homo sapiens’, which is about strengthening 
the self-confidence of Homo sapiens in the conflict over 
the borderlines between humans and machines. These 
three Dynamics are already emerging in parallel today, 
albeit at different levels of intensity; there is no strict 
chronological sequence. → Chapter 7
Global (environmental) awareness
refers, according to the WBGU, to → digitized know-
ledge and a global, individual awareness of actions for 
preserving the Earth system and the development of 
→ solidarity-based lifestyles. → Section 5.3.1
Governance
refers to regulatory and control structures at various 
levels that are established by state actors, non-state 
actors, or jointly by both actor groups. The concept was 
developed originally to make a distinction from the term 
‘government’. It expresses the idea that political control 
is exerted not only hierarchically by the state, but also 
by civil-society actors such as non-governmental orga-
nizations and private companies. → Chapter 8
Great Transformation towards Sustainability
is a comprehensive change towards sustainability that 
takes the → planetary guard rails into account; it invol-
ves a restructuring of national economies and the glo-
bal economy within these guard rails in order to avoid 
irreversible damage to the Earth system and ecosystems 
and the impacts this would have on humanity (WBGU, 
2011).
Interconnectedness
refers to a → core characteristic of the → Digital Age, 
according to which technical systems, as well as peo-
ple, things, processes and organizations are networked 
omnipresently on different levels of action. This creates 
qualitatively novel, border-crossing economic, social, 
cultural, institutional and political networking structu-
res with interdependent infrastructures and processes. 
→ Section 3.4
Internet
is a worldwide network of information and communi-
cation networks and computers that enables the use of 
services such as WWW (hypertext documents), email 
(electronic mail) or messaging using a wide variety 
of mobile devices. Data are exchanged via standard-
ized internet protocol stacks; for example, versions 
4 and 6 of the internet protocol (IPv4, IPv6) are cen-
tral. →  Section 3.3.1
Internet of Things – IoT
refers to the increasing interconnectedness and thus 
fusion of digital and physical infrastructures (Horvath, 
2012: 1). From a technological point of view, the IoT 
refers to objects or things of any kind that are given 
a distinct identity by means of physical identity carri-
ers such as barcodes, QR codes, RFID or smartcards and 
which can be networked with the internet or with each 
other via communication technologies such as → Blue-
tooth, near-field communication or mobile telephony 
(Fraunhofer FOKUS, 2016:  4). → Section 3.3.1
Interoperability
describes the ability of different ICT-based systems to 
communicate and collaborate with each other. Ensuring 
interoperability is particularly important in telecommu-
nications and the digital platforms based on them, as 
well as in the → Internet of Things (Schieferdecker et 
al., 2018).
IT platform
From a technical point of view, this refers in the broa-
der sense to software that serves as the basis for the 
development of applications; in a narrower sense it 
refers to the technical basis for the development, mar-
keting and implementation of smart services via online 
marketplaces and digital ecosystems (Engels et al., 
2017). The WBGU speaks more generally of ICT plat-
forms that also include communication and → inter-
connectedness. 
Knowledge explosion
refers to a → core characteristic of the → Digital Age, 
according to which digital methods modernize all kinds 
of quantitative and qualitative research and offer new 
approaches for understanding and shaping our natu-
ral and societal realities by means of data acquisition 
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and processing, modelling, simulation and visualiza-
tion. It is also the basis for a global exchange and an 
awareness of the → global (environmental) awareness. 
→  Section 3.4
Machine learning
refers to “procedures in which computer algorithms 
learn from data – e.g. to recognize patterns or show 
desired modes of behaviour – without each individual 
case having been explicitly programmed” ( Burchardt, 
2018:  13). The basis for this is large amounts of already 
categorized training data; their quality and design can 
distort the result. For example, “certain cultural influen-
ces or prejudices on the part of the developers [...] can 
be reflected in the training data” (Welzel and Grosch, 
2018:  4). → Sections 3.3.3, 3.2.4
Monitoring
refers to the systematic observation (called surveillance 
in Earth observation) of objects, processes or environ-
ments, for example to record their properties, behavi-
our or compliance with threshold values. It can collect 
data to gain knowledge or form the basis of control pro-
cesses. → Sections 3.3.5.1, 5.2.11
Normative compass
identifies the central dimensions to be taken into 
account in the → Great Transformation towards Sus-
tainability (1) ‘sustaining natural life-support systems’: 
complying with planetary guard rails and avoiding or 
solving local environmental problems, (2) ‘inclusion’: 
ensuring universal minimum standards for substan-
tive, political and economic participation, (3) ‘ Eigenart’: 
recognizing the value of diversity as a resource for suc-
cessful transformation and as a condition for well-being 
and quality of life (WBGU, 2016a). Up to now, human 
dignity has been the WBGU’s implicit normative start-
ing point. It cannot be realized without the three com-
pass dimensions; however, it is being increasingly chal-
lenged in the Digital Age. For this reason, the WBGU 
explicitly names the inviolability of, respect for and 
protection of dignity as guidance in the spirit of the 
Transformation towards Sustainability. → Chapter 2
Open data
refer to data that are made available for free use for 
the common good without any restrictions, including 
further distribution and sharing (Schieferdecker et al., 
2018). → Section 10.1.1
Open source
refers to software whose source code is disclosed and 
freely accessible. Depending on the terms of use, 
the software can be freely used or modified by users 
(Schieferdecker et al., 2018). → Section 10.1.1
Path dependency
refers to situations in which an ongoing development 
is determined by historical developments or decisi-
ons and thus follows a path whose structure becomes 
increasingly rigid over time (lock-in effect). For exam-
ple, the fact that one technology and not another beco-
mes dominant is not necessarily due to its superiority, 
but may be the result of historical coincidences and a 
self-reinforcing process.
Planetary guard rails
are quantitatively defined damage thresholds whose 
transgression would have intolerable or even catastrop-
hic consequences. They are scientifically deduced, but 
always contain an evaluating component. One exam-
ple is the climate-protection guard rail, which means 
that an increase in the global mean temperature by 
more than 2°C above the pre-industrial level should be 
prevented. Sustainable development pathways do not 
transgress these guard rails. The approach is based on 
the realization that it is hardly possible to define a desi-
rable, sustainable future in terms of a state to be achie-
ved. It is, however, possible to agree on the definition 
of an area that is recognized as unacceptable, and which 
society wishes to avoid. Compliance with the guard rails 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for sustaina-
bility (WBGU, 2007:  16, 2009:  14). → Section 2.2.1.1
Polycentric responsibility architecture
also called polycentric → governance, characterizes 
governance systems in which vertical and horizontal 
governance structures are interlinked across different 
levels. Thus, responsibility does not emanate from one 
location only, but is distributed across different actors 
and institutions at the various levels of governance 
(WBGU, 2016a:  381ff.). → Chapter 4
Precision agriculture / Precision farming
is a form of agriculture in which, in field crop produc-
tion, fertilizers, pesticides and water are applied pre-
cisely according to the needs of the plants and soil 
quality using digital systems (Gebbers and Adam-
chuk, 2010). The means used for this purpose include 
→  sensor technology (e.g. devices for measuring soil 
moisture and nutrients), → monitoring (e.g. digital col-
lection and evaluation of meteorological data, use of 
drones for image recognition), satellite-supported posi-
tion determination (e.g. digital maps of areas), and 
→ actuator technology (e.g. for dosing fertilizers) for 
the intelligent control of agricultural machinery ( Walter 




refers to the right of individuals, groups or instituti-
ons to decide when, how and to what extent informa-
tion about them is passed on to others (Westin, 1970).
Private life
refers in the legal sense, pursuant to Article 7 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, to “the identity and 
development of the person, as well as to the right to 
establish and maintain relationships with other per-
sons and the outside world” (Sydow, 2018). The pro-
tection of → privacy is legally addressed with the con-
cept of protecting a person’s private life and has the 
task of guaranteeing the narrower personal sphere of 
life and preserving its basic conditions, which cannot 
be fully covered by the traditional guarantees of free-
dom (BVerfG, 1969; BVerfG, 1973). → Section 8.3.1
Prosumers
A word uniting the terms producer and consumer, com-
bining the two market roles in one person. The term 
was coined on social platforms where users both pro-
vide their own information and consume it. It can also 
be found in private households that generate their own 
renewable energy (e.g. with a photovoltaic system) and 
consume this electricity themselves as well as feed it 
into the grid – and consume electricity from the utili-
ties as soon as their own supply runs out.
Public-service ICT
refers (according to the WBGU’s understanding) to 
information and communication technologies that are 
of key importance to society as a whole and where the 
state has a special responsibility for their realization. It 
includes a public-service part of the → internet, inclu-
ding social platforms, via which public data, informa-
tion, knowledge, and educational and citizens’ services 
are accessible and subject to key principles such as net 
neutrality (which is increasingly under threat), inclusi-
vity and accessibility. → Section 5.3.5
Quantum computing
aims to develop quantum computers (Aharonov, 1999; 
Feynman, 1986) which, unlike conventional compu-
ters, are based on a “completely new way of calcula-
ting: [...] while in a classical computer a bit is set to 
either 0 or 1, a quantum bit (qubit) can assume both 
values simultaneously, i.e. it can be in two states at the 
same time” (Homeister, 2015: 1f.). A qubit is a two-
state quantum system which can, in principle, assume 
an infinite number of states, but two of which can be 
reliably distinguished by measurement. On this basis, 
there is a great speed advantage in certain problem 
areas compared to classical computers, which could, for 
example, allow complex climate models to be calculated 
more efficiently. For the time being, however, classical 
computers could not be replaced in the vast majority of 
applications, but only in specifically calculation-inten-
sive areas. → Section 3.2.6
Resilience
refers in the technical sense to the ability of systems 
to deal with, prevent, protect themselves from, cope 
with and adapt to adverse events, i.e. human or tech-
nical disasters (e.g. terrorist attacks, major indust-
rial accidents) or natural disasters (e.g. extreme weat-
her events, earthquakes, volcano eruptions; Scharte et 
al., 2014: 121f.) and thus their ability to work towards 
“minimizing potential or existing damage to the physi-
cal and material well-being of the population” (Scharte 
et al., 2014: 54). → Section 3.3.4
Robotics 
“deals with the design, creation, control, production and 
operation of robots, e.g. industrial or service robots. In 
the case of human-like robots, it is also a question of 
the production of limbs and skin, facial expressions and 
gestures, as well as natural language abilities” (Bendel, 
2016:  191f.). The aim is to “promote the development 
of systems that advance the automation of human acti-
vities” (Kehl and Coenen, 2016:  120). However, the 
degree of human-machine interaction often varies just 
as much as e.g. industrial robots, telerobots or drones 
differ from human-like robots. → Section 3.3.5.3
Scoring
is generally used to assign a numerical value to a natu-
ral person in his or her role as a consumer, citizen, emp-
loyee, etc. Scoring can also refer to the aggregation of 
different characteristic values to form a single value – 
often using a statistical procedure. → Section 5.3.3
Sensors
are electrotechnical units which can be used for the qua-
litative or quantitative measurement of certain physi-
cal, chemical, biological or information-technical pro-
perties and quantities (such as acceleration and force, 
heat, temperature, humidity, pressure, sound intensity, 
light intensity, and electric and magnetic fields; Gay-
etskyy et al., 2005:  2). They are “technical sensory 
organs” that make it possible to make a digital image 
of their environment (Hoepner et al., 2016:  10, 101). 
Smart grids
refers to the IT networking and control of electricity 
generators, storage facilities, consumers, infrastructure 
and equipment such as energy-transmission and distri-
bution networks for electricity supply. This enables the 
12 Glossary
454
interconnected components to be optimized (WBGU, 
2011).
Solidarity-based quality of life
is defined by the WBGU as a quality of life that is not 
only oriented towards one’s own needs and those of 
one’s immediate environment (e.g. family), but also 
takes into account the principles of intra- and interge-
nerational justice (WBGU, 2016a).
Social cohesion
refers to cohesion among members of a social structure 
and thus relates to the relationships between the group 
members. Group cohesion is measured by the attrac-
tion exerted by the group on the individual members. 
It is believed that social cohesion has an impact on soli-
darity among the group members and strengthens the 
group vis-à-vis outside influences. In the political con-
text, strengthening social cohesion is seen as a goal of 
social policy.
Sustainable development
was defined in 1987 by the Brundtland Commission as 
development that meets the needs of the present gene-
ration without compromising the ability of future gene-
rations to meet their own needs and choose their life 
style. Today, there are many definitions of sustainabi-
lity. What they all have in common is that economic, 
social and environment-friendly development must be 
advanced at the same time.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
→ 2030 Agenda 
Transformation
→ Great Transformation towards Sustainability
Transformation research  
deals with the framework conditions of the → Trans-
formation and possible ways of shaping it. It analy-
ses the underlying drivers, causal relations, processes 
and dynamics of historical and current transformations 
in order to draw conclusions from these analyses for 
future transformations. In order to understand system 
contexts and adequately take them into account, trans-
formation research needs to be inter- and transdiscipli-
nary in orientation (WBGU, 2011, 2016a).
Transformative research 
aims to develop solutions for specific problems of socie-
tal change in the form of technical and social inno-
vations and to disseminate them in society and the 
 economy. The transdisciplinary involvement of  societal 
actors and businesses in the process of generating 
knowledge increases the chances of the subsequent 
application and acceptance of the resulting innovations 
(WBGU, 2011, 2016a). 
Turing test
refers to a thought experiment by the British mathe-
matician and AI pioneer Alan Turing from 1950, in 
which a person is connected either to a real person or 
to a computer without knowing with which of the two 
they are currently interacting. If it was impossible to 
distinguish between human and machine, the compu-
ter would have passed the ‘test’. Contrary to the recep-
tion over the last decades, Turing’s intention was not to 
practically test computers for ‘intelligence’, but only, in 
the context of his time, “to gain clarity about what is 
understood by a ‘thinking machine’ and what its exis-
tence would mean” (Walsh, 2018: 69). → Section 3.3.3
Urban data
refer to all types of data that are relevant in an urban 
context, regardless of the specific data location, data 
retention, intellectual property rights or licensing regu-
lations to which these data are subject. Urban data may 
also include data beyond the immediate municipal con-
text (Schieferdecker et al., 2018). → Section 5.2.7
Virtuality
refers to a → core characteristic of the →  Digital 
Age, according to which new spaces for human socie-
ties emerge in the virtual world. In this way, the 
Earth system, ecosystems and distant cultures can 
be directly experienced, and a connection to nature 
simulated, while real nature increasingly degenerates. 
→  Section 3.4
Virtual worlds
refers to augmented realities (AR) and virtual reali-
ties (VR). AR describes an interactive environment in 
which end devices (e.g. smartphones, special glasses, 
PCs or televisions) are used to overlay virtual content 
with the correct perspective in the user’s environment, 
thus augmenting reality (Dörner et al., 2016:  33). While 
AR applications enhance reality, VR applications go one 
step further. Here, the real world is faded out and a 
completely new world is created (van Looy, 2017:  57). 
Such a virtual reality is “a world simulated by compu-
ters and its software which is conveyed to users using 
special techniques and interfaces and with which they 




refers to the action plan for people, planet, prospe-
rity, peace and partnerships adopted by all UN mem-
ber states in September 2015 (UNGA, 2015). The 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which link eco-
logical, social and economic dimensions of sustainabi-
lity, will be at the core of effective implementation up 
to 2030. The 2030 Agenda is universally valid, i.e. for 
all countries, but not legally binding. Its adoption is 
regarded as a multilateral milestone and a central point 
of reference for global efforts towards an inclusive, 
responsible and low-carbon way of life and  economy 
worldwide. → Box 2.1-1
Towards Our Common Digital Future
In the report “Towards Our Common Digital Future”, the WBGU makes it clear that 
 sustainability strategies and concepts need to be fundamentally further developed in 
the age of digitalization. Only if digital change and the Transformation towards 
 Sustainability are synchronized can we succeed in advancing climate and Earth-system 
protection and in making social progress in human development. Without formative 
 political action,  digital change will further accelerate resource and energy consumption, 
and exacerbate damage to the environment and the climate. It is therefore an urgent 
political task to create the conditions needed to place digitalization at the service of 
sustainable development.
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